CIRILO LIM vs.

BASILISA DIAZ-MILLAREZ
October 19, 1966, L-17633

Doctrine: It cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo Lim, as a relative of the deceased, has some
interest adverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a
whole, Cirilo can not compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is
considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. (Sioca v. Garcia, 44 Phil. 711;
Arevalo v. Bustamante, 69 Phil. 656).

Facts:

On February 26, 1954, Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died
intestate on October 22, 1953, filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition
for his appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased. The petition alleged that
the deceased left collaterals relatives only.

Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow of the late Jose Millarez, filed an opposition on two
grounds: that the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of the estate
are the subject matter of a litigation between her and Lim.

Trial was postponed several times. After 5 years, the trial court dismissed the case and ordered that
parties can file another application for the judicial administration of the property involved in this
administration, neither a special nor a regular administrator has been appointed.

Lim brought the case to the CA. Meanwhile, the civil case between the parties which was also
elevated to the CA was decided on February 18, 1965. From the body of the decision, it appears that
Basilisa Diaz-Millarez sought to recover from Cirilo Lim one-half of the total amount of P22,000
allegedly delivered to him by her and the deceased Jose Millarez on various occasions and to
declare her as the owner of ½ of the profits and gains derived therefrom, on the ground that Jose
Millarez and she used to live as husband and wife for about 23 years and as such she is entitled to ½
of the property held in common by them. She asserted further that since she contributed capital and
labor to the tobacco business in which she and the deceased were engaged and from which they
gave P22,000 in cash to Cirilo Lim, she would be entitled to ½ of the capital and ½ of the proceeds
and profits derived from such capital. In answer, Cirilo Lim alleged that the money he received
from Jose Millarez on various occasions was handed to one Tan Suaco for investment in the
tobacco business. While the trial court, after hearing, ordered Lim to make an accounting of the
P22,000 invested in the tobacco business to be submitted to court.

CA decided that Millares is entitled to ½ of the estate of the late Jose. The case was remanded to
the trial court to appoint a qualified certified accountant, to admit other evidence presented to show
how much was invested by the deceased and Basilisa.
Issue: Wether or not Basilisa may be an administratrix of Jose Millarez estate.

Held:
It cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo Lim, as a relative of the deceased, has some interest
adverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole,
Cirilo cannot compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is
considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. (Sioca v. Garcia, 44 Phil. 711;
Arevalo v. Bustamante, 69 Phil. 656).

The Court affirmed the order of the CA. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court
is clearly in error.

CONCEPCION P. VIUDA DE PADILLA vs. FERNANDO JUGO

G.R. No. L-45617, October 29, 1937

Doctrine: The power to remove an administration falls entirely under the sound discretion of the
court, and the latter may remove him from his post, not only when he fails to comply with his duty
or disobeys a legitimate order, but also when it is shown that he is incapable to continue
discharging the functions inherent therein and his removal is beneficial to the interests of goods
administration.

Facts:
The petitioner is the widow of the deceased Dr. Narciso Padilla, who died in the City of Manila on
February 12, 1934, leaving two wills dated December 12 and 17, 1932, respectively. In the first
will, the petitioner was appointed residuary legatee of the estate left by the testator, while in the
second will the respondent, the mother of the testator, was instituted universal heir of his entire
estate, without prejudice to the widow's share due the petitioner. Both wills were presented for
probate thereby instituting special proceedings Nos. 46058 and 46063 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila. The court, in its decision of March 30, 1935, admitted to probate the will of December
17, 1932, and appointed said respondent as executrix thereof. The petitioner appealed from said
decision and she was appointed special administratrix during the appeal now pending in this court.

On January 30, 1935, the petitioner rendered her first account as special administratrix. In it she
mentioned only the income of the only immovable property included in the first inventory filed by
her.

On April 21, 1937, the respondent filed a motion of even date, praying for the removal of the
petitioner as special administratrix and for the appointment of a banking institution in her place. The
motion was based on their regularities committed by their petitioner in filing incomplete inventories
and inexact accounts, which gave rise to oppositions filed by the respondent.

On June 15, 1937, the court issued an order removing the petitioner from her post and appointing
the Philippine Trust Company thereto. The petitioner asked for the reconsideration of said order bit
the motion was denied in another order of the 28th of said month.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in removing the petitioner as special administratrix.

Held:
No.
The court, in removing the petitioner from her post, did not base its decision directly on the
irregularities committed by her in filing inaccurate inventories and accounts, but on the continuous
conflicts and disputes often arising between said parties, which, in its opinion, redounced to the
detriment of the properties under administration. For this reason the petitioner instituted this
proceeding, alleging that the court abused its discretion in removing her or causes different from
those stated in the motion filed by the respondent on April, 21, 1937.

The Code of Civil Procedure contains no expenses provision relative to the removal of a special
administrator. However, section 653 thereof, which provides for the removal of a regular
administrator and of an executor, is applicable to the case of a special administrator. Said section
reads:

SEC. 653. The court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administration. - If an
executor or administrator neglects, after notice by the court, to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or decree of such court, or absconds or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may, in its discretion,
remove him, and may allow an executor or administration to resign.

According to the foregoing provisions, the power to remove an administration falls entirely under
the sound discretion of the court, and the latter may remove him from his post, not only when he
fails to comply with his duty or disobeys a legitimate order, but also when it is shown that he is
incapable to continue discharging the functions inherent therein and his removal is beneficial to the
interests of goods administration.

It is true that in the present case the court did not base the removal of the petitioner on any of the
cause specified in the respondent's motion for said relief, but on the conflicts and misunderstandings
that have continuously existed between them. It is undeniable, however, that said conflicts have
really existed from the inception of the administration and have redounced to the detriment of the
interests of the administration. Due to such conflicts and to the lack of good harmony between the
petitioner and the respondent, the former showed incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties,
which gave rise to the filing of inaccurate inventories and accounts which, in turn, required the
filing of oppositions thereto, the hearings of which absorbed the attention of the court for quite a
long time. These facts, which cannot be denied because they appear of record and are admitted by
the parties, necessarily denote irregularities in the exercise of the administration and, in view
thereof, this court cannot hold that the respondent judge abused the sound discretion entrusted to
him by the law, or that he exceeded the exercise thereof. In the administration of the estates of
deceased persons and in the selection of the officers to help the court in the present settlement,
liquidation and distribution thereof, the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate
courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown
that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.

Suy Chong King vs. Coll. Of Internal Revenue

60 Phil 493

Doctrine: Apparently the statute does not require approval of the committee's appraisals by the
court; but doubtless exceptions thereto might be taken by the executor or administrator upon whom
a copy was served. The purpose of the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is to aid
the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or administrator
and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate
the administration of the estate.

Facts: The administrator of the estate of Tomas Siy Cong Bieng {alias Siy Chong Lin), deceased,
was ordered to pay an inheritance tax to be based on the value of the property of the estate as
appraised by the commissioners on claims and appraisals.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, through the Solicitor General, filed in said special
proceedings a motion for the reconsideration of said order. To this motion is attached a sworn proof
of debt in which the Collector of Internal Revenue certifies that the estate of the said deceased is
indebted to the Government of the Philippine Islands for inheritance tax, surcharge and interest.
The court having denied the motion of the Solicitor-General for reconsideration of the order of
October 2, 1933, he appeals to the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the judicial administrator to pay the
inheritance tax in accordance with the value of the estate as appraised by the commissioners on
claims and appraisals.

Held: There is no provision of law which makes it the duty of the Collector of Internal Revenue
.to take part in the deliberations of the commissioners on claims and appraisals nor is he required to
take exceptions to the report of such a committee and appeal to the court for a revision of its
appraisals. The statute provides that the committee, after being sworn to make a true appraisal, shall
appraise the value of the estate in money and return their warrants with such appraisal to the court
and shall deliver a copy of the appraisal to the executor or administrator. (Section 670, Code of
Civil Procedure.) Apparently, the statute does not require approval of the committee's appraisals by
the court; but doubtless exceptions thereto might be taken by the executor or administrator upon
whom a copy was served. The purpose of the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is
to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or
administrator and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise
to facilitate the administration of the estate. Although by Act No. 3606, which amends section 1544
of the Administrative Code, relating to taxes on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis
causa, it is provided that d Certified copy of letters testamentary or of administration as well as
certified copies of the schedule of partition and the order of the court approving the same shall be
furnished to the Collector of Internal Revenue by the clerk of the court within thirty days after the
issuance of such letters testamentary or of administration or after the promulgation of such orders,
these provisions do not in any sense make the Collector of Internal Revenue a party in all of the
cases of testate or intestate successions pending in these Islands. The object of these notices is to
inform the collector of estates that might be subject to inheritance taxes and to enable him to
perform his duty as such collector to make the assessments and perform the specific duties as
prescribed in section 1544 of the Administrative Code, as amended by said Act No. 3606,
particularly paragraph (6) thereof, and section 1545 of the Administrative Code.

Felix Garcia vs. Isabel Vda. De Arjona, et al.

G.R. No. l-8991, October 23, 1956

Doctrine:

Facts:
Plaintiff filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the purpose of having
certain document declared as an equitable mortgage and praying that the consignation he has made
of the sum of P4,350.02 with the clerk of court be approved and Defendants be ordered to execute a
deed of release of said mortgage, to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P14,779.98 representing excess
interest, to pay P6,000 as damages and P5,000 as attorneys’ fees, plus the costs of action.

Defendants answered denying the genuineness and due execution of the aforesaid document and
setting up as a defense that said document is a promise to sell or an option contract; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat they had already acquired the property subject-matter of the mortgage
through acquisitive prescription, and that the action is already barred by the statute of limitation.

The mortgage in question covers five lots situated in Liliw, Laguna, which were formally covered
by Tax Declaration all in the name of Plaintiff. To satisfy a judgment rendered against him in Civil
Case of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, said lots were sold at public auction to the Plaintiff in
said case in whose favor the corresponding certificate of sale was executed by the provincial sheriff
on December 14, 1929. On November 20, 1930, Francisco Arjona redeemed four of said lots and
Marcelino Arjona redeemed the fifth lot upon the request of Felix Garcia, who promised to
reimburse later on the amounts paid by the Arjonas.

In 1932, the first four lots were redeemed from Francisco Arjona with money borrowed by Felix
Garcia from Marcelino Arjona with the understanding that the refund of said sums would be
guaranteed by a mortgage on the properties above-mentioned. Hence, on March 3, 1932, Felix
Garcia and Marcelino Arjona executed the deed Exhibit A. Upon the execution of this deed, Felix
Garcia who, despite the auction sale in 1929 and the redemption by the Arjonas in 1930, had
remained in possession of the properties in question, delivered the same to Marcelino Arjona, in
whose name new tax declarations were issued subsequently. Upon the death of Marcelino Arjona
on February 8, 1941, the properties were placed under the administration of the judicial
administrator of his estate, his brother Engracio Arjona. In 1951, the latter asked Felix Garcia to
redeem the properties for P10,000, but before any definite agreement could be reached, Engracio
Arjona died. On February 6, 1952, Felix Garcia offered to redeem the properties, but the widow and
the children of Marcelino Arjona, who succeeded in the possession thereof, rejected the offer. So
Felix Garcia made a judicial consignation of the sum of P4,350.02 and instituted the present action.

