The document discusses how organizational habits and routines can impact an organization's success or failure. It provides examples of how NASA and the EPA consciously instituted routines that encouraged risk-taking and aggressive enforcement, contributing to their success. These included applauding when missions failed to encourage risk-taking, and establishing a process that defaulted to allowing enforcement actions at the EPA. The document states that the best agencies understood the importance of routines for guiding employee behavior, while the worst agencies failed to consider this impact of organizational habits.
The document discusses how organizational habits and routines can impact an organization's success or failure. It provides examples of how NASA and the EPA consciously instituted routines that encouraged risk-taking and aggressive enforcement, contributing to their success. These included applauding when missions failed to encourage risk-taking, and establishing a process that defaulted to allowing enforcement actions at the EPA. The document states that the best agencies understood the importance of routines for guiding employee behavior, while the worst agencies failed to consider this impact of organizational habits.
The document discusses how organizational habits and routines can impact an organization's success or failure. It provides examples of how NASA and the EPA consciously instituted routines that encouraged risk-taking and aggressive enforcement, contributing to their success. These included applauding when missions failed to encourage risk-taking, and establishing a process that defaulted to allowing enforcement actions at the EPA. The document states that the best agencies understood the importance of routines for guiding employee behavior, while the worst agencies failed to consider this impact of organizational habits.
groups have routines,” wrote the academic Geoffrey Hodgson, who spent a career examining organizational patterns. “Routines are the organizational analogue of habits.” To O’Neill, these kinds of habits seemed dangerous. “We were basically ceding decision making to a process that occurred without actually thinking,” O’Neill said. But at other agencies, where change was in the air, good organizational habits were creating success. Some departments at NASA, for instance, were overhauling themselves by deliberately instituting organizational routines that encouraged engineers to take more risks. When unmanned rockets exploded on takeoff, department heads would applaud, so that everyone would know their division had tried and failed, but at least they had tried. Eventually, mission control filled with applause every time something expensive blew up. It became an organizational habit. Or take the Environmental Protection Agency, which was created in 1970. The EPA’s first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, consciously engineered organizational habits that encouraged his regulators to be aggressive on enforcement. When lawyers asked for permission to file a lawsuit or enforcement action, it went through a process for approval. The default was authorization to go ahead. The message was clear: At the EPA, aggression gets rewarded. By 1975, the EPA was issuing more than fifteen hundred new environmental rules a year. “Every time I looked at a different part of the government, I found these habits that seemed to explain why things were either succeeding or failing,” O’Neill told me. “The best agencies understood the importance of routines. The worst agencies were headed by people who never thought about it, and then wondered why no one followed their orders.” In 1977, after sixteen years in Washington, D.C., O’Neill decided it was time to leave. He was working fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, and his wife was tired of raising four children on her own. O’Neill resigned and landed a job with International Paper, the world’s largest pulp and paper company. He eventually became its president. By then, some of his old government friends were on Alcoa’s board.