Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty.
Peter Joey Usita ib2i
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I. BOOK ONE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT ​(Art.
1-42; Migrant Workers Act)
1.PEOPLE VS. PANIS
GR NO. L-58674-77
July 11, 1986
FACTS
-- This case revolves with the interpretation of Art. 13(b) of the Labor
Code defining recruitment and placement.
-- Four informations were filed alleging that Serapio Abug criminally
operate a private fee-charging employment agency. (In short, illegal
recruitment)
-- Accused contends that there could only be illegal recruitment whenever
two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee. Hence, dealings with two or more persons is
considered an indispensable element.
-- Petitioner argues, on the other hand that the requirement of two or more
persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of
an offer or promise of employment and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE: ​Correct interpretation of Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, to wit:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement​.
HELD
-- The proviso on two or more persons is mere creation of assumption, that
if an individual or entity deals with two or more persons in consideration of
a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made x x x, he/it is engaged in
recruitment and placement.
-- Any of the acts mentioned in Art. 13(b) will constitute recruitment and
placement even if only 1 prospective worker is involved.
-- The number of persons dealt is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers.
-- To reiterate, where a fee is collected inconsideraion of a promise or offer
of employment to two ore more prospective workers, they are ​deemed ​to
be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
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2. STO. TOMAS VS. SALAC
GR NO. 152642
November 13, 2012
FACTS
-- This is a consolidated petition, as follows:
1.​GR No. 152642, GR NO. 152710
- It assails the constitutionality of Sec. 29 and 30 of RA 8042,
which deregulates the handling of recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out the regulatory function
of the POEA.
- The petition seeks to prohibit DOLE, POEA and TESDA from
implementing and further issuing rules and regulations regulating
the recruitment and placement of OFWs.
- On December 4, 2009, however, the Republic informed the
Court that President Arroyo signed into law RA 9422 expressly
repealing Sec. 29 and 30, and strengthening the role of POEA.
Therefore, moot and academic (sayang oras noh HAHA)
2. ​GR No. 167590
- The petition assails the constitutionality of Sec. 6, 7 and 9 of the
same law.
- Sec. 6 defines the crime of illegal recruitment; Sec. 7 on the
penalties; and Sec. 9 provides that the criminal action arising
therefrom may be filed before the RTC where the offense was
committed OR where the offended party resides.
- Re: Sec. 6. ​Manila RTC held the same as unconstitutional as it
violates the right to equal protection of those who operate with
government licenses.
- SC: Sec. 6 actually makes a distinction between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters:
- those who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
without appropriate government license or authority
are gulity of illegal recruitment WN they commit
wrongful acts in Sec. 6;
- Those with appropriate government license or
authority are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they
commit any of the wrongful acts in Sec. 6 therein.
- Sec. 7 was assailed because it was alleged that the penalties
failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act
committed. The Supreme Court ruled that the fixing of penalties
is within the prerogative of the Congress, a political question, by
which the Congress may impose penalties through the police
power of the State.
- Sec. 9 was also held by the Manila RTC as unconstitutional as it
disregards the jurisdictional nature of criminal laws by
prescribing the filing of criminal action in either the place where
the offense was committed or where the offended party resides.
- The Supreme Court held that Sec. 15(a), Rule 110 that the venue
may be subject to existing laws
- As it were, Sec. 9, RA 8042 is an exception on the rule of venue
on criminal actions and is within the declared policy of criminal
justice system.
3. ​GR 167590, 128978-79, 184298-99
-- Respondent spouses filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and
damages against petitioner Becmen Service Exporter and White Falcon
Services for the death of their daughter Jasmin Cuaresma while working in
Saudi Arabia.
-- The LA held that the death was due to suicide. On appeal, NLRC gave
credence to the findings that Jasmin died of criminal violence and rape.
-- CA held that Becmen and White Falcon is jointly and severally liable
with their Saudi employer for ​actual damages
-- The Court ruled that despite the death of Jasmin outside of work-related
or connected reasons, Becmen and White Falcon’s corporate directors is
liable for failure to investigate the nature of the death, abandoning its
moral, legal, and social duty to assist in obtaining justice.
-- The corporate directors aforementioned questioned the constitutionality
of Sec. 10, RA 8042 holding the corporate directors, officers and partners
jointly and solidarily liable with their company for money claims filed by
OFWs against their employers and recruiters.
-- The Supreme Court held that the liability of corporate directors and
officers under RA 8042 ​is not automatic​. To make them jointly and
solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were
remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or
tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
-- Final note: In the absence of clear and unmistakeable cause that the
statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
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3. SUNACE INTERNATIONAL VS. NLRC
GR NO. 161757
January 25, 2006
FACTS
-- ​Petitioner deployed to Taiwan Divina Montehermozo as a domestic
helper under a 12-month contract effective Feb. 1, 1997.
-- Edmund Wang was the broker in Taiwan.
-- After the contract expired on Feb. 1, 1998, she continued working with
her employer, Hang Ruixiong, for two more years.
-- Shortly after her return in the Philippines in 2000, she filed a complaint
with the NLRC alleging that she was jailed for 3 months and was
underpaid.
-- In its defense, Sunace contended that Divina has no cause of action
against them considering that she finished her contract term without being
illegally dismissed and that the extension was without its knowlege and
consent, therefore no liability arises against them.
-- Labor Arbiter rejected the claim, affirmed by NLRC.
-- CA ruled that petitioner cannot profess ignorance of such extension as
obviously, the act of the principal extending the employment contract is
necessarily bound by it
ISSUE: ​WN the petitioner is liable
HELD
-- ​The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent
(Sunace) to the principal (Taiwan), and not the other way around. The
knowledge of the principal foreign employer cannot be imputed to its
agent.
-- There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to
be bound under the extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto.
-- Furthermore, it is to point out that there is ​implied revocation of its
agency relationship ​with its foreign principal when, after the termination of
the ​orignal employment term​, the foreign principal directly negotiated with
Divina and entered into a separate contract in Taiwan.
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4. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME
GR NO. 167614
March 24, 2009
FACTS
-- ​Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services under a
POEA-approved contract of employment as Chief Officer, and a basic
monthly salary of $1,300 a month.
-- He was, however, constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract as Second Officer with a salary of $1,000, upon assurance that he
would be made Chief Officer on April 1998.
-- However, the respondent did not deliver with the promise, hence
petitioner refused to stay as 2/O and was repatriated May 1998.
-- Petitioner filed with LA a complaint for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims amounting $26,442.73, his supposed salary
from June 1998 to March 1999, $2,590 per month.
-- The LA awarded petitioner $8,770, representing computation of the
salary period of 3 months only, rather than the entire unexpired portion of
9 months.
-- Respondent appealed to NLRC with the issue that the LA erred in ruling
that petitioner was illegally dismissed; while petitioner appealed arguing
ib2i
that he should be awarded the salary amounting to the unexpired portion of
his term.
-- The main argument of the petitioner is that the second clause of Sec. 10,
RA 8042 violates the OFW’s constitutional rights in impairment of their
contract; deprives of equal protection, and denies them due process.
ISSUE: ​The computation of the lump-sum salary award by reason of
illegal dismissal
This issue is what is left for it is settled that there was indeed illegal
dismissal.
HELD
-- The subject clause indeed violates the constitutional safeguards on equal
protection clause and labor as a protected sector.
-- To Filipino workers, these constitutional safeguards translate to
economic security and parity; that all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category.
-- Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor”,
this Court employs the standard of ​strict judicial scrutiny​, the subject a
suspected classification prejudicial to the OFW.
-- A closer examination shows that the subject clause has individous
impact on:
a) OFWs with contracts of less than one year vis-a-vis with
employment contracts of more than one year;
b) Among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one
year.
c) Local workers vis-a-vis OFWs
-- Examination on the related jurisprudence regarding the matter that
applied the rule prior to RA 8042 shows that regardless of the contract
periods, the computation of monetary benefits in case of dismissal is
subjected to a uniform rule in computation: basic salaries multiplied by the
entire unexpired portion of the employment contracts.
-- The enactment of RA 9042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims, singling out those whose contracts have
an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to
disadvantage by limiting the same for 3 months for every year or for
unexpired portion thereof, ​whichever is less​.
-- As to the second category, it greatly prejudices those whose contracts are
for more than one year, owing to the award of ​“for the unexpired term or
for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less”​, as
those whose contracts are less than one year, is entitled to the unexpired
portion of the term, while those whose contract is more than one year, is
only entitled to 3 months only.
-- As for the third category, prior to the enactemd of RA 8042, OFW and
local workers with fixed-term employment illegaly discharged were treated
alike in terms of computation, entitled for the unexpired term of their
contracts. But RA 8042 differently treated those OFWs with more than one
year contracts, for they are entitled to onl 3 months per year of their
unexpired portion.
-- The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose, and therefore violates the right to equal protection and substantive
due process under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
-- Lastly, as regards to the inclusions to the award, Sec. 10(5) does not
include overtime and leave pay.
-- DOLE DO No. 33, s. 1996 provides that for seafarers, salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses.
-- There is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday
pay, unless there is evidence that the worker performed work during those
periods.
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
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5. YAP VS. THENEMARIS
GR NO. 179532
May 30, 2011
FACTS
-- Claudio Yao was employed as electrician of the vessel MT Seascout on
August 14, 2001, for the duration of 12 months. On 23 August, he
commenced the job.
-- On November 2001, the vessel was sold, informed to the POEA on
December 6, 2001.
-- The Captain has send an Advisory, stating that the officers may wish to
transfer to other vessels, or to reembark to schedule them accordingly.
-- Yap received payments, except the payment of one-month basic wage,
which he refused. He insists that he was entitled to the unexpired portion of
the contract as he was illegally dismissed from employment.
-- the LA ruled in favor of Yap, finding that he have been constructively
and illegally dismissed.
-- NLRC affirmed, except that the award was reduced to three month
salary, in pursuance of Sec. 10, RA 8042.
-- CA affirmed.
-- At the time this case was pending in Supreme Court, the case of Serrano
vs. Gallant was promulgated.
- Yap was unaware of the decision;
- Thenemaris was aware, arguing that there should be no
retroactive application of the law in this case.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the case of Serrano vs. Gallant applies
HELD:
-- Firstly, the Court held that since the facts in this case is the same as that
in Serrano, there is no reason for this to depart therefrom: Sec. 10, RA
8042 is unconstitutional and the employee illegally dismissed is entitled to
salary of his unexpired portion.
-- An unconstitutional law is not a law; it confers no rights, inoperative as
if it was not passed at all.
-- Exception: Doctrine of operative fact - nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot be always ignored.
-- Since it was not the fault of petitioner why he was illegally dismissed,
and to apply the same would be iniquitous, this doctrine should not apply
and the Serrano case shall apply.
-- Sec. 10(5) on salary includes basic pay, not including overtime and leave
pay. But if the tanker allowance is ​encapsulated ​in the basic salary, making
it $1,430; $1,300 basic, $130 tanker allowance, it should be included in the
computation.
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6. MERALCO VS. NLRC
GR NO. 78763
July 12, 1989
FACTS
-- Private respondent Signo was employed as supervisor-leadman since
January 1963 until his services were terminated on May 18, 1983.
-- A certain Fernando de Lara filed an application to Meralco for electrical
services at his residence at Antipolo. Since the place of de Lara is yet
ib2i
within the serviceable area of Meralco, certain employees of the company
made it appear in the application that the sari-sari store at the corner of
Marcos Highway is de Lara’s establishment.
-- As Meralco found the irregularity, Signo’s services were terminanted on
May 18, 1983.
-- Signo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, and
separation pay.
ISSUE: ​WN Signo should be dismissed from petitioner company on
grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
HELD:
-- The power to dismiss is the normal prerogative of the employer. An
employer can dismiss or lay-off an employee for just and authorized causes
enumerated under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.
-- There is no question that Signo is guilty of breach of trust and violation
of company rules. However, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held that
dismissal should not be meted considering his 20 years of service in the
employ of petitioner, without any previous derogatory record.
-- It is held that dismissal should not be imposed as dismissal is too severe
a penalty if the employee has been employed for a considerable length of
time in the service of his employer notwithstanding the existence of valid
cause of dismissal.
-- However, Signo is not entitled to backwages considering the good faith
by which Meralco dismissed him.
-- Lastly, in carrying out the provisions of Labor Code, the workingman’s
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
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7. JUCO VS. NLRC
GR NO. 98107
August 18, 1997
FACTS
-- ​Petitioner was hired as a project engineer of respondent National
Housing Corporation.
-- On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been
implicated in the crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.
-- Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal wtih the Department of
Labor;
-- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on ground that the NLRC
had no jurisdiction on this case; NLRC reversed the decision.
-- NHC appealed the same and held in this Court that the LA ruling should
be reinstated.
-- January 1989, petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint for illegal
dismissal;
-- CSC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
-- Petitioner then filed with respondent NLRC a complaint through which
the Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as it was
ruled that the case against him was clearly fabricated. Furthermore, it was
ruled that the action has not yet prescribed as the reckoning period for the
reglementary period should be from the date of the receipt of the decision
of the CSC, April 11, 1989.
-- NLRC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: ​WN the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
HELD
-- ​Employees of GOCCs were governed by the Civil Service Law and not
by the Labor Code, as was ruled in the previous case of Juco vs. NHC.
-- However, upon the supplantation of the 1987 Constitution, employees of
GOCCs ​with original charters ​are governed by the CSC. Those
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
government corporations incorporated through the Corporation Code shall
be governed by the Labor Code.
-- In the case at bar, NHC is a government-owned corporation established
in accordance with EO No. 399, the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation.
-- 100% of the stocks were owned by the Government from its
incorporation under the old Corporation law.
-- Since NHA had been incorporated under the old Corporation Code, it is
but correct to say that it is a GOCC whose employees are subject to the
provisions of Labor Code.
-- Therefore, the NLRC erred in dismissing the complaint by reason of lack
of jurisdiction.
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8. REPUBLIC VS. CA
GR NO. 87676
December 20, 1989
FACTS
-- The Manila RTC Branch 52 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the
petitioner, represented by the National Parks Development Committee,
petition in praying for declaration of nullity the strike of National Parks
Development Supervisory Association.
-- NPDC was created under EO 30, and was registered in the SEC as a
non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as “The National Parks
Development Committee, Inc.”
-- The CSC notified NPDC that all appointments and other personnel
actions shall be submitted to CSC.
-- Two CBA were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA, and NPDC
and NPDCSA
-- On March 1988, these unions staged a strike at the Rizal Park alleging
unfair labor practices by NPDC.
-- Manila RTC in dismissing the petition held that the case properly falls
under DOLE as there exists an employer-employee relationship between
NPDC and the strikers, hence jurisdiction is on the Labor Arbiters of
DOLE.
ISSUE: ​WN NPDC is a government agency, and from there whether the
strike is legal
HELD
-- ​In the case of Perlas, Jr. vs. People, it was ruled that NPDC is an agency
of the government, not a GOCC.
-- Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil
service rules and regulation, and its emplyees are ​civil service employees.
-- While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to
organize and join unions of their choce, there is yet no law permitting them
to strike.
-- Lastly, in case of labor dispute between the employees and the
government, the Public Sector Labor Management Council, not the DOLE
shall hear the dispute.
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ib2i
9. SSS EMPLOYEE’S ASSOCIATION VS. CA
GR NO. 85279
July 28, 1989
FACTS
-- SSS filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that
the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and prevented
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return
to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike.
-- The strike was due to the failure of SSS to act on, but not limited to,
enforcement of CBA provision on check off union dues, payment of
accrued overtime pay, and conversion of temporary workers working for
more than 6 months as regular and conversion of salary as the same.
ISSUE: ​WN employees of SSS have the right to strike
HELD
-- ​No. Art. III, Sec. 8 merely states that right to form union, associations, or
societies for purpose ​not ​contrary to law.
-- "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
-- To implement the guarantee of the right of the government employees to
organize, the President, in June 1987, issued EO No. 180, stating that
"[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes
in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that
may be enacted by Congress."
-- The EO refers to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the CSC under
date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees x x x enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs
and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service."
-- So, without any ​direct ​law permitting the right to strike, it is considered
illegal for government workers to stage a strike.
-- Being not allowed, it is within the power of the court to issue an
injunction order to prevent the same.
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10. JAMER VS. NLRC
GR NO. 112630
September 5, 1997
FACTS
-- Corazon Jamer is employed with the ISetann from 1976 until her
dismissal in 1990. Cristina Amortizado is a cashier in Isetann Cubao from
1977 to 1990.
-- In 1990, a shortage of P15353 and P450 under deposit, and failure to
account for P1,000 borrowed from Jamer, and P70 over replenishment of
petty cash expenses.
-- Upon investigation by Isetann, they were not able to sufficiently explain
the shortage and thus they were dismissed.
ISSUE: ​WN there was illegal dismissal.
HELD
-- No. The requisites for legal dismissal was complied. Dismissal has two
points: substantive and procedural.
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

