1. KMU vs.

Garcia

239 SCRA 386

2. Araneta vs. Degasa

84 Phil 368

3. Rodrigues vs. Guella

92 Phil 603

4. Magtajas vs. Rice Properties

234 SCRA 255

5. Lucena Grand Central terminal vs. JAC Liner

452 SCRA 172

6. Lagkaw vs. Lagra

GR No. 155746

7. Dela Cruz vs. Paras

GR No. L-42571

8. White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

GR No. 122846

9. US vs. Amtag Co
43 Phil 1

10. Ynod vs. IAC

148 SCRA 659

11. DAR vs. Soton

GR No. 162070

12. Solicitor General vs. MMA

204 SCRA 837

13. Bowi Takeda vs. Dela Serga

228 SCRA 329

Facts: P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. The Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. 851 contained provisions defining “13-month pay” and “basic salary” and the
employers exempted from giving it and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter alia
set items of compensation not included in the computation of 13-month pay. A routine inspection
was conducted in the premises of petitioner. Finding that petitioner had not been including the
commissions earned by its medical representatives in the computation of their 13-month pay.
Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results, and
expressing the view that the commission paid to its medical representatives are not to be
included in the computation of the 13-moth pay since the law and its implementing rules speak
of REGULAR or BASIC salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas issued an order for the payment of
underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986 to 1988. Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna
affirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned of medical representatives
before August 13, 1989

Held: Contrary to respondent’s contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or abrogate
P.D. 851. The concept of 13th Month pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D.
851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to
employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit was, and
still is, to be computed on the basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851.

14. United BF Homes Owner Ass. vs. BF Homes

310 SCRA 304

15. Lupangko vs. CA

160 SCRA 848 

Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to
all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. Petitioners,
all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a
complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction
against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and
to declare the same unconstitutional.

Held: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which
is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." It is unreasonable that an
examinee cannot even attend any review class, receive any tip from any school, instructor or
lecturer. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the
examination period.

16. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 499

Facts: Petitioner filed her CoC for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte.
She indicated that her residency in the locality was “seven months.” Syjuco sought to have her
disqualified, so she changed it to “since childhood.” COMELEC disqualified petitioner.

Issue: Did she lose her domicile in Leyte?

Held: According to the Court, she did not. Mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. It is
the fact of residence, not a statement in a CoC which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not and individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually
living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established
in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established
in some other place. Petitioner frequently returned to Leyte to celebrate important milestones.
Her conduct shows that she had no intention to abandon her domicile of origin.

17. Aquino vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 400

Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his CoC for Representative of the 2nd district of Makati. He
indicated that his residence in the constituency was 10 months. Move Makati filed a petition for
disqualification. He amended his CoC by changing residence to 1 year and 13 days. COMELEC
dismissed the petition. The elections were held and petitioner garnered the highest number of
votes. His proclamation was suspended pending the outcome of Move’s MR. Meanwhile,
COMELEC en banc reversed the dismissal and declared petitioner ineligible for the position.

Issue: Did petitioner satisfy the residency requirement?

Held: NO. His CoC for 1992 stated that his residence was in Tarlac. Domicile is the same as
residence in this case. He stated that he was a resident of the same for 52 years. He was also born
there. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that his domicile is origin is Tarlac and that he has
not changed the same. The fact that he merely rented a condo militates against his claim of
residency in Makati. He does not intend on permanently residing there. He has not shown intent
to abandon his domicile of origin. The lease contract is also spurious.

18. People vs. Jalosjos

G.R No. 132875-76

Facts: While Jalosjos’ appeal of his conviction for rape was pending with the Court of Appeals,
he filed a “Motion to be Allowed to Discharge Mandate as a Member of the House of
Representatives.” He contends that his continued detention in the National Penitentiary would
deprive his constituents of representation.

Held: Jalosjos cannot be allowed to attend sessions. This would practically make him a free man.
Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The evidence of guilt is strong. NO BAIL. There is no
substantial distinction between a Congressman and a regular citizen to warrant special treatment.
Furthermore, when the voters of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte cast their votes in
favor of petitioner, they did so with full knowledge of the limitations confronting petitioner.
They were aware of the charges against him.

19. Trillanes vs. Pimentel

GR. No. 179817
Facts: Pending the resolution of the criminal case filed against Sen. Trillanes for coup d’état, he
was detained at the Marine Barracks. He filed the instant petition to be allowed to attend sessions
in the Senate, have an office at the barracks, and give interviews to the media. The RTC of
Makati denied his motion.

Held: The SC affirmed, citing People v. Jalosjos. Election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. Petitioner argues that his election as Senator operates
as condonation by the public of the offense he has committed. Admin law doctrine: a public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The
doctrine simply does not apply because (1) his misconduct was criminal and not administrative
in nature, and (2) he had no prior term to speak of.

