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JMTM
21,7 Key factors in global supply
headquarters-subsidiary
control systems
794
Julio Sánchez Loppacher
IAE Management and Business School, Universidad Austral,
Received July 2009
Revised February 2010 Pilar, Argentina, and
Accepted March 2010 Raffaella Cagliano and Gianluca Spina
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Gestionale, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy

Abstract
Purpose – According to the reviewed literature, in order to build effective and efficient global supply
(GS) strategies, multinational companies (MNCs) need to define and implement adequate headquarters’
control and follow-up systems for GS management performance in order to guarantee world supply
consistence and alignment. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on how key variables affect
GS headquarters-subsidiary control systems and their complementary behaviours across culturally
similar business units.
Design/methodology/approach – Multiple case study methodology, with a sample including seven
Italian MNCs, has expanded their operations to the Mercosur area (Latin America’s Southern Common
Market) and designed to guarantee theoretical replication in the analysis of the empirical evidence.
Findings – It was found that, although cultural similarities strongly influence MNCs’ GS headquarters-
subsidiary control systems, other factors, such as purchasing and globalization sourcing strategy
centralization and globalization process evolution, lead companies to implement complementary formal
control systems that are consistent with the sharply personalized profile set by cultural proximity.
Research limitations/implications – In order to expand and deepen these conclusions, further
research will be necessary to validate these findings in a wider sample, including companies from
various countries of origin and destination. In any case, a longitudinal study could help to shed some
light on the evolution of headquarters-subsidiary relationships within global sourcing strategies.
Originality/value – The paper enables better understanding of the impact of and interactions
between key driving factors in GS headquarters-subsidiary control systems in cases of strong cultural
similarities through a multi-case sample study.
Keywords Parent companies, Subsidiaries, Globalization, Organizational culture,
Organizational structure, Supply
Paper type Research paper

Journal of Manufacturing Technology
Management
Vol. 21 No. 7, 2010
pp. 794-817
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1741-038X
DOI 10.1108/17410381011077928
1. Introduction
Academic literature studies widely agree that subsidiary supply management and
follow-up practices play a key competitive role in multinational companies’ (MNCs)
global supply strategy (GSS) development. MNCs require specific monitoring and
performance measurement systems to assess subsidiary supply chain management,
setting objectives and developing periodical reporting processes to remedy deviations
The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their dedication and their contributions which
have enhanced this research work.
through corrective actions (Baldiwala, 2001; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Ritchie and Headquarters-
Brindley, 2002). These companies use two major and opposing control systems to subsidiary
manage headquarters-subsidiary relationships: a bureaucratic control (output control)
system, encompassing greater control mechanisms and procedures and based on control systems
result-oriented subsidiary management monitoring processes, and a cultural control
(action control) system that features a more personalized approach relying on close
interactions between headquarters and subsidiaries. Many authors indicate that 795
subsidiary management control and follow-up procedures follow an intermediate path
between these extreme systems, depending on several key factors, such as company
internationalization extent, subsidiary role, and primarily, headquarters-subsidiary
cultural proximity (Griffith and Myers, 2005; Harzing, 2000; Mukherji et al., 2008).
While there is ample evidence supporting the strong influence of cultural proximity
between headquarters and subsidiaries on subsidiary control and follow-up through
more personalized and informal systems (Griffith and Myers, 2005; Zaheer and Zaheer,
2006), our research indicates the need for these systems to be complemented with
formal and bureaucratic control systems as a result of other relevant factors, such as
companies’ globalization evolution and international purchasing and sourcing
strategies.

2. Literature background
Literature studies point to GSS design as a key competitive concern for MNCs to ensure
adequate coordination and alignment in GS operations (Baldiwala, 2001; Christopher
et al., 2006; Handfield and Nichols, 1999; McAdam and McCormack, 2001). These studies
also discuss various GSS development models that seem to indicate that the supply
source globalization required by companies expanding in global markets is closely
related to a shift towards centralized purchasing strategies (from highly autonomous
subsidiaries to centralised corporate buying units), showing the significant influence of
companies’ global sourcing and purchasing strategies. Indeed, the greater resource
coordination, alignment and integration capabilities required by global sourcing
processes seem to become more effective when purchasing management and planning to
match worldwide supplies and global needs (Monczka et al., 2008; Rajagopal and
Bernard, 1993; Trent and Monczka, 2005).
However, although both dimensions (purchasing internationalization and supply
globalization) are interrelated, there seems to be a mix of GSS alternatives that are
selected according to a number of key variables (Table I), including local and GS
availability, economic convenience, supply specialization or need for local adjustment
at subsidiaries’ level, product relevance and negotiation leverage, as well as global
management centralization level (Loppacher et al., 2006).
According to these authors, GSS consists of two separate, though interrelated,
strategic dimensions: purchasing centralization and supply source globalization. Both
dimensions are defined by MNCs based on their globalization processes, product and
market characteristics, and role and relevance of individual subsidiaries within
individual organizations. These dimensions are defined within the frame of a dynamic
and selective process that ensures the best GS chain management performance. As a
result, while GSS definition at MNCs is part of their evolution towards globalization, it
requires a specific analysis for each product and market, calling for dynamic and
selective revisions to ensure the best GS chain management performance.
JMTM
Purchase centralization level
21,7 Supply source Central Local

Global Both standard and relevant (because of
high operative significance or purchase
relative value) materials with purchasing
796 scale economies and lacking critical
logistic costs or high delivery lead times
Local Relevant materials with negotiation
power incidence and better local economic
conditions, long delivery lead times and/
or customized or service-intensive
Table I. materials
Global purchasing and
supply strategy definition Source: Adapted from Loppacher et al. (2006)
Relatively less important materials, with
global economic convenience and low
service significance, or with local
representative of global supplier
Relatively less relevant materials,
featuring local economic convenience, or
plant-specific materials, or those with
high logistic costs or service significance
(delivery time)

Among the key dimensions supporting successful GSS, this literature consistently
refers to the role of adequate headquarter-subsidiary relationships and coordination
mechanisms (Bourne et al., 2005; Rao et al., 2007). Thus, companies should set GS chain
objectives and metrics to evaluate their effectiveness and to report results to their
stakeholders. GS chain performance may be assessed on two different levels:
(1) subsidiaries should monitor and control suppliers’ service quality; and
(2) headquarters should monitor and control subsidiaries’ supply chain management
(Griffith and Myers, 2005; Motwani et al., 1998; Ritchie and Brindley, 2002).

