Kantâ - S Critique of Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

22/06/2021 Kantâs Critique of Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics
First published Sun Feb 29, 2004; substantive revision Thu Mar 29, 2018
How are synthetic a priori propositions possible? This

question is often
times understood to frame the investigations at
issue in Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason. In answer to it,
Kant saw fit to divide the question into three:
1) How are the
synthetic a priori propositions of mathematics possible? 2)
How are the synthetic a priori propositions of natural
science possible?
Finally, 3) How are the synthetic a priori
propositions of metaphysics
possible? In systematic fashion, Kant
responds to each of these questions.
The answer to question one is
broadly found in the Transcendental
Aesthetic, and the doctrine of the
transcendental ideality of space and time.
The answer to question two
is found in the Transcendental Analytic, where Kant seeks to
demonstrate the
essential role played by the categories in grounding
the possibility of knowledge and experience. The answer to
question
three is found in the Transcendental Dialectic, and it is a
resoundingly blunt conclusion: the synthetic a
priori
propositions that characterize metaphysics are not really possible at
all. Metaphysics, that is, is inherently
dialectical. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is thus as well
known for what it rejects as for what it defends. Thus,
in the
Dialectic, Kant turns his attention to the central disciplines of
traditional, rationalist, metaphysics —
rational psychology,
rational cosmology, and rational theology. Kant aims to reveal the
errors that plague each of
these fields.
1. Preliminary Remarks: The Rejection of Ontology (general metaphysics) and the Transcendental
Analytic
2. The Rejection of Special Metaphysics and the Transcendental Dialectic
2.1 The Theory of Reason and Transcendental Illusion
2.2 Hypostatization and Subreption
3. The Soul and Rational Psychology
4. The World and Rational Cosmology
4.1 The Mathematical Antinomies
4.2 The Dynamical Antinomies
5. God and Rational Theology
5.1 The Ontological Argument
5.2 The Other Proofs
6. Reason and the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic
Bibliography
Relevant Works by Kant (includes German editions and translations):
Selected Secondary Readings on Topics in Kant’s Dialectic
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
1. Preliminary Remarks: The Rejection of Ontology (general

metaphysics) and the Transcendental Analytic
Despite the fact that Kant devotes an entirely new section of the
Critique to the branches of special metaphysics,
his
criticisms reiterate some of the claims already defended in both the
Transcendental Aesthetic and the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/ 1/18
Transcendental Analytic. Indeed, two

central teachings from these earlier portions of the Critique
— the
transcendental ideality of space and time, and the
critical limitation of all application of the concepts of the
understanding to “appearances” — already carry with
them Kant’s rejection of “ontology (metaphysica
generalis).” Accordingly, in the Transcendental
Analytic Kant argues against any attempt to acquire knowledge
of
“objects in general” through the formal concepts and
principles of the understanding, taken by themselves
alone. In this
connection, Kant denies that the principles or rules of either general
logic (e.g., the principle of
contradiction), or those of his own
“transcendental logic” (the pure concepts of the
understanding) by themselves
yield knowledge of
objects. These claims follow from Kant’s well-known “kind
distinction” between the
understanding and sensibility, together
with the view that knowledge requires the cooperation of both
faculties.
This position, articulated throughout the Analytic, entails
that independently of their application to intuitions, the
concepts
and principles of the understanding are mere forms of thought which
cannot yield knowledge of
objects.
For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the

concept, the concept would still be a thought,
so far as its form is
concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of
anything
would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know,
there would be nothing, and could be
nothing, to which my thought
could be applied. B146
We thus find one general complaint about efforts to acquire

metaphysical knowledge: the use of formal concepts
and principles, in
abstraction from the sensible conditions under which objects can be
given, cannot yield
knowledge. Hence, the “transcendental”
use of the understanding (its use independently of the conditions of
sensibility) is considered by Kant to be dialectical, to involve
erroneous applications of concepts in order to
acquire knowledge of
things independently of sensibility/experience. Throughout the
Analytic Kant elaborates
on this general view, noting that the
transcendental employment of the understanding, which aims towards
knowledge of things independently of experience (and thus knowledge of
“noumena”), is illicit (cf. A246/B303).
It is in this
connection that Kant states, famously, in the Analytic, that
“…the proud name of ontology, which
presumes to offer
synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general…
must give way to the more modest title of a
transcendental
analytic” (cf. A247/B304). Filling this out, Kant suggests that
to take ourselves to have
unmediated intellectual access to objects
(to have “non-sensible” knowledge) correlates with the
assumption that
there are non-sensible objects that we can know. To
assume this, however, is to conflate “phenomena” (or
appearances) with “noumena” (or things in themselves). The
failure to draw the distinction between appearances
and things in
themselves is the hallmark of all those pernicious systems of thought
that stand under the title of
“transcendental
realism.” Kant’s transcendental idealism is the remedy for
these.
2. The Rejection of Special Metaphysics and the Transcendental

Dialectic
Kant’s rejection of the more specialized branches of metaphysics is
grounded in part on this earlier claim, to wit,
that any attempt to apply
the concepts and principles of the understanding independently of the
conditions of
sensibility (i.e., any transcendental use of the
understanding) is illicit. Thus, one of Kant’s main complaints is
that
metaphysicians seek to deduce a priori synthetic knowledge
simply from the unschematized (pure) concepts
of the
understanding. The effort to acquire metaphysical knowledge through
concepts alone, however, is doomed
to fail, according to Kant, because
(in its simplest formulation) “concepts without intuitions are
empty”
(A52/B76).
Although this general charge is certainly a significant part of Kant’s

complaint, the story does not stop there. In
turning to the specific
disciplines of special metaphysics (those concerning the soul, the
world, and God), Kant
devotes a considerable amount of time discussing
the human interests that nevertheless pull us into the thorny
questions and controversies that characterize special
metaphysics. These interests are of two types, and include
theoretical
goals of achieving completeness and systematic unity of knowledge, and
practical interests in
securing the immortality of the soul, freedom,
and the existence of God. Despite their contributions to
metaphysical
illusion, Kant tells us that the goals and interests in question are
unavoidable, inevitable, and
inherent in the very nature of human

reason. In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic Kant thus
introduces “reason” as the locus of these metaphysical
interests.
2.1 The Theory of Reason and Transcendental Illusion

The emphasis on reason in this connection is important, and it links
up with the project of Kant’s “critique” of
pure reason. A
major component of this critique involves illuminating the basis in
reason for our efforts to draw
erroneous metaphysical conclusions (to
employ concepts “transcendentally”), despite the fact that
such use has
already been shown (in the Transcendental Analytic) to be
illicit. What emerges in the Dialectic is a more
complex story, one in
which Kant seeks to disclose and critique the “transcendental
ground” that leads to the
misapplications of thought which
characterize specific metaphysical arguments. In developing the
position that
our metaphysical propensities are grounded in the
“very nature of human reason,” Kant (in the Introduction
to
the Dialectic) relies on a conception of reason as a capacity for
syllogistic reasoning. This logical function of
reason resides in the
formal activity of subsuming propositions under ever more general
principles in order to
systematize, unify, and “bring to
completion” the knowledge given through the real use of the
understanding
(A306/B363-A308/B365). Kant thus characterizes this
activity as one which seeks “conditions” for everything
that is conditioned. It is therefore central to this Kantian
conception of reason that it is preoccupied with the
“unconditioned which would stop the regress of conditions by
providing a condition that is not itself conditioned
in its
turn.”
The demand for the unconditioned is essentially a demand for

ultimate explanation, and links up with the
rational prescription to
secure systematic unity and completeness of knowledge. Reason, in
short, is in the
business of ultimately accounting for all things. As
Kant formulates this interest of reason in the first
Critique, it
is characterized by the logical maxim or
precept: “Find for the conditioned knowledge given through
the
understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to
completion” (A308/B364). It is central to Kant’s
Dialectic
that this requirement for systematic unity and completeness of
knowledge is inherent in the very nature
of our reason.
Controversially, Kant does not take it that this demand for the
unconditioned is something we can
dismiss, nor does he take the
interests we have in metaphysics to be merely products of
misguided enthusiasm.
Although the demand for the unconditioned is inherent in the very