20. Jimenez vs. Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876

Facts: Cabangbang, then a member of the House of Representatives, caused the publication of an
open letter to the President in newspapers of general circulation. He did so while Congress was
not in session. The letter spoke of a coup attempt, and it mentioned the names of herein
petitioners as persons under the control of the planners of the alleged coup. Petitioners instituted
an action for damages against Cabangbang.

Issue: Is the letter covered by the Speech and Debate clause of the Constitution?

Held: NO. At the time, Congress was not in session. Cabangbang did not publish the letter in the
exercise of his official functions. He was not acting as a member of the House or any of its
committees.

21. Osmeña vs. Pendatun

GR No. L-17144

Facts: In a privileged speech, Osmeña criticized Pres. Garcia’s administration as being unpopular
and corrupt. The House resolved to suspend Osmeña for 15 months. He invokes parliamentary
immunity.

Held: The Constitution provides that speech and debate cannot be questioned in any other place.
This means that it can be questioned in Congress. The Court will not determine factual issues
such as the existence of disorderly conduct. That is for the House to decide. The Resolution
suspending Osmeña was unanimously approved. Alejandrino finds no application as the member
being suspended in this case is an elective and not an appointive one.

22. Adaza vs. Pacana

135 SCRA 431

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively. Their
terms were for 6 years, commencing in 1980. Both filed CoCs for the Batasang Pambansa
elections in 1984. Petitioner won, and assumed his post as Congressman. Pacaña was sworn in as
the Governor. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to serve both in Congress and as Governor.

Held: He cannot hold two positions simultaneously. The Constitution’s language is clear and
unambiguous. Respondent cannot be considered ipso facto resigned from his post upon his filing
of a CoC as BP 697 provides that he is only considered to be on a forced leave of absence.

23. Osmeña vs. Pendatun

GR No. L-17144

24. Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito

78 Phil 1

Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required ¾ vote in order to pass the Resolution. At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed
but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short
of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.

Held: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court
on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

25. Sampayan vs. Daza

213 SCRA 807

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of
their congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on
the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced his status as
permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987
Constitution (section 18, Article III).

Held: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic
for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to
unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case
rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of its members.

26. Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal

GR No. 83767

Facts: On October 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal an
election protest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-
elect. Subsequently, the petitioners filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution
of the aforementioned case, as respondents therein. The petitioners urged the contest to be
decided by only 3 members of the Tribunal.

Held: It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices
of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and
“Legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. Every member of the tribunal may,
as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its rules can confer on the 3 Justice-Members

27. Pimentel vs. HOR

GR No. 141489

Facts: On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. This sought to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system in pursuant of section2 of the Republic Act 7941. On 11 May 1998,
national elections were held, which included for the first time the election of party-list group
through popular vote. Subsequently, HRET and CA contingent by electing representatives to
these bodies. It appears that no one from the party-list group was nominated. On 18 January
2000, Senator Pimentel wrote two letters to the chairman of HRET and CA to reorganize both
bodies in order to include party-list representative in accordance to Sec. 17 and 18 Art. VI of the
Constitution.

Held: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Sen. Pimentel. Under Secs. 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves

28. Sarmiento vs. Mison

156 SCRA 549

Facts: Pres. Corazon Aquino appointed respondent Salvador Mison as the Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs. Petitioners Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla questioned the
appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the commission on
Appointment for approval. Under the Constitution, appointments made for the Heads of Bureau
requires COA’s confirmation.

Held: Under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that
needed confirmation from COA. Instances which do not require approval from the COA are: all
other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, those
whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint, and officers lower in rank whose
appointments the congress may by law vest in the president alone.

29. Guingona vs. Gonzales

214 SCRA 789

Facts: As a result of the 1992 Senatorial elections, the LDP was entitled to 7.5 seats in the CA,
the NPC to 2.5, the LAKAS-NUCD to 1.5 and the LP-PDP-LABAN to 0.5. The problem arose
as to what to do with the ½ to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority converted a
fractional half-membership to a whole membership to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so
doing, one other party’s fractional representation in the CA was reduced. This is clearly a
violation of Sec. 18, Art. VI because it is no longer based on proportional representation of the
political parties. Senator Tañada claimed that he has a right to be elected as member of the CA
because of the physical impossibility of dividing a person and because as the sole representative
of his party, his party is entitled to representation.

Held: The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and

does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule
on proportional representation. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such
rule. Section 18 also assures representation in the CA of any political party who succeeds in
electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so elected enables it to put
a representative in the CA. Therefore, in the Senate, a political party must at least have 2 duly
elected senators for every seat in the CA. It is not mandatory to fill up the 12 seats in the CA. Sec
10 of the Rules of the CA require only a quorum to function, provided at least four come from
each house. The Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 senators and 12
members of the House in order that the Commission may function. The election of Senator
Romulo and Tañada as members of the CA was clearly a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18.