As companies become more globalised, they need adequate alignment between

headquarters and subsidiaries across their GS chains. In specific terms, this alignment
refers to organizational resource and capability coordination, objective and strategy
consistency and, primarily, compatible management cultural values across the
organization (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Martinez and Jarillo, 1991). This alignment will
enable companies to accomplish suitable organizational competitiveness (especially in
stable local settings with strong management cultural patterns at headquarters) to
respond to environments and markets, to manage operating units consistently, to grow
as a result of consolidated expansion and to develop common patterns for operating
control and management improvements (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1994). In turn, while an
organization with no alignment between headquarters and subsidiaries may be more
flexible to respond to diverse market and environmental conditions (especially in
uncertain and volatile settings with different cultures in operating units), this would
require greater management efforts to develop centralised control policies and systems
that are compatible across worldwide operations.
Thus, there is a stronger need for alignment – integration of subsidiaries’ operations –
within MNCs. Companies achieve greater alignment by means of administrative
mechanisms that fall into two broad categories: formal and informal, corresponding to the
classification of formal and informal organizations (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991). There are
five formal coordination mechanisms: centralization, formalization, planning, output
control and behavioural control, while informal mechanisms include three kinds of
managerial tools, namely lateral relations, informal communications and organizational Headquarters-
culture. subsidiary
2.1 Subsidiary supply control mechanisms
control systems
Specifically, a literature review reveals three strategic GS performance control systems
that are closely related to the following three headquarter-subsidiary control systems
(Bourne et al., 2005; Harzing, 1996; Martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Rao et al., 2007): behaviour 797
or personal control, measured according to the significance of behaviour evaluations for
companies and their concern for procedures or methods, output or bureaucratic control,
measuring MNC’s focus on evaluation results, for example, qualitative and quantitative
indicators for effectiveness and performance and input or social control, assessing
MNCs’ abilities to offer significant training for new hires to use the best recruiting
methods and to commit to overall training and development. Three management or
governance mechanisms are employed by MNCs to suit these control systems. These
mechanisms are centralization, based on hierarchical and authority schemes used for
key decision making; formalization, focused on formal systems and procedures in
decision making and management; and normative involvement, referring to
decision-making processes based on shared values, goals and non-explicit rules
(Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Griffith and Myers, 2005; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994).
For Baliga and Jaeger (1984), personal and social controls are specific attributes in
“cultural control” schemes. Bartlett and Yoshihara (1988) argue that personal and
behaviour controls require physical and mental proximity, turning cultural and
bureaucratic controls into the best tools for corporate subsidiary management. These
two opposing control types can hardly be found in pure form in real-world companies.
Typically, key measurements used by MNCs to monitor GS performance include
(Gomes et al., 2004; Prasad and Sounderpandian, 2003; Rafele, 2004) financial
performance, referring to returns on operative investments (including stock, accounts
payable to suppliers, acquired equipment or technologies); resource utilization, i.e. the
exploitation of resources allocated to products’ value chains (including materials,
labour and outsourced services); and quality, as related to supplied product or service
quality (focusing on defects, rejections, delivery timeliness, stockout, etc.). GSS calls for
more coordinated and integrated requirements for world purchases, which imply
highly coordinated and interrelated activities to ensure proper subsidiary management
alignment and commitment to corporate goals and guidelines. As a result, companies
should resort to culturally based, less formal and bureaucratic control systems that
focus on global management results (Birkinshaw, 1997; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1994;
Trent and Monczka, 2003). In turn, GSSs based on regional or local supply characterize
multi-centre organizations with more autonomous business units that require more
formal and bureaucratic controls. MNCs choose control systems and management
mechanisms for headquarters-subsidiary relationships that run between both extreme
systems to respond to some influencing factors rather than in pursuit of specific
behaviour patterns.

2.2 Influencing factors on supply control systems

According to Giunipero and Monczka (1997), and Trent and Monczka (2003), both the
need for internationalization imposed by the global competition faced by MNCs and,
particularly, the broad cultural diversity found in purchasing and supply management
JMTM drive companies to pursue more professionalized control systems for policies, procedures
21,7 and quantitative follow-up, through management performance measurements and
regular operating reports. In fact, when it comes to setting a control strategy to monitor
supply management across MNC business units, international expansion as well as
subsidiaries’ cultural diversity and local environmental conditions become influential
elements to ensure alignment and coordination in pursuit of corporate goals (Ross, 1998;
798 Saunders, 1994; Vidal and Goetschalckx, 2000).
Thus, based on this literature, there are four relevant factors affecting decisions on
control systems and delegation: internationalization degree, subsidiary importance and
interdependence, environmental uncertainties and cultural proximity. Highly
internationalized companies tend to centralize their strategies and key decisions, as
well as to formalize their control systems, as they need to reduce risks of control and
strategic alignment loss. In turn, companies in early globalization stages feature closer
headquarters-subsidiary relationships to allow for greater subsidiary commitment to
and understanding of corporate goals and values (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Snell, 1992).
Subsidiary importance and interdependence is another relevant factor. Several authors
believe that subsidiaries (local implementers) with limited geographic and product or
value-added scope or with considerable expertise in some operations are subject to
bureaucratic controls, as their operations are integrated to their MNCs. Instead,
companies with worldwide or regional responsibility for a product line or overall
business roles rely on normative control because parent companies give subsidiaries
full responsibility over their operations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Taggart, 1998;
Wathne and Heide, 2000). In turn, subsidiaries that are highly dependent on
headquarters or other subsidiaries (in terms of knowledge, product and capital flows)
demand more centralized and bureaucratic headquarters-subsidiary control systems to
ensure adequate worldwide alignment and operating coordination (Birkinshaw, 1997;
Gupta and Govindarajan, 1994). Environmental uncertainty (particularly, political and
economic instability) is another factor that increases the incidence of bureaucratic and
centralized control mechanisms (Brownell, 1987). Generally, in more dynamic,
complex, diverse and hostile environments, less formal and bureaucratic control
mechanism seems to fare better, calling for greater local autonomy. Finally, cultural
proximity, construed as shared behaviour patterns and values, also accounts for a
relevant influential factor, as its absence may trigger internal tensions, discrepancies
among decision makers and communication interferences across the organization
(Griffith and Myers, 2005; Hendon et al., 1996; Tozier, 2006).

