PART II

Leibnrz on His
Contemporarles

Matebranche
Descartes and

o.3fili31m;'f:;'"t{ti"}r
Irrrr**:H::il:1il:"Jff T*T:"T,'fr 'm*::$:n";'*ll:
about
,I said
in Passing

r{$r''f-'-lfill'm*gl'mffiruw
tions of God's exrste
the circle and PelPlt
clarn
mechanics laYs

#fu irn#*:i,*'**lr**rrr'r:,

ffiu*fiff*$'iffifl*":r'+***
.l-se people o"1t^T::::;;;
s,^Lo.,."hansedrhistosecond
ffi,Leibniz,, n11.t', o.*"?Sj,1;il,!lil;
addresst
the third person.
\0e have changt

285'
person'
 236 LBmNrz oN Hrs CoNIEMpoRARTES
mathematicians who have spread errors, and there are
none who courd get
others to approve their mistakes. In my early years I was
well enough versed
in the subtleties of the Thomists and scotists, and when I left
schoor, I threw
myself into the arms of jurisprudence, which required history
as-well. But
my travels allowed me to know some great persons who gave me
a taste for
mathematics. I appried myserf to it with aisproportionate passion
"tr "rmo.t
during the four years I resided in paris, which resultea i" gr."i., ,u"".., ,rrd
public praise than a novice and stranger could have expe-cted. ,$rriit
,.rp..,
to analysis, I am not so bold as to say how the *.r, g.."t..t in
these marters
today have judged my work, but with respecr to meihanics,
the arithmetical
machine, whose model I showed to the two Royal societies
of rrance ana
England, appeared ro_be something compretely Lxtraordinary.
It is not th.
Rabdology of Napier286 (the scottish Baron) rransformed into
a machine, as
are some others that have been made public since. The two
Academies saw
an infinite difference between my machine and the others,
wt ict are, in fact,
mere games and have only a name in common with mine,
something people
will recognize when it is perfected, as I am expecring it will be.
As for myself, I cherished mathematics only becaus! I found
in it the traces
of the art of inaenion in general; and it seems to me that I discovered,
in the
end, that Descarres himself had not yet penerrared the mystery
science. I recall that he said somewhere that the excellence
oiiti. g..",
oi his method,
which only appears probabre from his physics, is demonstrar.d;;;,
geome-
try. But I must admit that I mainly recognized the imperfectioo
oit i. method
in his geometry itself. For, we should not be surprised if there is
much to
criticize in his physics, since Descartes did not have.nough
.rpiri-.no
his disposal. But geometry depends only on ourselvesl it ",
doeJnot neeJ externar
help. I claim then that there is yet another analysis i' geomet.y
completely different from the analysis of vidte and of Desiara"r,
*t i"r, t
*t o did not
advance sufficiently in this, since its most important problems
do not depend
on the qquations to which all of Descartes's geometry reduces.
Despite what
he had advanced too boldly in his geometry
lnamely, ihar prott.ris reduce
to his equations and his curved lines), he himself w"r ror".aio"tt ,""ogrize this
defect in one of his letters; for de Beaune had propos.a to
nir' orri of these
strange but important problems of the inverse method
or t*g*tr, and he
admitted that he did not yer see it clearry enough.*r r rortu""i""tv
dir"ou.r.d
that this very problem can be resorved in three rines by the
which
".*,*rv.i,
,s6J.tbnt t*.f*.tng to John Napier (1560-1617), rhe inventor of logarithms,
who published
a book called Rabdorogiae, seu nnnuatimtis pu virguras, ribi
mechanical aid to multiprication by "Napier's Bonis,,'or
duoi" re iz.rn.-L*li"r..iu". ,
numbering rods;N"piJ, Borr., *.r.
modifed in various ways during the seventeenth century so that trey
could be manipulated
rapidly, in the fashion of an adding machine.
287. rn an article in the Acn Enditorum (16g4), ..Nova methodus
pro maximis et minimis,
itemque tangentibus, quae nec.fractas, nec irrationales quantitates
calculi genus" (GM V, 22a-26)' Leibniz specifes that tire
moraa*;;;;; pro
inverse tangent p-Ur.* rr. can solve
'lis
by means of his methods was one proposed by Florimond
De Beaun"e rro'or_!4 i;;escartes.
Leibniz also observes that Descartes uied to solve it in his letter
to o. n*r".,Jo February
1639, AT II, 510-19.
 Lnrrsn To CouNTESS ErtznBETH 237
I am using. But it would be premarure of me to go into the details; it suffices
to say that geometry, enriched by these new means, can surpass the geometry
of vidte and Depcartes as much and incomparably more than theirs zurpassed
the geometry of the ancients. And this is not only in curiosities, but in the
solution of the'most irtrportgnt problems for mechanics.
I do not wish to discuss physics here, even though I have demonstrated
rules of motion that are quite different from those of Descartes. I come, then,
to metaphysics, and I can state that it is for the rove of metaphysics that I
have passed through all these srages. For I have recognized thai metaphysics
is scarcely different from the true logic, that is, from the art of invention in
generall for, in fact, metaphysics is natural theology, and the same God who
is the source of all goods is also the principle of all knowledge. This is because
the idea of God contains within it absolute being, that is, what is simple in
gyr thoughts, from which everything that we think draws its origin. Descartes
did not go about it in this way. He gave rwo ways of proving tlle existence of
God. The.frsr is that there is an idea of God in us since, nodoubt, we think
about God, and we cannot think of something without having its id""."'No*,
if we have an idea of God, and if it is true fouitabtel, that is, if it is the idea
ofan infinite being, and ifit represenrs it faithfully, it could not be caused by
something lesser, and consequently, God himself must be its cause. Thereforg
he must exist. The orfter reasoning is even shorter. It is that God is a being
who possesses all perfections, and consequently, he possesses existence, which
is to be counted as one of the perfections."' Therefore, he exists. It must be
said that these reasonings are somewhat suspect, because they go too fast,
and because they force themselves upon us without enlightening us. Real
demonstrations, on the other hand, generally fill the mind with some solid
nourishment. However, the crux of the matter is difficult to find, and I see
that many able people who have formulated objections to Descartes were led
astray.
some have believed that there is no idea of God because he is not subject
to imagination, assuming that idea and image are the same thing. I am not of
their opinion, and I know perfectly well that there are ideas of thought,
existence, and similar things, of which there are no images. For we think of
something and when we notice in there what it is that allows us to recognize
it, this is what constitures the idea of the thing, insofar as it is in our soul.
This is why there is also an idea of what is not material or imaginable.
othqs agree that there is an idea of God, and that this idea contains all
perfections, but they cannot understand how existence follows from it, either
because they do not agree that existence is to be counted among the perfec-
tions, or because they do not see how a simple idea or thought can imply an
existence outside us. As for me, I genuinely believe that anyone who has
recognized this idea of God, and who sees that existence is a perfection, must
admit that existence belongs to God. In fact, I do not queition the idea of ,

