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4 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Wailing Woman-kind
Ali Inan
Lahore, Pakistan
W
hile the eastern civilization wailed
over its decay near the Eastern by-
pass of Lahore, the country seethed
with rage as details surfaced of gang-rape of a
woman. The apathetic and unnecessary remarks
by the city’s police chief added fuel to the fire. In
this backdrop, the state faces yet another
challenge to provide justice to the victim. The
system, if it exists, seems obsolete and
outmoded and is guilty of victim-blaming. Even
the age-old patriarchal dogmatism has been
brought into question after this appalling
incident. It has; furthermore, exposed the
political myopia with which the nation has
suffered for decades. The nation’s response was,
in fact, symptomatic of deep seated grievances
as it mourned the incident with anguish and
fury.
Not Many rape cases are ever prosecuted in
Pakistan, and only a few successfully. Federal
Minister Fawad Chaudry said in the National
Assembly that there is an average of 5,000 rape
cases registered every year and that 5% lead to
convictions. However, it is believed the true
figure is even lower, indicating that many rape
cases are certainly not brought to the notice of
the police. Women fear embarrassment from
police officers and social judgement if they go
public. Lawyer and social activist Hina Jillani
said training was required to sensitize the police
and judiciary to crimes like rape. And to improve
forensic evidence collection and the methodol-
ogy of investigation to improve conviction rates.
The debate, in the aftermath of the tragic
incident, revolved around the severity of pun-
ishment while ignoring the bitter truth of lack of
conviction rate. There is no denying the fact that
a severe punishment does act as a deterrent in
criminological perspective; however, it does so
only if there is a higher probability of convicting
the culprits. Several attempts have been made to
introduce harsher punishments such as the
Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offense of Rape)
Act 2016. Still the scourge of rape plagues the
social fabric of society in Pakistan. Multitudes of
rape cases of several types occur every day.
These include Gang rape, Marital rape, Child
sexual abuse, Revenge rape, Rape of minorities
etc. Hence, it is imperative to introduce systemic
reforms for ensuring speedy justice for cases of
all forms of rape. Otherwise, the daybreak of
justice would remain stubbornly elusive.
The time is ripe to recognize that gender
equity and women’s inclusion play a significant
role both as a litmus test and as an active vari-
able shaping a more democratic, stabilized and
developed society. Simultaneously, we must not
fool ourselves. It is still a man’s world. An insen-
sitive patriarchal order is causing the decay of
the social fabric. A narrow dogmatic patriarchal
creed is limiting the sphere of debate as well.
Gender equality has multi-dimensional aspects
and aftereffects. As Kofi Annan, Ex- Secretary
General UNO said “Gender Equality is more
than a goal itself. It is a precondition for meet-
ing the challenge of reducing poverty, promot-
ing sustainable development and building good
governance.” Prosperity is not possible without
protection of the rights of women. Swami
Vivekanand had phrased the significance of
gender blind society emphatically. “There is no
chance for welfare of the world unless the con-
dition of women is improved. It is not possible
for a bird to fly on only one wing.”
A gender blind society is possible only
when every mother, daughter, sister and grand-
mother can breathe and walk safely, then we can
proudly and firmly proclaim ‘gender equality’. If
we fail to do so, women who are the inheritors of
the tradition of Fatima, Mary, Eve, and Yashoda
might continue to suffer. That would perhaps be
the lowest point for both the state and the
nation, and an elegy for those who failed to rec-
ognize and protect the sanctity of women.
Because while the vulnerable tantalize on roads,
then every cry of anguish is no less than a dirge
for the dead nation!
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Current edition
October 2020

4 Editorial
Wailing Woman-kind

Bangladesh Independence
Black Nationalist
8 Can Pakistan and Bangladesh Be Friends?
China and Turkey are providing the opportunity for Pakistan to sit with Bangladesh again. Islamabad must do so with sincerity and self-reflection 35 Civil Rights International
The fight against racism has always been global

Karachi Floods Transnational Policing

10 Can PTI and PPP Cooperate in Karachi?
Karachi is in ruins and the likely cooperation between the PTI and PPP is not going to change anything
40 To Protect and to Serve
Global lessons in police reform

Central Asia Policy Partition Archives

12 US Envoy Lauds Pakistan’s Role in Afghan Peace Talks Process
Washington’s peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and a U.S. delegation visiting Pakistan praised its assistance
44 Bhagat Singh’s India in Ferment
The voracious reader evolved with new knowledge and newer experiences, and grew as a fearless partisan

FATF and Pakistan Female Freedom

13 What Does the Controversial Anti-Money Laundering Bill Tell Us About Pakistani Politics?
Pakistan’s parliament rejected a major Anti-Money Laundering Bill, claiming the government had left out the opposition’s amendments
46 Reporting Rape
Every step of the way, the system is a monster

Interview Multilateralism
15 Touqir Hussain on Pakistan Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan
The Diplomat talks with Touqir Hussain on Imran Khan and his handling of Pakistan’s foreign policy thus far
47 The Crisis of a Lonely World
The world is more interconnected today than ever before and yet so atomised

Foreign Affairs Anthology Kashmir Unrest

17 The Project Twins – Which Past is Prologue?
Heeding the right warnings from history
49 Six-Track Kashmir Settlement
There are no risk-free or cost-free policy options for Pakistan on Kashmir

Brazilian Politics The Pillar of the State

22 Messiah Complex
How Brazil made Bolsonaro
51 Secrecy vs Justice
The press has every right to witness and report trial proceedings

Cino-US Politics US Trade Representative

28 An Answer to Aggression
How to push back against Beijing
52 How to Make Trade Work for Workers?
Charting a path between protectionism and globalism

Poem Border Dispute

34 Coronavirus has Incurred an Apocalyptical View 58 Asian boundaries
In 2020, neither India nor China is prepared for a compromise