Issue:
WON the lower court erred in denying his claim for the refund of the excess interest received by
Defendants in the form of fruits they and their predecessors-in- interest.

Held:
Yes.
The facts of the case is impressive and may serve as basis for determining the benefits derived by
Defendants from the lots in question, but a more careful scrutiny thereof would reveal that the same
contains many flaws. In the first place, the testimony of Monfero as to the price of coconuts from
1932 to 1952 cannot be relied upon for it is merely based upon memory and is not supported by any
document.

It is true that the tax declarations submitted by Appellant show the actual number of coconut trees
standing on the lands as well as the calculated annual yield of coconuts that the trees may bear
during said period, but such evidence is far from being satisfactory because it fails to take into
account certain factors which may prevent production and enjoyment, for it cannot be denied that
there may be years where no transaction can be made either because of faulty yield, sickness, lack
of buyers and the like. In short, as the lower court well said, “Such evidence does not furnish an
adequate and reliable basis for making a correct estimate of the annual yield of the land.” For this
reason, we are persuaded to uphold the finding of the lower court which we consider to be the most
fair and equitable under the circumstances.

Gatmaitan vs. Medina

L-14400, August 5, 1960
Doctrine: No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees or any of them, give a bond, in the sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the courts
directs.
Facts:
Veronica Medina, wife of Felicismo Gatmaitan, died intestate. Gatmaitan filed a petition seeking
his appointment as the administrator while Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina (half-blood
siblings of deceased) filed an opposition and prayed that Gorgonio, as neutral third party, or
Gorgonio and Gatmaitan, jointly, be appointed as administrator or administrators of the estate.
Gatmaitan was appointed as administrator of his wife’s intestate, along with his co-administrator,
Gorgonio Medina. Medina and other heirs filed a Motion for Partial Partition and Distributiton of
the estate even though there is no final inventory yet that was approved by the court. Such partial
partition includes P1,000.00 cash each for Gorgonio and Dominica Medina and 25 cavans of palay
each for the two and for the three other heirs. The court approved the motion for partial partition
and distribution. Gatmaitan filed an MR but was denied by the court.

Issue:
WON the court can order a partial distribution of the estate without requiring the distributes to file
the proper bonds.

Held:
The Supreme Court held in the negative.

As a partial distribution of the estate should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts in
order to ensure that all the creditors and the rightful heirs of the estate are protected.

A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate
proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged b\ the courts and, unless in extreme cases,
such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is
that courts should guard with utmost deal the estate of the decedent to the end that creditors be
adequately protected and rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance.
The appealed order is set aside by the Court, without prejudice to the issue of another order after
such strict compliance with the Rules of Court on proper filing of bond by the distributes.

DOLORES VASQUEZ vs. JAIME L. PORTA

G.R. No. L-6767, February 28, 1956

Facts:
Dolores Vasquez had obtained against her husband Mariano B. Arroyo a judgment for separate
maintenance at P500 a month. Dr. Arroyo repeatedly sought to evade fulfilling the judgment by
simulated sales of his properties, two of which were finally set aside by the Courts before the last
war. Later, in 1938, the husband attempted to make a simulated sale of the very properties here in
question in favor of his step-mother Dña. Trinidad Vda. de Arroyo, but the latter refused to accept
the simulated conveyance.

The evidence fully supports the findings of the trial Court that, after the rebuff from his stepmother,
the late Dr. Arroyo persisted in his plan of fictitiously encumbering his properties to defeat the
judgment in favor of his wife, Appellee herein. Hence on July 3, 1939, he executed a second
mortgage (Exhibit F) on the lands in question in favor of Appellant Jaime L. Porta, and ratified it
before Notary Public Advincula, whose office was in the same room as Arroyo’s lawyer, Jose G.
Ganzon. The consideration recited was P30,000, and receipt thereof was acknowledged; no money
was paid over when the mortgage was signed.

The foreclosure sale was had, and the certificate of sale in favor of the mortgagee was issued on
January 18, 1941 (Exhibit L); but no order confirming the sale is of record, though the Defendant’s
file of the proceedings appears otherwise complete. However, prior to the execution and sale, the
Appellant Porta appears to have executed a cancellation of the mortgage debt’.

The Appellant asserts that the Appellee, Dolores Vasquez, as administratrix and representative of
the late Mariano Arroyo, cannot now impugn the fraudulent transactions of her husband.

Issue:
WON mortgage and sale in favor of Appellant Jaime L. Porta were fictitious, simulated and without
consideration, hence, inexistence.

Held:

The principle “in pari delicto non oritur actio” does not apply to bar Appellee’s action: first,
because she sued not only as administratrix of the deceased, but also in her own behalf; because the
maxim applies only in case of existing contracts with illegal consideration. (Articles 1305, 1306,
Civil Code of 1889; Articles 1411 and 1412, new Civil Code) and is not applicable to simulated or
fictitious contracts nor to those that are inexistent for lack of an essential requisite (consideration in
this case). The fact that the collusive agreement between Arroyo and Porta had the illegal purpose
of defrauding Arroyo’s wife does not bring the case within the purview of the maxim and the
articles mentioned, since an illegal purpose cannot supply the want of consideration that renders the
contract inexistent (Gonzales vs. Trinidad, 67 Phil., 682).

Anent the defense of prescription, suffice it to say that, even under the prior legislation (Act 190),
the statute of limitations only commenced to run against the Appellee from the time of her
discovery of the fraudulent maneuvers of which she was a victim; and she had no inkling of them
until 1948, when her husband died and she found among his papers Porta’s cancellation of the
mortgage in his favor, and the draft of the complaint for foreclosure. Having initiated these
proceedings in 1949, the four-year limitation from the discovery of the fraud had not yet elapsed,
and her action was not extinguished or barred.

Julieta Tambunting De Tengco vs. Hon. Ramon R. San Jose

G.R. No. L-8162, August 30, 1955

Doctrine: In probate proceedings the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate and as such
trustee it should jealousy guard the estate under administration (Dariano vs.  Fidalgo, 14 Phil., 67)
and see to it that it is wisely and economically administered and not dissipated.

Facts: Clara Tambunting died on April 2, 1950, leaving properties, real and personal, of great
value. Her will was probated on August 21, 1950. Survived by her husband Vicente L. Legarda, she
left as sole and direct heir her grandson Vicente Legarda Price, an only child of her only child and
daughter Clarita Tambunting married to Walter Scott Price. Clarita died during the Liberation in
1945; her surviving spouse Walter Scott Price later remarried and returned to the United States. His
sister Pacifica Price de Barrios married to a brother of Atty. Salvador Barrios was later appointed
guardian of the minor Vicente Legarda Price who by now must be around ten or eleven years old. 

Three co-administrators were appointed—Vicente L. Legarda, represented by his father-in-

law Atty. Sarte; Pacifica Price de Barrios, represented by her brother-in-law Atty. Barrios; and
Augusto Tambunting, represented by Atty. Eduardo D. Gutierrez. Each co-administrator filed a
bond in the sum of P10,000. At the time the estate was valued at P200,000.

On June 15, 1951, Attys. Sarte and Gutierrez filed a joint petition asking the probate court
that their authorized attorney's fees of P25,000 each be equalized to that of Atty. Barrios which was
P50,000. Pacifica Price, co-administrator and her counsel Atty. Barrios opposed the petition but
later withdrew their opposition provided that the additional fees of P25,000 each sought by Attys.
Sarte and Gutierrez be paid from the share of their clients, namely, Benjamin, Augusto, Romeo and
Julieta, represented by Atty. Gutierrez and Vicente L. Legarda represented Atty. Sarte. Because of
the conformity of the parties this petition for increase was granted by the probate court, and to be
paid from the estate, but with the understanding that the fee of P50,000 given to Atty. Barrios and
the fees of Atty. Sarte and Gutierrez of P25,000 each plus the additional P25,000 to each should be
the limit to the amounts of attorney's fees chargeable to the estate, and that any additional attorney's
fees sought and awarded should come from the estate of their respective clients and with the
consent of the latter.

Issue:
Held: The Court agrees with petitioner that she has a right to appeal from the order denying her
petition to set aside the orders of April 9, 1952 and November 26, 1952. By merely granting the
petition for mandamus, the appeal would be given due course and when the case is elevated to us
on appeal, the question or questions to be submitted and discussed would revolve around the nature
of said two orders of April 9 and November 26, whether they had become final and executory and
therefore beyond the power of the probate court to amend or to set aside, even under a petition for
relief under Rule 38, for the reason that said petition was filed beyond the period prescribed by said
rule, or whether said two orders may be considered as merely incidental in the special proceedings
and consequently, interlocutory in nature, subject to the control of the probate court until the case is
finally closed, during which time they may be amended or set aside. These same questions were
exhaustively presented and discussed by counsel for both parties and we have carefully considered
and passed upon them, our opinion and ruling being that said orders are interlocutory in character
and may be modified or even set aside by the probate court when so warranted. For this reason, we
have decided in the interest of justice, and to save time, expense and labor to the parties, and avoid
further expense to the estate, and also so as not to unduly prolong these probate proceedings, to
dispense with the appeal and to consider the present petition as one for certiorari to set aside and
annul the order of the probate court of December 28, 1953 denying the petition to set aside two
orders in question, solely on the ground that it was filed out of time.

Prudencia Chua Tan vs. Lucia Del Rosario

G.R. No. 35903, Oct. 27, 1932

Facts: This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Prudencia Chua Tan and others, from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila finally dismissing their complaint and ab solving the defendant,
Lucia del Rosario, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Toco, with costs against said
appellants. In support of their appeal the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed
by the trial court in its decision, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in sustaining the defendant-appellee's defense of res judicata, on the
ground that this case has already been decided by the Supreme Court, instituted by Benedicta Santa
Juana, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Piaco against Lucia del Rosario, also as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Toco.
2. The lower court also erred in holding that the P20,000 belonged to Chua Toco
exclusively, when the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chua Toco received part of
this sum of money from his adoptive farther, Chua Piaco, the predecessor-in-interest of the herein
plaintiffs-appellants; and that this sum of P20,000 deposited in acurrent account bearing interest at
twelve per cent per annum, with the firm Ty Cameo Sobrino, amounted to P77,118.90 on April 24,
1913 when the liquidation was made; which sum is the exclusive property of Chua Piaco and Chua
Toco, father and son.
3. The lower court also erred in not Ànding that the sum of P38,559.30 which is one-half of
the P77,118.60 that Chua Toco had used to purchase a piece of land on Antonio Rivera Street,
e[propriated b\ the Manila Railroad Company, in civil case No. 12832 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, belongs to the herein plaintiffs appellants as surviving spouse and heirs of the late Chua
Piaco, and to the Intestate Estate of Chua Toco, as adopted son of Chua Piaco.
4. The lower court likewise erred in finally dismissing the complaint filed by the herein
plaintiffs-appellants, and in sentencing the latter to pa\ the costs of the trial. "5. The lower court
erred in denying the motion for a new trial filed in this case by the plaintiffs-appellants.

