Silva, Merlo Sebasthian C.

3E

I.  DISINHERITANCE 

1. What is disinheritance?

Article 915 of the Civil Code provides that a compulsory heir may, in
consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes expressly stated
by law. In essence, disinheritance is the process or act, thru a testamentary disposition
of depriving in a will any compulsory heir of his legitime for true and lawful causes. It is
the only instance recognized in the Civil Code by which a compulsory heir may be
deprived of his legitime by the testator.

2. Ways of depriving the compulsory heir of  his/her legitime.

Aside from disinheritance, there are other ways that the compulsory heirs will be
deprived of their legitime. These instances include:

(a)  In case of predecease, incapacity or repudiation. In case of predecease or

incapacity, the legitime will be inherited by the heirs of the compulsory heirs through
representation. As provided in Article 856 of the Civil Code, a compulsory heir who dies
before the testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, and one who renounces the
inheritance, shall transmit no right to his own heirs except in cases expressly provided
for in this Code.

(b)  In case the liabilities of the estate equal or exceed its assets, there would be no
hereditary estate, in which will result to no legitime for the compulsory heirs. Since the
estate of the deceased should be first liquidated, it is, however, undeniable that under
our law, no succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the assets and
debts left by the decedent shall have been made and all his creditors fully paid. Until a
final liquidation is made and all debts are paid, the right of the heirs to inherit remains
inchoate. It partakes of the nature of a mere hope and nothing more. If after liquidation,
the estate of the deceased is only sufficient or inadequate to cover the liabilities of the
latter, there will be no legitime for the compulsory heirs.

3. Requisites of a valid disinheritance.

For the compulsory heirs be deprived of their legitime through disinheritance, it is

important that the requisites of a valid disinheritance to be present. The requisites of a
valid disinheritance are as follows:

(a)  Must be made in a valid will. As provided under Article 916, disinheritance can be
effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified.

(b) Must be made expressly. Article 918 provides that disinheritance without a
specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not
proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of
heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited. Hence, disinheritance is not
presumed.

(c)  Must be for a legal cause. The basis for this requisite is Article 916 of the Civil Code
since under this provision, the cause must be one authorized by law. Article 918 also
provides that even if graver than those set forth in the law, if it be not one of those
enumerated, the disinheritance will be ineffective. It is important that the cause of the
disinheritance is one of the causes provided by law for it to be valid.

(d)  Must be for a true cause. Article 917 and 918 provide that the disinherited heir may
deny the cause of the disinheritance. If the cause of the disinheritance will be denied by
the disinherited heir, the burden of proving the truth of the cause for disinheritance shall
rest upon the other heirs of the testator. Under Article 918, the institution of heirs
prejudicial to the disinherited heir will be annulled if the truth of the cause of
disinheritance will not be proved.

(e)  Must be for an existing cause, therefore, there can be no conditional or preventive
disinheritance; although the revocation of the disinheritance may be conditional.
(f)  Must be total or complete. Under our jurisprudence, a partial disinheritance is invalid.

(g)  The cause must be stated in the will itself. Although the exact words of the law need
not be used] nor details given, nor is it essential that the statement of the fact of
disinheritance and the statement of the cause be made together in one will or
instrument as long as a necessary connection is proved. Neither is it essential that the
disinheritance be made in the same instrument by which the testator provides for the
disposition of his properties mortis causa, for the law merely says “a will,” meaning “any
will

(h)  The heir disinherited must be clearly identified, so that there will be no doubt as to
who is really being disinherited.

(i)  The will must not have been revoked, at least insofar as the disinheritance is
concerned.

4. Instances of ineffective/imperfect disinheritance

There are four instances of ineffective or imperfect disinheritance. The first three
instances are provided under Article 918 and the last instance is provided under Article
922. Article 918 of the Civil Code provides for the instances when the disinheritance is
considered invalid, ineffective or imperfect. This provision states that disinheritance
without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is
not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution
of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited. In this provision, there are
three instances where the disinheritance is considered imperfect or defective. These
are:

(a)  without giving the cause or no cause of disinheritance was stated in the will by the
testator;

(b)  a cause denied by the heir concerned and not proved by the instituted heir or when
there is no truth on the cause provided in the will;
(c) a cause not given in the law , hence, not a legal cause

On the other hand, Article 922 provides for the fourth instance that makes the
disinheritance ineffective or imperfect. Under this provision, a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made. If there
is a subsequent reconciliation, the disinheritance will be rendered ineffective.

