Spec Pro Case Digest

2, 2017
FACTS:
Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate of
deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir of
Gregorio who died intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio’s death, there had
been no effort to settle his estate. And that Dujali purportedly continued to manage and
control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further alleged that
Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the estate. Thus, Buot asked
that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio’s estate; (2) a final
inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate
be ordered distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.
Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to Dujali, when an estate
has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when there are
good and compelling reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or out of court)
is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding.
Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if
they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition. In her case,
she claims that there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration
proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate;
(2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot’
s status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate;
and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have already
manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator.
ISSUE: Won Petition for letters of administration filed by Buot be granted
HELD:
No, The Supreme Court held that the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant
of her petition for letters of administration do not suffice to warrant the submission of
Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings.
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Buot’s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio’s
entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the
estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and
whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be
considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the
administration of the estate
As to Buot’s other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2)
that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; (3) that other heirs have been deprived of
the estate; and (4) these heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we
find that none of these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for
partition.
An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot’s entitlement to
participate in the proceedings as an heir. Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of
the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true
heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to
litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if partition is proper and
who may participate in the proceedings.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial
administration proceedings.There are, however, several exceptions.
If the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may
divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so
extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In
case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.
Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition.
In the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez,
Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort
for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition.
Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made
therein of the word may.
In Pereira v. Court of Appeals we refused to allow administration proceedings where
the only reason why the appointment of an administrator was sought so that one
heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. What constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each
case. Buot’s reasons do not qualify as good and compelling reason to submit
Gregorio’s estate to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in
this case did not cover Gregorio's entire estate is not sufficient reason to order
the administration of the estate.
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO AND VITTORIO C. ROMERO
FACTS: Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death, their mother, respondent
Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal
properties in trust for her children. Since that year until the present, she continues to be
the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate
of her late husband. Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that
several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal
properties of their parents. Petitioners claim that their brother Vittorio – through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering properties in his name.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title. This was denied by the trial court on the ground that it could not
be adjudicated without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate
court as to the share of each of the heirs
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was correct.
RULING: Yes.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the
testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action.
That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet
if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership.
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded
therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not
final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of interested parties,
in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or existence of the right or
credit.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the
recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and to pass upon the
validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.25 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners’ co-
heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court, because it is the
probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and that
has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and dispositions as administrator. In
Peñaverde v. Peñaverde,26 the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-
shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners’
own case seeking that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the case
at bar, the petitioners in Peñaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the name of
their co-heir
BUTIONG VS PLAZO
(765 SCRA 227)
FACTS:
In 1989, Pedro Riñoza died
intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his
first wife, who are also the
respondents in this case; (Ma.
Gracia and Ma. Fe). Pedro also
left several properties including
a resort and a family home
both located in Nasugbu,
Batangas. The respondents
alleged that in 1991, their co-
heirs - Pedro's second wife
Benita, and other children had
sold the subject properties to
the petitioner spouses,
Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong without their knowledge
and consent. The spouses
are now deceased and
substituted by their son, Ruel.
Respondents learned that in July
1991, a notice of an extrajudicial
settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a
tabloid called "Balita". In the
course of his testimony during
trial, petitioner Francisco
contended that what they
purchased was only the resort. He
also presented an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Renunciation,
Repudiations and Waiver of Rights
and Sale which provides
that respondents' co-heirs sold the
family home to a certain spouses
Bondoc for P1M as
well as a Deed of Sale whereby
Benita sold the resort to petitioners
for P650K.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed
reversible error in not ruling
that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction in entertaining the
special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Pedro
and the civil action for annulment
of title of the heirs and third
persons in one proceeding
HELD:
NO. Petitioner is mistaken. It is
true that some of respondents'
causes of action pertaining
to the properties left behind by the
decedent Pedro, his known heirs,
and the nature and
extent of their interests thereon,
may fall under an action for
settlement of estate. However,
a complete reading of the
complaint would readily show
that, based on the nature of the
suit, the allegations therein, and
the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession. The
fact of the extrajudicial
settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the
manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no
notice thereof.
BUTIONG VS PLAZO
(765 SCRA 227)
FACTS:
Bondoc for P1M as
for P650K.
ISSUE:
HELD:
and the nature and
notice thereof.
BUTIONG VS PLAZO
(765 SCRA 227)
FACTS:
Bondoc for P1M as
for P650K.
ISSUE:
HELD:
and the nature and
notice thereof.
BUTIONG VS PLAZO
(765 SCRA 227)
FACTS:
left several properties
including a resort and a
family home both located in
Nasugbu,
Butiong without their
knowledge and consent. The
spouses
Respondents learned that in
July
purchased was only the resort.
He also presented an
Extrajudicial
Repudiations and Waiver of
Rights and Sale which provides
that respondents' co-heirs sold
the family home to a certain
spouses Bondoc for P1M as
Benita sold the resort to
petitioners for P650K.
ISSUE:
that the trial court acted
without
and the civil action for
annulment of title of the heirs
and third persons in one
proceeding
HELD:
to the properties left behind by
the decedent Pedro, his known
heirs, and the nature and
that, based on the nature of
the
the reliefs prayed for, the action
is clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of
title and recovery of
possession. The fact of the
extrajudicial
settlement or administration
shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation
in the
extrajudicial settlement shall
be
binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.
BUTIONG VS PLAZO
(765 SCRA 227)
FACTS:
left several properties
including a resort and a
family home both located in
Nasugbu,
Butiong without their
knowledge and consent. The
spouses
Respondents learned that in
July
purchased was only the resort.
He also presented an
Extrajudicial
Repudiations and Waiver of
Rights and Sale which provides
that respondents' co-heirs sold
the family home to a certain
spouses Bondoc for P1M as
Benita sold the resort to
petitioners for P650K.
ISSUE:
that the trial court acted
without
and the civil action for
annulment of title of the heirs
and third persons in one
proceeding
HELD:
to the properties left behind by
the decedent Pedro, his known
heirs, and the nature and
that, based on the nature of
the
the reliefs prayed for, the action
is clearly one for judicial
partition with annulment of
title and recovery of
possession. The fact of the
extrajudicial
settlement or administration
shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation
in the
extrajudicial settlement shall
be
binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.
BUTIONG VS PLAZO
(765 SCRA 227)
FACTS:
In 1989, Pedro Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with
his first wife, who are also the respondents in this case; (Ma. Gracia and Ma. Fe). Pedro
also left several properties including a resort and a family home both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas. The respondents alleged that in 1991, their co-heirs -
Pedro's second wife Benita, and other children had sold the subject properties to
the petitioner spouses, Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong without their
knowledge and consent. The spouses are now deceased and substituted by their
son, Ruel. Respondents learned that in July 1991, a notice of an extrajudicial
settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called "Balita". In
the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco contended that what
they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extrajudicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides that
respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to a certain spouses Bondoc for P1M as
well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650K.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed reversible error in not ruling that the trial court acted
without jurisdiction in entertaining the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of Pedro and the civil action for annulment of title of the heirs and third persons in one
proceeding
HELD:
NO. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and
the nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement
of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that,
based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the
action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that
Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations.
Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation
to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for
settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no· debts
or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even
if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court,
the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court . It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial partition
instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as law expressly
permits the same. That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for
settlement of estate does not. Mean that there was a prohibited joined of causes of
action for questions as to the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs,
their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be
properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone. 34 In fact, a complete inventory of
the estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially
since the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be
compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing
of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated.
4. ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. April 25, 2018 G.R. No. 230751
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).[4] The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident

of 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was
assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
3. The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968
in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal
home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set
out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979
and he never made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his
relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police
Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news
regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had
no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going
AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New
People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never
gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is
still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a meager source
of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the
benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of
death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the
benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the
Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent
Republic of the Philippines (Republic).[5]
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision [6] in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the
petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: [7]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N.
MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military
officer.
xxxx
The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41
of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it
was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking
the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and
not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
HELD: The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed
by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC.
The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an
action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because
petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that
the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose
of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed
"not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended."[10]
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death
under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code [11] as the basis of her
petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division
of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly
improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
OANIE SURPOSA UY v. JOSE NGO CHUA, GR No. 183965, 2009-09-18
Facts:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition[1] for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan.
In his Answer[3] to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he
had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.[4] Hearings then
ensued during which petitioner testified that... respondent was the only father she knew;
that he took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came
to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove
her claim of illegitimate filiation.
on
27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence[5] on the ground that the Decision
dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already
been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October
2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB,... assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a
Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000,
praying that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of
which follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no
blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and
[herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or
acknowledgement... is concurred with petitioner's brother Allan, who although not a party to
the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration
herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brother's (Allan)
civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent]
JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO
MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and... another TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby
acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more
claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his
heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or... against all corporations, companies or business
enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and
Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO
CHUA may have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand
with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent
dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a
judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim."... the Court notes
that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner
went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising
pure questions of law in her instant Petition
Issues:
whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.
Ruling:
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[18] In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico
v. Republic,[19] the Court pronounced that a... judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must
comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause
of... the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions
of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is
null and... void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no
legal effect at all.[
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February
2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner's
status and filiation,... i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange
for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although
unmentioned, it was a... necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that
petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate
child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
between petitioner and respondent is covered by... the prohibition under Article 2035 of the
Civil Code.
It is settled, then, in
law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of
a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.[22] Paternity and
filiation or the lack of the same, is... a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot
be rendered operative... even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their
respective prestations.
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by
his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding
Judge, Brach 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents
G.R. No. 148220 | June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Armi Alba, mother of 13-year-old Rosendo Alba, filed a petition for compulsory
recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner denied that he is the
biological father respondent. He also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support this motion, respondent presented the testimony of Dr.
Saturnina C. Halos, the head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute, a DNA analysis laboratory. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. He
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,13 support (as in
the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person
who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are
four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child. 14
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with
the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the
burden forward and shift it to the putative father.
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father
may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either
physical absence or impotency. 16The putative father may also show that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed

legitimate.17 The child's legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict
standards provided by law.18
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be
offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a
paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no
mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like
his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent's
mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent's
biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi
Alba's assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that
respondent is Armi Alba's child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner's denial by
submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble
each other.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under
Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father. 21 A notarial agreement to support a
child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence.22 Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of
the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate
of live birth, proved filiation.23 However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father
gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.24 Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism25 nor family pictures26 are sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and
filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources
of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are
conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.
N THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON
YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko), her 14-year-old
1
daughter, ran away from home on September 23, 2011. On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the
police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of
respondent Jovy Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused to
release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation NBI) to
rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura Pura), informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with
Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however,
that the child was fine and had been attending school.
This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban and
the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City citing as reason several threats against her life in that city.
In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012, the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP 07261 to deny the
2
petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas
corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or
as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of
such person. The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration on January 8, 2013,
3
hence, this petition for review.
In her Comment, respondent Cabcaban claimed that on September 28, 2011 police officers found
4
Shang Ko crying outside a church. When queried, the latter refused to give any information about
herself. Thus, they indorsed her case to the Bacolod City Police Women and Children Protection
Desk that Cabcaban headed. After the initial interview, Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay
Pasilungan , a temporary shelter for abused women and children.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with the minor who
said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. She narrated that on September 27,
2011 Shirly instructed another daughter to give Shang Ko ₱280.00 and take her to the pier to board
a boat going to Iloilo City. Shang Ko was told to look for a job there and to never come back to
5
Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she arrived in Iloilo City, Shang Ko decided to
return to Bacolod City with the money given her. She went to her best friend’s house but was turned
away for fear of Shirly. She called her sister so that she and her boyfriend could get her but they,
too, turned her down. 6
Respondent Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not
to return her to her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City Police filed a complaint against petitioner
7
Shirly for violation of Republic Act 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. The police sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a conference but
she refused to receive such notice. Two days later, however, she came and spoke to Cabcaban,
pointing out that Shang Ko had been a difficult child with a tendency to steal. From their
conversation, Cabcaban surmised that Shirly did not want to take her daughter back, having offered
to pay for her daily expenses at the shelter.
Respondent Cabcaban said that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn over Shang Ko to the
Calvary Kids, a private organization that gave sanctuary and schooling to abandoned and abused
children. On November 2, 2011 petitioner Shirly showed up at the police station asking for her
8
daughter. Cabcaban told her that Shang Ko was in a sanctuary for abandoned children and that the
police officer had to first coordinate with it before she can disclose where Shang Ko was. But Shirly
was adamant and threatened her with a lawsuit. Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a
Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the child back to use her as leverage for getting financial support
from him.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that one year later, NBI agents led by Pura went to the police
station to verify Shirly’s complaint that Cabcaban had kidnapped Shang Ko. Cabcaban accompanied
the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to talk to the institution’s social worker, school principal, and director.
They provided the NBI agents with the child’s original case study report and told them that it was not
9
in Shang Ko’s best interest to return her to her mother who abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko
herself told the NBI that she would rather stay at Calvary Kids because she was afraid of what would
happen to her if she returned home. As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that, contrary to her
10
mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban actually helped her when she had nowhere to go after
her family refused to take her back. 11
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only
in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor . The 12
general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children .
But the State
has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such
children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and
well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry
throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
properly counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it
would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering the
presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary
Kids the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this
custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to stay in that place.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP 07261
dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and ORDERS this custody case forwarded to the
Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime until
such court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of
Bacolod City.
Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson Demaisip to pay the balance of
the docket and other legal fees within 10 days from receipt of this Resolution.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 11222: An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth
Records and Prescribing Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose
ARTICLE II
RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATED BIRTHS
Section 4. Rectification of Simulated Birth Record. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, a person or persons who, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a
child, and those who cooperated in the execution of such simulation, shall not be criminally,
civilly, or administratively liable for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for
the best interest of the child and that the child has been consistently considered and treated
by such person or persons as her, his, or their own daughter or son: Provided, further, That
such person or persons has or have filed a petition for adoption with an application for the
rectification of the simulated birth record within ten (10) years from the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, finally, That all the benefits of this Act shall also apply to adult adoptees.
Section 5. Administrative Adoption and Rectification. - A person or persons who simulated the birth
of a child under the conditions provided under Section 4 of this Act may avail of administrative
proceedings for the adoption and rectification of the simulated birth record of such
child: Provided, That the child has been living with the person for at least three (3) years before the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That a certificate declaring the child legally available for
adoption (CDCLAA) is issued by the DSWD in favor of such child.
Section 6. Inadmissible Evidence. - All petitions, documents, records, and papers relating to
adoption and rectification of simulated births under this Act cannot be used as
evidence against those who simulated the birth of a child or who cooperated in
the execution of such simulation in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding.
Section 8. Required Consent. - After being properly counseled and informed of the right to give or
withhold approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following shall be required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The legitimate and adopted daughters and sons, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter and adoptee, if any;
(c) The illegitimate daughters and sons, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living
with said adopter and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
(d) The spouse, if any, of the adoptee. 1âwphi1

HABEAS CORPUS NOT REMEDY: IN RE: CORRECTION/ ADJUSTMENT OF
PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN v.
SANDIGANBAYAN SAMUEL SAGANIB y LUTONG, Petitioner. August 14, 2018 G.R.
No. 240347
The Facts
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code for pretending to be a lawyer, a certain "Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling" that will help
private complainants to facilitate the release of their friend from jail for ₱l00,000.00 as attorneys
fees. Despite receipt of the said amount, however, the prisoner was never released and worse, he
died injail. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 28, 2011 of the Regional Trial
4 5
Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 27487-R, reads:
WHEREFORE, [petitioner] is hereby FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, for the

crime of Estafa, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from FIVE (5)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, at the
National Bilibid Prisons (NBP), Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, and to indemnify private complainant
Ruben Iglesias the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as Actual Damages,
with legal interest from January 2007, until the amount is fully paid; Moral Damages of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) each to private complainants Nenita Catabay, and Ruben Iglesias;
and Exemplary Damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) each to the said private
complainants, plus costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC Decision became final and executory on February 12, 2012 per the said court's Entry of
Judgment dated February 20, 2012.
7
Per his Prison Record, petitioner already has two (2) years, seven (7) months, and six (6) days time
8
served with earned good conduct time allowance as of June 6, 2018.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 10951 was promulgated on August 29, 2017, which provides under Article 315,
paragraph 3 that estafa, involving an amount of over ₱40,000.00 but not exceeding ₱l,200,000.00
shall be punishable by arresto mayor in the maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period.
Applying, thus, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and invoking our ruling in Hernan, allowing for the
re-opening of an already terminated case and the recall of an Entry of Judgment for purposes of
modifying/reducing the penalty to be served, petitioner comes before this Court averring that he is
entitled to have his sentence modified in accordance with R.A. No. 10951 and be released
immediately from confinement in view of the aforesaid circumstances.
The Issue
Is petitioner entitled to the relief prayed for?