nature of our reason, although it is
unavoidable and indispensably
necessary, Kant nevertheless does not take it to be without problems
of a unique
sort; for the very same demand that guides our rational
scientific inquiries and defines our (human) reason is
also the locus
of error that needs to be curbed or prevented. In connection with this
principle, then, Kant also
identifies reason as the seat of a unique
kind of error, one that is essentially linked up with metaphysical
propensities, and one which he refers to as “transcendental
illusion [transzendentale Illusion].” Kant identifies
transcendental illusion with the propensity to “take a
subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts…for
an
objective necessity in the determination of things in
themselves” (A297/B354). Very generally, Kant’s claim
is that it
is a peculiar feature of reason that it unavoidably takes its own
subjective interests and principles to
hold
“objectively.” And it is this propensity, this
“transcendental illusion,” according to Kant, that paves
the
way for metaphysics. Reason plays this role by generating
principles and interests that incite us to defy the
limitations of
knowledge already detailed in the Transcendental Analytic. The
Introduction to the Transcendental
Dialectic is therefore interesting
for Kant’s presentation of reason as a presumably distinct capacity
for
cognizing in a way that, as Kant puts it, incites us to tear down
the boundaries already enforced in the Analytic
(cf. A296/B352). Kant
refers to this capacity of reason as one that leads to the
specifically transcendent
judgments that characterize
metaphysics. Thus, the Transcendental Dialectic is said to be
concerned “to expose
the illusion in transcendent
judgments” (A297/B354). Indeed, Dialectic is defined as
“the logic of illusion
[Schein]”
(A293/B350).
The central problem is that the above prescription to seek

the unconditioned presents to reason as a metaphysical
principle that
tells us that the unconditioned is already given, and is (as
it were) “there” to be found. This
problematic principle
is formulated by Kant as follows: “If the conditioned is
given, the absolutely
unconditioned… is also given”
(A308/B366). This “supreme principle of pure reason”
provides the background
assumption under which the metaphysician
proceeds. These claims set the agenda for Kant’s project, which
involves showing not simply that the metaphysical arguments are

fallacious, but also exposing their source in
reason’s more general illusions.
Kant has been traditionally taken to be offering a method of avoiding

the insidious “transcendental illusion” that
gives rise to metaphysics. Read in this way, Kant’s Dialectic offers a
criticism not only of the specific arguments
of metaphysics, but also
of transcendent, metaphysical (speculative or theoretical)
interests and propensities
themselves. This certainly accords
with much in the Dialectic, and specifically with Kant’s well-known
claim
that knowledge has to be limited to possible experience. Kant,
however, complicates things somewhat by also
stating repeatedly that
the illusion that grounds metaphysics (roughly, that the unconditioned
is already given) is
unavoidable. Moreover, Kant sometimes suggests
that such illusion is somehow necessary for our
epistemological
projects (cf. A645/B673). In this connection, Kant argues that the
transcendent ideas and
principles of reason do have a positive role to
play in knowledge acquisition, so long as they are construed
“regulatively” and not “constitutively.” He
thus suggests that rather than jettison the ideas of metaphysical
objects (something, it seems, he does not think we are in a position
to do), it is best to identify the proper use and
function of these
ideas and principles. This critical reinterpretation involves the
claim that the ideas and
principles of reason are to be used
“regulatively,” as devices for guiding and grounding our
empirical
investigations and the project of knowledge
acquisition. What the ideas do not do, according to Kant, is provide
the concepts through which we might access objects that could be known
through the speculative use of reason.
The need for this critical reinterpretation stems from the fact that
reason’s demand for the unconditioned cannot
be met or satisfied. The
absolutely “unconditioned,” regardless of the fact that it
presents to reason as objective,
is not an object or state of affairs
that could be captured in any possible human experience. In
emphasizing this
last point, Kant identifies metaphysics with an
effort to acquire knowledge of “objects” conceived, but in
no
wise given (or giveable) to us in experience. In its efforts to
bring knowledge to completion, that is, reason posits
certain ideas,
the “soul,” the “world” and “God.”
Each of these ideas represents reason’s efforts to think the
unconditioned in relation to various sets of objects that are
experienced by us as conditioned.
It is this general theory of reason, as a capacity to think (by means

of “ideas”) beyond all standards of sense, and
as carrying
with it a unique and unavoidable demand for the unconditioned, that
frames the Kantian rejection of
metaphysics. At the heart of that
rejection is the view that although reason is unavoidably motivated to
seek the
unconditioned, its theoretical efforts to achieve it are
inevitably sterile. The ideas which might secure such
unconditioned
knowledge lack objective reality (refer to no object), and our
misguided efforts to acquire
ultimate metaphysical knowledge are led
astray by the illusion which, according to Kant, “unceasingly
mocks
and torments us” (A339/B397).
The Dialectic is concerned to undermine three distinct branches of

special metaphysics in the philosophical
tradition: Rational
Psychology, Rational Cosmology and Rational Theology. Each of these
disciplines seeks to
acquire knowledge of a particular metaphysical
“object” — the “soul,” the
“world,” and “God,” respectively.
This being
stated, the Dialectic proceeds systematically to undermine the
arguments specific to each of these
disciplines—arguments about,
for example, the nature of the soul and the world, and the existence
of God.
Despite the difference in their objects, however, there are a
number of problems shared by all the disciplines of
special
metaphysics. In its most general terms, the central problem with each
of these attempts has to do with the
fact that the alleged
“objects” under consideration are
“transcendent.” Although we think the soul, the world,
and
God (necessarily) as objects, these ideas actually lack
objective reality (there is no object corresponding to
the ideas that
is or could be given to us in any intuition). It is thus not uncommon
to find Kant referring to these
alleged metaphysical entities as
“mere thought entities,” “fictions of the
brain,” or “pseudo objects.” Although
the Dialectic
does not presume to prove that such objects do not or could not exist,
Kant is committed by the
strictures of his own transcendental
epistemology to the claim that the ideas of reason do not provide us
with
concepts of “knowable” objects. For this reason
alone, the efforts of the metaphysicians are presumptuous, and
at the
very least, an epistemological modesty precludes the knowledge that is
sought.
For more on Kant’s theory of illusion, see Allison (2004), Butts

(1997), Grier (2001), Neiman (1994), Theis
(1985), Bird (2006). See
also Ameriks (2006), Dyck (2014).
2.2 Hypostatization and Subreption
There are two noteworthy themes implicit in Kant’s criticism of

metaphysics. First, Kant offers an account and
critique of the ideas
of reason specific to each discipline. In relation to this, the
general theory of reason plays a
role in Kant’s efforts to argue
against the “hypostatization” of each of the ideas. More
specifically, Kant’s
criticism of the metaphysical disciplines centers
on his efforts to show that the ideas of reason (the soul, the
world
and God), which are thought in accordance with the demand for an
unconditioned that could unify the
relevant domain of conditions, get
erroneously “hypostatized” by reason, or thought as
mind-independent
“objects” about which we might seek
knowledge. In the same way, that is, that the prescription to seek the
unconditioned appears to reason as an objective principle, so too, the
subjective ideas appear to reason as objects
existing in a
mind-independent way. Kant’s aim is to secure the subjective ideas
while enforcing their subjective
status, and thereby defusing the
metaphysics that attends to them.
Thus, Kant’s criticism of metaphysics simultaneously involves denying

the pure use of theoretical reason as an
instrument for
knowledge of transcendent objects, and defending
reason’s ideas as projections or goals that have
some significant role
to play in the overall project of knowledge acquisition. As we shall
see, Kant unfortunately
is not as clear as we might like on this
issue. Sometimes, he seems to argue that the ideas and principles of
reason play a merely heuristic role in guiding and systematizing the
knowledge already obtained. Other times, he
suggests that these ideas
are deeply essential to the project of knowledge acquisition, and that
their
presupposition is utterly necessary if we are to acquire
knowledge. Regardless of how the matter is to be
resolved, it is
clear that Kant’s criticism of metaphysics does not entail any
straightforward rejection of the ideas
and principles of
reason. Indeed, it appears to be precisely the rational constraint to
move to the ideas of reason
that binds us to our metaphysical
propensities and which thus demands a critique of the kind offered by
Kant.
In addition to criticizing the “hypostatization” of the