5. Effects of invalid/imperfect disinheritance.

Invalid or imperfect disinheritance has two effects based on Article 918 of the
Civil Code. As provided under Article 918, disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not
one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. Hence, the
effects of invalid or imperfect disinheritance can be summarized as follows:

(a)  The institution of heirs is annulled but only insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited, that is, insofar as the legitime of said heir is impaired.

(b)  The devises, legacies, and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such
extent as will not impair the legitime.

In other words, the imperfect disinheritance shall result in the annulment of the
institution of heirs insofar as the legitime of the compulsory heir who is disinherited is
prejudiced, although the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall
be valid, provided that the legitime of compulsory heirs is not impaired.

6.  Distinguish valid disinheritance from preterition.

There are different distinctions between a valid disinheritance and preterition.

First, disinheritance is an express deprivation because disinheritance is always
intentional, while preterition is an implied deprivation because the omission may be
either intentional or unintentional. Second, in a valid disinheritance, the cause must
always be stated in the will and such cause must be true and legal, while in preterition,
the omission can be made with or without cause.

Third, if the disinheritance is valid, the disinherited heir inherits nothing, either by
way of legitime, or by way of free portion, while in preterition, the institution of heirs is
annulled, hence, the omitted heir inherits. Fourth, a valid disinheritance should be made
in a will, while a preterition, may exist with or without a will, as when everything has
been given to only one of the compulsory heirs by way of donation inter vivos. Lastly,
the validity of disinheritance depends whether all the requirements of the law have been
complied with, while in preterition, the institution of heirs is always void except when the
omitted heir predeceases the testator.

7. Distinguish imperfect disinheritance from preterition.

Imperfect disinheritance is also different from preterition in a way that In

imperfect disinheritance, the person disinherited may be any compulsory heir, while in
preterition, the person omitted must be a compulsory heir in the direct line. In addition,
in imperfect disinheritance, the attempt to deprive the heir of his legitime is always
express, while in the second, the attempt is always implied. Also, in imperfect
disinheritance, the attempt to deprive the heir of his legitime is always intentional, while
in preterition, the attempt may be intentional or unintentional. Lastly, in imperfect
disinheritance, the institution remains valid, but must be reduced insofar as the legitime
has been impaired, while in preterition, the institution of heirs is completely annulled.

8. Grounds for disinheritance of a child or descendant 

The grounds for disinheritance of a child or descendant are provided under

Article 919, which states that, the following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of
the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testa- tor of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found ground-
less;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence

causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits
such child or descend- ant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

(a) Paragraph one — “When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt
against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants.”

There should be a final judgment of conviction by a court of justice. However, this

judgment may come before or after the execution of the will. It is also important that
there must be an intent to kill. The spouse, descendants, or ascendants mentioned in
this paragraph refers to those of the testator. Furthermore, If an attempt is sufficient to
disinherit, it follows that if the act is consummated, or frustrated there is sufficient cause
for disinheritance. This is true even if the heir be only an accomplice, provided of course
that there was intent to kill. In essence, if after conviction there is a pardon,
disinheritance is also proper, unless, the pardon be based on the heir’s complete
innocence.

Evidently, this ground refers to either attempted or frustrated parricide as defined

and punished in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the first requisite is that the child
or descendant must have committed either attempted or frustrated parricide.
Furthermore, the law requires that there must have been a previous criminal conviction.
Therefore, the second requisite is that the child or descendant must have been
convicted for the criminal offense of attempted or frustrated parricide.

(b) Paragraph 2 — “When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been
found groundless.”

