PRESUPPOSITIONALISM AND NATURAL THEOLOGY:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL CHALLENGE TO

NATURAL THEOLOGY

Introduction

Cornelius Van Til, arguably one of the greatest Reformed apologists, is also known as one

of the most prominent defenders of Presuppositionalism. Much of contemporary Reformed

thought, in theological and apologetical matters, depends upon Van Til’s exposition and defense

of Presuppositionalism as not only the only truly Reformed way of approaching apologetics,1

theology and philosophy, but also as the only truly Christian approach.2

In this short treatise I will be considering Van Til’s Presuppositionalism3 and will attempt

to demonstrate that the philosophical foundations of this system force him into a Relativism of

Interpretative Schemes, and, consequently, self-contradiction. I will begin by considering the

inner workings of his overall system, followed by an explanation of how he attempts to fit natural

theology into his overall system. I will conclude by demonstrating that Van Til’s system is

subject to a number of serious flaws.4 It seems that if the Presuppositionalist system succumbs to

1
Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed., ed. K. Scott Oliphint (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 2008), 103, 118, 121.
2
Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, vol. 5 of In Defense of the Faith (1974;
Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing Co., 1982), preface, 31, 39, 47. Cf. Van Til, DF, 29, 101, 116, 134.
3
It should be noted that I intend to take on only that system that is proposed by Cornelius Van Til in some of
his Introduction to Systematic Theology, and other works. The argument that I will be proposing may, or may not, be
detrimental to other types of Presuppositionalism (other variations include that of Francis Schaeffer, K. Scott
Oliphint, etc.). The strength of this argument against all forms of Presuppositionalism will be directly related to how
much they agree or differ from Van Til on the doctrines that I propose to examine.
4
I would like to point out that I would readily agree with a vast majority of the claims of Van Til (certain
un-nuanced elements of Calvinism aside).

1
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these flaws, then its most difficult objections to the traditional understanding of Natural Theology

do not hold. If this is the case, then we may be warranted in engaging in natural theology as

traditionally understood.5

Defining our Terms

The Van Tillian Presuppositionalist system claims that, in order to know anything truly,6

in order to be able to arrive at the conclusion that God exists through a reasoning process,7 in

order to ask a question about God,8 in order to reason properly about nature or man,9 in order to

create art,10 in order for logic to touch reality,11 in order for man to be able to intelligently use

words to describe reality,12 in order to rationally interpret the universe,13 and in order to even be

5
For many contemporary theologians, the term traditional natural theology refers to that form of natural
theology that was practiced by many modern rationalistic philosophers (cf. Alister McGrath, The Open Secret
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 3.). For this author, the term traditional natural theology refers to that form of
natural theology that was outlined by Thomas Aquinas, and has become associated with the thomist tradition (Cf.
Fernand Van Steenberghen, Dieu Caché: Comment Savons-Nous que Dieu Existe? (Louvain: Publications
Universitaires de Louvain, 1966). James F. Anderson, Natural Theology: The Metaphysics of God (Milwaukee: The
Bruce Publishing Company, 1961). Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in
Summa Contra Gentiles I (1997; repr., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). In general we might define natural theology
as that part of philosophy which explores that which man can know about God (his existence, properties, etc.) from
nature, through reason, unaided by the divinely inspired written revelation of any religion, and without presupposing
the truth of any religion. On this view, if some religion is true, and the God of that religion has provided a divinely
inspired written revelation that allows people to know of him, then we could compare the study of that written
revelation to taking the elevator to the top floor of a sky scraper, and the study of that which was created by the God
of that religion (nature) to taking the stairs. In both cases the person is using a method that was created by God. One
requires a lot of work on the behalf of the person, the other only requires getting in the elevator.
6
Cf. Van Til, IST, 14, 17, 18, 22, 23, 37, 39, 63, 87, 102, 105, 108. Van Til, DF, 16, 56-57, 66.
7
Cf. Van Til, IST, 17, 102. Van Til, DF, 96.
8
Cf. Van Til, IST, 102.
9
Cf. Van Til, IST, 37, 81-82, 85, 105, 108, 113. Van Til, DF, 58, 66, 96, 118, 128,
10
Cf. Van Til, IST, 67.
11
Cf. Van Til, IST, 39. Van Til, DF, 18.
12
Cf. Van Til, IST, 102. Van Til, DF, 18.
13
Cf. Van Til, IST, 105. Van Til, DF, 16, 58, 67, 118. We will come back to the notion of interpretation of
the world. It should be noted that Van Til is referring primarily to interpretative schemas. The point of this statement
 3

able to think truly about innate and acquired knowledge,14 we must first presuppose that God

exists as the ultimate ground of all things.15 Unless we presuppose that God exists, we will be

unable to know anything truly, even the facts of science that may be discovered by a non-

Christian scientist.16

Natural Theology, as it is frequently defined, and as Van Til also defines it, is the science

that reasons from nature to the existence, attributes, and presence of God.17 In light of the

is that, unless an interpretation schema presupposes the truth of the Trinitarian Presuppositionalism of Van Til then it
cannot provide a rational interpretation of the world. This last sentence could, of course, be challenged. One might
say that Van Til never said that one must adhere to his version of Presuppositionalism in order to be able to properly
interpret the world. This response does not take into account the well-known fact that Van Til severely criticized
anyone who had a different opinion than that of his own (even if the person in question was a Reformed theologian
and a presuppositionalist). People who have fallen under the sword of Van Til include (this list is not comprehensive)
Karl Barth (who also claimed implicitly that his version of Christianity was the only true version of Christianity and
also criticized any those who do not agree with him), Charles Hodge, C. S. Lewis (who was, according to Van Til, a
horrible Arminian! See Van Til, IST , 39.), Herman Bavinck, Edward C. Carnell and Gordon Clark (the latter two
were reformed theologians and presuppositionalists of sorts, just not Van Tillian enough for Van Til.). For Van Til,
other ways of understanding Christianity cannot possibly be true because they accept, as a starting point, the point of
view of fallen man.
14
Van Til, IST, 197.
15
Cf. Van Til, IST, 9, 14, 17, 18, 22, 23, 37, 39, 45, 46, 67, 102, 104, 105, 108, 197. We can add to this list
that, man must presuppose the truth of Christianity in order to: (a) have true ethical principles (Van Til, DF, 82-83.),
(b) properly interpret any law of nature (Van Til, DF, 118.), (c) properly interpret history (Van Til, DF, 118, 137.),
(d) account for one’s accomplishments (Van Til, DF, 126.), (e) discern any one fact from any other fact (Van Til,
DF, 137.), (f) avoid ultimate irrationalism and skepticism (Van Til, DF, 142.).
16
Van Til does not deny that a non-Christian scientist may discover truths about our world, in fact, he asserts
that they may indeed discover many important truths about our world (Van Til, IST, 26, 75, 83. Van Til, DF, 13, 15-
16, 109, 125.). However, due to their false interpretative schema they are unable to truly understand the meaning of
the ‘facts’ that they discover. It might be useful to note here that Van Til distinguishes between what he calls
"metaphysical and psychological facts (MPFs)" and "epistemological and Ethical facts (EEFs)" (see Van Til, DF,
190.). According to Van Til the MPFs are common to all men, but they are not known (or knowable?) by
unregenerate men (Ibid., 191.). Regenerate and unregenerate men do not have EEFs in common (Ibid., 191,
257.). According to Van Til the unregenerate people can contribute to scientific discoveries not because they
presuppose that God exists (in the sense that they accept without evidence, and as a starting point, Gods existence),
but because of the fact that MPFs apply just as much to them as to regenerate persons (Ibid., 196.). That said, they
cannot really understand their contributions to science due to their false EEFs (Ibid.).
17
Van Til, IST, 1, 14, 56, 57, 72-73, 100-109. Where Van Til’s definition differs from the traditional notion
of Natural Theology, is that Van Til does not think that Natural Theology is actually possible unless one first accepts
the Christian Interpretative schema, and relies on divine revelation in scripture (Ibid., 12, 13, 44, 54, 57, 61, 63, 66,
69, 71, 84, 197.). The traditional definition would add that this reasoning is done by the unaided human reason.
Nature, in this context, is typically understood to be referring to the totality of existing contingent things (for a
Christian theist it is the totality of creation). Reason, in this context, refers to the human faculty by which a human
thinks or reasons. Reasoning, in this context, is the act of thinking – one might describe thinking as the movement of
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principal claims of Presuppositionalism one might think that, in order to be coherent with his

claim, the Presuppositionalist must deny the possibility of natural theology. This, however, is not

the case. Van Til, and a number of other reformed theologians, not only allows for the possibility

of natural theology, but also claims that it is a viable domain of study, under certain

circumstances.