ideas of reason, Kant seeks to expose the “subreptions”
involved in the use of the ideas. The term “subreption”
refers to a fallacy that specifically involves the
surreptitious
substitution of different kinds of terms and concepts. Kant
usually uses the term to refer to the error
of confusing or
substituting concepts and principles meant for use in experience
(those which properly apply to
appearances) with principles of
“pure reason.” By this means, a concept or principle which
is a condition of our
experience (e.g., the principle of apperception)
is used in a way that assumes its applications to “objects in
general” or things in themselves. Alternatively, a most general,
formal, principle that would only hold for things
in general is taken,
by itself alone, to yield knowledge about appearances. This second kind
of criticism found
throughout the Dialectic thus pertains to Kant’s
efforts to expose the subreptions that ground the illusory
metaphysical
arguments. Ultimately, Kant will also seek to reveal the very
specific formal fallacies that vitiate
the metaphysical arguments, to
demonstrate that (although they have the appearance of soundness) the
positions
in each case are implicitly grounded in, or deploy,
dialectical uses of terms and concepts, misapplications of
principles,
and conflations of appearances with things in themselves. What we find
in Kant’s criticism of
metaphysics, in other words, is a complex
account, one grounded in a fairly robust theory of human reason.
Accordingly, he identifies reason as the locus of certain principles
and propensities, and certain “illusions,”
which cooperate
with misapplications of concepts and principles to create the errors
already exposed in the
Transcendental Analytic. Although this variety
of aims and complaints certainly complicates Kant’s discussions
in the
Dialectic, it also makes for a richer and more penetrating criticism
of metaphysics.
3. The Soul and Rational Psychology

One historically predominant metaphysical interest has to do with
identifying the nature and the constitution of
the soul. Partly for
practical reasons, partly for theoretical explanation, reason forms
the idea of a metaphysically
simple being, the soul. Such an idea is
motivated by reason’s demand for the unconditioned. Kant puts this
point
in a number of ways, suggesting that the idea of the soul is one
to which we are led necessarily insofar as we are
constrained by
reason to seek the “totality” of the “synthesis of
conditions of a thought in general” (A397), or
insofar as we
seek to represent “the unconditioned unity” of
“subjective conditions of representations in general”
(A406/B433). More straightforwardly, Kant states that a metaphysics of
the soul is generated by the demand for
the “absolute
(unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject itself”
(A334/B391). The branch of metaphysics
devoted to this topic is

Rational Psychology. Rational psychologists, among whom Descartes or
Leibniz would
serve as apt historical examples, seek to demonstrate,
for example, the substantiality, simplicity, and personal
identity of
the soul. Each such inference, however, involves concluding
“from the transcendental concept of the
subject, which contains
nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which
I possess no concept
whatsoever” (A340/B398). In other words,
Kant takes the rational psychologist to slide (mistakenly) from
formal
features of our self concept to material or substantive metaphysical
claims about an alleged (super-
sensible) object (the soul).
An essential aspect of all these arguments, according to Kant,is

their attempt to derive conclusions about the
nature and constitution
of the “soul” a priori, simply from an analysis
of the activity of thinking. A classic
example of such an attempt is
provided by Descartes, who deduced the substantiality of the self from
the
proposition (or, perhaps better, the activity) “I
think.” This move is apparent in the Cartesian inference from “I
think” to the claim that the “I” is therefore “a
thing” that thinks. For Descartes, this move is unproblematic:
thought is an attribute, and thus presupposes a substance in which it
inheres. Kant emphasizes the a priori basis
for the
metaphysical doctrine of the soul by claiming that in rational
psychology, the “I think” is supposed to
provide the
“sole text” (A343–4/B401–02). It is this feature of the
discipline that serves to distinguish it from
any empirical doctrine
of the self (any empirical psychology), and which secures its status
as a “metaphysics”
that purports to provide synthetic
a priori knowledge.
Kant’s criticisms of rational psychology draw on a number of distinct

sources, one of which is the Kantian
doctrine of apperception, or
transcendental self-consciousness (often formulated in terms of the
necessary
possibility of attaching the “I think” to all my
representations (B132). Kant denies that the metaphysician is
entitled to his substantive conclusions on the grounds that the
activity of self-consciousness does not yield any
object for thought.
Nevertheless, reason is guided by its projecting and objectifying
propensities. In accordance
with these, self-consciousness is
“hypostatized,” or objectified. Here again, Kant claims
that a “natural illusion”
compels us to take the
apperceived unity of consciousness as an intuition of an object
(A402). The ineliminably
subjective nature of self-consciousness, and
the elusiveness of the “I” in the context of that
activity, are thus the
well known bases for Kant’s response to
rational psychology, and the doctrine of apperception plays an
important role in Kant’s rejection. For in each case, Kant thinks that
a feature of self-consciousness (the
essentially subjectival, unitary
and identical nature of the “I” of apperception) gets
transmuted into a
metaphysics of a self (as an object) that is
ostensibly “known” through reason alone to be substantial,
simple,
identical, etc. This slide from the “I” of
apperception to the constitution of an object (the soul) has received
considerable attention in the secondary literature, and has fueled a
great deal of attention to the Kantian theory of
mind and mental
activity.
The claim that the ‘I’ of apperception yields no object of

knowledge (for it is not itself an object, but only the
“vehicle” for any representation of objectivity as such)
is fundamental to Kant’s critique of rational psychology.
Kant thus
spends a considerable amount of time arguing that no object is given
in transcendental self-
consciousness, and thus that the rational
psychologist’s efforts to discern features of the self, construed as a
metaphysical entity, through reason alone are without merit. To
elucidate the ways in which the rational
psychologist is nevertheless
seduced into making this slide from formal representations of self
consciousness to
a metaphysics of the self, Kant examines each of the
psychological arguments, maintaining that all such
arguments about the
soul are dialectical. He refers to the arguments designed to draw such
conclusions,
“transcendental paralogisms”, and hence the
chapter of the Critique that criticizes rational psychology goes by
the name “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason.” A
transcendental paralogism, according to Kant, is a “syllogism in
which one is constrained, by a transcendental ground, to draw a
formally invalid conclusion” (A341/B399).
Kant’s subsequent
efforts are thus directed towards demonstrating the paralogistic
(fallacious) nature of the
arguments about the soul.
Kant’s diagnosis of the fallacies has received considerable attention,

and has generated considerable controversy.
In each case, Kant tells
us, the argument is guilty of the fallacy of sophisma
figurae dictionis, or the fallacy of
equivocation/ambiguous middle. Kant suggests that in each of the
syllogisms, a term is used in different senses
in the major and minor
premises. Consider the first paralogism, the argument that allegedly
deduces the
substantiality of the soul. In the A edition, Kant
formulates the argument as follows:
That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our

judgments and cannot be employed as
determination of any other thing,
is substance.
I, as thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible

judgments and this representation of
myself cannot be employed as
determination of any other thing.
Therefore, I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (A349)
Kant locates the equivocation contained in the argument in the use of

the term “substance.” According to Kant,
the major premise
uses this term “transcendentally” whereas the minor
premise and conclusion use the same
term “empirically.”
(A403). What Kant appears to mean is this: the major premise deploys
the term “substance”
in a very general way, one which
abstracts from the conditions of our sensible intuition (space and
time). As
such, the major premise simply offers the most general
definition of substance, and thus expresses the most
general rule in
accordance with which objects might be able to be thought as
substances. Nevertheless, in order
to apply the concept of substance
in such a way as to determine an object, the category would have to be
used
empirically. Unfortunately, such an empirical use is precluded by
the fact that the alleged object to which it is
being applied is not
empirical. Even more problematically, on Kant’s view, there is no
object given at all. In
Kantian jargon, the category only yields
knowledge of objects if it is “schematized,” applied to
given objects
under the conditions of time.
This same kind of complaint is lodged against each of the paralogistic

syllogisms that characterize Rational
Psychology. Thus, Kant argues
against the inference to the simplicity of the soul, by remarking that
the
psychologist surreptitiously deduces the actual
simplicity of a metaphysical object simply from the formal
features of
subjectivity (the fact that the “I” is unitary in our
representational economy). The personal identity of
the soul is
attacked on similar grounds. In each case the metaphysical conclusion
is said to be drawn only by an
equivocation in the use or meaning of a
concept of the understanding.
This illustrates Kant’s efforts to demonstrate the fallacious nature