This ground requires the following requisites: first, the heir must have accused
the testator of a crime; second, the penalty prescribed by law for such crime must be six
years imprisonment or more, and third, the accusation must have been found to be
groundless.

Since the law does not make any qualification whatsoever, it is clear that
“accusation” includes not only the act of the disinherited heir of instituting the criminal
action in the capacity of a complainant, but also any act of intervention such as being a
witness for the prosecution, by which he accuses the testator of having committed the
crime charged. Similarly, as regards the third requisite, it will not make any material
difference whether the accusation was found groundless during the preliminary
investigation, or during the trial, or on appeal.

(c) Paragraph 3 — “When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or

concubinage with the spouse of the testator.”

It is essential that there must be a final judgment of conviction either in the

adultery case or in the concubinage case before this Article can be applied. Mere
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator is not, therefore, a ground for
the disinheritance of a child or descendant.

(d) Paragraph 4 — “When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or

undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made.”
 The fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence may have been employed
either for the purpose of causing the testator to execute a will or for the purpose of
causing the testator to change or will which has already been made. However, unless a
new will is made, there can be no disinheritance, because for this to exist, there must be
a will where the disinheritance is made.

(e) Paragraph 5 — “A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or

ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant.”

The refusal of the heir to give support must be without justifiable cause. Hence, if
there was a justifiable cause for such refusal, the disinheritance would be ineffectual or
imperfect. No judicial demand is needed for the law does not require this. If there had
been a refusal to support, and support is later given but only because of judicial
compulsion, this would still be a valid ground for disinheritance.

For instance, the son, although he could afford to do so, refused to support his
father, who needed the same. The father can disinherit said son. However, if the father
had been cruel to the son, or had abandoned the latter, the son would be justified in
refusing to give support. In such a case, there would be no valid cause for
disinheritance under this ground.

(f) Paragraph 6 — “Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or

descendant.”

This ground covers two causes, maltreatment by word and maltreatment by

deed. Furthermore, as long as acts of violence are committed against the testator,
whether physical injuries resulted or not, there would be a case of maltreatment.

It is clear that this ground includes all acts of violence against the person of the
testator. It also includes any maltreatment of the testator by words, whether such words
are defamatory or not. A final judgment of conviction is not required. It is, however,
necessary that the maltreatment must have been intentional or voluntary. Otherwise, if it
was due to insanity, lack of discernment or tender years of the child or descendant, the
maltreatment cannot be considered as a sufficient cause for disinheritance.
Furthermore, in case maltreatment by an ascendant of a descendant, it does not
constitute a ground for the descendant to disinherit the ascendant, for while it may be
an abuse, it is generally in the exercise of a power. The reverse is however repugnant
to natural law, and is therefore a ground for disinheritance.

(g) Paragraph 7 — “When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful

life.”

There need not be final judgment of conviction under this ground. The essence of
the cause is that anything that brings dishonor or disgrace to the family of the testator
merits correction in the form of disinheritance. However, a single act is not ordinarily
sufficient, for “leading a life” implies continuity. Furthermore, any dishonorable or
disgraceful conduct, such as engaging in a life of crime or immorality, provided that it
characterizes the mode of living of the child or descendant disinherited, is a sufficient
cause for disinheritance.

(h) Paragraph 8 — “Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction.”

Under this paragraph as a ground to disinherit a child or descendent, there must

be a final judgment of conviction . Moreover, under Arts. 40 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, civil interdiction is given as an accessory penalty to death if commuted,
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal.

8.1 Grounds for disinheritance of spouse

           Article 921 of the Civil Code provides for the grounds for disinheritance of
spouse. This provision provides that the following shall be sufficient causes for
disinheriting a spouse:

(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator,
his or her descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false;

(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;

(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority;

(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse.

Article 921 enumerates six different grounds for the disinheritance of the spouse.

(a) Paragraph 1- “When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life
of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants”

There should be a final judgment of conviction by a court of justice.