2.3 Cultural proximity

Herskovits (1989) listed five cultural dimensions to be considered in this type of
organizational analysis: material culture (shaping good requirements and quality
demands), social institutions of all kinds (which determine individual behaviour), man
and universe (religious and idiosyncratic beliefs), aesthetics (closely related to local
symbolism and values) and language (the most difficult cultural element for global
MNCs). To analyze local culture impact on individual behaviour, Hofstede (1983, 2001)
developed a paradigm that featured five cultural dimensions: power distance, focusing
on local social equality or inequality; individualism, referring to the significance awarded
by society to individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships;
uncertainty avoidance, which describes society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity;
masculinity, indicating the significance of traditional male achievements, control and Headquarters-
power roles in a specific society, and, finally, long-term orientation, which determines subsidiary
society’s long-term commitment to traditional, forward-thinking values. In light of these
dimensions, Hofstede (1983) surveyed cultural similarities across 50 countries and three control systems
regions in the world, reflecting his findings in cultural profile distribution maps. MNC
managers should focus on these dimensions to shape their headquarters-subsidiary
relationships by choosing centralized or decentralized, formal or informal systems 799
(Rodrigues, 1995).
According to Hedlund (1994), cultural proximity between headquarters and
subsidiaries allows for broader communications, adequate alignment and better
understanding in local corporate policy application. Hence, a cultural control system
becomes more adequate in this scenario. Conversely, sharp cultural diversity between
headquarters and operating units brings about greater difficulties and restraints for
worldwide business integration; therefore, in this scenario, bureaucratic control
systems mitigate risks associated with corporate control loss (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
2002; Gomez-Mejia and Palich, 1997).
According to the model developed by Baliga and Jaeger (1984), cultural control is
recommended in most scenarios, considering cultural proximity as a relevant variable
to determine control system choices. Model results reveal that headquarters-subsidiary
relationships across culturally similar environments are usually based on cultural
controls, because subsidiaries’ integration and cooperation conditions allow for closer
control systems (Griffith and Myers, 2005; Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006). Instead, in cases
of low cultural proximity, companies tend to resort to more formal and bureaucratic
control systems in an effort to make up for a global lack of integration, except when
there is high interdependence and strong ties allow for culture-based control systems.
Summing up, this literary analysis seems to indicate that cultural controls are
preferred for supply management performance in culturally similar headquarters and
subsidiaries (Hedlund, 1994; Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006). In turn, subsidiaries bearing
significant cultural differences with their respective headquarters exhibit other
influential factors for specific control strategy choices, such as globalization level,
interdependence among subsidiaries and local uncertainty. Companies tend to resort to
cultural control during early globalization stages or in cases of sharp local uncertainty,
high interdependence among subsidiaries or strong strategic orientation (Vidal and
Goetschalckx, 2000; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Griffith and Myers, 2005).
This research work attempts to analyze the behaviour of key influential criteria in
GS chain control systems used by MNCs to monitor subsidiaries that are culturally
close to their headquarters in order to discuss how these control systems influence the
need to implant mechanisms that complement traditional personalized systems. Our
analysis reveals that, in highly globalised MNCs or companies with highly centralised
global purchase strategies, cultural controls should be complemented with more formal
and bureaucratic controls to prevent control and alignment impairment as a result of
greater local management autonomy.

3. Research aims
This research work is part of a broader research project undertaken jointly by faculty
members from IAE Business School (Argentina) and the Dipartimento di Ingegneria
Gestionale del Politecnico di Milano (Italy) to study the development and
JMTM implementation of GS chains in MNCs pursuing worldwide expansion processes with a
21,7 view to drafting an organizational model that better explains key variable interaction
and behaviour.
As discussed above, this research work, based on a sample of seven Italian
companies that expanded to the Mercosur area, shows how combined control systems
may be applied in relationships among culturally similar headquarters and subsidiaries,
800 exploring some relevant factors, such as companies’ globalization and purchasing
strategy centralization. The following dimensions have been considered in this study:
.
GS headquarters-subsidiary control systems. Monitoring and control strategies
used by headquarters to oversee the purchasing and supply activities of their
business units throughout the world, including explicit policies and procedures,
annual budget process and control, management reports and personal contacts
between headquarters’ executives and subsidiary heads.
.
Cultural proximity. common, culturally based behaviour patterns and values
registered across business units.
.
Global sourcing and purchasing strategies. strategies chosen to select GS source
and to distribute key purchasing responsibilities in global organizations.
. Globalization process evolution. MNC evolutionary stage in internationalization
plans, as related to world market coverage, global organization autonomy and
worldwide operations throughout each business value chain.

Based on the analysis of strategic behaviours recorded in our sample, this paper
addresses the following research questions:
RQ1. How does cultural proximity impact GS control systems and procedures in
headquarters-subsidiary relationships?
RQ2. What is the effect of global sourcing and purchasing strategies on GS control
systems used in headquarters-subsidiary relationships based on strong
cultural similarities?
RQ3. How does globalization process evolution influence GS control systems used in
headquarters-subsidiary relationships shaped by strong cultural similarities?