Ruling of the Court
While the petitioner correctly invoked R.A. No. 10951 for the modification of his sentence, in the
recent case of In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty pursuant to R.A. No. 10951 in Relation to
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan - Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil, this Court, however, ruled that the
9
determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate release would necessarily

involve ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time actually served and whether
good conduct time allowance should actually be allowed, and thus should be better
undertaken by the trial court, which is relatively more equipped to make findings of both fact
and law. In the said case, the Court also had the occasion to issue Guidelines considering the
anticipated influx of similar petitions, in the interest of justice and efficiency, which states:
I. Scope.
These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking (1) the modification,
based on the amendments introduced by R[.]A[.] No. 10951, of penalties imposed by
final judgments; and, (2) the immediate release of the petitioner-convict on
account of full service of the penalty/penalties, as modified.
II. Who may file.
The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative,

may file the petition.
III. Where to file.
The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising territorial
jurisdiction over the locality where the petitioner-convict is confined. The case
shall be raffled and referred to the branch to which it is assigned within three (3) days
from the filing of the petition.
IV. Pleadings.
(A) Pleadings allowed. - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the petition
and the comment from the OSG. No motions for extension of time, or other
dilatory motions for postponement shall be allowed. The petition must contain a
certified true copy of the Decision sought to be modified and, where applicable,
the mittimus and/or a certification from the Bureau of Corrections as to the length of
the sentence already served by petitioner-convict.
(B) Verification. - The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-convict

himself.
V. Comment by the OSG.
Within ten (10) days from notice, the OSG shall file its comment to the petition.
VI. Effect of failure to file comment.

Should the OSG fail to file the comment within the period provided, the court, motu
propio, or upon motion of the petitioner convict, shall render judgment as may be
warranted.
VII. Judgment of the court.
To avoid any prolonged imprisonment, the court shall promulgate judgment no later
than ten (10) calendar days after the lapse of the period to file comment. The judgment
shall set forth the following:
a. The penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951;

b. Where proper, the length of time the petitioner-convict has been in confinement
(and whether time allowance for good conduct should be allowed); and
c. Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to complete
service of his sentence/s, as modified in accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951.
The judgment of the court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to the
filing before the Supreme Court of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court where there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.
The Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.10
REPUBLIC v. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, GR No. 207074, 2018-01-17
Facts:
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial
Court of Ilagan City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155[5] for the correction of her name from
"Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108[6]
of the Rules of Court.[7]
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle
name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date,
May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.[
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage
certificate... he Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 2010 Order, granted the petition.
It lent credence to the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she
sought were "harmless and innocuous."
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name.[19] It argued that Gallo did
not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her
Petition and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo."[20]
Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the cause of the
change of name.[21]
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the
Solicitor General's appeal.[22] It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under
Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous
However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For
it, Gallo wants to change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via
Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors
made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in finding for Gallo.
Issues:
whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the
change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of
error;...
whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors...
whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Ruling:
In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere
correction of error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition,
which should only raise questions of law.
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence
as determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a
substantive change requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents,
testimonies, and other evidence.
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the
entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while
Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative
petition has been filed and later denied.
Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012—more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction
of Entry on May 13, 2010.[85] Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the
misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael,"
especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are exactly the same. The
differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of
"Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly, considering the
possibility of different accents or intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo does not
seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has
been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her
records to conform to her true given name.
However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
the applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048...
it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the
Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal
civil registrar can the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case.
as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before
filing a petition under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule
108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or
typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was
only raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional
Trial Court, it is estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.
Principles:
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination
made after reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented. Thus, corrections
may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth
certificate was ever used.
Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous
mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register.[63] It also governs the
correction of substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section
2 of this Rule[64] and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a
person.[65] The proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the correction
pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors.
Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court
then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province
After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its
judgment to the Civil Registrar
Republic Act No. 10172

clarifies that these changes may now be
administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a
clerical or typographical mistake in the entry . It may be changed by filing a
subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept...
dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or
typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name
or nickname
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations... It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August
15, 2012 that
errors in entries as to biological sex may be
administratively corrected, provided that they involve a
typographical or clerical error... a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts'
intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity to
decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies
affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a condition precedent which
must be complied with prior to filing a case in court... failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction.[119] Thus, the
doctrine may be waived... octrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the
competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived. or reasons of equity, in cases
where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise the issue of non-
compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may
bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.
Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was
raised only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be
estopped from doing so.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine... where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere
correction of error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45
Petition, which should only raise questions of law.
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence
as determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a
substantive change requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents,
testimonies, and other evidence.
On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No.
9048, is helpful in identifying the nature of the determination sought.
Republic Act No. 1017250 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded

mistake, "which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding."
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the
person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding,
and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible

to the eyes or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that
there is a factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing
documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is
"obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance
in the birth certificate was ever used.
This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the
Court of Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are
findings of fact, this Court is bound by the lower courts' findings
II.A
In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the
entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic
Act No. 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons," which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
54
there. 55
Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage,
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments
of natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of name. 56
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172,
which amended Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes
or corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and
innocuous mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. It also governs the
63
correction of substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in

Section 2 of this Rule64 and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and
nationality of a person. The proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the
65
correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors. As