Benedicta Santa Juana, as administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Chua Piaco, was
the legal representative not only of said estate but also of its creditors and heirs. In view of this
relation of agent and principal between her and the plaintiffs in the present case, the decision
rendered against Benedicta Santa Juana, as such administratrix, in the former case is conclusive and
binding upon said plaintiffs in the present case, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issue: WON there is identity of parties in that said civil case and in the case at bar.

Held: In civil case No. 25797 the plaintiff was Benedicta Santa Juana, as judicial administratrix of
the intestate estate of Chua Piaco, and the defendant was Lucia del Rosario, as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Chua Toco. In the present case the plaintiffs are the presumptive heirs of the late
Chua Piaco and the defendant is Lucia del Rosario, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua
Toco. It is the duty of the administrator of the testate or in testate estate of a deceased to present an
inventory of the real estate and all goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which have
come into his possession or knowledge, in accordance with the provisions of section 668 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and to manage them according to section 643 of the same Code; and in
order that he may have in his power and under his custody all such property, section 702 of the
aforesaid Code authorizes him to bring such actions for the purpose as he may deem necessary.

Under the provisions of the law, therefore, the judicial administrator is the legal
representative not only of the testate or intestate estate, but also of the creditors, and heirs and
legatees, inasmuch as he represents their interest in the estate of the deceased. Benedicta Santa
Juana, as administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Chua Piaco, was the legal representative
not only of said estate but also of its creditors and heirs. In view of this relation of agent and
principal between her and the plaintiffs in the present case, the decision rendered against Benedicta
Santa Juana, as such administratrix, in the former case is conclusive and binding upon said plaintiffs
in the present case.

Testate estate of Jose Flores vs. Sotero Flores

G.R. No. 22102, September 19, 1924

The administrator of the estate applied to the lower court for authority to sell certain properties of the
inheritance. That court denied the application because the question about the title to the property sought to be
sold had not as yet been finally decided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This appeal from said ruling which we find substantially correct. The liquidation of an inheritance
consists not only in the payment of its debts, but also in the determination of its assets and
properties. And as the debts are to be paid out of said properties, it is obvious that there must first be
determined what properties can legally be disposed of by the administrator, so that he may use them
afterwards in the payment of the debts. We find no sufficient merit in the assignment of errors.

The orders appealed from are affirmed

Fortunato Layague and Santiago Rombo vs. Concepciðn Perez De Ulgasan

G.R. No. L-13666, October 31, 1960

Facts: a On July 29, 1949, petitioners Fortunato Layague and Santiago Rombo filed with the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental an action for declaratory relief against respondent
Concepcion Perez de Ulgasan, the judicial administratrix of deceased Alipia Perez’s estate, praying
that the deeds of sale, annexes "A", "C" and "E" of the complaint - wherein certain portions of real
property under administration were sold to them by the heirs of Alipia in 1946 – be declared legal
and valid and that the same be confirmed. The complaint alleged, among other things, that prior to
the sales sought to be declared valid, the real estate was partitioned by the heirs among themselves
and by virtue of such partition, the heirs took possession of their respective shares.

Concepcion, in her answer, claimed that the extrajudicial partition, as well as the sales made by the
alleged heirs of Alipia Perez, was null and void. Concepcion, therefore, asked for the dismissal of
the complaint and, as counterclaim, prayed that for the coconut fruits gathered from the lands
plaintiff Fortunato Layague be sentenced to pay P2,700.00 and plaintiff Santiago Rombo, P1,800.00
to the estate of the deceased Alipia Perez, including interests from the commencement of the action,
plus costs and expenses of the litigation.

No trial, however, was held on the main case, because on October 2,1956, the plaintiffs and the
defendant entered into a stipulation of facts. It is admitted in the stipulation of facts that Fortunato
and Santiago were "during the years 1947- 48 up to September 1949" in possession of two-thirds
portion of the land under administration proceedings by virtue of the deeds of sale executed by the
heirs; that during that period, Fortunato Layague gathered 40,000 coconuts which yielded about
8,000 kilos of copra, while Santiago Rombo gathered 12,000 coconuts which he converted into
2,400 kilos of copra; and that both of them sold the copra, the price thereof beingP55.00 per
hundred piculs at the time. It is likewise admitted that theland in question was in custodia legis
when the heirs sold their interest or participation therein in 1946. As a matter of fact, the intestate
proceedings of the late Alipia Perez was instituted way back in 1936and has not yet been closed or
terminated.

CFI RULING:
Upheld the sales made by the heirs of Alipia to Fortunato and Santiago. It also upheld the validity
of the stipulation of facts made by the parties.

Issue: Whether Fortunato and Santiago should pay Concepcion the value of the fruits they had
gathered from the estate?

RULING:
No.

Fortunato and Santiago should not pay Concepcion the value of the fruits they had gathered from
the estate, since there are no debts to be paid, there is no reason for the executor or administrator
taking possession of the estate which should pass to the heirs.

Under section 3, Rule 85, of the Rules of Court, the executor or administrator shall have the right to
take possession of the real or personal properly of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of debts and expenses of administration. Where there are no debts, however, to be paid,
there is no reason for the executor or administrator taking possession of the estate which should
pass to the heirs. (Buenaventura, et al. vs. Ramos, 43 Phil., 704.) The sale made in the instant case
by the heirs of their right, interest or participation in the lands under administration in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellees having been declared valid and there being not even an intimation that the estate
is indebted, we are inclined to rule that the payment for the value of the fruits gathered by the
plaintiffs- appellees as purchasers to the defendant administratrix is not necessary and might even
prove to be cumbersome. me.

In any event, the quantity of the fruits gathered by appellees is known and determinable in value.
Conceding that the proceeds they received from the fruits of the estate belong to the estate, the court
in the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over them and could, if necessary, compel said
appellees to deliver to the administratrix of the estate the necessary portion of said proceeds for the
payment of any claim against the estate. In this connection, we note that the estate of the deceased
has been under administration proceedings for quite an unreasonably long time. This is patently
against the policy of the Rules of Court to close up the estate as promptly and economically as
possible. As was once held by this Court, "All courts of first instance should exert themselves to
close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and may refuse to allow any
compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may
even adopt harsher measures." (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124.) The defendant
administratrix would, therefore, do well to accomplish the administration of the estate with the
utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the remainder among the persons
entitled thereto.
Primitivo Sato vs. Simeon Rallos, et al.
G.R.No. L-17194, September 30, 1964

Facts: The records disclose that at the near closing of the said Special Proceedings, defendant
Simeon Rallos engaged the services of plaintiff Primitivo Sato, for the purpose of securing a
reduction in the assessment of inheritance taxes on the estates, made by the Collector of Internal
Revenue. As of November 15, 1949, the estates had a combined liability of P130,076.43, including
surcharges and interests. According to plaintiff Sato, the compensation, which was contingent upon
the successful reduction of the assessed taxes to an amount less than P30,000.00, had been verbally
agreed upon at P20,000.00 cash and one (1) hectare of an\ of the commercial residential lots of the
estates, the choice of which was up to plaintiff Sato, or the corresponding value thereof.

On November 15, 1951, about ten (10) months after representations made b\ plaintiff Sato with the
Internal Revenue, the inheritance taxes of P22,545.47, a very much reduced amount to that of
P130,076.43, were paid. Because of the above payment made, the Collector of Internal Revenue
moved on November 16, 1953, to dismiss the Complaint of Intervention he earlier filed (Civil Case
No. R-899), which involved the properties of the estates. The motion for dismissal Zas granted b\
the trial court (Exhs. N and N-1). Demand letters were served for the settlement of the agreed
attorney·s fees upon Simeon Rallos. Apparently, no settlement Zas affected, for, on September 3,
1955 a complaint Zas filed for the collection of the fees. In the said complaint, plaintiff Sato asked
for attachment of the properties of the estates, which Zas denied on November 12, 1955,

Issue:

Held:

In the case at bar, the complaint was not only filed against the administrator as such and as a
distributee but also against the other distributees Which is more than the legal procedural
requirements. Appellees claim that since the estate had already been distributed and the heirs had
received their respective shares, free from an\ obligation, no award can be made in favor of
plaintiff. Under the circumstances of the case and in the spirit of Article 2142 of the Civil Code,
which declares that no one should unjustly enrich and/or benefit himself at the expense of another,
We cannot and Our Za\ clear to den\ appellant’s right to attorney’s fees. It is contended that the
other Congressman of Cebu, also offered to help and that appellant Sato made his offer as
Congressman, and not as a later. This allegation finds no factual support in the records. And if Ze
consider that the huge value of the properties of the estates, for appellee Simeon Rallos alone
received P930,000.0 as his share in the estate of Numeriana Rallos and estate of Victoria Rallos Zas
worth P613,000.00, the Court cannot justly assume that appellant Sato offered his services.

In Re: Intestate Estate Of Beatriz C. De Rama, Angelo O. De Rama vs. Cherie Palileo
G.R. No. L-18935, February 6, 1965
Doctrine: S2 R86. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the
preceding section, the court shall estate the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which
shall not be more than twelve (12) not less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication
of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a
creditor who has failed to file his claim within the previously limited, the court may, for cause
shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding
one (1) month.

Facts: In connection with the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Beatri] Cosio de Rama, and pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance of Ri]al before
which the proceeding is pending, a notice to all persons with money claims against the deceased to
file their said claims within six months, was duly published, the first notice appearing in the August
13, 1958 issue of the Manila Chronicle. On January 27, 1959, the administrator filed an inventory of
the estate, showing assets amounting to P139,596.77 and liabilities in the sum of P33,012.95. The
period provided in the published notice having expired without anybody filing any claim against the
deceased, the administrator, upon order of the court, submitted a final account of the estate and a
project of partition, which were approved on May 12, 1960.

Cherie Palileo petitioned the court for permission to file a claim in the proceeding, alleging that on
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 22556-R, promulgated on May 6, 1961, she
obtained a money judgment against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama; that the lower court decided
in her favor the question of ownership and possession of a real property involved in the case. The
administrator opposed this petition on the ground that the claim was filed beyond the period
provided in the notice to creditors.

Issue: WON Palileo filed her claim beyond the period provided in the notice to creditors.