-- ​Substantive - ​In Art. 282, dishonesty is a legal ground for dismissal

because they were not able to explain the shortage. Their failure to timely
report of the shortage, coupled with the fact of concealing the same,
constitutes lack of confidence and thus a legal ground.
-- ​Procedural - ​two written notice rule is complied: a) notice apprising the
employee of particular acts or omission which his dismissal is sought; and
b) Notice informing him of his dismissal.
-- Article 4 of the Labor Code on construing the law in favor of labor
should not apply here. The fact that they are employed for 13 and 14 years
should be taken against them. The infractions committed by them in their
special and unique employment relationship as cashiers, characterized as
fiduciary in character, manifests their regrettable lack of loyalty to the
employer. The apparent laxity proffered by petitioner should not be taken
against the employer.
-- At this juncture, the wide lattitude of employer’s discretion on
terminating officers or employees occupying positions of responsibility is
upheld.

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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
II. BOOK TWO: HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ​(Articles 42-81;
TESDA Law (RA 7796); Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons (RA 7727))
---------​XX---------
11. NITTO ENTERPRISES VS. NLRC
GR NO. 114337
September 29, 1995
FACTS
-- ​Private respondent Roberto Capili was hired in May 1990 as an
apprentice machinist, molder, and core maker, embodied in the
aprenticeship agreement, with his salary P66.75, 75% of the minimum
wage.
-- On August 2, 1990, Capili, handling a piece of glass, accidentally hit and
injured the leg of an office secretary.
-- Later that day, he entered a workshop not within his office station. He a
machine without authority and by reason thereof injured his left thumb.
Petitioner incurred P1,023.04 for the medication of Capili.
-- He was therefore asked to resign. He also executed a Quitclaim and
Release in favor of petitioner.
-- Three days thereafter, Capili filed before NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
-- ​LA: ​LA Libo-on ruled the dismissal as ​not ​illegal on reasons of:
a) That Capili was hired as an apprentice who violated their
agreement because of gross negligence by reason thereof he
injured not only himself, but also his co-worker;
b) That the acts show that he does not have the proper attitude in
employment.
-- ​NLRC: ​Reversed; that Capili is a regular employee, and that he is
entitled to reinstatement. Rationale:
That the apprenticeship agreement executed May 28, 1990 filed
with the Dept of Labor only on June 7 cannot be used as a basis
to conclude that Capili is a ​mere apprentice. ​By reason thereof
he is a regular employee entitled to security of tenure under
Article 280, Labor Code.
ISSUE: ​WN private respondent is an apprentice
HELD:
-- No. Article 61 provides that the apprenticeship agreement ​may be
entered only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by
the Minister of Labor x x x​.
-- Prior approval by the DOLE is therefore, a condition sine qua non before
an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. The mere act of
filing does not give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
-- Notwithstanding this application, petitioner enforced the apprenticeship
program the day it was enforced, without prior approval by the DOLE. The
agreement therefore is invalid, and Capili should be considered as a regular
employee.
-- Being regular employee, his termination must be grounded on valid
cause. Moreover, due process must be afforded without which, the
dismissal is void.
-- Due process requires the twin requirements of notice and hearing: and
there must be two notices before termination shall be valid: a) notice of
apprisal of particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and b) subsequent notice of decision to terminate him.
-- In the case at bar, the fact that Capili filed with the LA a complaint for
illegal dismissal three days after he was asked to “resign” and to sign a
“quitclaim”, shows that the resignation was not voluntary.
-- The alleged quitclaim and the resignation cannot disguise the apparent
summary dismissal of Capili, the same illegal before the Labor Code.
ib2i
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12. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES VS. SEBOLINO
GR NO. 187320
January 26, 2011
FACTS
-- 13 complainants filed several complaints for illegal dismissal against
petitioners Atlanta Industries.
-- The complainants are:
SEBOLINO (A); COSTALES (B); ALMOITE ( C); SAGUN (D); ZANO
(E); ALEGRIA (F); RAMOS (G); VILLAGOMEZ (H); PEDREGOZA (I);
CHIONG (J); DELA CRUZ (K); MAGALANG (L); MABANAG (M).
-- Complainants allege that they had attained regular status, allowed to
work with Atlanta for more than 6 months from the start of purported
apprenticeship agreement between them and Atlanta. They alleged that
they were ​illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired​.
-- ​LA: ​K, L, E, J, complaint dismissed; the dismissal of the remaining nine
ruled as illegal.
-- ​NLRC: ​During appeal to the NLRC, a Compromise Agreement was
entered with G, F, H, B, C acknowledging them to be regular employees
except G. NLRC affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by the LA; further
withdrawing the complaint of D, M, A, I; and affirming the Compromise.
-- Respondents Sebolino, Costales, Almoite, and Sagun (A,B,C,D)
appealed before the CA.
-- ​CA: ​The respondents were already regular employees when they entered
the apprenticeship agreements; the same were defective not approved by
the TESDA; the positions occupied by the respondents (machine operator,
extruder operator, scalemen) were necessary and desirable to the business
operated, hence regular employees. Lastly, the compromise agreement is
not binding upon Costales and Almoite as they did not sign the same.
ISSUE: ​WN the respondents were illegally dismissed
CONTENTION:
-- Petitioner: the respondent do not appear in the Master List which
contains all the names of all the persons who were employed; and that the
apprenticeship agreements were valid, and subsequent agreements were
entered with the petitioner for training of second skill. Lastly, the tenure of
the workers ended with the expiration of the agreement.
HELD:
-- The respondents were illegally dismissed because they were already
employees when they were required to undergo apprenticeship; and that
the apprenticeship is invalid.
-- CPS report shows that Sebolino and Sagun were scheduled on their work
according to their shifts in reports from July 2004 to March 2005; Costales
and Almoite were already in the CPS reports since 2003. (The complaints
were filed February-March 2005)
-- The Master list that Atlanta relied thereon cannot be countenanced;
being hardly legible, and actually contained employees employed from
1999-2004, the list shows “as of May 6, 2006”.
-- Respondents were already rendering services when they were made to
undergo apprenticeship, renders the agreement as irrelevant. Nevertheless,
their work is necessary and desirable to the business hence they should be
considered as regular employees under Article 280.
-- Wtih the expiration of the first apprenticeship agreement, Atlanta had
recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of regular
employee status.
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
13. CENTURY CANNING VS. CA
GR NO. 152894
August 17, 2007
FACTS
-- ​Petitioner Century Canning hired Gloria Palad as fish cleaner, with
apprenticeship agreement signed on July 17, 1997, with allowance of
P138.75 daily.
-- On September 26, 1997, TESDA approved the apprenticeship program.
-- A performance evaluation was made November 15, 1997, shows that
Palad’s remark is NI, with score of 27.75 only out of 100. Furthermore, she
also reportedly incurred numerous absences and tardiness.
-- By reason thereof, petitioner issued a termination notice on November
22, 1997.
-- Palad then filed for complaint for illegal dismissal
-- ​LA: ​dismissed complaint;
-- ​NLRC: ​affirmed.
-- ​CA: ​the dismissal is illegal; ordered to reinstate petitioner; she is also
entitled to back wages. CA ratiocinated that the agreement was executed
two months before TESDA approved the program, citing in Nitto vs.
NLRC that the approval is a condition sine qua non for the validity of
apprenticeship agreement. Moreover, Palad was deprived of due process
for failure of petitioner to apprise Palad of the standards and failure to
comply with twin requirements of notice and hearing.
ISSUE: ​WN CA erred in holding that Palad is not an apprentice; and that
the petitioner has not proven valid cause in terminating the service of
private respondent.
HELD:
-- Petition without merit.
-- Registration and approval by the TESDA of apprenticeship program
required before hiring apprentices. Note that as cited in Nitto Enterprises
vs. NLRC, the approval by the DOLE on apprenticeship agreement is the
condition sine qua non ​for the validity of apprenticeship, otherwise the
person hired shall be considered as regular employee.
-- This is bolstered by the fact that Article 60 only allows apprentices on
apprenticeable occupations approved by the Minister of Labor; ​and that
Article 61 provides that apprenticeship agreements may be entered into
only ​in acordance with the programs duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment​.
-- Note though that the authority over apprenticeship programs are
transferred to the TESDA through RA 7796.
-- RA 7796 emphasized the prior approval of TESDA on apprenticeship
agreements is a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices.
-- Since it appears that the agreement was enforced before TESDA
approved the program, the same is void.
-- At this point, since it is provided that “fish cleaner” is a necessary job for
petitioner’s business, she shall be deemed as regular.
-- Re: dismissal
-- Petitioner alleged poor performance as evinced in the rating provided in
the assessment after the program.
-- Art. 279 provides that habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency as valid
causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship
agreement.
-- However, petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance
evaluation which it claims to have been conducted on Palad. It was not
shown as well that Palad was apprised of the performance standards set by
the company.
-- For the failure also to prove that petitioner gave Palad the opportunity to
explain and defend, the procedural requirements of termination is not also
complied. The termination is illegal.
ib2i
14. BERNARDO VS. NLRC
GR No. 122917
July 12, 1999
Doctrine: ​The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified
disabled persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment
as ​qualified able-bodied employees. ​They attain the status of ​regular
employees​ notwithstanding written or oral agreements to the contrary.
FACTS
-- ​Complainants are deaf-mutes hired from 1988-1993, though on various
periods, by private respondent Far East Bank as ​money sorters and
counters.
-- The parties have ​Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers​,
stipulating, among others:
- That the agreement is in compliance with Article 80, LC;
- They shall undergo a training of 1 month, after which the Bank
shall determine WN shall be allowed to continue employment for
the rest of the term of the contract;
- ​Initial ​compensation of P118 per day (kinsenas ang bayad);
- That the employee recognizes that they are employed under
special employment program ​of the Bank, and therefore the
standard hiring process of the Bank are inapplicable to the
employees;
- The terms and conditions of employment are governed by this
contract ​exclusively and solely;
- That the foregoing is subject to subsequent issuances of DOLE
that may be issued ​in connection with employment of disabled
and handicapped workers
- That regulation of employment and separation pay are
inapplicable to them.
-- A total of 56 deaf-mutes were employed within the period, their
employment contract renewed ​every 6 months.
-- Far East Bank contends that the employees are special class of workers,
hired ​temporarily ​under the special employment arrangement; and where
hired due to ​pakiusap considered in the light of the Bank’s corporate
philosophy something something
-- They also contend that the assigned work of the deaf-mutes were
tellering works, always logically and naturally part and parcel of teller’s
normal functions; and that there is no separate items in the Bank plantilla
for sorters and counters.
-- ​this is not in the case, and only inferred, so take this with a grain of salt:
the allegation against Far East Bank is that the termination of contracts of
these deaf-mutes are illegal dismissal.
-- ​NLRC: ​They could not be deemed as regular employees under Art. 280,
LC, as they were only hired as an ​accommodation ​of civic personalities;
therefore, their employment is governed by Article 80 of the Labor Code,
including the duration thereof. Therefore the terms of the contract shall be
the law ​between the parties. ​The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons is
inapplicable to this case.
-- Before the Supreme Court, these are the contentions:
a) Petitioners - they should be considered as regular employees
because their task was necessary and desirable to the business of
the Bank.
b) Respondent - they were hired as special workers and not
considered a part of the regular complement of the Bank; that
what governs is Artile 80.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not petitioners have become regular employees.
HELD
-- Employees who worked for more than 6 months and whose contracts
were renewed shall be considered regular. The dismissal, therefore, is
illegal.
7
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

-- Their rights as afforded to able-bodied regular employees shall be given apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period x x x. An
to them, that the Court is duty-bound to uphold, as a consequence of law employee who is allowed to work after probationary period shall
and justice. be considered a regular employee.”
-- Though it is true that Article 80 is applicable and the contracts conform -- It is held that the extension may be lawfully covenanted, notwithstanding
thereto, the subsequent enactment of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons the seemingly restrictive language of the provision.
(RA 7727) then justify the application of Art. 280. -- Buiser vs. Leogardo upheld an employment contract providing an
-- Out of 56 workers, 37 were renewed. This act of renewal and the hiring 18-month probationary period. When the parties to an employment
of others more show that their task were beneficial and necessary to the contract on period ​longer than six months, as established by company
business, and that they are qualified to perform their positions. The renewal policy or nature of the work, the management prerogative shall be
of contracts after six months show that the employees thereby become recognized, allowing the extension of six-month probation.
regular employees. -- In the case at bar, the parties’ agreements ​in fact ​established extension of
-- Sec. 5 of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons provides that “x x x a the probationary period, as an act ​ex gratia ​by the company, affording him
qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and a second chance to make good after initially failing to prove his worth as
conditions of employment x x x as a qualified able-bodied person.” an employee.
-- By reason of the provision, they are thus covered by Article 280, and -- By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period,
removed from the ambit of the provisions of Article 80. Dequila ​waived ​any benefit attaching to the completion of the period if still
-- Article 280 provides that: failed to make it during the period of extension. This waiver is recognized
“The provisions of written agreement to the contrary as not contrary to law, morals, or public policy.
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement between
the parties, an employment shall be deemed regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer x x x”
-- Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and
desirable as it conforms to the standard that there should be reasonable
connection between the particular activity and the usual trade or business
of the employer.
-- As regular employees, the concerned employees are entitled to ​security
of tenure​, terminated only for just and authorized cause. Failure to show
just and authorized cause, they are deemed to be illegally dismissed.
-- Notwithstanding the contract valid at the onset under Article 80, as they
proved themselves qualified, the stipulations therein cannot prevail over
the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons.
-- Lastly, above all the contention of the respondent, whether or not an
employee has become regular employee depends on the nature of the work;
not on the mode of hiring them, nor on the will of the employer, nor on the
stipulations on the contract.

----------xx---------

15. MARIWASA VS. LEOGARDO

GR NO. 74246
January 26, 1989

FACTS
-- Private respondent Joaquin Dequilla was hired on probation by petitioner
Mariwasa as a general utility worker on January 10, 1979.
-- At the end of the probationary period, he was informed that his work is
shown to be unsatisfactory but was given a chance to improve his
performance by extending the probation period for three months, with his
consent.
-- His performance did not improve and so his employment was terminated
at the end of the probationary period.
-- Dequila then filed for a complaint for for illegal dismissal against
Mariwasa.
-- Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor dismissed the complaint and
ruled that the termination is justified; Mariwasa ordered that Dequila be
reinstated to the position.

ISSUE: ​WN employer and employee may by agreement extend the

probationary period of employment beyond six months as prescribed under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.

HELD:
-- Applicable provision: Article 282, Labor Code:
“Probationary employment shall not exceed 6 months from the
date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an

