Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot
74 Phil 579 –Malpractice
FACTS: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in
securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that
he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the
poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took
notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he
admitted the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never
repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
“the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.”  The advertisement he
caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public.  .” It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for
leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of
the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
Ledesma vs. Climaco
Facts:  Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a
case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964,
Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to
withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge not only
denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the
two defendants. On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or
pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence,
Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.  practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty
Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio
due to appointment as Election Registrar. 
Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as
counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the
defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner
to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at
present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. 
Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty
required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in
the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the
ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The
fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the
lawyer's zeal. 
In People v. Holgado: “In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it
is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for
the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.” 
The present Constitution provides not only “that the accused shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel” but further provides that “Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.” This made manifest the indispensable role of
a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused. 
Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing.
The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
Cui vs Cui
Facts:The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by
the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free
of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act
gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the
order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of
donation)”Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers,
being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro
and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the
Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into
between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however
had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of
the position.Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his
brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the
demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of
Jesus.
 ISSUE: Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
 HELD: Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator. Jesus is the older of the
two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed
gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews
named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one
who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. Jesus Ma. Cui
holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of
the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two
weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio. The
term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a
law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle
its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education. The
founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the
works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this criterion,
the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of
administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was
disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a
fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
Raul Villegas vs Valentino Legaspi
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a
member of Congress may appear before the regular courts as counsel for
ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their
answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi,
then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the
representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it
is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate
jurisdiction”. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas’ challenged and
proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde
Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo
Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the
appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground
invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino
Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel
berfore CFI’s acting in their original jurisdiction. CFI’s have dual personalities.
They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate
courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar,
CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both
cases were not elevated to the said  CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs
in the case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.
 