6 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020

globalagemagazine.kipscss.net globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 7
Bangladesh Independence
Can Pakistan and Bangladesh
Be Friends?
China and Turkey are providing the opportunity for Pakistan to sit with Bangladesh
again. Islamabad must do so with sincerity and self-reflection
s Bangladeshi students wave Bangladesh’s national flag as they sit together after paying tribute to the soldiers, academics, writers, journalists and doctors
who were killed during the war of independence against Pakistan on this day in 1971, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Sunday, Dec. 14, 2008. The bands read:
‘December 16, victory day.’
By Kunwar Khuldune Shahid
@khuldune
B angladeshi students wave
Bangladesh’s national flag as
they sit together after paying
tribute to the soldiers, academics,
writers, journalists and doctors who
were killed during the war of
independence against Pakistan on this
day in 1971, in Dhaka, Bangladesh,
Sunday, Dec. 14, 2008. The bands read:
‘December 16, victory day.’
On August 14, Pakistan’s Independ-
ence Day, the country’s high commis-
sioner in Dhaka, Imran Ahmed Siddiqui,
lauded the role that Bengalis played in
the creation of Pakistan in 1947. That
was preceded by Pakistani foreign office
spokesperson Aisha Farooqui saying
that Islamabad was now actively work-
ing on “moving forward” with Dhaka.
Before that, the two premiers, Imran
Khan and Sheikh Hasina, held a July 22
telephone conversation.
While August is usually an annual
8 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
reminder of what binds India and Paki-
stan together, this year provided a rare
opportunity for Islamabad and Dhaka to
reminisce about their own fractured
past. This was duly felt in New Delhi as
well, with Foreign Secretary Harsh V.
Shringla rushing to meet Hasina and
Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul
Momen last week.
Pakistan’s recent overtures toward
Bangladesh have overlapped with grow-
ing disputes between New Delhi and
Dhaka, largely centering around the
growing anti-Muslim tilt of the ruling
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India. In
the recent past, differences over the
Rohingya refugee crisis, the Citizenship
Amendment Act, and the construction of
Ram Mandir in Ayodha have sparked a
diverse array of skepticism from Dhaka.
Meanwhile, where the India-
Bangladesh drift has largely remained
under the radar, Pakistan has visibly
undergone a diplomatic metamorphosis
over the past three weeks. Three senior
diplomats interviewed for this piece dis-
cussed the recent foreign policy reshuffle
in Islamabad.
Pakistan’s unprecedented, and pre-
viously unthinkable, move to call out the
inaction of Saudi Arabia and the Organi-
zation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) over
Kashmir earlier this month has firmly
placed the country in the Chinese and
Turkish camps. While Army Chief Gen-
eral Qamar JavedBajwa’s visit to Riyadh
last week was aimed at salvaging Saudi-
Pakistan military ties, Islamabad is now
openly backing Turkish and Chinese
bids for Muslim and global leaderships
respectively.
One diplomat informed The Diplo-
mat that with both China and Turkey
wholeheartedly backing Islamabad’s
Kashmir narrative, much of Pakistan’s
recent diplomatic engagement with Ban-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
gladesh has been with regard to this fast-
growing alliance.
With China more invested in Kash-
mir because of its growing rivalry with
India, and its bid to involve itself in con-
flicts as the global superpower, Dhaka’s
interest in being a part of the China-
Pakistan-Turkey nexus could also be
piqued by Beijing’s investments in Ban-
gladesh. With over $10 billion worth of
Chinese infrastructure projects already
The UAE-Israel deal
epitomizes the rapid
splintering into a new
cold war reality, with the
Gulf states firmly in the
U.S.-Saudi camp. This
opened the possibility
for South Asian Muslim
countries to back the
potential China-Turkey
bloc
there, Bangladesh is now seeking
another $6.4 billion for new projects,
and $1 billion for Teesta river manage-
ment.
“Under the Turkey-led Muslim bloc,
both Pakistan and Bangladesh can get
more prominence as compared to what
we have under the Gulf states, who have
not only failed to provide support for
Kashmir, they’ve actively enhanced their
defense and energy cooperation with
India, and even Israel,” said a senior dip-
lomat.
The UAE-Israel deal epitomizes the
rapid splintering into a new cold war
reality, with the Gulf states firmly in the
U.S.-Saudi camp. This opened the possi-
bility for South Asian Muslim countries
to back the potential China-Turkey bloc.
Thus Pakistan’s efforts to woo Bangla-
desh, backed by China and Turkey, are
rooted in global, and regional, realign-
ments more so than any bilateral efforts
to reconcile with a tumultuous past.
Therefore, while Pakistan and Ban-
gladesh might find common interests in
coexisting in the same bloc, for the two to
actually become friends requires an hon-
est discussion on what transpired in 1971
– and the events leading up to it. That
mandates Pakistan self-reflecting about
its own past, wherein it could find roots
of many of its present predicaments, and
in turn the pathway toward a progres-
sive, pluralistic future.
Much of what ails Pakistan today
can be traced to country’s mistreatment
of the Bengalis from 1947 to 1971, result-
ing in the two wings that fought together
for Partition of India separating from
one another within 24 years. That bloody
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
divide in 1971 delineated many of Paki-
stan’s paradoxes that have been rooted
in the country’s existence, but remain,
unaddressed, in the national ethos.
The 1971 war helps explain why a
majority launched a separatist move-
ment, and why despite losing an entire
wing Pakistan never had to alter its
name. It reminds us how the two epicen-
ters of the Pakistan movement, Uttar
Pradesh and Bengal – the latter where
the Muslim League was founded in 1906
– are no longer in Pakistan. It underlines
how the 1940s separatist movement that
claimed that the Muslims of the Indian
subcontinent are “one nation” has since
divided them almost equally into three
separate states.
More critically for Pakistan, its
divorce from Bangladesh unveiled the
implosive fault lines that have only deep-
ened since 1971. For instance, the mili-
tary’s dominance in Pakistan – and then
in Bangladesh – is rooted in efforts to
deny the democratic principle of “one
person one vote,” because it was feared
that it would result in the Bengali major-
ity ruling over the two wings of Pakistan.
As a result, civilian leaders in the
then-West Pakistan were more keen on
enjoying certain perks under military
hegemony than letting East Pakistan
have the majority say in running of the
country.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had collaborated
with the military to reject the 1970 elec-
tions, in turn orchestrating the separa-
tion of Bangladesh; Pakistan’s continued
history of civilian leaders undermining
democracy to gain proximity to power
has since included Nawaz Sharif,
Benazir Bhutto, and now Imran Khan.
Similarly, Pakistan’s paranoid,
jihadist, and India-centric security pol-
icy is also rooted in events leading up to
1971. The 1965 Operation Gibraltar
incorporated two military strategies that
have been engraved in Rawalpindi’s Gen-
eral Headquarters: the use of non-state
mujahideenand a focus on strategic
depth.
Leaving its eastern wing open as
bait in the build up to the 1965 war,
Bhutto, then foreign minister, hoped to
lure India to the east, while it was to be
forced to fight on two fronts near Assam
if China moved in. While India counter-
attacked on the western wing instead,
and China never moved in across multi-
ple Indo-Pak military engagements, the
alienation of Bengalis and Pakistan’s
obsession with strategic depth were per-
manently etched. The fixation with stra-
tegic depth has since evolved into Paki-
stan’s regional security policy, exempli-
fied by its support for jihad in Afghani-
stan and Kashmir.
Pakistan’s usurpation of
Balochistan’s resources, its labeling of
Pashtun nationalism as “treason,” the
military’s occupation of territory, and its
undermining of democracy are all remi-
niscent of the state’s marginalization of
Bengalis. The growing number of Baloch
missing persons and extrajudicial kill-
ings are a similar throwback to the vio-
lence that eventually led to the Bengali
genocide of 1971 – one that Pakistan is
yet to recognize.
“Bangladeshis across the board feel
that Pakistan needs admit its mistakes of
the past, acknowledge that its army had
perpetrated a genocide and apologize for
the atrocities committed,” Ali Riaz, pro-
fessor of political science at Illinois State
University and nonresident senior fellow
at Atlantic Council, said while talking to
The Diplomat.
“With emerging global dynamics,
there are various possibilities. But with-
out the acknowledgement and apology of
Pakistan for its heinous crimes in 1971,
the road leads to nowhere,” he added.
While military dictators like Zia-ul-
Haq and Pervez Musharraf have
acknowledged the events of 1971, Paki-
stan’s leaders as a whole, and the state
officially, has failed to accept the gravity
of its crimes. In recent years, the death
sentences issued by Bangladesh’s Inter-
national Crimes Tribunal for 1971 war
crimes have sparked condemnation
from Pakistan. This in turn is seen as
Pakistan’s resistance to accept the war
crimes from 1971, let alone apologize for
them.
“Indeed an apology is long overdue.
I think the SAARC Charter should be
implemented in letter and spirit,” said
historian Ishtiaq Ahmed, the author of
“Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins,
Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011),”
while talking to The Diplomat.
Where China and Turkey might be
providing the opportunity for Pakistan
to sit with Bangladesh again, it must do
so with sincerity and self-reflection. That
will not only help Islamabad formulate
progressive bilateral ties, it might also
ring a timely reminder to undo many of
the same errors of the past.
For while opportunistic alliances
can be temporarily beneficial, Pakistan
is currently at a crossroads that could
lead to formulation of a more durable
unity based on mutual respect and
inclusivity. The failure to embrace such a
self-identity in 1947 led to South Asia’s
goriest post-Partition crimes in 1971.
Collective self-reflection might also
help undo the contrasting, but tangible,
Islamization damaging the two states.
Indeed, the divisive ideology that could-
n’t keep the east and west wing together
is now separately impairing Bangladesh
and Pakistan.
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 9
Karachi Floods
Can PTI and PPP Cooperate
in Karachi?
Karachi is in ruins and the likely cooperation between the PTI and PPP is not going to
change anything
s Residents sit alongside their houses at a flooded area after heavy monsoon rains in Pakistan's port city of Karachi on Aug. 26, 2020.
By Umair Jamal
@UmairJamal15
T he Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(PTI)-led federal government has
agreed to work with the Pakistan
Peoples Party’s (PPP) provincial
government in Sindh to clean Karachi,
which has been devastated after the
recent spell of heavy rains.
Both provincial and federal govern-
ments maintain that their cooperation is
necessary to uplift the city from the pres-
ent disaster. However, high stakes politi-
cal games are being played in Karachi,
too, underscoring that any such coopera-
tion is not likely to solidify.
Both PPP and PTI have been com-
peting to rule the city for many years.
PPP’s provincial government in Sindh
doesn’t have much electoral support in
Karachi — it lost heavily to the PTI there
in the last general election. In terms of
the city’s representation in the parlia-
ment, PTI has become Karachi’s biggest
party after winning 13 of 21 National
Assembly seats in the last election. In
10 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
one of the biggest upsets of 2018’s gen-
eral election, PTI defeated PPP’s chair-
man, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in Lyari, a
constituency which has been considered
the party’s stronghold for decades.
PPP’s continual loss of political
space to PTI in Karachi is not something
which the party is ready to accept. Thus,
after 2018’s election, Karachi become a
battlefield for the two parties’ political
games. PTI has been using its constitu-
tional muscle at the federal level to hold
PPP responsible for Karachi’s troubles,
mainly by highlighting its poor gover-
nance record. On the other hand, PTI’s
federal government has poured funds on
its lawmakers from the city in what
appears to be a move to discredit PPP’s
lack of focus on the provincial level vis-à-
vis Karachi’s development.
PPP, for its part, has held on to what-
ever constitutional tools it has at its dis-
posal to keep PTI’s political and electoral
encroachment in Karachi at bay. For
instance, last year PTI’s lawmakers from
Karachi launched a campaign to clean
the city in coordination with the
MuttahidaQaumi Movement-led local
government and other federal institu-
tions like Frontier Works Organization
(FWO) and the National Logistics Cell.
The drive bypassed the provincial gov-
ernment’s role and accused PPP of plun-
dering Karachi’s resources.
“Let us bring [the waste] to zero and
then you [the PPP government] can
maintain it, send less money to Dubai
and maintain the city,” said one of the
PTI’s Karachi lawmakers in a veiled ref-
erence to the PPP-led Sindh govern-
ment. The PTI’s “Clean Karachi” drive
didn’t make a difference beyond earning
the party prime time in local news and
social media appreciation. Within a
month of its launch, the drive was scaled
back on accusations that PPP’s provin-
cial government was hindering the ini-
tiative.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Understandably, the campaign did-
n’t sit well with PPP as it termed the ini-
tiative “interference” by the federal gov-
ernment in provincial matters. The pro-
vincial government said that the cleanli-
ness drive was nothing more than a
photo op.
The next big opportunity for PTI to
barricade PPP’s work in Karachi came
with the emergence of the COVID-19
crisis. Over the last six months, both
Karachi handles 95
percent of the country’s
international trade,
contributes 30 percent
to its manufacturing
sector and holds 50
percent of its bank
deposits
parties have traded blame over their
respective decisions regarding how to
handle the pandemic. PTI continues to
call the PPP-led Sindh government’s
“complete lockdown” policy a failure. In
May, PTI Karachi leadership vowed to
resist the provincial government if it
imposed a broad lockdown in the
metropolis. Blaming the provincial gov-
ernment for the spread of the virus in
Sindh, one PTI lawmaker said, “The
world is coming to realize that
lockdowns are not the solution [to deal
with the Covid-19 pandemic].”
PPP’s leadership said that Prime
Minister Imran Khan was dividing the
country with his COVID-19 policies. The
party also accused PTI of spreading the
virus in Karachi via its newly launched
EhsaasKifalat aid Program. PPP’s lead-
ership regretted that the COVID-19 aid
initiative was being promoted separately
from the Benazir Income Support Pro-
gram (BISP), which it claimed provided
effective infrastructure to distribute aid
to needy families. Questioning the
motives behind the federal government’s
COVID-19 aid, PPP’s senior leader
Sherry Rehman said that “If the [PTI]
government is actually so concerned
about the destitute, then why did it not
ensure that BISP’s budget was
increased?”
The mismanagement on the part of
the city’s authorities in the face of the
recent spell of heavy rains has opened
the flood gates of criticism and scrutiny
against PPP’s provincial government.
Issues such as the non-availability of
clean water, absent public transporta-
tion, broken drainage networks, ineffec-
tive electricity infrastructure and the
rampant construction of poorly planned
housing projects have ravaged the lives
of more than 20 million people.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
The ensuing pressure from the city’s
residents has forced both the central and
provincial governments to cooperate,
albeit temporarily. To an extent, this
cooperation has come due to the mili-
tary’s intervention. This is probably the
first time that the residents of high-end
military managed housing societies in
Karachi have come out in greater num-
bers to protest due to the recent flooding.
This should be a cause of concern for the
national security establishment as the
last thing they need right now is the resi-
dents of their private housing projects up
in arms against their real estate ven-
tures.
A recent meeting chaired by Khan
on Karachi’s flooding was also attended
by the head of Pakistan’s intelligence
agency. In a separate visit, Pakistan’s
Chief of Army Staff General Qamar
Bajwa was briefed on the city’s flooding
and efforts to resolve the crisis. “Our
issue is not non-availability of resources
but setting priorities right,” Bajwa said
in a statement issued by the Inter-
Services Public Relations (ISPR). “The
plans being made by the federal and pro-
vincial governments [for Karachi] will
have Army’s all out support as having
future repercussions on economic secu-
rity of the country,” he further noted.
Arguably, PPP sees the federal gov-
ernment and the military’s growing role
in Karachi as an attack on its political
future. For example, PPP’s leadership
worries that the federal government may
impose governor rule in Sindh to bring
the megacity under its control. As rains
devastate the city, PPP has warned that
Karachi cannot be turned into a PTI “col-
ony” while Khan has tasked military-run
institutions with cleaning the city and
has ensured “unlimited funds” to do so.
These big stake political games are
being played at the cost of a city which is
Pakistan’s economic lifeline. Considered
the financial and industrial hub of Paki-
stan, the city “counts for 54 percent of
the central government tax revenues and
70% of national income tax revenue
which means that it generates $21 mil-
lion in daily tax revenues,” notes Laurent
Gayer Gayer in his book “Karachi:
Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for
the City.” Moreover, the city “handles 95
percent of the country’s international
trade, contributes 30 percent to its manu-
facturing sector and holds 50 percent of
its bank deposits.”
Karachi’s annual Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) stands at around $164
billion. Thus, the shutdown of Karachi
due to the recent flooding is “costing
Pakistan approximately $449 million
every day,” argued one Pakistani media
outlet in late August.
Despite the city’s centrality for Paki-
stan’s economic future, Karachi is in
ruins. Karachi is ranked among one of
the worst cities in the Global Livability
Index. A World Bank Group report, titled
“Transforming Karachi into a Livable
and Competitive Megacity” claimed that
“a highly complex political economy,
highly centralized but fragmented gover-
nance, land contestation among many
government entities, and weak institu-
tional capacity has made it difficult to
This is a battle which
PPP is not going to lose
or compromise on. If
PPP’s provincial
government loses
control of resources to
PTI in Karachi or allows
the national government
to have its way in the
city’s politics, its rule is
virtually over
manage the city’s development.” The
report warned that the city’s current
growth and governance model is not
sustainable and the city’s GDP contribu-
tion to Pakistan has become stagnant.
Whoever controls Karachi, controls
the province of Sindh and a crucial sup-
ply of capital nationally. This is a battle
which PPP is not going to lose or com-
promise on. If PPP’s provincial govern-
ment loses control of resources to PTI in
Karachi or allows the national govern-
ment to have its way in the city’s politics,
its rule is virtually over. This is one of the
reasons that PPP has not supported any
changes in the 18th constitutional
amendment as it offers the party control
of funds at the provincial level.
It is unlikely that PPP and PTI are
going to deliver anything when it comes
to Karachi’s fate as the political interests
of both parties place them on a collision
course. The military, on the other hand,
has too much on its plate and is not keen
on giving governance space to PPP,
which is not assisting it in constitutional
matters, including changes to the 18th
constitutional amendment. Perhaps,
amid this disordered situation, PTI will
see an opportunity to sideline one of its
main political contenders from a city
that could define the party’s political
fortunes and relevancy in the Pakistani
politics.
Unfortunately, all of this is taking
place at the cost of a city that serves as the
backbone of Pakistan’s economy and has
been devastated by political and natural
disasters.
l Umair Jamal is a freelance journalist based in Lahore, Pakistan. His research
focuses primarily on the analysis of South Asian security and politics.
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 11
Central Asia Policy
US Envoy Lauds Pakistan’s Role
in Afghan Peace Talks Process
Washington’s peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and a U.S. delegation visiting Pakistan
praised its assistance
s The U.S. peace envoy for Afghanistan was in Pakistan on Monday to express his gratitude for Islamabad’s role in helping launch the much-awaited
negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan representatives, the Pakistani military said.
By Munir Ahmed
@munirahmedap
T he historic negotiations kicked
off over the weekend in Qatar, a
Middle East nation where the
Taliban have maintained a political
office for the past several years. The start
of negotiations was the latest in a flurry
of diplomatic accomplishments by the
Trump administration ahead of the U.S.
presidential election in November.
While the start of the talks on Satur-
day was mainly about ceremony, the
hard negotiations on agreeing to a road
map for a post-war Afghanistan will be
held behind closed doors and over a num-
ber of sessions.
The sides will be tackling tough
issues, including the terms of a perma-
nent cease-fire, the rights of women and
minorities, and the disarming of tens of
thousands of Taliban fighters and mili-
tias loyal to warlords, some of them
aligned with the government.
Washington’s peace envoy
ZalmayKhalilzad and a U.S. delegation
12 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
visiting Pakistan praised its assistance in
efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solu-
tion to the 19-year war in Afghanistan,
the Pakistani military said. The U.S.
team met with Pakistan’s army chief,
General Qamar JavedBajwa, in the garri-
son city of Rawalpindi on Monday.
A military statement said the visit-
ing delegation “greatly appreciated”
Pakistan’s role in the ongoing peace pro-
cess, saying that “it could not have suc-
ceeded without Pakistan’s sincere and
unconditional support.”
Islamabad has for the past several
years maintained that its influence over
the Taliban is overstated but that it
would do whatever is possible for peace
in Afghanistan, saying that a stable
Kabul was in its own interests.
In 2015, Pakistan hosted the first
ever face-to-face talks between Kabul
and the Afghan Taliban, but the second
round of the scheduled talks collapsed
when the Afghan government
announced the death of Taliban founder
Mullah Mohammed Omar.
The announcement strained ties
between Kabul and Islamabad at the
time. But since then, Washington has
pressed Islamabad to help convince the
Taliban to meet with the U.S. and Afghan
officials. Last month, a Taliban political
team led by the insurgents political chief
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, visited
Islamabad to consult with Pakistani offi-
cials.
The Taliban were ousted in 2001 by
a U.S.-led coalition for harboring Osama
bin Laden, the architect of the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks on America.
In Afghanistan, meanwhile, scores
of friends and families of those killed on
Afghan battlefields gathered at a ceme-
tery on Monday to call for a permanent
countrywide cease-fire, which is
expected to be first on the agenda of the
intra-Afghan negotiations in Qatar.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
FATF and Pakistan
What Does the Controversial
Anti-Money Laundering Bill
Tell Us About Pakistani Politics?
Pakistan’s parliament rejected a major Anti-Money Laundering Bill, claiming the
government had left out the opposition’s amendments
By Umair Jamal
@UmairJamal15
O
n August 26, Pakistan’s
parliament rejected a major
Anti-Money Laundering Bill
linked to the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)’s requirements for the country.
Opposition parties blame the Paki-
stan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) govern-
ment’s plans to victimize its political
opponents by legislating what critics
term a “black law.” The opposition has
also requested the military intervene as
the legislation deals with an issue of
national security.
The government, on the other hand,
has labeled the position of opposition
parties an attempt to gain the PTI’s sup-
port for money laundering. Recently,
tensions between the government and
the opposition have grown over allega-
tions that top opposition leaders are seek-
ing a National Reconciliation Ordinance
(NRO) — like the one President Pervez
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Musharraf enacted in 2007 — which
would effectively wipe out all pending
corruption cases. The PTI’s promises to
combat corruption has resulted in a raft
of charges targeting opposition figures,
angering political opponents.
Amid these tensions, Pakistan’s
government may end up missing signifi-
cant legislation to meet the FATF’s
demands while upsetting the military
further.
The ongoing debate on the contro-
versial legislation shows that opposition
parties are seeking the military’s
involvement in the process. The secre-
tary-general of the Pakistani Muslim
League – Nawaz (PML-N), Ahsan Iqbal,
said that with such provocative attempts
the government is dragging “national
institutions” into politics. He further
added, “The government is giving an
impression that our national institutions
are partners with it in its victimization
policy, which is not good for national
security and I severely condemn it.”
Opposition parties appear to be
willing to support any law that deals with
the FATF recommendations as it directly
involves the military’s interest. In the
past, opposition parties have supported
the government in FATF-related laws.
However, apparently the opposition
does not want the government to solely
take credit for the legislation and at the
same time sidelinethem further. Accord-
ing to the opposition, the government
had agreed to include their amendments
to the Anti-Money Laundering Bill. How-
ever, at the time of the voting, the gov-
ernment presented a bill that did not
carry those amendments, thus their vot-
ing it down.
In the past, the government has
responded with a heavy-handed
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 13
 The opposition may
see the new controversy
as another opening to
create space between
the military and the PTI
government.
Undoubtedly, the
legislation carries some
vague provisions that
could be employed
against the govt.’s
political foes
approach whenever the opposition
attempted to criticize its governance
failures and its alleged support within
the national security institutions. If
passed into law in its current form, the
Anti-Money Laundering Bill will give the
government more power to round up any
politician that it considers a challenge to
its rule.
It is likely that beyond generating
consensus over legislative issues dealing
with the FATF, the military’s leadership
is not aware of what the draft means in its
entirety. This possibility offers the gov-
ernment a chance to bring in clauses that
it finds useful for its own political needs.
However, the situation is likely to
backfire for the government. The case of
14 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
General Qamar JavedBajwa’s extension
offers insights into the current govern-
ment’s poor handling of important legis-
lative processes. Last year, the PTI gov-
ernment offered Bajwa an additional
three years in office, citing national secu-
rity reasons. However, the party’s law-
makers didn’t follow the necessary legal
and legislative procedures. The issue
drew serious criticism from the judiciary
and political parties and perhaps dam-
aged Bajwa’s standing within those insti-
tutions. The development is said to have
also strained Bajwa’s ties with the gov-
ernment.
With the current legislation, the
government is under pressure from the
military to complete all parliamentary
Interview
Touqir Hussain on Pakistan
Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan
The Diplomat talks with Touqir Hussain on Imran Khan and his handling of Pakistan’s
foreign policy thus far
processes involving the FATF’s require-
ments before the forum’s next hearing.
According to the decisions made in the
previous meetup of the FATF, Pakistan
was asked to close major loopholes
involving money laundering and anti-
terror laws by June 2020. The forum
couldn’t meet due to the COVID-19 cri-
sis, giving Pakistan more time to imple-
ment the necessary reforms. However,
with the opposition challenging the lat-
est legislation, the government has
become mired in another controversy.
The situation is sure to annoy the mili-
tary’s leadership.
This is not the first time that the
current government has created troubles
for the military in the foreign policy
space. Recently, Pakistani Commerce
Minister Abdul Razak Dawood proposed
suspending some projects under the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor By Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran
(CPEC). Following Dawood’s comments, @TheAsianist
Bajwa visited China and assured Beijing
of Pakistan’s commitment to the project.
S
ince coming to office last year, policy under Imran Khan has been an extraordinary leadership in handling
“China-Pakistan military ties are an
Pakistan Prime Minister Imran evolving so far in general just over two of the worst foreign policy chal-
important backbone of relations
Khan has had a full plate of issues a year since his election as prime lenges – Pulwama and the Kashmir situ-
between the two countries,” said General
to contend with in foreign policy, be it minister last year? ation. He has proven himself to be ‘made
Zhang Youxia, a deputy chairman of
managing the international aspects of Before Imran Khan could even for crisis’ leading from the front as he did
China’s powerful Central Military Com-
his country’s manifold domestic begin, Pakistan had come to face one of in cricket. He has shunned rhetoric and
mission, after meeting Bajwa.
challenges, coping with changes in key its worst economic crises. He realized focused largely on diplomacy thus avoid-
The opposition may see the new
individual relationships, and managing that as long as Pakistan was absorbed ing the risk of war. He has overall reha-
controversy as another opening to create
Pakistan’s international reputation with the Afghanistan crisis, the United bilitated Pakistan’s international stand-
space between the military and the PTI
which has come under greater scrutiny States kept putting pressure on Pakistan, ing.
government. Undoubtedly, the legisla-
in recent years. This is occurring amid a and the India-Pakistan relations More generally, looking at Khan’s
tion carries some vague provisions that
series of other wider developments, remained antagonistic, the economic tenure thus far, what is your sense
could be employed against the govern-
including continued India-Pakistan situation would remain weak sabotaging of the domestic political setting in
ment’s political foes. However, the scope
tensions and growing U.S.-China his vision of a Naya (New) Pakistan. So, Pakistan, including civil-military
of the legislation is far bigger than the
competition. he began mending fences with Afghani- dynamics and the country’s
trivial issues of settling scores in domes-
For a perspective on Khan’s han- stan and the United States. He also broader economic, political, and
tic politics — money laundering is a seri-
dling of Pakistan’s foreign policy chal- extended a hand of friendship to India. societal challenges?
ous issue.
lenges thus far, The Diplomat’s Senior India ignored Imran Khan’s over- Pakistan is enjoying political stabil-
Opposition parties understand that
Editor PrashanthParameswaran spoke tures, but there has been a visible prog- ity, and the internal security has vastly
the military is aware of the need for coop-
to Touqir Hussain, a former ambassador ress on other fronts. He had a successful improved. There is no threat to the gov-
eration in Parliament when it comes to
and diplomatic adviser to the prime min- visit to Washington. The relations have ernment from the military as each has
issues of national security. Thus, with
ister who is currently adjunct faculty at not been reset as he had hoped but at found shared interests in other’s objec-
the current situation, the opposition has
Georgetown University and Syracuse least the decks have been cleared for a tives. Imran Khan campaigned on the
a chance to get closer to the national secu-
University. possible reset. The Arab countries in the anti-corruption platform accusing for
rity establishment in seeking to include
Before we get to some individual Gulf responded positively for his request years the leadership of PML (N) and PPP
their amendments to the law, and blam-
key relationships, what is your for economic help. The relations with of “robbing the wealth of the nation.” The
ing the government for not doing so.
sense about how Pakistan’s foreign China continue to progress. He showed military had its own reasons for oppos-
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October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 15
ing this leadership, corruption and mis-
management being one of them. You
cannot maintain a strong defense estab-
lishment on a weak economy.
The military has found Imran Khan
appealing. His anti-corruption cam-
paign would clean up the traditional
political leadership and warn the future
leadership, his sincerity and commit-
ment to change might help improve Paki-
stan’s governance and economy, and his
nationalism would align him with the
military’s foreign policy priorities. And
with a popular political face especially
among the youth, the military may gain a
cover for some of its priorities needing
public support.
In the time ahead, the government
will have to meet tough IMF
conditionalities creating economic diffi-
culties for the people and political chal-
lenges for the government. Also chal-
lenging will be the continuing presence
of jihadists and issues of governance.
This will test collaboration between
Imran Khan and Pakistan’s military.
Getting to individual key relation-
ships, one item that has been domi-
nating the headlines of late is
India’s move on Kashmir. In your
view, how has the Imran Khan gov-
ernment handled this issue thus
far, and how does this affect the
broader trajectory of ties between
India and Pakistan more generally
given the exchanges we have seen
thus far, including on no-first use?
By revoking article 370 and 35A of
the Indian Constitution, Modi has taken
away Pakistan’s special status. Kash-
mir’s special status and the UN resolu-
tions had offered international commu-
nity a locus standi to play a role in the
resolution of the dispute.
By denying Pakistan this redress,
India has left Pakistan no choice but to
resort to bilateral means of pressuring
India such as restricting the relation-
ship. India too will respond specially
along the Line of Control injecting ten-
sions in the relations. Kashmiris may
find armed resistance as the only way out
now. And jihadists could get a new lease
of life increasing the chances of terrorist
incidents.
All this will enhance the risk of war.
India is already walking back India’s
nuclear no first use policy. And Pakistan
military has upped the ante by express-
ing support for Kashmir’s independence.
Imran Khan has unleashed a global
diplomatic offensive beyond the interna-
tional media which has also censured
India’s move, especially condemning the
continued lockdown and communica-
tions black out that has created a colossal
humanitarian crisis. Through Pakistan’s
own diplomacy and China’s help, the UN
16 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Security Council (UNSC) met for first
time in 50 years. Yet again Imran has
avoided bluster, threats, and war rheto-
ric and shown mature leadership.
We have also seen U.S.-Pakistan
relations in the headlines, with
Khan’s visit to the United States
and moves in relations since,
including aid cuts to Pakistan and
talk about the future of the Ameri-
can presence in Afghanistan. How
would you assess the state of U.S.-
Pakistan relations at this stage,
and what are you watching to get a
sense of how ties will evolve in the
coming months?
Before Imran Khan’s visit to Wash-
ington last July, the U.S. had followed a
simple policy. The U.S. had a policy on
India, on China, on Afghanistan, and on
combating jihadists. The policy on Paki-
stan was essentially derivative of these
four policies. And its impact was nega-
tive as the U.S. brought all the leverage
these policies gave into service against
Pakistan – including suspension of secu-
rity assistance, obstacles to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund deal, threats
against the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor, and use of the Financial Action
Task Force – to seek Pakistan’s help in
extricating itself from Afghanistan. Paki-
stan shifted its position by forcing the
Taliban to be flexible and Washington
also changed its tack. The White House
visit was a reward. And then followed the
shaping of the U.S.-Taliban deal we have
been hearing about.
The U.S. policy of compellence must
now give way to a proper policy as it
needs continued cooperation with Paki-
stan not only to resolve the Afghanistan
situation but also to get Pakistan’s help
in fighting the transnational terrorists
like al-Qaeda and ISIS and its own
jihadists. Pakistan’s nuclear assets and
their safety also remain a national inter-
est for Washington as stability in South
Asia is one of its goals. From Washing-
ton’s perspective, Pakistan should not be
left entirely dependent on China.
Another key relationship that con-
tinues to be in focus is Pakistan’s
ties with China. In your view, how
has the Khan government handled
bilateral ties in that respect, and
how do you see this evolving over
time?
Pakistan has longstanding and close
ties with China. Imran Khan’s govern-
ment is further deepening them. Prior to
his coming to power, Pakistan’s relations
with China had come to be seen with
skepticism in certain quarters. Paki-
stan’s growing debt crisis and falling
foreign exchange reserves had triggered
a concern that China was using financial
leverage to put itself in favorable eco-
nomic position. Imran Khan also had Foreign Affairs Anthology
some concerns about the priorities of
CPEC. China has managed to assuage
both these concerns.
Relations with China will be the key
The Project Twins – Which Past
strategic relationship for Pakistan
around which other big power relations
will be structured. And CEEC remains a
bedrock of Pakistan’s hope for economic
is Prologue?
Heeding the right warnings from history
recovery. But Pakistan does not want to
put all its eggs in the Chinese basket. U.S.
will likely support China-Pakistan rela-
tions to some degree as it has important
security interests in Afghanistan and
Pakistan shared by China. China needs
stabilization of Afghanistan for the sake
of BRI’s success. And both have shared
interest in Pakistan’s fight against the
jihadists. So there will be U.S.-China
limited convergence in a sense. All this
might be an incentive for Washington
not to rock the China-Pakistan relations
lest it result in broader configurations
such as a China-Pakistan-Iran axis.
Looking ahead, what do you think
are some key factors or issues to
watch in the evolution of Pakistan
foreign policy under Imran Khan?
The 21st century’s unstable power
balances, the emerging bipolar US-
China rivalry, and the post-9/11 security
challenges have impacted South Asia.
Pakistan is strategically vital because of
its location at the crossroads of Afghani-
stan, Russia, China, India and Iran. It
could benefit from its location or be
caught in the crossfire as South Asia
becomes an arena for shifting and over- By Margaret MacMillan
lapping coalitions among regional and Toronto, Canada
global players.
Pakistan will be in the eye of a devel-
oping storm as it faces on one side pros- U.S. President Donald Trump gling to deal with the COVID-19 pan- States has lost much of its moral author-
pects of failure of Afghanistan, and on largely ignores the past or tends to get it demic and is just coming to appreciate ity.
the other continued pressures from an wrong. “What’s this all about?” he is the magnitude of its economic and social Will the coming decades bring a new
assertive and dominant India while it reported to have asked on a visit to the fallout. Looming over everything is cli- Cold War, with China cast as the Soviet
continues to cope with its internal chal- Pearl Harbor National Memorial, in mate change. Union and the rest of the world picking
lenges. Of particular note are Pakistan’s Hawaii, in 2017. When he has paid atten- These troubled times are not all sides or trying to find a middle ground?
own struggle against terrorism and tion to history, it has been to call on it as a Trump’s fault, but he has made things Humanity survived the original Cold
extremism, and efforts at stabilization of friendly judge, ready to give him top worse. Flattery for dictators, especially War in part because each side’s massive
economy and strengthening of democ- marks and vindicate him: his adminis- coming from the leader of the most pow- nuclear arsenal deterred the other from
racy. tration, he has claimed repeatedly, has erful state in the world, does not make starting a hot war and in part because the
Successful navigation of all these been the best in U.S. history. The evi- them reasonable; it feeds their egos and West and the Soviet bloc got used to deal-
challenges by Pakistan would require dence—something that historians, at appetites. Washington’s fitful and cha- ing with each other over time, like part-
good relations with all big powers. Paki- least, take seriously—suggests a differ- otic response to the pandemic has made ners in a long and unhappy relationship,
stan also needs to maintain the current ent picture. the population of the United States and and created a legal framework with fre-
balance between the relations with Iran Whenever he leaves office, in early those of its neighbors more vulnerable to quent consultation and confidence-
and Arab countries. Improvement in 2021, 2025, or sometime in between, the the virus, and by pulling the United building measures. In the decades
relations with neighbors becomes an world will be in a worse state than it was States out of the World Health Organiza- ahead, perhaps China and the United
economic and political necessity for Paki- in 2016. China has become more asser- tion, Trump is undermining its ability to States can likewise work out their own
stan if it is serious in benefiting from its tive and even aggressive. Russia, under deal with the current pandemic and the tense but lasting peace. Today’s unstable
geographic location by serving as a corri- its president for life, Vladimir Putin, ones bound to come. Renouncing arms world, however, looks more like that of
dor for trade, and energy. Whether for carries on brazenly as a rogue state, control agreements has made the world a the 1910s or the 1930s, when social and
survival or progress Pakistan’s foreign destabilizing its neighbors and waging a more dangerous place. Trump’s bullying economic unrest were widespread and
policy will have to find a balance between covert war against democracies through of U.S. allies and his attacks on NATO multiple powerful players crowded the
addressing its external security chal- cyberattacks and assassinations. In and the EU have weakened ties that have international scene, some bent on
lenges and meeting its development Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines, and served the United States and its partners upending the existing order. Just as
needs at home. Saudi Arabia, a new crop of strongman well for decades. And although the dam- China is challenging the United States
rulers has emerged. The world is strug- age is difficult to measure, the United today, the rising powers of Germany,
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October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 17
Japan, and the United States threatened
the hegemonic power of the British
Empire in the 1910s. Meanwhile, the
COVID-19 pandemic has led to an eco-
nomic downturn reminiscent of the
Great Depression of the 1930s.
The history of the first half of the
twentieth century demonstrates all too
vividly that unchecked or unmoderated
tensions can lead to extremism at home
and conflict abroad. It also shows that at
times of heightened tension, accidents
can set off explosions like a spark in a
powder keg, especially if countries in
those moments of crisis lack wise and
capable leadership. Had Archduke Franz
Ferdinand not been assassinated in
Sarajevo in June 1914, World War I
might not have erupted. One can only
imagine the chain of potentially cata-
strophic events that could be set in
motion if Chinese and American naval
ships or airplanes collided in the South
China Sea today.
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it
often rhymes,” as Mark Twain is reputed
to have said, and it rhymes enough to
make one uneasy. If the administration
that succeeds Trump’s wants to repair
the damaged world and rebuild a stable
international order, it ought to use his-
tory—not as a judge but as a wise adviser.
The past offers warnings but also
encouragement. Moments of crisis are
sometimes moments of opportunity. The