30. Perez vs. Commission on Appointment

GR No. L-35474

31. Arroyo vs. De Venecia

277 SCRA 268

Facts: Petitioner challenges the validity of RA 8240 on grounds that the rules of the house were
violated when the bill was passed. He claims that he was denied the opportunity to raise the
question of quorum.
Held: The Court held what was allegedly violated were merely internal rules of procedure of the
house and not constitutional requirements of enacting a law. The rules of deliberating body are
subject to the amendment at the pleasure of the body adopting them and will failure to comply
with them will not invalidate the act if it is duly ratified by the requisite number of votes. Court
cannot declare an act of legislature void on account merely on noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself.

32. Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance

235 SCRA 630

Facts: Arturo Tolentino, et al, are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 (EVAT Law).
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the HoR as required by
Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that
it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after
the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed
its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done
is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that
way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text of the HB”.

Held: By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the
version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices,
is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and
other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that
it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

33. Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance

235 SCRA 630

34. ABAKADA vs. Ermita

469 SCRA 1

Facts: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6
of R.A. No. 9337. These questioned provisions contain a uniform provision authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that
the law is unconstitutional.

Held: Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments
to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate
income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
35. Lindasan vs. COMELEC
21 SCRA 496

Facts: Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. He
discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur.
Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred
that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

Held: The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of
the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur.

36. Sumulong vs. COMELEC

73 Phil 257

37. Pascual vs. Sec. Of Public Works and Communications

110 Phil 331

Facts: The sum of 85,000 pesos was appropriated by Congress for the construction of a feeder
road running through a private subdivision and over a property owned by a private individual.
Subsequently, the feeder road is donated to the government.

Issue: Is the appropriation valid?

Held: The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing that the property sought to be improved
with public funds was private in nature at the time the appropriation was made. The circumstance
that the road were later donated to the government did not cure the basic defect of the
appropriation as it was null and void ab initio.

38. Garcia vs. Mata

65 SCRA 520

Facts: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure
the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a
private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to
disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the
operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling
to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. 

Hence it was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure, in violation of the

constitutional prohibition against riders to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and
completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. 

39. Demetria vs. Alba

148 SCRA 208

Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)
insofar as it (1) authorized the illegal transfer of public money, (2) fails to specify the objectives
and purposes of such transfers, (3) allows the president to override the safeguards, form and
procedure prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations, and (4) amounts to an
undue delegation of legislative power.

Held: PD 1177 is unconstitutional. It allows the President to transfer funds across executive
offices without following the procedure described in the 1987 Constitution. There must be a law
approving the transfer and the money to be transferred must come from savings.

40. Garces vs. Estenzo

105 SCRA 510

Facts: Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden
image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of
solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the
image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also
designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner
parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image to the
council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for
its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and
posted the required bond.

Held: The barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private
funds in connection with barangay fiesta is constitutional. As said by the Court this case is a
petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering
with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Right of the determination of custody is
their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the
Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
41. Aglipay vs. Ruiz
64 Phil 201

Facts: Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the
Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church.
Hence, this petition.

Held: The Court said it is constitutional. The issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by
the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose
was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution
on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.

42. Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

14 SCRA 292

Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin
Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc,
for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually
spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return.
Under date of 29 April 1960, the CIR issued as assessment for donee’s gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15
June 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration
presented to the CIR were denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960.
After hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue except
the imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held: It may be assessed against the Catholic Church. The phrase “exempt from taxation,” as
employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated,
as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes.

43. Arnault vs. Nazareno

87 Phil 29

Facts: On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted a resolution creating a special committee to
investigate on the purchase by the government of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates owned
by Ernest Burt as represented by Jean Arnault. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. The
special committee called and examined among other witness, Jean Arnault. However, for the
latter’s refusal to answer some of the questions propounded on him, the name of the person to
whom he gave the money as well as answer to other pertinent questions in connection therewith,
the Senate resolved to imprison him until such time as he decided to answer relevant questions
put to him in connection with the investigation of a government transaction.

Held: The Supreme Court said the Senate has authority to punish petitioner for contempt.
Considering that he questions were pertinent to the pursuance of the Senate Resolution. The
Supreme Court also held that the offender could be imprisoned indefinitely by the State, it being
a continuing body, provided that the punishment did not become so long as to violate due
process.

44. Senate vs. Ermita

GR No. 169777

Facts: Invitations were sent out to officials of the Executive and the AFP. The Senate were to
conduct inquiries regarding: (i) the North Rail project; (ii) the Fertilizer Fund; (iii) the Budget;
and, (iv) the “Hello Garci” scandal, and allegations of cheating in the 2004 Presidential elections.
Subsequently, the President issued EO 464 which decreed that a class of people must first secure
the President’s consent before appearing in any hearing. Thus, Executive Secretary Ermita
communicated to the Senate that the invited officials would not be able to attend, since they had
not been able to secure the consent of the President.