However, this judgment may come before or after the execution of the will. It is
also important that there must be an intent to kill. The spouse, descendants, or
ascendants mentioned in this paragraph refers to those of the testator.
Furthermore, If an attempt is sufficient to disinherit, it follows that if the act is
consummated, or frustrated there is sufficient cause for disinheritance. This is
true even if the heir be only an accomplice, provided of course that there was
intent to kill. In essence, if after conviction there is a pardon, disinheritance is
also proper, unless, the pardon be based on the heir’s complete innocence.

(b) Paragraph 2- “When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which
the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, and the accusation has
been found to be false”

This ground requires the following requisites: first, the heir must have
accused the testator of a crime; second, the penalty prescribed by law for such
 crime must be six years imprisonment or more, and third, the accusation must
have been found to be groundless.

Since the law does not make any qualification whatsoever, it is clear that
“accusation” includes not only the act of the disinherited heir of instituting the
criminal action in the capacity of a complainant, but also any act of intervention
such as being a witness for the prosecution, by which he accuses the testator of
having committed the crime charged. Similarly, as regards the third requisite, it
will not make any material difference whether the accusation was found
groundless during the preliminary investigation, or during the trial, or on appeal.

(c) Paragraph 3 —" When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made”

The fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence may have been

employed either for the purpose of causing the testator to execute a will or for the
purpose of causing the testator to change or will which has already been made.
However, unless a new will is made, there can be no disinheritance, because for
this to exist, there must be a will where the disinheritance is made.

(d) Paragraph 4- “When the spouse has given cause for legal separation”

It is clear that by virtue of this provision, if the wife has committed adultery,
or if the husband has committed concubinage, or if either of the spouses has
made an attempt against the life of the other, the innocent spouse would be
justified in disinheriting the offending spouse. Thus, it has been held that criminal
conviction is not a condition sine qua non in order that the wife can disinherit an
unfaithful husband.

A decree of legal separation is not essential nor is a final judgment in a

criminal case required. If there is already a legal separation decree before the
execution of the will, disinheritance is superfluous, for this in effect would be
denying the guilty spouse of a right not possessed.
 (e) Paragraph 5 — “When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental
authority”

Basically, under this ground, the mere fact that there is a ground for the loss
of parental authority is a sufficient cause for disinheritance.

(f) Paragraph 6- “ Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse.”

The refusal of the heir to give support must be without justifiable cause.
Hence, if there was a justifiable cause for such refusal, the disinheritance would
be ineffectual or imperfect. No judicial demand is needed for the law does not
require this. If there had been a refusal to support, and support is later given but
only because of judicial compulsion, this would still be a valid ground for
disinheritance.

For instance, if a husband without valid reason refuses to support the

children, the wife can disinherit him.

9. Who is entitled to the legitime of a validly disinherited heir?

As provided under Article 923 of the Civil Code, the children and descendants of
the person disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights of
compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent shall not have
the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes the legitime.

Regarding the right of representation, the heirs of the disinherited heir can
represent the latter, but only insofar as the legitime of said disinherited heir is
concerned. The children and descendants are allowed to inherit by representation, the
legitime of the disinherited heir because the fault of the heir is not the fault of the
representative. However, Article 923 only applies to cases if the disinherited heir
happens also to be a child or descendant of the testator.

10.   What is the Effect of Reconciliation.

      a. What is reconciliation?

Reconciliation is the mutual restoration of feelings to the status quo. Basically, it

can be considered as an event between two parties with prior dispute which results to
the resumption of friendly relations. Reconciliation needs no special form; therefore it
may be express or implied.

The effects of reconciliation on a disinheritance differ depending upon whether a

disinheritance has already been made or not. Article 922 provides that a subsequent
reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
Hence, if no disinheritance has been made yet after reconciliation, no disinheritance can
now be done by the testator.

On the other hand, if there is reconciliation after the disinheritance has already
been made, the same is rendered ineffectual. It means that as if there had been no
disinheritance at all.

11.  May a disinheritance be revoked? 

Yes. Disinheritance may be revoked through different instances.

a. Instances
The instances that can revoke a valid disinheritance are as follows”

(a) subsequent reconciliation. As provided under Article 922, a subsequent

reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
Hence, the disinheritance is revoked by the reconciliation between the testator and the
disinherited heir.