Held: No. The Court held that the period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that
money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered,
at the discretion of the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. This extension of the
period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the order authorizing such extension. It is
not controverted in the instant case that no order of distribution of the estate has as yet been made.

Appelant, however, charges that the lower court committed an abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed order without sufficient ground or cause therefor. The petition of claimant-appellee, for
permission to file a claim in the proceeding, was based on the fact that the award of damages in her
favor, against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama, was contained in the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 22556-R which was promulgated on May 6, 1961 or after the 6- month
period provided in the notice to creditors had already elapsed. It is her contention that she could not
have filed a money claim against the estate before the promulgation of said decision because
although the lower court in that case upheld her right to the ownership and possession of the
building subject thereof, no damages were adjudged in her favor. Considering this argument, the
lower court found it sufficient to justify the relaxation of the rule and extension of the period within
which to file her claim. In the circumstances, the action taken by the lower court cannot be
considered an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to justify its reversal
by this court.

Manuel H. Barredo vs. CA

G.R. No. 17863, November 28, 1962

Doctrine: The one-month period for filing late claims mentioned in Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules
of Court, begins to run from the order authorizing the filing of the claims, and not from the
expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims.

Facts: a promissory note was secured by amortgage executed on 31 December 1940 in favor of
Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDonough on the greater portion of a parcel of
registered land located at Dongalo, Parañaque, Rizal, owned by Constantino Factor, and over four
(4) houses which McDonough had constructed on the leased land. The lease contract between
Factor and McDonough provided for a term of 10 years from 1 September 1936; but on December
1940, the parties extended the term up to 31 August 1961. The original lease, the extension of its
term, and the mortgage were all inscribed at the back of certificate of title of the land.

Upon Fausto Barredo’s death on 8 October 1942, his heirs, in a deed of extrajudicial partition,
adjudicated unto themselves the secured credit of the deceased, and had the same recorded on the
aforesaid certificate of title. This annotation was, however, cancelled when one day in August 1944
Manuel H. Barredo was ordered to appeal before an officer of the Japanese Imperial Army at the
Army and Navy Club and was commanded to bring with him all the documents pertaining to the
mortgage executed by the late McDonough whose private properties, because of his enemy
citizenship, were, in the words of the Court of Appeals, “appropriated by the triumphant
invader”.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim against the estate of
McDonough. This claim was opposed by the administrator. After hearing, the lower court allowed
the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order of allowance. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON the claim of the heirs of Fausto Barredo were belatedly filed against the estate of
McDonough in holding that “one month” period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the six-month period fixed in the published
notice to file claims.

Held: It is pertinent to state before discussing the arguments of counsel that in view of the burning
and destruction of the buildings which were the subject of the mortgage, the petitioners manifested
their wish to abandon their security and prosecute the claim against the estate as for a simple money
debt, and that when the Barredo heirs filed their claim, no order of distribution had been entered in
the proceedings.

Sec.2, Rule 86. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the
preceding section, the court shall estate the time for the filing of claims against the estate,
which shall not be more than twelve (12) not less than six (6) months after the date of the
first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim
to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.

However, the probate court’s discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing
claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only a claim for apparent
merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners
alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo
from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground is insufficient, due to the
availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of
title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by
the Japanese military authorities.

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim is without justification, because under Section
2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no
cause or for an insufficient cause.

Rio y Compania vs. Maslog, et al.

G.R. No. L-12302

Doctrine: The purpose of the law in filling a definite period within which claims against an
estate of a deceased person must be presented is to insure a speedy settlement of the estate and
the early distribution and delivery of the property to the persons who are legally entitled to
receive.

Facts: On January 15, 1939, Rio y Olabarrieta (predecessor-in interest of appellant Rio y
-Compania) and the late Anastacio Manalo, father of the defendant-appellee Elvira Maslog,
entered into a "Contrato de Servicios Personales" Zherein the personal services of Anastacio
Manalo Zere engaged by plaintiff-appellant for the administration and exploitation of its forest
concession. Under the contract, plaintiff-appellant Zas to extend to agent Manalo a credit not
exceeding P5,000.00 with interest at 9% per annum.

On May 30, 1941, Anastacio Manalo died intestate at Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Elvira Maslog
carried on the account of her late father and made payments thereon up to December 31, 1941.
As of December 31, 1941, the balance of the account stood at P18,614.58 due and owing to
plaintiff-appellant. On January 29, 1954, plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Palawan for the recover\ of said amount from Elvira Maslog (joined with her
husband) in her capacity as her father's only heir, because through an affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement of November 19, 1953 she had adjudicated to herself all the properties of the late
Anastacio Manalo. Before the case Zas set for hearing, defendants-appellees filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the cause of action has already prescribed. The trial
court rendered a decision, holding that the complaint Zas filed late and consequently dismissed
the same.

Issue: WON the complaint was filed late.

Held: It is admitted that Anastacio Manalo died intestate, and at the time of his death at Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, on Ma\ 30, 1941, he had an outstanding obligation in plaintiff-appellant's
favor in the total sum of P18,614.58. This claim, being for money and arising from contract, did
not survive and should have been filed promptly against the estate of the deceased debtor (Secs.
2 and 5, Rule 87). Plaintiff-appellant was aware of the death of Anastacio Manalo on said date,
and it is not claimed that Rio y Compania (successor to the original creditor) did not know the
existence of Manalo's obligation. As a creditor, it Zas appellant's duty to present its claim within
a reasonable time after Anastacio Manalo's death in the estate proceedings, and if none were had
to file a petition for letters of administration, as authorized by sec. 6(b) of Rule 79. But in spite
of the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's death on Ma\ 30, 1941 and its awareness of the
existence of the obligation, it did not take steps to institute administration proceedings, or collect
the debt in question until January 29, 1954, more than 12 years from the death of the decedent.
The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute
the residue.

The general objective of the moratorium law, which is rehabilitation of debtors, must give way to
the more urgent necessity of settling the estate of a decedent and distributing its residue among
his heirs as soon as possible thereby minimizing if not avoiding altogether, expenses of
administration." (Jison YV. Warner, Barnes & Co. Ltd., 89 Phil., 239; 48 Off. Ga]. No. 9, p.
3873.)

It appearing that more than 12 years had elapsed from the death of Anastacio Manalo before a
complaint was filed to recover the indebtedness of the deceased and without the filing of any
intestate proceedings in the court, the plaintiff-appellant's action is now barred and was correctly
dismissed by the court below.

Isidoro Santo vs. Leandra Manarang

G.R. No. 8235, March 19, 1914
Doctrine: If the property of the estate has been properly inventoried, the committee on claims
regularly appointed, the publication of the notice required by law duly made, and there has been no
fraud in the proceedings, claims or debts which the law requires shall be presented to the
committee on claims must be presented to it within the limitation of time provided in section 689
(Code Civ. Proc.) or they will be barred.

Facts: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property
which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of
this will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that
they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time
agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one
due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the
dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee
was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented.
This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff,
Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene
and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator. This
petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present
proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due
him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.

In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claims,
plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it
was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them
and directed that they should be paid. The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been mentioned
in the will he would have presented to the committee as a matter of course; that plaintiff was held to
believe by this express mention of his claims in the will that it would be unnecessary to present
them to the committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting them to the
committee until after the committee had made its final report.

Issue: WON petitioner’s claim is within the purview of the committee’s jurisdiction.

Held: The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the
administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him
appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix
for the recovery of the sum of money.

Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of
personal property. When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be
commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to
recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and
personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)

It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure
has established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at
least two restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and
which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all
legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due
his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In
case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must
be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an
insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if
the express mention of a debt in the will requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the
committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take
precedence over preferred debts?

We are aware that in some jurisdictions executors and administrators are, by law, obligated to
perform the duties which, in this jurisdiction, are assign to the committee on claims; that in some
other jurisdictions it is the probate court itself that performs these duties; that in some jurisdictions
the limitation upon the presentment of claims for allowance is longer and, possibly, in some shorter;
and that there is a great divergence in the classification of actions which survive and actions which
do not survive the death of the testator.

Estate of Telesforo de Dios

G.R. No. 7940, March 27, 1913

Doctrine: The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against as estate must be
presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early
delivery of the property to the persons entitled to receive it.

Facts: Tomas Osmexa claims to have had a claim against the estate of Telesforo de Dios, but did
not present the same within the six months speciÀed by the court for the presentation of claims to
the commissioners. The time having expired within which the claim should have been presented,
the claimant made a motion to the court asking for an extension of the time within which he could
present said claim. Said motion was founded upon a statement alleging as the only foundation for
the motion that said claimant "had not had an opportunity to formulate his claim during the period
of six months Àxed by the court." Later the statement was amended and ampliÀed so as to include
the allegation that the reason why said claim had not been presented was, "that during said time one
of the heirs of said estate was making propositions to said Tomas Osmexa to pay on his own
account the debt which he had against the property of said estate; that said Tomas Osmexa, under
the belief that the said heir would pay the said debt, and in the hope that the proposed settlement
would terminate satisfactorily, could not duly formulate his claim before the commission during
said period of six months; that said heir did not pay the debt or any part thereof to said Tomas
Osmena as he had at first offered to do."

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in denying appellant’s motion to extend.

Held:
Yes. The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be
presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased and the early delivery of the
property of the estate into the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. As we said in the case of
McMicking vs. Conbieng:
“it is the policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownershipof
property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for
the most urgent and imperative reasonsand then only so long as is necessary to make the
rights which underlie these reasons effective;” and, “it is a principle of universal
acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy that which he owns,
and it is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that
principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it.”

It is distinctly against the interests of justice and in direct opposition to the policy of the law to
extend unduly the time within which estates should be administered and thereby to keep the
property from the possession and use of those who are entitled to it.

To grant extension rest in the sound discretion of the court.

Before the time in which claimants must present their claims against an estate is extended the
person asking the privilege must present sound reasons Whether or not those reasons are
sufficient and whether as a result of their presentation the time ought or ought not to be extended
rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This being so, a decision as to whether or not the time shall be extended will not be disturbed on
appealunless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of that discretion. The general
doctrine is to the effect that, “in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, to the complaining
party’s prejudice, matters purely within the discretion of the trial court are not reviewable on
appeal.”

Tomas failed to show abuse of discretion (no meritorious claim against the estate).

In the case at bar the appellant failed to show that the court below abused the discretion given it
by law. In the first place, the appellant has not shown that he has a meritorious claim against the
estate. There appears nothing in the record demonstrating what the nature of the claim is, how it
was contracted, or when. There is simply a naked allegation that appellant has a claim.
In the second place, the appellant, admitting full knowledge of the time within which he should
have presented his claim and the date on which the time for presentation expired, presents no
sufficient explanation for failure to present the claim within that period. His only excuse is that
during the running of the period he was maintaining negotiations with one of the heirs for the
payment of the claim. Even if that were true, it furnishes no reason why the claim was not
presented. Although the negotiations may have been pending, the claim could have been
presented nevertheless and, on payment thereof by the heir, further proceedings could have been
prevented.