8
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
III. VISITORIAL AND ENFORCEMENT POWER
(Arts. 128-129)
16. PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING ​(BOMBO RADYO) ​VS.
SECRETARY OF LABOR
GR NO. 179652
May 8, 2009
FACTS
- ​A complaint was filed by Jandeleon Juezan against the petitioner for
illegal deduction, non-payment of SIL, 13th month pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment,
and non-coverage of SSS, Pag-ibig, and Philhealth before DOLE Regional
Office in Cebu.
- By virtue thereof, DOLE conducted a plant inspection. In the Inspection
Form, it provides that the respondent (petitioner in this case) deny EE-ER
relationship with the complainant, with the following notations, to wit:
- Complainant is a drama talent hired on a per drama
“participation” basis hence no EE-ER relationship existed
between them. Proof presented to that effect are cash vouchers,
billing statement, employments of specific undertaking
(contracts). They also has no control over the talent if he
ventures into another contract with other broadcasting industries.
- The Regional Director held in favor of the complainant, stating that
Juezan is an employee of the petitioner and is entitled to money claims
amounting to P203,726.30.
- Petitioner proffered the absence of EE-ER relationship upon appeal to the
Secretary of Labor, but was dismissed for failure to post a cash or surety
bond, submitting instead a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit.
- Before the CA, petitioner maintained the same position, and questioned
the jurisdiction of the DOLE as it should have been considered by the
Labor Aribter as the claim exceeded P5,000.
- CA ruled that the DOLE has power to order and enforce compliance with
labor standard laws irrespective of amount as the limitation has been
repealed by RA 7730.
ISSUE: ​WN the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the
existence of employer-employee relationship
Petitioner averred that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case, and not the
SOLE, in view of Arts. 128 and 217. Corollarily, it is grave abuse of
discretion then on the part of the respondent to dismiss the appeal;
Respondent SOLE invokes RA 7730, removing the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives from the effects
of restrictive provisions of Art. 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding
the confinement of jurisdiction based on amount of claims.
HELD:
- ​Firstly, the provisions of Art. 128(b) provides that the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only ​“in cases when the
relationship of employer-employee still exists”​. Its objective is to give
effect to the labor standard provision of this Code and other labor
legislation. And to give effect to the labor standard laws, and to confer
entitlement thereto to an employee, there must be an EE-ER relationship.
- The clause then signifies that the EE-ER relationship must have been
existed before the emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE’s
power does not apply when:
a) the EE-ER relationship has ceased; and
- has to be refered to NLRC as it has jurisdiction in
view of termination of the EE-ER relationship.
b) where no relationship has ever existed.
- NLRC has jurisdiction in view of the absence of the
relationship between the evidentiary parties from the
start.
ib2i
- This at hand, the question of EE-ER relationship becomes a battle of
evidence, the determination of which should be ​comprehensive, ​and
intensive and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial body like
NLRC. The intricacies and implications of an EE-ER relationship demand
that the level of scrutiny should be far above the cursory and the
mechanical. The elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a
mere ocular examination; not easily determinable from an ordinary
inspection.
- However, it may be assumed that DOLE, in the exercise of its visitorial
and enforcement power somehow has to make such determination. This
prerogatival determination, however, cannot be ​coextensive ​with the
visitorial and enforcement power ​itself. ​Such determination is merely
preliminary, incidental, and collateral ​to the DOLE’s primary function of
enforcing labor standards provisions.
- But, after all, the clause ​“in cases where the relationship of EE-ER still
exists” ​in Art. 128(b) means that the determination of EE-ER relationship
remains to be lodged with the NLRC.
- Before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Art. 128, two important
questions must be resolved:
a) does the EE-ER relationship still exists, or whether there is a
relationship to speak of; and
b) Are there violations of the LC or of any labor law?
- The existence of an EE-ER relationsip is a ​statutory prerequisite to and
limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor​. The question is a matter
fraught with questions of fact and law, best resolved by the quasi-judicial
body which is the NLRC.
- If the SOLE proceeds with his visitorial and enforcement power absent
the first requisite (which is supposed to be decided by the NLRC), then his
office confers jurisdiction on itself which it cannot otherwise acquire.
- By this operation, the existence of EE-ER relationship affects the
complexion of the putative findings of the SOLE may determine, as
employees are entitled to different set of rights under labor laws than those
non-employees; that if there is no EE-ER relationship in the first place,
there can be no duty to adhere to the labor standard laws.
- True that mere assertion of absence of EE-ER relationship does not
deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction under Art. 128, but a ​prima facie
evidence asserting such absence could have precluded the DOLE from
exercising his powers
Note: Petitioner presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing
statement, employments of specific undertaking (contract),
summary of billing drama etc.
- Therefore, in this case, a preliminary determiniation based on the
evidence presented and noted by the Labor Inspector puts in doubt the
existence of the EE-ER relationship. From that point on, it is a prudent
recourse on the DOLE to refer to the NLRC the proper dispensation of the
claims.
Re: perfection of appeal
- The SOLE dismissed the appeal of petitioner for failure to post a cash
bond, but instead executed a ​Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit​.
- Requirements for appeal must be ​strictly ​followed and considered
indispensable; save for some cases where the rule on posting bonds is
required:
a) where there is substantial compliance with the Rules.
b) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond
would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on
the merits;
c) appellants exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by
posting a partial bond x x x.
- The purpose of an appeal bond is to ​ensure, during the period of appeal,
against any occurence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the
aggrieved employees under the judgement if subsequently affirmed​.
- A liberal reading reveals that the petitioner did assign, as cash bond the
amount of P203,726 covered by its account with the depositary bank
authorized to remit amount to DOLE Region VII, on the basis of the writ
of execution. This, according to court serves the same purpose and is
substantial compliance with the bond requirement.
9
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
People’s Broadcasting v. Secretary of Labor
RESOLUTION
March 6, 2012
The Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of
Decision (with Leave of Court), to clarify as to when the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with
the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. DOLE sought clarification as well, as to the extent of its
visitorial and enforcement power under the Labor Code, as amended.
- Treating this motion as a second motion for reconsideration, the petition
is reinstated and there is a need to delineate the jurisdiction, vis-a-vis the
NLRC.
- RA 7730, or the ​Act Further Strengthening the Visitorial and
Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor ​do away with the limitation
proscribed under Art. 129, Labor Code, in the exercise of the SOLE of its
visitorial and enforcement power for claims beyond P5000, the limitation
remains that there must be ​existing ​EE-ER relationship.
- The decision on limitation of the DOLE in determining the existence of
the EE-ER relationship is revisited;
- ​No limitation in law was imposed ​on the power of DOLE to determine the
existence of the relationship; ​no procedure ​was laid down where the DOLE
shall make only preliminary findings and the primary power was vested
with the NLRC; ​the law did not say ​that the DOLE must seek NLRC’s
determination on the EE-ER existence, or referral to the NLRC
whatsoever.
- The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an
employer-employee relationship exists; and decide therefrom whether to
issue compliance orders in accordance to Art. 128(b), as amended by RA
7730.
- To this end, the DOLE may utilize the same test NLRC and the courts use
in determine EE-ER relationship exist: selection and engagement; payment
of wages; power of dismissal; control test.
- The powers granted to DOLE on visitation and enforcement would be
rendered ​nugatory ​if forced to refer the matter to NLRC. The previous
ruling that prima facie evidence of absence of EE-ER relationship oust the
jurisdiction from the DOLE is incongruent; for the DOLE itself is faced
with the evidence and will weigh it, if it refute the existence of EE-ER.
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee
relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the
NLRC.
a. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the
employer-employee relationship has already been
terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no
employer-employee relationship existed in the first
place.
The findings of the DOLE, at this point as it excludes the jurisdiction of the
NLRC upon them taking cognizance, is not beyond question of judicial
review. It is, through ​Rule 65 ​for petition for certiorari.
Moreover, DOLE need not necessarily arrive at an affirmative ruling; the
DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee
relationship exists, thus divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must
not be precluded from being able to reach its own conclusions, not by the
parties, and certainly not by this Court.
Note that in view of Art. 128(b), the determination of the DOLE of EE-ER
relationship must be ​in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power​.
Neither is the DOLE stripped of jurisdiction if the money claims involved
exceeds P5,000. This only applies on regular inspections, and not propelled
by a complaint. Hence, RA 7730 expanded the powers of the SOLE,
ib2i
conferring it jurisdiction despite the amount of claims, and note that the
inspection in this case is by virtue of a complaint.
Summary of rules:
1) f a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the
labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor
legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an
existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC;
2) If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC;
3) If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a
claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the
Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which
provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours
of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, ​if
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
4) If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an
existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is
properly with the DOLE.
5) The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
xXx
17. GUICO V. SECRETARY OF LABOR QUISUMBING
GR NO. 131750
November 16, 1998
- DOLE Region I received a letter complaint requesting for investigation in
Copylandia Services & Trading.
- Pursuant to its visitorial powers granted to the SOLE and its ​duly
authorized representatives ​under Art. 128, Labor Code, an inspection was
conducted an yielded violations involving 21 employees, who are copier
operators to wit:
a) underpayment of wages;
b) underpayment of 13th month pay;
c) no SIL with pay.
- Petitioner’s representative thereafter submitted a joint affidavit signed
and executed by 21 employees expressing their waiver and release of
petitioners from liabilities, but investigations reveal that it was executed for
fear of losing their jobs; and that their daily salary increased to P92, from
P35-60.
- The Regional Director ruled against petitioner, that the quitclaim cannot
cause dismissal; and that the increased daily salary is still below the
minimum wage. The RD made petitioner liable to pay P1,081,756 for its
liabilities.
- Petitioner appealed before the SOLE, questioning the jurisdiction of the
RD, citing Art. 129, hence when the claim exceed P5,000, the RD has no
jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter.
- Thereafter, District Labor Officer Peralta forwarded a report that