Held: The SC decided in favor of the Senate.

1. Insofar as EO 463 declares a blanket prohibition on the ground of Executive Privilege, it is

invalid for contravening the Legislature’s power of inquiry. Inquiries in aid of legislation are part
of the law-making function granted to the legislature. The general rule is that attendance therein
is mandatory. A blanket prohibition on the attendance of a category of persons, in the guise of
Executive Privilege, is a contravention of this Constitutionally-granted power. Executive
privilege may be invoked—by the President, or by others in his name with his consent—as
regards a category of information, not a category of persons.
2. At the same time, there is a violation of the right to information on matters of public concern.
3. There was also grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sec. Ermita in invoking EO 464 when
it had not yet been published.

45. Miguel vs. Gordon

GR No. 174340

Facts: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”

Held: Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.  Clearly,
there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the
mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions
are also available to the committees.

46. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon

203 SCRA 767

Facts: Bengzon was among those said to have collaborated with Kokoy Romualdez, a relative of
the former First Lady, in unjust enrichment at the expense of the Filipino people. At the center of
the controversy were alleged fictitious sales of corporations to Ricardo Lopa, a relative of then-
President Corazon Aquino. After Senator Enrile delivered a privileged speech on the matter, the
same was referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee for further investigation. The
Committee called on Bengzon to testify on what he knew, Bengzon declined, on the ground that
doing so would be prejudicial to a case pending before the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the
Committee was about to issue a subpoena, Bengzon et al. filed a petition for prohibition before
the Supreme Court.

Held: The Supreme Court decided in favor of Bengzon, et al. Relying on Sec. 21, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, the SC held that the power of Congress to conduct inquiries is limited to: (1)
investigations in aid of legislation, in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and,
with the qualifier that (2) the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. The inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The privileged speech given by Sen. Enrile,
which led to the delegation of the investigation of the Lopa controversy to the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee merely called upon the Senate to look into violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, to look into whether Lopa violated the law. Such a
determination properly pertains to the Courts.

47. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Secretary

GR No. 83896

Facts: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution.

CLU stated that the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
Held: It is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their
tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s
manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

48. Estrada vs. Desierto

GR No. 146710

Facts: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada. On November 13, 2000,
Estrada was impeached and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. On January 19, PNP and the AFP
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a
snap presidential election. SC declared on January 20 that the seat of presidency was vacant,
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in
the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.

Held: Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In an article of
Philippine Daily Inquirer entitled the Angara Diary wherein it revealed the “state of mind” of the
President in the last days of his office, he retorted to Angara that he would “call for snap
elections”. The proposal for a snap election is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up
the presidency even at that time. Also, when offered a graceful exit, the petitioner expressed no
objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the
country. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

49. Soliven vs. Makasiar

167 SCRA 303

Facts: Petitioner Luis Beltran contends, among others, that his constitutional rights were violated
when respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against him without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Petitioner contends that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in
his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests. The basis for his
contention was the fact that the word “personally” was added after the word “determined”, and
the phrase “other responsible officers as may be authorized by law” was omitted.

Held: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

50. Gloria vs. CA

GR No. 119903

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools,
Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino. Respondent Secretary Gloria
recommended to the President of the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology, to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro. President approved the
recommendation of Secretary Gloria. Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to
reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request.

The petitioner filed a petition to CA wherein they adjudged that the reassignment of the
petitioner is hereby declared to be violative of petitioner’s right to security of tenure, and the
respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the same.

Issue: Whether Respondent Court of Appeals has allowed itself to be instrumental in private
respondent’s circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit by giving due course and
granting reliefs prayed for in a suit purportedly filed against petitioners but actually questioning
an act of the president.

Held: No. Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the
same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from
suit. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against
petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of
the President.

51. Neri vs. Senate Committee

GR No. 180643

Facts: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct
an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to
testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA
about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

Held: The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It
is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique
constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.

52. Senate vs. Ermita

GR No. 169777

53. Sarmiento vs. Mison

156 SCRA 549

54. Soriano vs. Lista

GR No. 153881

Facts: Eight officers from Philippine Coast Guard were promoted by the President to Vice
Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, and Naval Captain. They assumed office without
confirmation from COA. The petitioner, who is a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation
from the COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a
statute must show not only that the statute is invalid but also that he has sustained, or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Petitioner being
a taxpayer has no interest in such case. The case does not involve the exercise by congress of its
taxing power.

55. IBP vs. Zamora

338 SCRA 81

Facts: The President ordered the PNP and the marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. On January 17, 2000, IBP filed the instant petition
to declare the deployment of Phil. Marines unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no
emergency situation would justify the employment of soldiers for the law enforcement work and
that the same is in derogation of Art II Sec. 3 of the Constitution.