Having considered some of the important definitions, we will begin by considering the

foundational premises of Presuppositionalism, followed by an explanation of the way in which

this system works. The first two points will allow us to explain how natural theology fits into his

overall system. We will finish by considering some major flaws in Presuppositionalism which, if

unanswered, seem to render this view unviable.

The Interpretative Systems of Nature

Foundational to Van Til’s Presuppositionalism is the notion that is sometimes called a

worldview. Van Til’s entire system is based upon the notion that every rational being is

constantly interpreting the world that presents itself to them.18 This interpretation is based upon a

complex interpretative structure that influences how they understand the numerous phenomenon

that they come into contact with, as well as the meaning or significance that they give to these

phenomenon. The notion of worldview has become, in Christian apologetics at least, an important

and fruitful way of understanding ourselves, our world, and other ways of viewing the world. For

any given person, their worldview is the sum of the foundational beliefs that they presuppose

the intellect in which the thinker attempts to move from that which is known (either based upon the senses or the
conclusion of a prior thinking) to a conclusion that is not evident to the senses, but which, upon reflection, is true..
18
It should be noted that a profound examination of Van Til’s system reveals distinct similarities between
his approach to epistemology and the approach of Immanuel Kant. One could simply point out the importance that is
placed on the critique of knowledge, however it is also to be noted that one of the reasons why there is no common
ground between the unregenerate interpretative system and the regenerate interpretative system is that they interpret
the world with totally different categories of the understanding.
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(critically or uncritically accept as true) in order to function and make sense of this world.19 An

important part of Van Til’s system is the claim that there is no neutral, common, or unbiased,

position from which humans can interpret the phenomenon that we meet in this world.20

Consequently, there is no common (neutral) ground between the different interpretative schemes

from which we may judge these schemes.21

19
Martin Heidegger did not have any particular love for the notion of a worldview. In his lecture course of
the winter semester 1921-22 which became the book Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into
Phenomenological Research Heidegger notes that “Plato and Aristotle did not have the term ‘worldview’ or the
nexus of experiences and attitudes announced in it. They had to see how to deal with philosophy and lay hold of the
problems without taking facile recourse in the swaggering pomposity of this term and in the attitudes and tendencies
it implies. The term—fully understood—expresses at bottom the disaster of our present spiritual condition.
Philosophy participates in this disaster and even aggravates it, precisely by the fact that it orients its problematic to
worldview, whether this means that we philosophize ‘in a worldview’ just as we might travel ‘in rough clothes or in
Belgian lace,’ whether we strive for a scientific (founded and developed) worldview, or whether we oppose to
worldview philosophy a scientific philosophy. Precisely this last opposition to worldview philosophy participates in
the disaster insofar as, in the attempt to oppose it, we implicitly determine science on the basis of worldview (Martin
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans.
Richard Rojcewicz (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 34.).”
20
Van Til, IST, 3. Van Til, DF, 57, 122. We can also mention discussions that claim that there is no other
point of contact between the regenerate and the unregenerate aside from the sensus divinitatus (Van Til, DF, 10, 15,
82, 90fn2, 91, 105, 116-117, 120, 121).
21
It is interesting to note that there seems to be a link between Van Til’s notion of interpretative structures
and the hermeneutics of being of Martin Heidegger. There has never been a study showing that Van Til was
influenced by Heidegger (and other post-modern existential thinkers such as Kierkegaard), and the frequent cry some
presuppositionalists is that Van Til was not influenced by any non-Christian philosophers (In fact, if he had been,
this would have been potentially detrimental to his system. Van Til, himself claims that he is not influenced by
Idealism, Hegel, Existentialism or Phenomenalism, but only by simple Calvinism (Cf. Van Til, DF, 23.).). To this
claim there are two comments that I would like to make. First of all, though Van Til may have been influenced by the
theology of Jean Calvin it is quite evident (to any competent translator of Calvin) that Van Til rejected at least one
important element of Calvin’s approach to theology—that unregenerate man can have natural knowledge of the
existence of the one true God who revealed himself in scriptures (cf. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion,
trans. Henry Beveridge (2007; repr., Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 2012), 4, 9, 10, 16, 20.). Van Til also
seems not to have noticed Calvin’s explicit statement, in section 6 of the 5th chapter of the first volume of the
Institutes, that « Je voulais seulement observer ici qu’il y a une voie commune aux païens et aux croyants de l’église
de rechercher Dieu, en suivant ses traces, comme ils sont esquissée dans le firmament et sur la terre, comme les
peintures de son image. (Jean Calvin, Institutes de la religion chrétienne, t. 1, ch. 5, section 6, nouvelle édition, éd.
Frank Baumgartner (Génève : E. Béroud & Cie, éditeurs, 1888). » In English we read, “I only wanted to note, here,
that there is a common way, to both pagans and believers in the church, to seek God: that is, that they follow the
traces, in the heavens and on the earth, that are like portraits of his image. (Italics are mine)” Van Til explicitly
denies that there is a “common way” by which both the regenerate and the unregenerate may come to some
knowledge of God. It seems, then, that in its most important contention (that which makes it a presuppositionalist
approach), Van Til’s apologetical method is distinctly not Calvinist!
Secondly, it is evident, contrary to Van Til’s protests, that Van Til was indeed influenced by different
aspects of the popular philosophical systems of his time (Cf. Van Til, DF, 137, 19fn80, 137, 113.) The attentive
reader cannot help but notice the subtle similarities between Heidegger’s hermeneutics of being, and Van Til’s
Presuppositionalism. That there is a probable connection between Van Til’s system and Heidegger’s hermeneutics of
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For Van Til, there are three main categories of interpretational structures, or schemas:22

(1) the interpretative schema of unfallen humanity, which would have been the interpretative

schema held by humanity prior to the fall in the garden of Eden;23 (2) the interpretative schema of

fallen humanity, which, according to Van Til, includes all non-Christian views;24 and (3) the

interpretative schema of regenerate humans.25 It should be noted that, according to Van Til, all

the various belief systems can be categorized under one of these interpretative structures. This

being can be shown as follows: It is common knowledge that Van Til was influenced by the Dutch reformed school
of philosophy (There is no doubt that Van Til was influenced by Abraham Kuyper, but he was also influenced by
thinkers such as Herman Dooyeweerd and Dirk Vollenhoven, both of whom were heavily influenced by Neo-
Kantian philosophy, Heidegger, and Husserl (cf. Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, Christian
Philosophy: A Systematic and Narrative Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2013), 243-244.) Also
important for this question is that Van Til was familiar enough with Heidegger’s writings to be able to write a
scathing attack on the Heideggerian notion of god (cf. Cornelius Van Til, “The Later Heidegger and Theology”, in
The Westminster Theological Journal, 26:2 (May 1964), 121-161. Interestingly enough, Van Til’s
Presuppositionalist system shares, with Existential Phenomenology and Relativism, some basic foundational
doctrines, namely the Kantian critique of knowledge (without going into too much detail we can note Van Til’s use
of the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world (Van Til, IST, 83, 113. Cf. Van
Til, DF, x, 32fn15, 71fn46, 91.)), and the hermeneutics of being (which is essentially the notion that all people
necessarily interpret the world that presents itself to them through categories that they inherit in one way or another).
For example, we find the influence and combination of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of Being, and of the Kantian
critique of knowledge, in the works of a well-known Canadian post-modern theologian, Myron Bradley Penner, “In
one sense, of course, hermeneutics is a kind of epistemology—at least insofar as it is a reflection on the nature and
limits of human knowledge. (Myron Bradley Penner, The End of Apologetics: Christian Witness in a Postmodern
Context (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2013), 70. Cf. Ibid., 11, 29, 67-68, 127, 147.) Let it be noted that to
claim that Van Til’s dependence on the works of Kant and Heidegger therefore falsifies his system would be a
genetic fallacy. However, if it turns out that the positions of Kant and Heidegger run into serious difficulties, then it
may be possible that Van Til’s system falls prey to these same problems.
22
I am not here referring to any one presupposition (which Oliphint, in one of his footnote commentaries on
Van Til’s Defense of the Faith, claims is not equal to a “paradigm” (cf. Van Til, DF, 121fn5.), but to what Van Til
refers to as a “life-and-world view (Van Til, DF, 103, 118.)”, an interpretational system (Ibid., 137-142.), a
consciousness (Ibid., 72-73.), etc. The general idea that Van Til expresses through these, and many other terms, is
resumed by the term I use above—Interpretational System or schema. The idea of an interpretational system can be
illustrated, as Van Til himself says, as follows: “every sinner looks through colored glasses. And these colored
glasses are cemented to his face. (Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
publishing, 1969), 295.)” A presupposition is, according to Oliphint, “that which is true and provides for the truth or
falsity of another proposition. A presupposition in the way that Van Til uses it need not be confined to propositions,
but includes the objective ‘state of affairs’ as well. (Van Til, DF, 121fn5.)”
23
Van Til, DF, 72.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
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claim creates the interesting phenomena that though we are tempted to talk about numerous