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
“No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear
as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice,
regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies
to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations
Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative
agencies, are included.
Enriquez Sr. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-12817, April 29, 1960]
Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation and vesting in it
the ownership and control over all existing government-owned waterworks
systems. However, Bauan Batangas passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not
desire to submit their local waterworks to the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383. 
Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action
to be brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of
the Act. Given this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to
commence an action challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383. The
Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorney’s
fees, which the Auditor General disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan
had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel 
Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a
special counsel
Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of
the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the
municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law, which in this
case he is not. A fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of
engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have
requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincialfiscal in place
of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case
in court. 
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and
mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing
in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.
Salcedo vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-42992. August 8, 1935]
FACTS:
Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted
alleged contemptuous paragraph in his motion for reconsideration read as
follows:
“We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the
resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed
at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within out power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we
should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the
herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost
desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each
and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these,
which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of “sakdalism” and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of justice.”
The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty
of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that purpose. In his answer
Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in
said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that
they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt
to tell the truth.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.
HELD: YES. Atty. Francisco ordered to pay a fine of P200.00 in ten days and
reprimanded.
RATIO:As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not  right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now
is.It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of
his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but
it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guarranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Alawi v Alauya
Facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed
that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso
wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of
NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s  usurpation of the title of “attorney,”
which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is
“lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney”
because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the
Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
 Issue:Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of
Attorney
Held:He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine
bar.As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in
the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction
Santa Pangan vs Atty. Dionisio Ramos
93 SCRA 87 – Legal Ethics – Lack of Candor by a Lawyer  – Proper name to be
used by a lawyer
FACTS: In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against
Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared
before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one
which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name “Atty.
Pedro D.D. Ramos”. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such
name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos.
“D.D.” stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mother’s surname.
However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the
names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is
not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly
to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an
attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D.
Ramos”, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to
deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959
FACTS: Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent
Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter
issued scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to practice
as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office,
and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law for
requiring such examination as condition precedent before members of the bar
may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the
Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition
or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent
Office.
ISSUE: Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the transaction of
business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these
things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure.
They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of
the bar has been prepared.
　 　 　 　 As stated in 5 Am. Jur,
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions.”
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business in
said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions
of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from
his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
Ui vs. Bonifacio
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris
Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral
relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.  and unfounded allegations against Deles in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a
photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she and Carlos got married in
1985 but according to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii
State Department of Health, they were married in 1987.  The CAR Case -- an intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. 
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he
must also have a continued possession of good moral character. A lawyer may
be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct , which has been defined as the
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers,
as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great caution. 
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact
remains that her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she
believed as a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct
to warrant disciplinary action, it must be “grossly immoral”, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. 
A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must
also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. Her act of distancing herself on her
discovery that Carlos was married proves that she had no intention of flaunting
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. 
On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable that she did not know the year of her
marriage or she failed to check that the information on the document she
attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.
Deles v. Aragona, Jr.
AM No. 598; Mar. 28, 1969; J. Castro
Facts:
Aurora Soriano Deles, complainant , filed a verified letter-complaint against
Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. , respondent, for having made, under oath, false
Relations, Iloilo, cases 1254 and 1255, which allegedly caused hergreat
mentaltorture and moral suffering.
10 hectares of the estate by Deles to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the
possession of Enrique Soriano (brother of Deles) as lessee of said land. In effect,
the order likewise sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos
Aglinao of a portion of the said land being tenanted by themupon authority of
the lessee, Enrique.
IN DISREGARD OF THE ORDER, Deles attempted to take possession of the
landholdings by placing thereon her own tenants. The Aglinaos countered by
filing against Deles two petitions with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Iloilo.
After a hearing, the men of Deles entered the land in question and planted rice
thereon, this unauthorized entry prompted Atty. Aragona to file an "Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order" praying that Deles, her agent, or
any person acting for and in her behalf from interfering with the work of the
Aglinaos in their respective landholdings. Mrs. Soriano (wife of Enrique) went to
see Atty. Aragano - she told him that she was personally present when one
Albert, a tenant of Deles, accompanied by armed men, went to the land in
question and harvested the palay thereon over the protests f the Aglinaos; and
that she was told that they were acting upon orders of the Deles. POSSESSED OF
THE ABOVE INFORMATION, Atty. Aragona promptly prepared and filed with the
CAR an "Urgent Motion to Declare [Deles] in Contempt of Court."
Issue/s: Whether Atty. Aragona should be disciplined or disbarred for having
prepared and filed under oath the said motion.
Held:No.
#1 -- In People vs. Aquino, this Court laid down the decisional authority that
[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged — that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the
presence of malice — if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the
cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who
makes them— such as a judge, lawyer, or witness — does not thereby incur the
risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages.
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the
questioned motion for contempt are statements made in the course of a judicial
proceeding — i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 — besides being relevant,
pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely
privileged, thereby precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.
#2 -- Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause
for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle
of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Xxx. The ultimate test is
that of bona fides.
Indeed, the actuations of Atty. Aragano were motivated by the legitimate desire
to serve the interests of his clients -- Mrs. Soriano informed Atty. Aragano of the
incident coupled with Deles' admissions.
BLANZA VS ARCANGEL
Facts:
1. On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective
pension claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both P.C.
soldiers.
a. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers.
b. After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no progress
was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent to return the said
documents but the latter refused.
c. Upon questioning by Fiscal Rana to whom the case was referred by the
Solicitor General respondent admitted having received the documents but
explained that it was for photostating purposes only.
d. His failure to immediately return them was due to complainants’ refusal
to hand him money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him
from withdrawing the documents.
e. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over
the documents to the fiscal.
2. Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the
respondents exoneration.
a. However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at least a severe
reprimand considering:
1) his failure to attend to complainants pension claims for 6 years;
2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands
upon him, and
3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her documents.
Issue: WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance
Held: No.
1. Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the claims in returning the
documents has not been controverted by complainants.
2. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the
photostating expenses but they did not give him any money. Hence,
complainants are partly to blame.
3. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by
respondent during the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for the
photostating costs himself.
4. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to
complainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza
pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant because res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet.
MELANIO L. ZORETA vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004 (443 SCRA 1) requisite commission therefore as “reprehensible, constituting as it does,
FACTS: not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. documents.”
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring
documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the
had expired. The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of merit, certifications and disbarment. In the case of Nunga v. Viray, the Court had reason to state
verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
Case No. 01-6240, and in respondent's petition for certiorari filed in do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. By such
the Court of Appeals. misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
aforementioned documents, he was not commissioned as notary public, dignity of the legal profession.
which was in violation of the Notarial Law. Records also show, and as Also, on different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers
confirmed by IBP Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, for notarizing documents with an expired commission in the following
respondent had already notarized a total of 590 documents after the cases, to wit: 1. Flores v. Lozada, 2. Joson v. Baltazar, 3. Nunga v. Viray, and 4.
expiration of his commission as notary public without having renewed said Buensuceso v. Barrera.
commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating
profession. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES the
did not even attempt to present any evidence. His counsel filed an ex- penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As modified, respondent
parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED
answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore
gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of
unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainant’s a copy of this Decision.
evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack
of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge
and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and
valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a
duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year
2002.
ISSUE: What is the significance of the commission?
RULING:
For one, performing a notarial without such commission is
a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public
must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has