end of the Thirty Years’ War brought the
Peace of Westphalia and with it the prin-
ciple of respect for national sovereignty.
The Congress of Vienna, on the heels of
the Napoleonic Wars, created a settle-
ment that provided Europe with an
unprecedented several decades of peace.
The world wars of the twentieth century
gave rise to new ideas and institutions
for a stable and just international order
based on cooperation and not confronta-
tion. Once the Trump administration
itself becomes history, world leaders can
allow the existing fault lines to
deepen—or they can work toward inter-
national peace and stability.
Warning Signs
A knowledge of history offers insurance
against sudden shocks. World wars and
great depressions do not come out of the
clear blue sky; they happen because pre-
vious restraints on bad behavior have
weakened. In the nineteenth century,
enough European powers—in particular
the five great ones, Austria, France, Prus-
sia, Russia, and the United King-
dom—came to believe that unprovoked
aggression should not be tolerated, and
Europe enjoyed more peace than at any
other time in its troubled history until
after 1945. Today, when states such as
Russia or Turkey act in defiance of such
18 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
restraints and face little in the way of
sanctions, they come away emboldened,
and others are tempted to follow their
example.
Further hastening the breakdown of
the international order is how states are
increasingly resorting to confrontational
politics, in substance as well as in style.
Their motives are as old as states them-
selves: ambition and greed, ideologies
and emotions, or just fear of what the
other side might be intending. Preparing
for conflict—or even appearing to do
so—pushes the other side toward a con-
frontational stance of its own. Scenarios
sketched out as possibilities in more
peaceful times become probabilities,
and leaders find that their freedom to
maneuver is shrinking. In World War I,
both the American and the Japanese
navies started to contemplate the day
when they would vie for control of the
Pacific. In the 1920s and 1930s, each
built bases, procured equipment,
strategized, and trained with the expec-
s World wars and great depressions do not come out of the clear blue sky.
tation that it might one day have to fight
the other. That did not make war
between them inevitable, just more
likely, since each side interpreted the
words and actions of the other as evi-
dence of hostile intent. After the Soviet
Union shot down a South Korean airliner
in 1983, its leaders persuaded them-
selves that the United States was plan-
ning to use the incident as pretext to gin
up a war and launch a sneak nuclear
attack. Suddenly, even U.S. President
Ronald Reagan’s more frequent phone
calls with British Prime Minister Marga-
ret Thatcher seemed to be evidence of
preparation.
Public rhetoric matters, too,
because it can create the anticipation of,
even a longing for, confrontation and can
stir up forces that leaders cannot control.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt
probably did not want war with Israel in
1967, but his eloquence and nods to Arab
nationalism (such as his decision to close
the Straits of Tiran) inflamed an already
tense situation. Today, decades of “patri-
otic education” in China’s schools have
fostered a highly nationalist younger
generation that expects its government
to assert itself in the world.
Defusing tensions is possible, but it
requires leadership aided by patient
diplomacy, confidence building, and
compromise. During the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962—probably the most dan-
gerous moment of the Cold War—U.S.
President John F. Kennedy and Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev found chan-
nels through which they could broker a
face-saving deal. Unfortunately, com-
promise does not always play well to
domestic audiences or elites who see
their honor and status tied up with that
of their country. But capable leaders can
overcome those obstacles. Kennedy and
Khrushchev overruled their militaries,
which were urging war on them; they
chose, at considerable risk, to work with
each other, thus sparing the world a
nuclear war.
Trump, too, has left a highly per-
sonal mark on global politics. In the long
debate among historians and interna-
tional relations experts over which mat-
ters most—great impersonal forces or
specific leaders—his presidency surely
adds weight to the latter. He has used the
bully pulpit as a megaphone. His charac-
ter traits, life experiences, and ambi-
tions, combined with the considerable
power the president can exert over for-
eign policy, have shaped much of U.S.
foreign policy over the last nearly four
years, just as Putin’s memories of the
humiliation and disappearance of the
Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War
have fed his determination to make Rus-
sia count again on the world stage. It still
matters that both men happen to lead
large and powerful countries.
EnverHoxha, who ruled Albania for over
40 years following World War II, was a
tyrant to Albanians and a menace to his
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neighbors in the Balkans, but not a
threat to the peace of Europe or the
world. When Germany fell into the
clutches of Adolf Hitler, in contrast, he
was able to start a world war.
The Not-So-Golden Age
In relatively stable times, the world can
endure problematic leaders without
lasting damage. It is when a number of
disruptive factors come together that
those wielding power can bring on the
perfect storm. One need go back no fur-
ther than to the international relations of
the first half of the twentieth century to
see this.
In the decade before the outbreak of
World War I, many Europeans—perhaps
a majority—looked back on the previous
century with satisfaction, even smug-
ness. The continent had come such a
long way: it dominated much of the
world and was enjoying ever-increasing
prosperity and, it was hoped, lasting
peace. The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig
called it “the Golden Age of Security.”
Europe and the world were increasingly
integrated through trade, investment,
and communications. International law
and multilateral agreements on such
issues as arms control and the rules of
war and a large and enthusiastic peace
movement seemed firm impediments to
war. Yet Europe had a darker side, and
its troubles were piling up both in
domestic politics and internationally.
Within countries, acute political and
class divisions, growing labor unrest,
often violent revolutionary movements,
and panicking upper classes strained
even robust political systems. Rising
ethnic nationalism shook multinational
states such as Austria-Hungary, Russia,
and the United Kingdom. Imperial appe-
tites had not yet been sated by the carv-
ing up of Africa and much of Asia, and
great powers now looked greedily at
China and the Ottoman Empire.
Norms and practices that had
restrained European powers began to
weaken. The Concert of Europe was a
shadow of its former self, and the great
powers found it more and more difficult
to act together. In 1911, when Italy
invaded what is today Libya, it breached
an unwritten understanding that no
power would risk setting off a dangerous
competition for the declining Ottoman
Empire. The other great powers
expressed regret but did little, and their
inaction did not go unnoticed. In 1912,
the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Greece,
Montenegro, and Serbia joined forces to
take what was left of Ottoman territory in
Europe and soon fell out over the spoils.
The Balkan wars that followed threat-
ened more than the region. Austria-
Hungary saw a Greater Serbia as a
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threat, whereas Russia saw it as a small
Orthodox brother. The two powers came
close to war. Had that happened, France
might have felt obliged to support its ally
Russia, and Germany might have come
to Austria-Hungary’s aid. After a certain
amount of belligerent talk and threaten-
ing moves, a peace of sorts was cobbled
together, thanks mainly to Germany and
s Bulgarian soldiers outside the Ottoman city of Adrianople during the First Balkan War, 1912.
the United Kingdom, which, for separate
reasons, did not want a general war. Nev-
ertheless, the war scare left behind a poi-
sonous residue of mutual suspicion and
resentment. Russia resolved to back
Serbia in the future, and Austria-
Hungary was as determined to destroy
what it saw as a deadly enemy.
This series of crises showed that war
was still a distinct possibility in Euro-
pean politics. Moreover, the division of
the continent into two alliance systems,
which some statesmen had assumed
would create restraint, turned out to do
the opposite. Considerations of prestige
and the need to keep alliance partners
happy meant that Russia found it diffi-
cult not to come to Serbia’s aid, no mat-
ter how recklessly that small country
behaved. Germany’s leaders, for their
part, feared that if they failed to back
Austria-Hungary, they risked losing
their only dependable ally. France was
anxious to maintain its alliance with
Russia, which it saw as a counterbalance
to Germany, even if that meant support-
ing Russia in a quarrel with Austria-
Hungary.
By 1914, confrontation had become
the preferred option for all the players,
with the exception of the United King-
dom, which still hoped to prevent or at
least stay out of a general European war.
Governments had grown accustomed to
taking threatening actions, whether with
troop movements or by ordering their
diplomats home. Feeding the tensions
further, Europe’s armies and navies were
growing at an accelerating rate. The rhet-
oric, both public and private, became
harsher. At a family wedding in 1913, the
German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, chastised
his British cousin King George V for sid-
ing with a decadent nation such as
France and a semi-barbarous one like
Russia. Across Europe, the press
whipped up hatreds and ran scare stories
about enemy plots. Although they might
not have realized it, many Europeans
were psychologically prepared for war.
An exaggerated respect for their own
militaries and the widespread influence
of social Darwinism encouraged a belief
that war was a noble and necessary part
of a nation’s struggle for survival.
Political and military leaders con-
vinced themselves that potential ene-
mies were on the verge of becoming real
ones. The German high command feared
that Russia’s modernization was pro-
ceeding so quickly that by 1917, Germany
would stand no chance against its east-
ern neighbor. German leaders also
assumed that the French were bound to
come to Russia’s aid in a conflict, so that
Germany would have no choice but to
fight a war on two fronts. The Russian
military similarly felt it might have no
option but to fight a two-front war
against both Austria-Hungary and Ger-
many.
The only chance of preventing a
local conflict from becoming a conti-
nent-wide conflagration lay with the
civilian leaders who would ultimately
decide whether or not to sign the mobili-
zation orders. But those nominally in
charge were unfit to bear that responsi-
bility. The governments of Austria-
Hungary, Germany, and Russia had all
failed to inform themselves of what their
militaries were planning. Even British
and French military leaders, whose coun-
tries had strong traditions of civilian
control over the military, had made
plans for joint military and naval prepa-
rations for war, going further than their
governments had perhaps intended.
In the last days of peace, in July and
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 19
early August 1914, the task of keeping
Europe out of conflict weighed increas-
ingly on a few men, above all Kaiser Wil-
helm II of Germany, Tsar Nicholas II of
Russia, and Emperor Franz Josef of Aus-
tria-Hungary. Each proved unable to
withstand the pressure from those who
urged war. Each was weak in his own
way. The Kaiser, who had backed down
in previous confrontations, was afraid of
being called a coward; the tsar feared for
his throne and the honor of Russia; and
the emperor—old, ill, and alone—could
not stand up to his generals. All signed
the mobilization orders put before them.
The last two were dead by the time the
war ended in 1918; Wilhelm had lost his
throne and was in exile in the Nether-
lands. Europe was changed forever: Aus-
tria-Hungary had vanished, Russia was
in the throes of a civil war, and the British
and French victors were considerably
weaker than they had been in 1914. The
global balance of power had shifted, with
a major new international player across
the Atlantic and a stronger and more
assertive Japan to the east.
The Misunderstood
Decade
With the benefit of hindsight, historians
have often considered the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919 to be a failure and the
1920s a mere prelude to the inevitable
rise of the dictators and the descent into
World War II. It is true that Europe and
the world faced many problems in 1919.
As often happens at the end of wars,
allies were drifting apart, and the win-
ners and losers alike felt they had not
come out of the peace settlements with
their just spoils. Germans, particularly
those on the right, loathed the Treaty of
Versailles, whereas many French felt
that it was too lenient. Italy and Japan
argued that they had not been treated
fairly despite having been on the winning
side. The successor states to Austria-
Hungary and the ones that had emerged
out of the Russian empire were weak,
economically fragile, internally divided
by class and ethnicity, and prone to quar-
reling with one another. Founded on the
basis of ethnic nationalism, all had sub-
stantial and often unhappy minorities.
Added to this combustible mix was inter-
national communism. The victory of the
Bolsheviks in Russia encouraged a wave
of revolutionary activity around the
world. Increasingly obedient to Moscow,
substantial communist parties in
France, Germany, and Italy threw them-
selves into undermining the existing
democratic structures in their countries.
Lately, however, some historians
have begun to see that interwar decade in
a different light—as a time of real prog-
ress toward a strong international order.
20 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
World War I had forced an appraisal of
what had gone wrong and what might be
done to prevent another such catastro-
phe. The value of international coopera-
tion had been a regular subject of debate
since the previous century, and states
had already taken some concrete steps
toward it, with multilateral agreements,
international courts, and even interna-
tional conferences to deal with pandem-
ics. So when U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson laid out his vision for a new world
order in his famous Fourteen Points
speech of 1918 and in subsequent
speeches, he found a receptive and
enthusiastic audience around the world.
Historians have begun to see the
interwar decade as a time of real prog-
ress toward a strong international order.
The establishment in 1920 of his
brainchild, the League of Nations, was a
significant step, even without U.S. mem-
bership: it created an international body
to provide collective security for its mem-
bers and with the power to use sanctions,
even including war, against aggressors.
Its first years were promising. It settled a
1923 dispute between Greece and Italy
that had threatened to escalate into all-
out war, monitored plebiscites in dis-
puted territories in Europe, and coordi-
nated a host of international agencies,
from the forerunner of the World Health
Organization to the International Labor
Organization. The United States sup-
ported much of the league’s work from
the outside and continued to assist in
building peace in Europe. With the back-
ing of their government, American nego-
tiators helped broker two agreements on
German reparations, the Dawes Plan of
1924 and the Young Plan of 1929, which
facilitated German payments through
foreign loans, among other things, and
reduced the total amount owed.
Overall, the 1920s were a time of
cooperation, not confrontation, in inter-
national relations. For the most part, the
leaders of the major powers, the Soviet
Union excepted, supported a peaceful
international order. In 1921 and 1922,
the United States held major naval disar-
mament conferences in Washington that
helped freeze naval competition in the
Pacific for the following ten years. At the
same conference, nine powers with
interests in the Pacific signed a treaty to
respect the territorial integrity of China.
The government of Japan, although still
angry over the outcome of the Paris
Peace Conference, saw itself as part of
the international order and cooperated
in sustaining it. Under the enlightened
leadership of Gustav Stresemann, who
was foreign minister from 1923 to 1929,
Germany joined the League of Nations
and once again became a respectable
member of the international commu-
nity. Alongside the French politician
Aristide Briand, Stresemann worked to
lay the basis for greater Franco-German
understanding. In 1926, the two men
won the Nobel Peace Prize.
In Italy, Benito Mussolini played the
part of a statesman, working with France
and the United Kingdom to defuse some
of the tensions resulting from the peace
settlements. At the Locarno conference
of 1925, when Germany accepted its new
western borders and agreed to a
nonaggression pact with Belgium and
France, Italy acted as a guarantor along-
side the United Kingdom. And under the
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, eventually
more than 50 signatories, among them
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, renounced war as an
instrument with which to settle disputes.
The promise of the 1920s was cut
short by the Great Depression. Bank
failures, sharp reductions in domestic
production, and a precipitous decline in
world trade led to mass unemployment
and deepening poverty even in prosper-
ous countries. Citizens lost faith in the
ability of their leaders to cope with the
crisis. What was more ominous, they
often lost faith in capitalism and democ-
racy. The result was the growth of
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extremist parties on both the right and
the left. Although some democracies
were able to adjust and survive, others
were not. In Germany, the Weimar
Republic came to an ignominious end in
1933, when antidemocratic conserva-
tives invited the leader of the Nazi Party
to become chancellor, foolishly thinking
they could exploit him for their own
ends. Instead, Hitler used and discarded
them. In Japan, ultranationalist milita-
rists seized power. Mussolini saw which
way the wind was blowing and eventu-
ally threw his lot in with the Axis.
The catastrophe that followed
showed yet again how important the
individual can be in the wielding of
power. Hitler had clear goals—to break
what he called “the chains” of the Treaty
of Versailles and make Germany and
“the Aryan race” dominant in Europe, if
not the world—and he was determined to
achieve them at whatever cost. Once in
power, he banned all political parties
except his own, outlawed labor unions,
and reorganized the institutions of civil
society. He welcomed the prospect of
confrontation and war, which he saw as a
means to bring the German nation
together and imbue it with the proper
military virtues. The military, delighted
by the increases in defense spending and
beguiled by Hitler’s promises of glory
and territorial expansion, tamely went
along. In Italy, Mussolini, who had long
dreamed of a second Roman Empire,
abandoned his earlier caution. On the
other side of the world, Japan’s new rul-
ers were also thinking in terms of
national glory and building a Greater
Japan through conquest.
Preoccupied with their own prob-
lems, the leaders of the remaining
democracies were slow to realize the
developing threat to world order and
slow to take action. The French, facing
deepening political divisions at home,
looked to the British to react, but they
had their own domestic challenges and
were seriously overstretched abroad,
with growing problems in their empire.
Both hoped for support from the United
States, but in his first term, U.S. Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt was focused on
solving the problems at home.
The League of Nations, only ever as
strong as its members allowed it to be,
was powerless in the face of open acts of
aggression. In 1931, Japan seized the
Chinese region of Manchuria, in breach
of the league’s covenant and Tokyo’s own
treaty obligations, and suffered few, if
any, real penalties. Four years later, Mus-
solini attacked Ethiopia in a brutal cam-
paign of conquest; again, democratic
states did little by way of sanctions. As
early as 1933, Hitler had pulled Germany
out of the league, and, step by step over
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the next several years, he violated the
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, mov-
ing troops into the Rhineland in 1936
and annexing Austria in 1938. That year,
France and the United Kingdom handed
over a large part of democratic Czecho-
slovakia to Germany in a doomed
attempt to appease Hitler. In 1939, Hit-
ler showed that he could not be appeased
and seized what was left of Czechoslova-
kia. France and the United Kingdom,
faced with a choice between continued
capitulation and resistance, finally chose
the latter, and war broke out that fall.
This time, war was the result not of reck-
less brinkmanship or weak governments
but of powerful leaders deliberately seek-
ing confrontation. Those who might
The COVID-19
pandemic has damaged
the world’s economy
and set back
international
cooperation. Tensions
are building up as they
did before the two world
wars, with intensifying
great-power rivalries
and with regional
conflicts, such as the
recent skirmishes
between China and
India, that threaten to
draw in other players.
Meanwhile, the
pandemic will shake
publics’ faith in their
countries’ institutions,
just as the Great
Depression did
have opposed them, such as the British
prime minister Neville Chamberlain,
chose instead to appease them in the
hope that war could be avoided. By fail-
ing to act in the face of repeated viola-
tions of treaties and international law,
the leaders of the democracies allowed
the international order to break.
Ominous Echoes
Led by Roosevelt, statesmen in the Allied
countries were determined to learn from
this mistake. Even as the war raged, they
enunciated the principles and planned
the institutions for a new and better
world order. Three-quarters of a century
later, however, that order is looking dan-
gerously creaky. The COVID-19 pan-
demic has damaged the world’s economy
and set back international cooperation.
Tensions are building up as they did
before the two world wars, with intensi-
fying great-power rivalries and with
regional conflicts, such as the recent
skirmishes between China and India,
that threaten to draw in other players.
Meanwhile, the pandemic will shake
publics’ faith in their countries’ institu-
tions, just as the Great Depression did.
Norms that once seemed inviolable,
including those against aggression and
conquest, have been breached. Russia
seized Crimea by force in 2014, and the
Trump administration last year gave the
United States’ blessing to Israel’s de
facto annexation of the Golan Heights
and may well recognize the threatened
annexation of large parts of the West
Bank that Israel conquered in 1967. Will
others follow the example set by Russia
and Israel, as happened in the 1910s and
the 1930s?
As the current world order weakens,
the confrontations have grown more
pronounced. Russia continues to meddle
wherever it can, and Putin dreams of
destroying the EU. U.S.-Chinese rela-
tions are increasingly adversarial, with
continued spats over trade, advanced
technology, and strategic influence, and
both sides are developing scenarios for a
possible war. The two countries’ rhetoric
has grown more bellicose, too. China’s
“Wolf Warrior” diplomats, so named by
Chinese officials after a popular movie
series, excoriate those who dare to criti-
cize or oppose Beijing, and American
officials respond in kind. Zhao Lijian, the
spokesperson for China’s Foreign Minis-
try, has tweeted that COVID-19 may
have been brought to Wuhan by the U.S.
military, and Trump speaks of the “kung
flu.” U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo calls the Chinese Communist
Party a “rogue actor”; according to
China’s state-controlled press, Pompeo
is “deranged” and “the public enemy of
mankind.”
It is easy to downplay this posturing
as merely for show and complacently
assume that the world will get through
the crises to come. One can guess what
those might be, but it is impossible to
foresee how different factors will inter-
sect, or in what order. How the world
copes will depend on the strength of its
institutions and, at crucial moments, on
leadership. Weak and indecisive leaders
may allow bad situations to get worse, as
they did in 1914. Determined and ruth-
less ones can create wars, as they did in
1939. Wise and brave ones may guide the
world through the storms. Let us hope
the last group has read some history.
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 21
Brazilian Politics
Messiah Complex
How Brazil made Bolsonaro
By Brian Winter
@BrazilBrian
B razil has a face that it tends to
present to the world: a country of
glittering beaches and hillside
favelas, of Oscar Niemeyer’s delightful
churches and museums, of João Gilberto
crooning “The Girl From Ipanema.” This
is the Brazil of Rio de Janeiro, which is
also, not coincidentally, the city that
hosts global events, such as the
Olympics, and that serves as a base for
most foreign correspondents. This Brazil
is troubled but romantic, a racial mosaic,
violent but impossible to resist. It is a
postcard, a nightmare, a dream.
Inevitably, a country of 210 million
people has many other faces, from the
riverside villages of the Amazon to the
Blade Runner–style skyscapes of São
Paulo and the old gaucho country of the
far south. But the Brazil perhaps least
known to outsiders is what some Brazil-
ians call—sometimes fondly, sometimes
with an eye roll—the interiorzão, which
translates literally as “the big interior.”
The interiorzão is not defined on
any map, but it generally refers to a belt
of land sagging around the country’s
geographic midsection, from the state of
Mato Grosso do Sul in the west through
22 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Goiás, Minas Gerais, and parts of Bahia
in the east. This is a Brazil of soy farms
and cattle ranches, oversize Ford pickup
trucks, air-conditioned shopping malls,
and all-you-can-eat steakhouses. Some
of it is old, but much of it was erected
only in the last 30 years or so. Instead of
Afro-Catholic syncretism and bossa
nova, it boasts evangelical
megachurches and sertanejo, a kind of
tropicalized country music sung by bar-
rel-chested men in cowboy hats and
Wrangler jeans.
The interiorzão, more than any
other region, is also the Brazil of Presi-
dent Jair Bolsonaro. It is where polls
show his support is strongest and most
intense. And it is critical to understand-
ing why a president who is often
regarded with a mix of incomprehension
and horror by the rest of the world has
maintained a steady domestic approval
rating of about 40 percent. Bolsonaro’s
tenure in office has been marked by one
of the world’s deadliest outbreaks of
COVID-19, a disappointing economic
record, a global uproar over deforesta-
tion in the Amazon, and a growing array
of scandals involving his allies and fam-
ily members. Yet his followers have con-
tinued to stand by their man.
Since taking office in January 2019,
the 65-year-old former army para-
trooper has fed his supporters a steady
diet of confrontation and outrage under
the slogan “Brazil Above Everything,
God Above Everyone.” The story of his
presidency so far illustrates how a gener-
ation of twenty-first-century populists,
which arguably includes such disparate
figures as U.S. President Donald Trump,
Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and the Philip-
pines’ Rodrigo Duterte, has had far more
staying power than many observers
expected. The global factors that drove
the rise of these leaders—including
resurgent nationalism and anger over
increasing economic inequality—have
been exhaustively documented. But local
factors have played as large a role: in
Brazil’s case, the growth of evangelical
Christianity and a legacy of military rule
that has never been fully overcome.
Much of the media coverage of
Bolsonaro, at home and abroad, portrays
his government as perpetually on the
brink of collapse, as if a great national
epiphany were just around the corner.
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But a deeper look suggests that support motions before Congress seeking the United States, with little tangible
for Bolsonaro—and, perhaps, for some of Bolsonaro’s impeachment for various benefit so far in return. Hunger is rising,
his peers—remains surprisingly resil-
ient, even if he is in many ways utterly
failing to deliver positive results for
causes, including his disastrous han-
dling of the pandemic and his alleged
interference in the investigations of his
the middle class is shrinking, and some
fear democracy itself is in danger. And
yet this man, who is best known abroad
either his base or the country as a whole. allies by the Federal Police. The conven- for telling a female legislator that she
A Nation in Crisis
Bolsonaro spends much of his energy
denouncing the various evils that he says
plunged Brazil into economic and politi-
cal crisis starting around 2013—a chasm
from which it has still not fully emerged.
He rages against “gender ideology” and
moral decay and attacks everyone from
the supposed “communists” who led
Brazil for the past 25 years (in reality, a
range of leaders from the moderate left
to the center-right) to the climate activist
Greta Thunberg (a “little brat”). These
tirades are amplified online by a so-
called digital militia made up largely of
20-something acolytes who talk of a con-
servative revolution that will last for 100 s Despite comparisons to Trump, Bolsonaro is a Brazilian invention.
years.
tional wisdom in Brasília is that congres- “didn’t deserve to be raped” and for mak-
Bolsonaro’s championing of
sional leaders will wait to push these ing such statements as “a policeman who
increased gun ownership as a cure-all for
cases forward at least until late this year, doesn’t kill isn’t a policeman,” has not
Brazil’s ills, including the COVID-19
after the worst of the pandemic has pre- seen his popularity budge by even one
pandemic, and his incessant clashes with
sumably passed, for fear of plunging percentage point in some polls. Fully
the Congress and the judiciary have
Brazil into an even deeper crisis. But the explaining why requires a deeper dive
alienated or simply exhausted many in
real deterrent is the support Bolsonaro into Brazil’s past and present.
the country’s cosmopolitan locales, such
enjoys from both his resilient base and
as Rio. In national polls, his negative
the military; it is a combination that A Trump of the Tropics?
ratings have steadily crept up. But in
makes impeachment impractical, if not International media coverage tends to
interior cities, such as Cuiabá and
physically dangerous, for its proponents. portray Bolsonaro as “the Trump of the
Goiânia, and in smaller towns, such as
If the president can maintain both pillars Tropics,” a “far-right” nationalist who is
Barretos, where the president rode a
of support, even leaders of the opposi- even more unrefined, more vulgar, and
horse in the rodeo last year, the fervor for
tion concede—in private, between
the man they call “the Messiah” more of a threat to the established world
clenched teeth—that Bolsonaro seems order than the man in the White House.
(Messias, which is Bolsonaro’s real mid-
likely to at least serve the entirety of his Such renderings are incomplete,
dle name, believe it or not) continues to
four-year term, until the end of 2022. In although they are not always unfair.
grow.
Brazil, that would be an achievement in Indeed, Bolsonaro himself has done
Maintaining an energized, loyal
itself. much to encourage the comparisons,
base even at the cost of intense polariza-
Of course, surviving isn’t every- including once streaming a Facebook
tion is regarded by politicians the world
thing. Brazil has seen some progress video in which he simply sat in front of a
over as a necessary evil in this age of
under Bolsonaro: violent crime is down television for more than an hour watch-
social media. But it has always been a
(although the causes are disputed), and ing Trump give a speech. Bolsonaro’s
matter of do or die in Brazilian politics,
the government has passed some pro- national political profile first began to
sometimes in the most literal sense. Two
market reforms and cut red tape for take off in early 2017, just as Trump took
of the last four presidents who won elec-
small-business owners. But overall, the office, and it is obvious that he was tak-
tion in Brazil prior to Bolsonaro were
country seems terribly stuck. It is con- ing notes. Prominent U.S. conservatives,
impeached, in 1992 and 2016, after see-
fronting the real possibility of a second including Steve Bannon, have direct ties
ing their popular support melt away.
consecutive “lost decade” of economic to the government in Brasília; in 2019,
Over the past 70 years, one Brazilian
stagnation, political dysfunction, and the Conservative Political Action Confer-
president resigned after less than a year,
diminished ambition. Even before the ence, a right-wing U.S. organization,
another committed suicide in office,
pandemic began, Brazil’s moribund econ- held a meeting in Brazil for the first time.
another was ousted by a military coup,
omy was, astonishingly, smaller than it In November 2018, Bolsonaro’s son Edu-
another may have been murdered after
had been in 2010 when measured on a ardo, a member of Brazil’s Congress,
leaving office, and yet another passed
per capita basis, and it had failed to grow walked out of the Trump hotel in Wash-
away—of natural causes—just before his
any faster under Bolsonaro than it did ington, D.C., wearing a “Make America
inauguration. Bolsonaro’s immediate
under his predecessors. Great Again” hat. Bolsonarohimself regu-
predecessor, Michel Temer, saw his
A country that a decade ago was larly complains about “fake news,” fan-
approval rating sink as low as three per-
clamoring for a permanent seat on the tasizes aloud about locking up his politi-
cent and staved off impeachment in 2017
UN Security Council and preparing to cal rivals, and wages a constant crusade
only by funneling billions in patronage to
host the World Cup and the Olympics against independent institutions, most
allies in Congress. Brazil is not a good
now seems content to pursue a foreign notably the Supreme Court. Like Trump,
country for presidents without friends.
policy of near-automatic alignment with Bolsonaro is on his third marriage, to a
Today, there are at least 40 separate
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October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 23
telegenic, much younger woman. At
times, the similarities are almost eerie.
But make no mistake: Bolsonaro is a
Brazilian invention. He is a product of
the singularly awful economic and politi-
cal crisis the country has endured over
the last decade and, just as important, of
Brazil’s long tradition of being ruled by
conservative white men of military back-
ground. Throughout most of Brazil’s
existence, going back to the nineteenth-
century monarchy of Emperor Dom
Pedro II and beyond, members of the
armed forces have held critical positions
in politics and business, forming the very
backbone of the country’s elite. One can
see the legacy clearly in Rio, Brazil’s capi-
tal from its independence until 1960,
where a disproportionately large num-
ber of thoroughfares bear names such as
Admiral Barroso Avenue, Major Vaz
Tunnel, and Captain César de Andrade
Street.
A century ago, an editorial in the
military journal A DefesaNacional (Na-
tional Defense) spelled out the need for
Brazil’s armed forces to exercise a “con-
servative and stabilizing role” in politics
to correct what officers saw as the inevi-
table excesses of self-interested and cor-
rupt civilian leaders. In the ensuing
decades, the armed forces frequently
acted on this sense of noblesse oblige,
although usually with a modicum of
restraint. That changed in 1964, when
the military toppled President
JoãoGoulart, who had flirted with China
and Cuba. The ensuing dictatorship held
on to power until 1985 and oversaw a
spurt of extraordinary economic growth,
the so-called Brazilian miracle, when
GDP briefly grew faster than ten percent
a year, until it fizzled out amid high infla-
tion and unsustainable debt. The regime
also tortured and murdered suspected
dissidents, censored the media, and tol-
erated little opposition in Congress.
The military emerged from that era
chastened and unpopular, but not quite
disgraced. Brazil’s generals, unlike their
contemporaries in neighboring Argen-
tina, were largely able to dictate the
terms of the transition to democracy and
never faced justice for their crimes. Civil-
ian leaders initially did little better at
managing the economy, and street crime
began a terrifying surge. Still, the end of
the Cold War seemed to signal that the
days of coups and military leaders were
over, not just in Brazil but throughout
Latin America. A duo of
transformational two-term presidents,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(1995–2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva (2003–11), ushered in a period of
solid economic growth and democratic
stability, and Cardoso carefully installed
a civilian-run defense ministry for the
24 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
first time in Brazil’s history. Under Presi-
dent Dilma Rousseff (2011–16), a former
left-wing guerrilla who had been tor-
tured by the dictatorship, a truth com-
mission was established to investigate
past crimes, although it had no power to
arrest or punish anyone. It seemed that
the soldiers had retreated to the barracks
for good.
That Jair Bolsonaro would be the
one to bring the military back to power,
or close to it, is profoundly ironic.
Bolsonaro served in the army from 1977
to 1988, but he ran afoul of senior offi-
cers on several occasions and never rose
beyond the rank of captain. In one
instance, he spent 15 days in a peniten-
tiary for insubordination; in another, he
was court-martialed for an alleged plot
to blow up Rio’s water supply, ostensibly
to protest low wages for the military rank
and file. (Bolsonaro denied wrongdoing
and was acquitted for lack of evidence.)
One of his commanding officers
described him as “lacking logic, rational-
s In the sweep of Brazilian history, Bolsonaro is not an aberration but a return to normalcy.
ity, and balance.” Ernesto Geisel, a gen-
eral and former president under the mili-
tary dictatorship, singled out Bolsonaro
in a 1993 interview as “a bad soldier” and
“an abnormal case.”
Bolsonaro’s subversive style always
played better among the military’s rank
and file than with its commanders; in
1991, after leaving active duty, Bolsonaro
was elected to Congress, representing
Rio de Janeiro, home to a large contin-
gent of retired military veterans. He soon
emerged as a lonely voice of nostalgia for
the dictatorship, at a time when such
sentiments were not uncommon in pri-
vate but definitely taboo in public. He
also drew attention for his invectives
against women, LGBTQ people, leftists,
and establishment figures such as
Cardoso, who he said “should have been
shot” during the dictatorship, “along
with 30,000 other corrupt people.” Dur-
ing his 27 years as a legislator, such state-
ments often made headlines, but
Bolsonaro was mostly treated as a side-
show—more embarrassment than men-
ace, too marginal to be taken seriously.
Then came the collapse. Not long
after the commodities boom of the first
decade of this century ended, Brazil
descended into a morass of street pro-
tests, the worst recession in the country’s
history, and a series of unprecedented
corruption scandals. Crime also contin-
ued its post-dictatorship rise; in 2017,
Brazil recorded 63,000 homicides, more
than any other country. In a tale that has
been repeated in other, comparatively
less troubled countries in recent years,
Bolsonaro’s outsider status suddenly
became his greatest asset.
But that was only part of the story.
By 2018, the year of the election, polls
showed that the military had once again
become Brazil’s most popular institu-
tion. This was precisely because soldiers
had been absent from politics for several
years and therefore could not be blamed
for the meltdown. Nostalgia surged for a
safer, more stable, supposedly less cor-
rupt past. Bolsonaro wisely emphasized
his military background during the cam-
paign (leaving out the rougher parts, of
course) and chose a retired general as his
running mate. For some voters,
Bolsonaro represented less a revolution
than a restoration—even if many of
them, in a country where half the popula-
tion was under 35, were too young to
know exactly what that meant.
Since becoming president,
Bolsonaro has indeed brought soldiers
back to the table—to the degree that
many Brazilians think of his administra-
tion as a military government in all but
name. By July of this year, retired or
active-duty soldiers were leading ten of
23 ministries and occupied hundreds of
key positions throughout the federal
bureaucracy. Along with social conser-
vatives, they form the two main pillars of
Bolsonaro’s support.
In private, members of the military
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
tend to say that their experience has
been mixed. They are delighted that one
of their own now runs the Defense Min-
istry, instead of the civilian leaders of
previous years. Not coincidentally, the
government largely exempted the armed
forces from recent budget cuts and
reductions to pensions. Government
officials have vowed to rewrite school
textbooks to de-emphasize the military
dictatorship’s atrocities, and the
National Truth Commission’s work has
mostly been forgotten. Yet even though
the generals should have known
Bolsonaro better than anyone, many
have expressed shock at his govern-
ment’s perpetual disorganization, pen-
chant for constant conflict, and narrow
emphasis on topics they view as second-
ary—or completely irrelevant—to
Brazil’s well-being. Carlos Alberto dos
Santos Cruz, a retired four-star general
whom Bolsonaro fired from a senior posi-
tion in early 2019, summed it up for
many when he called the government
“um show de besteiras”—freely trans-
lated, “a shitshow.”
Culture Warrior
Untamed
There is a particular type of Bolsonaro
voter who has repented in the past year:
relatively wealthy and well educated,
often an executive at a bank or a large
company. Among this tiny but dispro-
portionately influential demographic,
many cite one particular moment when
they realized the president was never
going to “pivot”—that he would always
be the same volatile provocateur he has
been since the 1980s.
s Bolsonaro attends an evangelical march in São Paulo, Brazil, June 2019.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
That moment came just two months
into his presidency, on March 5, 2019,
when Bolsonaro tweeted a video of a man
urinating on another man's head during
a Carnival celebration in São Paulo. The
post was meant to expose the supposed
decadence of the left in general and the
LGBTQ community in particular. “I do
not feel comfortable showing this . . . but
this is what Brazil's Carnival has turned
into,” the president wrote. The next day,
in an apparent effort to either feign igno-
rance or stir controversy even further—it
is not clear which—the president
tweeted: “What is a golden shower?”
This made headlines around the
world, and late-night TV comedians
from Argentina to the United States had
a field day. But in Brazil, especially
within business circles, the episode was
treated as something utterly serious: a
confirmation that Bolsonaro's presi-
dency would always be more about the
culture wars—about the need for “boys to
wear blue and girls to wear pink,” in the
words of his women's affairs minister,
Damares Alves—than about pro-market
reforms or even the fight against corrup-
tion. The Brazilian media have reported
extensively on “the cabinet of hate,” a
group of mostly young aides that alleg-
edly includes the president's three politi-
cally active sons and dedicates itself to
attacks against—and spreading fake
news about—the government's oppo-
nents. (Bolsonaro and his sons deny the
group exists.) The administration's chief
ideologue is Olavo de Carvalho, a septua-
genarian and former astrologer who
lives in the woods of rural Virginia,
dresses like a modern-day Marlboro
Man, and, via YouTube videos often
recorded in the predawn hours, excori-
ates anyone—including generals and
other military figures within the govern-
ment—who deviates from his version of
conservative dogma.
Time and again, the president has
opted to please the olavista portion of his
base, as it is known, even when doing so
sabotages other parts of his agenda.
Throughout much of 2019, Carvalho and
other online warriors turned their wrath
on Rodrigo Maia, the president of
Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. Maia was
the key to passing a pension reform bill
that would help close a gaping budget
deficit—a bill that had been the holy grail
of pro-market types in Brazil for years.
Maia, a centrist, was supportive of the
reform from day one, but he still came
under relentless, frequently vulgar
attacks on Twitter from Carvalho and
Bolsonaro’s sons for supposedly being
part of Brasília’s corrupt old guard. Maia
reacted with exasperation, calling the
government “a desert of ideas,” urging
Bolsonaro to stay off social media, and
lamenting “this radical environment
where they have to feed meat to the lions
every single day.” After months of delays,
and a few strained gestures of reconcilia-
tion from the president, the pension
reform finally passed in October 2019.
But by that point, many investors had
lost interest and moved on.
Indeed, the economy has suffered
extensive damage from the president’s
combative approach. Wall Street was at
first euphoric following Bolsonaro’s elec-