of the arguments that characterize
metaphysics, as well as his
interest in identifying the sources of such errors. Given this, Kant’s
criticisms of
rational psychology are not as straightforward as one
might expect, for embedded in his criticisms of rational
psychology
are actually a number of distinct charges: 1) The idea of the soul,
although it is one to which we are
naturally led in our quest for the
unconditioned ground of thought, does not correspond to any object
that is (or
could be) actually given to us in intuition. The
hypostatization of this idea, therefore, although it may be natural,
is deeply problematic. 2) Because the idea of the soul does not yield,
by itself alone, any knowable object, the
arguments about it, although
they may have the appearance of being legitimate, in fact involve
dialectical
applications of concepts. The arguments, in other words,
involve fallacies that vitiate their conclusions. 3) The
arguments are
traceable back to certain features of human reason that may not be
eradicated, but that can and
ought to be curbed and critically
reinterpreted. More specifically, the demand for the unconditioned,
and the idea
of the soul to which it gives rise, may be construed
regulatively as devices for guiding inquiries, but never
constitutively
— never, that is, as yielding grounds for any a priori synthetic
knowledge of a metaphysical self
given immediately to pure reason.
Kant’s Paralogisms have received considerable and focused attention in

the secondary literature. See Ameriks
(1992), Brook (1994), Kitcher,
Patricia (1990), Powell (1990), Sellars (1969, 1971), Wolff, R. P.
(1963). There
are also excellent discussions to be found in Allison
(1983, 2004), Bennett (1974), Buroker (2006), Guyer
(1987), Wuerth
(2010), Bird (2006), Ameriks (2006), Melnick (2006), Dyck (2014),
Proops (2010).
4. The World and Rational Cosmology

The second discipline of rationalist metaphysics rejected by Kant is
Rational Cosmology. Rational cosmology is
concerned with the arguments
about the nature and constitution of the “world,”
understood as the sum-total of all
appearances (objects and events in
space and time) (A420/B448). The arguments about the world occupy an
especially important place in Kant’s rejection of metaphysics. Not
only does Kant address himself to the task of
discounting the
metaphysical arguments in cosmology, but the resolution to some of
these conflicts provides, he
claims, an indirect argument for his own
transcendental idealism.
The arguments about the world are referred to by Kant as

“antinomies” because in the field of cosmology, reason
gives rise to sets of opposing arguments (the “thesis” and
the “antithesis”) with respect to each issue. Thus, the
case here differs from the paralogisms (and, as we shall see, from the
Ideal). The reason for this difference
resides in the nature of the
idea of reason in question. The idea of the “world”
purports to be an idea of an
unconditioned but somehow still sensible
object (cf. A479/B509). Unlike the soul and God, which are clearly
supposed to be non-sensible metaphysical entities, the sum total of
all appearances refers specifically to spatio-
temporal objects or
events. Kant highlights this unique feature of the idea of the world
by noting that whereas
the ideas of the soul and God are
“pseudo-rational,” the idea of the world is
“pseudo-empirical.” It is precisely
this feature of the
idea (that it both purports to refer to a somehow sensible object AND
that it involves thinking
that object as already given in its
unconditioned totality) that leads to the two opposed sets of
arguments. For
with respect to each problem addressed (the finitude
vs. the infinitude of the world, freedom vs. causality, etc.),
one can
either adopt a broadly “dogmatic” (Platonic) or broadly
“empiricist” (Epicurean) approach, each
reflecting a
different way of thinking the totality of conditions (See
A471–2/B499–500). More specifically, one
can either think
the unconditioned as an intelligible ground of appearances, or as the
total (even if infinite) set of
all appearances. Unfortunately, each
of these conceptual strategies is unsatisfying. To accommodate the
thesis
interest in ultimate (intelligible) beginnings is to posit
something “too big” for the understanding, something that
is never to be met with empirically (e.g., freedom, ultimately simple
substances). Thus, although the thesis
positions satisfy reason’s
demand for the unconditioned, they do so by fleeing (however
unwittingly) into an
intelligible realm, by providing explanations
that abstract from that which is or could be given in any
spatio-
temporal experience. But adopting the empiricist approach is no
more rewarding, in the final analysis; although
the antithesis
positions remain securely lodged within “nature’s own
resources,” they can never measure up to
the demands of reason’s
ideas. Such a strategy is “too small” for reason which,
even despite its capacity to think
beyond all standards of sense and
by its demand for more thorough explanation. Worse, the antithesis
arguments,
in refusing to go beyond the spatio-temporal realm, end up
being just as dogmatic as their opposites, for the
assumption is that
whatever holds within space and time also holds generally. To assume
this is to take what are
for Kant merely subjective features of our
intuition (forms of sensibility, space and time) to be universal
ontological conditions holding of everything whatsoever.
Because both sides to the cosmological disputes seem to be able to

argue successfully against the opposite, Kant
finds in the antinomies
a dramatic exhibition of the “conflict” into which reason
inevitably falls (and in which it
will remain) so long as it fails to
adopt his own transcendental distinction between appearances and
things in
themselves. The historical debacle of reason’s conflict with
itself provides Kant with a dramatic exhibition of the
vacillation of
reason between two alternatives, neither of which it can accept (or
dismiss) without dissatisfaction.
Left unresolved, this conflict leads
to the “euthanasia of pure reason” (A407/B434), in the
sense of provoking
skeptical despair.
4.1 The Mathematical Antinomies

There are four “antinomies” of pure reason, and Kant
divides them into two classes. The first two antinomies are
dubbed
“mathematical” antinomies, presumably because in each
case, we are concerned with the relation
between what are alleged to
be sensible objects (either the world itself, or objects in it) and
space and time. An
important and fundamental aspect of Kant’s
rejection of each of these sets of arguments rests on his view that
each of these conflicts is traceable back to a fundamental error, an
error that can be discerned, according to Kant,
in the following
dialectical syllogism:
If the conditioned is given, then the whole series of conditions, a

series which is therefore itself
absolutely unconditioned, is also
given
Objects of the senses are given as conditioned
Consequently, the entire series of all conditions of objects of the

senses is already given. (cf.
A497/B525).
There are a number of problems with this argument, according to

Kant. Obviously, one problem is located in the
major premise, in the
assumption that the unconditioned is “already given.” The
problem, maintains Kant, is that
such a totality is never to be met
with in experience. The rational assumption that the total series of
all
conditions is already given would hold only for things in
themselves. In the realm of appearances, the totality is
never given
to us, as finite discursive knowers. The most we are entitled to say,
with respect to appearances, is
that the unconditioned is set as a
task, that there is a rational prescription to continue to seek
explanations
(A498/B526-A500/B528). As finite (sensible) cognizers,
however, we shall never achieve an absolute
completion of
knowledge. To assume that we can do so is to adopt the theocentric
model of knowledge
characteristic of the dreaded transcendental
realist.
This hypostatization of the idea of the world, the fact that it is

taken to be a mind-independent object, acts as the
underlying
assumption motivating both parties to the two mathematical antinomies.
The first antinomy concerns
the finitude or infinitude of the
spatio-temporal world. The thesis argument seeks to show that the
world in space
and time is finite, i.e., has a beginning in time and a
limit in space. The antithesis counters that it is infinite with
regard to both space and time. The second antinomy concerns the
ultimate constitution of objects in the world,
with the thesis arguing
for ultimately simple substances, while the antithesis argues that
objects are infinitely
divisible. In this, the thesis positions are
each concerned to bring the explanatory effort to a close, by arguing
for
ultimate or, as Kant says, “intelligible beginnings”
(cf. A466/B494). The claim that there is a “first
beginning”
or an ultimately simple substance is sustained only
by abstracting from the spatio-temporal framework. The
alleged
proponent of the antithesis arguments, on the other hand, refuses any
conclusion that goes beyond the
sensible conditions of space and
time. According to the antithesis arguments, the world is infinite in
both space
and time (these being infinite as well), and bodies are (in
accordance with the infinite divisibility of space) also
infinitely
divisible.
In each of these antinomial conflicts, reason finds itself at an

impasse. Satisfying the demands placed by our
rational capacity to
think beyond experience, the thesis arguments offer what appears to be
a satisfying resting-
place for explanation. The antithesis charges
that such a strategy fails to find any confirmation, and, citing the
unjustified flight into an intelligible realm, lodges itself squarely
in the domain of “experience.” In each of these
cases, the
conflicts are resolved by demonstrating that the conclusions drawn on
both sides are false.
How does Kant demonstrate this? Both the thesis and antithesis
arguments are apagogic, i.e., that they constitute
indirect proofs. An
indirect proof establishes its conclusion by showing the impossibility
of its opposite. Thus,
for example, we may want to know, as in the
first antinomy, whether the world is finite or infinite. We can seek
to show that it is finite by demonstrating the impossibility of its
infinitude. Alternatively, we may demonstrate
the infinitude of the
world by showing that it is impossible that it is finite. This is
exactly what the thesis and
antithesis arguments purport to do,
respectively. The same strategy is deployed in the second antinomy,
where
the proponent of the thesis position argues for the necessity of
some ultimately simple substance by showing the
impossibility of
infinite divisibility of substance, etc.
Obviously, the success of the proofs depends on the legitimacy of