petitioner and ​most ​of the 21 employees have reached a compromise
agreement, except for four, the total claim amounting to P231,841.
- In this case, the RD dismissed the appeal for failure to post an appeal
bond of only P105,000, falling short of the total claims.
- The Secretary also denied the Motion , for failure to post the correct
amount of surety.
- The Secretary ruled that the RD has jurisdiction over the case, citing Art.
128(b), amended by RA 7730, repealing the jurisdictional limitations
imposed by Art. 129 on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the SOLE
and its ​duly authorized representatives.
ISSUE: ​WN the RD has jurisdiction over the instant case; and whether or
not the petitoner has perfected the appeal.
10
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
HELD:
- The visitorial power of the SOLE to order and enforce compliance with
labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim
exceeds P5,000 can no longer be applied in view of RA 7730, seeking to
do away with the jurisdictional limitations imposed and to finally settle any
lingering doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the SOLE.
Art. 129 also provides that where the case involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or
surety bond issued in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
order appealed from. Since the petitioner failed to post in such amount, the
appeal is not perfected.
IV. WORKING CONDITIONS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS OF
EMPLOYEES (ARTS. 130-161); RA 9262 (VAWC); RA 7877
(ANTI-SEXUAL HARRASMENT ACT); RA 10361 (KASAMBAHAY
LAW); RA 7610
18. PT&T V. NLRC
GR NO. 118978
May 23, 1997
FACTS
- Grace de Guzman was initially hired as reliever as a Supernumerary
Project Worker, in lieu of one CF Tenorio who is on maternity leave,
terminated after the expiration of the agreed period; once again engaged as
the same to replace Erlinda Dizon who went on leave.
- FInally, she was asked to join the company as a ​probationary ​employee,
covering 150 days. In the job application, she indicated herself as ​single
though contracted marriage months before the contract.
- When discovered, she was asked to explain the discrepancy, and was
reminded of the policy of not accepting married women for employment.
- She was nonetheless dismissed even if stated that de Guzman was not
aware of the policy.
- Before the Labor Arbiter, it was held that she was illegally dismissed and
that it was apparent that she was discriminated against on account of her
having contracting marriage in violation of company rules.
- NLRC upheld the LA but modified in such a way that de Guzman is
thereby suspended for 3 months for her dishonesty, but nonetheless
reinstated.
HELD
Constitutional guarantees
Art. II, Sec. 14, recognizing the role of women in nation-building and
commanding the State on fundamental equality before the law of women
and men;
Art. XIII, Sec. 3, requiring the State to afford ful protection to labor and to
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including security of tenure;
Art. XIII, Sec. 14, mandating the protection of working women.
Corrective laws on gender inequality
RA 6727 prohibiting discrimination against women with respect to terms
and conditions;
RA 7877 punishing sexual harrasment;
RA 7322 increasing maternity benefits; and
the Labor Code.
Art. 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.
Acknowledged as paramount is the constitutional protection to labor and
security of tenure, that as a condition sine qua non for the severance of the
employment ties, it must by convincingly established through substantial
evidence the existence of just and valid cause; the other is the regulation of
ib2i
manpower, so called management prerogatives: the discipline, dismissal,
and recall of employees; that the employer is free to regulate according to
his discretion and best business judgement all aspects of employement.
- In the case at bar, the policy of PT&T in considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul to the test of,
and the right against discrimination afforded to women by our labor laws
and the Constitution.
- As gleaned from the memorandum and the termination notice sent to the
employee, private respondent was made to understand that the severance
from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married
status but, over and at the top of that, was her violation of the company
policy against marriage.
- The act of concealment by the private respondent could not be properly
characterized as willful as she was moved to act that way because she
wanted to retain her job in a stable company. She was then practically
forced by that same illegal policy into misrepresenting her civil status for
fear of disqualification.
- Finally, the collateral insistence of misappropriation is untenable; the sole
reason of her dismissal is the concealment of her marital status, and not the
defalcation of funds.
- It is important to note moreover that she has gained her regular status at
the time of her dismissal. An employee who has attained the regular status
and has been dismissed without just cause is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits.
- To repeat, the government abhors ​any ​stipulation in the nature of that
adopted by PT&T, provided by the Labor Code, Art. 136. On the other
hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could
be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the same. For it to be valid,
it must reflect an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.
The policy assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to
deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
It may be even said that the policy would encourage ilicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
19. APEX MINING V. NLRC
GR NO. 94951
April 22, 1991
FACTS
- Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was employed by Apex Mining
Company to perform laundry services at its staff house in Maco, Davao del
Norte.
- She was then paid at a piece rate basis, but subsequent paid on a monthly
basis to P575 a month.
- December 18, 1987, while attending to her assigned task, and hanging the
laundry, she slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the accident,
she could not continue with her work.
- Her immediate supervisor offered her the amount of P2,000, subsequently
increased to P5,000 to persuade her to quit her job, but still returned to
work.
- She was dismissed on February 4, 1988.
- Candido then seek assistance from the DOLE, which decided against her,
and adjudged with a total amount of P55,161.42.
- Petitioner appealed to NLRC, which upheld the DOLE.
ISSUE: ​WN the private respondend should be treated as a mere
househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee
11
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
HELD
- ​Rule XIII, Book 3 of the Labor Code defined “househelper” or “domestic
servant” as:
Any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and
about the employer’s home and which services are usually
necessary and desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer’s family,
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates those employed in the
employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer’s family. It includes:
a) family drivers;
b) domestic servants;
c) laundry women;
d) yayas;
e) gardeners;
f) houseboys; and
g) other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundry
women working in staffhouses of a company. They may not be considered
a househelper or domestic servant as above-defined by law.
- The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the
employer in the home of said employer.
- Househelpers are actually serving the family, while in this case, services
is rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the
employer.
- In such instance, they are employees of fthe company and entitled to
privilege as such.
- The mere fact that househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to its business, in
the staffhouses, warrants the conclusion that such househelper is and
should be considered as regular employee.
20. ZIALCITA V. PAL
Case No. RO4-3-3398-76,
February 20, 1977 (Office of the President)
FACTS
- Complainant Zialcita is an international flight stewardess of PAL, and
was discharged from the service on account of her marriage
- PAL, on the other hand, invoked its policy as follows:
“D. Flight Attendants. — Flight attendant applicants must be
SINGLE. Flight attendants will be automatically separated from
employment in the event they subsequently get married.”
- PAL alleged that the policy is in conformity with the following provision
of law:
Article 132. Facilities for women. — The Secretary of Labor
shall establish standards that will insure the safety and health of
women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall by regulations
require any employer to:
xxx
“(d) determine appropriate minimum age and other standards
for retirement or termination in special occupations such as
those of flight attendants and the like.” [Article 132 is
renumbered as 130]
- Zialcita questioned her termination on account of her marriage based on
the policy, invoking Art. 136 [now 134] of the Labor Code.
HELD
PAL’s policy or regulation with the codal provision of law is ​incompatible.
- Standards have not yet been established as set forth in the 1st par., of Art.
130 [132], nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting
flight attendants. And, in the absence of said standards or regulations
which are as yet to be established, the policy of PAL against marriage is
patently illegal.
ib2i
- In its vain attempt to give meaning to its position, PAL invoked the
provisions of Arts. 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation
of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic
social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In
both instances, PAL predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home
for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life not
based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world,
sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to
another
- PAL overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their
lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
- Article 136 [134] is not intended to apply only to women employed in
ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so.
Therefore, The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or
ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by
Article 135 [133] that speaks of nondiscrimination on the employment of
women.
21. DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMEN V. GLAXO
WELLCOME
GR NO. 162994
September 17, 2004
FACTS
- Pedro Tecson signed a contract of employment as medical representative
for Glaxo Wellcome Philippines. He signed a contract of employment
which stipulates, among others, to disclose to management any ​existing ​or
future ​relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of ​competing ​drug companies, the same included in Employee
Code of Conduct of Glaxo, that if the same appears, the management and
employee will explore the possibility of transfer to another department in a
non-counterchecking position or separation for employment (if no possible
solution).
- Tecson was assigned in CamSur-CamNorte area.
- Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo in its Branch in
Albay. He received several reminders from his District Manager regarding
conflict of interest of his relationship. However, September 1998, they
married. And by then he was informed that there arose a conflict of interest
- Tecson requested for more time to resolve the problem, that Bettsy would
avail with the redundancy package to be offered by Astra, and by her
separation to the company the conflict of interest would be eliminated. He
also applied to transfer to its milk division, but was denied.
- Glaxo then transferred Tecson to Butuan-Agusan sales area. Tecson
sought reconsideration and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance
Committee, but nonetheless denied. Tecson though defied the order and
continued in Camarines area; paid his salary; but was not issued samples of
products competing with that similar to Astra.
- Because of failure to resolve the issue, they submitted the matter to
NCMB, which declared as valid the policy of GLaxo and affirming its right
to transfer Tecson.
- CA upheld the NCMB, holding that the Glaxo’s policy of prohibiting
employees from personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of ​management prerogatives​.
ISSUE: ​WN CA erred in ruling that Glaxo’s policy against its employees
marrying employees from competitor companies is valid.
Petitioner - the policy run afouls the equal protection clause as it creates
ivalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage.
Respondent - The policy is a valid exercise of management prerogatives,
and does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing and
future relationships with employees of competitor companies.
HELD
12
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

- Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,

marketing strategies, and other confidential programs from competitors,
especially as it and Astra are rival companies, with 67% of its products
compete with that of Astra.
- The prohibition then is reasonable because relationship of that nature
might compromise the interest of the company.
- Indeed,while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on
social justice and protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor
dispute be decided in favor of the workers. The law recognizes, as well,
management rights entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.

- A US Case (Emory v Georgia Hospital Service Association) affits that it

is a legitimate practice to guard business confidentiality and protect a
competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and
female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor.

- Glaxo does not impose an ​absolute ​prohibition against relationships

between its employees and those of competitor companies, what the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the
employee and the company that may arise from such relationships. Tecson
was even aware of this restriction when he signed the contract and entered
into a relationship with Bettsy. He is therefore estopped from questioning
the policy.
- Therefore, Tecson was not unduly discriminated upon by reason of such
transfer, that Glaxo is actually properly exercised its management
prerogative, as correctly put by the CA.

- Note that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of
interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy, by constantly
reminding him of the effects thereof and the company’s interest, and was
given the chance to resolve the conflict upon their marriage, by either
resigning in the company or persuade Bettsy to resign from Astra.
- Even upon transfer, Glaxo considered the welfare of Tecson family,
clearly dispelling any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of
Glaxo.

13
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
V. BOOK IV (ART. 162-217)
22. BELARMINO V. ECC
GR NO. 90104
May 11, 1990
Pertinent topic: Proximate Cause
1 Azucena 530
FACTS
- Oanis Belarmino was a classroom teacher.
- While performing duties, and eight months pregnant, she slipped and fell
on the classroom floor, which led her to complain of abdominal pain and
stomach cramps.
- Despite adviced by her co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she
continued working.
- 11 days after, she prematurely gave birth.
- However, her abdominal pain persisted even after birth; which the doctor
found out that she was suffering from ​septicemia post partum ​due to
infected lacerations of her vagina.
- She later died, because of the disease.
- GSIS denied the claim for death benefits, holding that ​septicemia post
partum ​is not an occupational disease, neither there was showing that the
ailment was caused by her employment.
HELD
- The husband of Oanis is entitled to death benefits, with legal interest plus
attorney’s fees.
- Reason: ​Condition of the classroom causing Belarmino to slip and fall
and suffer injury as a result; the fall precipitated abdominal pains, and
premature delivery with tragic consequences, and that, was the cause of her
septicemia post partum​.
- Her fall then is the ​proximate or responsible cause​, set in motion with
unbroken chain of events leading to her death.
- Therefore, her primary injury arouse in the course of her employment;
therefore compensable.
xXx
23. HIMOGUIN V. ECC
GR NO. 8430
April 17, 1989
Topic: Arising out/In the Course of Employment
1 Azucena 531
FACTS
- Sgt. Hinogiun was a detachment non-commissioned officer in
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
- He and other two members shough permission from their Commander to
go on overnight in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, which he granted and allowed
them to take their firearms with them because Aritao is a critical place.
- While in Aritao, his companion accidentally touched the trigger of his
M-16 rifle, in semi-automatic mode, firing a shot and accidentally hitting
Hinogiun causing his death.
- The Line of Duty Board held that his death has been “in line of duty”, and
recommended benefits.
- The GSIS however enied because Hinoguin was not at his workplace nor
performing his duty as soldier when he died.
HELD
- The death of Sgt. Hinogiun arose out of and in the course of his
employment as a soldier, and hence compensable.
- The concept of workplace cannot be always be applied to a soldier on
active duty status, and must go to where his company is stationed.
ib2i
- Sgt. Hinoguin and his companions securing a lawful permission cannot
be very different from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer.
- Note that they are not on vacation leave; and by virtue of the fact that a
soldier on active duty is really on duty 24 hours a day, and the Line of
Duty Board already determined that the death occured “in line of duty”, he
died in the course of performance of official functions and his death is
compensable.
- A soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to
have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition
temporarily.
xXx
24. GSIS v. CA and ALEGRE
GR NO. 128524
April 20, 1999
Topic: 24-Hour Doctrine as applied to Policemen
1 Azucena 533
FACTS
- SPO2 Alegre was driving his tricycle ferrying his passengers when SPO4
Tenorio, Desk Officer, confronted him on his tour of duty. A verbal tussle
ensued leading to SPO2 being shot, causing his death.
- GSIS denied his claim holding that Alegre was performing a ​personal
activity ​and not work-connected.
HELD
- ​For death to become compensable, the conditions must be followed:
a) employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;
b) The employee must have been performing his official functions;
c) where the injury was sustained elsewhere, the employee must
have been executing an order for the employer.
- In the case of ​Hinoguin v. ECC ​where the wife of Alegre tacks her claim
of benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre, the Court found a reasonable
nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of
work and the incident that led to his death.
- Note that in the case at bar, Alegre at the time of his death is ferrying
passengers for a fee, an intrinsically ​private and unofficial nature​.
- In the absence of prior authority, like in ​Hinoguin, ​or peacekeeping
nature of the act attended to by the policeman, there is no justification in
holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requirements set forth in ECC
Guidelines.
- The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts
and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those
which, although not an official line of duty, are nonetheless, basically
police service in character.
xXx
25. VALERIANO v. ECC
GR NO. 136200
June 8, 2000
24-Hour Duty Doctrine Requires
1 Azucena 537
FACTS
- CS Valeriano was employed as a firetruck driver.
- On July 3, 1985, he was with a friend in EDSA, Quezon City for dinner;
and ride an owner-type jeepney on the way home. The jeepney met a
head-on collision with another vehicle, which made Valeriano be thrown
out of the vehicle, and was severly injured.
14
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

- Pusuing his ECC claim, Valeriano argued that the exigency of his job - While waiting for a ride on her way to school, she was bumped and run
requires constant observance of his duties as such; hence should be over by a speeding bus which caused her death.
considered “on call” when he met the accident. - ECC denied claim as it was not employment accident.