tion, believing that the finance minister,
the University of Chicago–trained Paulo
Guedes, would have free rein to cut
entitlements, privatize state-run compa-
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 25
nies, and simplify what the World Bank
has characterized as the world’s most
complex tax system. (“I truly don’t
understand economics,” Bolsonaro fre-
quently insists, in an effort to underline
Guedes’s autonomy.) Guedes has made
some changes, including privatizations,
but almost all the truly transformational
reforms require legislative approval.
Bolsonaro’s relationship with Congress
has been so dysfunctional that in
November 2019, he dropped out of his
own party, which he had essentially cre-
ated himself a year earlier. With the
reform agenda mostly stalled, Brazil’s
economy ended up growing just 1.1 per-
cent in Bolsonaro’s first year, its worst
performance in three years and less than
half what economists expected when he
took office.
For many, the final straw came in
mid-2019, when massive fires set by ille-
gal land speculators broke out in the
Amazon and international commenta-
tors began using the word “pariah” to
describe Brazil. Activists called for boy-
cotts of the country’s soy and beef, and
some investment funds, especially those
in Europe, dropped Brazilian assets from
their portfolios. After initially lashing
out at “globalists,” the government even-
tually took some steps to suppress the
fires, including deploying the military.
But concern flared again earlier this year
when a video surfaced of a cabinet meet-
ing in which the environment minister
urged Bolsonaro to remove as many envi-
ronmental regulations as possible while
the world was distracted by COVID-19.
This prompted another wave of political
instability, pressure for divestments,
and exasperation with the president.
One Brazilian CEO privately lamented,
“It’s like Trump, but without the good
economy.”
Standing By Their Man
In Brazil, as elsewhere in the world, the
pandemic has exposed the shortcomings
of this generation of populist leaders on
both the ideological left and the ideologi-
cal right. As of late June, Bolsonaro’s
Brazil, Trump’s United States, Boris
Johnson’s United Kingdom, and Andrés
Manuel LópezObrador’s Mexico were
among the countries with the highest
number of deaths and confirmed cases.
Brazil has a history of bold, creative pub-
lic health responses to diseases such as
AIDS and Zika. But Bolsonaro, again
taking cues from Washington, dismissed
COVID-19 as “a little flu,” frequently
refused to wear a mask in public, and
championed chloroquine as a miracle
cure. He also fired or forced out two
health ministers in the span of a month
and actively undermined governors and
mayors who espoused social-distancing
policies—to an extent that surpassed
26 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
even Trump’s actions. When journalists
asked Bolsonaro about the rising death
toll in April, he replied, “What do you
want me to do? My name is Messiah, but
I can’t make miracles.” Even when he
tested positive for the virus himself in
July, his initial reaction amounted to a
shrug.
Through it all, Bolsonaro’s base has
barely wavered. Nor has it lost its
remarkable ability to explain away obvi-
ous setbacks. When Sérgio Moro, a for-
mer judge and an iconic figure in Brazil’s
fight against corruption, resigned as
Bolsonaro’s justice minister in May,
alleging that the president had tried to
interfere in police investigations, the
online brigade quickly labeled him an
“opportunist” who had never been a true
conservative believer. Investigations of
two of Bolsonaro’s sons for their alleged
roles in a kickback scheme among public
servants in Rio and in spreading libelous
statements against their rivals have been
dismissed as sour grapes on the part of a
corrupt elite still angry over the 2018
election result. The loss of support
Doomsday predictions
for Bolsonaro, frequent
in both the Brazilian and
the international press,
have failed to hold up.
Some political analysts
believed that the
scandals involving his
sons would damage his
approval ratings
Bolsonaro has experienced amid the
pandemic among wealthy, well-
educated voters has been offset by an
increase of support among poor Brazil-
ians, who are grateful to be receiving a
new emergency government stipend of
about $125 a month.
Indeed, even as deaths from
COVID-19 mounted and the economy
slid deeper into recession, many of
Bolsonaro’s supporters were urging him
to make a play for even greater power.
This time, the Supreme Court was the
main target; signs appeared at pro-
Bolsonaro rallies urging the president to
arrest some members of the court or
even to close it entirely. Following sev-
eral adverse rulings, Bolsonaro declared
that neither he nor the armed forces
would accept further “absurd orders”
from Congress or the judiciary. This fed
widespread rumors that the military
could intervene on Bolsonaro’s behalf in
the power struggle and even stage a
coup. Most observers doubt that is likely,
in part because of many army command-
ers’ misgivings about Bolsonaro.
Regardless, the parlor game of trying to
decipher the military’s true motivations
and the power dynamics among individ-
ual generals has once again become a
national pastime in Brazil—as it was
throughout most of its history until the
1990s.
The opposition, meanwhile, has
remained divided and in search of a new
message, still focused on its losing argu-
ment of 2018: that Bolsonaro poses a
threat to democracy. By the middle of
this year, efforts were gathering momen-
tum to launch a broad, pro-democratic
front with promising young leaders such
as Flávio Dino, the leftist governor of the
state of Maranhão, and Luciano Huck, a
television host and entrepreneur popu-
lar with both the business community
and Brazil’s working class. But much of
the left has refused to participate. Early
polls suggest that the 2022 election is
shaping up as another battle between
Bolsonaro and Lula da Silva’s leftist
Workers’ Party—which is still widely
reviled for its role in Brazil’s collapse
during the last decade—and that in such
a matchup, Bolsonaro would win hand-
ily.
Doomsday predictions for
Bolsonaro, frequent in both the Brazilian
and the international press, have failed
to hold up. Some political analysts
believed that the scandals involving his
sons would damage his approval ratings.
Others have predicted that if Trump
loses his reelection bid in November, it
could spell doom for Bolsonaro, depriv-
ing him of his greatest ally and hastening
the impeachment process in Congress.
Anything is possible; Trump’s recent
struggles suggest that today’s populists
are not invincible. But these forecasts
have probably been shaped by the same
fallacy that has plagued Bolsonaro’s
opponents since his unexpected rise to
power began: they ignore not only the
strong loyalty Bolsonaro inspires but
also the profoundly Brazilian nature of
his appeal. In the broad sweep of history,
Bolsonaro is arguably not an aberration
but a return to normalcy. The excep-
tional period may prove to have been the
past 30 years, when civilian authority, a
degree of tolerance, and an emphasis on
reducing inequality were the rule.
Today, Brazil is a country where,
according to a Veja/FSB poll taken in
February, 61 percent of people support
Bolsonaro’s idea to open new military
schools, 60 percent favor mandatory
religious instruction in schools, and
majorities oppose gay marriage and abor-
tion. The progressive Brazil the world
was accustomed to seeing, the Brazil of
samba and Carnival, still exists; it hasn’t
disappeared. But the Brazil of 2020 is
more like its president than many would
care to admit.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Cino-US Politics
An Answer to Aggression
How to push back against Beijing
s Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, March 2018.
By Aaron L. Friedberg
@AaronFriedberg
T he Chinese Communist Party’s
initial mismanagement of the
COVID-19 pandemic and its
subsequent attempts to exploit the crisis
have produced enduring problems for
the rest of the world. But the CCP’s
behavior has also helped clarify the
threat that China poses to the security,
prosperity, and well-being of other
countries. Public opinion polls show that
over 60 percent of Americans of both
political parties now hold a negative view
of Beijing’s leadership and intentions,
and similar attitudes can be found across
the democratic world. This heightened
awareness of a shared danger creates an
opportunity for the United States and its
allies to formulate a new and more
effective strategy for dealing with China.
For the past four decades, Western
democracies have hoped that engage-
ment with China would cause its leaders
to abandon any revisionist ambitions
they might harbor and accept their coun-
try’s place as a “responsible stakeholder”
in the U.S.-led international order.
Expanding flows of trade and invest-
ment would, it was thought, also encour-
age Beijing to proceed down the path
28 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
toward greater economic and political
openness. The policy of engagement was
not absurd on its face; it was a gamble
rather than an outright blunder. But as
has become increasingly obvious, the
West’s wager has failed to pay off.
Instead of opening up and mellow-
ing out, with Xi Jinping at the helm,
China is pursuing unusually brutal and
oppressive policies at home and acting
more aggressively abroad. China is try-
ing to replace the United States as the
world’s leading economic and techno-
logical nation and to displace it as the
preponderant power in East Asia.
Beijing has ratcheted up its efforts to
exploit the openness of democratic soci-
eties in order to shape the perceptions
and policies of their governments. It is
working hard to establish itself as the
leader of the developing nations and,
with their support, to rewrite rules and
reshape international norms, standards,
and institutions in line with its own illib-
eral, authoritarian preferences. In the
long run, China’s rulers evidently hope
that they can divide, discredit, and
weaken the democracies, lessening the
appeal of their system, co-opting some,
isolating others, and leaving the United
States at the head of what will be, at best,
a diminished and enfeebled coalition.
It is one thing to have such dreams,
another to actually fulfill them. In addi-
tion to its impressive strengths, China
has large and mounting liabilities,
including a slowing economy, a rapidly
aging population, and a system of gover-
nance that relies on costly coercion
rather than the freely given consent of its
people. These liabilities will complicate
the regime’s plans and could eventually
derail them. But it would be imprudent
to assume that this will happen soon or of
its own accord.
Deflecting Beijing from its present,
revisionist path will naturally require
defensive measures. In the face of
China’s growing strength, the United
States and its allies need to bolster their
defenses against overt acts of military
aggression or coercion. They must also
do more to protect their economies from
exploitation and their societies and
political systems from penetration and
subversion.
But better defenses alone will not
suffice. An effective strategy must also
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
have a strong offensive component; it
must be designed to identify and exploit
the CCP regime’s vulnerabilities instead
of simply responding to its actions or
trying to match its strengths. A purely
reactive posture might have been ade-
quate for dealing with a far weaker,
nascent rival, but it cannot succeed
against an opponent as powerful and
aggressive as China has become. Even as
they block Beijing’s attempts to advance
toward its goals, the United States and its
allies must therefore find ways to regain
the initiative.
The aims of this approach should be
twofold: first, to deny Beijing its immedi-
ate objectives, imposing costs, slowing
the growth of China’s power and influ-
ence, and reducing the threat it can pose
to democracies and to an open interna-
tional system; and second, by demon-
strating the futility of China’s current
strategy, to change the calculations of its
ruling elite, forcing them to eventually
rethink both their foreign and their
domestic policies. This will take time,
and given Xi’s obvious predispositions
and commitments, success may well
depend on changes in the top leadership
of the CCP.
As a National Security Council white
s Beijing will beat the nationalist drum no matter how Washington and its allies behave.
paper that the White House released in
May notes, it would be foolish to premise
U.S. strategy on “determining a particu-
lar end state for China.” But Washington
need not be fatalistic. Even as they
acknowledge that China’s future is not
theirs to decide, the United States and its
allies should articulate a hope for deeper
reforms that will someday change the
fundamental character of the regime.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
The democracies should not waver in
their insistence that universal values do
in fact exist and that all people, including
China’s citizens, are entitled to the rights
and freedoms that flow from those val-
ues. Anything less would be a betrayal of
principle, and of those in China who hold
fast to this belief.
A Leninist State in a
Liberal Order
Ever since the founding of the People’s
Republic of China, in 1949, the nation’s
leaders have felt threatened from within
and without. The principal danger has
always been the United States, which
Chinese leaders have seen as working
tirelessly to constrain their country, even
as it has spoken earnestly of engage-
ment. In Beijing’s view, the United States
has sought to encircle China with a ring
of alliances. It has also challenged the
legitimacy and endangered the survival
of the CCP’s one-party Leninist system
by proclaiming the existence of a liberal
international order based on principles
at odds with authoritarian rule.
Faced with these threats, the party
has pursued three essential goals: to
preserve its monopoly on political
power, to restore China to its rightful
place as the dominant power in Asia, and
to demonstrate the superiority of its
socialist system by transforming the
country into a truly global player whose
wealth, power, and influence will even-
tually exceed those of the United States.
Although these goals have not changed
over time, Beijing’s confidence in its abil-
ity to achieve them has. After a period of
relative quiescence, the regime now feels
strong enough to push back, not only
against the material strength and physi-
cal presence of the United States and its
democratic allies but also against the
insidious threat of their liberal demo-
cratic ideals.
A turning point in this process came
shortly after the 2008 financial crisis.
The near collapse of the global economy
aroused a mix of anxiety and optimism
among the CCP elite, deepening fears
about their own ability to sustain growth
and stay in power, while persuading
them that the United States and other
liberal democracies had entered a period
of decline. Beijing responded with
repression and nationalism at home,
mercantilism and assertiveness abroad.
These tendencies became much more
pronounced after Xi came to power in
2012. Under Xi, the CCP has finally aban-
doned Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide
its capabilities and bide its time.”
Despite his swagger, Xi is driven by
a sense of urgency. He is keenly aware of
his country’s many problems. CCP strat-
egists have also anticipated for some
time that China’s growing power would
eventually provoke counterbalancing
from others. If such a response comes
too soon, they recognize, it could choke
off China’s access to Western markets
and technology, halting its rise before it
can achieve a sufficient degree of self-
reliance.
Unlike other, earlier rising powers,
such as the United States, which estab-
lished regional dominance before pursu-
ing their global ambitions, China is try-
ing to do both at once. The mix of instru-
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 29
ments used varies with distance. Close to
home, Beijing is expanding its conven-
tional anti-access/area-denial capabili-
ties and modernizing its nuclear arsenal
in an effort to weaken the credibility of
U.S. security guarantees and undermine
the network of democratic alliances that
rests on them. But because China’s
capacity to project military power over
long distances is limited, the further
from its own borders China goes, the
more it must rely on other
tools—namely, economic statecraft and
political influence operations.
With the advanced industrial
democracies, Beijing wants to preserve
the status quo, which it considers favor-
able, for as long as possible. The regime
seeks to discourage these countries from
implementing tougher policies by high-
lighting the benefits of continued coop-
eration and the costs of potential con-
flict. It wants them to believe that they
face a choice between, on the one hand,
continued profits and collaboration on
issues such as climate change and com-
municable diseases and, on the other,
the terrifying specter of protectionism,
deglobalization, and a new Cold War.
The regime hopes that the democracies
will choose the promise of cooperation,
thus safeguarding Chinese access to
Western markets and technology, which
are still essential to the country’s quest to
become a high-tech superpower.
With its massive Belt and Road Ini-
tiative, a network of infrastructure pro-
jects that stretches across Asia, the Mid-
dle East, Africa, and Latin America,
China seeks to secure resources, tap new
markets, and expand its military reach.
But Beijing also aims to cement its self-
proclaimed position as leader of the
global South. Abandoning its past reluc-
tance to be seen as posing an ideological
challenge to the West, it now openly
offers its mix of authoritarian politics
and quasi-market economics as a model
for nations that want to, in Xi’s words,
“speed up their development while pre-
serving their independence.”
The CCP is also leveraging its rela-
tionships with elites in the developing
world to gain influence in international
institutions (such as the World Health
Organization) and encouraging develop-
ing countries to enter new groupings that
it can more easily dominate. Rejecting
what he calls the “so-called universal
values” of liberal democracy and human
rights, Xi has declared his desire to build
a nonjudgmental “community of com-
mon destiny” in which China would natu-
rally take the lead.
To an underappreciated degree, the
global South appears to be central to the
CCP's strategy. China's rulers may not
want to rule the world, but as the analyst
30 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Nadège Rolland has argued, they do
aspire to a “partial, loose, and malleable
hegemony” over much of it. Taking a
page from Mao Zedong's peasant-centric
playbook, today's leaders may also
believe that they can “encircle the cities
from the countryside,” rallying poorer
nations to roll back the influence of a
divided, demoralized, and declining
West.
The Cooperation Trap
A more competitive stance toward China
does not preclude working with it when
interests converge. But Washington
shouldn’t get its hopes up. Seemingly
sensible proposals that the United States
engage in “responsible competition” or
“cooperate while competing” overlook
the zero-sum mentality of China’s cur-
rent rulers and understate their ambi-
tions. As the CCP’s mishandling of the
COVID-19 outbreak made plain, just
because transnational policy coordina-
tion is desirable does not mean it will be
forthcoming. Democratic governments
must avoid the familiar trap of allowing
the alluring prospect of cooperation to
take precedence over the urgent neces-
sity of competition.
Nor should the democracies worry
that tougher policies will empower
hawks in the CCP. At this point, there is
no evidence that doves are nesting qui-
etly in its upper ranks. Persistent opposi-
tion to Xi’s current course is more likely
to force change than further attempts at
accommodation. The dominant hawks
must be discredited before any doves can
be expected to emerge.
Faced with greater resistance to its
actions, Beijing will inevitably blame
“hostile foreign forces” and amp up its
patriotic rhetoric. But these are well-
worn tactics that have been deployed
even when the United States was bend-
ing over backward to get along. Beijing
will beat the nationalist drum no matter
how Washington and its allies behave.
All that the democracies can do is convey
as clearly as possible that their stiffer
stance comes in response to the CCP
leadership’s misguided policies.
Beyond heightening its rhetoric, the
regime may manufacture crises, both to
play to a domestic audience and to dis-
courage foreign powers from challeng-
ing it. This is a real danger, as the June
skirmish on the Chinese-Indian border
suggested, but it should not be exagger-
ated. Despite being strategically for-
ward-leaning, the CCP has generally
been cautious in its tactics. It has shown
no inclination to lash out blindly or enter
into confrontations that it has reason to
fear it may lose or that could spin out of
control. Nevertheless, a strategy that
applies greater pressure to Beijing must
be accompanied by enhanced defenses
and a stronger deterrent.
Battleground Asia
The starting point for a successful U.S.
strategy lies in preserving a favorable
balance of military power in the Indo-
Pacific. If China can control the waters
off its coasts and sow enough doubt
about U.S. security guarantees, it will be
able to reshape relations with its mari-
time neighbors in ways that enhance its
power while freeing up resources to pur-
sue aims in other regions. Absorbing
Taiwan, for example, could give China
control of some of the high-tech manu-
facturing capabilities that it needs to
strengthen its military and economy.
It will be especially difficult for
Washington to right the military balance
in a time of tighter defense budgets, but
it can be done. Pentagon planners will
have to shift scarce resources away from
the Middle East and Europe and toward
the Indo-Pacific, while deepening coop-
eration with regional allies (particularly
Australia and Japan) and democratic
partners (including India and Taiwan).
They also need to prioritize the develop-
ment and large-scale acquisition of rela-
tively inexpensive weapons, such as
long-range conventional missiles and
unmanned air and undersea vehicles,
that can offset China’s sizable invest-
ments in its anti-access/area-denial
capabilities and its growing surface fleet.
A successful strategy for long-term
military competition with China must
also have an offensive component.
Greater investment in undersea warfare
is an area of particular promise in this
regard. By upgrading their already sub-
stantial capabilities in this domain, the
United States and its allies would high-
light the possibility of a maritime block-
ade of China. That, in turn, could rein-
force Beijing’s inclination to build
uneconomical overland pipelines and
transportation infrastructure. It would
also force China to invest more in anti-
submarine warfare—a costly and diffi-
cult business in which its navy has little
experience. For similar reasons, the
United States and its allies should refine
their capabilities to deliver precision
strikes with stealthy cruise missiles, con-
ventional ballistic missiles, and hyper-
sonic delivery vehicles. This could
induce Chinese planners to throw money
at underground bunkers and air and
missile defenses, including for its newly
built and potentially vulnerable island
bases in the South China Sea, rather than
spending still more on their own offen-
sive forces. Such U.S. and allied invest-
ments should be designed to redirect a
greater portion of China’s military bud-
get toward capabilities that are less
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s A Chinese-Thai joint naval exercise off the Chinese coast, May 2019.
threatening to the United States and its
allies and away from those that are more
so.
The Growth Game
The world’s democracies opened the
doors to their economies and societies
on the assumption that doing so would
cause China’s system to converge with
their own. Instead, they now find them-
selves vulnerable to a massive and pow-
erful state that rejects their values and
threatens their prosperity and security.
In the economic realm, what is
required is not total decoupling but par-
tial disengagement, a substantial
realignment of trade and investment
policies that takes account of three facts.
First, for the foreseeable future, Beijing
is not going to abandon its problematic
policies of stealing technology, subsidiz-
ing industry, and restricting access to its
s The United States can no longer afford to treat China as just another trading partner.
market. Despite their win-win rhetoric,
Chinese leaders are mercantilists; they
see economic relations as yet another
zero-sum struggle in which the goal is
not primarily to improve their citizens’
welfare but to enhance the power of the
party and the nation. Second, because of
the nature of the Chinese system and
Beijing’s doctrine of “civil-military
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
fusion,” even nominally private compa-
nies must be regarded as likely tools of
the state. And finally, a China ruled by
the CCP is not merely an economic com-
petitor but also a geopolitical and ideo-
logical rival.
In light of these facts, the United
States and other advanced industrial
countries can no longer afford to treat
China as just another trading partner.
Doing so only accelerates the growth of
China’s power while weakening the foun-
dations of their own. The democracies
should do nothing to make it easier for
Beijing to sustain its growth without far-
reaching reforms of the sort that engage-
ment was intended to encourage.
To defend themselves against sur-
veillance or sabotage, Washington and
its partners must restrict the role of Chi-
nese companies in building information
technology networks and other sensitive
infrastructure and prevent them from
acquiring more of their citizens’ personal
data. The democracies also need to limit
their reliance on China for some critical
materials and manufactured goods,
using tax incentives to encourage the
diversification of supply chains. If the
CCP continues to wield trade as a
weapon, the democracies will have no
choice but to limit their overall depend-
ence on the Chinese market.
For military and commercial rea-
sons, the United States needs to preserve
and extend its advantages in high tech-
nology. This will require a mix of defense
and offense, running faster to stay ahead
and doing more to slow China down. To
foster innovation, the U.S. government
needs to invest more in education and
basic research, encourage greater coop-
eration with the private sector, and
adopt immigration policies that attract
talented people from around the world.
At the same time, Washington must
work with like-minded countries to
reduce the rate at which ideas and tech-
nologies first developed in their univer-
sity, corporate, and government labora-
tories diffuse to China. These efforts will
not prevent China from advancing, but
they will slow its progress and force it to
bear more of the costs of innovation.
Some of the ways in which China
obtains technology are clearly illegal.
The United States must toughen its
enforcement of existing laws against
intellectual property theft and cyber-
espionage, but it should also go further
and punish violators with tariffs on their
products and restrictions on their ability
to raise capital in U.S. financial markets.
Given Beijing’s mercantilist practices
and hostile intent, even Chinese compa-
nies that are not violating the law must
be subject to greater scrutiny and special
restrictions. Proposed investments from
China should be tightly screened, and
stricter limits should be imposed on the
export of critical technologies, such as
the machinery and software required for
manufacturing high-end semiconduc-
tors. Washington has made strides in
these areas, but it has tended to do so
unilaterally. Undertaking these mea-
sures on a multilateral basis would give
them teeth.
More generally, the United States
must abandon for the moment the
dream of building a fully integrated
global economy. Instead, it should work
with like-minded countries to rebuild
and strengthen a partial liberal trading
system, one in which all the participants
genuinely adhere to the same principles
of openness and defend their interests
against those that do not. This is the best
way to promote trade among the democ-
racies and reduce Beijing’s economic
leverage—forcing it to pay a price for its
predatory behavior and perhaps, with
enough time and pressure, convincing it
to change.
Protecting Open Societies
The CCP exploits the openness of liberal
societies and, in particular, their com-
mitment to freedom of speech. Its use of
social media platforms banned in China
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 31
to spread disinformation about COVID-
19 in the West is just the most recent
illustration of this phenomenon. Many
of Beijing’s influence operations are
more subtle. In an effort to shape the
perceptions of foreign elites, it engages
them in profitable business ventures,
hires local lawyers and lobbyists to sway
them, and donates generously to the
influential think tanks and universities
they frequent.
Most of these activities are legal in
the United States, and many are the hall-
marks of a free society. Nevertheless,
tighter rules are clearly required in cer-
tain areas. Former members of Con-
gress, military officers, and executive-
branch officials should be barred from
lobbying for companies from countries
(such as China) that the U.S. government
has identified as posing a security threat.
And private institutions such as think
tanks and universities should have to
disclose the gifts they receive from for-
eign entities.
In addition to passing stronger laws,
the democracies should focus on
increasing public awareness of what the
CCP calls “United Front” tactics. These
typically involve employing seemingly
unofficial Chinese organizations or pri-
vate individuals to gain access to influen-
tial institutions and people in target
countries. More readily available infor-
mation about the links between these
intermediaries and the organs of the
party-state would help reduce the risks
of manipulation. Their counterparts in
democracies must also be made to
understand that in today’s China, there
is no such thing as a truly independent
think tank, foundation, university, or
company.
The American higher education
system is an extraordinarily valuable
asset that attracts people from the world
over. Although the vast majority of stu-
dents and researchers from China pose
no threat, prudence demands restric-
tions on those who are affiliated with the
People’s Liberation Army or other ele-
ments of China’s security apparatus.
Scientists and engineers who choose to
accept funding from and share their
expertise through Beijing’s talent-
recruitment programs, whether Chinese
nationals or American citizens, should
be barred from taking part in projects
funded by the U.S. government. And to
directly impose costs on the CCP elite,
Washington should restrict educational
and other visas for party officials
involved in human rights abuses or other
noxious and threatening activities, along
with members of their families.
The challenge for the United States
and other free societies is to do all of this
while remaining as open as possible to
32 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Washington cannot
oppose every one of
China’s expanding
activities in the
developing world, nor
should it try to. Some of
China’s investments will
prove wasteful, others
may provoke a local
backlash, and some
could even draw Beijing
into counterinsurgen-
cies or other costly
armed conflicts
individual Chinese citizens who have
legitimate reasons to study, work, and
live in their countries. Continued open-
ness helps undercut the CCP’s claims
that Western democracies have a prob-
lem with the Chinese people, rather than
with their government.
Winning Over the
Developing World
As the pandemic spreads across the
developing world, it will create opportu-
nities for China to deepen its influence
there. If countries that have received
loans through the Belt and Road Initia-
tive are unable to repay their debts to
Chinese lenders because they have been
stricken by the virus, Beijing may seize
the valuable assets or natural resources
they put up as collateral. Or it may seek
to accrue political capital, and gain
future diplomatic leverage, by renegoti-
ating the loans on more favorable terms.
Beijing is in a tight spot. If it insists
on the prompt repayment of outstanding
loans despite the current crisis, it should
be held accountable for the additional
hardship that results. On the other hand,
if some of their debtors default, Chinese
banks will suffer losses, and Xi may face
renewed criticism at home for his costly
overseas adventures. In any event, the
United States and the other advanced
democracies should ensure that the sup-
port that international institutions offer
distressed countries is not funneled
directly to Beijing, bailing it out of a prob-
lem of its own creation.
China must be made to bear the
reputational costs of its exploitative prac-
tices. Beijing is allergic to accusations
that it engages in “debt-trap diplomacy,”
an aversion that can be reinforced with
continued scrutiny, especially from inde-
pendent journalists and local
nongovernmental organizations. Gov-
ernments and nongovernmental organi-
zations in the advanced democracies can
make developing countries more resis-
tant to Chinese influence by helping
strengthen these institutions of civil soci-
ety.
Washington cannot oppose every
one of China’s expanding activities in the
developing world, nor should it try to.
Some of China’s investments will prove
wasteful, others may provoke a local
backlash, and some could even draw
Beijing into counterinsurgencies or
other costly armed conflicts. When its
gambits in the developing world saddle
Beijing with new burdens and generate
new vulnerabilities, Washington and its
allies should not stand in the way. At the
same time, to prevent developing coun-
tries from being drawn still further into
China’s orbit, the democracies must
have something positive to offer. That
may include aid, medical assistance,
more educational visas, and improved
access to their own markets. Western
governments should also work with
established international institutions
and private investors to fund infrastruc-
ture projects that are built to high stan-
dards, using local labor, and on reason-
able financial terms. Here, as in other
areas, the objective should be to regain
the initiative rather than merely respond
to China’s actions.
Waging Political Warfare
For all its investment in information
control, in the early stages of the COVID-
19 outbreak, China was unable to pre-
vent critical commentary and damaging
images from circulating domestically.
The authorities soon regained their grip,
silencing critics and unleashing a torrent
of self-praise, detailed accounts of disor-
der in other countries, and disinforma-
tion about the source of the virus. Yet the
episode highlighted both the importance
that the CCP attaches to shaping how
others speak and think about its actions
and the difficulty of actually doing so.
The democracies should not aban-
don their efforts to penetrate China’s
tightly controlled information sphere.
They should continue to invest in meth-
ods of circumventing the “Great
Firewall.” But finger-wagging and public
diplomacy campaigns are not the right
approach. Instead, the goal should be to
amplify critical Chinese voices and to
enable accurate information about what
is happening inside China’s borders to
flow back into the country. Before the
pandemic began, the Chinese public was
already concerned about the CCP’s cor-
ruption, unfair treatment of ordinary
citizens, and wasteful overseas invest-
ments. Especially if the coming eco-
nomic recovery is slow, dissatisfaction
on all these issues is certain to grow. If
the regime feels compelled to spend
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s Surveillance cameras in Shanghai, March 2019.
more money to deal with rising discon-
tent—either by addressing the genuine
needs of the Chinese people or by spend-
ing still more on internal security—it will
have to divert scarce resources from the
pursuit of its external objectives.
There is a growing recognition that
China’s problematic behavior stems
from the character of its regime; it is, as a
European Union communiqué put it in
2019, “a systemic rival” of the liberal
democratic West. In addition to high-
lighting the differences that separate
them from an authoritarian China, the
United States and like-minded countries
need to reassert their commitment to
their shared ideals. Unless their leaders
can forcefully and credibly articulate
those principles and act on them, the
democracies will continue to drift apart,
just as Beijing hopes they will.
The United States and its allies must
be prepared to take the offensive in what
CCP theorists describe as the struggle for
“discursive power”—the battle of dueling
narratives. The democracies should not
only push back harder against Beijing’s
false claims about the West; they must
also directly attack its distorted narra-
tive about itself. China’s material
achievements of the last several decades
are undeniably impressive. But they
were accomplished on the backs of
poorly paid and politically powerless
workers and peasants, at enormous cost
to the natural environment, and with
invaluable help from the advanced
industrial countries. The CCP’s attempts
to substitute the “right to development”
for widely shared conceptions of human
rights provide thin cover for its brutal
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
repression. China’s rulers live in fear of
their own people; they go to extraordi-
nary lengths to enforce what they label
“social stability,” spending billions on
internal security forces and high-tech
surveillance programs. Claims that their
system is superior, that its rise is unstop-
pable, or that it provides a desirable
model for others deserve to be
debunked.
By contrast, for all their shortcom-
ings, the democracies have a track record
of flexibility, innovation, adaptation,
and self-renewal that extends over two
centuries. They have achieved sustained
material progress while granting their
citizens the freedom to express their
opinions and choose their leaders. Need-
less to say, the case for liberal democracy
will be all the more compelling if its exem-
plars are themselves seen to be reaping
the benefits of the freedom, prosperity,
and security that they promise, practic-
ing the virtues that they preach, and
extending an open hand to those who
wish to follow a similar path.
The Long Game
At present, the United States is not well
situated to capitalize on Beijing’s bellig-
erence. The Trump administration
deserves credit for turning U.S. China
policy in a more realistic direction. But
for nearly four years, the president has
picked fights with the United States’
friends and allies, proved incapable of
speaking persuasively about democratic
values, and refused to criticize Beijing
for its egregious violations of human
rights. All of this has left the United
States poorly positioned to lead a coali-
tion in pushing back against China.
Meanwhile, the president’s decision to
make China a centerpiece in his reelec-
tion campaign, blaming Beijing for all
the hardships unleashed by the pan-
demic, has short-circuited some early
efforts at bipartisan cooperation in Con-
gress. Still, the fact that the Democratic
and Republican Parties are now accusing
each other of being soft on China and
competing to stake out the tougher posi-
tion suggests that a consensus has begun
to take shape.
If the United States and its allies are
able to engage in sustained resistance,
China’s leaders may eventually be forced
to reconsider their present path. For the
moment, however, Xi and his colleagues
appear to believe that they have the wind
at their backs and that, in any event, they
have no choice but to press ahead. It will
take time and effort to convince them, or
their successors, that their goals are unat-
tainable and that they should adopt a
more accommodating stance.
A change in the upper ranks of the
CCP, the emergence of a new leading
group persuaded of the need to take a
new approach, could bring a change in
tactics and perhaps an easing of ten-
sions. But the problem likely lies deeper
than the current composition of the
party’s Central Committee. In light of the
CCP’s implacable insecurities, over-
weening ambition, and obsessive desire
for control, it is difficult to see how a
China in which the party continues to
wield absolute authority can coexist com-
fortably in a world where liberal democ-
racies remain strong and united. Assum-
ing the democracies hang together, until
China changes, a prolonged period of
rivalry is therefore all but inevitable.
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 33
Poem
Coronavirus has Incurred an
Apocalyptical View
By Zehra Vistro
Lahore, Pakistan
This pandemic possess utter levity
It’s erupted the half race of the cosmos
Leaves you with no idea what is it going to unleash
Apocalyptic has incurred
Bliss flipped into a curse
A prospectus dream turned out into a nightmare
Dare not bid to bring the night and the day together
For the day is way too haughty
And the night is way too clingy
As it has cleaved to you for a quitetime
Thereof, put you in the shock of history
The Mcdonald world is endangered by a mere wave coronavirus
For it has the power to pose you in an isolation forever
Reflecting some gross movie scene:
The borders have been shut down, survivors live under surveil-
lance and sequestered in high-rise towers
However, insulation was never the idea of 21st century
That, indeed, befall when you work antagonist to the nature
All engrossed in the run race
To win it either at any cost or at any pace
For the jolt, you are going to face up
May be geared up or may not be
Don’t saddle the negligence and ignorance
34 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Black Nationalist
Civil Rights International
The fight against racism has always been global
s A protest in support of the Black Lives Matter movement in Seoul, South Korea, June 2020.
By Keisha N. Blain
@KeishaBlain
Shake the fear off your skin
Let the rumors and prejudice plunge into the gutter
For lest we eradicate the mark of sapiens on the earth
O
n June 13, 2020, Black Lives
Just as was done to Erectus and Neanderthals Matter (BLM) activists gathered
Who could tell, sapiens’ cognizant abilities aided them to in London’s Trafalgar Square to
extinct all other diverse races call for the eradication of racism and
white supremacy. With their fists raised
One day, will be the tale of its own doom high, the activists, mostly dressed in
What an upshot of irony! black, chanted, “Black power!” Were it
Sapiens that arrogated themselves to be Homo (wise) are not for the face masks, which they wore
coerced to get immure today to help stop the spread of COVID-19, the
scene could have been taken straight
While, the animals are relishing their time-out as the police- from the 1960s. In that earlier era,
men activists around the world connected
Nay! Not coronavirus but the materialism has broken out their own struggles to those of African
The feature that distinct today’s sapiens from their ancestors is Americans who challenged segregation,
disenfranchisement, poverty, and police
their engrafted unscrupulous genetic trait brutality—just as their successors do
No one owns the nature today. Meanwhile, Black American
The corona contagious virus is all-pervasive activists agitated for human rights and
Permeating from the downtrodden to the affluent called attention to the devaluation of
Black lives not only in the United States
Uprooting the idea of verification of people by their classes but all over the world, including in places
Bringing the world to the one stratum under colonial rule.
Many tend to think of that era's push
And pleading them to close off in its own harrowing peculiar
for civil rights and Black power as a dis-
style.
tinctly American phenomenon. It was, in
fact, a global movement—and so is BLM
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
today. By linking national concerns to
global ones, BLM activists are building
on a long history of Black international-
ism. Indeed, Black Americans have
always connected their struggle for
rights to fights for freedom in Africa,
Asia, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.
Although surges of Black interna-
tionalism have often been led from the
top—through the efforts of politicians
and diplomats—some of the most
dynamic and enduring movements have
developed at the grassroots, often led by
Black women and involving working-
class and impoverished Black people.
During the twentieth century, Black
internationalists organized on the local
level, frequently in urban centers, to give
voice to the concerns of ordinary people.
Utilizing diverse strategies and tactics,
they articulated global visions of free-
dom by working collaboratively and in
solidarity with Black people and other
people of color across the world. BLM
activists have carried on this tradition,
often using social media as a vehicle to
forge transnational alliances.
Although much has changed since
the 1960s, racism continues to shape
every aspect of Black life in the United
States. The troubling pattern of police
killings of unarmed Black Americans
sparked the current uprisings, but it rep-
resents only part of the problem; such
killings, horrific though they may be, are
merely symptoms of the deeper diseases
of anti-Black racism and white suprem-
acy. As BLM activists have emphasized,
these problems are not contained within
the borders of the United States: they are
global scourges, and addressing them
requires a global effort.
FOOTSTEPS TO
FOLLOW
BLM was launched in 2013 by the activ-
ists PatrisseCullors, Alicia Garza, and
Opal Tometi after the acquittal on mur-
der charges of the man who killed
Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African
American boy, in Florida the previous
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 35