4. Research methodology
This research has relied on a multiple case study method that seeks to understand the
complex relationships among multiple variables and their dynamics. This method has
proven to be the most appropriate means to address how and why questions regarding
a set of facts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1992).
The research methodology is unfolded in two key stages, with an initial phase that
involved the analysis of this literature followed by the empirical application of the
theoretical framework to the research sample. The theoretical analysis contributed
mainly to better identifying existing global sourcing strategies and buyer-supplier
relationship types as well as their key driving factors to provide the necessary grounds
for research framework definition. Once preliminary analyses had been developed, we
could formulate the research framework that was used to analyze empirical data.
Empirical evidence was drawn from a sample of Italian MNCs operating in the
Mercosur area, varying in size and industry. Following Eisenhardt (1989), who
recommends a sample size of four to ten organizations, we limited this study to a Headquarters-
sample of seven companies. The geographic location considered for this research subsidiary
matched a single country of origin criterion, which determines the existence of similar
cultural patterns, and a single region chosen by companies for their expansion, in order control systems
to allow for a comparative analysis of different cases in the same environmental and
market conditions.
The Southern Common Market (known as Mercosur) is the custom duty union forged 801
by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay on March 26, 1991, when the Asunción
Treaty was signed to ensure free trade of goods, services and productive drivers among
member states, to establish a common export duty and trade policy, to coordinate
macroeconomic and sector policies among member states and to harmonise local
legislation to strengthen regional integration. Mercosur encompasses an area of
approximately 12 million square kilometres, with sovereignty over a large array of
natural resources. Its population of over 200 million produces a gross domestic product
(GDP) in excess of US$ one billion, accounting for more than 54 percent of Latin
America’s overall GDP.
The Mercosur area was selected because it embodies the largest Latin American
economy (65 percent) and the fourth largest economic region in the world, with an
overall GDP of US$ 1.9 billion in 2006 and sustained growth since 1990 (reaching an
economic growth rate of 3.2 percent in 2005, a rate higher than the European Union’s
2.3 percent). Mercosur has become the second foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient
among emerging markets – with a total foreign investment of US$ 60 billion between
1970 and 2005 – and a notable example of renewed worldwide interest in regional
trade agreements (Eichengreen, 2004). In this context, Italian investments account for a
high FDI share, also as a result of a strong cultural influence in the region due to
significant immigration flows dating back to the 1940s and 1990s.
The companies selected for the research sample are manufacturing companies, with
upstream supply chain development and global operations, to enable an adequate
analysis for the research purposes. Cases were selected in order to maximize the
differences in terms of size, ownership schemes, strategies and globalization processes in
order to allow for theoretical replication while analyzing empirical data (Yin, 1992).
Specific data were collected through personal, in-depth interviews with members of the
top management teams in each firm, including key company officials in charge of
international supply management areas, as well as subsidiaries’ general managers as
well as supply and purchasing area managers in order to obtain a general and reliable
view of both corporate GSS management and subsidiaries’ development and
implementation processes. Interviews were carried out by researchers, using a
semi-structured questionnaire, at both MNC headquarters and subsidiaries, ensuring
interviewers’ control, instant feedback and clarification of specific issues, over a period
spanning from early 2003 to mid-2005. A checklist was sent to respondents in advance to
allow them to focus and reflect on the research subject. The questionnaire consisted of
key open-ended questions to be supplemented with additional ones during the interview.
Interviews were transcribed immediately after meeting with respondents, with the
data analyzed as soon as possible, while information was still fresh in the mind of
researchers.
Qualitative and empirical data from interviews were analyzed by qualitative methods,
using cross-case comparisons and explanation-building techniques. On the basis of
JMTM Eisenhardt’s (1989) work, a unique methodology was developed to structure this type of
21,7 analysis. Then, organizations were paired within their group and iteratively compared to
each other in order to identify similarities and differences among them. These
comparisons were used to identify characteristics or practices shared by all or some firms
to determine the specific behaviour of their strategic activities. Because there was a
circular relationship between theoretical and empirical analyses, findings provided
802 further information for framework refinement.

5. Research sample
This section describes major specific developments in each case (Table II). The sample
included two types of companies: family businesses – typically managed by their
owners, with a paternalistic management style, flatter organizational structures and
more informal control policies and systems (Cases 1-3) – and MNCs with strong global
expansion, characterized by shareholder governance schemes, professional and formal
management style, pyramid-like organizations and more explicit and formalized
control policies and systems (Cases 4-7).

Case 1
This family-owned business company operates in 22 countries, with a total of
15 production plants in 12 countries, including Italy, Portugal, Russia, Romania, Canada,
the USA, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Korea, Australia, Sweden and Iran. The company
manufactures and sells supermarket refrigerating equipment and accessories, responding
to local markets’ requirements with standard products and customized equipment. Its
product portfolio featured six lines: supermarket/hypermarket units, built-in condenser
units, cold rooms, condensing units, shelves and checkout counters and accessories. The
company started operating in Mercosur (Argentina) in 1994, through a joint venture with
a local firm that manufactured and marketed exhibits and equipment for supermarkets.

Case 2
The company is an Italian family-owned business managed by its owners since
inception. It manufactures and markets chocolate products and candies (including
chocolate candies, iced tea, Easter eggs, surprise eggs and cocoa jams), leading the
Italian market and holding the second position in the overall European market. The
group owns 28 operating units, 31 marketing locations and 17 manufacturing plants –
three of them in South America (in Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil). At the beginning of
1990s, the company decided to expand its operations to the Mercosur area. In
Argentina, the company owns a single-product plant that manufactures chocolate
candies widely known for their prize toys, while the Brazilian affiliate also produces
chocolate candies at a single-product factory for exports.

Case 3
This Italian family-owned company ranks among top European manufacturers in the
wood panelling and furniture industries. It also manufactures other products for the
furniture production and decoration industries, such as plywood boards, resins and
wallpaper. The company has five product lines, including melamine paper-covered
boards, raw particleboards for both furniture and construction industries, thin panels
Company Industry World operation Employees Annual sales International process evolution

Case 1 Supermarket equipment 15 manufacturing plants in 22 countries 1,000 e350 M Early globalization stage (SME)
Case 2 Food industry 17 manufacturing plants in 37 countries 16,000 e6,000 M Early globalization stage (SME)
Case 3 Decorated plywood panels Five manufacturing plants in 16 countries 1,600 US$1,500 M Early globalization stage (SME)
Case 4 Wires 54 manufacturing plants in 22 countries 14,000 e3,100 M Intermediate globalization stage
Case 5 Tires 24 manufacturing plants in 12 countries 20,000 e3,600 M Intermediate globalization stage
Case 6 Car manufacture 84 manufacturing plants in 190 countries 165,000 US$50,000 M Advanced globalization stage
Case 7 Industrial procurement solutions 15 manufacturing plants in 30 countries 45,000 US$16,000 M Advanced globalization stage
Note: SME, small and medium enterprise
subsidiary
Headquarters-

control systems

companies (as of 2008)

Description of sample
803

Table II.
JMTM for drawers and doors, laminates for a perfect finish in furniture and melamine bands
21,7 for panel edges.
It owns three manufacturing plants in Italy for panels and furniture, a plant in the
Mercosur area for panels and, a plant in Belgium exclusively for resins. In Mercosur,
the company adjusts its offerings to suit the local market’s preferences, transportation
costs and similar manufacturing processes.
804
Case 4
This MNC focuses on the production and marketing of cables, accessories and systems for
electricity generation, transportation and distribution, leading markets throughout the
world. Its product family includes accessories for power cables, building wire products,
high-voltage power cables, industry and special cables, low-voltage power cables, magnet
wires and medium-voltage power cables. The company has 54 productive units in
22 countries: 39 in Europe, four in North America, six in South America (Brazil and
Argentina) and five in Asia and Australia. As a multinational corporation, it has
diversified its activities into other businesses, such as tire manufacturing and marketing,
large-scale real estate developments and telecommunications. The product strategy
adopted for Mercosur is based on a market-oriented regional supply policy, with three
product categories: domestic cables, industrial cables and installation services.