interpretative schemes (worldviews), in order to be faithful to Van Til, we must only refer to

three, one of which, technically,26 no longer exists.27

It is important to note that the first and the third structures are both analogical in nature.28

When Van Til uses the term ‘analogical’ in discussing ways of thinking, understanding or

interpreting, he defines the term as follows, “the form of reasoning employed by the Christian

who recognizes that God is the ultimate reference point of predication.”29 This type of reasoning

cannot be done without presupposing the existence of the Christian God, as, in order to think

analogically, one must recognize that all of man’s knowledge is dependent on the presupposition

of God’s self-revelation and is derivative of God.30 It follows, therefore, that unregenerate

humanity cannot think analogically.31

26
I say technically because there is no return to the pre-fall condition, but, Van Til claims that the view of
the regenerate man is a return to the Pre-fall interpretative system (Cf. Van Til, DF, 72.)
27
As such, to change from the fallen scheme to the regenerated scheme, one must, according to reformed
theology, first be regenerated by God, and then, with the intellect and will renewed, accept the truth of Christianity.
From this it is evident that, for a Reformed Presuppositionalist, it is impossible to change interpretative schemes: (a)
one could not move from fallen to regenerate without divine assistance, and (b) once one is in the regenerate scheme
(if one also holds to the doctrine that salvation cannot be lost – a form of the Perseverance of the Saints), it is
impossible to move back to the fallen scheme (even if one wishes to attempt to analyse it).
28
Cf. Van Til, IST, 11, 25, 61, 72, 101. Van Til, DF, 62-63, 67, 70, 71.
29
Van Til, IST, 101fn1. Cf. 18, 257.
30
Ibid., 12. There is a major difference between saying that man is (and, indeed, that all of creation) is
ontologically dependant on God for his very existence (and, thus, capacity to know that x), and saying that all of
man’s knowledge is dependent on the presupposition of God’s self-revelation and is derivative of God. It is perfectly
true to say, as a Thomist, that all of man’s knowledge (indeed man’s capacity to know) is dependent on (1) God’s
existence, and (2) God giving man (a) existence, (b) a rational nature, and (c) the capacity to use that rational nature.
It is manifestly false, however, to say that man’s knowledge is dependent on the presupposition of God’s self-
revelation. As such, though there is much to contest in the presuppositionalist position, there is a sense in which the
thomist is able to agree with the presuppositionalist.
31
Van Til, IST, 101. It should be noted that Van Til’s understanding of analogical thinking and predication
is not at all related to the views of Aristotle and Aquinas, and their respective schools, on analogy. As is obvious
from even a superficial lecture of both views. Oliphint says as much in a commentary in a footnote to Van Til’s
Defense of the Faith (Van Til, DF, 62fn25.). It should be noted, however, that Van Til does use the term analogy, on
occasion, in the same way that Thomistic scholars use it (cf. Van Til, DF, 60.) For Van Til, analogical knowledge
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The second structure, the interpretative schema of all fallen humans, is univocal in

nature.32 Univocal reasoning or interpretation is described as “all forms of reasoning in which

man is assumed to be the final or ultimate reference point of predication.”33 Such thinking,

according to Van Til, presupposes a number of important premises:34 (1) “that man and the

universe are entities from which, as ultimate starting point, we can reason to God”;35 (2) that time

and eternity are aspects of one another;36 (3) that God and man are on the same level of being;37

and (4) that man and the universe are self-sufficient (autonomous).38 Based upon these

signifies that man’s knowledge is dependent on God’s knowledge (cf. Van Til, DF, 62-63, 67, 70, 71.). Van Til
explains that analogical thinking or reasoning is “the form of reasoning employed by the Christian who recognizes
that God is the ultimate reference point of predication. (Van Til, IST, 101fn1. Cf. Ibid., 18, 257.)” Oliphint notes that
“for Van Til, the notion of analogy was meant to communicate the ontological and epistemological difference
between God and man. This difference has been expressed historically in terms of an archetypal/ectypal relationship.
(Van Til, DF, 62fn25.)” A general definition of analogical predication, from a well-known Thomistic scholar, would
be as follows, “The property of a concept or linguistic term (not a real being) by which a concept or term is
predicated of several different subjects according to a meaning partly the same, partly different in each case: strength
of muscles - strength of will. (W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 315.)”
32
Van Til, IST, 11, 61, 101, 103. Cf. Van Til, DF, 71.
33
Van Til, IST, 101fn.1. Cf. 18, 105. It should be noted that Van Til’s understanding of univocal thinking
and predication is not at all related to the views of Aristotle and Aquinas, and their respective schools, on univocal
predication. Aristotle, for example, explains univocal predication as follows, “things are said to be named
‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. (Aristotle, Categoriae
1a7-8, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, trans. E. M. Edghill, ed. Richard Mckeon (New York: Random House, 1941),
7.” Van Til says that Univocal thinking or reasoning refers to “all forms of reasoning in which man is assumed to be
the final or ultimate reference point of predication. (Van Til, IST, 101fn1. Cf. Ibid., 18, 105.)” Oliphint, in a footnote
to Van Til’s The Defense of the Faith, explains that Van Til understands Univocal thinking as “thinking between two
(or more) persons that is ‘connected’ by some point of epistemological identity. (Van Til, DF, 71fn44.)”
34
Van Til’s overly broad generalizations are almost embarrassing.
35
Van Til, IST, 101.
36
Ibid., 11, 16.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., 15, 23. The notion of ‘autonomy’ is an important by-word in Presuppositional thinking. The basic
idea in autonomy is that man and the universe, once created, are not in need of God in order to continue existing and
functioning according to what they are. So, man is able to know the world, himself, and even God, without any help
from God. This is a very un-nuanced claim. For example, in thomistic theology God alone, by nature, is. Everything
else depends on God not only for its existence but also for its nature. It follows, from thomistic philosophy, that no
human being is able to know anything unless God (1) gives him existence, (2) makes him to be what he is, and (3)
ensures that he acts according to his nature. It follows, then, that for Aquinas it makes no sense to talk about “human
 9

presuppositions one can only conclude, according to Van Til, either that no God exists, or that a

God exists (but not the God of Christianity, and, therefore, not the true God).39 With these

notions in mind we can now turn to a consideration of how Van Til’s system fits together.