Held: The calling of the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian enforcement and that it does not contravene Art II Sec. 3 of the Constitution. The limited
participation of the marines is evident in the LO 1 itself which sufficiently provides the meters
and bounds of the marine’s authority. The deployment of the marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged
in the head of civilian institution and not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and
cooperation between the military and civilian authority, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

56. David vs. Arroyo

GR No. 171396
Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino Nation celebrated the 20 th anniversary of EDSA 1,
Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 implemented by G.O. No. 5. The proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, NPA, and some members
of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate Pres. Arroyo. On February 24, 2006,
petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants. The offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo was searched without a warrant. Team of PNP
and AFP officers, cited as basis for warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure was the
PP 1017.

Held: Warrantless arrests of petitioners pursuant to PP 1017 were not valid. Searches, seizures
and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest, according to Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure. Warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to
PP 1017 was not valid. Rule 126 of the Revised Rues on Criminal Procedure should be followed.

57. Gudani vs. Senga

GR No. 170165

Facts: Military officers prohibited by President Arroyo from testifying in the Senate may not
invoke their right to free speech to justify their defiance of her orders. Although the Court ruled
in Senate v. Ermita that executive privilege cannot be used to grant blanket immunity, in this
case, the President prohibited the military officers in the exercise of her Commander-in-Chief
powers, not her Executive powers.

Held: Petitioner-officers were en route to the Senate to participate in an investigation of alleged

cheating in the 2004 elections in Lanao. President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered that no military
personnel should appear before any House or Senate hearing without her approval. Petitioners
nonetheless testified. Consequently, they were relieved of their duties and subjected to court-
martial proceedings. The petitioners questioned the validity of PGMA’s directive. The SC
decided against the petitioners. The power behind the directive was not Executive Privilege, but
the President’s Commander-in-Chief (CIC) powers. Under the CIC powers, the President has full
control over the military and its personnel.

58. Lansang vs. Garcia

42 SCRA 448

Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the
death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation.
Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension
does not meet the constitutional requisites.

Held: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this
case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the
same if no legal ground could be established. After satisfying itself that there was actually a
massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as
claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

59. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile

121 SCRA 471

Facts: The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14
detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in
the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under
surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the
PCs know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.

Held: The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial,
question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI
1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest
incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

60. Aquino vs. Enrile

59 SCRA 183

Facts: Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and
ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any
charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce
Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is
valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.

Held: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the
case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is
a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
President’s order.

61. Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34

150 SCRA 144 

Facts: The petitioners were charged for subversion. The respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP
created the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the
petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed for seven offenses. Sometime thereafter, trial
ensued. In the course of the proceedings the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their
release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that
military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been
committed during the period of martial law.

Held: Military commission has no jurisdiction to try civilians when the civil courts are open. Due
process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to, among
others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to
the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process.
Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the
Philippine judicial system.

62. People vs. Salle, Jr.

250 SCRA 581

Facts: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The
appellant seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the
appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of
the conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants
impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be
dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. La’o
further in formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting
her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal.

Held: Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the
person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

63. People vs. Nacional

GR No. 11294

64. Monsanto vs. Factoran

170 SCRA 190

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog
City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon. 
Held: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant
city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

65. Constantino vs. Cuisia

GR No. 106064

Facts: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of the Philippine Comprehensive
Program for 1992. Petitioners are members of the non-government organization, Freedom from
Debt Coalition, which advocates a “pro-people and just Philippine debt policy.” They question the
Financing Program started by then President Corazon Aquino, characterized as a “multi-option
financing package”, wherein the President entered into three restructuring agreements with
foreign creditor governments. Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President.

Held: Petition is dismissed based on the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. Each head of the
department is and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority, based on RA 245, as amended by PD 142.

66. Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

GR No. 158088

Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant
to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion. 

Held: The Supreme Court held NO. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and
authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign
nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the
members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

67. Nitafan vs. CIR

G.R. No.78780

Facts: Nitafan and some others duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They
submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the
final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission
negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-
diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers.

68. CJ Corona vs. Senate

GR No. 200242

Facts: The present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the
basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally
infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in
Art. II of the complaint; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged
corruption and unexplained wealth; (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner‘s
alleged bank accounts.

Held: The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
without any protest vacated his office. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner
had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

69. De Castro vs. JBC

GR No. 191002

Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The
said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Punond to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants
argue that the disputed constitutional provision clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary.

Held: The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. Election ban on appointments does
not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the
prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing
president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

70. Bengzon vs. Drilon

GR No. 103524

Facts: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the
Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided
for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

Held: The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant
the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

71. In RE: First Endorsement from Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez

AM No. 88-4-5433

Facts: The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution in
which, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr. Justice
Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant
Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded
serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had
granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading. The Court
treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April
1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.