Case 5
This MNC manufactures and markets tires for all kinds of vehicles (including
passenger cars, light trucks, medium heavy trucks, motorcycles and motor sports),
ranking sixth among the top world producers created in Italy as a family business and
managed by its founder, it owns 24 productive units in over 12 countries, including
plants in South America (Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela). In the early 1930s, the
company decided to expand to the Mercosur area (Brazil and Argentina) to take
advantage of the region’s strategic importance and growth. The company’s Mercosur
plants are designed to accommodate specialization projects, with fewer product lines in
order to seize economies of scale and operative synergies across countries.

Case 6
This company has more than 100 years of experience in the automotive industry,
designing, building and marketing cars, trucks, tractors, agricultural machinery,
road-building equipment, engines, automotive and aeronautic industry parts and
production systems. It operates through wholly owned production plants – located in
Italy, Poland and Mercosur – and joint venture or license agreements for other plants –
located in Europe and Asia – with a total of 84 manufacturing plants in 190 countries.
In the early 1940s, the company decided to expand to Mercosur as part of its
globalization process and in order to secure a relevant role in South America, one of the
areas chosen by the group for its operations in emerging markets. The plant in Argentina
is intended as a backup for the Brazilian plant, although the company’s regional policy
assigns different models to each of these plants to supplement their markets.

Case 7
This MNC specializes in industrial plant infrastructure and architectural design,
engineering and construction. Its expertise focuses on five business areas: the steel
industry, infrastructure projects, industrial process and plant exploitation, the power Headquarters-
industry and utilities. This group owns more than 15 manufacturing plants in over subsidiary
30 countries around the world, including Italy, Romania, Japan, Canada, Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela. Its global purchasing strategy is strongly control systems
centralized through a corporate business unit. In 1940, the company was driven to expand
to the Mercosur area (specifically in Argentina). The product portfolio strategy adopted
for Mercosur is similar to the one pursued by the company elsewhere in the world. 805
6. Research development and findings
This section outlines an overview of GS control strategies used in headquarters-
subsidiary relationships recorded in our MNC sample (Table III).

Case 1
This company’s GSS is based on local sourcing and handled by subsidiaries, except for
specific global supplies warranting headquarters’ involvement for supplier certification
and benchmark pricing. Its purchasing strategy is locally oriented, although it also
seeks convenient conditions through GS leverage with centrally negotiated prices and
contract terms. In most cases, subsidiaries are in charge of purchase management, with
the exception of specific global supplies that require supplier certification and
benchmark prices from headquarters.
Generally, this company’s corporate culture and managerial style are not conveyed
through explicit policies; rather, the company shares its habits and costumes with its
subsidiaries through close relationships. Indeed, control systems are strongly
personalized, focusing on economic and financial results as well as supply management
performance (in terms of raw material inventories, supply rejection and compliance ratio,
supply product quality level, etc.), through the presence of Italian comptrollers in local
organizations, reporting to headquarters (via e-mail, CDs or network information
systems), telephone contacts and frequent meetings in Italy to align objectives, strategic
decisions and monitoring purposes.

Case 2
This company’s GSS is highly decentralized, with global supplies managed centrally
and local supplies handled locally. It leans heavily towards local supply to ensure greater
flexibility and to exploit tax benefits resulting from local integration. The relationship
between the group and its subsidiaries is based on feedback support, as well as on
communication and control tools used to manage affiliates’ performance. There were
several control levels. First, a local Italian controller acted as internal auditor,
representing headquarters at the subsidiary. The information provided by the local
controller was reviewed by a corporate controller through the network information
system (a compatible network system to keep online communications with headquarter).
Also, Italian directors travelled to the Argentine affiliate three or four times every year to
discuss and define future policies, follow up on action plans, visit important customers
and meet with other regional representatives. In turn, representatives from all
subsidiaries met in Italy once a year to review the consolidated balance sheet and to draw
a sales forecast for the next year. Although the company has no explicit policies in place,
its culture has provided global guidelines. Headquarters’ control is non-bureaucratic,
based on personal contacts and focusing on economic and financial results.
JMTM
Case 1 GSS based on local sourcing with, generally, locally oriented purchasing strategy. No
21,7 explicit corporate policies to monitor subsidiaries
The relationship between the group and its subsidiaries is based on feedback support
(intranets, management information system reports, etc) as well as on frequent visits and
communications
Case 2 Strong trend towards decentralized purchasing management, focusing on local sourcing
806 No explicit corporate policies for practical applications. Centralization on financial
strategies, product and processes design
Personalized and un-bureaucratic control, focusing on economic and financial results as well
as production and supply management, based on informal management reports and
frequent managers’ visits and communications
Case 3 Global purchasing strategy is largely local, mostly based on local sourcing
No explicit corporate policies. Centralized definitions for key functions such as financial
control, product design and process technology
Personalized control focusing on economic and financial results and operating management,
based on informal management reports and frequent managers’ visits and communications
Case 4 GSS highly decentralized, leaning towards local sourcing through subsidiaries’ or regional
buyers’ purchase management
Explicit corporate policies for human resources management, product and process
technology, financial strategy and purchasing management
Personalized control mechanisms are becoming more bureaucratic, focusing on financial
results, productivity indicators and supply management performance metrics, through on-
line central information system linked to subsidiaries
Case 5 GSS with strongly purchasing local autonomy, tending towards local sourcing
Explicit corporate policies for financial strategy, IT systems, product and process design,
and human resources strategies
Personalized control system supplemented with bureaucratic control focusing on economic,
financial and production and supply management results (product quality and productivity)
through on-line central system via intranet
Case 6 Tending towards global-regional supply with strong central purchasing control for policy
and procedure setting
Centrally defined corporate policies for product design, process technology, financial
strategy, purchase management and human resources management
Personalized control system (periodical visits and contacts) supplemented with highly
bureaucratic control measures focusing on financial, economic and operations management
results (productivity, product quality, service and supply performance), based on systematic
and formal management reports and central information systems
Case 7 Strongly centralized purchasing strategy with sourcing either local or global, depending on
price conditions and customers’ customization requirements
Corporate policies are explicitly defined in procedure manuals that guarantee management
consistence and effectiveness
Table III. Personalized control system (periodical visits and contacts) supplemented with strongly
Sample companies’ GS bureaucratic control measures focusing on economic, financial, internal and supply and
headquarters-subsidiary purchase management results through frequent on-line reports and central information
control mechanisms systems via intranet