HELD
- ​Having dinner with some friends is a ​purely personal and social function​,
and was not able to solidly demonstrate how his job was related to the
injuries he had suffered.
- It was not acquired at his work place, nor sustained while performing an
act within the scope of his employment, or in pursuit of an order of his
superior.
- It is therefore not work-connected and thus not compensable.
HELD:
- The deceased died while going to work; she was at the place where her
job ​necessarily required her to be if she reach her place of work on time.
- Her employment required her to be there. Therefore, it is compensable.
xXx

xXx 28. LAZO v. ECC

GR NO. 78617
June 18, 1990

26. IDECO v. WCC Accident on the way home

GR NO. L-26341 1 Azucena 542
November 27, 1978
FACTS
Ingress-Egress/Proximity Rule - Lazo is a security guard from Central Bank with regular tour of duty from
1 Azucena 538 2PM to 10PM.
- On June 18, 1986, as the guard after him ​failed to arrive​, he rendered
FACTS overtime duty up to 5AM the next day.
- Pablo, employed as mechanic of IDECO, while walking on his way - On his way home thereafter, at about 6 AM, the passenger jeepney the
home, about 20 meters from the ​main IDECO gate, ​on a ​private road petitioner is riding on turned turtle due to slippery road; and he sustained
called IDECO road, he was shot dead. injuries as a result.
- The killer, Martin Cordero, was himself kiled before he coud be tried.
- At the time of the killing, 5:02 in the afternoon, he had finished overtime HELD
work at 5PM and is going home. - ​The claim is compensable.
- He left his station several hours after his regular hours of duty because his
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Pablo’s death comes within the meaning of reliever failed to arrive; and hence rendered overtime.
“arising out of and in the course of employment - Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
HELD from the place where the work is to be done.
- General rule: ​Going and coming rule​, in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from, his place xXx
of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen’s compensation acts.
Exception:
a) going to or from his work ​on the premises ​of his employer;
b) where he is about to enter or about to leave the premises by way 29. NFD INTERNATIONAL v. ILLESCAS
of customary or exclusive means of ​ingress or egress; GR NO. 183054
c) employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place or at September 29, 2010
his home, during his employment, ​with some duty or special “Accident” and “Injury”
errand connected with his employment; 1 Azucena 557
d) employer provides, as an incident of the employment, means of
transportation to and from the place of employment. FACTS
- The point where Pablo was shot was barely 20 meters away from the - ​Illescas was employed as Third Officer of MV Shinrei for 9 months with
main IDECO gate, and is immediately proximate to IDECO’s premises; if $854 monthly salary.
the injury has happened immediately proximate to his place of work, the - On his 7th month, the vessel officers orderd Illescas to cary 25 fire
accident in question must be deemed to have occured within the zone of his hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop. The next day, while
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. doing the work, he felt a sudden snap on his back with pain that radiated
- The fact that the assault was unexplained is no matter; if it happens in the down to the left side of his hips.
immediate proximity, it arose out of employment. - The orthopedic specialist declared him ​“unfit to work at sea in any
capacity as seaman”,
xXx - Employer denied the claim, stating that the disability is not beause of an
accident.

27. ALANO v. ECC HELD

GR NO. L-48594 - ​The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word “accident” as “that
March 16, 1988 which happens by chance or fortuitously”, and which is “unexpected,
unusual, and unforeseen.”
Accident on the Way to Work - It presupposes any unexpected personal injury from any unlooked for
5 Azucena 541 mishap or occurence.
- Therefore, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the
FACTS circumstances, for the purpose of compensability in view thereof.
- Dedicacion was a school principal, with tour of duty from 7:30 to 5:30. - However, in this case, it is till compensable under the CBA of the
company.

15
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

HELD:
- The cause of death is work-connected, ​i.e. ​the risk of contracting the
30. MENEZ v. ECC illnes was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that the
GR NO. L-48488 petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for his death.
April 25, 1980 - Note that as the facts appear, the risk of contracting the disease, though
Occupational Disease not directly caused by its nature, is aggravated by their working habits
1 Azucena 562 necessitated by demands of job efficiency.

FACTS
- ​Petitioner was employed as a school teacher, retiring under disability
retirement plan at the age of 54 due to rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis.
- At the time of her retirement, she was assigned to Rajah Soliman HS in
Binondo, near a dirty creek.
- She then claimed for disability benefits but GSIS denied, on ground that
it is not an occupational disease.
- On petition, she claimed that she contracted pneumonitis and/or
bronchiectasis and rheumatoid arthritis after wetting and chilling during the
course of employment; it is recurring and work-connected.
HELD
- ​An occupational disease is one which results from the ​nature of the
employment; Nature of the employment ​is meant conditions to which all
employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural
incident of a particular occupation.
- To be occupational, the disease must be one due ​wholly ​to causes and
conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of
the particular occupation, and that science and industry have not yet
learned how to eliminate.
- From there, it may be considered that the aforestated disease may be
occupational disease.
Ratio:
a) All public high school teachers are admittedly the most underpaid but
overworked employees of the government;
b) subject to emotional stress;
c) her workplace appears to be a tough area, inhabited by lawless elements,
aggravated by heavy pollution and the stinking smell of the Estero de la
Reina neaby;
d) she, like any other women, are the most vulnerable to unhealthy
conditions therein.
Even if the aforestated is not an occupational disease, there is ample proof
that the disease is caused by the risks and adverse working conditions
above-mentioned.
xXx
31. NARAZO v. ECC
GR NO. 80157
February 6, 1990
Increased Risk Shown
1 Azucena 565
FACTS
- The death of petitioner’s husband is caused by, “Uremia due to
obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy”, admittedly not
among those listed as occupational disease.
- One of it causes, as it appears, is the obstruction of the flow of urinary
waste products.
- The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office
of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, and had
to sit for hours and even delay and even forego urination not to interrupt
the flow of concentration, in addition to tension and pressure aggravating
the situation.
xXx
32. LIMBO v. ECC
GR NO. 146891
July 30, 2002
Increase risk not shown
5 Azucena 567
FACTS
- ​Petitioner Limbo was employed in Nestle as salesman and promoted as
Sales supervisor in 1977.
- In 1994, he was confined for a week at PGH for joint pains, revealing that
he had elevated BUN, creatinine, and anemia, and chronic renal disease.
- After his discharge, he claimed compensation benefits but was denied on
the ground that his illness had no casual relationship to his job.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the disease is compensable
HELD
- ​Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner, it was
not unlikely to develop hypertension leading to uremia.
- Note that whether the disease is compensable, it is enough that there
exists a reasonable work connection as the workmen’s claim is based on
probability, ​not ​certainty.
- Despite the fact that the disease: ​end-stage renal disease secondary to
uric acid nephtopathy” ​is not among the Occupational Diseases
compensable, it would not automatically bar petitioner’s claim so long as
he could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his
working conditions.
- Petitioner’s JD is that he is responsible for the following:
a) Territory’s collection, merchandising, market hygiene, and
promotion goals;
b) Nestle’s principal satisfaction provider to the company’s
customers and business partners, govt and others;
c) Principal Liaison of the territory with the National Sales
Manager;
d) Leads and manages sales force and third party support.
- Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner, it is
not unlikely for him to develop hypertension, which in turn led to uremia.
xXx
33. RARO v. ECC
GR NO. 58445
April 27, 1989
Cancer, proof is required
1 Azucena 582
Jurisprudence on compensability of cancer has become a source of
confusion among the claimants and government agencies enforcing the
ECL.
The problem lies on the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of
“proof of increased risk”. Note that there are two approaches to a solution
in where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed
as occupational disease was increased by claimant’s working conditions:

16
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
a) if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection
because the causes of disease are still unknown, it must be
presumed that the working conditions increased the risk of
contracting the ailment; or
b) if there is no proof of required work connection, the disease is
not compensable because the law says so.
Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific
working conditions, the Court cannot conclude that it was the employment
which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
xXx
34. NAESS SHIPPING v. NLRC
GR NO. 73441
September 4, 1987
Suicide, when compensable
5 Azucena 589
FACTS
- ​The vessel’s chief steward fatally stabbed a co-employee, then ran to the
deck from which he jumped or fell overboard; the body was never
recovered.
- Under ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement, the widow has collected the
amount of P75,000l and also filed with the POEA a complaint against
NAESS for payment of death benefits.
- Under the agreement, a crewman of the vessel is entitled to compensation
for “loss of life”.
ISSUE: ​Whether “death caused by suicide” is compensable.
HELD
- ​No law or rule would make it illegal for an employer to assume the
obligation to pay death benefits in favor of his employee in their contract
of employment.
- Since NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it
unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits while in its service,
regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the
legal sense, NAESS cannot escape liability.
- In short, NAESS is liable under the contract which covers “loss of life”
during employment regardless of the cause of death.
xXx
35. SOLIDUM v. GSIS
ECC CASE NO. 4061
November 23, 1988
Notorious negligence
1 Azucena 590
FACTS
- ​Solidum is an enlisted man of the Philippine Marines, assigned in
Zamboanga City.
- One morning, Solidum, was then resting after a patrol mission, jokingly
challenged his comrades to a duel, but ignored.
- Pointing a muzzle of his loaded rifle, and temple saying, ​“Bahala na”​, he
squeezed the trigger; he died instantly.
- GSIS denied claim pointing out that the deceased was not performing his
duties as a soldier when the accident occured.
- It moreover said that the death was caused by his ​notorious negligence
and not by an accident.
HELD
- ​ECC noted that the deceased pointed the muzzle of his rifle to himself
and squeezed its trigger causing his death.
ib2i
- Such an act constitute notorious negligence. Note that the compensation
program under the appellant seeks relief is designed to compensate only
the working men who are victims of work-connected injuries and
contingencies.
- In this case, it is attended by ​notorious negligence ​therefore not
compensable.
xXx
36. QUIZON v. GSIS
ECC CASE NO. 3015
October 26, 1987
Not notorious negligence
1 Azucena 591
FACTS:
- A Philippine Army solder died in December 1980 due to dynamite blast
in Tumalutab detachment in Zamboanga City.
- Investigation showed that after lunch that day, he asked permission to test
the dynamite they have confiscated in Sinonog Island.
- On the way, he accidentally ignited the fuse of the dynamite, causing the
explosion, and died instantly.
- Compensation benefits was denied compensation benefits because at the
time of the accident, the deceased was not performing his duties aside from
being ​notoriously negligent.
- Appellant sought reconsideration, contending that testing a dynamite is
actually part of deceased’s training as a ranger, whose primary mission is
to specialize in small unit tactics, particularly weapons, explosive, and
hand-to-hand combat, among others.
- Note though that the one who advised him not to test the dynamite is not
his superior; but a colleague of the same rank.
HELD:
- The ECC belief that there is indeed ​negligence​, but should not be
perceived as ​notorious, ​as perceived by GSIS.
- Note that NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE signifies deliberate act of the
employee to disregard his own personal safety;
- Disobedience to rules does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if
no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life.
xXx
37. GSIS v. CA and BALAIS
GR NO. 117572
January 29, 1998
Conversion from Permanent Partial Disability to Permanent Total
Disability
1 Azucena 617
FACTS
- ​In December 1989, the employee claimant was diagnosed to be suffering
from Ruptured Aneurysm; she underwent craniotomy.
- Despite the operation, she cannot perform her duties as cashier in the
NHA as efficiently as she did before, hence forcing her to retire at the age
of 62; she then claimed disability benefits.
- GSIS granted her ​temporary total disability ​benefits, then ​permanent
partial disability ​benefits for 9 months.
- Thereafter, she requested to convert the classification to ​permanent total
disability, ​but the GSIS denied request, saying that her condition did not
satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability.
ISSUE: ​Is private respondent entitled to conversion?
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

HELD:
- CA is affirmed holding favorably to her.
- Note that though the condition was not considered as permanent total
disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently
worsened after her head operation and consequent retirement.
- It was undisputed, moreover that the private respondent was made to take
her medications ​for life.
- It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be ​temporary
may later on become permanent; or one who suffers ​partial ​disability
becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.
- Court has ruled that disability should not be understood ​strictly ​on its
medical significance, but on the loss of earning capacity.
Note that the private respondent’s ​persistent illness forced her to
retire early which, in turn, resulted in her unemployment, and
loss of earning capacity.
- Loss of earning capacity here does not mean state of absolute
helplessness, but inability to do substantially customary and usual manner.

xXx

38. CENTRAL AZUCARERA v. DE LEON

GR NO. L-10036
December 28, 1957
Earning capacity impairment if earning higher after the injury
1 Azucena 619

FACTS
- ​Claimant laborer was granted benefit for ​temporary total disability;
- ​When disability cesed, he found a new employment at higher salary.
- Thereafter, he filed a claim for permanent partial disability but denied
because of the fact that his salary was higher than before.