In re: David 93 Phil 461
FACTS:Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his
profession as a lawyer for a period of five years from the November 9, 1949.
The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed on March 17,
1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of
suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a
lawyer but as an agent. (For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of
Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion for execution. In another
civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a
brief for an order to demolish homes.
“In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to
disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge
of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In
Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I
am Practicing as attorney-at-law.”
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or
as part of firm name under the signature of another qualified lawyer because
the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or
congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because
he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative
body in violation of the constitutional restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what
the Constitution prohibits directly.”
PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity
as Director of the Philippines Patent Office
FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that
he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed
the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding
an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases
“ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter
of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who
passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his
right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence
of fact to beestablished in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court
but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work
involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and
conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should
be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod
FACTS: In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the
ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional
requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have
been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:
 Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
 Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
 Thereafter, until 1970, he went  abroad where he had a degree in
economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
 In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for
various local corporations until 1986.
 In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as  chairman of the COMELEC. What
constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court
appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know
that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is
loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases.  In the course of a
working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers
of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
Justice Padilla dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following  criteria
in determining what constitutes practice of law:
1. Habituality. The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually
holding one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving
the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term “practice of law” (Ernani
Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and
Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are
practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term “practice of law”.
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be
said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed
activities which are related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents
and giving legal advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his father’s law
office. The Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the
practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be “engaged” in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the
result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee,
working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsod’s track record which will show that he Monsod has
given the law  enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having
engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he
has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal
services, he was the one adviced and those services as an executive but not as a
lawyer.
De Leon vs CA 338 S216 (FULL CASE)
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is private respondents motion for reconsideration of the
January 22, 2001 Decision of the Court, which reversed and set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38664 and reinstated
Resolution Nos. 953268 and 955201 of the Civil Service Commission.
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private
respondents appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO
IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case
of Achacoso v. Macaraig,[1] we held that since private respondent was not a
Career Executive Service (CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain
permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES
position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned
without violating his right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on
September 26, 1990,[2] where the nature of private respondents appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was first
contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding
that Achacoso v. Macaraig  is not applicable to the case of private
respondent. The pertinent portion thereof reads -
The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable to petitioner
Montesa. Petitioner was appointed on August 28, 1996 by virtue of Article III of
the Freedom Constitution. He was extended a permanent appointment by then
Minister Pimentel and subsequently confirmed as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission. He is a first grade civil service eligible (RA 1080) the
appropriate eligibility for the position at that time and a member of the
Philippine bar.
There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution
or at the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by
the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August
1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency
in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination
was given on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement
at the time of the appointment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that
of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible.Therefore, having met all
the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be
removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and
due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his
appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present
case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing
Minute Resolution of the Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the
principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, [3] would bar a re-litigation of the nature of
private respondents appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated
in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be contoverted
anew and should be finally laid to rest. [4]
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res
judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed
that this is not the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the
principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which
is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence. [5]
In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private respondent
who was appointed in 1986 pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, though not a
CES eligible, possessed all the requirements for the position of Ministry Legal
Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, since a CES eligibility
was not, at that time, a requirement for the same position.
 A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was
adopted and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1,
dated September 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a
requirement for a position embraced in the CES. Thus:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive
Service shall be made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles
recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of
rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the
incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices
and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any
person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such
appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he
qualifies in such examination.
In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid
down the requirements for membership in the CES, to wit:
a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the requirements for
membership in the CES. Except as otherwise provided by law, no person shall be
admitted into the CES without having satisfactorily completed the program;
b) Admission into CESDP shall be limited to incumbents of positions falling
within the CES duly nominated by their Department Heads;
c) Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the incumbent-participant shall
be enrolled in the roster of CES eligibles and shall be qualified for appointment
by the President to the appropriate rank in the CES upon recommendation of
the Board. He may then be assigned to any position in the CES by the President.
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the
Freedom Constitution. A CES eligibility was an existing and operative
requirement at the time of private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal
Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were the said law and circular inconsistent with the
Freedom Constitution as to render them modified or superseded. In fact, the
Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of non-CES eligibles, like
private respondent, provided they subsequently acquire the needed eligibility.
It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the questioned
appointment was made on October 16, 1987, before the CES Board was
reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO examination was given in 1990,
as in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES
eligibility is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one who
does not possess such eligibility shall be temporary. Evidently, a CES eligibility
has always been one of the requirements for a position embraced in the
CES. The Court finds no reason to make an exception in the instant controversy.
Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina Bacal,[6] we
ruled that security of tenure in the CES is acquired with respect to rank and not
to position. Hence, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a
requirement in the case of private respondent, the mobility and flexibility
concepts in the assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or
reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of the same rank or salary,
[7]
 justify his transfer to other CES position without violating his right to security
of tenure.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for
reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez,  and Carpio,
JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
 Roberto Soriano v. Atty. Manuel Dizon (2006) (disbarment; frustrated
homicide)
Doctrine:
• The purpose for a proceeding of disbarment is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.
Facts:
Complainant was a taxi driver who overtook the accused”s car on his way home
after gassing up. Accused was drunk at that time and tailed the taxi until it
rounded by the Chugum and Carino streets. The accused stopped his car and
berated Soriano. There resulted an altercation, but Soriano merely tried to stop
Dizon from attacking him, because he was the older guy and he smelled of
liquor. Dizon dropped his eyeglasses, and Soriano picked them up. However,
when Soriano attempted to return the eyeglasses, Dizon had gotten a gun and
wrapped its handle with a handkerchief and fired a shot at Soriano. The bullet
got Soriano”s carotid artery, but he survived due to prompt medical treatment.
Dizon was convicted of frustrated homicide and applied for probation, which
was granted. However, he obstinately refused to satisfy civil liabilities with
Soriano. He also tried to settle with Soriano”s family with the vice mayor”s help,
but that got nowhere. He also fabricated stories that Soriano with two others
beat him up. Also, he was found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm.
Issues:
1. W/N Manuel Dizon”s disbarment was proper.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Accused displayed dishonestly and moral turpitude by his behavior.
Among others, the following facts prove that he lacks good moral character:
a. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
b. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the
latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
c. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent
went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant, who was unarmed;
d. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
e. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent
denied that he had shot Complainant;
f. Apart from his denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the
one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
g. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has, to date, not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. CA (181 SCRA 367
01/23/1990)
FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by
Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. These
properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a
loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel
Corporation. During the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were
sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on
the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial
and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same
properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower courtfound that private
respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.            his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of
the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation. Private
respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the records of the
aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual
and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees.
Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a
result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of
Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the
parcels of land.
Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum
meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of argumentsbetween the
parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private
respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given
by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash
advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980.
It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise
with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of
P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
ISSUES:   
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its
charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee.
2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such
lien.
3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the
actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruit basis.
HELD: 
1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall
also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of
the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse
party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment
of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging
lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires
as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance
of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of
as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when
something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. The
civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of
the frill satisfaction of their claims."
2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded,
is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction
subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorney’s
fees.
3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered in
fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the
basis of quantum meruit. These are:
(1) the importance of the subject matter in controvers
(2) the extent of the services rendered, and
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer  order of the trial court is hereby  
                