6
explained in Republic v. Mercadera: 67
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court

insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for
the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as
sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the
nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or
citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein
all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted .... " "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be
establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous
entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution." (Emphasis in the original)
68
Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108,
thus:
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with
Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on
grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a
proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule
108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of
clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained
above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like
citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary
proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts
recorded therein." (Citations omitted)
71
In Silverio v. Republic: 74
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .
....
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law
is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. (Citations omitted)
75
In Republic v. Cagandahan: 76
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.77 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In Republic v. Sali: 78
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name
has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known
by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It

is only
when such petition is denied that a petitioner may
either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court. (Emphasis 79
supplied, citations omitted)

Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical
or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames. 80
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 81
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her
name through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative
petition has been filed and later denied.
In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172. 82
In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a
person may now be changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that
these changes may now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical
or typographical mistake in the entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit
with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be
corrected or changed is kept. 83
Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex
of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
84
However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012-more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry
on May 13, 2010. Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
85
II.B
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the nature
of the correction sought by Gallo.
Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent
contends that it is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of
clerical errors.
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's
Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
A clerical or typographical error pertains to a
[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or

typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records[.] 86
However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered
clerical or typographical.
87
Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute.
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting
the misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as
"Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are
exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in
"Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be
vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of
different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different
appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as
"Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to
conform to her true given name.
As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. The current law,
101
Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012. 102
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. 103
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction
of clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need
for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register,
or changes of first name or nickname. Thus:
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected
or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 104
Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the
Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can
the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case.
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her
parents as Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents'
marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic
Act No. 9048.
Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
107
Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" fall within the coverage
108
of clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is
no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be
made.
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before filing
a petition under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as
this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in
Republic Act No. 9048. 109
This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan: 110
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error.
It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. (Citation omitted)
111
that errors in
It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012
entries as to biological sex may be administratively
corrected, provided that they involve a typographical
or clerical error. 112
However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be
considered a substantive matter.
In Cagandahan, this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in his
113
or her Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule
108. In that case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error
114
in recording but a petition for a change of records because the sex change was initiated
by the petitioner
11. RAMON CORPUS TAN, Petitioner vs.
OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and THE
REYES, J. JR., and LAZARO-JAVIER, JJ NATIONAL STATISTICS Promulgated:
OFFICE OF QUEZON CITY (now PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY),
Respondents . April 10, 2019 G.R. No. 211435
On September 7, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entry6 before the

RTC. Realizing that he failed to implead the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
(LCR Manila) and the National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority PSA),
petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition7 and an Amended Petition
for Correction of Entry8 on September 30, 2011, this time impleading the aforesaid
offices as respondents.
In his Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that he was born on November 13, 1965 at
St. Paul Hospital in the City of Manila; that his birth was duly registered in the civil
registry of Manila; that he had been using his real name "Ramon Corpuz Tan" during his
lifetime; that when he later secured a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he discovered
that his name was entered as "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" instead of his true and correct
name which is "Ramon Corpuz Tan"; that the aforesaid material errors and mistakes in
the entries of his Certificate of Live Birth were due to inadvertence and error of the
hospital personnel who prepared the subject certificate; that "Ko," which was the first
name of his father, was inadvertently included in his last name; and that the mistake
was not immediately rectified because he only discovered the same, after having his
own children.
In support of his claim and prayer, petitioner appended the following documents to his
petition:, (a) Diploma from the Philippine Chung Hua School; (b) Certification from the
Philippine Chung Hua School stating that petitioner completed his kindergarten course
therein; (c) Secondary Report Card from the Philippine Chung Hua School; (d)
COMELEC Voter's Identification Card; (e) COMELEC Voter's Affidavit; (f) BIR Tax
Identification Number and Identification Card (g) Community Tax Certificate issued by
Quezon City; and (h) Certificate of Marriage to Maria Teresa Gatuz.
After finding the petition sufficient in form, the RTC set the case for hearing on
November 23, 2011.
On November 23, 2011, petitioner and his counsel appeared for the hearing of the case
for purposes of the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. On the same day,
petitioner testified through his judicial affidavit.
The petitioner was also cross-examined by the prosecutor who was deputized by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
On November 24, 2011, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Among the pieces of evidence offered in evidence in support of petitioner's material
allegations are: (1) Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit;9 (2) Certificate of Live Birth indicating
petitioner's name as "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko";10 (3) BIR Identification Card indicating
petitioner's name as "Tan Ramon Corpuz";11 (4) Firearm License Card indicating
petitioner's name as "Tan, Ramon Corpuz";12 (5) PhilHealth Identification Card
indicating petitioner's name as "Tan, Ramon Corpuz";13 (6) Certificate of
Marriage;14 and (7) Certificates of Live Birth of petitioner's children.15 The Republic of
the Philippines (Republic) did not interpose any objection to the offer.
On December 2, 2011, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the pieces of evidence

offered
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY RULED THAT THE
PETITIONER FAILED TO OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDING IN THIS CASE.
Contention : Petitioner insists that the error sought to be corrected is merely a clerical
error which does not require a material or substantial alteration so as to necessitate an
adversarial proceeding. He argues that changing his surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan"
would not materially affect his relationship with his mother or his deceased father. The
correction of his name would not involve an alteration on his citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity, filiation, or legitimacy of marriage.
Petitioner also claims that her mother could not be considered as a real party-in-
interest in his petition for correction of entry by the mere fact that she appears to be
the informant in the subject Certificate of Live Birth. After all, whatever happens to his
petition, whether it be granted or denied, his mother would not be affected as her
surname would still remain as "Corpuz." He further states that he was not even sure
about the authenticity of the purported signature of his mother as appearing in his
Certificate of Live Birth. Thus, petitioner asserts, it is clear that the error in the entry of
his name was committed by other persons who prepared his Certificate of Live Birth,
particularly, the personnel at St. Paul Hospital, Manila where he was born.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that he properly impleaded the LCR Manila, and no other,
considering that no other person would be affected by his petition. He also stresses that
the OSG, through the deputized prosecutor, participated in the case. Thus, petitioner
submits that the requirement of adversarial proceeding, if any was required, has been
substantially complied with. In sum, the petitioner prays for the Court to issue an order
directing the correction of his name to "RAMON CORPUS TAN."
The Court's Ruling