(b) the making of a new will making the disinherited heir an instituted heir. If the
disinherited heir in a previous will was instituted as heir by the testator in making of a
new will, the disinheritance will be deemed as revoked.
II. LEGACIES AND DEVICES

1. Distinguish legacy from device.

Article 782 of the Civil Code, a legatee is defined as a person to whom a gift of
personal property is given by virtue of a will, while a devisee is defined as a person to
whom a gift of real property is given by virtue of a will. Based from this definition, it can
be asserted that legacy is a testamentary disposition by virtue of which a person is
called by the testator to inherit an individual item of personal property. On the other
hand, a device, may be defined as a testamentary disposition by virtue of which a
person is called by the testator to inherit an individual item of real property.

Furthermore, Article 924 provides that all things and rights which are within the
commerce of man may be bequeathed or devised. Based from this provision, legacy is
bequeathed while device is devised.

2. Things that cannot be the subject of legacy or device.

Article 924 states that all things and rights which are within the commerce of man
may be bequeathed or devised. In essence, this provision means that things outside the
commerce of men cannot be the subject of a legacy or device.

The following are examples of things outside the commerce of men. For
instance, public roads and other properties for public use are outside the commerce of
man, and may not be the subject of lease or other contracts. Property of public
dominion is outside the commerce of man since it cannot be alienated and acquired by
prescription against the State. Hence, property belonging to the public domain, or those
owned by the State such as forest or timber land or mineral land, is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be titled and any title which may be issued is void. 
In addition, the status of a person is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
lost or acquired by prescription. The corpse of an individual is also outside the
commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over
the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it.
3. Discuss the Kinds of legacy.

     a. Legacy of credit 

As provided in the second paragraph of Article 935, a legacy of credit takes place
when the testator bequeaths to the legatee a credit which he has against a third person.
It means that there are three parties involved in a legacy of credit. These parties are the
testator-creditor, the legatee, and the debtor. In this type of legacy, there is a novation
of the credit by subrogating the legatee in the rights of the original creditor.

The executor or administrator may either assign the creditor’s actions to the
legatee or himself collect the credit. In the latter case, the proceeds should naturally be
delivered by him to the legatee. Under Article 935, The legacy of a credit is effective
only as regards that part still existing at the testator’s death, together of course with all
the interests still due.

The legacy of a credit may be generic or specific. It is generic if it refers to all the
credits appertaining to the testator. On the other hand the legacy of a credit is specific if
only specified credits are mentioned. Furthermore, in the legacy of a credit, all
guarantees whether personal such as the obligation of a guarantor or a surety or real as
such in a pledge or a mortgage are deemed included.

b. Legacy of remission

In legacy of remission, there are only two parties involved, the testator-creditor and
the legatee-debtor. The legacy of remission amounts to a sort of donation mortis causa
and is therefore subject to the rule of inofficious testamentary dispositions; that is, this
may be reduced if the legitime is impaired. The second paragraph of Article 935
requires that the legacy of remission mandates the estate to give the legatee favored an
acquittance such as the receipt or acknowledgement, should he request one.      

b.1 Kinds
 The Civil Code distinguishes three different kinds of legacies of remission or
release of debts. They are: first, specific legacy for the remission of a definite debt;
second, generic legacy for the remission of all debts of the legatee existing at the time
of the execution of the will; and third, legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him.

The first kind of legacy of remission is governed by Article 935. The legacy of
remission or release of a definite debt of the legatee, which is taken up in Article 935,
involves only two parties – the testator-creditor and the legatee-debtor.

The second kind of legacy of remission is the generic legacy of remission, which
is taken from Article 937 of the Civil Code. It is generic when no particular debt is
mentioned such as when all debts are remitted. The law states however that in such a
case, only those existing at the time the will was made, should be included. Subsequent
ones are excluded. Furthermore, it is a generic legacy of remission if it includes all
debts whether pure, conditional, or with a term.