s Black Lives Matter follows in the footsteps of previous movements against racism.
year. Following the 2014 police shooting
of another Black teenager, Michael
Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, BLM
evolved into a nationwide and global
protest movement. In a matter of
months, activists had established BLM
chapters in several major cities outside
the United States. In Toronto, for exam-
ple, Janaya Khan and Yusra Ali co-
founded a chapter in October 2014 fol-
lowing the police killing of Jermaine
Carby, a 33-year-old Black man, in
nearby Brampton, Ontario. A few
months later, a diverse group of activists
in Japan launched an Afro-Asian soli-
darity march called “Tokyo for Fergu-
son” in the wake of a grand jury’s acquit-
tal of the police officer who gunned down
Brown. Displaying signs in both English
and Japanese, hundreds of protesters
marched through the streets of Tokyo. In
the months that followed, BLM demon-
strations swept cities across Europe,
including Amsterdam, Berlin, London,
and Paris.
In 2016, Tometi delivered a speech
before the UN General Assembly and
issued a statement emphasizing an “ur-
gent need to engage the international
community about the most pressing
human rights crises of our day” and
pointing out that by internationalizing
the movement, BLM was following “in
the footsteps of many courageous civil
and human rights defenders that came
before.” Over the past several years,
BLM activists in the United States have
indeed forged meaningful alliances with
activists and human rights campaigners
elsewhere. The movement’s internation-
alization was made visible with the mas-
sive demonstrations that erupted in the
36 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
wake of the police killings of Breonna
Taylor, George Floyd, Tony McDade,
and other Black Americans earlier this
year.
In establishing such links, BLM is
very much following in the footsteps of
previous movements against racism. In
In December 1940, for
example, after reading
in the Richmond Times
about Akweke Abyssinia
NwaforOrizu, a Black
nationalist from eastern
Nigeria, she invited him
to speak before an
audience of PME
supporters in Chicago.
For ten days in March
1941, Orizu held a series
of public meetings with
Gordon and her
supporters, addressing
African nationalism and
the emigration of Black
Americans to Africa
the early twentieth century, civil rights
activists often called on African Ameri-
cans to see their interests as tied to those
of people of color elsewhere. In January
1919, for example, the Black journalist
John Quincy Adams published an open
letter to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
in The Appeal, an influential Black-
lectuals who sought international sup- abroad. In December 1940, for example, cance. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his
port in the decades that followed. after reading in the Richmond Times wife, Coretta Scott King, worked across
The 1930s saw the rise of a number about Akweke Abyssinia NwaforOrizu, a national borders and forged solidarity
of grassroots political organizations Black nationalist from eastern Nigeria, with people of color across the globe. The
through which African Americans built she invited him to speak before an audi- Kings joined a cadre of Black activists
alliances with activists of color from ence of PME supporters in Chicago. For and artists—including Randolph, the
other countries in the global struggle ten days in March 1941, Orizu held a actress and vocalist Etta Moten Barnett,
against white supremacy. During the series of public meetings with Gordon and the political scientist and diplomat
early 1930s, Pearl Sherrod, a leader of an and her supporters, addressing African Ralph Bunche—on a trip to Ghana in
organization called the Development of nationalism and the emigration of Black 1957, just after the country won its inde-
Our Own, became an early proponent of Americans to Africa. pendence from the United Kingdom. At
solidarity among poor nations, identify- Like Sherrod, Gordon saw a direct the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah,
ing the common interests between Black link between manifestations of white Ghana’s new prime minister, these Afri-
Americans and nonwhites in colonies supremacy in the United States and can American activists participated in
across Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and those in Asia, arguing in 1942 that the several events in the capital, Accra. Dur-
Latin America. In a 1934 editorial in the “destruction of the white man in Asia is ing an interview he gave while in Ghana,
Detroit Tribune Independent, she the destruction of the white man in the King credited the visit with renewing his
reminded readers that “the greater part United States.” In particular, she conviction in “the ultimate triumph of
of the colored world is today under white emphasized the connection between the justice.” Ghana’s liberation, he said, had
political control,” even though the challenges facing Black Americans and given him “new hope in the struggle for
majority of the world’s inhabitants were the plight of Indians under British colo- freedom.”
nonwhite. Echoing Garvey, W. E. B. Du nial rule. “The complete freedom of The following year, the anticolonial
Bois, and others, Sherrod called on peo- India will bring complete freedom to the activist Eslanda Goode Robeson, the
ple of African descent in the United American black people,” she wrote, “be- wife of the singer and civil rights activist
States to forge transracial political alli- cause the same men are holding them in Paul Robeson, joined Nkrumah, the Con-
ances. “Then, and only then will we get slavery.” golese leader Patrice Lumumba, the U.S.
owned newspaper, demanding that the power,” she wrote. labor organizer Maida Springer, and
United States seek to protect the rights Sherrod’s internationalist vision FREEDOM IN THE many other notable figures at the All
and recognition of people of color every- mirrored those of other Black intellectu- African People’s Conference in Accra. At
where. “Through the centuries,” Adams als and activists, including members of MOTHERLAND the conference, attendees advocated the
the Peace Movement of Ethiopia, the The Black internationalist movements immediate end of colonialism in Africa
noted, “the colored races of the globe
largest Black nationalist organization and organizations that formed in the and emphasized the significance of pan-
have been subjected to the most unjust
established by a woman in the United first half of the twentieth century laid the African unity. In subsequent years, sev-
and inhuman treatment by the so-called
States. Founded by Mittie Maude Lena intellectual groundwork for the civil eral well-known Black American activ-
white peoples.”
Gordon in Chicago in December 1932, rights and Black Power movements of ists and intellectuals, including Du Bois,
At around the same time, Madam C.
the PME advocated universal Black lib- the second half. Many of the African Maya Angelou, and Julian Mayfield,
J. Walker, a business pioneer who rose to
eration, economic self-sufficiency, racial American leaders who emerged during relocated to Ghana, drawn to the country
fame after making a fortune marketing
pride, and Black unity and attracted the 1950s and 1960s adopted an interna- by Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist vision and
beauty and hair products for Black peo-
around 300,000 supporters during the tionalist vision. For some of them, excited by the challenge of nation build-
ple, established the International
League of Darker Peoples with several 1930s and 1940s. Deeply attuned to Ghana—one of the first African countries ing in a postcolonial state. “I never
to gain independence from European
other well-known Black activists, includ- developments elsewhere, Gordon
colonial rule—held particular signifi-
dreamed to see this miracle,” Du Bois
ing the Jamaican Black nationalist sought out alliances with activists from later explained. “I am startled before it.”
Marcus Garvey, the labor organizer A.
Philip Randolph, and the Harlem clergy-
man Adam Clayton Powell, Sr. During
World War I, the ILDP provided a plat-
form for Walker and her associates to
advocate for the rights and dignity of
marginalized groups across the world
and to tap into surging anti-imperialist
and anticolonial fervor. In January 1919,
Walker coordinated a historic meeting in
New York City between a delegation
from the ILDP and S. Kuriowa, the pub-
lisher of the Tokyo newspaper
YorudoChoho. At the meeting, members
of the ILDP asked Kuriowa to encourage
Japanese officials to advocate racial
equality at the Paris Peace Conference,
which was scheduled to take place sev-
eral days later. They received a favorable
response from Kuriowa, who assured
them: “The race question will be raised at
the peace table.” Western officials ulti-
mately sidelined the issue of racial preju-
dice at the conference. But Walker’s
actions laid the groundwork for a new
generation of Black activists and intel-
s A demonstrator wears a t-shirt with the image of Malcolm X in Brasilia, Brazil, June 2020.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 37
 During this period, activists skill-
fully leveraged their transnational alli-
ances and global audience to bring inter-
national pressure on the United States to
confront racism and discrimination.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War,
U.S. leaders wanted their country to be
seen as a champion of equal rights and
democracy and as a beacon of freedom.
But efforts to draw a stark contrast
between U.S. democracy and Soviet com-
munism were undermined by the mis-
treatment of Black Americans. Black
leaders took advantage of this tension to
advance the struggle for civil and human
rights.
Less well-known and more radical
African American activists also drew
inspiration from overseas and built
international networks. From 1957 to
1963, the Universal Association of Ethio-
pian Women, a grassroots organization
led by the radical Black activist Audley
“Queen Mother” Moore, brought
together Black women in Louisiana to
seek reparations, welfare rights, and
legal aid for Black men in the United
States who had been wrongly accused of
rape. Moore emphasized the need to
secure rights and freedom for “Africans
everywhere at home and abroad,” and
the UAEW actively forged transnational
relationships, including with the Kenyan
labor leader and pan-Africanist Tom
Mboya.
Moore mentored a number of Black
Power activists, including Malcolm X.
Her dreams of global Black liberation
influenced the internationalist ideas that
defined his later years. In 1964, Malcolm
X toured West Africa for six months,
during which time he made a pilgrimage
to Mecca. When he returned to the
United States, he established the Organi-
zation of Afro-American Unity, which
became a significant vehicle for Black
internationalist organizing in the 1960s.
During his first public address on behalf
of the new organization, Malcolm
X—who had adopted the name el-Hajj
Malik el-Shabazz following his trip to
Mecca—explained that the new group
would seek to organize “everyone in the
Western Hemisphere of African descent
into one united force” and, eventually, to
“unite with our brothers on the mother-
land, on the continent of Africa.”
Malcolm’s work inspired the activ-
ists in the Black Panther Party, originally
established in Los Angeles in 1966 by
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale to chal-
lenge police brutality against African
Americans—much like today’s BLM
movement. And, like BLM, the BPP’s
work in the United States sparked a
global movement to confront anti-Black
racism. By the late 1960s, BPP chapters
could be found in several cities across the
38 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
globe, including Algiers and London.
BPP leaders also maintained strong
transnational alliances with activists in
diverse places, such as Cuba, India,
Israel, and New Zealand.
From the late 1960s to the early
1990s, African Americans were actively
engaged in the struggle to end apartheid
in South Africa. Several organizations,
including the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People and
the National Council of Negro Women,
supported the antiapartheid movement
through picketing, lobbying, fundrais-
ing, and other activities. Prominent Afri-
can American celebrities, such as Harry
Belafonte, Arthur Ashe, and Stevie Won-
der, also lent their support, using their
platforms to bring international atten-
The collaboration
between African
American and South
African activists
highlighted the power
and significance of Black
internationalism as a
political strategy.
Activists in both
countries endured some
of the same challenges,
including
anticommunist smear
campaigns waged by
officials intent on
suppressing Black
resistance. Yet these
transnational exchanges
played a vital role in
shaping the foreign
policies of both nations
tion to the issue.
The collaboration between African
American and South African activists
highlighted the power and significance
of Black internationalism as a political
strategy. Activists in both countries
endured some of the same challenges,
including anticommunist smear cam-
paigns waged by officials intent on sup-
pressing Black resistance. Yet these
transnational exchanges played a vital
role in shaping the foreign policies of
both nations. The political gains and
successes, no matter how small, helped
invigorate organizers, who drew inspira-
tion from one another as they worked to
dismantle racism and white supremacy.
By linking local and national concerns
with global ones, activists during this
period set a precedent for future genera-
tions of Black internationalists, includ-
ing members of BLM.
BLACK LIVES MATTER
— EVERYWHERE
In a recent interview, Cullors, one of the
co-founders of BLM, described the cur-
rent uprisings as “a watershed moment”
in U.S. and global history. “The entire
world is saying, ‘Black lives matter,’” she
added. “The world is watching us,”
remarked her fellow co-founder Tometi.
“We see these rallies in solidarity emerg-
ing all across the globe, and I have
friends texting me with their images in
France and the Netherlands and Costa
Rica, and people are showing me that
they are showing up in solidarity.”
BLM has become a vital force in the
long history of Black internationalism.
The movement now offers a significant
platform for Black activists in the United
States to forge and deepen transnational
links with activists across the globe.
Today, BLM has a global network of doz-
ens of chapters. This number will likely
grow exponentially in the coming years.
The protests in the United States, in
their strength, reach, and sheer magni-
tude, are unlike any the country has ever
witnessed before. The COVID-19 pan-
demic—which has exacerbated already
difficult conditions for Black people in
the United States and abroad—has pro-
voked a sense of urgency among protest-
ers. As recent data have revealed,
COVID-19 infection rates in Black com-
munities are significantly higher than in
predominately white communities.
Owing to disparities in income, wealth,
and access to health care, among other
factors, Black people in the United States
are dying from COVID-19 at a rate that
far exceeds those for other racial groups,
laying bare how racism shapes every
aspect of Black life.
As the 2020 U.S. presidential elec-
tion looms, the uprising that began this
past spring in the United States is likely
to fuel new rallies and protests, which
will probably expand across the globe,
extending to new places and inspiring
activists of all races and social back-
grounds. Efforts to quell these move-
ments will also intensify—including
efforts that involve surveillance by local,
state, and federal law enforcement agen-
cies. However, the urgency of the
moment and the demands to dismantle
anti-Black racism and white supremacy
and the violence they yield will keep
activists in the streets. Those in the
United States can take heart knowing
that people all over the world see their
own struggles for rights and dignity
reflected in the BLM movement.
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Transnational Policing
To Protect and to Serve
Global lessons in police reform
s A Black Lives Matter protest in New York City, May 2020.
By Laurence Ralph
@Laurence_Ralph
P ublic outcry over the murders of
Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna
Taylor, and George Floyd earlier
this year has ignited mass
demonstrations against structural
racism and police violence in the United
States. The protests have reached every
American state and spread to countries
around the world; they arguably
constitute the most broad-based civil
rights movement in American history.
Protests against the brutalization of
communities of color by the U.S.
criminal justice system have been
growing for years, but the explosive scale
of the uprising this spring and summer
makes it clear that the United States has
reached a national reckoning.
Most Americans now understand
that their country needs a radical trans-
formation: polls conducted in early June
found that a majority of U.S. citizens
support sweeping national law enforce-
ment reforms. But as Americans embark
on an urgent public conversation about
policing, bias, and the use of force, they
should remember that theirs is not the
first or the only country to grapple with
these policy questions. Many reform
40 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
advocates and researchers have already
begun to look overseas, pointing to coun-
tries where police training looks vastly
different than it does in the United
States: countries where police depart-
ments take far different approaches to
the use of force or have even disarmed
entirely, where criminal justice systems
have adopted alternative sentencing
programs, and where authorities have
experimented with innovative
approaches to de-escalation.
Some of these ideas could be
adapted for use in the United States. For
too long, a culture of American
exceptionalism has been a barrier to the
implementation of policies that have
improved public safety around the globe.
Now, the United States’ capacity to heal
as a nation could very well depend on its
willingness to listen and learn from the
rest of the world.
BRUTALITY AND BIAS
If Americans and their political leaders
are to glean useful lessons from the expe-
riences of other countries, they must first
examine the practice of policing in the
United States and try to define—as pre-
cisely as possible—the nature and scope
of the problem. The aggressive tactics
that U.S. police departments employ
today were shaped by the legacies of slav-
ery and Jim Crow. During the late nine-
teenth century, the slave patrols and
militias that had regulated the move-
ment of enslaved people before emanci-
pation coalesced into more formalized
police forces, and they continued to
enforce the racial hierarchy in a segre-
gated nation. In the second half of the
twentieth century, as the country slowly
and often grudgingly integrated, police
departments honed the tactics of those
earlier eras as a new means of controlling
and repressing Black Americans. In
response to the protests and unrest of the
1960s, police forces developed the kinds
of quasi-military techniques that Ameri-
cans today have seen applied to a new
generation of protesters. In recent
decades, police departments have sys-
tematically harassed Black communities
with stop-and-frisk methods and aggres-
sive fines, which municipalities craved to
supplement their shrinking budgets in
an age of tax cuts and austerity.
This kind of policing does not sim-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
ply threaten the quality of life in Black
communities; it is a matter of life and
death. In 2014, ProPublica published
one of the most comprehensive analyses
to date of racial disparities in deadly
police encounters. Its examination
included detailed accounts of more than
12,000 police homicides between 1980
and 2012, drawn from the FBI’s Supple-
mentary Homicide Reports. During this
three-decade period, ProPublica found
that young Black men were 21 times as
likely to be fatally shot by law enforce-
ment as were their white peers.
The ProPublica investigation went
on to describe how white officers, who
were responsible for 68 percent of the
police killings of people of color, typi-
cally reported that they had used deadly
force out of fear for their physical safety.
Reliance on this rationale increased sub-
stantially after the Supreme Court’s 1985
decision in Tennessee v. Garner, which
held that the police could use deadly
force if a suspect posed a threat to a
police officer or to others. In the four
years preceding Tennessee v. Garner,
“officer under attack” was cited in just 33
percent of police killings; 20 years later,
over another four-year period, it was
cited 62 percent of the time, eventually
becoming an almost infallible legal
defense for police officers who kill.
The U.S. government has not made
data on police shootings available to the
public since 2013, despite a number of
high-profile fatal police shootings that
would have made these records a matter
of keen public interest. Although the
Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013
requires U.S. law enforcement agencies
to provide basic information about the
people killed while in custody, the extent
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to which individual police departments
have complied with this mandate is
unclear.
Citizen-led organizations have tried
to fill the void. A group called Mapping
Police Violence maintains a comprehen-
sive, crowdsourced database on police
killings in the United States, scouring
social media, obituaries, and criminal
records in an effort to account for every
lost life. In an analysis of the more than
8,200 police killings that have taken
place in the United States since January
2013, Mapping Police Violence found
that African Americans were three times
as likely to be killed by law enforcement
as were their white counterparts. Cru-
cially, the group’s findings contradict the
common assumption that police officers
kill African Americans at higher rates
because they pose a greater threat: police
departments of the 100 largest American
cities killed unarmed Black people at a
rate four times as high as the rate for
unarmed white suspects. Still, in a
shocking 99 percent of the cases the
group analyzed, no officers were con-
victed of a crime.
GLOBAL POLICING
NORMS
The analysis by Mapping Police Violence
also contained another revealing find-
ing: the group compared the victim data
it had compiled against published crime
rates and found no correlation between
levels of violent crime in American cities
and the likelihood of police killings. This
presents a stark contrast with the rest of
the world, where correlations generally
exist between crime, social instability,
and police killings. The United States is a
wealthy, stable outlier in the list of coun-
tries with the highest rates of police kill-
ings. In 2019, the rate at which people
were killed by the police in the United
States (46.6 such killings per ten million
residents) put it right between the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (47.8 per
ten million) and Iraq (45.1 per ten mil-
lion), both of which are just emerging
from years of conflict. Countries with
levels of police brutality comparable to
that in the United States are generally far
more violent places to live and include
ones, such as Egypt and Iran, that are
often described by human rights cam-
paigners as “police states.”
Other factors also differentiate the
United States from wealthy, stable coun-
tries with low rates of police killings. For
one thing, the countries with the lowest
rates, such as Denmark, Iceland, Swit-
zerland, and Japan, have instituted
mechanisms for police oversight at the
national level. Although police unions
exist in countries with low levels of police
violence, these unions are generally affil-
iated with larger organizational bodies,
such as Sweden’s Confederation of Pro-
fessional Employees and the German
Confederation of Trade Unions, and do
not have as much power to insulate offi-
cers from punishment as police unions
in the United States do. Many profes-
sional groups in the United States have
experienced sharp declines in union
membership since the 1970s, yet Ameri-
can police unions remain strong, and
union protection frequently makes it
difficult to hold police officers account-
able for misconduct.
Compared with the law enforce-
ment infrastructures in countries that
have lower levels of police violence, the
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 41
U.S. law enforcement infrastructure is
extremely decentralized. There are
nearly 18,000 police agencies in the
United States. Most states have hun-
dreds of municipal police departments
and county sheriff’s offices, as well as
state police forces and highway patrols.
Additionally, the United States has a
large number of autonomous federal law
enforcement agencies, including the
FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, and Customs and Border Protec-
tion. As a result, the standards around
the use of force vary widely. On rare occa-
sions, typically after a city has been
embroiled in years of scandal, the federal
government and a municipality might
enter into a consent decree, which allows
the Department of Justice to monitor the
activities of a particular agency and shep-
herd any necessary reforms. Such over-
sight is considered an exceptional step in
the United States; in the safest countries
in the world, it is the norm.
In Japan, where just 0.2 people per
ten million were killed by the police in
2019, police departments are coordi-
nated and trained by the National Police
Agency. In Luxembourg (16.9 per ten
million) and Iceland (no police killings),
that role is filled by the Ministry of Inter-
nal Security and the Ministry of Justice,
respectively. In the Netherlands (2.3 per
ten million), the National Police Corps
coordinates policing efforts in different
regions of the country.
Other countries have also estab-
lished firm rules about police conduct,
which make deadly violence far less
likely. The Netherlands, for example,
employs more than 23,500 “peace offi-
cers,” known as BOAs, in addition to its
regular police force of 55,000. Although
a June 2020 decision by the Dutch Jus-
tice Ministry now permits BOAs to carry
batons under certain circumstances,
most are unarmed. BOAs receive train-
ing to help resolve noncriminal issues
and to de-escalate conflict by remaining
calm, inquiring about a person’s well-
being, and trying to reduce a person’s
anxiety—even while asking for identifi-
cation, issuing fines, and making arrests.
Such techniques also inform policing in
the United Kingdom (0.5 per ten million
killed by the police in 2019) and Norway
(1.9 per ten million). In both places,
police officers face far more restrictions
than their American counterparts when
it comes to the use of deadly weapons
and combat techniques that can injure
and kill, such as chokeholds.
Another commonality among coun-
tries with low rates of police violence is
the rigor of their training programs. In
2016, Colin Kaepernick, the American
quarterback who is widely believed to
have been blackballed by the National
42 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Football League for kneeling during the
national anthem to protest police vio-
lence, observed that in the United States,
“you can become a cop in six months and
don’t have to have the same amount of
training as a cosmetologist.” In fact,
Kaepernick’s estimate was too generous:
basic training can take as little as 21
weeks. By contrast, the requirements to
be a police officer in Germany (1.3 per
ten million killed by the police in 2019)
include at least two and a half years of
basic training, and in some circum-
stances, it takes up to four years to
become an officer. Iceland, which has
had only one fatal police shooting in its
history, requires two years of training.
CONFOUNDING
FACTORS
When analyzing police training pro-
grams internationally, it is important to
note that many practices that have con-
tributed to lower rates of police violence
elsewhere—changing the rules govern-
ing deadly force, training about implicit
bias, and emphasizing officers’ connec-
tions with the community—have also
been tried in the United States. And
although such approaches might have
led to some forms of progress, they have
not made a dent in the country’s shock-
ing rate of police killings.
In 1990, Estonia, a
country that today has
extremely low levels of
crime, abolished the
militsiya, its Soviet-era
police force, and
established a more
peaceful security force,
not unlike the unarmed
peace officers in the
Netherlands
One reason for this that is fre-
quently given is the prevalence of guns in
the United States, which is comparable
in this regard to no other country on
earth. Faced with a heavily armed popu-
lace, U.S. law enforcement agencies
often argue that they must have military-
grade weapons and the right to use
deadly force. Citing the correla-
tion—widely accepted in public health
scholarship—between the availability of
firearms and homicide, Derek Thomp-
son of The Atlantic recently described a
vicious cycle: “Where guns are abun-
dant, civilians are more likely to kill civil-
ians and cops, and cops are, in turn,
more likely to kill civilians.” In Thomp-
son’s view, “the morbid exceptionalism”
of police violence in the United States
can be sufficiently addressed only
through legislation that reduces the
availability of firearms. But when it
comes to weapons and law enforcement,
the central question, How much is
enough? has never been answered suffi-
ciently. In 2014, the Los Angeles School
Police Department announced that
although it had decided to return the
grenade launchers it had stockpiled, it
would be keeping its armored tank.
Yet the prevalence of guns is surely
not the only reason that reform efforts
have failed to address the worst forms of
police abuse in the United States. Nor is
the localized nature of policing or the
lack of federal oversight. Part of the prob-
lem, it seems, is that police departments
in the United States appear to be
immune to reform. Much has been made
of the fact, for example, that the Atlanta
police officer who was charged with mur-
der after the killing in June of Rayshard
Brooks outside a Wendy’s restaurant
had recently been trained in de-
ment abolished them, along with the tion of how the lack of resources in her lence with a combination of organiza-
escalation techniques. The same could Ministry of State Security, the Ministry community contributes to violence tional reforms, training programs, ethics
be said of hundreds of other officers in
of Internal Affairs, and the traffic police, seemed laced with resentment because, codes, and civilian-oversight bodies,
the United States whose reform-based all of which had become infamous for as she saw it, a vast expenditure of time along with efforts to ramp up recruit-
training should have led to different out-
extorting the public. and resources was being spent to clean ment and increase pay. But a coherent
comes in situations that ended in police The recent decision by the Minne- up a problem that should not have model of noncoercive policing has yet to
killings. That is one reason why many
apolis City Council to take steps toward existed in the first place. emerge in American cities. The federal
within the U.S.-based Black Lives Matter dismantling the city’s police force may In activist circles, the concept of government has stepped in occasionally.
movement have shifted from calling for seem extraordinary to many Americans, defunding the police has long stood in for Over the decades, large-scale, govern-
police departments to be reformed to but defunding the police as the first step a call to reprioritize the spending of tax- ment-commissioned studies, despite
demanding that they be defunded or toward an abolition program has been payer money. The argument is that the differing in their specific recommenda-
abolished altogether. the goal of grassroots activism for nearly government should redirect the billions tions, have almost always suggested fun-
From a global perspective, it is not
unprecedented for calls for police aboli-
a decade. Activist groups in Chicago, for that now go to police departments neling more economic resources into
example, have long discussed scaling toward providing health care, housing, police departments, even though more
tion to follow protracted political unrest back the city’s police department and education, and employment. spending has not led to meaningful
due to a lack of trust in the government redirecting its funds to social programs. Activist groups that seek to abolish reductions in police violence. That fact
and questions about its legitimacy. In In March 2018, young people of color in or dramatically cut funding for police has fueled the movement for
1990, Estonia, a country that today has Chicago staged a “die-in” at City Hall to forces often hark back to large-scale defunding—and it also explains the dis-
extremely low levels of crime, abolished protest then Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s social programs such as those developed satisfaction many activists felt when, in
the militsiya, its Soviet-era police force,
and established a more peaceful security
plan to spend $95 million to build a under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, the wake of Floyd’s death and the explo-
police academy. The young protesters noting that such programs did in fact sion of Black Lives Matter protests this
force, not unlike the unarmed peace offi- set up cardboard tombstones featuring work to create social mobility for many past spring, the Democratic presidential
cers in the Netherlands. The Estonian the names of people who had been killed Americans and helped keep them safe. hopeful Joe Biden suggested spending
police underwent another significant by the Chicago police, along with the The problem was that the programs were $300 million in federal funds to
transformation in 2004, as part of the names of schools and facilities in Chi- not extended to all citizens equally, par- strengthen community policing pro-
country’s process of integration into the cago that had been shuttered because of ticularly Black Americans. In this regard, grams.
European Union—a process that a lack of funding. it is important to note that the Scandina- Political scientists and social psy-
reduced the number of police officers in Speaking about her reasons for help- vian countries with the lowest levels of chologists have long been able to demon-
Estonia by 75 percent. ing organize the event, 20-year-old Nita crime and police violence also provide strate that even the mere perception of
Likewise, Georgia abolished its Tennyson explained: “In my neighbor- comprehensive social programs that racial bias within a police force erodes
police force following its 2004 revolu- hood, there are no grocery stores. We live have been remarkably successful at public trust in law enforcement and can
tion. Georgia’s newly elected president, in a food desert. There are a bunch of reducing poverty. Also, whereas in Den- compromise its legitimacy. If police
Mikheil Saakashvili, created a dramati- schools getting shut down. The mental mark, Norway, and Sweden, a high per- forces in the United States are to regain
cally smaller force, with support from health facilities are shut down, too. And centage of the workforce is unionized, the public’s trust, any serious discussion
the U.S. embassy, the European Union, that just leaves people with nothing to instilling job security, in the United of policing practices—including police
and the British Council—a move that has do. They become a danger to themselves States, unions have largely eroded since rules, training standards, reform efforts,
helped reestablish the legitimacy of the and their community. But if we had those the 1980s—except for police unions, and legal frameworks—must be part of a
government and quell corruption in the resources,” she continued, referring to whose profound influence has made it all new consensus committed to uniting the
country. In total, the government fired the funding earmarked for the police the more difficult to hold accountable American public around human dignity.
some 16,000 police officers because of academy, “we wouldn’t even need the officers who break the law.
enduring problems with corruption. police to try to stop those people, For more than a century, cities
After significant resistance from the because resources would already be in across the United States have periodi-
police unions, Saakashvili’s new govern- place to help them.” Tennyson’s descrip- cally responded to anger over police vio- l Laurence Ralph is Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Center on
Transnational Policing at Princeton University.
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October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 43
Partition Archives