Isidoro Santos vs. Manarang

Facts:

Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal
property which, by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of
this will reads as follows: I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is
my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time
agreed upon with my creditors. Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in
favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other
described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of
P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and
determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its
report to the court on June 27, 1908.

On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the
committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were
recognized in the will of testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21,
1910, the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to
recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and
now appeals to this court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s claim is within the purview of the committee’s jurisdiction.

Ruling:
YES. The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the
administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due
him appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the
administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking
possession of or title to real property or specific articles of personal property. When a committee
is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the
executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but
actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the
estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.) It is evident from the brief
outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a
system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two
restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which
pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for an illegal
obligations incurred by him; and (2) he cannot dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his
heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. In case his estate is sufficient
they must be paid.

In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly
necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not
entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires
the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the
case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts? If it is
unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of non claims is not applicable. It
is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then
the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been distributed, what security
have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the administrator required to
pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has
he to vise the claim?

Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may, with the approval of
the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, But he is nowhere
permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of
the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of
the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The
administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as parties
litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To
allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the
dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may
not occur. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by
will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions
due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections614,
684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will
must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of
the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be
paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.

Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of
error he alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his
claim against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true
that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a
release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is an asset of the estate.
It would be absurd to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878,
Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure
beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the
mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by
law and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. Debts are demandable
and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of
personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum
mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt.
As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now
it is a legacy. But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the
nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive
nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares.

Rule 87

Modesto vs. Modesto, et al., 105 Phil. 1067

FACTS:

Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them were petitioner Cirilo and respondent
Jesus. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Jesus, acting as Administrator of the estate, filed
with CFI Tacloban, a Motion to Cite and Examine under Oath several persons, including Cirilo,
regarding properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulently conveyed, listing among others were
jewelries, furnitures, other personal properties, cash in the amount of P1,700 and real properties.
The CFI issued an Order appointing the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte and the Chief of Police of
Tanawan, Leyte as joint commissioners, to verify and ascertain persons who were holding,
claiming or possessing properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cirilo to turn over to him as administrator the personal
properties belonging to the intestate in his possession. The CFI issued an Order requiring Cirilo
to deliver to the administrator certain personal properties (narra aparador, desk, looking glass,
trunk containing clothes, bicycle, steel matting and P1,700 cash taken from a deposit made with
the Chief of Police). Thereafter, a writ of execution and alias writ of execution was issued by the
trial court. By virtue of which, the provincial Sheriff issued a Notice of Attachment against the
real property in the name of Cirilo Modesto.

Cirilo filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Writ of Execution and for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction which was opposed by Jesus. The Provincial Sheriff sold at public auction the real
property to the highest and only bidder Jesus for P2,454, and thereafter, issued a Sheriff’s
Certificate of Final Sale in favor of Jesus. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Cirilo,
which was however denied by the trial court. Consequently, upon motion of Jesus for a Writ of
Possession, the Provincial Sheriff issued a notification to Cirilo placing Jesus in possession of
the real property sold to him.

ISSUE: WON the trial court has the authority to decide whether the properties
concealed, embezzled or conveyed belong to the estate.

RULING:

No. The trial court committed error because the purpose of the Section 6, Rule 88 of the Rules of
Court, which section was taken from Section 709 of Act 190, is merely to elicit information or to
secure evidence from those persons suspected of having possessed or having knowledge of the
properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the
said properties of the deceased. In such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide
whether or not said properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined.
If, after such examination there is good reason to believe that said person or persons examined
are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next step to be taken should be for the
administrator to file an ordinary action in court to recover the same.

Valera vs. Inserto, 149 SCRA 533

FACTS:

Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18 hectare fishpond in Iloilo by the
Government to last during his lifetime. He transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter
Teresa to support her children with the agreement that when the children finishes schooling, the
fishpond will be returned to him
Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died. The heirs of Teresa—her
husband Jose Garin and their children bought the fishpond from the government acquiring title
thereto . The administrators of the Spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarosa filed before
the Probate Court and claim the fishpond to the spouses’ estates.
The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has been an implied trust created,
therefore the fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses pursuant to Articles 1453
and 1455 of the Civil Code1
Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforce reconveyance of the fishpond to the estate
1 Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is
an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated.

Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an
implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated.
The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to Fabiana, who although willingly surrendered it to
the sheriff, later filed a complaint-in-intervention. This was dismissed so he instituted a separate
action for injunction and damages
CA reversed (fishpond be returned to Garin Heirs and their lessee Fabiana) saying that: Probate
Court had no jurisdiction; that the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the
presumption that the estate owns the fishpond; and that assuming the Probate Court had
competence to resolve ownership, a separate action has to be filed.

ISSUE: WON the probate court had authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond.

RULING:

No. The RTC, acting as Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power
to take cognizance of and determine the issue of the title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question of the Probate Court
for adjudgment, or the interests of the third person are not thereby prejudiced.

This is issue not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving a mode of practice which may be
waived
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the
rule.
It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of
the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely
and permanently, and writing “finis” thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination
“in an ordinary civil action,” but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included
in the inventory. This function of resolving WON property should be included in the estate
inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court’s competence, although the Court’s
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, the fishpond cannot be the subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set
up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not
been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action.
These considerations assume greater cogency, where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is
not in the decedent’s names but in others. A separate action must be instituted by the
administrator to recover the property. The CA decision was affirmed.
Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353

FACTS:

After Luisa Garcia was appointed special administratrix of the properties left by the deceased
Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, she filed with the competent court an inventory thereof on May
13, 1936. On May 23, 1936, the heir Teresa Garcia objected to said inventory, taking exception
to various items therein.
On June 20, 1936, the court issued the following order: Without prejudice to the filing of an
ordinary action by the heir Teresa Garcia de Bartolome, the petition to include in the inventory
certain properties of the estate, filed by Teresa Garcia and others with the conformity of counsel
for the administratrix, is denied.

On July 28, 1936, Teresa Garcia filed a motion asking that she be appointed special
administratrix of the intestate for the sole purpose of bringing any action which she may believe
necessary to recover for the benefit of the intestate the properties and credits set out in her
motion, as well as other properties which might be discovered from time to time belonging to the
said intestate. After hearing said motion and the administratrix' opposition thereto, the Court
denied the motion.

ISSUE: WON a court has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon the exceptions which an heir takes
to an inventory of the properties left by a deceased referring to the inclusion or exclusion of
certain properties and credits.

RULING:

Yes. The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the
filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and
under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires
the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also
inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties
of a deceased persons duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations,
with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties
referred to therein belong  prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and
ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties (23 C.J., p. 1163, par. 381).
It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or regular, imposed by section 668 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his appointment a true
inventory of the real estate and all the goods, chattels, right, and credits of the deceased which
come into his possession or knowledge, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the
prescribed bond.

A court takes cognizance of testate on intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima
facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and
without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question
bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit.

Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213

FACTS:

In the inventory of properties submitted by the administratrix and approved by the Court without
opposition, one of the properties included is titled and registered in the name of petitioners. The
ownership of said property is in issue in an ordinary action in the regular court and the estate is
one of the parties therein. They moved to exclude the property from the inventory and asked for
a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership. Respondent judge denied the motion
holding that a probate court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of ownership of
properties included in the inventory of an estate.

On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that a probate court may make a prima facie
determination of the issue of ownership, and resolve the issue before it.

ISSUE: WON the probate court has the authority to inquire into the propriety of
such inclusion or exclusion of properties.

RULING:

Yes. The mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to
inquire into the propriety of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title
thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie
determination of the issue of ownership. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve
the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It
does not even matter that the issue is raised after the approval of the inventory because
"apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory and appraisal be approved by the court."

In the matter of inclusion or exclusion of property, if a property covered by Torrens title is

involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when the
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title.

A probate court’s order allowing the administratrix to collect rentals from a disputed property
listed in the inventory would have no more legal basis after the Supreme Court had held that the
property in issue should be excluded from the inventory of the subject estate. The probate court’s
authority extends only over properties listed in the inventory, without prejudice to any party
adversely affected asserting or protecting his right or interests in a separate appropriate remedy.

Alafriz vs. Mina, 28 Phil. 137

FACTS:

Prospero K. Alafriz was appointed as administrator of the estate of the deceased Gregorio
Navarroand presented a motion that appellant had in her possession a certain document or paper
or receipt for certain jewelry deposited by Gregorio Navarro, before his death, as security for a
loan. Upon the facts stated in this motion, the administrator asked that Pia Mina be cited to
appear in court for the purpose of showing whether she had such paper, document or receipt in
her possession.

After considering said motion, issued an order citing Pia Mina to appear in court, for the purpose
of answering the allegations of said motion. After hearing the respective parties, the judge, on
the same day, ordered her to deliver to the clerk of the court the paper or document mentioned in
said motion.

Pia Mina complied with the order of the court and deposited with the clerk of the court the pawn
ticket. She alleged that she and her mother were the real owners of the jewelry pawned.

Pia Mina presented a motion asking that the jewelry represented be excluded from the inventory
presented by the administrator and presented that the trial court erred in granting the petition of
the administrator’s counsel by summoning Pia Mina to testify in connection with the pawned
jewels.
ISSUE: WON the probate court may cite to appear before it any person who is suspected of
having concealed, embezzled or conveyed away any of the property belonging to an estate.

RULING:

Yes. Section 709 provides: "If any executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other
person interested in the estate of a deceased person complains to the court having jurisdiction of
the estate, that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of
the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his possession, or has
knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence of,
or tends to disclose the right, title, interest or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or
the last will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to appear
before it, and may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; if the person so cited
refuses to appear and answer such examination, or to answer such interrogatories as are put to
him, the court may, by warrant, commit him to the jail or prison of the province, there to remain
in close custody until he submits to the order of the court; and such interrogatories and answers
shall be in writing and signed by the party examined, and filed in the clerk s office."

There is nothing in section 709 which authorizes the court to take possession of the property, if
any should be found in the possession of persons cited to appear, under a proper complaint,
provided for in said section. When it appears that property belonging to an estate is in the
possession of a third person, it is the duty of the administrator to proceed by an ordinary action to
recover the possession of the same. There may be cases, however, where paper and documentary
evidence of ownership of property may be ordered turned over to the court.

There seems to be nothing in said section 709 which makes provision for the determination of
the ownership of property. It simply provides that a person who is suspected of having in his
possession property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under
oath, and such interrogatories and answers shall be in writing and signed by the party examined
and filed in the clerk’s office. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the
right of ownership of such property This conclusion seems to be supported by section 711 of the
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.