Held: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal
from office.

The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity
from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
or other supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A
member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of
impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is,
disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.
72. OCA vs. Del Castillo
AM No. MTJ-08-1708

Facts: In its Memorandum to the Court dated May 19, 2008, the OCA opined that Judge Del
Castillo should be held liable for delay in deciding the Criminal Case No. 97-10140. The OCA
noted that the case was ordered submitted for decision in an order issued by Judge Del Castillo
herself on February 3, 2004 when she was still Acting Presiding Judge of MTCC, Branch 2,
of Roxas City, Capiz.

Held: For lack of material facts sufficient to conclude that Judge Del Castillo was in delay in
deciding the subject criminal case, we can only find her liable for simple misconduct. 

What both judges completely missed under the Mabunay ruling is that the subject criminal case
was a MTCC Branch 2 case and that Judge Conlu, as the presiding judge of MTCC Branch 2,
had the primary responsibility over the case. He could not have passed on the case to another
judge, even if it had been submitted for decision when Judge Del Castillo was there and even if
Judge Del Castillo had already been in delay when Judge Conlu assumed office, without the
documentation that the Mabunay guidelines require.

73. Maceda vs. Vasquez

GR No. 102781

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged
that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

74. Nitafan vs. Commissioner

GR No. 78780

75. Fabian vs. Desierto

GR No. 129742

Facts: PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those
under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the
parties. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.  She eventually
filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24,
1995.

Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

Held: Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained
in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court.

76. People vs. Gacott, Jr.

246 SCRA 52

Facts: Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case
No.11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for
reconsideration. In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be
resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
granting the motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. The Court ruled guilty and
imposed upon him the appropriate penalties. Hence, this another motion for reconsideration of
him asking the Court to sit as an En Banc and decide upon his case

Held: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matter or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and
undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since
even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court En Banc.
77. Primicias vs. Ocampo
GR No. L-6120

Facts: This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial
of two criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the assistance of
assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 in relation to
section 154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a writ of preliminary injunction
issued so that the trial may be held pending until further orders of this court.

Held: The contention of respondents is predicated on the assumption that the provisions on
assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is not the case. We
have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of
substantive law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court. The corollary to this
conclusion is that this remedy may be invoked out only in Manila but in all other places where it
existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With regard to
criminal cases, we have already said that the same remedy may be invoked in the cities of Cebu,
Iloilo and Quezon, with the particularity that their charters make express reference, either
directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure. With this historical
background, the claim that under the theory we have entertained the trial with the aid of
assessors can only be invoked in the City of Manila is certainly without merit.

78. In RE: Manzano

166 SCRA 246

Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur
Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice
created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee
will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of
Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Held: This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in
the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes
for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties. Accordingly, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U.
Manzano is DENIED.

79. In RE: Judge Mateo Valenzuela

AM 98-5-01-SC

Facts: On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the
Constitution.

Held: Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to
those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-
called “midnight” appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which
have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as
they are “few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,”  can be made by
the outgoing President.

The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of
the President during the period of the ban.

80. PBA vs. COMELEC

GR No. 72915

Facts: Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for
President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986. The law was enacted following the letter of
President Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably vacating the position of President effective
only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking
his oath of office ten days after his proclamation." The principal ground for the challenge to the
validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation of the President did not create a
vacancy required by Article VII, Sec. 9 which authorized the calling of a special election.

Held: After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to
declare the statute unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v. Executive Secretary, of the
view that as there were less than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional. The petitions
should be dismissed.

81. Peralta vs. COMELEC

82 SCRA 30

Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The
period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election,
excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality
of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the
Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should
cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution
provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall
end thirty days thereafter.” 

Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in
the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa
is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as
provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the
Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim
Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under
Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been
lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a
state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority
and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within
which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even
assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign,
the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is
enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.

82. Arnault vs. Balagtas

97 Phil 358

Facts: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons,
Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in
contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in
relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs.
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for
defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.

Held: The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but
merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the
confining made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.

83. Ople vs. Torres

293 SCRA 141

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized

Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996.
Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy.
He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a
usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.
Held: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner
is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of
Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The
blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.

84. Jaworski vs. PAGCOR

419 SCRA 420

Facts: On 31March 1998, PAGCOR granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports
Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local
and international bettors. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its
operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards
and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets. Senator Robert S.
Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Games, Amusement and Sports, files the petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the
simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since
at the time of its enactment the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space.

Held: Herein, PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared
its franchise to SAGE. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s
and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR
cannot delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest,
inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

85. Arnault vs. Balagtas

97 Phil 358

86. PCA vs. Enriquez

235 SCRA 506

Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994. GAA
contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of
Congress themselves. President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and
imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings
to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
Held: Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually
savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which
said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to
transfer funds is exclusive.the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

87. Sanlakas vs. Exec. Sec

412 SCRA 656

Facts: In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O. 4, both
declaring a “state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After hours-
long negotiations, the Oakwood occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a
state of rebellion.