The third kind of legacy of remission is taken from the second paragraph of
Article 936, which states that, the legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him is
understood to discharge only the right of pledge. In this kind of legacy, only the pledge
will be remitted and not the principal obligation since only the pledge has been
extinguished. Hence, the debt itself still remains, for same has not been remitted.

On the other hand, if the principal obligation is remitted however, the accessory
obligation is automatically remitted. Article 936 of the Civil Code can also refer to a
mortgage, an antichresis or any other security.

c. legacy of education

Article 944 of the Civil Code treats the nature of a legacy of Under this provision, a
legacy for education lasts until the legatee is of age, or beyond the age of majority in
order that the legatee may finish some professional, vocational or general course,
provided he pursues his course diligently.
 Based from this provision, it can be inferred that the legacy for education may be for
a shorter period than that given by the law, despite the lack of an express provision on
that matter. Furthermore, The diligence required in pursuing the course is a judicial
question. Legacy of education is ordinarily personal, and cannot therefore be
transmitted unless of course the testator has ordered otherwise.

Furthermore, the amount of the legacy, whether for education or for support, shall
depend upon the testator. If the amount is not fixed, it shall be fixed in accordance with
the circumstances and social standing of the legatee and the value of the estate. The
only limitation is that the legacy must not impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.

d. legacy of support

The second paragraph of Article 944 provides that a legacy for support lasts during
the lifetime of the legatee, if the testator has not otherwise provided. The amount of the
legacy for support shall depend upon the testator. If the amount is not fixed, it shall be
fixed in accordance with the circumstances and social standing of the legatee and the
value of the estate. The only limitation is that the legacy must not impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.

Similarly, a legacy for support is personal and cannot therefore be transmitted

unless the testator has ordered the same.

4. Who should pay or deliver a legacy or devise?

The person obligated to pay or deliver a legacy or device depends whether the
testator charged no one with this duty or if the testator gives this duty to the compulsory
heirs, legatees or devisees.

As a general rule, if no one is charged with this duty, it is the estate which must give
the legacies and devises. The estate is of course represented by the executor, or the
administrator with a will annexed.
 On the other hand, If the testator gives this duty to the compulsory or voluntary heirs,
or to the legatees and devisees, they must comply with their duties, subject to the
limitations imposed by law. As provided under Article 925, a testator may charge with
legacies and devises not only his compulsory heirs but also the legatees and devisees.
Basically, The testator is allowed to charge them with this duty because the right to
dispose presumes the right in general to impose conditions for the dispositions.

5. Discuss the Status of a legacy or device of a thing belonging to a stranger.

Article 930 provides that the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person
is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. Hence, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing belonged to him and not to another, the
legacy or devise is void. On the other hand, if the testator knew that the thing belonged
to another, the legacy or devise is valid because it is presumed that his intention is that
such thing which is bequeathed or devised must be acquired either by the executor or
administrator of his estate or by the heir expressly charged with such obligation for the
benefit of the legatee or devisee.

6. Discuss the Status of a legacy or device of a thing belonging partly to the

testator and partly to a stranger.

Article 929 provides that if the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a part of, or an
interest in the thing bequeathed, the legacy or devise shall be understood limited to
such part or interest, unless the testator expressly declares that he gives the thing in its
entirety. Hence, if he bequeaths or devises a thing which belongs partly to him and
partly to a third person, the legacy or devise shall be understood limited only to the part
or interest belonging to him. The same rule is applied where the thing belongs partly to
the heir, legatee or devisee and partly to a third person. The legacy or devise is limited
only to the part or interest belonging to such heir, legatee or devisee.

There is, however, an exception to the rule and that is when the testator
expressly declares that he bequeaths or devises the thing in its entirety. However,
before this exception can be applied, there must be: first, an express declaration to that
effect appearing in the will itself; and second, knowledge on the part of the testator that
the thing belongs partly to a third per- son. Such knowledge may be proved either from
the context of the will itself or from extrinsic evidence. Obviously, such knowledge on
the part of the testator of his limited right is essential because, otherwise, the legacy or
devise would be void under Art. 930.

7. Discuss  Status of a legacy or device if the thing bequethed  is already

owned by the legatee or devisee.