the exclusive disjunction agreed to by both
parties. Both parties,
that is, assume that “there is a world,” and that it is,
for example, “either finite or infinite.”
Herein lies the
problem, according to Kant. The world is, for Kant, neither finite nor
infinite. The opposition
between these two alternatives is merely
dialectical. In the cosmological debates, each party to the dispute
falls
prey to the ambiguity in the idea of the world.
Kant thus structures his analysis of the mathematical antinomies

by appealing to the general dialectical
syllogism presented at the end
of section 4.0 (If the conditioned is give, the unconditioned is
given, Objects of
the senses are given as
conditioned....etc.). Problems stem from the application of the
principle expressed in the
first premise to the objects of the senses
(appearances). Here again, Kant diagnoses the error or fallacy
contained
in this syllogism as that of ambiguous middle. He claims
that the major premise uses the term “the conditioned”
transcendentally, as a pure concept, whereas the minor premise uses
the term ‘empirically’ – that is as a “concept
of
the understanding applied to mere appearances”
(cf. A499–500/B527–528). What Kant means is that the
major
premise uses the term “the conditioned” in a very general way, one
that considers things in abstraction
from the sensible conditions of
our intuition. The minor premise, however, which specifically refers
to objects in
space and time (appearances), is committed to an
empirical use of the term. Indeed, such an empirical use would
have to
be deployed, if the conclusion is to be reached. The conclusion is
that the entire series of all conditions
of appearances is actually
given. Put in other terms, the conclusion is that there is a world,
understood as the sum
total of all appearances and their conditions
(A420/B448).
4.2 The Dynamical Antinomies

In the dynamical antinomies, Kant changes his strategy somewhat.
Rather than arguing (as in the mathematical
antinomies) that both
conclusions are false, Kant suggests that both sides to the
dispute might turn out to be
correct. This option is available here,
and not in the two mathematical antinomies, because the proponents of
the
thesis arguments are not committing themselves solely to claims
about spatio-temporal objects. In the third
antinomy, the thesis
contends that in addition to mechanistic causality, we must posit some
first uncaused causal
power (Transcendental Freedom), while the
antithesis denies anything but mechanistic causality. Here, then, the
debate is the standard (though in this case, the specifically
cosmological) dispute between freedom and
determinism. Finally, in the
fourth antinomy, the requirement for a necessary being is pitted
against its opposite.
The thesis position argues for a necessary
being, whereas the antithesis denies that there is any such being.
In both cases the thesis opts for a position that is abstracted from
the spatio-temporal framework, and thus adopts
the broadly Platonic
view. The postulation of freedom amounts to the postulation of a
non-temporal cause, a
causality outside the series of appearances in
space and time (A451/B479). Similarly, in its efforts to argue for a
“necessary being,” reason is forced (against its own
argument) into a non-sensible realm. If there is a necessary
being, it
will have to be “outside” the series of appearances:
“Either, therefore, reason through its demand for the
unconditioned must remain in conflict with itself, or this
unconditioned must be posited outside the series, in the
intelligible” (A564/B592). The rational necessity of postulating
such a necessary being or a causality of freedom
satisfies the
rational demand for intelligible explanation. Against this, the
antithesis rightly notes that the
conception of transcendental
freedom, or a necessary being, again represents an attempt to abstract
from
“nature’s own resources” (A451–2/B479–80). Insofar as
the antithesis denies the justification for doing this, of
course, it
is said to adopt a broadly Epicurean standpoint. The problem here,
however, is that in refusing to move
beyond “nature’s own
resources,” the antithesis surreptitiously smuggles in
spatio-temporal conditions as the
basis for a universal ontological
claim that nevertheless transcends all experience. If space and time
were things
in themselves, then of course the application of the
demand for this unconditioned would be warranted. Kant’s
view,
however, is that space and time are not conditions of things in
themselves.
The resolution to these antinomies here consists in giving each side

its due, but simultaneously limiting the
domain over which the claims
hold. The thesis demand for an absolute causal beginning or a
necessary being
might well be allowed to stand, but certainly not as
“part of” or as an explication of appearances in
nature.
Similarly, the antithesis conclusions can stand, but only in
relation to objects in nature, considered as
appearances. Here, the
conflict seems irresolvable only on the assumption that appearances
are things in
themselves. If appearances were things in themselves,
for example, then it would certainly seem true that either
they are
one and all subject to mechanistic causality, or not. In such a case,
it makes sense both to argue for a
non-temporal beginning and to deny
such a beginning. Left unresolved, then, this antinomy leaves us wit
the
following dilemma: on the assumption of transcendental realism,
both nature and freedom seem to be
undermined. To avoid this, Kant
appeals to transcendental idealism, which is supposed to rescue reason
from the
conflict. Given transcendental idealism (with its distinction
between appearances and things in themselves) it
remains possible that
in addition to the mechanism of nature, or contingent existence, there
is an intelligible
causal power, or a necessary being.
Detailed discussions of Kant’s antinomies can be found in Al-Azm

(1972), Bennett, (1974), Grier (2001, 2006),
Guyer (1987), Heimsoeth
(1967), Strawson (1966), Thiel (2006), Watkins (1998, 2000), Van Cleve
(1984). See
also Allison (1983), and Walsh (1975). See also Bird
(2006), Wood (2010).
5. God and Rational Theology

The metaphysical drive, and the demand for the unconditioned, seem to
find their natural resting place in the
idea of God, an absolutely
necessary and supremely real being, the concept of which
“contains a therefore for
every wherefore” (A585/B613). It
is here, in the concept of God, that the demands for systematic unity
and
completeness of knowledge find their “objective
correlate.” Kant refers to this idea as an Ideal, suggesting it
defines itself as a “concept of an individual object which is
completely determined through the mere idea”
(A574/B602). The
Ideal represents the highest singular manifestation of reason’s demand
for the unconditioned.
The last area of metaphysics under attack, then, is Rational

Theology. Kant’s criticism of rational theology is
complicated by his
desire to elucidate the sources of the dialectical errors,
which he will expose in relation to the
specific arguments for God’s
existence. (“…Merely to describe the procedure of our
reason and its dialectic does
not suffice; we must also endeavor to
discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may explain…the
illusion to
which it has given rise” (A581/B607).) Kant thus
spends a considerable amount of time tracing the idea of God
back to
its rational, speculative, sources. According to Kant,
“….the Ideal …is based on a natural, not a merely
arbitrary idea” (A581/B607). On this score, Kant wants to tell
us that we are compelled to think the idea of God
(the ens
realissimum) when pursuing certain speculative or philosophical
interests. More specifically, the idea of
a supremely real being (the
ens realissimum) is one to which we are inevitably led during
our attempts to
account for the pure possibility of things in general.
The upshot that the idea of the ens realissimum is not an
arbitrary or easily dispensable one. Instead, Kant suggests that
reason is philosophically constrained to move to
such an idea in its
efforts to thoroughly determine every thing. Such efforts require
thinking the totality, or “All”
of reality (the
omnitudo realitatis). Such an idea is philosophically
required because, in our efforts to thoroughly
determine each thing
(to know it completely, specify it exhaustively), we must be able to
say, of every possible
predicate and its contradictory (p v
˜p) which of the two holds of the thing in
question. (For every object, it is
either A or not
A, either B or not B, etc., and this
process is iterated until each predicate pair (each positive
reality)
is exhausted — Kant clearly has a Leibnizian procedure of
complete determination in mind here.) This
process is parasitic upon
the idea of “sum total of all predicates of things in
general.” Or, put in another way, we
represent “every
thing as deriving its own possibility from the share it has in the
whole of possibility”
(A572/B600). Such an idea, the All of
reality, however, defines itself as an individual thing, and leads us
to the
representation of the “supremely real being.” The
problem seems to come in, according to Kant, when the
“All”
of reality gets hypostatized, and (eventually)
personified, thus yielding the ens realissimum (cf.
A583/B611n).
Here again, Kant thinks that this idea itself gets
transmuted into the notion of a given object by virtue of a
unique
subreption, whereby we dialectically substitute for a principle that
is only meant for empirical
employment one which holds of things in
general. The argument Kant offers is excruciating, but the essential
point is that, just as the idea of the soul involved the subreption of
the hypostatized consciousness, so too, the
idea of the ens
realissimum is generated by both a subrepted principle and a
hypostatization.
As in the cases of both rational psychology and rational cosmology,

