ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, II Author(s) : Martha C. Nussbaum Source: Phronesis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1972), pp. 153-170 Published by: Brill Accessed: 18-03-2020 23:03 UTC

ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, II
Author(s): Martha C. Nussbaum

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1972), pp. 153-170
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4181882
Accessed: 18-03-2020 23:03 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis
This content downloaded from 132.248.184.4 on Wed, 18 Mar 2020 23:03:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Y'YXH in Heraclitus, II
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM
H aving investigated the role of +uZ' in the li

now to a consideration of 4u - at death. The implications of the
spider simile led us to suspect that death may be, for Heraclitus,
something that occurs as the result of damage to 4uZj, primarily,

and not to the body or to any or its other faculties; 4u' is that by
virtue of which a living creature is alive: therefore death must be
explained in terms of 4uy. The Homeric man saw death as the
departure of +u ' from the body; breathed out through the mouth or
through a wound, it takes up a shadowy existence in Hades, while
it is the corpse that continues to be spoken of as the man's owto6,,
as preserving whatever was characteristic of him as an individual in
the eyes of those who mourn for him.2 I believe Heraclitus criticizes
and rejects this aspect, too, of Homeric teaching; and his new view
of the death of men leads to a reassessment of how men ought to live.
Fr. 36: AuXiatvY Voroq (Sp yevicaL...

Fr. 77: 4UXtL. . .-Tp4P V g&VOXTOV uYpnaL yEVa&OxL.
The first thing we notice about these fragments is the peculiar nature
of the expression N*&VOCTO 4uZaytq. First of all, it is clearly a word-play,
a juxtaposition of opposites: "It is death to the life-faculty..."
Secondly, we notice that this is a very un-Homeric way of talking
about death. For the Homeric man, death is something that comes to
an individual, or to his body. At the moment of death, the iu '
is released, or departs, but death is never described as coming to the
+uXn, or as being a death of or for the 4uyJ. Death is generally describ-
ed as a dark cloud which covers the eyes of the man as he becomes a
corpse (E 82, etc.). After +u ' departs, the corpse, not Pux , is de-
scribed as being in a state of death. Thus, at X 361, the poet describes
the death of Hector:
* For modern works referred to in this article, please see Bibliography on pp.
169-70.
N Nus3baum, "TYXH in Heraclitus, I," this volume, pp. 1-16.
2 Iliad A 3, II 453 ff., Theognis 567, etc.
153
Jg &pXt twlV ?tTrormX -iXog Nv&uoto xoXuXe
PVT8'kx felhcv mrm[dwn 'AtMah8 Pepy'Xe
8v nr6t,Lov yo6caoc, XLvro5ava0pow7)tz xct i53i-v.
T6v xcd T5vC46m)X TpocqX Koq 'AXLXXzUG-
One might say that to say 'k4*vocx to a corpse is to say "you have lost
your uZ`"; it is not to say "your +uZ' is dead," or even "death has
come to your 4uXj4" Corpses are frequently described as being in a
state of death (H 89, 409, K 343, 387, 0 664, HI 5, 26, 565, P 369, E 540,
X 448). But the 4uyaoc in Hades are always described, not as dead
shades, but as the shades ol the people or corpses which are in a state
of death (x 530, X 37, 84, 141, 205, 541, 564, 567). The single excep-
tion - X 147, GV 6 LVO CV Xv xev e Vi XVq x savvyrTi, where vkxuq
means "shade" and is apparently equivalent to fuZn - can easily be
explained as a later variant of the more common formula involving
fVza ... VeXUcV X oc'T.T?V?eG(b)V. The nearest we find to a deliberate
juxtaposition of &voc'aoq and +ux' in Homer is at X 488, where the
4uXt of Achilles asks Odysseus not to try to comfort him about *&vMo-o,
since he would rather be a servant on earth than ruler of all the shades.
For him, a&varoq means ceasing to exist as a whole man, and taking up
existence as a mere 4ux. But the 4?Xj, speaking, does not describe
itself as being in a state of death.3
In fact, the first time we find an expression similar to the 54voaC'o0
fuXmZg of Heraclitus is in the Antigone of Sophocles: a [ 'u qX
/'),L6/tr'vjxev (559-60). However, this passage itself is so problematic
that it is not useful for purposes of analogy.
We may say, then, that Heraclitus' expression is foreign to tra-
ditional ways of talking about death; if IMivavroq 4uXmZL had any
meaning for Homeric man, it would have to mean the moment of the
separation of iuX' from the body, and certainly not the termination
of 4ux4's existence or importance. In fact, as we have seen, iuX'
generally seems to become important, and is spoken of, only upon its
separation from the corpse.
A further consideration of fragment 36, however, shows us that this
cannot be the meaning Heraclitus has in mind. For we see that 4uy'
here has replaced fire in the ?o6yo4 of cosmic change, as it is elsewhere
discussed. And it is impossible to elicit from the cosmic fragments any
3 Vergil understands and reproduces this Homeric restriction, writing simula-