The Inter-relation of the Interpretational Structures

In order to understand how these structures fit together, we should first of all mention

that, for Van Til, God, as the creator and sustainer of the entire universe, has the perfect view of

this world. God sees the world, his creation, as it is. Therefore, God alone has a perfect

understanding of this world, and God alone knows perfectly the significance of every

phenomenon that comes to be in this world. In Van Til’s own words, God is “the ultimate

interpreter.”40 God’s interpretative structure, however, cannot be possessed by a limited human

autonomy”. That being said, Aquinas thinks that man is able, by the unaided reason (which simply means that,
within the context of the three points just mentioned, by the human capacity of reason without the aid of special
divine revelation—whether this be by dreams, visions, inspired writings, etc.), to come to knowledge not only of
himself and the world that presents itself to him, but also to some limited knowledge of the true God. Van Til seems
to think that to make such a claim is to claim autonomy for human reason (in spite of the context of the three points
mentioned above)!
39
Van Til, IST, 57 (the claim here is that the god discovered by philosophers is only a finite god), 101, 104.
It should be noted that Van Til recognizes that, in theory, man should be able to deduce the existence of God from
the basic presuppositions mentioned above (cf. Ibid., 72, 76, 79, 101, 104, 197), but, he denies that the God thus
deduced is the true God (Cf. Van Til, DF, 101, 108, 127, 131, 136.). Rather it would be a finite God. It should be
noted that his seems to directly contradict the results of Aristotle’s metaphysical research. I would point the
interested reader to Metaphysics 1072a23-26, 1072b27-30, and 1073a3-13, where Aristotle concludes that there is
one Deity that is immutable, eternal, ousia, pure act, living, intelligent (knowing everything perfectly – some
scholars have argued that God described as thought thinking itself gives an image of a God who knows nothing of
the world and the individuals in the world. This claim is refuted by Jonathan Lear, in a manner reminiscent of
Aquinas, who notes that by knowing himself God knows everything that is (Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: the desire to
Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 300-306.), perfect, absolutely transcendent (distinct
from everything else), not limited by space (spatially infinite), simple, all powerful (infinitely powerful), infinite and
impassible. Some would argue that Aristotle denies that there can be an actual infinite, and, therefore, that his “God”
cannot be infinite. This is to miss the point of Aristotle’s claim. Aristotle is saying that there can be no spatially
infinitely extended being. They key element of this claim is “extension”. It should be noted that it is true that there
can be no infinitely extended being, but that God is not extended. He is spatially infinite without extension. This
certainly seems to refute Van Til’s claim.
40
Van Til, IST, 24.
 10

being, except in a limited way and through submission to divine revelation in scripture – which is

essentially the third interpretational structure.

The first interpretational structure, which is that of Unfallen Humanity, no longer exists. It

is not now possible to see the world as an unfallen human being. That being said, those humans

who possessed this interpretational structure, due to their unimpaired and direct communication

with God, were able to see the world as it was (untainted by sin),41 not with a perfect

comprehension,42 but with a mind that was unhindered by sin.43 They would, therefore, be able to

reason from nature to the true God.44 Man, however, rejected God and all true knowledge of and

from him; as a result, man fell into sin and his interpretative structure changed.45

The second interpretative structure, which is that of Fallen, or Unregenerate, Humanity,

is the most common and wide spread interpretative structure. It takes many forms (i.e. – Atheism,

Deism, Pantheism, Polytheism, Islam, etc.) and is the anti-thesis and absolute rejection of the pre-

fall (and regenerate) view. In a sense, we might say that those who accept the univocal

interpretation reject the analogical method. The fall, according to Van Til, so affected man’s

intellect, and nature itself,46 that fallen man is now, aside from the regeneration of the Holy

41
Ibid., 25.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.

Ibid., 59, 71. But, even then, this reasoning was only possible by “relating such studies to direct
44

supernatural revelation of God. (Ibid., 71.)” Cf. Van Til, DF, 111.
45
It is interesting to note that in the fall man changed, by himself, his interpretative scheme. One might say
that Van Til’s claim is that man fell into the hole by himself, and can’t even see the way out unless he gets divine
assistance. Seeing the way out and being able to get out, are two totally different acts.

Van Til, IST, 21, 24-25, 72, 92, 94, 197. For more on Van Til’s view of total depravity (he claims that it is
46

moral depravity not metaphysical depravity, and, distinguishing between man’s nature and man’s essence, that
depravity has affected them both.) see: Ibid., 253-62. Van Til, DF, 36-37, 70, 76-77, 96, 97. It should be noted that
Van Til combines Ethics and Epistemology such that a moral depravity includes intellectual depravity (Cf. Van Til,
DF, 39fn31, 77.).
 11

Spirit,47 unable to know anything about himself, nature or nature’s true God. Based upon what

has already been said, it becomes obvious, that in rejecting the existence of God fallen humanity

has condemned itself to being incapable of truly knowing or understanding anything about this

world. Van Til does not deny that it may be possible for fallen humans to discover many valuable

truths about themselves and this world,48 but, it is impossible for fallen humans to truly

understand (interpret or understand the true meaning and significance of) these truths.

Furthermore, though they have a sense of something that transcends them,49 and, indeed, continue

to seek for the absolute and transcendent,50 they cannot know the true God so long as they stay

within the fallen schema.51 It is, therefore, impossible for an unregenerate human to move from

the Fallen schema to the Regenerate schema by the use of his unaided reason.52

47
Van Til, DF, 73, 78, 87, 99, 105, 112, 127. The regeneration of the Holy Spirit is what happens to that
man who (speaking philosophically) leaving behind the erroneous assumptions of fallen man, presupposes that God
exists, and accepts the Christian theistic worldview along with all of its claims. This is what happens prior to the
moment of salvation.
48
Van Til, IST, 1, 14, 83. The claim that we find on page 83 is particularly important and is worth quoting.
“from an ultimate point of view the natural man knows nothing truly, but that from a relative point of view he knows
something about all things. He knows all things after a fashion, and his fashion is best when he deals with earthly
things such as electricity, etc. (Ibid., 83.)” This quote must be always be read with an eye to claim found on the
previous page, that, “the natural man is as blind as a mole with respect to natural things as well as with respect to
spiritual things. (Ibid., 82.) Natural things are the things of this world – earthly things.
49
Ibid., 27, 29, 38, 59, 89, 90, 93, 94, 253. Van Til is primarily referring to what Calvin calls the sensus
divinitatus (Van Til, DF, 90fn21, 113, 117, 120-121.), which Van Til seems to equate with a form of innate
knowledge of God. Van Til sometimes goes so far as to say that fallen man can grasp something of God, but,
because of his prior assumptions he immediately rejects it and persists in his separation from God.
50
Van Til, IST, 103-104, 107.
51
Ibid., 101, 104.
52
Ibid., 72, 197. It should be noted that to move from a fallen schema to a regenerate schema cannot be
equated to the change of spiritual status from unregenerate to regenerate. First of all, because a schema is a way of
interpreting the world, not a state of spiritual being. Secondly, because in Calvinistic theology regeneration comes
prior to salvation. Regeneration is the necessary state of being that one must possess in order to accept salvation. We
are often told that unless a person is regenerated they cannot accept the gospel, in the same way that a dead person
must be brought back to life before you can feed them.
 12

Therefore, if we are to truly understand the world, and truly discover the meaning and

significance of the phenomenon that we observe, then we must accept a totally different

interpretative schema. This third schema is the interpretative system that can be referred to as

Regenerate Humanity. We must presuppose the existence of God and assume that God is the

ultimate foundation for all knowledge. Only by presupposing the existence of God can we truly

reason from nature to the true God (whom we have presupposed).53 As such, natural theology, as

defined above, is only possible if we presuppose the truth of the Christian interpretation of

nature.54 Furthermore, even the regenerated human, presupposing the truth of the Christian

interpretative system, can only properly interpret nature insofar as they interpret it in light of

revealed scripture and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.55 Indeed, Van Til claims, all of man’s

knowledge depends upon God’s revelation to man.56

The picture that we have before us, is that of a fractured universe. Every rational being

understands and interprets the phenomenon that it meets in a different way. All of these different

interpretations can be categorized, today, under two broad categories: (1) The many

interpretations of fallen humanity, characterized by univocal thinking, and (2) The interpretation

of regenerated humanity, characterized by analogical thinking and entire dependence upon divine

communication in scripture and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.57 We cannot reason from the first

53
Ibid., IST, 72, 197.
54
Ibid., 44, 54. Interestingly enough, Alister McGrath seems to agree, to a point, with this claim in his book
The Open Secret. Cf. Alister E. McGrath, The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 4-5, 13, 16-17, 19.
55
Cf. Van Til, IST, 44, 57, 61, 66, 69, 71, 84, 197. Van Til, DF, 78, 111, 128. If such is the case, then it is
doubly certain that an unregenerate human would never be able to properly interpret the world.