then, one central problem thus has to do
with the assumption that pure
(speculative) reason yields any access to a transcendent object (in
this case, God)
about which it is entitled to seek a priori
knowledge. Despite his insistence that the idea of God is
indispensable
and “inescapable” (cf. A584/B612), Kant
again denies that we can acquire any theoretical knowledge of the
alleged “object” thought through such an idea. On the one
hand, then, the idea of God is “the crown of our
endeavors.” On the other, as in the cases of both rational
psychology and cosmology, the idea answers to no
given and
theoretically knowable object (A339/B397). Indeed, according to Kant,
the idea of God should not
lead us to “presuppose the existence
of a being that corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a
being,
and this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned
totality of complete determination the
conditioned totality. i.e., the limited…” (A578/B606). As in the other disciplines of
metaphysics, Kant suggests
that we are motivated (perhaps even
constrained) to represent the idea as a real object, to hypostatize
it, in
accordance the demand for the unconditioned:
Notwithstanding this pressing need of reason to presuppose

something that may afford the
understanding a sufficient foundation
for the complete determination of its concepts, it is yet too
easily
conscious of the ideal and merely fictitious character of such a
presuppostion to allow itself,
on this ground alone, to be persuaded
that a mere creature of its own thought is a real being — were
it not that it is impelled from another direction to seek a resting

place in the regress from the
conditioned, which is given, to the
unconditioned (A584/B612)
This demand for the unconditioned, according to Kant, links up with a

demand for some ultimately necessary
being. Reason, that is,
ceaselessly demands the ground of all the contingent beings in
existence, and will not rest
until it settles on the absolutely
necessary being which grounds them. The idea of the ens
realissimum plays a
singular role in satisfying this desire of
reason, for of all concepts, it is that “which best squares with
the concept
of an unconditionally necessary being” (A586/B614).
In fact, according to Kant rational theology is based on the
coincidence of the rational demands for a supremely real being and for
a being with absolutely necessary
existence. If the movement to the
idea of God, as the unconditioned ground, is inevitable, it is
nevertheless as
troublesome as the other rational ideas:
This unconditioned is not, indeed, given as being in

itself real, nor as having a reality that follows
from its mere
concept; it is, however, what alone can complete the series of
conditions when we
proceed to trace these conditions to their
grounds. This is the course which our human reason, by its
very
nature, leads all of us (A584/B612; cf. A584/B612n).
Thus, although Kant is most well known for his attacks on the specific
arguments for God’s existence, his
criticisms of rational theology are
in fact more detailed, and involve a robust critique of the idea of
God itself.
This account of the rational origin and the importance of
the idea of God clears the way for Kant’s rejection of
the
metaphysical arguments about God’s existence. Kant identifies three
traditional arguments, the ontological,
the cosmological, and the
physico-theological (the argument from design). What all such
arguments do is
attempt to wed the idea of the ens
realissimum with the notion of necessary existence. Whereas the
Ontological
argument moves from the concept of the ens
realissimum to the claim that such a being exists
necessarily, the
Cosmological and physico-theological arguments move
from some necessary being to the conclusion that such a
being
must be the ens realissimum.
5.1 The Ontological Argument

Kant’s formulation of the ontological argument is fairly
straightforward, and may be summarized as follows:
1. God, the ens realissimum, is the concept of a being that

contains all reality/predicates.
2. Existence is a reality/predicate.
3. Therefore God exists.
Kant’s identification of the errors involved in this argument are so

varied that it seems surprising that he is so
often simply said to
have argued against the use of “existence” as a
predicate. His first complaint is that it is
“contradictory” insofar as it introduces
“existence” into the “concept of a thing which we
profess to be thinking
solely in reference to its possibility”
(A597/B625). This suggests that he thinks that in taking “all
reality” to
mean or include “existence,” the
rational theologist begs the question, and already posits the analytic
connection
between the concept of the ens realissimum and
necessary existence.
At the heart of this complaint is a more general one, to wit, that

there is a problem with the attempt to infer
anything as
necessarily existing. Although, according to Kant, reason is
unavoidably led to the notion of an
absolutely necessary being, the
understanding is in no position to identify any candidate answering to
the idea.
(cf. A592/B620). Clearly, the ontological argument is
designed to show that, in fact, there is one (and only one)
candidate answering to this idea, namely, the ens
realissimum. But it does so by deducing the necessary
existence
from the concept of the ens realissimum (a being that
contains all reality or predicates) only via the
minor premise that
“existence” is a predicate or reality. Kant, however,
famously denies that existence is a “real
predicate,” or
determination. Thus, one criticism is that the argument conflates
merely logical with real
(determining) predicates. A real
(determining) predicate is one that enlarges the concept to which it
is attached.
It seems clear that the locus of the error here, as in
the other metaphysical disciplines, is the view that the idea of
the
ens realissimum provides us with a concept of an
“object” to which it would be appropriate to apply
categories or concepts in a determining way. Thus, included in Kant’s
criticism is the claim that the category of
existence is being subject

to a transcendental misemployment (A598/B626). This misapplication of
the category
is problematic precisely because, according to Kant, we
are dealing only with an object of pure thought, whose
existence
cannot be known (A602/B630).
5.2 The Other Proofs

If the ontological argument seeks to move from the concept of the
ens realissimum to the concept of an
absolutely necessary
being, both the cosmological and physicotheological proofs move in the
opposite direction.
Each, that is, argues that there is something that
must exist with absolute necessity and concludes that this being
is
the ens realissimum. Because these proofs aim to identify the
ens realissimum with the necessary being, and
because the
attempt to do this requires an a priori argument (it cannot
be demonstrated empirically), Kant thinks
that they are both
(ultimately) vitiated by their reliance on the ontological
proof. More specifically, they are both
mitigated by their assumption
that the ens realissimum is the only object or candidate that
can do the job of
existing necessarily. Since he thinks that the
ontological argument is in some sense implicitly relied upon in
making
such a claim, these arguments stand or fall with it. On Kant’s view,
as we shall see, they fall.
The cosmological proof has, according to Kant, two parts. As

above, the proponent of the argument first seeks to
demonstrate the
existence of an absolutely necessary being. Second, the rational
cosmologist seeks to show that
this absolutely necessary being is the
ens realissimum.
As Kant formulates it, the cosmological argument is as follows:
If something exists, then an absolutely necessary being must also

exist.
I myself, at least, exist.
Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists.
As above, the theist will ultimately want to identify this necessary

being with the ens realissimum, an
identification which Kant
thinks surreptitiously smuggles in the (dialectical) ontological
argument. The claim
here is that the proponent of the cosmological
argument is committed ultimately to accepting the ontological
argument, given her attempt to identify the necessary being with the
ens realissimum. Although this suggests
that the cosmological
argument relies on the ontological, Kant also indicates that the
effort to produce a purely a
priori argument for God’s
existence (the ontological argument) itself gets momentum from
reason’s need to find
the necessary ground for existence in general, a
need expressed in the cosmological argument
(cf. A603–
04/B631–32). This suggests that Kant takes the ontological
and cosmological arguments to be complementary
expressions of the one
underlying rational demand for the unconditioned.
Even aside from its alleged commitment to the ontological argument,