craque luce carentum (Georg. IV. 472), but defunctaque corpora vita (Georg. IV
475==Aen. VI. 306).
154
notion that the change to water means the departure of fire for
existence in another realm. The fire simply ceases to exist, and is
replaced by water, although the underlying stability of the ?6^yoq assu
us that we will eventually get back the same proportion of each con-
stituent as we had before (fr. 31). So, too, in the case of Qux-, or the
fire-element in man, the replacement by water cannot mean separation
of suxn for existence in Hades; it must mean the end of the existence
of that particular bit of "fire," together with the assurance that finally
the same amount will be returned when the cycle of transformation
has run its course. It is difficult to understand, in the case of 4ux ,
what the entire cycle described by fr. 36 can be; and since the replace-
ment of 4u ' by water is the only change on which, in the fragments
we possess, Heraclitus places further emphasis, we will not attempt to
press the analogy of the elements too far. We can say, though, that
human life, is, in some way, viewed as a microcosm of cosmic processes
(cf. also in fr. 50 the pair X6yov - CIvo.), and that QuXy represents the
chief constituent of the XO6yoq, fire4. Such a view leaves no room for a
Homeric view of death; 4upJ) cannot be regarded, on this basis, as
preserving individual identity. Although the overall Xoyo4 is stable,
and new living beings constantly arise, there is no reason to think that
any particular individual might ever return. It would require very
strong counter-evidence to show that Heraclitus has any notion of an
individual after-life; his microcosm picture of human life depends
upon the denial of such notions.
But this interpretation of fr. 36 is not without very real problems,
and the microcosm view of +ux4, though I think it must be accepted
*as the view of Heraclitus, is difficult to reconcile with his ethical views.
For the views expounded in fr. 36 seem to make no allowance for
individual identity, and to offer no way of distinguishing one portion
of fire from another. If, after the extinction of one 4uxn, in the course
of the cyclic Xo6yoq, we got back the same amount of fire, could we, in
fact, tell whether it was the same or a different +u ? Heraclitus' view
of human life is in other respects far from mechanistic, and places
great emphasis upon distinctions among men. This makes it hard to
accept at face value the +u '-fire analogy and the theory of death it
' Cf. Frame, p. 171: the traditional association he observes between the death
of the sun and the death of a person may be one source for Heraclitus' microcosm
picture. A man with v6o4 would be a man with a particularly fiery character -
here, to Heraclitus, a particularly great or intense +uX.
155
implies. If one individual kuX' differs from another qualitatively, first,
how can the fire analogy be maintained, and, secondly, what can this
mean, in terms of the total Xoyo4, except that we ought to get, in the
course of time, a bit of similar quality in return for the lost one? And
if the difference is quantitative (the better having more of the fiery
element), this will result in an equally unsatisfactory situation;
individuals will be only numerically identifiable (e.g. "he is the man
with x-quantity of ;u?x4"). Two equally good men would, perhaps, be
indistinguishable; and the return of the same quantity in the course of
time would seem to mean the return of the same individual. Finally,
any extrapolated view of the microcosm theory poses grave difficulties
when we come to an interpretation of the ethical PuxZ fragments.
Marcovich poses the problem correctly, I think, when he says, "Now
it the change soul > water is a necessary one (as is that of fire into
sea), why then is a Uyp' +uX' rebuked, and an xu' 'u~X praised?"5
There is really no answer to these questions; and one must not
abandon consideration of fr. 36 because to press the analogy too
closely leads to absurdity. Clearly there is a real confusion; necessary
death and voluntary drunkenness are described in similar terms, and
there seems to be an insufficient allowance for individuals, given the
emphasis elsewhere on self-development and individual excellence.
But I think that we can conclude from fr. 36 that Heraclitus rejects a
Homeric Hades of shades, and denies that 4uyJ preserves, after death,
the identity of the individual.
As for fr. 98, at 4uxaoc O6api&vroct XcW' 'ALnv, I think this fragment
mocks the absurdity of the typical conception of a world of shades,
while playing on the standard folk etymology of Hades as the "sightless
place." The use of the article with PuxaoL seems to suggest that it is not
to the whole class of 4uvxot that Heraclitus refers, but rather to a
specific group: the shades of the underworld, as described in popular
legend. Heraclitus generally uses +uXy in the singular, without the
generic article, and indeed +u is cited by Smyth (Gr. Gramm. 1135)
as a word with which the article is generally omitted. And Heraclitus
rarely uses the generic article at all (rather &VapcorQL, aJiTOL, &VXMTOL,
etc.). So the presence of the article here should indicate that a definite
reference is being made (cf. Smyth 1133). Perhaps it even retains
demonstrative force. Thus: "These (the Homeric) 4uxc[, or shades,
must sniff to find their way around down in the 'sightless place'."
5 Marcovich, p. 361.
156
Since the traditional +u ' is a principle of breath, Heraclitus may also
be declaring the popular picture to be self-contradictory. The way
Hades is described, the only way that shades could do anything there
would be by sniffing; but the shades are breath, and how could breath
itself sniff?6 To say "shades sniff" is absurd and illogical. In any case,
this fragment by no means outweighs the strong evidence of fragment
36 as to Heraclitus' opposition to traditional ideas of death.
In fr. 96, Heraclitus makes a statement which, even more than the
denial of 4uZ'-immortality, strikes at the very roots of Homeric reli-
gion: vexues yo&cp xonpLov z XXT6OpOL. Corpses are more fit to be cast
away than dung. Now, for the Homeric man, the corpse was the
aulo6, the man-himself (A 3, etc.); its fate was apparently more
important than that of the shade, whose existence was seen, in any
case, as mindless and unrewarding. We have seen that it was in con-
nection with the corpse that one thought of death; and the fear of
being devoured as a corpse seems to have been a more terrible fear
than the fear of death itself. Although the prologue of the Iliad tells
us we will hear of corpses left for the birds and the dogs, this extreme
plight is never directly described. One man is eated by fish (4D 203-4),
but this is the only scene of corpse-devouring in the whole poem;
presumably it is too terrible to contemplate. The ultimate threat one
can make to one's enemy is not that he will die, but that his corpse
will be left to the birds and dogs. Thus Odysseus (A 450-5) first
declares to the dead Sokos that he has met his death, and then goes
on, with heightened feeling, to describe the fate of the corpse (which
is addressed irn the second person):
&E &(X's, ov tL aot ye 7rau'p xxi 7r6-rvLm VIp