Reports on operations and supply management performance are regularly submitted to

headquarters via online information systems linked to subsidiary management
evaluation and incentive systems. There are frequent auditing visits by Italian directors
and headquarters trips by local managers.
Case 3 Headquarters-
This company’s global purchasing strategy is largely local, mostly based on local subsidiary
sourcing, depending on availability at competitive prices and headquarters’ quality
requirements. However, there is central involvement when it comes to evaluating and control systems
submitting more sensible global alternatives. The relationship the group has built with
its subsidiaries is highly significant and informal, involving feedback support to and
from headquarters as well as the corporate control required to manage affiliates’ 807
performance. The company oversees its subsidiaries through management indicators
defined by headquarters to report on daily operations (sales, product quality, customer
satisfaction, market share, growth, exports percentage, etc.), monthly supply
performance (timely deliveries, raw material inventory, purchasing price and cost
savings), financial figures and quarterly economic results. Typically, there are no Italian
auditors’ visits to group affiliates. Subsidiary officials visit the company’s corporate
offices quarterly to review general budgets, to consolidate them with corporate
strategies and to analyze business results.

Case 4
This company’s GSS is highly decentralized, leaning towards local sourcing through
subsidiaries’ or regional buyers’ purchase management, except in cases of supply
shortage and inconvenient prices, when the company resorts to regional supply. For
global supplies, corporate lead buyers (in Italy) only certify suppliers and negotiate
prices, leaving order allocation to local officials. Its central control policy focuses on
results, engulfing economic, financial, productive and industry management
indicators. The company uses bureaucratic control systems that include reporting
on economic and financial results, productivity indicators and supply management
performance metrics (supply product inventory, purchase price, logistic costs, timely
deliveries, etc.) via the company’s online central information system linked to
subsidiary management evaluation and incentive systems. Some control systems are
executed online on a daily basis (for operative information), while management
evaluations are handled by headquarters on a monthly basis. There are also visits by
Italian directors to subsidiaries and by subsidiary heads to headquarters to agree on
annual objectives, as well as quarterly videoconferences to discuss monthly results and
quarter forecasts. The company also relies on frequent videoconferences with
subsidiaries to discuss monthly and yearly results, as well as to determine forecasts for
upcoming quarters. Once a year, each country subsidiary negotiates its budget,
objectives, terms and activities (in units and currency).

Case 5
The company’s corporate GSS relies on centralized or local purchases from MNCs,
heavily leaning towards global sourcing. When there is local availability or regional
MNCs offer better conditions, local supply is favoured. In general, global supplies are
managed by headquarters (supplier selection and certification, price negotiations and
global purchase contracts) and by subsidiaries (with benchmarking price provided by
headquarters) when global suppliers have local representatives.
The company has explicit policies for financial strategies, information technology
systems, product design, process technology and human resources practices. Control
systems are highly bureaucratic for economic, financial, production and productivity
JMTM results, while supply and purchasing management performance is assessed through
21,7 online reporting via the company’s centralized information system, which is closely
linked to subsidiary management evaluation and incentive systems. This information
is used to build a global overview that is broken down into countries and business
units. There are also auditing visits by headquarters’ officials and regional directors
and visits to Italy by subsidiary managers to discuss annual objectives.
808
Case 6
Typically, global supplies are managed by subsidiaries, either via local supply or from
other affiliates in case of global suppliers. Although the company’s GSS intends to
provide local purchase management autonomy, there is strong central control for
policy and procedure setting. The company relies on explicit, corporately defined
policies for product design, process technology, financial strategy, purchase
management and human resources practices. The relationship between headquarters
and subsidiaries is close, largely based on highly bureaucratic controls focusing on
economic and financial results, internal management (productivity, product quality,
service and marketing performance) and supply management performance (as regards
raw material inventory cost, purchasing price, supplier’s on-time delivery, rejections,
etc.) through daily and monthly reports submitted via its central information network,
which is linked to subsidiary management evaluation and incentive systems. There are
also audits by headquarters’ directors and scheduled visits from subsidiary heads to
headquarters or regional hubs.

Case 7
This company pursues a strongly centralized purchasing strategy through a corporate
business unit that enables it to achieve purchase efficiency, to secure supply availability
and to ensure required quality levels. Supply origin is either local or global, depending
on price conditions and customers’ customization requirements. In general, corporate
policies are explicitly defined in procedure manuals that guarantee management
consistence and effectiveness. While the company follows a centralized strategy based
on its business units and processes, it affords certain flexibility for local and specialty
operations so as to exploit regional market opportunities. As a result, corporate policies
and strategies are adjusted to suit local specificities with headquarters’ approval.
Specifically, there are clearly defined procedures for each key purchase management
phase, that is, for product and process selection and standardization, for bidding
processes and supply allocation, contract elaboration and supplier follow-up and
control. Company control systems tend to be bureaucratic, including frequent reports
with operative and management indicators, and monitored through the company’s
central information system, which is linked to subsidiary management evaluation and
incentive systems.