Sebial vs. Sebial, 64 SCRA 85

FACTS:

Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and
6 other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, BEjamina filed for
the settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator. Thisd petition was
oppsed by Roberta on the ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she
should be the one appointed as administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed
Benjamina and found that alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the letters of
administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue don the same date. The
oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an amicale settlement,
the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the porperties of te decedent with
segregation for each marriage.
On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six
months from the appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reocnsideration alleging as
ground that the court has no jusridiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyiind the 3-
month period.

Issue: WON the court loses jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6
months after the appointment?

RULING:

NO. The three-month period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court is not
mandatory. After the filing of petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the
publication of the notice of hearing, the proper court of first instance acquires jurisdiction over a
decedent’s estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed, and the fact that the
inventory was filed after the three-month period does not deprive the probate court of
jurisdiction to approve it. The administrator’s unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a
ground for his removal.

The probate court’s approval of the inventory is not a conclusive determination of what assets
constituted the decedent’s estate and of the valuation thereof, because such determination is only
provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue
of title or ownership.

The general rule is that questions of title property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate
proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to
submit to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate
court may definitely pass judgment thereon.

Matters affecting property under the administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate
court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided that the interest of third persons are not
prejudiced. However, the third person to whom the decedent’s assets had been fraudulently
conveyed may be cited to appear in court and may be examined under oath as to how they came
into the possession of the decedent’s assets but a separate action is necessary to recover said
assets.
Betty Chua, et al., vs. Absolute Management Corp., et al., G.R. No. 1448881, October 16,
2003

FACTS:

Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Jose L.
Chua. Thereafter,
she submitted to the trial court an inventory of all the real and personal properties of the
deceased. Absolute
Management Corporation, one of the creditors of the deceased, filed a claim against the estate of
the deceased in
the amount of P63.7M. As administratrix, Betty T. Chua tentatively accepted said amount as
correct, with a
statement that it shall be reduced or adjusted as evidence may warrant.

Absolute Management Corporation noticed that the deceased’s shares of stocks with Ayala Sales
Corporation and
Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. were not included in the inventory of assets. As a consequence,
it filed a motion to
require Betty T. Chua to explain why she did not report these shares of stocks in the inventory.
Through a reply, Betty T.
Chua alleged that these shares had already been assigned and transferred to other parties prior to
the death of her
husband, Jose L. Chua. She attached to her reply the deeds of assignment which allegedly
constituted proofs of transfer.

Absolute Management Corporation, suspecting that thedocuments attached to Betty T. Chua’s

reply were spurious
and simulated, filed a motion for the examination of the supposed transferees based on Section 6,
Rule 87.
Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that this provision bears no application to
the case. On February
7, 2000, Judge Dumatol issued the assailed order, denying the motion of the corporation as it was
seen as a mere
fishing expedition on its part. CA reversed, allowing the motion.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the trial court to give due course to the
Motion for Examination

RULING:
Yes. Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected of having possession
or knowledge of the properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or
conveyed any of the properties of the
deceased. The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through
the filing of the corresponding proceedings has supervision and control over these properties.
The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory of the administrator lists all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory.
In compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased the administrator should include or exclude in the inventory.
An heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that
certain properties, rights or credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise
the court’s duty to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to determine if
such observations deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to the estate.

However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties,
real or personal,
belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If after such examination there is good reason to
believe that the person examined is keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the
administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain
shares of stock by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically deprive the assignees
of their shares. They have a right to be heard on the question of ownership, when that property is
properly presented to the court.

In the present case, some of the transferees of the shares of stock do not appear to be heirs of the
decedent. Neither
do they appear to be parties to the intestate proceedings. Third persons to whom the decedent’s
assets had been
conveyed may be cited to appear in court and examined under oath as to how they came into
possession of the
decedent’s assets. In case of fraudulent conveyances, a separate action is necessary to recover
these assets.
Taken in this light, there is no reason why the trial court should disallow the examination of the
alleged transferees of
the shares of stocks. This is only for purposes of eliciting information or securing evidence from
persons suspected of
concealing or conveying some of the decedent’s properties to the prejudice of creditors.
Petitioners’ admission that these
persons are the decedent’s assignees does not automatically negate concealment of the
decedent’s assets on their part.
The assignment might be simulated so as to place the shares beyond the reach of creditors. In
case the shares are
eventually included in the estate, this inventory is merely provisional and is not determinative of
the issue of
ownership. A separate action is necessary for determination of ownership and recovery of
possession.

Punongbayan vs. Punongbayan, G.R. No. 156842, December 10, 2004

FACTS:

The intestate court denied respondent’s motion that petitioner (who has been co-administrator for
only one (1)
day at the time it was filed) should render an accounting of his administration of the estate and to
turn over the
certificates of placement of the proceeds from the sales of estate properties. He maintains that
petitioner should
be made to account first for the alleged illegal transfers of estate properties made by him before
he (respondent)
could render his own accounting.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the motion is proper?

RULING:

Yes. Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court, provides : Every executor or administrator shall
render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters
testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of
time for
presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or of disposing of the estate; and he
shall
render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled.
and Sec. 7, Rule 87, of the same Rules, provides – The court, on complaint of an executor or
administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor or administrator with any part of the
estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person to render a full account,
on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate
as came to his possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and of his proceedings
thereon; and if a person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish
him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court.
Applying Sec. 8, Rule 85, the intestate court denied the motion on the ground that it was
premature considering
that petitioner has been co-administrator for only one (1) day at the time it was filed. With the
denial, petitioner’s accountability as co-administrator was in no way settled as it did not preclude
or forestall future accountings by him which, under said Sec. 8, he is obliged to render within
one (1) year from receiving letters of administration, or as required by the court until the estate is
settled. Neither an accounting or an examination of petitioner under Section 7, Rule 87,
definitely settle the issue of his alleged illegal transfers and lease since a proceeding under this
section, like that under Sec.6 of the same Rule, is merely in the nature of fact-finding inquiries. It
is intended to elicit information or evidence relative to estate properties.

Rule 88

Robles vs. Manahan, L-10111, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Benigno Diaz Y Heredia, in his will, created a trust estate out of the properties not otherwise
disposed of. After the death of his wife, Diaz caused the preparation of a codicil. The testator
died and his will and codicil were accordingly probated. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was
appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in the will and the codicil, for the purpose of
paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named therein.

The trustee then petitioned the court, with the consent of all the legatees, for authority to sell all
the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted. The property located at
Rosario, Binondo, Manila was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan de Santiago.

Legatees Soledad Robles and her children filed a motion praying that the trustee be ordered to
deliver to them, in accordance with the will, 90% of the rentals collected from the property in
Rosario; which the trustee refused to deliver contending that upon authorization of the court of
the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and the rentals collected thereafter not
only from the Rosario property but also from all the other properties of the estate, constitute the
mass of the residuary estate to be distributed among the legatees in accordance with the terms of
the codicil, that is, only 30% and not 90% to the heirs of Domingo Legarda.

The motion was granted by the court and directed the trustee to deliver to Soledad Robles and
her children, their shares in rentals.

ISSUE: WON the said legatees-appellees may still demand their share of the rentals.
RULING:

Yes. From the testamentary provisions, it seems clear that the testator intended the
enjoyment by the legatees, of their respective legacies for the entire duration of the trust estate,
even when the specified properties are sold, the proceeds of which have been directed to be
invested in mortgages with interest, or in the purchase of other rental-bearing properties. The
legacies should therefore be viewed as one whole, continuing obligation based upon a judgment
(the will becomes binding upon probate) and the prescription period is ten years. The fact that
the rentals are to be delivered monthly, did not make each delivery a separate, distinct prestation.
Considering that the obligation terminated upon the sale of the said property on March 18, 1955,
the demand for complete delivery of the inheritance has not yet prescribed.

It is evident therefrom that the testator intended the expenses incidental to the execution of his
will to be defrayed and deductible from the residuary estate, excluding the rents from the Rosario
property.

Johannes vs. D’Almeida, 44 Phil. 212

FACTS:

Mr. B. E. Johannes is the lawful husband of the deceased Carmen D'Almeida Johannes and the
legally appointed administrator of the estate of Carmen D'Almeida Johannes in Singapore, Strait
Settlements; that the said B. E. Johannes is actually within the jurisdiction of this court and by
request of his attorney of record asks the court to direct the administrator here (the ancillary
administrator) to turn over to him as the domicile administrator appointed in the residence of the
deceased all the cash money, liberty bonds and Spanish shares pertaining to said estate.

Ordinarily the court would have been justified in transmitting the funds of this estate to the
probate court of the last residence of the deceased for distribution in accordance with the laws of
said jurisdiction, but in this case the administrator B. E. Johannes is temporarily within this
jurisdiction and ask the court, through his attorney, to deliver to him the balance of the funds of
the estate in his capacity as administrator appointed by the court of the last residence of the
deceased and the court is of the opinion that it is proper to deliver the funds to said administrator.

At the time of her death Carmen D'Almeida left an estate in the Philippine Islands, consisting of
liquid assets of about P100,000, over which Alfred D'Almeida was appointed ancillary
administrator. It appears that the deceased left few, if any, debts or claims in the Philippine
Islands, and that all of the duties of the defendant were simple, and that there was nothing to do
but to comply with the formalities of law. It also appears that the administrator in the Philippine
Islands has been completed, and that any and all debts and expenses of administration have been
paid, and that the only remaining thing to be done is to turn over the remaining assets to someone
that is legally authorized to receive them.

ISSUE: WON a local resident is entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.

RULING:

Yes. After an ancillary administration has been completed and upon the tender of a proper
receipt, it is the duty of the ancillary administrator to deliver the assets in his possession to the
domiciliary administrator of a foreign country.

As in this case sometimes in the orderly administration of justice, and to protect its own citizens,
the courts will retain a sufficient amount of the assets of the estate in custodia legis within the
Philippine Islands, pending the final decision of a foreign court as to whether or not a local
resident is entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.

The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than
that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable
for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay the claims of
creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction,
for distribution among the next of kin.
The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the deceased in Singapore.
What is sought in the Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the
domiciliary administration.

Aldamiz vs. CFI of Mindoro, 85 Phil. 228

FACTS:

Santiago Rementeria, the decedent was a member of the commercial partnership “Aldamiz y
Rementeria”. The
other members were his brothers Gavino and Jose Aldamiz. Rementeria died in 1937, and a
probate proceeding was
instituted in the same year in the CFI of Mindoro, by Gavino Aldamiz, represented by Atty. Juan
Luna. Aldamiz was
appointed administrator, and was represented by Atty. Luna until 1947, when the order
complained of was issued.
On January 15, 1947, after 10 years from the date of appointment, Gavino, through Atty. Luna,
submitted his
accounts, and a project for partition with a view to closing the proceedings. The court approved
the accounts but refused to approve the project for partition unless all debts including attorneys
fees be first paid.