6aac x 4oLpraouat &mv6v-t irvp, & XX' otwvol
co[LtaGdt 4pUOUML QIt? MMrep& NTUXV 'a POCV
XCzT& ?', St xe &vw, XT?pLi3at y- 8aot 'AXyLoL
6 Marcovich's statement (p. 393) that "the souls of the dead throughout Hades
need the exhalation from the fresh blood of the sacrificed animals to survive"
seems without basis in tradition. The Homeric tuXczL drink blood in order to
speak with a mortal, but are in no danger of "perishing" at other times. And I
do not understand - apart from the unlikelihood that Heraclitus believes in a
Hades of shades - why he should be interested, as Marcovich claims, in cor-
recting the Homeric drinking to sniffing. I also fail to understand Kirk's conclu-
sion (AJP, p. 389) that "Souls use smell in Hades because they are surrounded
by dry matter than which they are but a little less dry." See also Tugwell.
157
Odysseus' +uX', if he dies, will presumably meet the same fate as that
of Sokos; and yet he regards his lot as something about which to gloat,
since the fate of his corpse is likely to be so much better than that of
his enemy's corpse.7
Thus Heraclitus' denial of the worth of the corpse - presumably a
denial that it preserves any sort of individual identity (since +uxy

the seat of that identity, has been annihilated) is a shocking one.
Guthrie8 sees it as evidence for an "Orphic strain" in Heraclitus.
Marcovich9 rightly rejects this insubstantial claim, but concurs with
Burnet and Gigon10 in believing that the critique is dependent upon
a belief in immortality of 4uy'. Burnet's description of the fiery 4uz'

as having left the body seems to betray a lack of awareness of the
implications of fr. 36. All these interpretations wish to salvage for
Heraclitus some measure of traditional religious feeling, and fail to
perceive the radical nature of his criticism. For it is most likely that
Heraclitus believes that the identity of the individual is preserved,
after death, neither by a shade nor by the corpse. There are no shades,
and the corpse is worthless. Thus when, in fr. 27, he declares that when
men die there awaits them that which they neither hope nor expect,
we have no reason to interpret this as a reference to eternal punish-
ment. For the outcome which men, as far as we can tell, least expected
and least desired was that there would, in fact, be nothing awaiting
them. Various myths might lead them to anticipate punishment; most
hoped for honor to the corpse and for some sort of 4uxZ-survival.
"Nothing" is the most likely solution for Heraclitus' cryptic riddle.
Before we turn to a consideration of how Heraclitus' view of death
influenced his teaching concerning human life, there is an important
problem remaining in the death fragments, one which itself will throw
light on the relationship between Heraclitus' eschatology and his
ethical views. This is the association of pleasure with death in fr. 77:
"It is pleasure or death for souls to become watery." We notice, first
of all, that for the "water" of fr. 36 is substituted "watery." Presum-
ably the parallel between pleasure and death can be drawn only if it
is not specified that the 4uX' has been completely replaced by water.
A man can be in a watery state and still be alive, so long as +u'm
7On these and related points, see Benardete, Agon.

8 Guthrie, p. 477.
10 Burnet, p. 151; Gigon, p. 133.
158
remains and is not completely overwhelmed. Another fragment in
which the same sort of parallel can, I think, be found is fr. 15, in which
Heraclitus concludes: W-uroq 'ALayq XxL LtoLvuaoq, 0Ct ,LOLcVovL XOCL
kqvat~ouamv. Hades and Dionysus are here the gods of death and of
pleasure respectively, and Heraclitus indicates that to be a follower
of Dionysus, devoted to pleasure, is also to be a follower of Hades,
devoted to death. Further, in fr. 117, a watery state of +u ' is associated
with the self-indulgence of drunkenness, and in 118 goodness and wis-
dom with dryness of +u J. In 112, temperance is called the greatest
virtue. Fragment 4 implies that the pleasures of the body are bestial;
85 declares that 8-ut6k is difficult to combat, and buys what it wishes
at the expense of +uXo Fr. 116 tells us that all men have a capacity
for temperate living, which, we assume, is to be encouraged, as is self-
knowledge. In general, then, both death and pleasure are described as
involving the total or partial replacement of +uZ' by water; in this
respect they are one. And indulgence in physical pleasures, is to be
condemned as not conducive to the best (dry) state of 4ux.
The most difficult problem here is to understand why death,
imposed by external necessity, ought to be compared with pleasure,
or voluntary self-indulgence. All men die, and surely death is in no way
disgraceful; the disgrace inherent in abandonment to pleasure lies
precisely in the fact that it is subhuman, and that all men have the
capacity to live more prudently. Kirk's attempt to circumvent this
difficulty by postulating a fiery death for certain types of men'2 has
grave difficulties, and is not helpful here. I think the parallel can be
understood in terms of the nature of 4u j and the effect of both
pleasure and death upon it. Fr. 117 describes the drunken man, with
wet iu ', as being led, stumbling, by a small child, not knowing where
he is going. The shamefulness of the wet state of 4u;v consists, ap-
parently, in a loss of self-direction, self-awareneess, self-control. This
is perfectly consistent with our picture of 4u x as the faculty respon-
11 If &u[?6q means anger here, as most commentators believe, this can be yet
another example of how indulgence in one of the passions harms +uXt. &U,uk
could, in fact, mean passion in a more general sense, but Ramnoux is right to
observe (pp. 89-90) that the context in Plutarch, describing a hero dead in
battle, suggests another interpretation: &utL6q is battle-ardor, 4uyx, is li
spiritedness involves the risk of life. Ramnoux herself suggests that the frag-
ment refers to the expenditure of vital energy in procreation - a notion for
which I see little evidence.
12 Kirk, AJP.
159
sible for all sorts of connections among other faculties, the central
source of intelligent energy, and the seat of linguistic understanding.
In death, clearly, this central monitor has ceased to function, and a
man is once again simply a collection of limbs. The obliteration of
+uxn by water is complete. But, next to death, the state of extreme
abandonment to rcp4Lq - either to drunkenness or to sexual pleasure -
might reasonably be considered as the state in which self-control and
central awareness of self are most completely overwhelmed.'3 That
this is Heraclitus' analysis of drunkenness we have already seen. And
the same would be true, presumably, of abandonment to the orgiastic
phallic rites described in fr. 15. But fragment 116, and the moral
indignation involved in Heraclitus' critique of the intemperate, indi-
cate that he views passion not as an external force as inexorable as
death, but rather as controllable by moderation and the maintenance
of a "dry" +uy. He seems to say that the obliteration of +uy' by
water in death is necessary and therefore not shameful, but that to
choose to lose one's self and the exercise of one's central faculty in life
is bestial, and a disgrace to one's humanity.
Abandonment to bodily pleasure means temporary death, and death
is the end of iuX 's existence.'4 Returning now to the question of
individual immortality, we see that Heraclitus, having denied the
continued existence of suy' and the sacredness of the corpse, does not
for this reason conclude that the individual life is without significance.
If each man is mortal, and nothing concrete survives his death, he
ought to struggle, in life, to win a fame and glory among his fellow
mortals that will accord him the only sort of immortality there is.
Thus in fr. 29, Heracitus says:
octpeV'rol y&p &v &vrl &UrcVk&v o0t dpLm-rot, Xxog &kvaov 5VbT)Vv
ot 8A 7o?Xol xex6p7jvraL 6xcoa7TEp x'v9cX.
13 Pleasure-death parallels are of course not uncommon in Greek literature,

and Frame discusses at length an underlying opposition in the Indo-European
tradition between v6oq - light and gpo4 - darkness. (Cf. also my part I, n. 4).
It is interesting to note that R. D. Laing, in his studies of schizoid and other
mentally disturbed patients, points to a fear of being swollowed up in water as a
common way in which patients express insecurity about their sense of identity.
By contrast, in moments of self-possession a patient may often describe himself
as "dry" (The Divided Self, 1965, p. 45).
14 Cf. also fr. 26, where sleep is said to touch on death. The sleeper, out of touch
with the tuv6v, may also be described as lacking direction and self-awareness.
160
Marcovich, in an extremely labored analysis,'5 insists that we must
understand &v-qr6v as "mortal things," and supply &v'L, since the
subjective genitive favored by Snell, Burnet, and others'6 is too harsh,
and since we would have to supply 7cpo6 anyway to understand it as
subjective. Now, first of all, the use of twv&x to mean "mortal things"
is comparatively late; the basic use of Iv'rko is clearly with reference
to men. The neuter is used only in cases where it could not be confused
with the masculine, and usually in contexts where it plays against a
masculine &vwqoL already mentioned. (Thus, for example, Eurip.
Bacch. 1069: *voct& r oavr.oZt nTpet=L). The genitive here would be
ambiguous, and the supplying of &v'TL seems to strain both syntax and
sense. Secondly, the subjective genitive with the word xe'oq 1) does
not require the supplying of 7rpo6 and 2) is not harsh, but instead,
according to the distinguished Indo-Europeanist Gregory Nagy, in his
discussion of the semantic development of x?ro4,'7 it is one of two
possible constructions with the word x?'o4, and, indeed, the con-
struction which it is most important to consider in order to determine
the meaning of the word. A good example of the subjective genitive
without preposition is at A 227: Vvrc xM:o4 'Lxe-c' 'AXxciiv, which Nagy
translates: "He came (to Troy) so that the Achaeans would talk
about him." Marcovich's second argument against this most natural
interpretation of the fragment - that it leads to inconsistencies with
fr. 24 - is also inappropriate, as we shall see later. Thus we may
translate: "The best men choose one thing above all: ever-flowing
x?sos among mortals; but the many are in a state of satiety, like
cattle."
A consideration of Nagy's analysis of the history of the common
epic formula xXeo p& abov'8 will help us to see how Heraclitus operates
here within the context of tradition: how he reveals his awareness of
the basic meaning of an ancient expression,19 and yet subtly alters
its meaning. For &94yltOV, the word commonly used with KX;ok in Greek
epic (as its cognate aksitam in Vedic is used with the Vedic cognate of
16 Marcovich, pp. 505-8. Also DK ad loc., Ramnoux, p. 113.

16 Burnet, p. 140; Snell, Heraklit, ad loc.; Kirk and Raven, p. 213; Guthrie,
p. 477.
17 Nagy, pp. 79-80. Cf. also Benveniste, Vocabulaire II, pp. 58-9.
18 Ibid., esp. pp. 56-66, 79-80.
19 Frame, in his chapter on v6oq in Parmenides, argues that Parmenides, too,
has understood the history of a group of words independently of, and more
accurately than, Homer.
161
xX6o;) means, historically and implicitly, what Heraclitus' &?avcov
means explicitly: ever-flowing. It is used of streams of liquids of
various sorts beneficial to human life; and the original usage of the
expression x?1o; 4cp,'rov was, according to Nagy, to designate the
professional craft possessed by the singer for the purpose of invoking
streams of such liquids from the gods. At a later date the epithet came
to be used to describe the song itself; but the importance of the gods,
hearing the song is still implicit. Heraclitus, in using the word &6vcsov
with xXAo&, shows his awareness of the association of the ancient notion
with flowing liquids. And if we consider his expression, as I think we
must, in the light of his other famous statement about flowing liquids,
we see how he corrects and enriches the old formula, and at the same
time we can appreciate his emphasis upon fame among mortals.
Despite the difficulty of determining which version of the river
fragment is original (and lack of space prevents a full inquiry into this
subject here) I think it is possible to understand 49a, in combination
with 91, to be saying, generally, that although there is no stable
material constituent in a river - though the waters are always different -
yet there is a sense in which the river is the same. Its identity does
not depend on the preservation of the same waters. This conception
may be what Heraclitus has in mind, again, in his discussion of ever-
flowing fame: as a man's fame is handed down from generation to
generation among mortals, it is constantly reinterpreted and re-
expressed; it is never, in fact, the same. And yet, as the fame of one
man, it is the same, and the changing continuity of human tradition
does not destroy its identity. For example, no two people, throughout
the centuries, have given the same account of the x&;os of Heraclitus.
In one sense we might say that there is no such thing as the fame of
Heracitus, since each expression of it has rather more to do with the
living than with the dead. And yet there is a sense in which the fame
of Heracitus, insofar as it engages the minds of the living, continues
to live itself. If one denies all other sorts of preservation of individual
identity after death, one sees that the only form of immortality
20 Frame (134 ff.) observes that Achilles' choice of x01oq (and hence his for-
feiting of his v6GTo;) shows a lack of v6oo: "Homer has closely equated a "loss
of mind" with "death."" So that, although we must recognize that Heraclitus'
emphasis on xOEoq is not un-Homeric, we see that he accords it a new dignity:
it is the single choice of the best. If one has insight, one chooses death rather
than v6aroq, recognizing that xXkoq is the only real escape from death, the only
immortality.
162
available to men is the kinetic immortality of x?eog (and xX*oq, as
Nagy notes, is traditionally used only of the fame won for good deeds).
Each generation reinterprets tradition and builds upon it (cf. fr. 74),
and a man's fame is immortal only insofar as it is ever-flowing,
growing and changing in the minds and words of living men. To hunger
after this kinetic xX6o4 is to continue, oneself, to strive and to grow,
to escape the bestial existence of the satiated many.
We are now in a position to understand the emphasis on Aeos
DvqTCv. For the gods, being staticaly immortal, always the sam
have no share in this sort of kinetic immortality. The one sort of
immortality precludes the other. I would like to see this as the sense
of the cryptic fragment 62: &a&ivwtocL 4vIroE, tvrwrol &o4avaroL, ~c&vtg
'69v ?x?Lvv b&Vmtov, TOv 8e iLVctv f3Cov t-ve&-eq. It seems likely,
considering that 'xeNo4 generally refers to the further subject, and that
neither Smyth nor Schwyzer gives an example of two successive
exeLvog 's with different references (after all, he might easily have used
okoq), that x[v&cov refers to mortals in both cases, and both Cv'oe
and te-vN'req refer to immortals. Thus we may translate: "Mortals
are immortal, immortals mortal, since they (immortals) are living
with respect to the death of mortals, but are dead to their (mortals')
life." This is probably the most straightforward way to understand the
fragment; but the same interpretation can be reinforced by reading it
in just the opposite way, and probably it is deliberately ambiguous so
as to support both readings: "Immortals are mortal, mortals im-
mortal, since they (mortals) are living with respect to the death of the
immortals (i.e. the fact that immortals are dead to xA?oq &'vo'ov, which
constitutes mortal immortality), but are dead with respect to their
(immortals') (statically eternal) life.'"2' Each single reading of the
sentence must, I think, refer rxe'Lvcv to a single subject; but two
complementary readings are possible, and probably what Heraclitus
intended.23
21 A similar point - that mortal life is, from another point of view, death -
may possible be made in fr. 20.
2' Contrast Marcovich, pp. 240-241. Kirk (Archiv, p. 75) believes we have to
decide whether to understand atav or ytyvov-rax in this fragment. But Benveniste
has shown convincingly in his article "La phrase nominale" that no verb need
be supplied in such cases: "Si la phrase nominale peut d6finir une ov6rit6 g6n6-
rale. c'est parce qu'elle exclut toute forme verbale qui particulariserait l'expres-
sion." (p. 167).
163
To say that gods and men have separate types of immortality is not
to deny all connection between mortal deeds and the gods. The gods
do not give X?0oq to men, but they do give honor, as we see in fr. 24,
to certain men: "Both gods and men honor those who die in battle."
Marcovich23 believes that eol Ttptca alludes to some sort of concrete
posthumous reward; but this sense can be extracted only if one has
already concluded, as has Marcovich, that Heraclitus believes in some
sort of immortality of +u Guthrie's comment is appropriate here:
"Fr. 24... has also been adduced as evidence for posthumous survival
and reward, but need mean no more than that death in battle is
thought glorious, and the memory of the slain respected by gods as
it undoubtedly is by their fellow-mortals.24 Liddell and Scott list the
meaning "award, or give as an honor" as a rare one for tr.uo&; far more
usual is the simple meaning to honor.25 And when gods are depicted,
in Homer, as giving n[L' to mortals, this consists in respect, not in any
gift of immortality; in fact the giving of honor is often directly related
to the god's recognition that the man is not immortal, and never can
be. For example, at 0 610:
aUT6q yap OL &7r' OaUOq t EV M[LUV6Ca)p

Z6u4, o5 ULv nXe6vaaL [LCT' &v6pckatv jxo5vov U6vrm
t[L xl XuO 8OLVC .L LVUV? 8lO yap I texxcv
(Here, the x68ouve, presumably, represents the granting of distinction

motivated by the granting of respect -
Why should Heracitus single out death in battle as likely to win
men honor from the gods, and why should the gods pay particular
heed to the virtue of warlike courage? Perhaps at least a partial
explanation lies in the fact that this sort of courage (frequently
represented in Homer and elsewhere as the willingness to risk one's
uy') is one virtue which the gods are most clearly incapable of
possessing. If there is no risk of life, there is, essentially, no bravery.
When Ares describes the risk he took in battle, and the dangers con-
fronting him, there is, inevitably, a note of parody. A mortal man in
24 Guthrie, p. 477.
25 Cf. Benveniste, Vocab. II, p. 50: "La traduction de timd par 'recompense'
est impropre." Benveniste concludes that the central notion of 't%L is the rec-
ognition of heroic dignity, especially by the gods. It is distinguished from y&pos,
a material reward given by mortals.
164
his situation would say, "I might either have lost my life or have been
alive but badly wounded." Ares can only say:
1 T xe 8qp6v
oCU-05 iovzr' 9cmzaxov kV octvjtav vweaaLBev
xC X (? 4X6LeVV6 got XOCXXOZO 'TunfaLV. (E 885-7)226
A being for whom the ultimate risk is that of suffering pain among
the corpses might well honor the courage of a man who risks becoming
a corpse, and loses his life because of his acceptance of this risk.
Courage is the virtue which is most obviously connected with aware-
ness of mortality, and in terms of which the difference between an eter-
nally living being and a living being doomed to die can most readily be
seen. But Heraclitus seems to have felt that the question of mortality
was central to all ethical questions, and that the gods, being outside
the polar opposition between life and death, are also outside the other
oppositions that are central to human life. In fr. 102 he declares: "To
the god all things are beautiful and good and just; but men have taken
some things to be unjust, and some things to be just." Kirk's inter-
pretation of this fragment27 is that Heraclitus declares the view of the
god - the comprehension of the essential unity of opposites - to be the
more profound; the analytic view taken by men is essentially in-
correct. I think this betrays a misunderstanding both of this fragment
and of what Heraclitus says about opposites. Heraclitus never says
that, because pairs of opposites form a continuum and must be under-
stood together, there is not a perfectly good use for both terms in the
pair; nor does he suggest that our language would be more correct if
we used only one of each pair of opposites. We must understand the
relativity of relative terms, but this does not mean we ought not to
use them. The fact that injustice and justice are incomprehensible in
isolation from each other is no justification for calling every action a
just one. Ethical judgments are relative, but they must be made;
and the recognition of the relative nature of our ethical terms should
not trick us into believing they are meaningless.
The fragment's intent is not to advocate the god's course of action
as one which men would take if they were wise, but rather to reveal in
yet another way the consequences of the god's immortality in ethical
terms. I think Heraclitus' meaning is that men's awareness of their
21 Cf. Benardete, p. 32.

27 Kirk, HCF, p. 166.
165
mortality determines their views both of ethics and of language. The
feeling of the opposition between life and death is basic to all ethical
polarities, and the concept of injustice is one that a being who is
immortal and omnipotent cannot form.28 What can seem unjust to a
god, who understands that nothing can ever take away his life, or
surrender him to the power of time and fate? Injustice, then, is seen
to ultimately connected with the taking of life. And men, who can kill
and be killed, have a need for ethical oppositions which the gods do
not. There is something essentially playful in the deeds of the gods;
and their synthetic view is appropriate to them only, and not to mortals.
Mortals have, one might say, created ethical oppositions in language
in the image of the inexorable life-death opposition which is funda-
mental to their existence.
We recall that 4uxn, the faculty by virtue of which men have
understanding of linguistic oppositions, is also that by virtue of which
they are mortal. The gods, traditionally - and, as far as we can see, in
Heraclitus too - do not have 4Uvx.29 If all fire necessarily becomes
water, and if for the fire-substitute, +u ', to become water is to be
annil ilated, we cannot understand how an immortal, unchanging
being can have iux. The gods have language of some sort, and some
sort of central faculty; but these cannot be the same as their mortal
counterparts. Thus we see yet a new dimension to the opposition be-
tween mortals and immortals set up in fragment 62: by virtue of their
being alive with respect to the death of men, the gods are dead, not
only to the mortal immortality of suZ', but also to the essential
features of human language and human life.
We see, then, that the notion of mortality is basic in several ways to
Heraclitus' understanding of human life, and that, rejecting notions
of psychic immortality, he emphasizes the winning of fame by deeds of
virtue. We have attempted to elucidate the nature of this fame, and
the view of ethical polarities which is related to it. There is, however,
one more fragment which has often been cited as evidence that
Heraclitus does, after all, believe that good men are rewarded with
28 Ramnoux, too, connects Heraclitus' understanding of opposites with the

awareness of mortality (p. 17 ff.), but she suggests, I think wrongly, that his
purpose is to take the fearfulness out ol night, death, etc. Cf. also fr. 20, which
emphasizes the way in which the life of each man from birth is a progress
towards death: the awareness of mortality is a central factor even in pro-
creation.
"I Cf. part I, n. 4.
166
some sort of psychic immortality. The fragment is obscure, and can
never be conclusively interpreted; but there are several points, at least,
which may be worth discussion.
Fr. 63, from Hippolytus, Refutatio, IX. 10.

va 8'6Vrt inxotamaONL xact caxxocxcq yEyveacAam lycp') ~c,vrcjv xxi vexpC&v.
Hippolytus here is attempting to refute the Noetian heresy by demon-

strating that it is based on Heracitean doctrine. He introduces this
fragment by saying that it speaks of the resurrection of the flesh, and
calls god responsible for this resurrection. It seems, then, to be in
Hippolytus' interest to make the fragment sound, insofar as possible,
as if it is talking about some such thing; and it does not seem that
Hippolytus was too scrupulous to doctor or alter a fragment to suit
his own purposes, particularly if the change would involve merely an
addition of several words to the fragment's end. Now the phrase
Wvrwv xGC vexp&v has an oddly Christian ring. Marcovich even trans-
lates it using the familiar liturgical phrase "the quick and the dead."
vexpoE is the usual, and in fact, I believe, the only word for "the dead"
in the New Testament, and in passages such as 2 Tim. 4.1 and Peter 4.5
it is coupled with CwVT?e in contexts discussing the resurrection of the
flesh. vexpoL at the time of Heraclitus, however, meant only "corpses,"30
while vexue? could mean either corpses or shades in Hades. v'xuq seems
to have been the more common word for "corpse" in Ionic, and
Heraclitus nowhere else uses vexp6. If he had used vexpoL here, it must
have meant "corpses," and, considering the attitude he expresses
towards corpses in fr. 96, it would be surprising that he should speak
of guardians for them. I would, therefore, like to suggest that xocL
vexpxv is an addition made by Hippolytus, in order to give the fragment
a ring of similarity to the contemporary writings which he wishes to
refute.31
30 In four out of the sixty-six occurrences in Homer (three being the same for-
mula) vexp6q seems to mean "shade." But all these are plurals in line-final
position, where metrical pressure would explain the anomaly. vkxuq is used
freely in both meanings.
31 It is difficult, however, to understand precisely Hippolytus' motives for
including this fragment at all, since he himself believed emphatically in the
resurrection of the flesh (see Commentary on Daniel, II. xxvii), and would not
want to brand his own doctrine as dependent on pagan speculation. His argu-
ment, though he may not have realized it, does him as much harm as it does his
opponents.
167
If we consider the fragment as ending with ~CovT&v, we must, I
think, also understand Cysp'r differently. Usually it has been taken as
a reference to the waking state of the guardians; and since EyrLp& and
its derivatives are commonly used of resurrection in the New Testament,
Hippolytus probably understood it in the same way - another reason
why he felt no compunctions about adding vexpFv. But I think it is
much more natural, especially if the fragment ends with 4v'wov, to
understand it with co v.32 Thus we have: "There, before the one
who is, (or before the one who is there) (that) they arise and become
guardians of those who live wakefully."
The fact that the fragment is in indirect discourse causes great
difficulties. We cannot tell whether Heracitus is expressing his own
view or that of another; neither do we know whether he agrees or dis-
agrees with the view expressed. I would like merely to show that, even
if we understand it as his view, or a view he supports, it need not be
seen as evidence of any sort of resurrection. The similarity to the
Hesiodic discussion of aa[009?, pointed out by Marcovich and others,33
is probably deliberate. But there are also dissimilarities. If one takes
the mysterious r6v't literally, and not as a mystical formula of some
sort, it seems to imply that the being appeared to has real being in a
way that the being doing the appearing does not; otherwise to say
"the one who is" would not be to offer a useful sort of identification.
I think it is possible to regard the passage as descriptive, metaphori-
cally, of the effect of the x04oq and the example of the dead upon the
man who is actually living, and living wakefully enough to be cognizant
of their fame. The images of the dead men (which do not exist, except
in the minds of the living) rise up before the man who actually is (or
is there), and become guardians for such men as live wakefully. The
intent is not to reproduce the Hesiodic picture, but to correct it in the
light of Heraclitus' views of Puyx
This is, admittedly, speculation, and serves merely to show that this
fragment can be interpreted in various ways, and cannot be taken as
basic or strong evidence for theories of resurrection of sux. Without
this fragment, there is no evidence at all that Heraclitus envisioned
such a resurrection, and copious evidence that he did not.
In conclusion, we may say that the Heraclitean doctrine of 4uXn
32 Ramnoux (p. 60), though she keeps vexp&v, also understands &yep-ri with
46vmwv: "devenir gardiens - juges pour les vivants-en-6veil et pour les cadavres."
as Marcovich, pp. 395-8. See Hes. Op. 107, 122, 252.
168
amounts to a radical and profoundly creative critique of traditional
ideas about man's faculties, his language, and his death. For the first
time, apparently, in the history of Greek thought, man is seen,
explicitly, as having a central "self": a single, vital faculty in terms of
which sense-perception, language, ethical behavior, and, ultimately,
death, must be understood. As the cosmos, articulated into a plurality
of species, is, nonetheless, one through the all connecting ?O6yoq of fire,
so a man, though he has many faculties, is one by virtue of the central,
connecting faculty of 4ux4 This cosmic analogy, though it raises
difficult questions, does not cause Heraclitus to arrive at a mechanistic
or deterministic understanding of human behavior. Instead, he
emphasizes the capacity of each man for self-seeking and self-knowl-
edge, and teaches the importance of self-restraint, of the dry 4u .
Man's potential for self-development in terms of 4uyX is unlimited;
and understanding leads to new understanding. Heraclitus' iux' theory
recognizes death as necessary and denies posthumous survival. And
yet it accords to man the possibility of the kinetic immortality of
xX'o4, which even the immortal gods cannot attain. And because
4uy' embraces the notions of mortality, of language, of the essential
nature of human life, Heraclitus is led to reappraise the nature of the
language and life of immortal beings, and to conclude that these must
be very different in quality from the life and language of men, governed
by the mortal 4ux4
Harvard University
BIBLIOGRAPHY: PART II
Benardete, Seth. "The Aristeia of Diomedes and the plot of the Iliad." Agon 2
(1968). Pp. 10-38.
Benveaiste, ]Emile. "La Phrase nominale." Problemes de Linguistique g6ntrale.
Paris, 1966. Pp. 151-167.
Le Vocabulaire des Institutions Indo-europlennes. Vol. 2: Pouvoir, Droit,
Religion. Paris, 1969.
Bumet, J. Early Greek Philosophy. 3rd edition, London, 1920. Pp. 130-168.
Diels, Hermann, and Kranz, Walther. Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Dublin-
Zurich, 14th edition, 1969. Vol. I pp. 139-190.
Frame, Douglas Gordon. The Origins of Greek NOOE. Dissertation, Harvard,
1971.
Gigon, Olof. Untersuchungen zu Heraklit. Leipzig, 1935.
Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Cambridge, 1962. Vol. I pp.
403-492.
169
Kirk, G. S. "Heracitus' Contribution to the development of a language for
Philosophy." Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte 9 (1964). Pp. 73-77.
- Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments. Cambridge, 1954. (Cited as Kirk, HCF).
- "Heracitus and Death in Battle." AJP 70 (1949).
Kirk, G. S. and Raven, J. E. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. Cambridge, 1957.
Pp. 182-215.
Marcovich, M. Heraclitus. Merida, Venezuela, 1967.
Nagy, Gregory. Indo-European Poetics. Volume 1. Metre. Chaptei III, "The
Semantic Context of Rig-Vedic ?raaa(s) sksitam and Greek xOloq #4,troV."
Forthcoming.
Ramnoux, Cl6mence. Heraclite, ou l'homme entre les Choses et les Mots. Paris, 1959.
Snell, Bruno. Heraklit: Fragmente. Munich, 1926.
Tugwell, Simon. "Heraclitus: Fragment 98 (DK). " Classical Quarterly 21 (1971).
P. 32.
170

ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, II Author(s) : Martha C. Nussbaum Source: Phronesis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1972), pp. 153-170 Published by: Brill Accessed: 18-03-2020 23:03 UTC

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, II Author(s) : Martha C. Nussbaum Source: Phronesis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1972), pp. 153-170 Published by: Brill Accessed: 18-03-2020 23:03 UTC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, II

Author(s): Martha C. Nussbaum

H aving investigated the role of +uZ' in the li

something that occurs as the result of damage to 4uZj, primarily,

Fr. 36: AuXiatvY Voroq (Sp yevicaL...

T6v xcd T5vC46m)X TpocqX Koq 'AXLXXzUG-

3 Vergil understands and reproduces this Homeric restriction, writing simula-

&E &(X's, ov tL aot ye 7rau'p xxi 7r6-rvLm VIp

denial that it preserves any sort of individual identity (since +uxy

a belief in immortality of 4uy'. Burnet's description of the fiery 4uz'

7On these and related points, see Benardete, Agon.

13 Pleasure-death parallels are of course not uncommon in Greek literature,

16 Marcovich, pp. 505-8. Also DK ad loc., Ramnoux, p. 113.

aUT6q yap OL &7r' OaUOq t EV M[LUV6Ca)p

(Here, the x68ouve, presumably, represents the granting of distinction

21 Cf. Benardete, p. 32.

28 Ramnoux, too, connects Heraclitus' understanding of opposites with the

Fr. 63, from Hippolytus, Refutatio, IX. 10.

Hippolytus here is attempting to refute the Noetian heresy by demon-

You might also like