REVERSED and SET.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the
order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to
such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to
establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
A.M. No. 1048, July 14, 1995
Facts: Complainant reported to the NBI that he had been the victim of extortion
by respondent lawyer. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant
furnished the NBI agents several peso bills for marking. The paper bills were
sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently
returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment. Complainant went to
the respondents office and thereafter handed to respondent the marked money
which he placed in his pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent
and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination.
Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder
applied earlier to the marked money. The NBI recommended the prosecution of
respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and recommended to
the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of
disbarment proceedings against him. In his answer to the complaint for
disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the
marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. In a resolution
dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However,
upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was
transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On
March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said
recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution
dated March 26, 1994.
Issue: Whether or not the recommendation approved by the IBP Board of
Governors is correct?
Ruling: Yes. Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of
such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
ground. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a
public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
lawyer's oath , imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money
or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a
ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
Isidra Ting-Dumali vs Atty. Rolando Torres
FACTS: The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died intestate and they left several
properties including two parcels of land Lot 1586 and Lot 1603 both in Malabon.
Isidra has 5 other siblings. In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima Ting-
Torres and Miriam Ting-Saria, executed two Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement.
They were assisted by Felicisima’s husband, Atty. Rolando Torres – who was
also the administrator of the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
covering Lot 1586, they made it appear that Felicisima and Miriam were the
only heirs of the Tings. Atty. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot
1603, the signature of Isidra was forged to make it appear that she was a party
to the Deed. Torres then presented the Deeds to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite
for the purpose of transferring the titles into the name of Miriam and Felicisima.
Thereafter, Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation.
Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this
disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Torres, in his defense, averred that he
acted in good faith in allowing his wife and Miriam to execute the Deeds; that
he thought that the Deeds were agreed to by the other siblings pursuant to a
toka or verbal will left by Isidra’s mother and as implemented by their eldest
brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of the other heirs was merely an
oversight. Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no
such toka.
ISSUE: Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of
the other heirs from the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement despite his
knowledge of their presence.
HELD: Yes. He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has
committed falsehood. By letting his wife and Miriam declare in a public
document that they are the only heirs to the estate when in fact there are other
compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds to the Registry of
Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to advise that the two were doing acts contrary to
law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to the subsequent
transactions involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts
facilitated a wrong against the other heirs.
PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360 01/30/1990)
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks
this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for
sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by
the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to
settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of
estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further
suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the
offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the
Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a
penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the
plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the
offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she
is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme  Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the  Court of  Appeals  or a Court  of
First Instance. — The Court  of Appeals or a  Court of First Instance may
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is
a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public
order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless checktranscends the private
interest of  parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest
of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until
further orders from this Court.
Aguirre v. Rana (2003) (counsel for vice mayoralty candidate)
Doctrine:
• It is upon signing the roll of Attorneys that one becomes a full-fledged lawyer,
prior to which one has no authorityto practice law [please note what
constitutes the practice of law]
Facts:
The respondent Edwin Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Exams.
A day before the mass oath taking, the complainant Donna Aguirre filed against
him a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar, charging him with
unauthorized practice of the law, grave misconduct, violation of the law, and
grave misrepresentation. Because of these, Rana was disallowed from signing
his name in the Roll of Attorneys until the said charges are resolved. These
charges stemmed from the fact that during the mayoralty elections in May
2001, Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for candidates before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate. Further, he
even signed pleadings as “counsel for George Bunan”, “Undersigned Counsel
for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan”, and even
entered his “appearance as counsel for mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao”. All these were executed prior to his taking the lawyer”s oath. In denial of
the charges, he claims to have assisted the candidates not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. He also claims that the charges against him were
only brought as political vendetta by the daughter of the losing mayoralty
candidate.
Issue:
1. W/N Rana was guilty of unauthorized practice of the law
Held:
1. YES. The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. The OBC found that Rana did in fact
appear as counsel for Bunan in the mayoralty elections even before he took the
lawyer”s oath on May 22, 2001, thus recommending that he be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar. The SC agreed with the findings and conclusions
of the OBC and denied him admission to the Bar. The Court ruled that although
he passed the examinations and took the oath, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Prior to this, he had no
authority to practice the law.7 [Aguirre also charged him with a violation of the
law because he appeared as counsel but he was allegedly still employed
as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Court ruled there was no violation
since his resignation was accepted before
practicing law, albeit without authority]
IN RE: ATTY MARCIAL EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980)
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney
in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By
Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition
to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is
merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only
compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment
is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction
over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to
pay their annual dues.
IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO(former Bar confidant)
RAMON GALANG (1971 Bar Examinee) flunked in 1969, 1966-76, 1962-64 Bar
exam
FACTS:
 Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.
1. Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-
checking.
2. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the
notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority
to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.
3. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of
Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects
namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
4. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical
Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
RULING:      
The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request the examiners to re-
evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the bar.  He does not a have any business evaluating the answers
of the examinees.
 
Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be  of good moral
character.  Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending
criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license.
First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA
Facts:
o Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82)
and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the
jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies
such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
 o BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend
its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor
Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a
petition for review with CA.
o CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The
TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without
respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
o Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order
contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the
same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82
of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
o Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129
and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court
of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme
Court.
o While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have
been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue
for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme
Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after
E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.
226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from
decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by
statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court,
should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February
2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore never became
effective for the concurrence of theCourt was no sought in its enactment. Thus,
the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The exclusive
jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.  them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
In Re: Cunanan (1954) (Bar Flunkers Law)
Doctrines:
• It is the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
law according to existing rules.
Facts:
Unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. Republic Act
Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers” Act of 1953” admitted to
the bar those candidates (they took they Bar examinations during the war so
reading materials were scarce) who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by
raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while
other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question.
Issues:
1. W/N RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held/Ratio:
1. No.
The law decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this
Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
A judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter
Constitution. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. It is the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI
Nature: En Banc DecisionDoctrine:
Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law.
Theyform part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Facts:
- A Military commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order
68 of the President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is
an
actestablishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals.- Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a
Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from1943-1944, is charged
before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces
of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed"to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit bru
talatrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners
of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war".-
Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed
prosecutors in behalf of USA.- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68
and the personality as prosecutors of Hussey and Port.- Kuroda’s arguments
were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws; (2) Military Commission has no
Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention
and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the
first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with
“crime” not based on law, national or international; and (3) Hussey and
Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and
theappointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our nationalsove
reignty.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid because it is
based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form part
of our laws.](2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form part of our
laws.](3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this
case?[Yes, they can.]
Ratio:
(1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in
its section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law
of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention ands
ignificant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the UnitedN
ation, all
those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto
in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are hel
accountable therefor . Consequently, in the promulgation
and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said
executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in
chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs.
Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered
to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment
of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No.
68.(2) Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law.
In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations,
the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions.
Such rule
andprinciples therefore form part of the law of our nation even if thePhilippines
was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scopeand is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of internatio
nal law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and
thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to
the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries.(3) There is nothing in said executive order which requires that
counsel
appearingbefore said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in 
the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent Military
Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by
the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment
of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is
only fair and proper
thatUnited States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against hergov
ernment and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowedrepresent
ation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been anyrelinquishment of
sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United
 