HELD
- The fact of new employment, even if proven true, would not in itself
necessarily affect the laborer’s claim for compensation for a permanent
partial disability.
- An injured laborer’s incapacity for work is not to be measured solely by
the wages he receives. It may indicate:
a) employee as mere beneficiary of a mere gratuity and not actually
earing “wages”;
b) that the employee, considering his education and training, has
fitted himself for more remunerative employment;
c) employee works longer hours than he did before his injury, his
hourly remuneration also increased;
d) general change in wage scales has taken place for the type of
work;
e) new wage are intended as an inducement to him to refrain from
pursuing a claim;
f) employee before the injury was younger or a minor; or
g) that the employment in which the employee was employed was
of uncertain duration.

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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
-------------XX---------------------
VI. COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
(RA 6657, AS AMENDED BY RA 8532, FURTHER AMENDED
BY RA 9007)
39. GONZALES v. CA
G.R. NO. L-36213
June 29, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioners spouses Felix and Carmen Gonzales leased a lot in their
subdivision on which they built their house; by tolerance of the subdivision
owner, they cultivated palay on some adjoining lots.
- The subject land in Barrio Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan was purchased
by spouses Agcaoile. At the time of the purchase in 1937:
a) It was tenanted by ​Maximo Cruz ​planting palay thereon;
b) Fidel Cruz​, Maximo’s son succeeded him;
c) Succeeded by ​Pascual Gonzales ​after 4 years of tenanting by
Fidel.
- Pascual Gonzales, father of Felix, ceased to be a tenant because the land
was proposed to be converted into a residential subdivision. 1955 it was
approved as a residential subdivision and was subdivided into 26 lots.
- Plaintiff spouses thereafter offered to pay a rental on one lot (Lot No.
1285-M) on the subdivision where they will build a house, to which
Leonora Agcaoile agreed.
- While being rented, spouses Gonzales requested that they be allowed to
plant palay on the lots not yet sold, to which Leonora acquiesed, pitied the
plaintiffs.
- Gonzales defaulted in renting Lot 1285-M, and so a letter asking them to
pay the accrued rentals and vacate the premises was given by Agcaoile; but
Gonzales countered the letter by filing an action to ​elect the leasehold
system of tenancy​.
- In the action, the defendant answered that the subject property is a
residential land.
- Court of Agrarian Relations ruled that the plaintiffs are not de jure
agricultural tenants.
- CA upheld the CAR decision; holding that agricultural tenancy cannot be
created on homesite or residential subdivision.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created
over land embraced in an approved residential subdivision.
HELD: ​NO.
- An agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased
to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a
residential subdivision.
- Reliance on Sec. 36(1) of RA 3844 is unavailing, the provision refers to
lessee dispossessed from an agricultural land because of the conversion of
his land to a subdivision, and the lessor-owner fails to substantially carry
out such conversion; the petitioners were not the ones dispossessed by
reason of conversion and hence not entitled to reinstatement.
- There is no scheme to dispossess the petitioners by reason of conversion,
as gleaned from the circumstances: petitioners leasing the respondents to
build a house; him constituting as commission agents for the respondents;
and have sold a number of lots to different buyers.
- Lastly, it is held by the court that private respondents’ tolerance of
petitioners’ supposedly temporary use of some vacant lots in the
subdivision was seized by them as a weapon to deprive the respondents of
their land.
xXx
ib2i
40. HACIENDA LUISITA v. PARC
G.R. NO. 171101
July 5, 2011
http://philippineconstitutionallawdigests.blogspot.com/2011/11/hacienda-luisita-inc-hli-vs.html
FACTS
In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
(Tabacalera) sold Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar
mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned
and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The Central Bank of the
Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the
GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale, with the condition that ​“the lots comprising the Hacienda
Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants,
should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action
under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” ​Tadeco however did not comply with
this condition.
On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC
against Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost.
Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides
which sugar lands – of which the hacienda consisted – are not covered by existing
agrarian reform legislations. The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.
On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco
Aquino, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the government’s
case against Tadeco, et al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the PARC’s
approval of Tadeco’s proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its
farmworkers. ​[Under EO 229 and later RA 6657, Tadeco had the option of availing
stock distribution as an alternative modality to actual land transfer to the
farmworkers.] On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein
petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this
purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares)
and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of
stock.
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs)
complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the
proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the
SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs.
This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis
and mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a
follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117
FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the
hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The
DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three
percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued
compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of
stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the
converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares
for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in
developing an industrial complex. From this area was carved out 2 parcels, for
which 2 separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred
these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in payment of
LIPCO’s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCO’s titles were
cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another
80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the
government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus,
4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.
Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the
latter part of 2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory
Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its
revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation and nullification of the
SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda, was filed by ​Alyansa ng mga
Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then constituted
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After
investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its
obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. On December
22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01,
recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject
lands be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land
acquisition scheme of the CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion
notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what
it considers as the DAR’s hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even
before PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARC would
eventually deny HLI’s motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01
dated May 3, 2006.
ISSUES:
1) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright
land transfer, unconstitutional?
2) Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and
placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and
distribution scheme?
3) Did the PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included LIPCO’s
and RCBC’s respective properties that once formed part of Hacienda
Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed
Notice of Coverage?
HELD
1) The Court actually refused to pass upon the constitutional question because it was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis
mota of the case​.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of
a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC
approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter,
and why its members received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest.
It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP that said plan
and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or
any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA.
And before the Court, the ​lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the
fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional and
statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved without
plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of
RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution
component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: “[T]hat
after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to
sell and compulsory acquisition.” Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock
distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under
existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot
issue.
2) The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and
timelines of HLI’s stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum
individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a
result of the use of “man days” and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the
30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of
DAO 10 prescribes.
The revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld because of violations of DAO
10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have
the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product
of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be
duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP.
Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989
approving the HLI’s SDP is nullified and voided.
3) There are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good
faith, namely:
ib2i
1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property; and
2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at the time of
such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are––based on the above
requirements and with respect to the adverted transactions of the converted land in
question––purchasers in good faith for value entitled to the benefits arising from
such status.
They are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to
commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken out of the
CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally
and validly acquired by them.
Note: While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda
Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact
principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose
whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a
blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the
MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution
No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989.
xXx
41. MORTA v. OCCIDENTAL
G.R. NO. 123417
June 10, 1999
FACTS
- On January 10 and 21, 1994, petitioners filed 2 cases of damages with
preliminary injunction against respondents.
- Petitioners alleged that respondents, through the instigation of Atty.
Baranda, gathered pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts, and destroyed
their banana and pineapple plants.
- In their answer, respondent Occidental claimed that the petitioners were
not the owner of the land, but rather by one Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, and
they were ​bona fide ​tenant of Opiana-Baraclan, and denied the harvesting
of anahaw leaves and coconuts.
- MTC Guinobatan, Albay ruled in favor of petitioners; that the petitioners
have been in actual, continuous, open, and adverse possession of the land
in question for 45 years.
- Respondents appealed to RTC Ligao questioning the court’s jurisdiction
contending that the case should be cognizable by the DARAB (Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board).
- RTC then reversed the MTC decision; it ruled that these cases for
damages are ​tenancy-related ​which fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of DARAB. CA upheld.
- On this appeal, petitioners argued that these case for damages are ​not
tenancy-related​, hence may fall under the jurisdiction of regular courts,
and not of the DARAB
ISSUE: ​Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over petitions for
damages
HELD
- What determines the nature of an action as well as the corollary proper
jurisdiction are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. The complaint then, as described by the court, is ​“an action
for damages for illegal gathering of anahaw leaves, pili nuts and coconuts,
and the destruction of their banana and pineapple plantations.”
- Note that as inferred from the facts, the issue of jurisdiction was not
raised for the first time in the MTC; it was raised only on appeal.
- For DARAB to have a jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a ​tenancy
relationship between the parties. ​And by “tenancy relationship” to exist for
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
the purpose of acquiring DARAB’s jurisdiction, the indispensable elements
are:
a) parties ​are landowner and the tenant ​or ​agricultural lessee;
b) subject matter ​of the relationship is an agricultural land;
c) there is ​consent ​between the parties to the relationship;
d) purpose ​of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
e) there is ​personal cultivation ​on the part of the tenant;
f) the harvest is ​shared ​between the landowner and tenant.
- Furthermore, DARAB’s jurisdiction was limited to the following, as
provided in ​Vda. de Tangub v. CA:
a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform;
b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems;
and
c) approval and disapproval of:
i) conversion;
ii) restructuring; or
iii) readjustment of agricultural lands into:
1) residential;
2) commercial;
3) industrial; and
4) other non-agricultural uses.
- In the case at bar, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner
of the land; and it is outside of jurisdiction of DARAB to determine the
issue of ownership; or when it assumes so, its findings are not conclusive
to settle the matter.
- The issue then of ownership shall be resolved in a ​separate proceeding
before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof.
- Even if this point shall be adjudicated and solved, the case cannot be
considered as tenancy-related for failure to comply with other requisites.
- The case then is ​not tenancy-related ​and therefore outside the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.
xXx
42. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. NO. 78742
July 14, 1989
FACTS
1. G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
- The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., comprising
of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings does not
exceed 7 hectares, sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657.
- They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A.
6657 on account of their willingness to till their own land,
- They invoking PD 27 granting the right to retention on owners who are
owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares, as long as they are
cultivating, or intending to cultivate the same.
- PD 316, implementing PD 27, is also invoked which provides that no
tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall
be ejected from his farmholding until such time the rights of the
tenant-farmers and landowners be determined.
- They want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
- Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD
27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their
ib2i
lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
- They contend that it violated due process for under the constitution, no
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
- Petitioner averred that it violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation.
- Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may
be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred
that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in
bonds, as provided in the Bill of Rights, invoking the guildelines set in
EPZA v. Dulay, and Manotok v. NFA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program,
must be in terms of cash.
HELD​:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program.
- Under the law, ​classification, ​within the ambit of equal protection clause,
has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars.
- To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
- Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed.
- The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
- In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the
courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights.
- In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small
landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No.
- Where the measures challenge prescribe retention limits for landowners,
there is an exercise of the ​police power ​for regulation of private property.
But where it becomes ​necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands
they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed​, there is definitely
taking under the ​power of eminent domain for which just compensation is
imperative.
- For police power be sustained, there must be the ​concurrence ​of lawful
subject, and lawful method.
- Anent the first requisite, it involves situation where the interest
of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the state. Since the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform had been laid down by the
Constitution itself, the first requisite is satisfied;
- On the second requisite, ​eminent domain is the inherent power
of the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation. Forcibly acquiring by
expropriation only comes when the landowner is unwilling or
refused to surrender lands; otherwise there is no need for
expropriation.
21
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
- It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in
the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies
like the DAR from determining just compensation.
- The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by
an administrative body is merely preliminary.
- If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by
an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the
latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA
6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is
a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money
hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for
just compensation.
- Proportion of cash payment to other things of value constituting as total
payment, is therefore not unduly oppressive upon the landowner.
xXx
43. NATALIA REALTY v. DAR
G.R. NO. 103302
August 12, 1993
FACTS
- ​Petitioner is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land located in
Antipolo, Rizal with a total of 125.0078 hectares, registered under a TCR,
in Rizal RD.
- PD 1637 was enacted in 1979 setting aside land located in Antipolo, San
Mateo, and Montalban as ​townsite areas​, in which the properties of Natalia
was included in the reservation.
- EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for clearance in Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, which was approved, hence the properties
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
- Upon enactment of RA 6657, Natalia received a ​Notice of Coverage ​on
the ​underdeveloped ​portions of the Subdivision, roughly 90 hectares.
Natalia then proffered their objection.
- SAMBA on the other hand, filed a case of injunction against Natalia to
restrain them from developing areas under cultivation by their Members;
Regional Adjudicator issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
- Natalia appealed to DARAB; but DARAB remanded the case to Regional
Adjudicator.
- Natalia and EDIC impute grave abuse of discretion against DAR for
including the underdeveloped portions of the Subdivision within the
coverage of DAR;
- They argued that the properties already ceased to be agricultural lands
when they are included in the areas for townsite reservation.
ISSUE: ​Whether lands already classified for residential, commercial, or
industrial use, as approved by HLURB covered by CARL
HELD:
- ​Note that Natalia properties were within the areas set aside for the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. By virtue of PD 1637, it in effect converted
for residential use what were before agricultural lands.
- Since there is compliance with PD 957, the conversion is effective.
ib2i
- CARL, in Sec. 4, RA 6657, provides that it covers ​all public and private
agricultural lands.
- By ​agricultural land, ​it is defined as those not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.
- By this definition, it is apparent that the underdeveloped portions of the
Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands, for they are
intended to be for residential use; despite its slow-paced development.
- To bolster this ruling, lands outside the coverage of CARL also includes
those converted as ​non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL by
government agencies other than DAR.
- Since Natalia was converted prior to that time, DAR is bound by such
conversion.
xXx
44. LUZ FARMS v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. NO. 86889
December 4, 1990
FACTS
- ​By virtue of CARL, which includes raising of livestock, poultry, and
swine in its coverage, the SAR promulgated Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing.
- Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry, stands to be
adversely affected by its enforcement.
- Luz Farms questions the constitutionality of the following provisions:
a) Section 3(b) which includes the ​"raising of livestock (and
poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity";
b) Section 11 which defines ​"commercial farms" as "private
agricultural lands d​evoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising​ . . .";
c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a
production-sharing plan;
d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian
Reform the authority to summarily determine the ​just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law;
e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan
mentioned in Section 13.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the foregoing provisions are constitutional
HELD:
Petitioners
Luz Farms argues that the Congress transgressed the Constitution, in
including land devoted to raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its
coverage; that livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree
farming, where the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking;
- The use of land is ​incidental ​but not the principal factor or consideration
for productivity in the industry of commercial livestock and raising; the
owners thereof use their available space for such purposes, the land
supporting its buildings and other amenities.
SC: Petition is in order.
- In construing constitutional provisions which has ambiguous or doubtful
meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional
convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the
constitution.
- Transcripts and deliberations provides that the word ​“agricultural”
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers to include
livestock and poultry industry ​in the coverage of the agrarian reform
contemplated in the Constitution, to the end that the Constitution opted to
limit the word “agriculture”.
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Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita
- Therefore, Sec. 11 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry, and swine raising” ​within the definition of
commercial farms ​is invalid.
- Therefore, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement of
directing ​corporate farms ​including livestock and poultry raisers to execute
and implement “production-sharing plans” as unreasonable for being
confiscatory, and violative of due process.
xXx
45. GELOS v. CA
G.R. NO. 86186
May 8, 1992
FACTS
- The subject land is 25,000 sqm farmland in Cabuyao, Laguna, and
belonging to Ernesto Alzona and parents.
- They entered into a contract with Gelos employing him as ​laborer ​on the
land with stipulated daily wage of P5.00.
- Three years after, he wrote to Gelos informing him of the termination of
his services, demanding him to vacate the property, Gelos refused and
continued working on the land.
- ​Gelos ​then went to CAR asking for fixing of agricultural lease rental on
the property;
- ​Alzona ​filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos in MTC
Cabuyao, where it was declared not proper for trial by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, appealed to Ministry of Labor, then to CAR, and lastly
to Opres. OPres declared it was proper for trial.
- After the hearing, RTC San Pablo dismissed the complaint; finding Gelos
as a tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain as such.
- CA reversed; it held that Gelos was not a tenant and ordered him to
surrender the land to Alzona.
ISSUE: ​Whether Gelos is a tenant
HELD
- ​Generally, a factual conclusion made by the trial court that a person is a
tenant farmer, it it is supported by minimum evidence demanded by law, is
final and conclusive and cannot be reversed except for compelling reasons.
(Talavera v. CA)
- However, it appears that the trial court misappreciated the facts when
ruling that Gelos is a tenant.
- In the agreement, pertinent stipulations provide that:
a) The Second Party, (being Gelos) desires to lease services at the
rate of P5 per day; eight hours of work; and
b) The Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but
only a hired laborer who is paid everyday of work.
These stipulations clearly provide that the parties did not enter a tenancy
agreement, but rather ​contract of employment​ or a lease of services.
- On the argument that there are specific tasks suggests that they are a work
of a tenant, rather than a laborer, the Court held that it is not the nature of
the work involved but the intention of the parties that determines the
relationship between them.
- Tenancy relationship is differentiated from a farm employer-employee in
that:
The landowner is the lessor of the The landowner is the lessee of the
land; and the tenant the lessee; services of the laborer; while the
laborer is the lessor of his
services;
The tenant derives his income Laborer receives wages or salary
ib2i
form the agricultural harvest or for the work done regardless of
produce. whether the employer makes a
profit or not.
- It appears that the private respondent ​pays petitioner lump sums ​for
specific kinds of work; and giving vales as advance payment as wages.
- Petitioner Gelos, therefore, is a laborer, not a tenant.
xXx
46. TEODORO v. MACARAEG
G.R. NO. L-20700
February 27, 1969
FACTS
- Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past
seven (7) years in a land with an area of 4 hectares devoted to rice culture.
- March 2, 1961 he was advised by the latter to vacate the property because
it would be given to another tenant.
- Thereafter, a new tenant Niegos was installed who forbade Macaraeg
from working on the riceland.
- Macaraeg then on prohibition, refrained from forcibly entering the
landholding; but at the advent of planting season, it became imperative that
the agrarian court order his reinstatement.
- On the other hand, Teodoro denied that Macaraeg was his tenant and
claimed that he had always leased all of his 39-hectare riceland under civil
lease.
- He further claimed that after the expiration of his "Contract of Lease"
with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter did not anymore renew his contract.
- CAR ruled in favor of Macaraeg, with damages also granted upon
reconsideration.
- The Contract of Lease has the following primary stipulations:
a) That the lessor is the registered owner of the parcel of land;
b) That the consideration for the lease is rental of 9 cavans of palay
per hectare for one agricultural year;
c) that the lease is 1960-1961;
d) That the rental must be same variety as that produced by the
Lessee;
e) That the property used shall be utilized for agricultural purposes
only.
HELD​:
- The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements
of a leasehold tenancy agreement. The landholding in dispute is
unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. More
specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or
utilized for agricultural enterprise only."
- Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be used for
rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of
nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural year . . . must be of
the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE​.​"
- The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is
of an area of only four and a half (4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a
bigger area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the
help of the members of his immediate farm household.
- From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that
produced by the LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention
of the parties was that Macaraeg ​personally work the land​, which he did as
found by the Agrarian Court.
- Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he
delivered the possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental
certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a ​valid leasehold
tenancy agreement.
- Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce
is an unmistakable earmark, that the parties did actually enter into a
23
Labor Standards Law | CASES Atty. Peter Joey Usita ib2i