Kant has a number of complaints about the
cosmological argument.
Indeed, according to Kant, the cosmological argument is characterized
by an “entire
nest of dialectical presumptions” which must
be illuminated and “destroyed” (A609/B637). These
dialectical
presumptions include the attempt to infer from the
contingent (within experience) to some cause lying outside
the world
of sense altogether, an effort involving a transcendental
misapplication of the categories. It also
includes, Kant claims, the
dialectical effort to infer from the conceptual impossibility
of an infinite series of
causes to some actual first cause
outside of sense. Such efforts involve a “false
self-satisfaction” according to
which reason feels itself to
have finally landed on a truly necessary being. Unfortunately,
according to Kant, this
is only achieved by conflating the merely
logical possibility of a concept (that it is not
self-contradictory) with
the transcendental (real)
possibility of a thing. In short, the cosmological argument
gets its momentum by
confusing rational or subjective necessities with
real or objective ones, and thus involves transcendental illusion
(cf. A605/B633).
We come finally to the physicotheological proof, which argues

from the particular constitution of the world,
specifically its
beauty, order, and purposiveness, to the necessary existence of an
intelligent cause (God). Such
an argument goes beyond the cosmological
one by moving not from existence in general but from some
determinate experience in order to demonstrate the existence
of God (A621/B649). Although this might seem to
be a strength, this
strategy is doomed to fail, according to Kant. No experience could
ever be adequate to the
idea of a necessary, original being:
“The transcendental idea of a necessary all-sufficient original
being is so
overwhelmingly great, so sublimely high above everything
empirical, which is at all times conditioned, that
partly one can
never even procure enough material in experience to fill such a
concept, and partly if one searches
for the unconditioned among
conditioned things, then one will seek forever and always in
vain” (A621/B649).
Kant’s claim is that even if we could grant that the order and
purposiveness of nature gives us good reason to
suppose some
intelligent designer, it does not warrant the inference to an ens
realissimum. At most, Kant tells us,
the proof could establish a
“highest architect of the world…., but not a creator of
the world.” (A627/B655). The
last inference, that to the ens
realissimum, is only drawn by moving far away from any
consideration of the
actual (empirical) world. In other words, here
too, Kant thinks that the rational theologist is relying on a
transcendental (a priori) argument. Indeed, according to
Kant, the physicotheological proof could never, given
its empirical
starting point, establish the existence of a highest being by itself
alone, and must rely on the
ontological argument at crucial stages
(cf. A625/B653). Since, according to Kant, the ontological argument
fails,
so does the physicotheological one.
Although Kant rejects the physiciotheological argument as a

theoretical proof for God’s existence, he also sees
in it a powerful
expression of reason’s need to recognize in nature purposive unity and
design (cf. A625/B651).
In this, the physicotheological argument’s
emphasis on the purposiveness and systematic unity of nature
illuminates an assumption that Kant takes to be essential to our
endeavors in the natural sciences. The essential
role played by the
assumption of purposive and systematic unity, and the role it plays in
scientific inquiries, is
taken up by Kant in the Appendix to the
Transcendental Dialectic. To this topic we now turn.
For some discussions of the Ideal of Pure Reason and Rational

Theology, see Caimi (1995). England (1968),
Grier (2001), Henrich
(1960), Longuenesse (1995, 2005), Rohs (1978), Walsh (1975), and Wood
(1978),
Chignell (2009),Grier (2010), Chignell (2014).
6. Reason and the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic

The criticisms of the metaphysical arguments offered in the
Transcendental Dialectic do not bring Kant’s
discussion to a close.
Indeed, in an “Appendix” to the Transcendental Dialectic,
Kant returns to the issue of
reason’s positive or necessary role. The
curious “Appendix” has provoked a great deal of confusion,
and not
without reason. After all, the entire thrust of the Dialectic
seemed to be directed at “critiquing” and curbing pure
reason, and undermining its pretense to any real use. Nevertheless,
Kant goes on to suggest that the very reason
that led us into
metaphysical error is also the source of certain necessary ideas and
principles, and moreover, that
these rational postulations play an
essential role in scientific theorizing (A645/B673;
A671/B699). Exactly what
role they are supposed to play in this regard
is less clear.
The Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic is divided into two

parts. In the first, “On the Regulative Use of
the Ideas of Pure
Reason,” Kant attempts to identify some proper
“immanent” use for reason. In its most general
terms, Kant
is here concerned to establish a necessary role for reason’s principle
of systematic unity. This
principle was first formulated by Kant in
the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic in two forms, one
prescriptive, and the other in what sounded to be a metaphysical
claim. In the first, prescriptive form, the
principle enjoins us to
“Find for the conditioned knowledge given through the
understanding the unconditioned
whereby its unity is brought to
completion.” The complementary metaphysical principle assures us
that the
“unconditioned” is indeed given and there to be
found. Taken together, these principles express reason’s interests
in
securing systematic unity of knowledge and bringing such knowledge to
completion.
Kant is quite clear that he takes reason’s demand for systematicity to

play an important role in empirical inquiry.
In connection with this,
Kant suggests that the coherent operation of the understanding somehow
requires
reason’s guiding influence, particularly if we are to unify
the knowledge given through the real use of the
understanding into
scientific theory (cf. A651–52/B679–80). To order knowledge
systematically, for Kant,
means to subsume or unify it under fewer and
fewer principles in light of the idea of one “whole of
knowledge”
so that its parts are exhibited in their necessary
connections (cf. 646/B674). The idea of the form of a whole of
knowledge is thus said to postulate “complete unity in the

knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which
this knowledge is to
be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according
to necessary laws”
(A646/B676). Having said this, it should be
noted that Kant’s position is, in its details, difficult to pin down.
Sometimes Kant suggests merely that we ought to seek
systematic unity of knowledge, and this merely for own
theoretical
convenience (A771/B799-A772/B800). Other times, however, he suggests
that we must assume that
the nature itself conforms to our
demands for systematic unity, and this necessarily, if we are to
secure even an
empirical criterion of truth (cf. A651–53/B679–81). The
precise status of the demand for systematicity is
therefore somewhat
controversial.
Regardless of these more subtle textual issues Kant remains committed

to the view that reason’s proper use is
always only
“regulative” and never constitutive. The distinction
between the regulative and the constitutive may
be viewed as
describing two different ways in which the claims of reason may be
interpreted. A principle of
reason is constitutive, according to Kant,
when it is taken to supply a concept of a real object (A306/B363;
A648/B676). Throughout the Dialectic Kant argued against this
(constitutive) interpretation of the ideas and
principles of reason,
claiming that reason so far transcends possible experience that there
is nothing in
experience that corresponds with its ideas. Although
Kant denies that reason is constitutive he nevertheless, as
we have
seen, insists that it has an “indispensably necessary”
regulative use. In accordance with reason’s
demand, the understanding
is guided and led to secure systematic unity and completion of
knowledge. In other
words, Kant seeks to show that reason’s demand for
systematic unity is related to the project of empirical
knowledge
acquisition. Indeed, Kant links the demand for systematicity up with
three other principles — those
of homogeneity, specification and
affinity — which he thinks express the fundamental presumptions
that guide
us in theory formation. The essential point seems to be
that the development and expansion of empirical
knowledge is always,
as it were, “already” guided by the rational interests in
securing unity and completion of
knowledge. Without such a guiding
agenda, and without the assumption that nature conforms to our
rational
demands for securing unity and coherence of knowledge, our
scientific pursuits would lack orientation. Thus,
the claim that
reason’s principles play a necessary “regulative” role in
science reflects Kant’s critical
reinterpretation of the traditional
rationalist ideal of arriving at complete knowledge.
It is connection with this that Kant argues, in the second part of the
Appendix (“On the Final Aim of the Natural
Dialectic of Human
Reason” (A669/B697)), that the three highest ideas of reason
have an important theoretical
function. More specifically, in
this section Kant turns from a general discussion of the important
(regulative) use
of the principle of systematicity, to a consideration
of the three transcendental ideas (the Soul, the World, and
God) at
issue in the Dialectic. As examples of the unifying and guiding role
of reason’s ideas, Kant had earlier
appealed to the ideas of
“pure earth” and “pure air” in Chemistry, or
the idea of a “fundamental power” in
psychological
investigations (cf. A650/B678). His suggestion earlier was that these
ideas are implicit in the
practices governing scientific
classification, and enjoin us to seek explanatory connections between
disparate
phenomena. As such, reason’s postulations serve to provide
an orienting point towards which our explanations
strive, and in
accordance with which our theories progressively achieve systematic
interconnection and unity.
Similarly, Kant now suggests that each of
the three transcendental ideas of reason at issue in the Dialectic
serves
as an imaginary point (focus imaginarius) towards
which our investigations hypothetically converge. More
specifically,
he suggests that the idea of the soul serves to guide our empirical
investigations in psychology, the
idea of the world grounds physics,
and the idea of God grounds the unification of these two branches of
natural
science into one unified Science (cf.
A684/B712-A686/B714). In each of these cases, Kant claims, the idea
allows us to represent (problematically) the systematic unity towards
which we aspire and which we presuppose
in empirical studies. In
accordance with the idea of God, for example, we “consider every
connection in the
world according to principles [Principien]
of a systematic unity, hence as if they had all
arisen from one single
all-encompassing being, as supreme and
all-sufficient cause” (A686/B714). Such a claim, controversial
as it is,
illuminates Kant’s view that empirical inquiries are one and
all undertaken in light of the rational goal of a single
unified body
of knowledge. It also points towards the Kantian view, later
emphasized in the Transcendental
Doctrine of Method, that reason’s
theoretical and practical interests ultimately form a higher
unity.
For discussions on the Appendix and the role of reason and

systematicity, see Allison (2004), Brandt (1989),
Buchdahl (1967),
Britton (1978), Forster (2000), Friedman (1992), Ginsborg (1990),
Grier (2001), Guyer
(1990a, 1990b), Horstmann (1989), O’Neill (1992),