288. Cf. Descarres, Meditation III.

289. Cf. Descarres, Meditation V.
238 LstsNIZ oN Hts CoNTEMPoRARIES

God anv*more than Ido his existence; on the contrary, I claim to have a
and persuade
il}o];irh;;;;il. B* I do not want us to flatter ourselves little cost' Paralo-
ourselves that we can arrive at such a great thing with such
when they occur' they reflect on us' and
;ir;;";" dangerous in this matter; that we must prove with the
tey strength* th. opporite side' I therefore say
perfect
gi"","r, iiaginable i*r.t r"r, that there is an idea of a completely
6lirrg, that i-s, an idea of God. It is true that the objections of those who
image of God
i"il.*a that they could prove rhe contrary because there is no
just But we also have to admit that the proof
are worthless, as I have shown.
of God is imperfect. How, he would say,
O.rl"*., gives to estabiish the idea think of him
L" on" splak of God without thinking of him, and how can one
*itto.r, having an idea of him? Yes, no doubt we sometimes think about
;;r;tbl. ,triitg. and we even construct demonstrations from them. For
the circle is impossible, and yet we
."i-pt., Descaites holds that squaring happen if it
stu trrint about it and draw consequences about what would
is impossible in any body
;;;.;;". The motion having the greatest speed
whatsoever, because, for example, if we assumed it in a
circle' then another
.orr".rr,ric to the formeicircle, surrounding it and firmly attached to
"i.iL
ii*oota -ove with a speed still greater than the former, which, consequently,
contradiction to what we had assumed'
would not be of the gr;test degree, in
this greatest speed, something that has no
In spite of all that, we think about
the greatest circle of all is an impossible
ia"" ri"". it is impossible. Similarly,
demonstra-
tt irrs, the number of all possible units_ is no less so; we have a
this. And nevertheles;, we think about dl this. That is why
there are
tionif "na
about the idea of
surely grounds for wondering whether we should be careful
it not contradiction'
it. gt""","" of all beings, an-cl whether might contain_a
speed and what
Fori fully understandifor example, the nature of motion and
ial, ,o be greatest, but, for all ihat, I do not understand whether all those
,*iorr. and whether there is a way of ioining them and making
"r.-"o-p"tlb1",
them into an idia of the greatest speed of which motion
is capable. Similarly,
is, what-it is to be the gleatest and most
.iatt""gft I know what being and
know, for all that,_ whether there 1,sn't a
f".f""i nevertheless I do not yet
all that together, as there is, in fact, in the
iridd.rr-"orr,radiction in foining
;;;;;tr,ated examples. In brief, I do not yet know, for all that' whether
;;h being is possible, for if it were not possible, there would be no'idea of
"
it. Howevei, I must admit that God has a great advantage, in this respect,
over all othir things. For to prove that he exists, it would
be sufficient to
prove that he is possible, something we find nowhere else, as far as
I know.
-Mor.ou.r, presumption that God exists. For
I infei from t'hat that thire is a
there is always a presumption on the side of possibility, that
is, everything is
held to be possible unless it is proven to be impossible. There is,
therefore,
pr"..r-piion that God is poisible, that is, that he exists, since in him
".*'irt.rr.. iollows from possibility. This is sufficient for practical matters in
tii", Urrt it is not sufficient for a demonstration. I have strongly disputed this-
*"it", with several Cartesians, but I finally succeeded in this with some of
the most able of them who have frankly admitted, after having understood
 I 239
LBrrERToCouNTESSErlzt'BETH
theforceofmyreasons,thafthispossibility,isstilltobedemonstrated'There
are even some who,
rt""* ["tn "an"a away from me' have undertaken
"rtlt vet succeeded'
ilt-;;;;;;tration, but thev have notyou see what the state of things
is and
Since Your Highness is intelligent' \rhen I consider
*t'd,ove. this possibility'
vou see we can d" myself
""th;;;"f"ti
all this, I take pity "t i"i''
*""ft"ess' andl t"k" """ not to exclude
of this century'
from it. Descartes, *t " *"r ""
J""ut one of the greatest men
ittotttious people erred with him'