Van Til, IST, 12, 13, 63, 66, 69, 71, 84. It should be noted that, for Van Til, God’s revelation is as much
56

found in nature as it is in the Bible (though, perhaps, less explicitly). Cf. Ibid., 64.
57
Ibid., 12, 57, 61, 66, 69, 71, 84, 197.
 13

schema into the second. Either you accept the assumptions of the first or you accept the

assumptions of the second.58 The first gives no true knowledge, and the true significance of all of

the phenomenon that we meet is unknowable. The second allows for the possibility, with the aid

of divine revelation and the help of the Holy Spirit, of truly understanding nature and nature’s

God. What then of natural theology?

Natural Theology and Van Til’s Presuppositionalism

Natural theology was defined above as reasoning from nature to God. If it is true that

fallen man cannot reason from nature to God (as Van Til believes), then the unregenerate person

will never be able to reason from nature to the true God, and, therefore, natural theology is

impossible for the unregenerate person.59 Though they may arrive at some god, it will not be the

true God; 60 in fact, claims Van Til, all that the classical arguments for the existence of God can

prove to an unregenerate human is the existence of a finite god.61

However, according to Van Til, the enterprise of natural theology is not therefore

condemned to futility. On the contrary, insomuch as one presupposes the truth of the Christian

theistic interpretational system, one will be able to engage, in a significant way, in natural

theology.62 Natural theology, for the Christian theist, then, is the practice of properly

understanding God based upon what nature tells us of Him. According to Van Til, and a number

58
This acceptance of the second is only possible if one is first regenerated by God. Cf. Van Til, DF, 73, 78,
87, 99, 105, 112, 127.
59
Van Til, IST, 44, 54, 194.
60
Ibid., 97, 101, 104. Van Til, DF, 101, 108, 127, 131, 136.
61
Van Til, IST, 57. This claim seems to contradict the claims of those who advanced the classical arguments,
who concluded to an infinite God. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XII, ch. 7, 1072a17-1073a13. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae I, A. 2, Q.3, and following.
62
Van Til, IST, 72, 197.
 14

of Reformed thinkers, in order to embark in the endeavour of natural theology one must

presuppose the truth of the Christian theistic interpretative schema.

This, however, does not seem to be what has been commonly understood to be the nature

of natural theology. Though most of the proponents of natural theology would agree with Van

Til’s basic description of natural theology, as reasoning from nature to nature’s God,63 many of

the proponents of natural theology would be uncomfortable with the notion that we must

presuppose the truth of Christianity in order to be able to do natural theology. Is this malaise

simply the result of indigestion, or is there, in fact, a problem with Van Til’s approach? If there is

no problem with his system, then we should fall in line; but if there is a fatal flaw, then we may

be entitled to maintain the traditional view of natural theology, which does not presuppose the

truth of Christianity.64

Problems with Van Til’s System

As we noted in the introduction, if there is a fatal difficulty with Van Til’s

Presuppositionalism, then we may be warranted in continuing to engage in the traditional form of

natural theology. I would like to propose a problem with Van Til’s system which is not,

necessarily, related to any of the specifically Reformed doctrines to which he adheres.65 Rather, it

63
Ibid., 72-17, 100-109.
64
Note, this is not a positive argument that seeks to show that we can indeed engage in Natural Theology,
but a negative argument which seeks to remove a possible obstacle to this domain of thought. It is for this reason that
my conclusion is in the subjunctive.
65
One exception would be if he held to an extreme understanding of the Reformed doctrine of Total
Depravity, by which it would be impossible for man to know something of God prior to regeneration. Regeneration,
would, at this point, be the divine changing of Interpretative structures, by which God allows a human who was
formally entrenched in the fallen Interpretative structure to come to God. It is a fact of history that the majority of
Calvinists prior to the full development of Modern philosophy would have disagreed emphatically with Van Til’s
Presuppositionalism. According to Francis Turretin, understood as such (and in opposition to the heresies of the
Socinians, who denied that the unregenerate people could acquire some knowledge of God from nature with the
unaided reason and “who deny the existence of any such natural theology or knowledge of God (Francis Turretin,
Institutes of Elentic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T Dennison, Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
 15

is found in the philosophical presuppositions that he claims are foundational to the Reformed

system.66 Van Til’s Achilles’ heel is his commitment to the notion that all rational beings

necessarily observe the phenomena of this world through an interpretative schema by which they

interpret everything, and from which they cannot escape.67 My basic argument is that if this is the

foundation of Presuppositionalism, then it would appear that there is no way to know for sure that

Van Til’s version of Reformed Christianity is true and that all other interpretations of the world

are wrong.68 If we accept Van Til’s Reformed theology, then we are taking a shot in the dark.

Publishing: 1992-97), 1:6.)”) “The orthodox, on the contrary, uniformly teach that there is a natural theology, partly
innate (derived from the book of conscience by means of common notions [koinas ennoias]) and partly acquired
(drawn from the book of creatures discursively). (Ibid.)” It seems, then, that some of Van Til’s claims (specifically
those related to Presuppositionalism) are, quite simply, heretical. It seems, in light of the observation about Total
Depravity, that though one can be Reformed without being a Van Tillian Presuppositionalist, one cannot be a Van
Tillian Presuppositionalist without being Reformed. However, according to Turretin, Reformed presuppositionalism
is heretical.
66
If these philosophical presuppositions are indeed foundational to the reformed system; and if these
philosophical claims are shown to be false; then the reformed system will be severely handicapped.
67
Note his claim of the necessity of an “absolute system (Van Til, DF, 137-142.)”.The similarities between
Van Til’s Presuppositionalism and the Heideggerien hermeneutics of being are very interesting, and it seems that
both systems fall prey to the same problems.
68
I recently came across what amounts to a similar argument (as that which I present here against
Presuppositionalism), presented in two different works. I discovered it, first of all, used against the coherentist
approach to truth, in James K. Dew Jr. and Mark W. Foreman, How Do We know? An Introduction to Epistemology
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 110. Here they say, “A third problem is the problem of plurality: It is
possible to have two coherent systems that are logically incompatible. How do I judge between them? How do I
decide which system is the right one when the only way I can justify my belief is by appealing to a system? I need to
step outside the system in order to judge them. But step into what? Another system? How do I know it is right?
Again, we have a bit of an infinite egress here.” I also recently stumbled across a similar argument in R. Scott
Smith’s excellent work on Moral knowledge, In Search of Moral Knowledge: Overcoming the Fact-Value
Dichotomy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 277, 328fn1. Smith uses this approach as a manner of
responding to the systems of Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre. Smith notes that, « If all experience is
interpreted, then even our experience of ourselves, as well as of the language, culture and rational resources of that
second way of life (even from its own standpoint) would be interpreted. It seems then that we would interpret this
alien way of life according to our primary way of life, which could well involve translation and mistranslation. (Ibid.,
277)” He notes, a little later, that “Accordingly, when we are learning a second culture’s language, even as a native
among them, we cannot shed our first community’s way of seeing, lest we suddenly not have an aspect from which
to have experiences…Hence, as we saw above, the second culture’s features always remain beyond our abilities to
know. (Ibid.)” He later notes that this argument seems to apply even to presuppositionalism, “Let me address a
concern that some (but not all) presuppositionalists may raise. They may object to evidential, natural theological
arguments on the basis that we always access reality by way of our presuppositions. That is, as James K. A. Smith
suggests, presuppositionalists agree with his (and Derrida’s) point that everything is interpretation, i.e., that all
experience is aspectual, or conceptual…I think we end up with the same kinds of problems as we saw for others,
such as MacIntyre and Hauerwas. (Ibid., 328fn1.)” John Warwick Montgomery arrives at similar conclusions as
 16

There are no reasons that can be mustered either in defense of his system, or against his system;

and this is also true of all versions of the fallen interpretative system. The difficulty that we are

raising against Presuppositionalism could be presented as follows (the references for the

following premises can either be found in the previous section that summarizes

Presuppositionalism, or they follow necessarily from the other premises):

(1) The interpretative schema of each person includes all the claims that are accepted as

true by that person, and which are used to understand and interpret the world in which this person

finds themselves.