Patricia Kitcher (1991), Philip Kitcher (1984), Nieman
(1994),
MacFarland (1970), Walker (1990), Walsh (1975), Wartenberg (1979,
1992), Rauscher (2010).
For an important discussion on the “unity” of

theoretical and practical reason, see again Forster (2000). See also
Velkley (1989).
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Critique of Practical Reason, 1956, trans. L. W. Beck,

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Critique of Pure Reason, 1929, trans. N. Kemp Smith, New
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Gesammelte Schriften, 1922, Koniglich Preussischen
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de Gruyter
Kant: Philosophical Correspondence , 1759–99, 1970, ed.
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Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1954, ed. R. Schmidt, Hamburg:
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Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. J.
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Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1950, trans. L.W.
Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
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Beck, 1968, trans. G. B. Kerferd and D. E.
Walford, Manchester:
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Lectures on Philosophical Theology, 1978, trans. Allen
Wood and Gertrude M. Clark, Ithaca: Cornell University
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First Introdcution to the Critique of Judgment, 1965,
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The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lectures
on Metaphysics, 1997, trans. and ed. Karl
Ameriks and Steve
Naragan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Lectures
on Logic, 1992, trans. and ed. J. Michael
Young, Cambridge:
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The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The
Critique of Pure Reason, 1998, trans. and ed. Paul
Guyer and Allen
Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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Al-Azm, S., 1972, The Origins of Kant’s Argument in the

Antinomies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ameriks, K., 1992, “The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and
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ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2006, “The Critique of Metaphysics: The
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–––, 1982, Kant’s Theory of Mind, Oxford:
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Allison, H., 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, New
Haven: Yale University Press
–––, 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, revised
and expanded version, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bennett, J., 1974, Kant’s Dialectic, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
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Court.
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Blackwell.
Buroker, J., 2006, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An
Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Judgment: Comments on Hampshire and
Horstmann,” in Kant’s
Transcendental Deductions, Eckhard Forster (ed.), Stanford: Stanford University
Press, pp. 177–190.
Brook, A., 1994, Kant and the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Brittan, Gordon G., 1978, Kant’s Theory of Science,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Buchdahl, Gerd, 1969, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of
Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Butts, R., 1997, “Kant’s Dialectic and the Logic of
Illusion,” in Logic and the Workings of the Mind, ed.
Patricia
Easton, Atascadero, California: Ridgeview,
Caimi, M., 1995, “On a Non-Regulative Function of the Ideal

of Pure Reason,” Proceedings of the Eighth
International
Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson, Volume 1, Part 2 (3A-3L):
539–549.
Dyck, C., 2014, Kant and Rational Psychology, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
England, F. E., 1968, Kant’s Conception of God, New York:
Humanities Press.
Forster, Eckhard, 2000, Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the
Opus Postumum, Cambridge and London:
Harvard University
Press.
Friedman, M., 1992, “Causal Laws and Foundations of Natural
Science,” in Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed.
Paul
Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 161–199.
Ginsborg, H., 1990, The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of
Cognition. New York and London: Garland Publishing
Company.
Guyer, P., 1987, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge,
Cambridge: Cambridge University press
–––, 1990a, “Kant’s Conception of
Empirical law,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(Supplementary
Volume), 64: 220–242.
–––, 1990b, “Reason and Reflective
Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity,”
Noûs, 24: 17–43.
Guyer, P. (ed.), 1992, The Cambridge Companion to Kant,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
––– (ed.), 2010, The Cambridge Companion to
the Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Grier, M. , 2001, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental
Illusion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
–––, 2006, “The Logic of Illusion and the
Antinomies,” in Bird (ed.) 2006, Oxford: Blackwell:
192–207.
–––, 2010, “The Ideal of Pure
Reason,” in P. Guyer (ed.) 2010, pp. 266–289.
Heimsoeth, H., 1967, Transzendentale Dialektik. Ein Commentar
su Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft. Berlin: de
Gruyter
Henrich, D., 1960, Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. Sein Problem
und seine Geschichte In der Neuzeit,
Tubingen: Morh.
Horstmann, Rolph P., 1989, “Why must there be a Deduction in
Kant’s Critique of Judgment?” in Kant’s
Transcendental Deductions, ed. E. Forster, pp. 157–176. Stanford:
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Kitcher, P., 1990, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology,
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–––, 2005, Kant on the Human Standpoint,
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Loparic, Z., 1990, “The Logical Structure of the First
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MacFarland, P., 1970, Kant’s Concept of Teleology.
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Nieman, S., 1994, The Unity of Reason, New York: Oxford
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22/06/2021 Kantâs Critique of Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

How are synthetic a priori propositions possible? This

1. Preliminary Remarks: The Rejection of Ontology (general

Transcendental Analytic. Indeed, two

For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the

We thus find one general complaint about efforts to acquire

2. The Rejection of Special Metaphysics and the Transcendental

Although this general charge is certainly a significant part of Kant’s

inherent in the very nature of human

2.1 The Theory of Reason and Transcendental Illusion

The demand for the unconditioned is essentially a demand for

Although the demand for the unconditioned is inherent in the very

The central problem is that the above prescription to seek

involves showing not simply that the metaphysical arguments are

Kant has been traditionally taken to be offering a method of avoiding

It is this general theory of reason, as a capacity to think (by means

The Dialectic is concerned to undermine three distinct branches of

For more on Kant’s theory of illusion, see Allison (2004), Butts

2.2 Hypostatization and Subreption

There are two noteworthy themes implicit in Kant’s criticism of

Thus, Kant’s criticism of metaphysics simultaneously involves denying

In addition to criticizing the “hypostatization” of the

3. The Soul and Rational Psychology

devoted to this topic is

An essential aspect of all these arguments, according to Kant,is

Kant’s criticisms of rational psychology draw on a number of distinct

The claim that the ‘I’ of apperception yields no object of

Kant’s diagnosis of the fallacies has received considerable attention,

That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our

I, as thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible

Therefore, I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (A349)

Kant locates the equivocation contained in the argument in the use of

This same kind of complaint is lodged against each of the paralogistic

This illustrates Kant’s efforts to demonstrate the fallacious nature

Kant’s Paralogisms have received considerable and focused attention in

4. The World and Rational Cosmology

The arguments about the world are referred to by Kant as

Because both sides to the cosmological disputes seem to be able to

4.1 The Mathematical Antinomies

If the conditioned is given, then the whole series of conditions, a

Objects of the senses are given as conditioned

Consequently, the entire series of all conditions of objects of the

There are a number of problems with this argument, according to

This hypostatization of the idea of the world, the fact that it is

In each of these antinomial conflicts, reason finds itself at an

Obviously, the success of the proofs depends on the legitimacy of

Kant thus structures his analysis of the mathematical antinomies

4.2 The Dynamical Antinomies

The resolution to these antinomies here consists in giving each side

Detailed discussions of Kant’s antinomies can be found in Al-Azm

5. God and Rational Theology

The last area of metaphysics under attack, then, is Rational

As in the cases of both rational psychology and rational cosmology,

Notwithstanding this pressing need of reason to presuppose

it not that it is impelled from another direction to seek a resting

This demand for the unconditioned, according to Kant, links up with a

This unconditioned is not, indeed, given as being in

5.1 The Ontological Argument

1. God, the ens realissimum, is the concept of a being that

Kant’s identification of the errors involved in this argument are so

At the heart of this complaint is a more general one, to wit, that

existence is being subject

22/06/2021 Kantâs Critique of Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)