States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of herene
mies.---
DISSENTING OPINION of Justice Perfecto
(1) Executive Order No. 68., is null and void because, through it, the President
of the Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in
Congress and in the Supreme Court. EO No. 68 confers upon military
commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes. It is clearly
legislative in nature. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the
Constitution in Congress. It also appropriates the sum of P700,000 for the
expenses of the National War Crimes office established by the said EO No. 68.
Thisconstitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress. It provides rules of procedure for the
conduct of trial. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of
the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.(2)
Respondents suggest that the President issued EO No. 68 under the
emergencypowers granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended 
byCommonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671. The above
Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they ceased to have effect much before
Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon
the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when
the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945. It has
never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the
delegation of legislative powers to the President beyond the emergency created
by the war, as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provisions
of the Constitution. EO No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it
violates the fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of
the law because it permits the admission of many kinds evidence by which no
innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to
determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs Simplicio Villanueva
14 SCRA 109 – Legal Ethics – Practice of Law – Isolated Appearance
FACTS: In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the
municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party
asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule
was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of
Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of
Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is
not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for free for his friend who
happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the
fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend
should be given credence.
Jose Alcala vs Honesto De Vera
56 SCRA 30 – Legal Ethics – Duty of a lawyer to update his client of the status of
the case
FACTS: Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him
in a civil case.On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty.
De Vera failed to inform Alcala about the adverse decision. On July 17, 1963, the
court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was the only time
when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De Vera’s failure to
inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal
his case had already lapsed. As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil
case against Atty. De Vera in order to collect damages as he averred that he
sustained damages due to Atty. De Vera’s negligence. The court however ruled
that Alcala is not entitled to damages. Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case
against Atty. De Vera.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure
to update his client of the status of the case.
HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera
had been remiss in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update
him of the status of the case, however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any
damage by reason of such negligence. But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera
can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only serve as a mitigating
circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of simple
negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De
Vera’s failure to notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of
total dedication or devotion to the client’s interest expected of Atty. De
Vera under the lawyer’s oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the
client to collect damages from the negligent lawyer.
 

Ramos vs. Rada [A.M No. 202 July 22, 1975]

Facts: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines,
Norte. He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII,
which provides as follows: 
Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the government… 

Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing

Corporation on December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise
real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the
corporation. 