In the project of partition, it was expressly stated that attorneys fees, debts and incidental
expenses would be proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the closure of the testate
proceedings, but the court refused to sanction this
clause of the project. It is for this reason that, Atty. Luna, without previously preparing and filing
a written petition to have his professional fees fixed and without previous notice to all interested
parties, submitted evidence of his services and professional standing so the court might fix the
amount for compensation and the administrator may make payment. This failure was not due to
bad faith or fraudulent purpose but to an honest belief that such requirements were not necessary
under the circumstances.

At the time respondents evidence was submitted to the court, Gavino and Jose Aldamiz were
residing in the Philippines and other interested parties were residing in Spain. No written claim
had ever been filed for respondents fees, and the
interested parties had not been notified thereof nor of the hearing, not even the administrator
Gavino Aldamiz who did
not know when he was called to testify that he would testify in connection with respondents fees.
The court ordered payment of P28,000. Gavino made a payment of 5,000, but did not pay the
rest. After several demands, Atty. Luna filed a motion for execution which was granted by the
court, which resulted in the levying of two parcels of land owned by the commercial partnership
“Aldamiz y Rementeria.

ISSUE: WON the order of the court was valid.

RULING:

The fixing of the amount of Attorneys fees by the court is null and void. As such, the order of
execution is also
null and void. The correct procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees, is for the counsel to
request the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal
capacity, and not as an administrator should he fail to pay. If judgement is rendered against the
administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The
attorney may, instead of bringing such action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding,
asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the
administrator to pay it as an expense of
administration.
In this case, no written petition for the payment of atty.’s fees has ever been filed and the
interested parties had not been
previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court. Thus, the orders issued by the
Court are null and void
as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. The order of execution was declared by the Court
as null and
void because a writ of execution was not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for
the payment of
debts and expenses of administration. The proper procedure was for the court to order the sale of
personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses
of administration
should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage.

Rule 89

Gabriel vs. Encarnacion, 94 Phil. 917

FACTS:

On November 28, 1952, Petrita Pascual, as co-administratrix, and her co-heirs filed a motion
with the court praying that all the real properties of the intestate be sold for cash at public
bidding on the date and hour to be fixed by the court and their proceeds be deposited in a
banking institution to be designated by the court. Copy of this motion was served on counsel for
the widow, Isabel Gabriel, and the co-administrator of the estate, Rudyardo Santiago, and the
motion was set for hearing on December 5, 1952, but the motion was not heard on the date set in
view of the absence of the judge presiding the court. For this reason, the widow, Isabel Gabriel,
and co-administrator, Rudyardo Santiago, requested that the intestate case be transferred to the
court holding sessions at Caloocan which was then presided over by Judge Villamor and this
request was granted on February 4, 1953.

Petitioners filed a motion praying that the order of the court be set aside on the ground that that
motion was not before the court for consideration during the hearing that took place, but the
motion filed by respondents wherein they prayed that the intestate case be referred to the branch
of the court holding sessions at Pasig and therefore said order was null and void because it was
issued in violation of the rules of court.

ISSUE: WON the regulations in the sale, mortgage or encumbrance of the properties
of the decedent is mandatory.
RULING:

Yes. When the court decides to authorize the sale of the property of the decedent because it
appears beneficial to the heirs, the same shall be made subject to the regulations provided by the
Rules of Court. Failure to comply with these regulations will have the effect of rendering the
order authorizing the sale void as well as the sale made in pursuance thereof.

Rafols vs. Barba L-28446, December 13, 1982

FACTS:

After more than fifteen (15) years from the execution of the deed of sale in favor of defendant-
appellee of a parcel of land, part of the estate of the late Nicolas Rafols, by administrator Vital T.
Montayre, later substituted by plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Rafols after his death, an action to
nullify the said sale was filed by plaintiffs-appellants, wife and four (4) children of Nicolas
Rafols, on the ground that it was effected without notice to them as required by Section 2, Rule
89 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 2, Rule 90). The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the wound that it is barred by the statute of limitations and by estoppel by laches. On appeal,
plaintiffs-appellants contend that since they were not notified of the hearing of the application to
sell the subject land nor of the order and approval of the sale by the probate court, the deed of
sale is null and void, and invoke Article 1410 of the new Civil Code that the action to declare the
inexistence of a void contract is imprescriptible.

ISSUE: WON a sale of property of the estate without such notice to the heirs, devisees
and legatees is void.

RULING:

Yes. It is true that when an application is made by an administrator to sell real property of the
estate for the payment of debts, expenses and other obligations of the estate, an application must
be filed with the probate court which may grant the same on written notice to the heirs, devisees
and legatees. (Section 2, Rule 89, Rules of Court, formerly Section 2. Rule 90, of the old Rules
of Court which was the rule in force at the time of the transaction herein involved.) It is also the
rule that a sale of property of the estate without such notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees is
void. Nevertheless, plaintiffs-appellants’ cause of action may not derive support from the
aforementioned doctrines. There is no clear showing that the authority granted by the probate
court to sell the parcel of land in question way back since May 22, 1948 was without written
notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees. Plaintiffs-appellants offered no proof as to such alleged
lack of notice. They rely solely on Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "D" and "D-1" which were presented
not by them but by defendant-appellee during the hearing of the motion to dismiss to support
such contention. Plaintiffs- appellants capitalize the fact that in none of said documents or papers
does it appear that they were served or given notice of the same. To Our mind, the circumstance
pointed out by plaintiffs-appellants does not suffice to annul the sale in question. The lack of any
indication on the documents mentioned that they were served with copies of the same does not
necessarily mean that they had no notice thereof. In the absence of a positive showing that the
requirements for securing the authority to sell had not been complied with, it is appropriate to
apply the presumptions that the law had been obeyed; that official duty has been regularly
performed; and that private transactions had been fair and regular.(Sec. 5, pars. m, p and ff, Rule
131, Rules of Court.)

Maneclang vs. Baun, 208 SCRA 179

FACTS:

The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of
an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for authority to sell and an order granting it which
were filed and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedent.chanrobles vir

ISSUES: 1. WON decedent’s representative is estopped to question the validity of his own
and his predecessor’s acts.
2. WON for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court, notice to the father implies notice to the children.

RULING:

1. No. Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of the estate and against
the children. As to the former, this Court, in Boñaga v. Soler, supra, reiterated the rule "that a
decedent’s representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting
to convey land; and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor
can not be estopped to question the acts of predecessor are not conformable to law." Not being
the party who petitioned the court for authority to sell and who executed the sale, she cannot be
held liable for any act or omission which could give rise to estoppel.

As to the heirs, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who executed the deed of sale in
his capacity as judicial administrator, the rest of the heirs did not participate in such sale, and
considering further that the action was filed solely by the administratrix without the children
being impleaded as parties plaintiffs or intervenors, there is neither rhyme nor reason to hold
these heirs in estoppel. For having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is deemed to have
assented to both the motion for and the actual order granting the authority to sell. Estoppel
operates solely against him.
2. No. It does not follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of
said Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in writing, must be given to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and
cause notice to be given to the interested parties. There can be no dispute that if the heirs were
duly represented by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may
be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse,
Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and
Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining
seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent
them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the
aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell,
the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio. Consequently, for want
of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September 1949 granting the application, the sale in
question of 4 October 1952 and the Order of 15 March 1954 approving the sale are all void ab
initio as against said children. Severo Maneclang, however, stands on different ground
altogether. Having been duly notified of the application, he was bound by the said order, sale and
approval of the latter. However, the only interest which Severo Maneclang would have over the
property is his right of usufruct which is equal to that corresponding by way of legitime
pertaining to each of the surviving children pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of Spain,
the governing law at that time since Margarita Suri Santos died before the effectivity of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

Lim vs. Loy Jr., 405 SCRA 319 [2003]

FACTS:

On 13 January 1950, Teodoro Vaño, as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vaño, sold seven lots of the
Banilad Estate located in Cebu City to Benito Liu and Cirilo Pangalo. 3 Teodoro Vaño dealt with
Frank Liu, the brother of Benito Liu, in the sale of the lots to Benito Liu and Cirilo Pangalo. The
lots sold to Benito Liu were Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14, and 15 of Block 12 for a total price of P4,900.
Benito Liu gave a down payment of P1,000, undertaking to pay the balance of P3,900 in monthly
installments of P100 beginning at the end of January 1950. The lots sold to Cirilo Pangalo were
Lot Nos. 14 and 15 of Block 11 for a total price of P1,967.50. Cirilo Pangalo gave P400 as down
payment, undertaking to pay the balance of P1,567.50 in monthly installments of P400 beginning
at the end of January 1950. Meanwhile, Jose Vaño passed away.

Benito Liu subsequently paid installments totaling P2,900, leaving a balance of

P1,000.4 Apparently, Benito Liu stopped further payments because Teodoro Vaño admitted his
inability to transfer the lot titles to Benito Liu. Later, in a letter 5 dated 16 October 1954, Teodoro
Vaño informed Frank Liu6 that the Supreme Court had already declared valid the will of his
father Jose Vaño. Thus, Teodoro Vaño could transfer the titles to the buyers’ names upon
payment of the balance of the purchase price.

When Frank Liu failed to reply, Teodoro Vaño sent him another letter, 7 dated 1 January 1955,
reminding him of his outstanding balance. It appears that it was only after nine years that Frank
Liu responded through a letter, 8 dated 25 January 1964. In the letter, Frank Liu informed
Teodoro Vaño that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price of the seven lots. He
requested for the execution of a deed of sale of the lots in his name and the delivery of the titles
to him.

On 22 April 1966, Benito Liu sold to Frank Liu the five lots (Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14 and 15 of
Block 12) which Benito Liu purchased from Teodoro Vaño. 9 Frank Liu assumed the balance of
P1,000 for the five lots. Cirilo Pangalo likewise sold to Frank Liu the two lots (Lot Nos. 14 and
15 of Block 11) that Pangalo purchased from Teodoro Vaño. Frank Liu likewise assumed the
balance of P417 for the two lots.

On 21 March 1968, Frank Liu reiterated in a letter 10 his request for Teodoro Vaño to execute the
deed of sale covering the seven lots so he could secure the corresponding certificates of title in
his name. He also requested for the construction of the subdivision roads pursuant to the original
contract. In the letter, Frank Liu referred to another letter, dated 25 June 1966, which he
allegedly sent to Teodoro Vaño. According to Frank Liu, he enclosed PBC Check No. D-782290
dated 6 May 1966 for P1,417, which is the total balance of the accounts of Benito Liu and Cirilo
Pangalo on the seven lots. However, Frank Liu did not offer in evidence the letter or the check.
Frank Liu sent two other letters,11 dated 7 June 1968 and 29 July 1968, to Teodoro Vaño
reiterating his request for the execution of the deed of sale in his favor but to no avail.

ISSUES: 1.WON a sale of estate property made by an administrator without court

authority is void.
2. WON the notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the
application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased is
mandatory.