Article 932 treats the status of a legacy or device already owned by the legatee or
devisee. Under this provision, the legacy or devise of a thing which at the time of the
execution of the will already belonged to the legatee or devisee shall be ineffective,
even though another person may have some interest therein.

If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from such interest or
encumbrance, the legacy or devise shall be valid to that extent.

The rule with regard to such legacy or devise is that it shall be ineffective whether
or not the testator had knowledge of the fact. The rule applies even though another
person may have some interest therein. The rule also applies even though the legatee
or devisee who is supposed to be favored may have subsequently alienated the thing.
To hold otherwise would be to permit the testator to play a grotesque joke in his
dispositions mortis causa. If he did not know that the thing or property belonged to the
legatee or devisee favored at the time of the execution of the will, the law presumes that
had he known of the fact, he would not have bequeathed or devised the thing.

Nonetheless, if another person has an interest in the thing which is the object of
the legacy or devise and the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from such
interest or encumbrance, the legacy or devise shall be valid to that extent.

8. Define and Discuss the status of the following legacies and devises:
 Article 947 provides that the legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and
simple legacies or devises from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs.
This Article speaks of the right to the legacy or devise, as becoming vested as of the
moment of the testator’s death.

If it is pure, the right to property is vested from the testator’s death

If it is alternative, the right to property is vested from the time the choice has been
made.

If it is generic, the right to property is vested from the time a selection has been
made, so as to make the property specific.

9. When does the legatee or devisee acquire ownership over the thing
bequethed?

The first paragraph of Article 948 provides that if the legacy or devise is of a specific
and determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the
ownership thereof upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing fruits, or
unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the income which was due
and unpaid before the latter’s death. On the other hand, Article 949 provides that if the
bequest should not be of a specific and determinate thing, but is generic or of quantity,
its fruits and interests from the time of the death of the testator shall pertain to the
legatee or devisee if the testator has expressly so ordered.

Hence, the time by which the legatee or devisee acquires ownership over the
bequeathed depends upon whether the legacy or devise is of a specific and determinate
thing or not. The rule stated in Art. 948 springs logically from the general principle
enunciated in Art. 777 of the Code. It is, however, essential before the legatee or
devisee can acquire ownership of the thing bequeathed or devised upon the death of
the testator that the thing is determinate and that the legacy or devise is pure and
simple. If the legacy or devise is subject to a suspensive term or period or to a
suspensive condition, the rule cannot be applied. In the first, the legatee or devisee
becomes the owner of the thing bequeathed or devised only upon the expiration of the
term or period; in the second, only upon the fulfillment of the condition.

On the other hand, if the legacy or devise is generic or alternative, there is a right of
choice governed by the provisions of Arts. 941 to 943 of the Code. Once the choice or
selection has been made in accordance with these provisions, the legacy or devise
ceases to be generic; it becomes a pure and simple legacy or devise. It will be only then
that the legatee or devisee can be considered as the owner of the thing which is chosen
or selected. Consequently, from that very moment, the legatee or devisee shall be
entitled to all of the fruits and interests of the thing, unless the testator has expressly
ordered in his will that such fruits and interests shall pertain to the legatee or devisee
from the moment of his death.

10. Distinguish Article 950  from Article 911.

Article 950 provides that If the estate should not be sufficient to cover all the legacies
or devises, their payment shall be made in the following order:

(1)  Remuneratory legacies or devises;

(2)  Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be preferential;

(3)  Legacies for support;

(4)  Legacies for education;

(5)  Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing which forms a part of the estate;

(6) All others pro rata.

Meanwhile, Article 911 states that after the legitime has been determined in
accordance with the three preceding articles, the reduction shall be made as follows:

(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be covered, reducing or
annulling, if necessary, the de- vises or legacies made in the will;
(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata without any distinction
whatever.

If the testator has directed that a certain devise or legacy be paid in preference to
others, it shall not suffer any reduction until the latter have been applied in full to the
payment of the legitime.

(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life annuity, whose value may be
considered greater than that of the disposable portion, the compulsory heirs may
choose between complying with the testamentary provision and delivering to the
devisee or legatee the part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely dispose.