Bhagat Singh’s India in Ferment

The voracious reader evolved with new knowledge and newer experiences, and grew as a
fearless partisan

s When Bhagat Singh was hanged along with his comrades Rajguru and Sukhdev on 23 March 1931 in Lahore jail, he was just 23 years old. Singh is hailed
as a pioneer in changing the narrative of the Indian freedom struggle that had been so far dominated by the Gandhian principles of non-violence. Though his
revolutionary principles often receive divided opinions, he is hailed by everyone for going all the way and sacrificing everything at a young age for his country.

Gandhi’s rejection of against the ruling alliance of zamindars spite of being the most necessary ele-
and British administrators. ment of society, are robbed by their
violence showed up in Gandhi’s rejection of violence exploiters of their labour and deprived of
his pact with Lord Irwin showed up in his pact with Lord Irwin their elementary rights. The peasant
that came about on the that came about on the eve of Bhagat who grows corn for all, starves with his
s Shaheed Bhaghat Singh photographed secretly at Lahore Railway Police Station, during his first arrest – 29 May to 4 July 1927 – in connection with Singh’s hanging. Though he did canvas family; the weaver who supplies the
Lahore Dussehra Bomb Case (25 October 1926) with Gopal Singh Pannu, DSP, CID Lahore.
eve of Bhagat Singh’s with the viceroy on behalf of the Indian world market with textile fabrics, has not
hanging. Though he did people to commute the death sentence, enough to cover his own and his chil-
he took care not to make it a condition for dren’s bodies; masons, smiths and car-
canvas with the viceroy the crucial pact. The Gandhi-Irwin pact penters who raise magnificent palaces,
By Jawed Naqvi on behalf of the Indian restored civil liberties for everyone live like pariahs in the slums. The capi-
@jawed_naqvi
people to commute the involved in the salt satyagraha (Salt talists and exploiters, the parasites of
March). All prisoners were to be freed society, squander millions on their
death sentence, he took except those that were jailed for violence. whims.”

I t was Bhagat Singh’s birthday last

month. The legendary
revolutionary was born on Sept 28,
1907, in Banga village in erstwhile
Lyallpur, the current Faisalabad district
of Pakistan. The Pakistan government
has declared his birthplace a national
heritage while India’s Punjab state has
offered to help set up the site as a world-
class memorial.
The two countries had earlier prom-
ised in vain to build a joint memorial to
Begum Hazrat Mahal — an older free-
dom icon — who lies buried near a foot-
path in Kathmandu.
Prof Chaman Lal, an old friend from
Jawaharlal Nehru University, has
avoided such lofty pursuits. He works on
collecting every letter, article, photo, or
scrap of paper that would help our
understanding of the truer hero that
Bhagat Singh was. Lal’s voluminous
Bhagat Singh Reader has leaned on
resources from both sides of Punjab and
beyond that could throw light on his
heroic life, struggles and dreams. Bhagat
Singh’s charisma had touched so many
Indians in his lifetime that historian and
member of Congress party, Pattabhi
Sittaramayya acknowledged the revolu-
tionary’s popularity rivalled Gandhiji’s,
says Lal.
An annual memorial fair is held in
Bhagat Singh’s village on March 23, the
day he was hanged in Lahore Central Jail
with his two comrades — Sukhdev and
Rajguru — in 1931, short of his 24th
birthday.
At that young age, Bhagat Singh
didn’t stay fixed in his beliefs. The vora-
cious reader evolved with new knowl-
edge and newer experiences, and grew as
a fearless partisan. He eventually began
to rejoice (without being preachy) in
being a self-confessed atheist. It was
ironical therefore to see the atheist’s
large image — and of his two non-atheist
comrades — sketched inside the Babri
Masjid.
Bhagat Singh’s picture smiled
laconically from the southern wall at the
rituals taking place 60 years after his
death. Under the central dome, a few feet
from his portrait, a pujari (Hindu priest)
was receiving devotees to worship the
image of Lord Ram. A policeman on duty
with an archaic 303 rifle was sharing his
insights, mouth brimming with tobacco
spittle, that Ram was born 900,000
years ago at the spot where the idol now
stood.
The instant historian’s account
might have found resonance when the
supreme court recently awarded the
disputed land to worshippers who cele-
brated the constable’s grip on the ancient
past. The verdict in any case enthused
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan who
promptly converted a mediaeval church
into a grand mosque. Bigotry is not any-
one’s national monopoly, Bhagat Singh
would have learnt early on.
What would he have said about
today’s India in ferment? That his por-
trait adorned the heart of Ayodhya
clearly indicated the region was in the
throes of revolutionary fervour during
British rule.
care not to make it a
condition for the crucial
pact. The Gandhi-Irwin
pact restored civil
liberties for everyone
involved in the salt
satyagraha (Salt March).
All prisoners were to be
freed except those that
were jailed for violence.
So went the pact
For a stretch of time in newly inde-
pendent India, the rural region became a
hub of Marxist activism. Gandhiji was of
course on the other end of the pole vis-à-
vis Bhagat Singh’s militant quest for a
socialist India. Gandhi had stopped at
Ayodhya once, and though a devotee of
Ram, he got off the train not to pray at
any of the several temples to his favour-
ite deity. He chose instead to berate res-
tive peasants who were on the warpath
So went the pact.
Ambedkar, not exactly a great
admirer of Gandhi, rescued him, how-
ever, with a more reasonable explana-
tion for why Bhagat Singh could not be
helped. He blamed the bloodlust of Brit-
ish politics and its bureaucracy of the
day. The Tory opposition would savage
the Labour government had Irwin gone
soft on the killers of a British official,
Ambedkar reasoned. He also described
the British bureaucracy as casteist.
John Saunders was assassinated on
Dec 17, 1928, in broad daylight in
Lahore. On Dec 23, in a proclamation
pasted on Lahore’s walls, Bhagat Singh’s
Hindustan Socialist Republican Army
owned up to the deed.
Bhagat Singh and fellow partisan
B.K. Dutt enunciated their understand-
ing of revolution in a statement made in
connection with the assembly bomb case
on June 6, 1929: “By Revolution we
mean that the present order of things,
which is based on manifest injustice
must change. Producers or labourers, in
Bhagat Singh and Dutt advocated
“radical change”, saying it was necessary
“and it is the duty of those who realise it
to reorganise society on the socialistic
basis”. For this purpose the “establish-
ment of the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat” was necessary.
Indian peasants are restive again,
not an unusual event for a largely mon-
soon-fed economy. Their perennial
exploitation and periodic rebellion has
been of a piece with Indian history. The
Indian government last week passed a
bill opening up the agriculture sector,
according to prevalent fears, to depreda-
tions from big corporates. Given that 86
per cent peasants are small farmers, with
five acres or less, the turbulence could be
earthshaking. In Punjab, Sikh farmers
usually assemble at Shaheed Bhagat
Singh Nagar to launch their protest.
l Jawed Naqvi is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.