erred in so visible ot their care' Alt of this
";*"t;;;J*-y
Nevertheless, we do ;;il;:iltl.r* ll:tot"t"" in
of the-certainty of our knowledge
could give ro*" p"opi".'Ji"a-"pittion to avoid a uap' what
general. For, one tivl#!;;;;v abllmen unatile we must
"* #
can I hope for, I, who nothing comparedto them? Nevertheless'
enor' which these able men
not lose our courage' f#;;;;"v of
"uoiai"g to the greatness
have not condescendeJa" "r"r-i
*ouart"* been contrary
to the common people'
of their mind., L"tl'ipp"jt;1t;;;;J*ith 'e'p""t up
"t be great figures and who set themselves
All those who wish to tppt"' to walker does
of sects t'""t the a-crobat in them' A tightrope
iiii"f
as leaders
notallowhimselftoUeU'"c"ainordertoavoidfalling;ifhedidso'hewould I will be
no longer appear a skillful man'
be sure of his act, U"t ft" *""fd us from falling? I am
asked, what then ir,t i, *""J"rrJ
*"y th"t"*'prevenr
I speaking to Your
be too lowlv. But am
almost afraid to ,.v iiJ "pi"-"-* In brief it is to
bvttreir
Highness who does ;J;"dilhtngs "ppt"t*tt' to see.onlv people
construct oiiJffi;"r*i"""
"*ft"
lin fornal.I seem
But I beg them to
"rr*"rr,.
who cry out against -" l"J
send me back to school'
me; argumen$ m
be a little padent, f* ;;;h"pt-they
do not understand
Any rigorous
proper form do oot A*"i' bear the siamp ofBcrbaraCelarent''*
for the force of reasoning
demonstratioo,t'"' o'#lt"oi "-il;ht"gnecessary of an accountant and a
is of this nna, .r,iii"r""r"t-,ii". proper
tli"
in """orrrri
form,- lince.th:t"
calculation of analysis are arguments T TlPg rs
tG fo'- or arrangement of the whole reasomng
missing in them
"'a 'i*" ir onrn the form that distinguishes an
the cause of their ;"ir;:il;.-ii
ao trr" pr""ti.. we commonly call Italian (of
account uoor., or"a"l.""oJirrg
which Stevin h", *;il;;"-"*ior"
.r.",ir.) from the confused iournal of
That is whv I maintain tfaf in order
to
someone ignorant ;;;;;'
reasonwithevidenceinallsub|ects,*.,no,t-holdsomeconsistentformalism But
be less eloquence' butmore certainty'
Vormalita ,*'*nn|iino"*o"ra do no less in metaphysics'
in order to aa""L" J" i"i*1qm
that would
does in mathematics' that
would even
physics, ,rra -ot"il,"ti"i iii"*:tt probabilistically'
we can only reason
give us degrees ot-pioU"Uitity when
I wourd have to ,"i#i"r" irt.-iit""grt r-i rt"* on a new characteristic
*oUJ ok" too long' Nevertheless' I will
lcharactaistiqu'1, '"-"it''i"'-tf'"t
to the- first line of some thirteenth-century mnemonic
fr-. aorboro crlor^t is a reference remember tne-Je, governing the validitv of syllogisms;
nonsense u.rr", ;J;;;;
"rr"blioi
" indicates that there il;
therurrinewo,,uo..ff"iill:t#.il;nF.lg-.,f":,:,""*:1ly;:*.il:lli.fr are
*:*tij;il::[,.i: ffi11f;,;H;'ir,.,,.-p or BarbLracetarent
by syllogistic
cannot be established
means'
valid argumen; whose validity
240 LnrsNrz oN Hls CoNTEMpoRARTES
S?y, in brief, that this characteristic would represent our thoughts truly and
distinctly, and that when a thought is composed of other simpler ones, its
character would also be similarly composed. I dare not say what would follow
from this for the perfection of the sciences-it would appear incredible. And
yet, there is a demonstration of this. The only thing I will say here is that
since that which rye know is from reasoning or experience, it is certain that
henceforth all reasoning in demonstrative or probable matters will demand
no rnore skill than a calculation in algebra does; that is, one would derive
from given experiments everything that can be derived, just as in algebra. But
for now it is sufficient for me to note that the foundation of my characteristic is
also the foundation of the demonstration of God's existence. ,For simple
thoughts are the elements of the characteristic and simple forms are the source
of things. I maintain that all simple forms are compatible among themselves.
That is a proposition whose demonstration I cannot give without having to
explain the fundamentals of the characteristic at length. But if that is granted,
it follows that God's nature, which contains all simple forms taken absolutely,
is possible. Now, we have proven above that God exists, as long as he is
possible. Therefore, he exists. And that is what needed to be demonstrated.