leasehold tenancy relation Agricultural tenancy relation is different from dead at the time of the decision, his heirs are then entitled to backwages +
farm employer-farm employee relation. ​ Tenant defined​. share of the proceeds of copra from the time of illegal dismissal)
- A ​tenant, ​as defined in RA 1199, ​is "a person who by himself, or with the
aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land xXx
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes
of production, sharing the produce with the landholder or for a price certain
or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system."

xXx

47. ZAMORAS v. SU
G.R. NO. 85611
April 6, 1990

FACTS
- Zamoras was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City.
- Zamoras was tasked to have the land titled in Su's name. He was also
"​assigning portions of the land to be worked by tenants, supervising the
cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of
coconuts and selling of the copra."
- As compensation, he was paid salary of P2,400 per month plus 1/3 of the
proceeds of the sales of the copra. Su got another 1/3 of the proceeds while
the other third went to the tenants.
- In 1981, Su obtained a loan from Anita Hortellano and the latter was
authorized by Su to harvest the coconuts. Meanwhile, he informed
Zamoras that he was being temporarily laid-off until the loan is settled.
- Zamoras filed a case for ​illegal termination and breach of contract before
the RAB of the Ministry of Labor.

- Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras' dismissal was without just cause and
ordered Zamoras reinstatement.
- On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter by holding that there is
no employee-employer relation existing between the parties but a
landlord-tenant relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian court.
Zamoras assailed the decision of NLRC.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the petitioner was an employee or

tenant of the private respondents

HELD:
- ​Tenancy agreement, requisites:
a) parties ​are landowner and the tenant ​or ​agricultural lessee;
b) subject matter ​of the relationship is an agricultural land;
c) there is ​consent ​between the parties to the relationship;
d) purpose ​of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
e) there is ​personal cultivation ​on the part of the tenant;
f) the harvest is ​shared ​between the landowner and tenant.

- The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed

between Su and Zamoras is not supported by the evidence which shows
that Zamoras was hired by Su ​not as a tenant but as overseer of his
coconut plantation.
- As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned their respective
portions which they cultivated under Zamoras' supervision.
- The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras and received their one-third share
of the copra produce from him. The evidence also shows that Zamoras,
aside from doing administrative work for Su, regularly managed the sale of
copra processed by the tenants. There is no evidence that Zamoras
cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid of his
immediate farm household.
- There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal cultivation
does not exist.
- Since Zamora is actually an employee and is illegally dismissed, he is
entitled to reinstatement and backwages. (but since Zamoras is already

24