44 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020

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Female Freedom
Reporting Rape
Every step of the way, the system is a monster
By Beenish Zia
@Beenish003
H ave you ever wondered what a
rape survivor goes through
post-incident? Let me walk
you through their journey and encourage
readers, in particular policymakers and
state officials, to imagine themselves in
the shoes of the survivor. And to keep
this feeling in mind when they take their
next steps.
The first torture for the survivor, if
conscious, is to report the crime. There is
no universal access number in Pakistan.
Therefore, depending on where you are,
you have to be in your complete senses to
know where to call to report. The longer
the delay between a crime committed
and its reporting, the weaker the case.
Within the state machinery, the
police are typically the first responders.
Yet they are a product of the same society
that reeks of patriarchy and misogyny.
We are naive to expect them to behave
differently, unless trained and under
strictly enforced protocols. As you can
imagine, that is not the case.
Unsurprisingly, the police engage
with survivors in an insensitive and judg-
mental manner — their questions reveal
they are mostly on the lookout for things
that the survivors must have done to
‘invite’ such ‘behaviour’. Although police
protocols require that a female officer be
part of the investigation team, this is
often not the case due to a number of
reasons, including shortage of female
officers.
Next comes the investigation pro-
cess. What is the first step, you ask?
Demanding the survivor prove her vir-
ginity. A survivor who was just assaulted
is then subjected to an intrusive, out-
dated and wicked procedure known as
the ‘two-finger test’ (TFT). It has no legal
or medical basis but is followed more
rigorously than any existing laws.
Recently, Punjab health authorities indi-
cated their intent to ban this horrendous
practice. However, as of writing, it is still
customarily enforced across the country.
After reporting, the survivor needs
to undergo a medical examination as
soon as possible. The most authentic
evidence that can prove rape is said to be
gathered within the first 24 hours — with-
out taking a shower or changing clothes.
According to official Punjab Police sta-
tistics for this year, 2,043 rape cases have
been registered to date, with only 295 (a
46 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
mere 14 per cent) being under investiga-
tion. One ray of hope in the investigation
process has been the growing use of
forensic labs (particularly in Punjab),
but the quality and usage varies across
provinces.
Let’s say you get this far, and the
case goes to trial. The torture doesn’t end
here. Rape has been criminalised under
Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code.
It mandates death penalty for gang rape,
and 10-25 years’ imprisonment or death
We need a universal
helpline that works
throughout Pakistan. It
makes reporting easier
and also generates useful
statistics for informed
and targeted decision-
making. The command
centre should inquire
about the issue and pass
on the complaint to the
relevant and nearest
team for immediate
relief
penalty for rapists. The case begins at the
sessions court but, like all other cases, it
can be appealed in the superior courts as
well.
While the law since 2016 requires
that a rape trial be concluded within
three months, this is rarely the case. The
final decision could take years, given the
backlog of cases. The mortifying treat-
ment a survivor endures is also psycho-
logically tormenting. Imagine being in a
courtroom filled with strangers (mostly
Multilateralism
The Crisis of a Lonely World
The world is more interconnected today than ever before and yet so atomised
men) and having to narrate the horrific
incident in as much detail as possible.
Imagine being cross-examined while
men snicker around you. Every step of
the way, the system is a monster.
Today, I don’t want to aim for the
sky, but to at least be able to look up. I
want to feel hope. Today, I want to rec-
ommend small changes, not big wins.
Firstly, first responder police teams
should be trained and given strict proto-
cols to follow. We need to criminalise By Maleeha Lodhi
breaches of protocol. @LodhiMaleeha
Secondly, we need a universal
helpline that works throughout Pakis-
tan. If the state doesn’t have the
resources, then it should find a develop-
ment partner. It makes reporting easier
and also generates useful statistics for
informed and targeted decision-making.
The command centre should inquire
T here is little doubt that the
present era is among the most
unsettled moments in
contemporary history. The 75th session
of the UN General Assembly has begun
with this and more. As the world grap-
ples with the coronavirus crisis, The
Lonely Century deals with another pan-
demic afflicting the globe, which the
author argues, is both personal and
nected to right-wing populism.
She argues that a conflation of
diverse causes and events have gener-
ated a ‘lonely planet’ — “structural and
institutional discrimination”, an urbani-
about the issue and pass on the com-
at a time of deep divisions in the world political, and whose linkages and varied sation wave, rise of neoliberalism and
plaint to the relevant and nearest team
for immediate relief. This is likely to elim-
even as it seeks to reaffirm the collective aspects she explores in her work, punc- fundamental changes to how we live.
commitment to multilateralism, now tuated by research findings from several Smartphones and social media have also
inate possible confusions and delays
under unprecedented stress. This is disciplines. She defines loneliness as not played an “integral role”, making us
caused over territorial disputes.
being challenged by big and regional just a feeling of being unsupported in a “more angry and tribal”. She describes
Thirdly, Pakistan should immedi-
ately ban the use of TFT across the coun-
powers trying to rewrite the rules of the social and familial context but also by neoliberalism as a particularly harsh
game by unilateral actions, which is fellow citizens, governments and the form of capitalism and maintains that
try. There is no legal reason for it, besides
eroding even the semblance of a rules- state. An example she cites is of the years this has made us “see ourselves as com-
being traumatising and humiliating.
Finally, police stations in every province
based international order. This urged preceding the coronavirus crisis when petitors not collaborators, consumers
UN Secretary General António Guterres two-thirds of people living in democra- not citizens, hoarders not sharers, takers
should have the numbers of listed NGOs
to recently reiterate that multilateralism cies felt their governments were not act- not givers, hustlers, not helpers”.
that can send professionally trained
is needed more than ever to “repair ing in their interests. Having known Noreena, an econo-
female facilitators to accompany first
broken trust in a broken world”. Feelings of isolation and loneliness mist and writer, over the years, I spoke to
responders to the crime scene, with her
Many paradoxes characterise the soared, she writes, during the lockdowns her about her latest book and asked how
prime purpose being to ensure the wel-
global landscape today. The world is and social distancing imposed by Covid- she manages to write on such diverse
fare of the survivor.
more interconnected than ever before 19. But what she calls the lonely century subjects. Her first work The Silent Take-
In conclusion, if we can’t do any-
and yet so atomised. International soli- didn’t begin in 2020. Even earlier, peo- over was, as its subtitle indicated, about
thing else, we should at least improve the
darity has never been more needed to ple felt isolated and disconnected. We global capitalism and the ‘death of
quality of state-citizen engagement post-
deal with common challenges but unity are, she asserts, in the midst of a global democracy’. It examined how govern-
incident. We can at least try to ease the
remains elusive. The Covid-19 crisis has crisis of loneliness. It is also a political ments had been losing power to private
pain and help the survivors and their
thrown these paradoxes into sharper crisis, she maintains, fuelling divisive- business and its impact on 21st-century
families begin healing through our han-
relief. ness and extremism in the US, Europe politics and society. Her last book, Eyes
dling of the situation.
Noreena Hertz’s new book deals and across the world, and closely con- Wide Open dealt with the present era’s
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October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 47
 Kashmir Unrest

Six-Track Kashmir Settlement

There are no risk-free or cost-free policy options for Pakistan on Kashmir

information deluge and navigating this
complex data landscape to make smart
decisions.
She explained that the common
theme in all her books has been to under-
stand a world in profound change and
help to shape the personal and political
choices citizens have to make. Did the
Covid-19 crisis motivate her to write her
latest book? She said she began
researching it two years ago and was
completing the book when the virus
struck. The global loneliness trend the
book discusses predated Covid-19 but
was accelerated by it. What about the
Of course, perceptions nerability and their sense of going
unheard by traditional politicians.
of isolation are not the Her chapter on digital distraction,
only factor behind brought on by technology, and social
media is also very insightful. She uses
support for right-wing research findings to press the case that
populism. Hertz these too are contributing to the loneli-
acknowledges this and ness crisis. Smartphones “fragment our
attention”, estrange us from people and
recognises that populism “create a splintered self” — among other
in different countries damaging effects she mentions. Apart By Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
from pushing people into isolated digital ashrafjqazi@gmail.com
has different underlying bubbles, social media is creating a
reasons. But she points meaner, more aggressive and angrier
to a growing body of world. This is more than apparent from

connection between the loneliness phe-
nomenon and support for right wing
populism? She said populist leaders
exploit vulnerable, disconnected citizens
by offering a ‘manufactured or branded
community’ to elicit their backing by
giving them a sense of belonging.
As this is among the more insightful
parts of the book it merits greater con-
sideration. Hertz argues that the ties that
bind people to each other and to the state
have been eroding as increasing num-
bers of people now feel isolated and dis-
connected from other citizens and their
governments. This trend she fears will be
compounded by the pandemic as eco-
nomic stress will likely fuel more disaf-
fection from political leaders. These con-
ditions, she shows persuasively, offer an
enabling environment for extremist poli-
ticians to manipulate. They, in turn, fos-
ter even more the politics of intolerance
often invoking the threat of their country
being taken over by immigrants or those
of other ethnicities and religions.
Of course, perceptions of isolation
are not the only factor behind support for
right-wing populism. Hertz acknowl-
data that shows that
feelings of isolation and
alienation have played a
key role in shaping
today’s fraught political
landscape. And she cites
the Trump phenomenon
as the case of a leader
exploiting people’s
economic vulnerability
and their sense of going
unheard by traditional
politicians
edges this and recognises that populism
in different countries has different
underlying reasons. But she points to a
growing body of data that shows that
feelings of isolation and alienation have
played a key role in shaping today’s
fraught political landscape. And she cites
the Trump phenomenon as the case of a
leader exploiting people’s economic vul-
W
‘trolling’ and offensive online behaviour. hat is a Kashmir settlement?
Therefore, Hertz urges the need to hold It should mean the
social media to account and acknowl- implementation of UN
edge the great dangers of “tech addic- resolutions on Kashmir, including the
tion”. exercise of the right of self-
As she explained to me, her aim in determination. Or, given current
her book is not just to analyse the worry- realities, something as close to it as
ing trends of a lonely century but to call possible.
for action — for politicians to listen care- What would this take? It would take
fully to public concerns and grievances, a sea change in India’s Kashmir policy
for capitalism to align itself to the com- and in international attitudes towards
mon good, for governments to address the fatal prospect of genocide in India-
long-standing inequalities and for peo- held Kashmir and conflict between the
ple to put tolerance and compassion at two nuclear armed parties to the Kash-
the heart of their pursuits. Governments mir dispute.
have a unique opportunity “to seize the It would also entail recognising that
moment to rebuild our post-Covid for Pakistan’s diplomacy to be effective
world”. against India’s greater strategic and eco-
The question is whether this sensi- nomic weight, and overcome the status
ble advice will be heeded by those who quo inertia of the international commu-
are shaping the destinies of their nations nity, it is not enough just to have a supe-
and of a deeply troubled world. rior diplomatic and legal narrative on
Kashmir.
Pakistan would need to project a
political, economic, human rights, and
national development image that rein-
forces its democratic credentials and its
l Maliha Lodhi is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN. narrative on Jammu and Kashmir.
This is especially important in light
of India’s attempts to undermine Paki-
stan’s arguments and image through
allegations of support for terrorism in
Kashmir, India and Afghanistan. India’s
attempt to have Pakistan blacklisted by
the Financial Action Task Force is just
one example.
India’s attempt is reinforced by
international perceptions of structurally
undemocratic, corrupt, and dysfunc-
tional governance in Pakistan. Accord-
ingly, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy needs to
be embedded in a national transforma-
tion imperative. The entrenched status
quo structure in Pakistan, however, is a
major obstacle.
So, what are the current prospects
for peace in Kashmir? Exceedingly dim!
But they can brighten very considerably
if Pakistan can seriously begin to tackle
its vast range of mutually reinforcing
domestic challenges and implement a
multi-track Kashmir policy.
What is the situation in IHK a year
after Aug 5, 2019? India is getting away
with murder! The forever disgraced
Kashmiri Quislings, Mir Jafars and Mir
Sadiqs who ruled IHK for decades on
behalf of India, but publicly repented
their actions after Aug 5, 2019, are now
crawling back to their Indian masters
with pleas for the restoration of Articles
370 and 35A. They are seeking to deceive
the Kashmiri people again that they are
“champions of Kashmiri autonomy”.
Modi, however, is committed to
eliminating Kashmir’s political identity
altogether through administrative,
demographic, economic, political and
security policies or, if all else fails,
through genocide.
India is certainly internationally
isolated over its Kashmir policy. It is
angry and embarrassed over the interna-
tional condemnation of its Kashmir pol-
icy, especially since Aug 5, 2019.
But India will pursue its Kashmir
policy to the bitter end because (a) it
would be suicidal for any Indian govern-
ment not to; (b) there is no country will-
ing to compel it to reverse its policy; and
(c) even if that happened it would only
restore the status quo ante, along with
massive pressure on Pakistan to accept
the LoC as the international border.

48 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020

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October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 49