RULING:

1. Yes. A sale of estate property made by an administrator without court authority is void and
does not confer on the purchaser a title that is available against a succeeding administrator.—In
Teresita Loy’s case, her seller was the Estate of Jose Vaño. Teodoro Vaño executed the contract
of sale in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Jose Vaño, the registered owner of the
lots. The Court has held that a sale of estate property made by an administrator without court
authority is void and does not confer on the purchaser a title that is available against a
succeeding administrator. An administrator cannot unilaterally cancel a contract to sell made by
the decedent in his lifetime.—A prior contract to sell made by the decedent prevails over the
subsequent contract of sale made by the administrator without probate court approval. The
administrator cannot unilaterally cancel a contract to sell made by the decedent in his lifetime.
Any cancellation must observe all legal requisites, like written notice of cancellation based on
lawful cause.

The contracts of the Loys did not convey ownership of the lots to them as against third persons.
The contracts were binding only on the seller, Teodoro Vaño. The contracts of the Loys would
become binding against third persons only upon approval of the sale by the probate court and
registration with the Register of Deeds. Registration of the contracts without court approval
would be ineffective to bind third persons, especially creditors of the estate. Otherwise, this will
open the door to fraud on creditors of the estate.

2. Yes. It is mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the
application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased otherwise
the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself, is completely void.—The
failure to notify the administratrix and other interested persons rendered the sale to the Loys
void. As explained by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in De Jesus v. De Jesus: Section 9, Rule 90, however,
provides that authority can be given by the probate court to the administrator to convey property
held in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries of the trust only “after notice given as required
in the last preceding section”; i.e., that “no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of
the application for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested,
and such further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper”
(sec. 8, Rule 90). This rule makes it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other
interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by
the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as
the conveyance itself, is completely void. (Emphasis supplied)

Pahamotang, et al. vs. PNB, et al., G.R. No. 156403, March 31, 2005

FACTS:

The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the PNB
and Arguna respectively without making a valid notification with the legal heirs. The heirs later
questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. The trial court declared the real
estate mortgage and the sale void. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

RULING:
No. In the present case, the appellate court makes a mistake in applying laches against
petitioners.
Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties.
There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified petitioners of the
contracts they had executed with Agustin.
It is not clear from the decision of the appellate court when petitioners actually learned of the
existence of said orders of the intestate court.
The Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against them in the absent of any indication
of the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders.

Rule 90

Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano, 63 Phil. 629

FACTS:

The parents of Andres Reyes leased certain parcels of land from the Spanish government.  Upon
their death during the Spanish regime, their son Andres Reyes succeeded them in said lease and
the Jatter afterwards  purchased said leased  lands as friar lands from  the Insular Government in
the years 1909,1910 and  1921, it appearing of record that he was married to Luciana Farlin.
On  October 1, 1910,  Luciana Farlin also acquired by purchase from the Insular Government
certain parcels of  friar land. After  the death of Luciana Farlin, her surviving spouse, Andres
Reyes, contracted a second  marriage with  the herein applicant-appellant Felisa Camia.
During her marriage  to  Andres  Reyes, Felisa Camia also purchased a parcel of friar land
Andres Reyes died. He was survived by his  wife, the herein executrix and appellant Felisa
Camia, his only son  had with her, and his daughter by his first marriage. Felisa Camia qualified
as executrix of the estate left by the deceased husband Andres Reyes.
The executrix-appellant Felisa Camia de Reyes filed a project of partition, which was also
opposed by the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano in a pleading of October 20, 1933,
alleging, among other things, that the valuation of the properties made by the commissioners on
claims and appraisal is inadequate and unjust; that said project does not contain all the properties
that should be partitioned; that it contains properties belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage; and that said project is based upon the will, some of the provisions of which are
inofficious and illegal; at the same time submitting a counterproject of partition with an appraisal
of the properties therein enumerated, which appraisal is different from that made by the
commissioners on claims and appraisal. This counterproject of partition presented by the
oppositor-appellee is the one admitted and approved by the court.
The appellee Juana Reyes de llano filed her opposition to this account claiming that some of the
items of expenses stated  therein are unnecessary  and inaccurate.

ISSUES:
1. WON the distribution of the estate of a deceased person is imposed upon the executor or
administrator to present a project of partition.
2. WON The committee’s appraisal of the estate of the deceased is conclusive.

RULING:

1. No. There is nothing in the law imposing upon the executor or administrator the obligation to
present a project of partition for the distribution of the estate of a deceased person. Section 753
of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to assign." . . the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled . . . ." According to section 754 of said Code, the order referred to
in the above-cited section shall be issued." . . on the application of the executor or administrator,
or of a person interested in the estate; . . . ." (See also article 1052, Civil Code.)

It is the Court of First Instance alone that may make the distribution of his estate and determine
the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled, and it may require the
executrix to present a project of partition to better inform itself of the condition of the estate to
be distributed and so facilitate the prompt distribution thereof.

The project of partition that the executor or administrator might have presented would not be
conclusive and the interested parties could oppose the approval thereof and enter their objections
thereto, at the same time presenting their counter-project of partition which the court might
accept and approve, as it did in this case. In adopting the project of partition of the oppositor-
appellee J.R. de I., said court acted within its discretionary power and committed no error of law.
 Section 773 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants the creditor of a deceased person the right to
appeal to the competent Court of First Instance from the disallowance, in whole or in part, of his
claim by the committee on claims and appraisal, and failure to exercise this right within the
period and in the manner prescribed by section 775 of said Code makes the committee’s
resolution final and prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the matter (Kette v.
Suares, 55 Phil., 712).

2. No. The committee’s appraisal of the estate of the deceased is not conclusive and the court is
not bound to adopt it. Therefore, the court a quo committed no error in permitting B. A. I. to
testify for the purpose of impugning the committee’s appraisal of the estate of the deceased A.R.

According to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. In this case the
parties admit that the parcels of land under consideration were purchased by the deceased A.R.
during his marriage to his first wife L.F. The mere fact that A.R. appears as purchaser in the
certificates of sale and in the certificates of title does not change the ganancial nature of said
lands.
Rule 91
Mun. of San Pedro vs. Colegio de San Jose, 65 Phil. 318

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court which denied the petition for escheat filed by the
said petitioners, with the costs against the latter.
This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of the
municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasa by the right of escheat.

ISSUES:

1.WON COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL. may be parties to the case?
2. WON the land is proper subject of escheat?
RULING:

1.Yes. The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the provisions of
section 750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of which reads:
SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. — When a person dies
intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines Islands, leaving no heir or person
by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where the
deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he
had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a petition
with the Court of First Instance of the province for an inquisition in the premises…
SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. — If, at the time appointed for the that
purpose, the court that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Islands,
leaving no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary,
the court shall order and decree that the estate of the deceased in these Islands, after the payment
of just debts and charges, shall escheat.
2.No. Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and personal
property of a deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving
any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the said section. The proceeding, as
provided by section 750, should be commenced by petition and not by complaint.
In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the
sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the
property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and
oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos
Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; and
the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he
claim to be the lessee thereof under a contract legality entered with the former.
According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to the escheat
upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus, among them, the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed
from then on to the Crown of Spain. If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only
property sought to be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already
passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners
cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case
of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may
legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a petition
for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of
Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the
Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition.

Divino vs. Hilario, 62 Phil. 926

FACTS:

Tan Kui Sing began the intestate of the deceased Tan Chay, special proceeding. Ang Liong filed
an inventory of the properties left by the deceased Tan Chay wherein he stated that he had left
P5,000 in cash in the possession of the Philippine Foreign Trading & Company and P390 as
rents of a house. On July 6, 1935 the respondent judge ordered that the petition of Tan Kui Sing
be set of trial. On the 9th of the same month, the clerk of court set the trial of the petition on
August 24, 1935, and ordered that the notice of trial be published in the newspaper El
Magindanaw, published in Davao, once a week for three consecutive weeks.

It does not appear that the notice was actually published. On August 24, 1935, the court called
the petition for hearing, and after the presentation of the evidence declared that Tan Chay, had
died intestate, that he left no legal heirs, that he left as his only estate the sum of P5,000
deposited with the Philippine Foreign Trading & Company, and declared the escheat of said
funds to the municipality of Guianga, Province of Davao. Thereafter the municipal president of
Guianga took charge of the funds. On October 16, 1935, the petitioner, in the same capacity as
guardian, appeared in the case and through her attorneys filed a motion to set aside the decree
escheating the P5,000 to the municipality of Guianga, to declare the minors the only heirs of Tan
Chay, and, finally, to adjudicate to them share and share alike the sum of P5,000. The motion
was based on the allegation under oath that the minors were the only legitimate nephews and
niece left by the deceased and that the latter had not been survived by another near relative with a
better right. On the 21st of the same month, the respondent judge denied the motion on the
ground that the decree of reversion was already irrevocable and that, in any case, the minors
could avail themselves of the procedure under section 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: WON the probate court acquires jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
escheat case.

RULING:

No. In the case under consideration, the procedure fixed by section 750 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has neither been followed nor complied with, wherefore, we hold that the respondent
judge and the Court of First Instance of Davao did not acquire jurisdiction either to take
cognizance of the escheat case or to promulgate the order of August 24, 1935, whereby the sum
of P5,000 was escheated or adjudicated to the municipality of Guianga. No petition was filed
either by the municipal president or by the municipal council, nor was the required publication
made which was the essential step which should have conferred jurisdiction.

Section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure how the Court of First Instance may acquire
jurisdiction over the properties left by a deceased who resided in the Philippine Island and may
decree its escheat to the municipality where he resided. It provides that the municipal president
and the municipal council may file a petition to that effect, whereupon the court shall set the
same for hearing and shall cause the latter to be published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province where the deceased had resided, or in default thereof, in some newspaper of
general circulation in the province in which he had estate, for a period of six successive weeks,
the last of which publications shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed for the trial.
Section 752 provides that any heir or legatee may appear in the proceeding within 17 years, and
after establishing his hereditary right, it shall be the duty of the court to order the municipality to
which the estate was escheated to return the same for adjudication to the former, and in case it
had been sold the municipality shall return its avails after deducting charges for its care.

As the special proceeding No. 314 has been instituted, neither could the petitioner resort to the
remedy granted by section 752, because if the respondent judge and the Court of First Instance of
Davao never acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the escheat case, it is clear and logical
that they neither have jurisdiction to grant the aforesaid remedy. As we have seen, the only
petition which conferred jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased T. C. was that filed by T. K.
S., which was for the sole purpose of appointing a special administrator to represent the deceased
in the appeal interposed in civil case No. 1147 of the Court of First instance of Davao. If another
petition for the appointment of a regular administrator had been filed, it should have been
incumbent on the court to follow the entire procedure in intestacy in order to determine the heirs
and to distribute finally the estate among them.