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.

88. Zandueta vs. Dela Costa

66 Phil 115

Facts: Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5th Branch of Courts of First Instance of Manila. He
received a new ad interim appointment issued (Commonwealth Act No. 145) to discharge the
Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4 th Judicial District with the authority
topreside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan. The ad interim appointment of
the petitioner was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa (respondent), judge of 4 th Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan. Dela
Costa’s appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly. Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 is
unconstitutional.

Held: Zandueta is estopped by his own act questioning the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He
should know that his ad interim appointment was subject to approval by the Commission on
Appointments. If the said commission disapproved, it would become ineffective and would cease
him discharging the office. Zandueta is free from to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so.
When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or
reorganized by law qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary
oath, enters in the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or
reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have
abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of appointment, and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by which he was last appointed. He is exempted from the said rule if
he did not accept the new appointment or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal
exigencies.

89. Hilario vs. CSC

243 SCRA 206

Facts: Petitioner was appointed City Attorney by then Mayor of Quezon City, Brigido R. Simon,
Jr. A new mayor, Ismael MAthay, Jr. was subsequently elected. Mathay sent a letter to Hilario
informing him that he is deemed resigned pursuant to Sec. 481, Art. II of the LGC of 1991 which
provided that the position of City Legal Officer is coterminous with the appointing authority.
Vice Mayor of QC Charito Planas later filed a complaint with the CSC against Hilario and a
certain Pecson praying that they be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave
misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of service. CSC issued Resolution No. 93-4067 holding in
abeyance any disciplinary action against Hilario should no longer be allowed to continue holding
the position of Legal Officer (City Officer) of QC. Motion for Recon by Hilario was
subsequently denied by the CSC. Hilario filed a petition with the SC to annul the above
mentioned resolutions of the CSC.

Held: An examination of the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 reveals no intention by the
legislature to remove the confidential nature of the position of city legal officer. What it does, is
to merely specify the various qualifications, powers and duties of a city legal officer which were
not enumerated under Republic Act No. 5185. We have consistently held in previous cases that
the position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one. In the recent case of Griño v. Civil
Service Commission, respondent was appointed provincial attorney at a time when Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 was in effect. We held that the position of City Legal Officer has its
counterpart in the position of provincial attorney appointed by the provincial governor, both
being positions involving the rendering of trusted services. Instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

90. PAGCOR vs. Rilloraza

GR No. 141141

Facts: On November 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss of confidence, were brought against
respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of petitioner, PAGCOR.
Respondent duly filed his answer during an investigation conducted by petitioner’s Corporate
Investigation Unit. The Commission denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in Resolution
No. 990465 dated February 16, 1999.
Held: Undoubtedly, respondent’s duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of both
ability and dependability. They can hardly be characterized as routinary, for he is required to
exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of authority.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied for lack of merit.

91. Besa vs. PNB

33 SCRA 330

Facts: The constitutional safeguard against removal from office except for cause is invoked by
petitioner Tomas Besa in this proceeding for certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto. Appointed
Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice-President of respondent Philippine National Bank in
1962, he was shifted by virtue of a resolution of respondent Bank on October 19, 1966, to the
office of its President, respondent Roberto S. Benedicto, as Consultant on Legal Matters, with
respondent Conrado E. Medina being assigned to his position. While petitioner would seek to
nullify the above resolution and enjoin its enforcement, his action is essentially one of quo
warranto. Its success is thus dependent on his being able to sustain the burden of demonstrating
that what was done by respondent Bank, through its Board of Directors, all of whom were
likewise named respondents, could in law be characterized as removal without cause contrary to
the explicit mandate of the Constitution. That he was not able to do.

Held: This petition for certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto is dismissed. Petitioner's reliance
on the constitutional provision against removal without cause is misplaced. It is appropriate to
invoke it when an officer or employee in the civil service enjoying a fixed term is made to lose
his position without warrant or justification. Petitioner in his memorandum apparently was
encouraged by the long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication of this Court
that has given a well-nigh all-embracing scope to the mantle of protection covering civil service
personnel against removal without cause. It is manifest from the foregoing that we have
considered the crucial issue posed from the standpoint of the right enjoyed by respondent Bank
to choose who its legal counsel should be and how long he would remain as such.

92. Dario vs. Mison

176 SCRA 84

Facts: When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the
government, upon which Mison, the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to
394 Customs officials. Some sought reinstatement from the CSC which the latter granted to 279
of them while the others went directly to the Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition
questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA 6656 was passed, providing that all officers and
employees, who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation
of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed. The validity of this law
is also put into question.

Held: All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on
its nature and extent. Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the
new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure. At this point, we
must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of the
Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In
case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the
Government is not obliged to prove anything because the Constitution allows it.