Letter to Molanus(?), On God

ond the SouI (ca. 1 679)*,
INCE YOU \[ANT me to frankly tell you my thoughts on Cartesianism,
I will hide nothing from you that I think, ?t least nothing that can be stated
briefly; and I will make no claims without giving or being able to give a reason
for them.
First, all those who completely surrender themselves to the opinions of any
author become enslaved and raise suspicions of error on themselves; for to
assert that Descartes is the only author who is exempt from significant error
is to assert something that might be true, but is not likely. In fact, this kind
of attachment belongs only to those who themselves do not have the strength
or the leisure to meditate, or who do not wish to take the trouble to do so.
That is why the three noted Academies of our time, England's Royal Society,
which was established first, and then the Acaddmie Royale des Sciences atparis
and the Accademiq del Cimento at Florence, have openly asserted that they did
not want to be Aristoteliansr or Cartesians, or Epicureans, or followers of any
author whatever.
Moreover, I have recognizedfrom experience that those who are completely
Cartesian are not capable of discovery; they merely undertake the iob of
interpreting or commenting upon their masterr &s the Scholastics did with
Aristotle. There have been many beautiful discoveries since Descartes, but,
as far as I know, not one of them has come from a true Cartesian. I know
these people a little, and I defy them to name one such discovery from their

291. A II, 1,499-504; G M97-303. French.