7. Discussion
7.1 The Impact of cultural proximity
Our research work seems to indicate that cultural proximity between sample
headquarters and subsidiaries has allowed companies to develop closer, more
personalized and informal relationships with their affiliates, thus confirming research
studies found in this literature. A common behavioural pattern has been found in MNC
headquarters-subsidiary control and monitoring relationships, leaning towards an Headquarters-
informal approach based on shared practices and values while supported by formal subsidiary
control systems (Table IV).
This pattern basically included the following elements: control systems
.
Annual budget process, carried out by subsidiaries and submitted for
headquarters’ approval in Italy.
. Annual conventions, where subsidiary directors present their plans to 809
headquarters’ top management and other subsidiary directors.
.
Inclusion of headquarters’ officials in local organizations – this control mechanism
has been particularly used by MNCs during early local insertion stages.
.
Scheduled visits from headquarters’ managers to set the policies for subsidiary
development, follow-up and planning.
. Frequent visits to headquarters by subsidiary managers (twice a year), with
similar objectives as those mentioned in the previous item.
.
Ongoing subsidiary contact with corporate management to plan strategies and
discuss operating issues. This mechanism allows for swift and effective actions
and decisions.

Cultural similarities have been found to influence headquarters-subsidiary

relationships, allowing sample companies to use personalized control systems, as
conditions favoured cross-subsidiary integration and cooperation. As a result,
subsidiaries experience greater understanding of and commitment to corporate
objectives, values and practices. Their remarkable cultural closeness to headquarters
enhances their strategic fit during the process of local market development and
strengthening. For headquarters, this cultural resemblance prevents the use of explicit
policies to instil its management style into subsidiaries, which simply adopt its
customs. Indeed, in cases of culturally similar headquarters and subsidiaries, like the
MNCs included in this sample, companies usually prefer informal control systems
featuring strong subsidiary involvement (cultural control). However, our study also
shows that, in some scenarios, companies employ complementary formal control
mechanisms that reflect their corporate culture, carefully avoiding any impairment to
their highly personalized control frameworks.

7.2 The influence of global sourcing and purchasing strategy

The present study reveals that companies’ evolution in their globalization processes
relevantly influences their GSS of choice. An analysis of value distributions in GS
purchases in terms of sample supply source and purchasing locations (Figure 1) shows
that more globalised MNCs (Cases 4 and 5 and, particularly, Cases 6 and 7), with global
production and marketing expansion through highly centralized corporate strategies
based on over five decades of experience in international business, handle their global
requirements through centralized purchasing management for greater efficiency and
competitiveness. Conversely, MNCs with more limited international experience
(Cases 1-3) and a solid family-business culture, characterized by owner management
and corporate strategies that favour local autonomy, mostly exhibit local needs
preferably satisfied through local purchasing management for more effective and agile
relationships with suppliers.
 21,7

810
JMTM

Table IV.

control-type analysis
Headquarters-subsidiary
Personal relationship and control Bureaucratic relationship and control
Annual meeting Scheduled visits Frequent Constant Headquarters
Annual with other from visits from contact directors in Annual Periodical
budget subsidiary headquarters subsidiary with subsidiary Explicit Explicit budget management Control Global
MNC process heads directors heads directors organization policies procedures control reports system used GSPSa evolution

Case 1 High Yes High High High Yes Low Low Medium- Medium Cultural Basically with local Earlier
high control sourcing and purchasing globalization
stages
Case 2 High Yes High High High No Medium Medium Medium- High Semi- Balance GS managed Earlier
high formalized centrally, and local globalization
cultural supply handled locally stages
control
Case 3 High Yes High High High Yes Low Low Medium- Medium Cultural Basically with local Earlier
high control sourcing and purchasing globalization
stages
Case 4 High Yes Medium Medium High No High and High and High High Highly Highly decentralized, Intermediate
medium medium formalized with trend to globalization
cultural local sourcing stages
control
Case 5 High Yes Medium Medium High No High and High and High High Highly Balance GS managed Intermediate
medium medium formalized centrally, while local globalization
cultural supply handled locally stages
control
Case 6 Medium Yes Medium Medium High No High High High High Highly Trend to global sourcing Advanced
formalized managed locally with globalization
cultural strong central control stages
control
Case 7 Medium Yes Low Low High No High High High High Highly Strongly centralized Advanced
formalized purchasing globalization
cultural stages
control

Note: aGSPS, global sourcing and purchasing strategy

 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Headquarters-
S subsidiary
Global Global Global
u
p control systems
p
l Local Local Local
y
High Low High Low High Low 811
Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
S
o
u Global Global Global Global
r Figure 1.
c
e Purchase economic value
Local Local Local Local
mapping in sample global
sourcing and purchasing
High Low High Low High Low High Low
strategies
Purchase centralisation level

Our sample research analysis has also revealed that companies with GSS featuring
highly centralized purchase and global sourcing strategies (cases 5-7) usually develop
more formal and bureaucratic monitoring and control systems to manage their
subsidiaries, allowing for greater consistence in worldwide control standards and
criteria and, at the same time, ensuring deeper GSS alignment and coordination. With a
more centralized GS management, these companies need this approach to develop
universal measurement and evaluation patterns for all operating units. These systems
focus on management results, relying on periodical reports of economic, financial,
quality and productivity results via online, compatible network systems, explicitly
defined purchasing policies and procedures, budgets with quantified management
objectives, regular deviation control and rewards/penalties based on annual evaluation
for subsidiaries’ general management. Instead, companies with more local sourcing
and decentralized purchasing strategies (cases 2 and 4 and, particularly, cases 1 and 3)
develop more informal and, therefore, more action-oriented mechanisms to manage
their subsidiaries in order to reduce the risks involved in ex-post monitoring
procedures and to profit from subsidiaries’ greater natural understanding and
alignment (Table V).
Indeed, we may conclude that global sourcing and purchasing strategies have a
direct influence on headquarters-subsidiary relationships and monitoring systems.
Specifically, in the pursuit of more centralized purchasing and global sourcing
strategies, MNCs favour more formal and bureaucratic headquarters-subsidiary control
systems, and, while opting for more localized and decentralized strategies, MNCs prefer
more personalized relationships leaning towards joint management.