93. De La Llana vs. Alba

GR No. L-57883

Facts: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking
to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister
of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary.  It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify
a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

Held: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices
from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Well-settled
is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is
the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office.

94. Palma-Fernandez vs. De La Paz

GR No. 78946

Facts: On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief
of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan. Petitioner exercised direct control and supervision
over all heads of departments in the Medical Center. In partial implementation of the new
organizational structure, respondent Dr. Adriano de la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, issued
Hospital Order No. 30 designating petitioner as Assistant Director of Professional Services.

Held: Since the East Avenue Medical Center is attached to the Department of Health, the power
to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees, is vested in the Secretary of Health
not the Medical Chief Center. The latter’s function is confined to recommendation. Even a
transfer requires an appointment, which is beyond the authority of respondent to extend.

95. SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals

175 SCRA 686

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The
court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in
taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National
Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand
that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right
to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities
such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that  may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

96. Bangalisan vs. CA

276 SCRA 619

Facts: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on
September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the
government to implement measures intended for their material benefit. The Education Secretary
issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence they were charged by
the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.
 
Held: No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo Circ.
No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public
employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages public employees was
clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike
there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express
legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strike,
walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector.

97. Intia v COA

GR No. 131529

Facts: On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7354, otherwise known as The Postal Service Act of
1992, was enacted and approved creating the Philippine Postal Corporation and defining its
power, functions, and responsibilities.
Pursuant to the powers granted to it by the said charter, the PPC Board of Directors issued and
approved Board Resolution No. 95-50, entitled Approving the three-year progressive increase of
Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA) benefits equivalent to 40% of the basic salary of
the officials of the Philippine Postal Corporation, subject to the existing rules and regulations.

Held: The PPC being a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter, it
falls within the scope of the Civil Service. Thus, as regards personnel matters, the Civil Service
Law applies to the PPC. Its Board of Directors is authorized under its charter to formulate and
implement its own system of compensation for its personnel, including the payment of RATA. In
the exercise of such power, it is not required to observe the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office. Neither is it required to follow strictly the
amounts provided for in the General Appropriations Act as its annual budget is not covered
thereby. However, since the PPC charter expressly exempts it from the rules and regulations of
the CPCO. Said Board is not required to follow the CPCOs guidelines in formulating a
compensation system for the PPC employees.

98. Quimson v Ozaeta

98 Phil 705

Facts: Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal.
Defendant-Appellee Roman Ozaeta who by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was
acting as Chairman of the Board of Directors, signed the appointment and forwarded the papers
to the President through the Secretary of Finance for approval. Without waiting for the said
approval Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector
of the Administration until October 21, 1949, inclusive, when he was informed that because of
the disapproval of his appointment, his services were considered terminated.

Held: The appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was only the double
compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was that Plaintiff herein assumed office
without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his appointment and compensation
by the President and the different offices which the appointment had to go through. Quimson
himself, a Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer, a financial officer expected to
be tersed in government disbursements and payments of salaries and compensation should have
also known and undoubtedly he knew about that prohibition against double compensation.

99. Santos vs. CA

GR No. 139792

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City. On 1 April 1992, petitioner
optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and received his
retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years
thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-
entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of
the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA).
Held: Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under
R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving
the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as
Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services
as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director III of the
MMA.

100. Brillantes vs. Yorac

192 SCRA 358

Facts: Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then
President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting
capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity”. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

Held: Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. Although all constitutional

commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in
the discharge of their functions. Only the members who should elect their acting chairman
pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.

101. Gallardo vs. Tamabo

218 SCRA 253

102. LDP vs. COMELEC

GR No. 161265

103. Alunan vs. Mirasol

GR No. 122250

104. Feliciano vs. COA

GR No. 147402

Facts: COA assessed Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) auditing fees. Petitioner
Feliciano, as General Manager of LMWD, contended that the water district could not pay the
said fees on the basis of Sections 6 and 20 of P.D. No. 198 as well as Section 18 of R.A. No.
6758. He primarily claimed that LMWD is a private corporation not covered by COA's
jurisdiction. Petitioner also asked for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to
COA. COA Chairman denied petitioner’s requests. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which COA denied. Hence, this petition.

Held: Petition lacks merit. The Constitution under Sec. 2(1), Article IX-D and existing laws
mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original charter. 
Obviously, LWD’s are not private corporations because they are not created under the
Corporation Code. LWD’s are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members.
There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all
corporations registered with the SEC. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the
directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of
the LWDs. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are government employees subject
to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, an LWD is a public and not a private entity,
hence, subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.

105. Orocio vs. COA

213 SCRA 109

106. Gonzales vs. Commission Board of Iloilo

12 SCRA 71

107. Guevarra vs. Gimenez

6 SCRA 813