(2) In order to know that his interpretive schema is true69 a person must be able to have

unmediated and uninterpreted access (in one way or another),70 to reality, in order to compare the

statements of his schema with the way things really are.

(3) If a person interprets all of reality, always, through his interpretative schema, then he

cannot have unmediated and uninterpreted access to reality in order to compare the proposed

truth claims of his schema with the way in which things really are (in other words, there is no

those that follow from the argument that I present here. I would highly recommend that anyone interested in the
difficulties related to Presuppositionalism read Montgomery’s article and Van Til’s response found here: « Once
Upon an A Priori, » in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussion on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius
Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan, 380-392 (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1971).
69
That is to say, to know that all the statements that are part of his interpretive schema are true.
70
This is the case even with the reading of the Bible. If I believe that the Bible says in John 1: 1, "In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.", then, in order to know that my
belief is true I must be able, in one way or another, to open some Bible, turn to John 1: 1, and really read John 1: 1. If
I cannot confirm (having access in one way or another to the real text) that John 1: 1 really says "In the beginning
was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.", then how could I possibly say that it is either
true or false that John 1: 1 indeed says," In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God."? If one cannot confirm my believe about what the Bible says, then one falls, necessarily, either into
absolute skepticism, or absolute relativism (think whatever you want, there is no way to know for sure that one
person is telling the truth and that another speaks falsely).
 17

common ground or objective position from which a person could accomplish the unmediated and

uninterpreted comparison that he must accomplish, according to the second premise, in order to

know the truth or falsity of his schema.).71

(4) All rational beings interpret, always and with ceasing, the world around them through

an interpretative schema.72

It is interesting to note, and this is our main contention, that premises 2-4 force us either

to accept an absolute relativism of interpretative schemas or to make self-contradictory

71
This is the foundational principle: No common ground. There are two important comments that must be
made about this premise: First of all, for Van Til this premise is not only philosophically true (as shown above), but
also theologically true. As has already been noted, the only way to get out of the fallen scheme is by a divine act (Cf.
Van Til, DF, 73, 78, 87, 99, 105, 112, 127.). Once in the regenerate scheme, there is no return (eternal security).
Therefore, there is no way to step outside of one’s own interpretative schema so as to know if it is true or false. It
should be noted that this premise is essentially the claim of no neutral viewpoint.
Secondly, this premise is devastating for any type of correspondence theory of truth. Oliphint, in his
commentary on Van Til’s Defense of the Faith, seems to adhere to a correspondance theory: “To the extent that our
knowledge reflects the way the world is, our knowledge is true. (Van Til, DF, 90fn2.)” Of course if a statement is
true in so much as what it predicates (affirmation or negation) of x is an accurate description of the way x actually is,
then in order to know truth one must have access to x in order to compare the statement of x and x itself. If there is
no way to step outside of an Interpretative scheme so as to observe x itself from a “neutral” or “unbiased”
perspective, then either the correspondence theory of truth is itself false, or there is no way to know truth. Perhaps
there is a way of escape for a Presuppositionalist. Van Til seems to equate truth and coherence, such that a system
would be true if, and only if, it is fully coherent (of course, for Van Til, a fully coherent, non-Reformed, system is
impossible). However, if it was possible for there to be more than one fully coherent system of interpretation (a
possibility that Van Til is only able to deny if he presupposes—as he does—the truth of his own system), then either
there would be no way to know which of the two systems was true, or both would be true. What if we accept both the
correspondence theory and the coherence theory? If we add another premise to the argument above, such that a
system is true if and only if it is endowed with a perfect interior coherence, and all of its propositions correspond to
the way things are, then (always working with the other premises) there is no way to know the truth of any one
system (especially if there is more than one fully coherent system). Basically, adding the two theories together only
complicates matters as we end up with the necessary conclusion that both: (a) either there would be no way to know
which of the two systems was true, or both (all?) would be true, and: (b) either the correspondence theory of truth is
itself false, or there is no way to know truth.
72
For Van Til there are, as can be seen from a cursory reading of his works, 3 basic interpretative schemes,
including one that no longer exists: pre-fall humanity, fallen humanity, and regenerate humanity. One might object,
“But God is a rational being. If this premise is true, then God always interprets the world through an interpretative
schema.” Keep in mind that according to Van Til it is simply a fact of reality that God is the “ultimate interpreter” of
reality, always interpreting the world through an interpretative schema (cf. Van Til, IST, 24.). So as such, Van Til
would not raise this objection.
 18

claims. Note what happens when these premises (which are proposed as true, as already noted, by

Van Til) are put into relationship with each other:

(5) Van Til knows that his interpretive scheme (Van Tillian Calvinist

Presuppositionalism) is true,73 and (we'll give him the benefit of the doubt) Van Til is a rational

being.

(6) Based on premises 4 and 5 it follows that Van Til interprets, always and without

ceasing, the world around him through an interpretative schema.

(7) Based on premises 3 and 6 it follows that Van Til cannot have unmediated or

uninterpreted access to reality, in order to compare the proposed truth claims of his schema with

the way things really are.

(8) Based on premises 7 and 2 it follows that Van Til cannot know that his interpretive

schema is, in fact, true.

(9) But premise 8 creates a contradiction with the claim (premise 5) that he knows that his

interpretative schema is true.74

73
Indeed, if we want to know that something, anything, is true, then we must assume the truth of the
reformed presuppositionalist theology of Van Til.
74
Below is my attempt to show that this argument is logically valid. If the argument is logically valid, and
the premises are true (that is, if the premises are an accurate representation of the foundation claims of Van Tillian
Presuppositionalism), then the conclusion follows necessarily:

1. ∀x (Kx ↔ Cx) A
2. ∀x (Ix → ¬Cx) A
3. ∀x (Rx → Ix) A
4. Rv & Kv A
5. Kv 4&O
6. Rv 4&O
7. Rv → Iv 3∀O
8. Iv 6,7 MP
9. Iv → ¬Cv 2∀O
 19

It seems, then, that if the fundamental claim of Presuppositionalism (the only premise that

really distinguishes the approach of Presuppositionalism from the approach of classical Christian

theology apologetics) is true (that there is no common ground—that it is not possible to have

access, without mediation or interpretation, to reality in order to compare the truth claims that are

proposed by one’s interpretative schema to the way things really are), then one cannot say that

one knows that his interpretive schema is true (no matter who they are: Van Til, Karl Barth,

Martin Heidegger, or even Thomas Aquinas); and this is, quite simply, the way things really are.

Is there any way to avoid this embarrassing situation? In order to avoid the pains of self-

contradiction we must reject one of the three following premises (2, 3 or 4). The third premise

seems to be the most analytical affirmation that is to be found in the postmodern theory that is

Presuppositionalism. It is quite simply a fact that, if a person always interprets reality through

their interpretive schema, then one cannot have access, without mediation or interpretation, to

reality in order to compare the truth claims of said schema to the way things really are. That is to

say, if a person always interprets reality through their interpretive schema, then even if they

wanted (or attempted) to compare the statements of their schema with "reality", they would be

doing this comparison through the interpretive schema that they are attempting to examine. It's

like having a pair of colored spectacles (let us say that they are pink) permanently cemented on

10. ¬Cv 8,9 MP

11. Kv ↔ Cv 1∀O
12. Kv → Cv 11↔O
13. ¬Kv 10,12 MT
14. Kv & ¬Kv 5,13 &I

v = Cornelius Van Til

Kx = x Knows that its interpretative schema is true.
Cx = x can have access, without mediation or interpretation, to reality, in order to Compare the truth claims
that are proposed by his schema to the way things really are.
Ix = x Interprets through an interpretative schema, always and incessantly, the world around him.
Rx = x is a Rational being.
 20

your face.75 If we cannot deny the third premise, then perhaps we could reject the second premise

or the fourth premise?