The correction sought by petitioner involves a substantial change, not a mere
clerical error.
At the onset, the Court notes that the change sought by petitioner in his Petition for
Correction of Entry before the RTC is inconsistent with the correction he prays for
in the present petition. In his Petition for Correction of Entry before the trial court,
petitioner prayed that his name be corrected from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to
"Ramon CORPUZ Tan." This is consistent with his government-issued identification
cards and other supporting documents he submitted.
In the present petition, however, he prays that his name be rectified from "Ramon
Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon CORPUS Tan." The Court considers this variance as a result
of a typographical error due perhaps to the ineptness of petitioner's counsel. Thus, for
purposes of this petition, the Court considers the correction to "Ramon CORPUZ Tan" as
petitioner's proper prayer considering that it is the one consistent with his supporting
documents.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the proceeding for the cancellation or
correction of any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded
in the civil register.22
In Republic of the Philippines v. Valencia,23 the Court declared that a petition for

correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court covers not only
clerical errors, but also substantial changes. The difference lies only on the
procedure which would govern the correction sought. "If the correction is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary."24
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an
error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other hand, substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.25 Substantial
and controversial alterations include those which may affect the citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage. 26
Corrections in the name, whether of the owner of the Certificate of Live Birth or any of
the parents indicated therein, may also involve substantial and controversial matters
which would require an adversarial proceeding.
In this case, the alleged error could not be considered a clerical error or a
readily apparent mistake. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the correction sought
would definitely have an effect on his filiation with the persons named in his
Certificate of Live Birth.
As aptly observed by the appellate court, the name "Tan Ko" has been consistently
used not only in the entries for petitioner's name, but also for that of his parents. In
entry No. 7, the name of petitioner's father was entered as "Tan Ko," while his mother's
name was entered as "Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" in entry No. 12. Furthermore, his
mother, as the informant for petitioner's birth certificate, signed as "T.C. Tan Ko" in
entry No. 17.
Verily, the "correction" of petitioner's name from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon
Corpuz Tan" would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the
names of his parents as entered in his Certificate of Live Birth.
As correctly explained by the appellate court, altering petitioner's surname from "Tan
Ko" to "Tan" would, in effect, be an adjudication that the first name of his father is
indeed "Ko" and his surname "Tan." Clearly, the correction would affect the identity of
petitioner's father. Moreover, there would be a need to correct his mother's name
from "Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" to "Trinidad Corpuz Tan." This would require
deleting the word "Ko" from "Tan Ko" and changing the letter "s" to "z" in
"Corpus." Following Benemerito, to effect the correction, it would be essential to
establish that "Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" and "Trinidad Corpuz Tan" refer to the same
person. A summary proceeding would certainly be insufficient to effect such
substantial corrections.
Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of an adversarial

proceeding under Rule 108.
Petitioner claims that even if the correction sought involves a substantial change,
he has substantially complied with the requirement of appropriate adversarial
proceeding when he impleaded LCR Manila and after he caused the publication
of the notice setting his petition for hearing in accordance with Section 4, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The Republic, through the OSG, submits that indeed the
petitioner has substantially complied with the procedural requirement of an adversary
proceeding. Both the petitioner and the Republic mention the cases of Barco v. Court of
Appeals (Barco)29 and Republic of the Philippines v. Kho (Kho)30 as authorities in
support of their submission that the failure to implead indispensable parties could be
cured by compliance with the publication requirement under Section 4 of Rule 108.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows
that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given
to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and
notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the
notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court
all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there
is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left
out.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners, vs.ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. G.R. No. 202666 September 29,
2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,

Petitioners,
vs
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN

DOES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned

from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne,
among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b)
Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the

minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that
is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to
informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the

latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is aremedy available to any person whose right to

privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to

informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at
least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to

enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include updating, rectification, suppression or
the
destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing
data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences , or
about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be
in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business . What matters is
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason
is immaterial and such will not
or even for no reason at all,
prevent the writ from getting to said person or
entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control

information about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying
question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a
user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their
privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of

digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,”
except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers
to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and
photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose
facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’
daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either
by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view
the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and
that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely

intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed
by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested,
that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot
easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to
petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures
to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They
did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly,
the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner,
vs.Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents. G.R. No.
192413 June 13, 2012
Facts: Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa)