Article 911 applies only when aside from the various legacies and devises, there are
legitimes to be pre- served, whether impaired or not by the testamentary provisions, or
there are donations inter vivos which should be respected as much as possible.
Meanwhile, Article 950 applies only when there are no compulsory heirs or when there
are no inofficious donations inter vivos. Basically, if the reduction concerns itself merely
with the legacies or devises, Article 950 should be applied.

The order of payment of legacies and devises which is specified in Article 950
should be distinguished from the rule stated in Article 911 of the Civil Code regarding
the pro rata reduction of legacies and devises. Art. 911 applies in the following cases:
(1) When the reduction is necessary to preserve the legitime of compulsory heirs from
impairment, whether there are donations inter vivos or not; and (2) when, although the
legitime has been preserved by the testator himself by leaving the compulsory heirs
sufficient property to cover their legitime, there are donations inter vivos concurring with
the legacies and devises within the free portion. In all other cases not included within
the scope of Article 911, Article 950 applies. More specifically, the latter applies in all
cases where the conflict is exclusively among the legatees or devisees themselves.

11. What are the instances and effect of ineffective legacies or devises?
 There are three instances that may result to ineffective legacies or devices. These
instances and the effect of ineffective legacies or devices are provided in Article 956 of
the Civil Code. Article 956 provides that if the legatee or devisee cannot or is unwilling
to accept the legacy or devise, or if the legacy or devise for any reason should become
ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of the estate, except in cases of substitution
and of the right of accretion.

The first instance occurs when the legatee or devisee may be incapacitated to
succeed the testator in accordance with the rules laid down in Articles. 1024 to 1040 of
the Civil Code. On the other hand, the legacy or device is ineffective if it is repudiated by
the legatee or devisee by virtue of the right in accordance with the law. Lastly, the
legacy or device becomes ineffective if for some reason such as transformation,
alienation or destruction of the object, or the non-fulfillment of a suspensive, condition.

The effect of an ineffective legacy or device will result to the merging of the legacy or
devise with the mass of the hereditary estate, except in cases of substitution or
accretion.

12. State and discuss the causes of revocation of legacies and devises.

The different causes for the revocation of legacies and devises are provided in
Article 957 of the Civil Code. This provisions states that the legacy or devise shall be
without effect:

(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not
retain either the form or the denomination it had;

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part
thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without
effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should
again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy
shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue
of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his
death without the heir’s fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy of
devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have been
determinate as to its kind, in accordance with the provisions of Article 928.

The different causes for the revocation of legacies and devises enumerated in
the above article are examples of what is known as revocation by implication of law.
They take effect automatically and by operation of law. The enumeration, however, is
not complete. We can add as a fourth cause or ground the act of the testator in bringing
an action against the debtor for payment of the debt as applied to legacies of a credit or
of remission of a debt. Under Article 936, such an action will also have the effect of
revoking the legacy. As provided in the above article, revocation can be made by virtue
of revocation by transformation, alienation or by lost or destruction.

In revocation by transformation, if the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in

such a manner that it does not retain both the form and the denomination it had, there is
an implied revocation of the legacy or devise. However, the transformation must be both
with respect to the form and denomination. Basically, transformation with respect to the
form only but not with respect to the denomination is not sufficient. Neither is trans-
formation with respect to the denomination but not with respect to the form.

In revocation by alienation, if the testator by any title, whether by sale or any

other act of disposition inter vivos, alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof,
there is also an implied revocation of the legacy or devise. If only a part of the thing is
alienated, the legacy or devise shall take effect with respect to the part untouched.
Hence, there would be only a partial revocation.

In revocation by lost or destruction, if the thing bequeathed is totally lost during

the lifetime of the testator or after his death without the heir’s fault, obviously, the legacy
or devise can no longer take effect. If the thing bequeathed or devised is de- terminate,
there is no liability for eviction on the part of the person obliged to pay or deliver the
legacy or devise; if it is indeterminate as to its kind, the latter shall be liable in
accordance with the provision of Article 928.