The fourth premise is absolutely necessary if Presuppositionalism is to be "true." That is,

if the fourth premise is not true, then the third premise is, at best, trivially true (which means that

it is, at best, analytically true); but, if the fourth premise is false, then the third premise has

nothing to say about the way things actually are.76 If the fourth premise is true, then Van Til can

only say that there is no way to verify the truth of an interpretative schema. Indeed, we could say

that Presuppositionalism, in relation to its fundamental claims, just is the combination of

premises 3 and 4. It follows that if we reject either the third or fourth premise, or both, then we

reject at the same time, Presuppositionalism; what we accept, however, would be the classical

position of orthodox reformed theology, as seen in such great theologians as John Calvin and

Francis Turretin. So, Van Til would not readily reject the fourth premise.

We are left with only one premise that we can reject if we want to save Van Til from the

pains of self-contradiction: the second premise. But the second premise is nothing other than the

application of the correspondence theory of truth to the question of interpretative schemes. If we

reject the second premise, then it follows that we could never know that our particular

interpretative schema is true, and we are obliged to accept an absolute relativism of interpretative

schemas from which we cannot escape. It looks, then, that Van Til must either agree to remain in

self-contradiction (it is impossible to know that one of the interpretative schemes is true, but Van

Til knows that his schema is true) or he must accept an absolute relativism of interpretative

75
Now where have we heard this illustration?
76
It would be a theory that has no relationship to reality.
 21

schemes such that no one could ever know which interpretative schema is true. More on this later

on.

Perhaps we could reply that, “It is possible to demonstrate the truth of his own

interpretive scheme by showing that others are wrong.”77 Philosophically speaking, of course,

this reply seems right. It is a well-known fact in logic that in an argument that is based upon a

dilemma with several disjuncts, we are only able to conclude that a single disjunct must be true if

we are able to prove the negation of all the other disjuncts. We could certainly proceed to the

negation of the other disjuncts by demonstrating that they are, each in turn, incoherent. A major

difficulty with this method is that if our list is not exhaustive, then we may never know, even

when we have denied all but one (of those known to us), that the remaining option is true. There

is, moreover, another difficulty with this method that is specific to Presuppositionalism. If

Presuppositionalism is true (that is to say, that premises 3 and 4 are true), then the answer to this

objection must be “No! We cannot demonstrate that the others are false.” This response is

77
The idea that we can adopt, in order to properly examine, the position (or beliefs) of another interpretation
system is very similar to the presuppositionalist method of apologetics. The presuppositionalist method will try to
attempt a reductio ad absurdum with the fundamental presuppositions of all other interpretation systems. The reality
is that this is a useful method in the toolbox of any philosopher, theologian and apologist, however, it can only
function as a negative test for truth. In other words, suppose a presuppositionalist managed to demonstrate that all
other human interpretation systems known to man are inconsistent. Have they now shown that their interpretative
schema is true? No. (1) It is quite possible that a system that they think they have shown to be inconsistent is the only
scheme that is true, but, the person who was explaining it included, unknowingly, some incoherencies in his
explanation. Correcting those incoherencies, that were pointed out by the discerning presuppositionalist, ensures that
this system becomes both consistent and true, and that Presuppositionalism (a different and opposing system) is
false. (2) It is quite possible that there is another system that is, for the moment, unknown to man, but is a consistent,
and true system. (3) It is a general rule of argumentation that the proof of a mistake either in the premises or in the
conclusion of the opponent does not prove the truth of one’s own views (except in the situation where we talking
about contradictory positions such as: God currently exists in extra-mental reality and God does not currently exist in
extra-mental reality.). Another argument must be used to demonstrate the truth of own positions and statements, and
the consistency of one’s own views is not a positive truth test. To demonstrate one’s own point of view to be true,
one must be able to demonstrate that his position accurately represents reality. I have already argued that the method
of Van Til does not allow him to test whether or not his system accurately represents reality. Therefore, a
presuppositionalist is capable, in theory, to demonstrate the falsity of any other system, but will never be able, in
practice, to demonstrate the truth of his own system. The problem for the presuppositionalist, if Presuppositionalism
is true, is that the same statement could be said of any other system of interpretation that exists. Therefore, this
method, although useful in itself, is useless for the presuppositionalist, just in case the presuppositionalist desires to
demonstrate the truth of the system of Presuppositionalism.
 22

necessary because the presuppositionalist analysis of another interpretative schema is never, and

cannot be, done without mediation or interpretation. According to Van Til, as we saw above,

there is no way to consider the truth claims of any system of beliefs without interpreting them in

light of one’s own system of beliefs (remember the pink sunglasses that are cemented to our

face). According to Van Til, then, the presuppositionalist must necessarily analyze the

fundamental affirmations of any other interpretive schema in light of, and through, the

fundamental affirmations of his own interpretative schema. If this is true, then it is obvious that

the presuppositionalist will always find the other positions to be false. The only way by which

one can critically (and honestly, some might say sincerely) consider another interpretive schema,

without being biased by one’s own interpretive schema, is to be able to objectively, put aside

one’s own views and to consider the truth claims of the other interpretative schema as they are in

themselves and in comparison to the way things really are. But if we do this (indeed in order to

do this properly), we must allow for the possibility that the new schema just might be true, and

our former schema (Presuppositionalism) false. This, however, is not possible for a Van Tillian

presuppositionalist, and, therefore, this method cannot be used by the presuppositionalist. It

would seem, then, that if we use the presuppositionalist method, we are left either in self-

contradiction, or in an absolute relativism of interpretative schemes.

Some Concluding Corollaries of this Problem

Van Til claimed that all rational beings necessarily interpret reality through an

interpretative schema, and that the Christian Reformed interpretation that he proposed was the

only true interpretative schema. How he was able to know that all other systems of interpretation

(eg the Catholic interpretation, atheistic interpretation or Arminian interpretation, to name a few)
 23

were false is a problem that seems to be irresolvable, once we accept his system. Van Til

presupposes the truth of his own interpretation of reality, and then says that all other

interpretations cannot really understand reality (despite the fact that they seem to be able to

explain much, if not all, of the same phenomena, though in a different way).78 However,

Presuppositionalism cannot, according to its own principles, know that other interpretations are

wrong, even if they first attempt to accept them as true. Let us conclude with a summary of the

consequences of this argument.

First, according to the foundational principles of Presuppositionalism, if we accept an

interpretation, then we will not only interpret every phenomenon by it (which makes all the other

interpretative schemas false for us), but we also cannot use reason to intellectually reject a false

interpretation schema, and to accept a true interpretative schema.79

Second, as indicated above, the correspondence theory of truth, in which one might be

able to check the veracity of an interpretative schema is unsustainable if it is impossible to get out

of our interpretative schemas in order to take a look at our own schema from some common

ground or objective stand point. It seems, therefore, that if we accept Van Til’s

Presuppositionalism, then we are simply unable to know which interpretative system gives the

78
See Norman Geisler's comment about it in Christian Apologetics (1976; repr, Grand Rapids, MI. Baker
Book House, 2007), 96.
79
This is complicated, quite obviously, by the fact that Van Til thinks, because this is how his interpretative
schema understands the phenomena of this world, that all human beings are born in a single interpretive scheme (that
of fallen man), and that no man can get out of this schema without divine intervention (coloured eye-glass
replacement surgery) of the Holy Spirit.
 24

true interpretation of reality.80 Why, then, should we accept an interpretation rather than

another?81

Indeed, third, a consequence of Presuppositionalism is that if Van Til is right, then the

schema is only one of a huge list of different schemas. Why, then, choose Presuppositionalism

instead of non-Presuppositionalism? It seems to follow from what was already said, that either

the fundamental affirmations of Presuppositionalism are true (premises 3 and 4), and, therefore,

Presuppositionalism is just one interpretative schema in a multitude of schemas, all of which

could be true (we might never know which one);82 or the fundamental affirmations of