are registered owners of six (6) parcels of land in Quezon City. These lots were
sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government [(PCGG)].
Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan (Millan), through her representative, Jerry
Montemayor, offered to buy said lots for ₱6,724,085.71, with the promise that she will
take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a completion
of the sale.
The Spouses Bakunawa gave to Millan the Owners Copies of said TCTs and in turn,
Millan made a downpayment of ₱1,019,514.29 for the intended purchase. However, for
one reason or another, Millan was not able to clear said obstacles. As a result, the
Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and offered to return to Millan her downpayment
of ₱1,019,514.29. However, Millan refused to accept back the ₱1,019,514.29 down
payment.
Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, the Hi-Tri Development
Corporation (Hi-Tri) took out on October 28, 1991, a Managers Check from RCBC-
Ermita in the amount of ₱1,019,514.29, payable to Millan’s company Rosmil Realty and
Development Corporation (Rosmil) c/o Teresita Millan and used this as one of their
basis for a complaint against Millan and Montemayor which they filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99.
On January 31, 2003, during the pendency of the above mentioned case and without
the knowledge of [Hi-Tri and Spouses Bakunawa], RCBC reported the ₱1,019,514.29-
credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed
balances as of January 31, 2003. Allegedly, a copy of the Sworn Statement executed by
Florentino N. Mendoza, Manager and Head of RCBCs Asset Management,
Disbursement & Sundry Department (AMDSD) was posted within the premises of
RCBC-Ermita.
On December 14, 2006, x x x Republic, through the [Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)], filed with the RTC the action below for Escheat [(Civil Case No. 06-244)].
On April 30, 2008, [Spouses Bakunawa] settled amicably their dispute with Rosmil and
Millan. Instead of only the amount of ₱1,019,514.29, [Spouses Bakunawa] agreed to
pay Rosmil and Millan the amount of ₱3,000,000.00, [which is] inclusive [of] the amount
of []₱1,019,514.29. But during negotiations and evidently prior to said settlement,
[Manuel Bakunawa, through Hi-Tri] inquired from RCBC-Ermita the availability of the
₱1,019,514.29 under RCBC Managers Check No. ER 034469. [Hi-Tri and Spouses
Bakunawa] were however dismayed when they were informed that the amount was
already subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the escheat (the reversion of property to the state on the owner’s
dying without legal heirs) of the account in RCBC is proper.
Held: No.
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices
upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on
them rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat
proceedings are actions in rem,10 whereby an action is brought against the thing
itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without
11
personal service upon the depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
12
court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified
13
by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all

persons interested. 14
Nevertheless, we find sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds
allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check in the escheat proceedings.
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without
there being an interested person having a legal claim thereto. 15
In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of
the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of
death or absence of or abandonment by the
depositor. If after the proceedings the property remains
16
without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be

reverted to the state "to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers." 17
However, if interested parties have come forward and lain claim to the property, the courts
shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in
favor of the state. We emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing
18
to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state compels the
surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial
ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
Petitioner acknowledges that the Manager’s Check was procured by respondents, and that the
amount to be paid for the check would be sourced from the deposit account of Hi-Tri. When Rosmil
32
did not accept the Manager’s Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of the
instrument instead of cancelling it. As the Manager’s Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor
was it further negotiated to other persons, the instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner does not
dispute the fact that respondents retained custody of the instrument. 33
Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur.
An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the
Manager’s Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and
that the allocated fund is still held by the bank .34 As a result, the
assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri,
which procured the Manager’s Check.
The doctrine that the deposit represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the
payee is inapplicable, because the instrument – although accepted in advance –
remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had
been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if
left unclaimed.1âwphi1
After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to remand the case
for hearing to determine whether the claim of respondents was valid. There was no contention that
they were the procurers of the Manager’s Check. It is undisputed that there was no effective
delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled
that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions that
they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the
Manager’s Check, should be excluded from the escheat proceedings .
We reiterate our
pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is
state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note that there is nothing
in the records that would show that the OSG appealed the assailed CA judgments. We take this
failure to appeal as an indication of disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the
Republic.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PASAY CITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD
DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO
SOLANO, respondents. G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002
For more than 3 decades, private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal
domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and French national.
-During Elizabeth's lifetime, Solano was her faithful "girl Friday" and a constant companion since
no close relative are available to tend to her needs.
-In recognition of her good deeds, Elizabeth executed in her favor 2 deeds of donation involving
2 parcels of land. Respondent Solano allegedly misplaced the deeds of donation and was
nowhere to be found.
-While the deeds of donation is missing, respondent Republic filed a petition for the escheat of
the estate of Elizabeth before RTC Pasay.
-During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of
Amada Solano; and one Gaudencio Regosa but eventually the motion was denied for the
reason that they failed to show a valid claim to the properties in question.
-Therefore by virtue of a decision by the RTC Pasay, the previous TCTs were cancelled and re-
issued in the name of Pasay City.
-Meanwhile, private respondent Amada Solano claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of
donation she had been looking for a long time. Hence, she filed a petition for annulment of the
RTC Pasay decision.
ISSUE: A. Whether or not the subject properties allegedly donated may form part of Elizabeth's estate?
B. Whether or not Amada Solano, private respondent herein, is a proper claimant as she is allegedly a
donee?
C. Whether or not Solano's claim in the escheated property has prescribed?
The Court rules in favor of the Republic.

We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property
of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a
property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first
comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
5
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and
a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought.
A&B. The Court noted that it should be noted that during the lower court proceedings, a motion
for intervention was earlier denied for failure of these claimants to establish their right over the
subject property. Moreover, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were still
in the name of decedent Elizabeth, which therefore indicates that no transfer of
ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made.
Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on

such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his right to intervene . In
this case, the CA cannot presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of
decedent's estate.
C. Rule 91, Section 4: "A

claimant to an escheated property must file
his claim within 5 years from the date of such judgment, such
person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds after deducting the estate; but a claim shall not be barred
forever.
The 5 year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant, on
the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctual in
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.qqq+
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27
June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment
of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her
right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is

conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who
are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held
8
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on
the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure
him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-
year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the
supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the
escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner,vs. NIXON LEE, Respondent. G.R. No. 176831
January 15, 2010
Issue:Whether mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent
HELND: No. Writ of mandamus can only be issued if there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in ordinary course of law other than the remdy of mandamus invoked.
In the instant case, mandamus cannot be avaied of by the respondent Lee because
there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary course of law for the
production of subject will. Rule 76, section 1, rule 75, section 2 to 5 provides adequate
remedy that respondent lee can avail. Rule 76, section 1 provides that petition for
allowance of will can still proceed regardless of whether the petitioner hast he will in
his possession. Rule 75, sections 2 to 5 provides remedy for the production of the
original holographic will.
 In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in
the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted
that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of
the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the
will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1
relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time,
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
HEIRS OF PAULA C. FABILLAR v. MIGUEL M. PALLER +
DECISION
In the present case, petitioners insist that the filiation of Ambrosio to
Marcelino can only be successfully proved by virtue of a declaration of
heirship by a competent court in a special proceeding, absent which,
respondents cannot claim any right over the subject land. [40] Moreover, they
insist that mere allegations in the complaint and the presentation of
Ambrosio's baptismal certificate cannot be considered as competent proof
of the claimed filiation.
A special proceeding for declaration of heirship is not necessary

in the present case, considering that the parties voluntarily
submitted the issue of heirship before the trial court.
Although the principal action in this case was for the recovery of ownership
and possession of the subject land, it is necessary to pass upon the
relationship of Ambrosio to Marcelino for the purpose of determining what
legal rights he may have in the subject land which he can pass to his heirs,
petitioners herein. Notably, the issue of whether or not Ambrosio is one of
the children of Marcelino was squarely raised by both parties in their
respective pre-trial briefs.[42] Hence, insofar as the parties in this case
are concerned, the trial court is empowered to make a
declaration of heirship, if only to resolve the issue of ownership.
To be sure, while the Court, in Yaptinchay, ruled that a declaration of

heirship can only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as
what is sought is the establishment of a status or right,[43] by way of
exception, the Court, in Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte,[44] declared that "the
need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship,"[45] and "the [trial court]
had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined
during the pre-trial,"[46] as in this case.[47] Indeed, recourse to
administration proceedings to determine who the heirs are is sanctioned
only if there are good and compelling reasons for such recourse, [48] which is
absent herein, as both parties voluntarily submitted the issue of Ambrosio's
heirship with Marcelino[49] before the trial court and presented their
respective evidence thereon. Thus, the case falls under the exception, and
there is no need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
declaration of Ambrosio's heirship.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, GR No. 206248, 2014-02-18
Facts:
Grace Grande (Grande) and
Patricio Antonio... and Jerard Patrick
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own
The parties' relationship, however,... eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children in May 2007.
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied
by the trial court
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the
RTC
Since respondent Antonio... failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that
adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors,
she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
Not satisfied with the CA's Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration... her motion was denied
Issues:
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:
This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255[14] which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation... has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an... action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)... the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his
or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the... record of birth appearing
in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary...
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[15] is enough to establish the paternity
of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate... children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.[16] Respondent's position that the court can order the minors to... use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that
an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his...
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion[17]
upon the illegitimate children.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, GR No. 189121, 2013-07-31
Facts:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom
Eliseo... was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter's marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove
her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his
Death Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,[7] the
petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City.
In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision[10] rendered by the Court of Appeals
In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from
1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON
WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]
Ruling:
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or... place of abode.
As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,...
Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the... decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.[28]
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners' pounding... on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate,
is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is
on good... grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29] Having a vested right
in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012
(Special Proceedings – Adoption)
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and
heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties
were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the
deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the
certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree
was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by
the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
“badges of fraud.”
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon
the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree
render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than
those which she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public
records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As
such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding
details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications
suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses
until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of
irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the
certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
The clock tower of the dallas country courthouse had collapse fivedays after a
thunderstorm in 1957. Dallas county requested for its insurer commercial union
assurame company to cover the damage resulting the collapse of the clock tower.
Several witnesses testified that lightning struck the building during the storm. The
county used the existence of the charred timebers in the wreckage to corroborate the
eyewitness accounts. The insurance company, however denied that the lightning
charred the timbers, contending instead that the damage occurred during a previous
fire. The company offered and the trial court admitted, an unsigned newspaper article
dated 9 Jne 1901 whch reported a blaze in the court house. The article did not come
within the established exception to the hearsay rule. It will be admitted solely on the
grounds of necessity and trustworthiness. The article was trustworthy since it was
inconceivable that a small town reporter would fabricate a story. It is recognized that
the article was needed because the memory of any witness to the fire would not have
been reliable as the newspaper account.
Rape shield rule. Evidence of rape complainant’s past sexual conduct is inadmissible
unless found by the court to be material and relevant to the case. Here the evidence of
sexual acts with men other than the accused is irrelevant. Even an immoral woman has
some freedom of selection.

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2, 2017

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was correct.

4. ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed

hence, this petition for review.

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(d) The spouse, if any, of the adoptee. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, [petitioner] is hereby FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, for the

served with earned good conduct time allowance as of June 6, 2018.

Is petitioner entitled to the relief prayed for?

determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate release would necessarily

II. Who may file.

The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative,

(B) Verification. - The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-convict

V. Comment by the OSG.

VI. Effect of failure to file comment.

VII. Judgment of the court.

a. The penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951;

VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.

Republic Act No. 10172

Republic Act No. 1017250 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible

correction of substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in

correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors. As

explained in Republic v. Mercadera: 67

Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court

general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It

supplied, citations omitted)

Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

A clerical or typographical error pertains to a

[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or

Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:

Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:

This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan: 110

On September 7, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entry6 before the

On December 2, 2011, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the pieces of evidence

The Court's Ruling

In Republic of the Philippines v. Valencia,23 the Court declared that a petition for

Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of an adversarial

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,

ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data

– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned

1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is aremedy available to any person whose right to

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control

Facebook Privacy Tools

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of

US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Facts: Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased (Spouses Bakunawa)