7.3 The influence of globalization process evolution

This analysis shows that, while this sample reveals a behavioural pattern in MNC
headquarters-subsidiary control and monitoring relationships that leans towards a
direct approach based on shared practices and norms, this pattern is more relevant in
less globally developed companies (cases 1-3). In turn, this monitoring strategy is
supplemented by formal mechanisms and explicit procedures in more globally
developed companies (cases 4-7), probably due to the fact that these more developed
JMTM
Sourcing and purchasing
21,7 strategy globalization
and centralization level GS headquarters-subsidiary control strategy

Low Case 1 Personalized control systems, based on:

Frequent visits and contacts
812 Case 3 Annual budget process
Informal management reports
Case 2 Personalized control systems, based on:
Medium Periodical visits and contacts
Case 4 Annual budget process
Regular management reports
Case 5 Personalized control systems, based on:
Table V. High Periodical visits and contacts
Summary of purchasing Case 6 Annual budget process
and sourcing strategy Case 7 Complemented with formal control:
influence on GS Frequent budget control and follow-up
headquarters-subsidiary Explicit policies and procedures
control systems Systematic and formal management reports

companies need more formal means to enforce and control their strategies in order to
reduce alignment loss risks and to prevent the control loss entailed by decentralization
(Table VI).
Indeed, this research study has found that, although control mechanisms used by
headquarters to manage subsidiaries are strongly personalized and flexible to suit
subsidiary cultural conditions, formal control systems – such as explicit policies,
explicit procedures throughout purchase management steps, annual budgetary control,
and periodical management reports, including economic and financial information, as
well as productivity and quality measurements – are adopted, as long as they are
relevant to MNC globalization evolution and maturity.
While all cases feature strong corporate controls focusing on close headquarters-
subsidiary relationships, there are significant differences in specific strategies employed.
Companies in earlier globalization stages have flatter and more flexible organizations,
which allow them to communicate corporate guidelines swiftly and to control subsidiary
management through more informal means. These family-owned businesses in early

Globalization
process evolution GS headquarters-subsidiary control strategy

Less globally Case 1 Personalized control systems based on shared practices and values,
developed essentially via:
Table VI. Case 2 Periodical managers’ meeting and contracts,
Summary of globalization Case 3 Annual budget and informal management reports
process evolution More globally Case 4 Personalized control systems, complemented with:
influence on GS developed Case 5 Explicit policies and procedures,
headquarters-subsidiary Case 6 Formal and bureaucratic control and follow-up, and
control systems Case 7 Systematic monitoring via central information system
internationalization stages can exploit cultural proximity to ensure corporate and Headquarters-
strategic alignment through control mechanisms based on personalization and mutual subsidiary
agreement. In turn, companies in advanced globalization stages tend to adopt
complementary, formal and bureaucratic control systems, with explicit procedures and control systems
policies. With this strategy, these companies seek to reduce control and alignment loss
risks by setting framework policies and closely monitoring subsidiary results and
management deviations. 813
Summing up, based on this research study, it may be argued that, while MNCs with
significant cultural closeness between headquarters and subsidiaries typically prefer
strongly personalized, culturally oriented headquarters-subsidiary supply control
mechanisms, other relevant factors (their globalization status, purchasing centralization
and globalised sourcing) often lead to complementary bureaucratic and formal control
and follow-up systems (systematically monitoring management results and setting
explicit corporate standards and policies) that are consistently aligned with MNCs’
strongly personalized and culturally close relationships.

8. Conclusions and limitations

The literature review has revealed that the type of relationship built by MNCs’
headquarters to monitor their business units’ supply management practices is
influenced by key factors, including internationalization extent, subsidiaries’ relative
significance, environmental conditions and local economic stability, as well as cultural
compatibility between headquarters and subsidiaries. As a result, MNCs face a choice
between opposing bureaucratic and cultural control systems. The studies of this
literature also suggest that, in cases of close cultural proximity, this factor becomes
crucial for control mechanism choices, making cultural control preferable and leading to
personalized relationships and control systems that focus on management practices and
overall company results.
However, this research sample analysis seems to indicate that, when headquarters
and subsidiaries share cultural similarities, there may be influential variables
associated with specific conditions – such as companies’ globalization evolution and
internationalized purchasing and sourcing – that may lead companies to resort to
formal and bureaucratic control mechanisms to complement and support the strongly
personalized relationships stemming from cultural proximity.
It should be noted, nonetheless, that this research suffers from certain restraints that
should be addressed explicitly. In fact, this research does not quantify the impact of
performance benefits or failures in headquarters-subsidiary relationships, as compared
to other strategic alternatives.
In addition, while the sample featured a wide range of industries and company sizes,
the conclusions hereby presented are subject to the restrictions inherent to the nature of
this sample, notably including the fact that it was reduced to a single MNC cultural
profile (Italian companies), focusing on their strategy in a geographical area with
similar cultural characteristics.
While the nature of the sample with reduced number of companies does curtail our
ability to draw more general conclusions as a result of its limited results, it makes it easier
to gain a better understanding of company behavioural patterns and their causes. As a
result, in order to expand and deepen these conclusions, they should be subsequently
tested and validated through a broader sample, including MNCs from other
JMTM organizational cultures and other economically appealing regions in future research
21,7 analyses that explore the variables’ correlations more accurately and extensively.

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About the authors

Julio Sánchez Loppacher is a Full-time Professor of Operation and Technology Management at
IAE Management and Business School, Universidad Austral, where he also serves as a
Management Development Program Director. Julio Sánchez Loppacher graduated as Industrial
Engineer at the Universidad República Oriental del Uruguay, Uruguay, in 1988. He also holds an
MBA degree from IAE Management and Business School, Universidad Austral, and a PhD in
Management Engineering from MIP (Milano, Italy). He has written and published several papers
on operations management topics.
Raffaella Cagliano is an Associate Professor in the area of Management, Economics and
Industrial Engineering at the School of Management of Politecnico di Milano, where she also
heads the Executive Master in Business Administration part-time program. She received her
degree and PhD in Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering from Politecnico
di Milano. Raffaella Cagliano is a member of the Board of EurOMA – European Operations
Management Association. She has published more than 20 articles in relevant international Headquarters-
journals and presented over 40 papers in international conferences in operations management.
Gianluca Spina is Full-time Professor of Business Management and Organization at the subsidiary
School of Management of Politecnico di Milano, where he is also the Director of MIP Business control systems
School. Gianluca Spina teaches Management, Business Economics, and Operations Management
in the Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering course and the MBA programs.
He serves on the Advisory Board of Journal of Operations Management and is a referee
of International Journal of Operations & Production Management. He is the Italian Coordinator 817
of IMSS – the International Manufacturing Strategy Survey – a global research network.
Gianluca Spina has extensively researched and authored over 70 publications in operations
management.

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