India and Pakistan would then be
expected to quell any Kashmiri dissent
on their respective sides of the LoC!
India would happily do so. Pakistan
would commit national suicide if it did
so.
What is to be done? It is necessary to
avoid both genocide in IHK and war with
India. But limiting Pakistan’s Kashmir
policy to ultimately unavailing diplo-
macy and ‘lawfare’, is equivalent to a
progressive surrender to India-created
facts in IHK.
There are no risk-free or cost-free
policy options for Pakistan on Kashmir.
A de facto surrender would entail an exis-
tential cost for Pakistan. This situation
has been brought about by India’s blind
arrogance and obduracy, and Pakistan’s
accumulated short-term and short-
sighted policies.
It is tempting to say that Pakistan is
in no position to take up such a challenge
given its parlous state today. However,
an integrated and mutually reinforcing
six-track Kashmir policy could render
the seemingly impossible possible.
The first track would, within the
framework of UN resolutions, seek to
restore dialogue with India in pursuance
of a negotiated and principled Kashmir
settlement in regular consultation with
the Kashmiri resistance leadership. A
likely Indian refusal to respond would
contrast with Pakistan’s constructive
and peaceful approach.
The second track would seek to
deter India from its current policies in
IHK which include gross human rights
violations, torture, and likely genocide
according to the Genocide Convention of
1948 and the Genocide Alert issued by
Genocide Watch on Aug 11, 2019, only
50 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
six days after Aug 5.
This would transform
Pakistan’s image,
maximise its policy
options, and render its
voice far more resonant
in the capitals of the
world. This is indeed a
humongous task. But
Kashmir has become an
existential challenge for
Pakistan along with
climate change, nuclear
conflict, dysfunctional
governance, food and
water insecurity,
pandemics, etc. This
task can never be cost
and risk-free. But
avoiding it risks
Pakistan’s existence
The third track would be to ensure
the survival of legitimate Kashmiri resis-
tance, including armed resistance, to
Indian annexation, black laws, atrocities
and genocide. This is entirely legitimate
according to international law, including
UN resolutions. However, to remain
legitimate such resistance must forbid
all acts of terror against unarmed civil-
ians.
A fourth track would need to
address any division of Kashmiri opin-
ion between the Pakistan and azadi
The Pillar of the State
Secrecy vs Justice
The press has every right to witness and report trial proceedings
By A.G. Noorani
Mumbai, India
options on the basis of a proper under-
standing of Article 257 of the Pakistan
Constitution. This reconciles the two
T he expression ‘lifafa’ for justice
has an altogether different
connotation from that of a certain
low form of journalism. This is not to say
that lawyers and journalists are
options within the Pakistan option and
denies India an opportunity to divide altogether innocent of corruption.
Kashmiri opinion. But it would require Fortunately, the latter is small in
Kashmiri trust in Pakistan’s fidelity to its number. Lifafa justice refers to a practice
developed in recent years in which
own constitutional obligation to the
Kashmiri people. lawyers provide sealed documents to
A fifth track would involve an inten- judges that no one else can see. This is a
sification of Pakistan’s diplomacy on gross perversion of justice.
behalf of (i) a principled and negotiated Justice Gautam S. Patel struck a
Kashmir settlement verifiably accept- forceful blow in the Bombay High Court
on Sept 18 when he rejected documents
able to Kashmiri opinion, especially in
tendered in evidence in a ‘sealed cover’.
the Valley; (ii) Kashmiri political and
human rights protections in order to The facts were simple: a group of peti-
avoid unthinkable outcomes which the tions alleging that the defendant’s com-
current situation is rapidly sliding pany had caused the petitioners great
towards; and (iii) making the interna- financial losses through illegal and
tional community aware of its existential unauthorised trades. Justice Patel
perused the petitioners’ affidavit, which
stake in restraining India.
included disclosure of the defendant’s
The sixth track would integrate the
five tracks into a comprehensive assets, the provenance of which the peti-
national transformation policy. This tioners questioned since the defendant
would transform Pakistan’s image, maxi- had claimed paucity of funds.
In declining the sealed envelope, the
mise its policy options, and render its
voice far more resonant in the capitals of judge made observations that also affect
the press: “Anything that I can see, all
the world.
parties before me are entitled to see. This
This is indeed a humongous task.
But Kashmir has become an existential is the only method that I know of to
challenge for Pakistan along with cli- ensure an open and transparent deci-
sion-making process.” When the counsel
mate change, nuclear conflict, dysfunc-
tional governance, food and water inse- expressed apprehension that the mate-
rial would find its way to the press, the
curity, pandemics, etc. This task can
never be cost and risk-free. But avoiding judge responded: “That is not my con-
cern. The fourth estate will do its job and
it risks Pakistan’s existence.
Such a policy recommendation will I will do mine. I decide matters before me
on the basis of the papers filed in court,
have to be fleshed out in detail to build an
informed and rational consensus on the not newspapers delivered to my door-
step. The press exists for a reason. It has
way forward. Existential challenges can
be unique opportunities. a purpose, one that it serves. I cannot
and will not curtail the rights of the free
l The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN press at the instance of this or that party.
missions in Iraq and Sudan.
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I refuse to proceed on the basis that the
press is always irresponsible. There will
be no gag orders here.”
The press has every right to witness
and report trial proceedings and peruse
documents in a case. On July 2, 1980, the
US supreme court delivered a landmark
ruling in Richmond Newspapers, Inc vs
Virginia: “People in an open society do
not demand infallibility from their insti-
tutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from
observing. When a criminal trial is con-
ducted in the open, there is at least an
opportunity both for understanding the
system in general and its workings in a
particular case. …
“Instead of acquiring information
about trials by first-hand observation or
by word of mouth from those who
attended, people now acquire it chiefly
through the print and electronic media.
In a sense, this validates the media claim
of functioning as surrogates for the pub-
lic. While media representatives enjoy
the same right of access as the public,
they often are provided special seating
and priority of entry so that they may
report what people in attendance have
seen and heard.”
In the infamous Profumo affair in
the UK, Judge Lord Denning was
appointed to conduct an inquiry because
security issues were involved. But that
was not the only reason why Lord Den-
ning conducted his inquiry in secret
rather than as per the Tribunals of Inqui-
ries Act, 1921. He decided on this unique
course because he felt that, “inasmuch as
it has been held in private and in strict
confidence, the witnesses were, I am
sure, much more frank than they would
otherwise have been”.
This confidence was hopelessly mis-
placed. In 1966, the UK government
appointed a royal commission on tribu-
nals of inquiry headed by Lord Justice
Salmon, who elegantly dismissed the
inquiry as “a brilliant exception” thanks
to Denning’s unique blend of qualities.
Having applied the anaesthesia, the
Salmon Report proceeded to perform a
thorough surgery:
“We do not believe that it can ever be
right for any inquiry of this kind to be
held entirely in secret save on the
grounds of security. It is true that a tribu-
nal does not hold a trial but only investi-
gates and reports. Nevertheless, reputa-
tions and careers may depend on their
findings. It is said that sometimes wit-
nesses are willing to give evidence only if
they are allowed to give it in private or in
confidence. This is no doubt true. But
such evidence in matters of this kind is
treated as suspect by the general public
and, in our view, rightly so. Secrecy
increases the quantity of evidence but
tends to debase its quality.”
This is precisely why, on Oct 22,
1990, the UK court of appeals warned
sharply against the practice of counsel
seeing the judge in private in a criminal
trial. Surely if the public has a right to
watch court proceedings, the right is
denied to them as well as the press —
their judicially accepted ‘surrogate’ — if
any departures are made from a public
trial.
In 1913, the Privy Council ruled:
“The order directing the proceedings of
this trial to be held in camera was so com-
pletely beyond the powers of the high
court that, although obtained at the
instance of the appellant, might be dis-
charged by her with impunity.”
l The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 51
US Trade Representative
How to Make Trade Work
for Workers?
Charting a path between protectionism and globalism
s A General Motors worker in Romulus, Michigan, August 2019.
By Robert E. Lighthizer
Washington, D.C.
T he new coronavirus has
challenged many long-held
assumptions. In the coming
months and years, the United States will
need to reexamine conventional wisdom
in business, medicine, technology, risk
management, and many other fields.
This should also be a moment for
renewed discussions—and, hopefully, a
stronger national consensus—about the
future of U.S. trade policy.
That debate should start with a fun-
damental question: What should the
objective of trade policy be? Some view
trade through the lens of foreign policy,
arguing that tariffs should be lowered or
raised in order to achieve geopolitical
goals. Others view trade strictly through
the lens of economic efficiency, contend-
ing that the sole objective of trade policy
should be to maximize overall output.
But what most Americans want is some-
thing else: a trade policy that supports
the kind of society they want to live in. To
that end, the right policy is one that
makes it possible for most citizens,
including those without college educa-
52 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
tions, to access the middle class through
stable, well-paying jobs.
That is precisely the approach the
Trump administration is taking. It has
broken with the orthodoxies of free-
trade religion at times, but contrary to
what critics have charged, it has not
embraced protectionism and autarky.
Instead, it has sought to balance the bene-
fits of trade liberalization with policies
that prioritize the dignity of work.
Under this new policy, the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, which I
head, has taken aggressive and, at times,
controversial actions to protect Ameri-
can jobs. But it has done so without
sparking unsustainable trade wars and
while continuing to expand U.S. export-
ers’ access to foreign markets. The U.S.-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),
which was first signed in 2018 and is
scheduled to enter into force this year,
offers the best and most comprehensive
illustration of this new approach. This
new way of thinking has motivated the
administration’s policies toward China
and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), as well. In addressing the chal-
lenges that remain, the administration
has the same goal: a balanced, worker-
focused trade policy that achieves a
broad, bipartisan consensus and better
outcomes for Americans.
The Limits Of
Interdependence
Before World War II, tariffs were high by
contemporary standards. From the
1820s until the late 1940s, the weighted
average U.S. tariff (which measures
duties collected as a percentage of total
imports) rarely dipped below 20 per-
cent. President Franklin Roosevelt and
the New Deal Congress ushered in a
period of relative tariff liberalization in
the 1930s, but the rate remained in the
mid- to high teens throughout the
decade. After the war, however, both
Democrats and Republicans came to
champion tariff reduction as a means of
preventing yet another conflict, arguing
that trade fostered interdependence
between nations. Trade liberalization
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
therefore came to be seen not just as a
tool of economic policy but also as a path
to perpetual peace.
Subsequent events seemed to vindi-
cate this view. Exports to U.S. consumers
helped Japan and West Germany rebuild
and become responsible members of the
world community. The tearing down of
trade barriers within Europe, starting
with the establishment of the European
Coal and Steel Community in 1951,
surely contributed to postwar security,
as well, by bringing the democracies of
Western Europe closer together and
setting a template for future coopera-
tion.
But interdependence does not
always lead to peace. In the United
States, economic ties between the North
and the South did not prevent the Civil
War. Global trade grew rapidly in the
years right before World War I; exports
as a percentage of global GDP peaked at
nearly 14 percent in 1913, a record that
would hold until the 1970s. Likewise, it
would be hard to argue that the rise of
Germany as a major exporter in the late
nineteenth century helped pacify that
country in the first half of the twentieth.
Japan’s dependence on raw materials
from the United States motivated its
attack on Pearl Harbor. More recently,
China’s accession to the WTO in
2001—which was supposed to make the
country a model global citizen—was fol-
lowed by massive investments in its mili-
tary capabilities and territorial expan-
sion in the South China Sea.
On the flip side, conflict over trade is
not always destabilizing or a threat to
broader foreign policy objectives. The
NATO alliance survived the tariff hikes
associated with both the 1960s “chicken
war,” when the United States clashed
with France and West Germany over
poultry duties, and the 1970s “Nixon
shock,” when the United States effec-
tively abandoned the Bretton Woods
system. The United States and Japan
fought about trade in the 1980s, but their
bilateral security alliance stayed strong.
Countries, like people, compartmental-
ize.
There may be situations when it is
appropriate to make concessions on
trade in order to achieve broader diplo-
matic aims, but one should keep in mind
that such bargains can prove costly in the
long run. Letting India join the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
precursor to the WTO) in 1948 with
nearly a third of its industrial tariffs
uncapped, for example, no doubt made
sense to Cold Warriors, who thought that
it would help bring India into the U.S.
camp. Yet the negative repercussions of
that decision persist to this day, now that
India has become one of the world’s larg-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
est economies and, at times, a trouble-
some trading partner for the United
States. Over the years, such concessions
have piled up.
Sometimes, the tendency to view
trade through the lens of diplomacy has
led to excess timidity. The most vivid
example is the failure of the George W.
Bush and Obama administrations to
meaningfully confront China’s market-
distorting subsidies and policy of forcing
foreign companies to share their tech-
nology. But there are many others. For
instance, until the current administra-
tion took office, the United States had
never invoked the procedures for enforc-
ing environmental commitments it had
bargained for in its free-trade agree-
ments. The Trump administration has
Concessions to achieve
broader diplomatic aims
can prove costly in the
long run
used those tools to crack down on illegal
timber harvesting in Peru and illegal
fishing in South Korea.
Although the United States should
not wield its economic leverage blithely,
fear of rocking the diplomatic boat can-
not be an excuse for inaction. The Trump
administration has demonstrated that it
is possible to take targeted yet aggressive
trade actions while managing the risk of
escalation. Despite the “sky is falling”
rhetoric that has greeted many of the
administration’s policies, the United
States has remained the most open of the
world’s major economies throughout
Donald Trump’s presidency. Even with
the recent tariffs imposed against China,
along with efforts to rescue the domestic
steel, aluminum, and solar power indus-
tries, the United States’ weighted aver-
age tariff was only 2.85 percent in 2019
(and 1.3 percent for imports from coun-
tries other than China). That’s slightly
higher than the 1.5 percent rate that pre-
vailed during the last year of the Obama
administration but still lower than a com-
parable figure for the EU: the 3.0 percent
weighted average rate it imposes on
imports from other WTO members.
History will judge the ultimate
effectiveness of the Trump administra-
tion’s targeted duties. But experience
has already proved wrong the Cassan-
dras who said that its actions would inev-
itably lead to a 1930s-style trade war.
The Efficiency Obsession
The other dominant school of
thought in trade policy is the economist’s
perspective. For adherents of this faith,
the sole objective of trade policy is mar-
ket efficiency. Lower tariffs and nontariff
barriers reduce the costs of producing
and distributing goods and services;
that, in turn, makes society as a whole
better off—so the argument goes. How
such policies affect the men and women
who do the producing and distributing is
of little or no consequence.
Rather than envisioning the type of
society desired and fashioning a trade
policy to fit, economists tend to do the
opposite: they start from the proposition
that free trade should reign and then
argue that society should adapt. Most
acknowledge that lowering trade barri-
ers causes economic disruption, but very
few suggest that the rules of trade should
be calibrated to help society better man-
age those effects. On the right, libertari-
ans deny that there is a problem, because
the benefits of cheap consumer goods for
the masses supposedly outweigh the
costs. On the left, progressives promote
trade adjustment assistance and other
wealth-transfer schemes as a means of
smoothing globalization’s rough edges.
Neither response is satisfactory.
Those obsessed with efficiency tend to
see employment simply as a means of
allocating resources and ensuring pro-
duction. In so doing, they greatly under-
value the personal dignity that individu-
als derive from meaningful work. Com-
mentators from Pope Leo XIII in the
nineteenth century to Arthur Brooks and
Oren Cass today have written eloquently
about the central role of work in a well-
ordered society. Doing honest work for a
decent wage instills feelings of self-
worth that come from being needed and
contributing to society. Stable, remuner-
ative employment reinforces good habits
and discourages bad ones. That makes
human beings better spouses, parents,
neighbors, and citizens. By contrast, the
loss of personal dignity that comes from
the absence of stable, well-paying
employment is not something that can
be compensated for either by increased
consumption of low-cost imported
goods or by welfare checks.
None of this is to suggest that mar-
ket efficiency should be irrelevant. But it
should not be the sole factor in trade pol-
icy, and certainly not an object of idola-
trous devotion, as some have made it.
When it comes to taxes, health care, envi-
ronmental regulation, and other issues,
policymakers routinely balance effi-
ciency with other competing goals. They
should do the same for trade.
In recent years, however, the fixa-
tion on efficiency caused many to ignore
the downsides of trade liberalization.
Particularly as elites came to accept free
trade as an article of faith, businesses
found that they could send jobs abroad
without attracting much negative pub-
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 53
s Trump visits a mask manufacturing facility in Phoenix, Arizona, May 2020.
licity. General Electric’s hard-charging
CEO from 1981 to 2001, the late Jack
Welch, told suppliers at one point that
his company would stop doing business
with them if they weren’t outsourcing
jobs. “Supply chain relocation” became a
cure-all peddled by management con-
sulting firms. Unfortunately—as
COVID-19 has made painfully appar-
ent—many companies caught up in the
outsourcing frenzy failed to appreciate
the risks.
Economic groupthink also led
policymakers to stop worrying about
trade deficits. In recent years, the U.S.
trade deficit in goods has rivaled the size
of many G-20 economies. In theory, if
the United States could produce enough
goods domestically to eliminate its $345
billion goods deficit with China, that
would be the equivalent in revenue
terms of adding two and a half more Gen-
eral Motors to the U.S. economy. Yet in
most policy circles, discussion of the
trade deficit has been limited to why it
supposedly doesn’t matter.
Many take comfort in the following
trope: “I run a trade deficit with my bar-
ber; since both of us are better off as a
result, trade deficits are benign.” This
analogy is flawed. A deficit with the bar-
ber is one thing, but if I run a deficit with
the barber, the butcher, the baker, the
candlestick maker, and everyone else
with whom I transact, the situation is
altogether different. Moreover, long-
term trade deficits must be financed
through asset sales, which can prove
unsustainable over time. To carry the
analogy further, the trade deficit I run
with providers of goods and services I
consume is benign if it is offset by the
54 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
surplus I run with my employer through
the sale of my labor. But the situation
may prove unsustainable if I’m funding
my consumption by taking out a second
mortgage on my home. And that is essen-
tially what the United States has been
doing over the past three decades by run-
ning a trade deficit year after year. These
persistent deficits are financed by net
inflows of capital—which means that
every year, the country must sell U.S.
assets to foreign investors in order to
sustain the gap between exports and
imports.
Academic theory also cannot hide
the basic fact that if a country imports
goods it could produce domestically,
then domestic spending is employing
people abroad rather than at home. This
tradeoff might be worth it if it frees up
workers to move to more productive,
higher-paying jobs. It might make sense,
too, if reciprocal agreements for market
access create new export-related jobs
that replace those lost to competition
from cheaper imports. But persistent
trade deficits should, at the very least,
cause policymakers to question the
tradeoff and inquire as to the reasons
behind the imbalance. Such scrutiny
should increase with the size of the defi-
cit. And particularly when trade deficits
are the result of currency manipulation,
a lack of reciprocity in market access,
unfair labor practices, or subsidies, the
United States should try to change the
rules of trade.
The Dark Side Of Free
Trade
The trade policy of the future should be
informed by a balanced assessment of
the past. On the positive side of the led-
ger, lower trade barriers and the prolifer-
ation of free-trade agreements in recent
decades swelled the profits of many mul-
tinational corporations. That benefited
not only CEOs but also middle-class
Americans who hold equities in their
retirement accounts. Trade helped
revive many of the country’s great urban
centers. Cheap imports and the rise of
big-box and online retailers have made
an ever-expanding class of consumer
goods available to the masses. In China,
India, and throughout the rest of the
developing world, millions of people
have been lifted out of poverty.
Yet the dark side is undeniable.
Between 2000 and 2016, the United
States lost nearly five million manufac-
turing jobs. Median household income
stagnated. And in places prosperity left
behind, the fabric of society frayed. Since
the mid-1990s, the United States has
faced an epidemic of what the econo-
mists Anne Case and Angus Deaton have
termed “deaths of despair.” They have
found that among white middle-aged
adults who lack a college education—a
demographic that has borne much of the
brunt of outsourcing—deaths from cir-
rhosis of the liver increased by 50 per-
cent between 1999 and 2013, suicides
increased by 78 percent, and drug and
alcohol overdoses increased by 323 per-
cent. From 2014 to 2017, the increase in
deaths of despair led to the first decrease
in life expectancy in the United States
over a three-year period since the 1918
flu pandemic.
Trade has not been the sole cause of
the recent loss of manufacturing jobs or
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s A phone manufacturing plant in Noida, India, May 2020.
of the attendant societal distress. Auto-
mation, productivity gains, foreign cur-
rency manipulation, and the financial
crisis of 2008 have played key roles, as
well. But it cannot be denied that the
outsourcing of jobs from high- to low-
wage places has devastated communities
in the American Rust Belt and elsewhere.
Of course, economic upheaval is
often the price of progress, and, econo-
mists insist, comparative advantage
should encourage workers to move to
more productive and higher-paying jobs.
But this theoretical phenomenon has
failed to materialize in recent years. Com-
pared with those who lost their jobs in
Outsourcing of jobs
has devastated
communities in the
American Rust Belt and
elsewhere
earlier periods of economic change, dis-
placed workers in modern, developed
economies typically have fewer and less
attractive options. In the United King-
dom in the nineteenth century, for exam-
ple, the repeal of the protectionist Corn
Laws prompted agricultural workers to
flee the countryside for industrializing
urban areas where factory jobs were wait-
ing. By contrast, the American factory
workers who were displaced beginning
in the 1990s either had nowhere to go or
ended up working in low-skill, low-
paying service jobs.
Rather than attempt to reverse
these trends, some argue that mature
economies should double down on ser-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
vices, the digital economy, and research
and development. These sectors contrib-
ute greatly to the United States’ competi-
tive edge, and the service sector employs
most Americans today and will likely
continue to do so for the foreseeable
future. At the same time, however, it is
difficult to imagine that the U.S. econ-
omy can serve the needs of working peo-
ple without a thriving manufacturing
sector.
The technology sector, for all its
virtues, simply is not a source of high-
paying jobs for working people. Over half
of the United States’ roughly 250 million
adults lack a college diploma. Histori-
cally, manufacturing jobs have been the
best source of stable, well-paying
employment for this cohort. Perhaps
with massive new investments in educa-
tion, former autoworkers could be
taught to code. But even so, there proba-
bly wouldn’t be enough jobs to employ
them all. Apple, Facebook, Google, and
Netflix collectively employ just over
300,000 people—less than half the num-
ber that General Motors alone employed
in the 1960s.
Moreover, the service and technol-
ogy jobs most accessible to working peo-
ple, such as data entry and call center
jobs, are themselves vulnerable to
offshoring. Economists have estimated
that nearly 40 million service-sector jobs
in the United States could eventually be
sent overseas—that’s more than three
times the number of current manufac-
turing jobs in the country.
Cheerleaders for globalization are
quick to point out that many products
manufactured abroad were designed by
engineers and researchers located in the
United States. But those jobs are not safe
from offshoring, either. China is invest-
ing heavily in its universities, and India
has no shortage of capable engineers. In
the technology sector, in particular,
there are valuable synergies from having
engineers located close to manufactur-
ing facilities. The back of today’s iPhone
reads “Designed by Apple in California.
Assembled in China”; tomorrow, it easily
could read “Designed and Assembled by
Apple in China.”
COVID-19 has exposed other prob-
lems with the erosion of the United
States’ manufacturing capacity. The
country has found itself overly depend-
ent on critical medical equipment, per-
sonal protective gear, and pharma-
ceuticals from abroad. Even Germany
and South Korea, strong U.S. allies, have
blocked exports of key medical products
as their own citizens have fallen ill. The
crisis also has demonstrated how over-
extended supply chains increase the risk
of economic contagion when a single link
in the chain is broken. Even before the
crisis reached American shores, many
U.S. companies were feeling the effects
of China’s economic shutdown. Now, as
companies prepare to reopen their U.S.
operations, many still can’t produce
what they want, since their overseas sup-
pliers do not yet have government per-
mission to reopen.
The United States should not
attempt to wall itself off from the rest of
the world in response to the current pan-
demic, but it should reinforce its deter-
mination to maintain and grow its manu-
facturing base. Trade policy alone can-
not do that. But as part of a broader suite
of tax and regulatory policies designed to
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 55
encourage investment in the United
States, reforms to the rules of trade can
play an important role.
A Model Deal
A sensible trade policy strikes a balance
among economic security, economic
efficiency, and the needs of working peo-
ple. When the administration began the
task of renegotiating the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement—one of the
president’s signature campaign prom-
ises—two things were clear. One was that
the agreement had become wildly out of
balance, badly out of date, and hugely
unpopular. The second, however, was
that undoing 25 years of economic inte-
gration in North America would be costly
and disruptive. The challenge in negoti-
ating the USMCA was to right NAFTA’s
wrongs while preserving trade with the
United States’ two largest trading part-
ners.
We started by identifying the main
imbalances, particularly in the automo-
tive sector, which accounts for nearly 30
percent of North American trade. Before
Trump was elected, nine of the last 11
auto plants built in North America were
built in Mexico. Yet 80 percent of the
NAFTA had become
wildly out of balance,
badly out of date, and
hugely unpopular
cars manufactured in those facilities are
sold in the United States. Over time, auto
companies started to use Mexico as a
place not only for assembling compact
sedans but also for manufacturing high-
value-added parts such as engines and
transmissions, as well as for producing
highly profitable trucks and suvs. The
net result was that the United States lost
a third of its auto-industry jobs to Mex-
ico: 350,000 since 1994, while Mexico
gained 430,000.
This wage-driven outsourcing was
not simply the work of Adam Smith’s
invisible hand. The gap between U.S. and
Mexican wages exists in part as a result
of widespread corrupt labor agreements
in Mexico. “Protection contracts,” as
these deals are known, are struck
between employers and unions, but the
unions do not in fact represent workers.
And the workers have no opportunity to
vote on the contracts. No wonder predic-
tions that NAFTA would cause American
and Mexican wages to converge never
came true. In fact, wages in Mexico are
lower today in real terms than they were
in 1994.
The USMCA requires Mexico to
eliminate protection contracts, ensure
56 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
basic union democracy, and establish
independent labor courts. Rather than
seek to micromanage labor policies in
Mexico— as critics have charged—the
USMCA sets reasonable standards that
correct a major source of labor-market
distortion in North America. Although
the new labor provisions received a chilly
reception by some parts of the Mexican
business community, they were warmly
embraced by President Andrés Manuel
López Obrador and his government. The
new obligations will not prevent compa-
nies from taking advantage of efficien-
cies in integrated North American sup-
ply chains. But they will eliminate a form
of regulatory arbitrage that hurts Ameri-
can workers.
The USMCA also overhauls the
“rules of origin” that govern trade in the
automotive sector. All free-trade agree-
ments contain rules of origin, which
require goods to be made mostly with
component materials sourced from
within the free-trade area in order to
qualify for duty-free treatment. In the-
ory, NAFTA’s rules of origin specified
that 62.5 percent of the value of an auto-
mobile had to be made up of parts manu-
factured in North America. But the rules
contained a peculiar quirk: the only parts
that counted in the equation were those
listed on a schedule created in the early
1990s and frozen in time. As cars
evolved, many expensive parts, such as
dashboard electronics and navigation
systems, simply didn’t figure in the cal-
culation of North American content. As a
result, cars with more than half of their
value composed of parts from outside
the continent could still be exempt from
duties. And the problem was only going
to get worse over time, as electric and
autonomous vehicles came online.
After discussions with the Canadian
and Mexican governments, American
labor unions, and the auto companies
themselves, we arrived at a solution that
will result in more investment through-
out the region while still allowing manu-
facturers the flexibility to stay competi-
tive. The USMCA sets a higher threshold
for the minimum fraction of a car’s value
that must be produced within North
America (75 percent). It also includes
separate requirements for the minimum
share of regional content in the highest-
value-added parts, as well as for steel
and aluminum. The USMCA makes
these requirements meaningful by elimi-
nating loopholes, and it includes a mech-
anism for revisiting the rules of origin in
the future to keep up with industry
trends.
For the first time in any trade agree-
ment, the USMCA also includes provi-
sions that discourage a race to the bot-
tom in wages, by requiring that 40 per-
cent of the value of a car and 45 percent
of the value of a light truck be manufac-
tured by workers who make at least $16
per hour. This rate is aspirational for
Mexico, where wages are closer to $3 per
hour, but it will create new incentives for
companies to invest not only in Mexico
but also in Canada and the United States.
The U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion, an independent, nonpartisan fed-
eral agency, projects that increased
demand for U.S.-sourced engines and
transmissions alone will create roughly
30,000 new automotive-sector jobs. By
my office’s estimates, the effect on the
entire supply chain will be close to
80,000 new jobs.
The USMCA’s rules
have been designed to
actually work
Critics have labeled these changes
“managed trade,” whereby governments
set specific goals in lieu of letting market
forces do their work. But rules of origin
feature in all free-trade agreements. The
key difference between those in the
USMCA and those in NAFTA and other
agreements is that the USMCA’s rules
have been designed to actually work.
They will ensure that the benefits of the
agreement will flow principally to Can-
ada, Mexico, and the United States, not
to other countries that have not provided
reciprocal market access. Indeed,
NAFTA-enabled free-riding has long
undermined U.S. leverage in negotia-
tions with other trading partners. Until
now, foreign automakers have been able
to obtain duty-free access to the U.S.
market by setting up assembly opera-
tions in Mexico, while manufacturing
most of the high-value parts outside
North America. With the loopholes
closed, the United States will be in a
stronger position to negotiate with
China, the EU, and others.
The USMCA can be updated as cir-
cumstances change. It contains a sunset
clause stating that it expires after 16
years. Every six years, however, the par-
ties will have an opportunity to review
the agreement and extend it for another
16 years. These periodic reviews will
force policymakers in all three countries
to avoid the temptation to defer mainte-
nance of the agreement and will allow
them to respond to unanticipated devel-
opments in their economies.
The Challenges Ahead
The principles of a worker-focused
trade policy should be front and center as
the United States confronts two of the
most significant trade challenges it will
face in the coming years: market-
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distorting state capitalism in China and a made more progress than the previous to any mechanism that would revive or
dysfunctional WTO. two administrations made in 16. replace the Appellate Body until it is
No trade policy decision since the Most important—and often over- clear that the WTO’s dispute-resolution
end of World War II proved more devas- looked by knee-jerk, partisan critics of process can ensure members’ flexibility
tating to working people than the exten- the deal—is that the administration has to pursue a balanced, worker-focused
sion of permanent normal trade rela- maintained pressure on China through a trade policy. Until then, the United
tions to China in 2000—a legal status 25 percent tariff that remains on half of States is better off resolving disputes
entitling it to the lowest possible tariffs. its exports to the United States, includ- with trading partners through negotia-
Despite President Bill Clinton’s predic- ing nearly all high-tech products. These tions—as it did from 1947, when the Gen-
tion that the move would allow the duties help offset the unfair advantage eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was
United States to “export products with- China has obtained through forced tech- signed, until 1994, when the WTO was
out exporting jobs,” the opposite nology transfer and market-distorting created—rather than under a made-up
occurred. The U.S. trade deficit with subsidies. At the same time, China has jurisprudence that undermines U.S.
China ballooned to over half a trillion made a series of purchasing commit- sovereignty and threatens American
dollars at its peak, and economists have ments that will create long-term market jobs.
calculated that the loss of at least two access for U.S. exporters, particularly In confronting these and other chal-
million jobs between 1999 and 2011 was farmers. Whether there will be a Phase 2 lenges, the path forward lies somewhere
attributable to the influx of Chinese depends on whether China complies between the openness of the 1990s and
imports. At the same time, Beijing with the terms of Phase 1 and whether it the barriers of the 1930s. Navigating it
increasingly forced foreign companies to is willing to fundamentally change its successfully will require flexibility, prag-
share their technology, a policy that model of state-run capitalism. Regard- matism, a willingness to break with past
resulted in the theft of billions of dollars less, the policy in place today protects practice, and the courage to take posi-
in U.S. intellectual property and helped American jobs, blunts China’s unfair tions that sometimes are unpopular with
China become the world’s top exporter of advantages, and minimizes the pain to international elites. The United States
high-tech products. U.S. exporters and consumers. must avoid the stale, reductionist para-
Without much success, the George
W. Bush and Obama administrations
tried to correct these problems at the
WTO. Our team has taken a different
No trade policy was
more devastating to
working people than the
decision to extend
permanent normal trade
relations to China
approach. We spent much of the first
year of the Trump administration inves-
tigating China’s history of intellectual
property theft and forced technology s Trump, along with China’s top trade envoy, Liu He, displaying the signed trade deal, January 2020.
transfer. Where the WTO rules provided
The challenges in the WTO are also digm of free trade versus protectionism,
a remedy—as was the case with China’s
vexing. Like many international organi- which oversimplifies complex issues and
discriminatory patent-licensing prac-
zations, the WTO has strayed from its stifles creative policymaking. This
tices—we filed a complaint with the
original mission. Designed as a forum for almost religious approach to trade policy
WTO. But where they did not, we turned
negotiating trade rules, it has become also obscures the fact that trade is an
to remedies available under U.S. trade
chiefly a litigation society. Until recently, issue on which it is possible to achieve
law. We carefully identified products
the organization’s dispute-resolution broad, bipartisan consensus in an other-
produced by Chinese companies that
process was led by its seven-member wise divided time. After all, the USMCA
had benefited from China’s market-
Appellate Body, which had come to see won the support of 90 percent of both the
distorting practices and imposed a 25
itself as the promulgator of a new com- House and the Senate.
percent duty on those products.
mon law of free trade, one that was This powerful consensus should
We remained open to a negotiated
largely untethered from the actual rules last, because it is rooted in deeply held
solution, however, and in January, the
agreed to by the WTO’s members. The values. Where trade is concerned, most
administration reached a Phase 1 agree-
Appellate Body routinely issued rulings Americans want the same thing: bal-
ment with China under which it will stop
that made it harder for states to combat anced outcomes that keep trade flows
forced technology transfer, refrain from
unfair trade practices and safeguard strong while ensuring that working peo-
manipulating its currency, strengthen
jobs. This was one of the reasons why the ple have access to steady, well-paying
protections for intellectual property, and
Trump administration refused to con- jobs. Neither old-school protectionism
eliminate a host of nontariff barriers to
sent to new appointments to it, and on nor unbridled globalism will achieve
U.S. exports. For the first time, these
December 11, 2019, the Appellate Body that. Instead, as the United States con-
commitments are in writing and
ceased functioning when its member- fronts future trade challenges, it should
enforceable through a dispute-
ship dipped below the number needed to chart a sensible middle course—one that,
resolution mechanism. The agreement
hear a case. at long last, prizes the dignity of work.
by no means resolves all the outstanding
The United States should not agree
issues, but in roughly three years, we’ve
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
October 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 57
Border Dispute
Asian boundaries
In 2020, neither India nor China is prepared for a compromise
By A.G. Noorani
Mumbai, India
I ndia’s Defence Minister Rajnath
Singh’s statement in parliament on
Sept 15 did nothing to clarify the
joint statement of the foreign ministers
of India and China in Moscow on Sept 10.
The five points the ministers formulated
are delightfully vague; as vague indeed,
as the famous Panchsheel or Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
formulated in the preamble to the India-
China Agreement on Tibet in 1954.
Accord on mutual withdrawal means
nothing unless the details are agreed.
India’s ambassador to China K.M.
Panikkar advised prime minister
Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954 not to raise the
boundary question then. The former
secretary general of the external affairs
ministry, Girija Shankar Bajpai, then
governor of Bombay, forcefully advised
settlement of the boundary issue before
signing the Tibet agreement. It was
signed on April 29, 1954.
Nehru did worse. On July 1, 1954, he
ordered that “all our old maps” should be
withdrawn. “New maps should be
printed” showing the entire northern
frontier as a clear defined line “not open
to discussion with anybody”.
This fateful decision lies at the heart
of the impasse in the India-China ques-
tion. In 2020, neither side is prepared
for a compromise.
In April 1960, Nehru could have
accepted Zhou Enlai’s offer in the talks in
New Delhi and settled the matter —
China to accept the McMahon Line in the
east and India to accept China’s position
in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh in the
west. The Tibet-Xinjiang road, vital to
China, ran through Aksai Chin. This was
and is a vital interest for China as the
McMahon Line is for India.
Therein lay president Ayub Khan’s
statesmanship. There were similar pin-
pricks on the border. The pro-West for-
eign minister Zafarullah Khan criticised
China. Ayub Khan asked for an honest
historical appraisal and put the best
brains on the job. This writer had the
privilege of extended talks with Agha
Shahi and Abdul Sattar.
The Pakistan-China Boundary
58 | GLOBAL AGE October 2020
Agreement of March 2, 1963, was based
on two fundamentals — the facts of his-
tory and the realities of today. The talks
were long-drawn. Contrary to the lie
spread by the Americans, Pakistan did
not yield a square kilometre of territory.
On the contrary, it gained from China
some 2,000 sq km of administered terri-
tory. The late Abdul Sattar, another
accomplished diplomat, described to
this writer how that was won.
For decades, if not centuries, people
from Hunza would cross the watershed
with their sheep and had thus acquired
grazing rights by long usage. There was
disquiet in Hunza over omission of this
In 1959-60, Nehru
was advised by a
historian and an
external affairs
ministry official who
detested each other,
vied for favours and
misled Nehru
right. Pakistan took up the issue with
China. Its diplomats were summoned to
a midnight meeting with Zhou. The first
question he asked was, “Are you other-
wise satisfied with the draft?” Their reply
was swift and reasonable. Satisfied they
were, and fully too; but purely as a ges-
ture of goodwill, they sought the grazing
rights. “You can have it,” was Zhou’s
reply.
One is reminded of B.R. Ambedkar’s
words: “Boundary marking is the task of
a surveyor; boundary making is the task
of a statesman.” China has settled its
land boundaries with all but two coun-
tries, India and Bhutan; 12 out of 14 coun-
tries. They are: Afghanistan (1963),
Kazakhstan (1994-5), Kyrgyzstan
(1996), Lao (1990), Mongolia (1962),
Myanmar (1960), Nepal (1960), North
Korea (1962), Pakistan (1963), Russia
(1991), Tajikistan (1999) and Vietnam
(1993-6).
In India’s case, Nehru was at fault in
1954 on the maps and in 1962 on the For-
ward Policy in Ladakh to recover lost
territory. But China is not blameless. It
raises its demands. It says today that
Zhou’s offer of a swap in 1960 is off the
table. It changes its lines on its maps. In
1980, Deng Xiaoping laid claim to areas
south of the McMahon Line. This was
soon enlarged as a claim to the Twang
Pact. Its Line of Actual Control changes
also.
Recent clashes on the frontier have
made a settlement more difficult. Since
1959, public opinion has been whipped
up. In 1959-60, Nehru was advised by a
historian and an external affairs minis-
try official who detested each other, vied
for favours and misled Nehru.
The tragedy is that each has its non-
negotiable vital interest secure under its
control. India has the McMahon Line,
China has the Aksai Chin Road. As for
the territory itself, Nehru described it
well: not a blade of grass grows there.
The truth is that in the 19th century
there were no linear boundaries. There
were frontier zones, ilaqas as they were
called. And historically, from the time
Kashmir was added to the British
Empire, its frontier was not defined. The
only frontier that was defined was the
McMahon Line and the Sikkim bound-
ary with China. Statesmanship required
a prompt definition of the boundary.
This was put off, with consequences that
are now upon us.
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