Presuppositionalism are wrong (and if that's the case then we can stop talking about it). If we

accept the foundational claims of Presuppositionalism, as mentioned above, then it is quite

possible that several interpretative schemas can explain, consistently, the world before us. One

could even say that all facts that are coherently interpreted by Van Til can also be interpreted,

coherently, by John Calvin, Jacobus Arminius, Thomas Aquinas, or even, Muslim thinkers,

Buddhist thinkers or Atheist thinkers. If this is the case, then how can we say, consistently, that

any of them is, or is not, right? For Van Til, there are no unbiased (in fact not interpreted or un

mediated) facts, which could lean in favor of any one interpretative schema; and even if there

were, we could not access them (or even observe them) without interpreting them through some

It is important to note that if we reply, “Okay, then we'll say that there is common ground, an objective
80

standpoint, where the schemas of interpretation can be examined in order to see which one is true.”, then we do not
have the Presuppositionalism but either the classical approach to apologetics, or the evidentialist approach.
81
Any presentation of “reasons” to accept position X instead of position Y, if it is compatible with
Presuppositionalism, will be based upon the personal taste, or desire, of each individual. If one calls upon certain
“truths of reality” in order to justify his choice of position X instead of position Y, and if one wishes to argue that
this is a valid reason for everyone (which means that it is not a matter of taste but of truth), then it is (a) inconsistent
with the claims of Presuppositionalism, and (b) making use of some common ground that is available to all
humanity.
82
We have no way of finding out which one is true. There could not be any reason to choose one rather than
another, it is, therefore, really a matter of taste.
 25

interpretative schema. It would seem, then, that if we accept Presuppositionalism, we are caught

in an absolute relativism of interpretative schemas. The result, then, is that Presuppositionalism

leads necessarily to absolute skepticism regarding the possibility of giving a true interpretation of

reality.83 There is, therefore, if the Presuppositionalism is true, no reason to accept the claims of

Christianity as true (including the version of Van Til), instead of any other interpretative schema

that can be found in the world.84

Fourth, if our argument works, then the system of Van Til suffers from internal

incoherence,85 because it affirms not only that his schema is true, but also that other interpretative

schemes found in the world (including the positions of other Reformed theologians,86 of

83
If Presuppositionalism is true, and if we want to maintain our Christian beliefs, then we are forced either
into a form of postmodern Christianity (“we cannot know that it's true, but we can make it true”), such as we see in
the works of contemporary postmodern Christian theologians such as Myron B. Penner (Op cit.); or we are forced
into a form of fideistic dogmatism (which is just another way in which contemporary theologians have retreated from
the overconfident claims of modern thinkers, and the postmodern rejection of this confidence), such as we see in
Karl Barth and Cornelius Van Til (“we cannot know that it’s true, but has to be true, therefore we must simply
believe that it is true”).
84
Perhaps presuppositionalists would agree with this statement? See Montgomery, OAU, 387.
85
Which is very ironic because presuppositionalists think that the only way to demonstrate that other
interpretative schemas are wrong is to demonstrate that they have internal inconsistencies. The result of their own
method is the demonstration that their position is false.
86
Van Til, IST, 31-42, 43-61.
 26

Arminians,87 Roman Catholics,88 and specific thinkers such as C. S. Lewis,89 Augustine,90 and

Aquinas91) are false.92

In addition, it follows that we have no reason to accept the presuppositionalist division of

humanity, into three different interpretative schemas (pre-fall, fell, and regenerated). If

Presuppositionalism is true, then this division is nothing other than one of the truth claims of the

interpretative schema of Van Til’s Presuppositionalism, and we have no reason to accept this

presuppositionalist schema. Perhaps other schemes have other lists with more or less categories

of schemas? What if they are right? How would we know?

A sixth difficulty with Presuppositionalism, which should be important enough for those

who think (1) that it is important to remain faithful to the theology of John Calvin, and (2) that

the claim that there is no common ground between regenerate men and unregenerate men goes

against the spirit of Calvinism (the theological system to which Van Til claims to adhere). For

John Calvin, as evidenced by his Institutes, the fact that we can know God through his creation is

just is common ground between the regenerate and the non-regenerate. In fact, Calvin explicitly

87
Ibid., 16, 19, 39, 70.
88
Ibid., 12-13, 16, 19, 39, 44, 48, 84, 160, 260.
89
Ibid., 16, 39.
90
Ibid., 49.
91
Ibid., 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 160.
92
Furthermore, it would seem, by the fact that several different authors have different viewpoints (even
within the Calvinist camp), that each thinker holds a different interpretation schema. Which one is correct? In order
to know the truth must we adhere to the interpretative schema of Van Til? If we differ from Van Til on one single
point do we, or can we, change interpretative schemas? What does this mean for the Arminian schema, or the 4 point
Calvinist schema? We know, because of the many dogmatic critics of Van Til about these views, that, according to
Van Til, they are, one and all, prostitutions of truth with error. (See Van Til, DF, 29.) For Van Til, Calvinism (and
specifically the presuppositionalist Calvinism of Van Til) is simply true Christianity, and all others positions are false
(see Van Til, IST, v, 39. Van Til, DF, 29). What does that mean for contemporary presuppositionalists who differ
with Van Til on various claims?
 27

states, “I just wanted to note here that there is a way to seek God that is common to pagans and to

believers of the church, by following in his footsteps, as they are outlined in the heavens and on

earth, as paintings of his image.”93

Finally, if we want to speak of the existence, or even possible existence, of interpretative

schemes, then we are necessarily either (a) only expressing a claim that is part of our own

interpretative schema, an claim that cannot be proved (as we have already seen), or (b) taking up

a position (at least theoretically) that puts us outside of all interpretative schemas. Consider, in

conclusion, an example that might illustrate this point.

Let us say that there is a warehouse that is full of 500 metal sound proof boxes. Suppose

that there is also a person who was born, through some form of incubation, inside one of the

metal boxes, and who has been living inside that box their entire life, with no way of escape, or

contact with something that is outside of his metal box. Such a person would be unaware that

there is something outside of his metal box. He would not be able to know that what he was in

was a metal box.94 He would not be able to know that there was anything else in existence aside

from himself and the inside walls of his metal box. As such, it is evident that he would also be

incapable of telling us how many metal boxes there were in the warehouse. In order to be able to

talk about how many metal boxes are in the warehouse, that they are metal, and that they are in

the warehouse, one must necessarily take up a position that is outside of the metal boxes, and,

indeed, outside of the metal boxes. It seems, then, that unless one takes a position that is outside

of all interpretative schemes, one would be entirely unable to talk about the existence, nature, and

Calvin, IRC, t.1, c.5, s. 6. My translation. In French we read, « Je voulais seulement observer ici qu’il y a
93

une voie commune aux païens et aux croyants de l’église de rechercher Dieu, en suivant ses traces, comme ils sont
esquissée dans le firmament et sur la terre, comme les peintures de son image. »
94
How could he even possess the concept of a metal box?
 28

content of any interpretative schemas.95 One might argue: “But God is the ultimate interpreter,

and, therefore, if God tells us how many schemas there are, then that is how many there are.” The

difficulty with this objection is that the claim that God has communicated such information

would have to be part of an interpretative schema. There is, therefore, no way to know that there

is a God, nor that he has communicated (one can only blindly accept an interpretative schema in

which this is a truth claim). You either accept that interpretative schema or you do not. There is

no way of knowing, however, whether or not it is true. Therefore, either it is possible for us to

step outside of all interpretative schemas, to at least a limited degree, implying that we can then

talk objectively about them (perhaps even demonstrating the truth or falsity of some of them); or

it is not possible, and talking about the truth of interpretative schemas is self-contradictory.96

Ultimately, if Presuppositionalism is true, then Van Til is like that person who is caught in

a metal box trying to talk about what actually exists. Unfortunately, as he is caught in a metal

box, he does not realize that his little world is only a small part of reality, and that he has wrongly

interpreted the elements of reality that are presented to him.

It so happens that in Van Til’s metal box there are 3 interpretative schemes. The floor manager of the
95

warehouse passed him a message?

96
Van Til simply proves that in his interpretative scheme, all other interpretative schemes are false. Which
says nothing about whether or not Van Til’s scheme is true.