His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the
administrative complaint against Rada which was filed with the Department of
Justice on October 3, 1973. Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested
permission to accept appointment. It was not indicated that his acceptance and
discharge of the duties as administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as
messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.  documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI,
Issue: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 ofCivil
Service Rule XVIII
Held: Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission)
of Sec 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand.  The
duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his
entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his
situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive
endeavor to augment his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he
were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private
undertaking outside of office hours and without forseeable detriment to the
Government service. His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need
not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission from proper
government authority.
BELTRAN JR. VS. ABAD (132 SCRA 453 10/11/1984)
FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has
not been admitted to the Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized
practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S.
Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO
MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO
PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the
respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made
appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a
charge for perjury.  The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe
collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of
the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account
for his association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and
the signatures therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures
therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon
of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in
Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he could give
regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have
been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Courtthat he (respondent)  law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.
was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis of
respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity
to prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits with
the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court,
which latter signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid
have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the
decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.
HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this
country. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educationalattainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without license. Respondent Abad
should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3
(e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is
hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Courtwithin ten (10)
days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five  (25) days
imprisonment.
Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing. A lawyer shall not assist
anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he
must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a
lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended
from practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law
whether directly or indirectly is subject to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty.
Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he
should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the
 
CARMEN E. BACARRO, Complainant,  however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain
vs.  his AAdegree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously
RUBEN M. PINATACAN, Respondent.
Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984
Facts:  This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral
turpitude and immorality. Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan; that because of respondent's betrayal, her family
suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of
respondent render him unfit to become a member of the Bar. On the other
hand, respondent maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's
allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other, does not
justify him for disqualification to the practice of law.  Ruling: Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did
Issue:  WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a
case involving his good moral character
HELD: Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that
respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial
support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his
past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. But he must be
admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are
dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal
obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.  intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in
Ratio: One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is
that the applicant must be of good moral character. This requirement aims to
maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal
profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice
of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to
possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader
of the community, looked up to as a model citizen" He sets an example to his
fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living.
Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and
passing the Bar examinations.
Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez
Facts:
 Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to
the Bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the
information in his application for such Bar Examination. Upon further
investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and
neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College
in 1941.Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the
US army, and took the General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is
equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification
for such claim from any proper school officials. The claim was doubtlful,
certified, and asserts that he obtainedhis AA from Arellano University in 1949. This
claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated
from the University in April1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948
(second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not havebeen permitted to take
the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that “
Previous to the studyof law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education (AA) as required bythe Department of Private
Education”
Issue: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.
by falsifying information. Admission under false pretenses thus give grounds for
revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is notthe only
requirement to become an attorney at law.
In re: Argosino (1997)
Doctrine:
• The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to “weed out” lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble
profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent “misfits” from
taking the lawyer”s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
Facts:
Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993 but the Court deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner”s conviction, arose
from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in
September 1991. Petitioner and 7 other accused initially entered pleas of not
guilty to homicide charges. Later, the 8 accused later withdrew their initial pleas
and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer”s oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. The Court
noted however, that his probationary status was only for the length of 10
months.
Issue:
1. W/N Argosino may be allowed to take the lawyer”s oath.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Court issued a resolution requiring Argosino to submit to the Court
evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
Petitioner submitted no less than 15 certifications/letters executed by among
others 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been
established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter”s family and the 8 accused in the criminal case. In allowing Mr.
Argosino to take the lawyer”s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is
not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts
to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. They are prepared to give him the
benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
 
Canon 6: CANNONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICER.A. 6713,
Section 4
Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD 1
CASE No. 31[A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991]
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES,complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE C.RENOMERON
respondent
FACTS:
Nature of the Complaint:
Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel for
V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the
latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for
registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor
of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
 
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended
the registration of the documents with certain “special conditions” between
them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket
from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu
thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS
representatives.
Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He
himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds
RegistrationAdministration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor
of the registrability of the documents.
Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the
registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission
of additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by
theCourt for his malfeasance as a public official.
 
Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
governmentservice in the discharge of official tasks.
HELD: Yes
to both issues.
RATIO DECIDENDI: On Issue No. 1
A lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
 The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice.
 The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
On Issue No. 2
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6).
 The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any
man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).
 
RULING:
Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys