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Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

Issue

Is there liability in negligence for injury caused by another in the absence of a contract?

Facts.
On the 26 August, 1928 Donoghue and a friend were at a café in Glasgow (Scotland).
Donoghue's companion ordered and paid for her drink. The cafe purchased the product from a
distributor that purchased it from Stevenson. The ginger beer came in a Dark bottle, and the
contents were not visible from the outside. Donoghue drank some of the contents and her friend
lifted the bottle to pour the remainder of the ginger beer into the tumbler. The remains of a snail
in a state of decomposition dropped out of the bottle into the tumbler. Donoghue later
complained of stomach pain and her doctor diagnosed her as having gastroenteritis and being in
a state of severe shock. Donoghue sued Stevenson, the manufacturer of the drink, for negligence.
She was unsuccessful at trial and appealed the decision to the House of lords. Finally, her claim
was successful.

Issue
1. Does the defendant owe a duty of care to the plaintiff being as there is no contract

Decision
Appeal allowed.

Reasons
The majority stated that the manufacturer does owe a duty of care to the end consumer, for the
purpose of their product is to be consumed, not to be sold to a distributor.

Winterbottom v Wright does not apply in this case, for that case was about breach of contract and
this one was not

The absence of a contract between two parties does not mean that a duty is not owed

Overall, the court found that in cases like this where the manufacturers are manufacturing goods
for the eventual consumption of consumers, they do have a duty to take reasonable care to ensure
that their products are safe for consumption.
You cannot knowingly foresee harming your neighbor. Neighbors are persons who are
reasonably foreseeable as being affected by your actions or omissions. A duty of care is not
owed to the world at large; it is owed to your neighbors.

Ratio
Manufacturers owe the final consumer of their product a duty of care (at least in the instance
where the goods cannot be inspected between manufacturing and consumption). There need not
be a contractual relationship, or privity, in order for the final consumer to sue in negligence

Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932 )


Donoghue v. Stevenson is often referred to as the ‘snail in the bottle’ case

Donoghue v. Stevenson, also known as the ‘snail in the bottle case’, is a significant case in
Western law. The House of Lords’ ruling in this case established the civil law tort of negligence
and obliged manufacturers to observe a duty of care towards their customers. The events of the
case took place in Paisley, Scotland in 1928. While attending a store, Ms May Donoghue was
given a bottle of ginger beer, which had purchased for her by a friend. The bottle was later
discovered to contain a decomposing snail. Since the bottle was not made of clear glass,
Donoghue had consumed most of its contents before she became aware of the snail. She later fell
ill and a physician diagnosed her with gastroenteritis. Donoghue subsequently took legal action
against Mr David Stevenson, the manufacturer of the ginger beer. She lodged a writ in the Court
of Sessions, Scotland’s highest civil court, seeking £500 damages.

Donoghue could not sue Stevenson for breach of contract, because a friend had purchased the
drink for her. Instead, her lawyers claimed that Stevenson had breached a duty of care to his
consumers and had caused injury through negligence – an area of civil law which at the time was
largely untested. Stevenson’s lawyers challenged Donoghue’s action, on the basis that no
precedents existed for such a claim. They referred to an earlier action by Donoghue’s lawyer,
Mullen v. AG Barr, where a dead mouse was found in a bottle of soft drink; judges in this case
dismissed it because of a lack of precedent. Donoghue’s initial action failed, however she was
granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords, which at the time still had the judicial authority to
hear appellate cases. The leading judgement, delivered by Lord Atkin in 1932, established that
Stevenson should be responsible for the well-being of individuals who consume his products,
given that they could not be inspected. The case was returned to the original court; Stevenson
died before the case was finalised and Donoghue was awarded a reduced amount of damages
from his estate.

The outcomes of Donoghue v. Stevenson established several legal principles and precedents:

Negligence. Firstly, the House of Lords ruling affirmed that negligence is a tort. A plaintiff can
take civil action against a respondent, if the respondent’s negligence causes the plaintiff injury or
loss of property. Previously the plaintiff had to demonstrate some contractual arrangement for
negligence to be proven, such as the sale of an item or an agreement to provide a service. Since
Donoghue had not purchased the drink, she could prove no contractual arrangement with
Stevenson – yet Lord Atkin’s judgement established that Stevenson was still responsible for the
integrity of his product.

Duty of care. Secondly, the case established that manufacturers have a duty of care to the end
consumers or users of their products. According to Lord Atkin’s ratio decendi, “a manufacturer
of products, which he sells… to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left
him… owes a duty to the consumer to take reasonable care”. This precedent has evolved and
now forms the basis of laws that protect consumers from contaminated or faulty goods. These
protections began as common law but many have since been codified in legislation, such as the
Trade Practices Act (Commonwealth, 1974).

Neighbour principle. Thirdly, the Donoghue v. Stevenson case produced Lord Atkin’s
controversial ‘neighbour principle’, which extended the tort of negligence beyond the tortfeasor
and the immediate party. It raised the question of exactly which people might be affected by
negligent actions. In Donoghue’s case she had not purchased the ginger beer but had received it
as a gift; she was a neighbour rather than a party to the contract. Atkin said of this principle:
“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems
to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought to have them in
[mind] when I am [considering these] acts or omissions.”

Source http://lawgovpol.com/case-study-donoghue-v-stevenson-1932/

Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932(in Brief)


C, Mrs Donoghue went to Minchella's Wellmeadow Cafe in Paisley with a friend. The friend
ordered ice cream over which part of a bottle of ginger beer was poured. When the
remainder of the ginger beer was poured, it was found to contain a decomposed snail.
Mrs Donoghue became ill through having consumed contaminated ginger beer.

Held:
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour become in law, you must not injure your
neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? Receives a restricted reply.
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions, which you can reasonably
foresee, would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The
answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question." 
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] Q.B. 256 (C.A.).

Facts

Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (D) manufactured and sold The Carbolic Smoke Ball. The company
placed ads in various newspapers offering a reward of 100 pounds to any person who used the
smoke ball three times per day as directed and contracted influenza, colds, or any other disease.
After seeing the ad Carlill (P) purchased a ball and used it as directed. Carlill contracted
influenza and made a claim for the reward. Carbolic Smoke Ball refused to pay and Carlill sued
for damages arising from breach of contract. Judgment for 100 pounds was entered for Carlill
and Carbolic Smoke Ball appealed.

Issue

 Does one who makes a unilateral offer for the sale of goods by means of an
advertisement impliedly waive notification of acceptance, if his purpose is to sell as much
product as possible?

Holding and Rule (Lindley)

 Yes. One who makes a unilateral offer for the sale of goods by means of an
advertisement impliedly waives notification of acceptance if his purpose is to sell as
much product as possible.

The court held that a person who makes an offer may decline to require notice of acceptance if
he or she wishes. One who makes an offer dispenses with the requirement of notice of
acceptance if the form of the offer shows that notice of acceptance is not required. To accept an
offer, a person need only follow the indicated method of acceptance. If the offeror either
expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act without giving notice
of acceptance, performance is sufficient acceptance without notification.

The court held that an advertisement is considered to be an offer when it specifies the quantity of
persons who are eligible to accept its terms. If such an advertisement requires performance, the
offeree is not required to give notice of his performance.

The court addressed the issue of whether the ad was intended to be a promise or whether it was
merely “puffing”. The court pointed to Carbolic Smoke Ball’s claim in the advertisement that it
had deposited 1000 pounds with Alliance Bank, which the court decided was intended to
demonstrate the company’s sincerity in paying the reward.

Concurring (Bowen)

Notification of acceptance is required under our law. The person who makes the offer may
dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it desirable to do so. He may expressly or impliedly
create any method of acceptance for his offer. An offeree need only follow the method indicated
for acceptance. The requirement of notice of acceptance to the offeror must be determined by an
objective reasonable person standard.

In the advertisement case, it seems to me that an inference may be drawn from the transaction
itself that a person is not to notify his acceptance of the offer before he performs the condition,
but that if he performs the condition notification is dispensed with. We must look to the essence
of the transaction and what the offeror is bargaining for under the circumstances. Under these
facts, the defendant impliedly indicated that it did not require notification of acceptance of the
offer.

Disposition

Appeal dismissed.

(Source: http://www.lawnix.com/cases/carlill-carbolic-smoke-ball.html)

Heaven v Pender (1883) CA


D, a dock owner on whose scaffolding C was working whilst he painted a ship. One of the
ropes broke, and C fell into the dock and was injured.
 
Held: D was under an obligation to him to take reasonable care that at the time he supplied
the staging and ropes they were in a fit state to be used, and that for the neglect of such
duty D was liable to the C he had sustained:
 
Brett  MR: A duty arises when every one of ordinary sense would at once recognise that
care and skill was needed to avoid danger of injury.
Two drivers meeting have no contract with each other, but have a reciprocal duty towards
each other. So two ships navigating the sea. So a railway company has a duty towards
passengers. So the owner or occupier of house or land towards visitors. A contract between
two persons does not prevent the existence of a duty.

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