Religious freedom and the constitutionality of the National Defense Law

Footnote No.
172
Estrada vs. Escritor,
492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
PONENTE: Justice Reynato Puno
Facts:
1. Petittioner: ALEJANDRO ESTRADA
2. Action of the Petitioner: Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas
City.
3. Cause of Action: Estrada requested an administrative investigation [for "disgraceful and
immoral conduct"] of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having
a child with the latter while she was still married. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
4. Respondent: SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
5. Action of the Respondent: Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but
denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct for the reason that she is a
member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower Society and her
conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious beliefs. She
further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in
accordance with her religion which allows members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who have
been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration makes
the union moral and binding within the congregation throughout the world except in
countries where divorce is allowed. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Ruling:
No, the State cannot penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
The constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
In the case at bar, Soledad’s cohabitation with her husband was in conformity with the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance with her religion. Such cohabitation had
been consented by members of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The State could not penalize respondent
for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. A distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.
In addition, the Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. One should demonstrate
compelling state interest for the state to intervene in the right to religious freedom. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including religious
freedom, may be enjoyed.
Thus, the state cannot penalize the respondent for such conjugal arrangement since it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
FOOTNOTE 173, 176, 177
S
CASE TITLE Reli German, et. al. v Gen. Santiago Barangan and Maj. Isabelo Lariosa
DATE March 27, 1985; G.R. No. L-68828
PONENTE Justice Venicio Escolin
FACTS 1. Petitioners are Reli German, Ramon Pedrosa, and 38 others composed of
businessmen, students, and office employees converged to hear mass at
St. Jude Chapel adjoining Malacañang grounds.
2. Petitioners, wearing yellow shirts, marched with raised clenched fists and
shouted anti-government invections. They were barred to enter the
church; so decided to leave but was warned not to enter the church in
the future.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners contended that the Constitution will never
restrict any person or persons from entering and worshipping at the
church.
4. Respondents are Gen. Santiago Barangan and Maj. Isabelo Lariosa. They
barred the assembly from proceeding on the ground that St. June
Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area.
5. Respondents maintained that petitioners true intention was to conduct a
demonstration at place close to the very residence and offices of the
president. Prohibition was based on experiences that demonstrators
crashed through the gates and perimeter fences.
ISSUE (173) Whether or not the right to freely exercise one’s religion is highly ranked in
the scheme of constitutional values.
RULING Yes, the right to freely exercise one’s religion is highly ranked in the scheme
of constitutional values.
Constitution provides that no law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise
of religion.
In the case at bar, there is grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect
for and deference to such preferred rights, including the freedom to worship
alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly.
No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can dispense with the sovereign
prerogative of judgment. This right has precedence and primacy.
Therefore, the right to freely exercise one’s religion is highly ranked in the
scheme of constitutional values.
ISSUE (176) Whether or not religious freedom is entitled to the highest priority among
human rights.
RULING Yes, religious freedom is entitled to the highest priority among human rights.
of religion.
In the case at bar, religious freedom is the most fundamental and thus
entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the
relationship of man to his Creator. It is that deeply-held faith that affords
solace and comfort. Without that faith, man’s very existence is devoid of
meaning, bereft of significance.
Thus, religious free is entitled to the highest priority among human rights.
ISSUE (177) Whether or not disallowing petitioners’ entry to St. Jude Chapel a violation of
their religious freedom.
RULING No, disallowing petitioners’ entry to St. Jude Chapel is not a violation of their
religious freedom.
of religion.
In the case at bar, the restriction imposed is established in the interest of

national security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of
belief or choice of their religion but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action. The right to religious freedom
and the exercise thereof must be done in good faith.
Therefore, disallowing petitioners’ entry to St. Jude Chapel is not a violation of

their religious freedom.
Footnote 175
CASE TITLE: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, Respondent
DATE: July 13, 1938 G.R. No. L-45892
PONENTE: JUSTICE RAMON AVANCEÑA,
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
2. Respondent: Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law.
3.Respondent: It is alleged that, being a Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in
1936, wilfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th
of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
4. Action of the respondent: The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense
that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and
has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father
to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
5. The respondents was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
RULIING:
Yes, the National Defense law is constitutional
Under the Constitution, No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
In the instant case, the duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. If the individual externalizes what he believes, his freedom to do
so becomes subject to the authority of the state. This is so because religious freedom can be
exercised only with due regard to the rights of others.
Therefore, the violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as National Defense
law was constitutional.
FOOTNOTE 178
S
CASE TITLE Genaro Gerona, et. al. v Hon. Secretary of Education, et. al.
DATE August 12, 1959; G.R. No. L-13954
PONENTE Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor
FACTS 1. Petitioners-appellants are Genaro Gerona and others. They belong to

Jehovah’s Witness teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is
superior to that of laws enacted by the State.
2. Petitioners’ children attending community school in Masbate refused to

salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
contrary to the requirement of the Department Order No. 8. They were
expelled; so, they wrote to the Secretary that they be exempted.
3. Subject/Object: Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8 for
the rules and regulations of compulsory daily flag ceremony in all public
and private schools under RA 1265.
4. Respondents-appellees are the Hon. Secretary of Education and others.

5. Respondent Secretary denied the request of the petitioners contending
that the flag is not an image but an emblem of national sovereignty.
ISSUE Whether or not Department Order No. 8 violates the constitutional right to
freedom of religion.
RULING No, Department Order No. 8 does not violate the constitutional right to
of religion.
In the present case, in requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute
is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on the students.
It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all
alike whether Christian, Muslim, Protestant or Jehovah’s Witness. The flag
salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for.
Hence, Department Order No. 8 does not violate the constitutional right to
FOOTNOTE 179, 181, 185

S
CASE TITLE Alejandro Estrada v Soledad S. Escritor
DATE August 4, 2003; A.M. No. P-02-1651
PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS 1. Complainant is Alejandro Estrada. He wrote Judge Jose Caoibes of RTC Las
Piñas to investigate the rumors that respondent Escritor is living with a
man not her husband.
2. Petitioner filed this case arguing that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court and that she should be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear condoning her act.
3. Subject/Object: This is an administrative case filed by the complainant.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Maceda or RTC Las Piñas for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
4. Respondent is Soledad S. Escritor, court interpreter of the above station.

She is a widow but living with a man without the benefit of marriage for
22 years.
5. Respondent admitted the allegations but denied liability because her
conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious
belief as a member of the Jehovah’s Witness. That she and her partner
executed a “Declaration of pledging faithfulness” allowing members
who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
relations.
ISSUE (179) Whether or not voluntarism and insulation in religion is protected by the
establishment clause.
RULING Yes, voluntarism in religion is protected by the establishment clause.
Constitution provides that no law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
In the instant case, firstly, freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to

any creed or religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law. Secondly, freedom of religion is an
insulation, a safeguard to exercise the chosen form of religion. The first one is
absolute; the second is not.
Therefore, voluntarism in religion is protected by the establishment clause.
ISSUE (181) Whether or not freedom of choice is protected by the free exercise clause.
RULING Yes, freedom of choice is protected by the free exercise clause.
Constitution provides that no law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
In the present case, free exercise clause principally guarantees voluntarism.

This freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscious and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in
the practice of one’s religion.
ISSUE (185) Whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an
exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which
government employees are held administratively liable.
RULING No, respondent’s right to religious freedom should not carve out an exception
from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government
employees and should be held administratively liable.
The constitution provides that No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
In the case at bar, respondents action of making there cohabitation valid by

excuting “ Declaration of Pledging Faithfullness” since it is based on their
belief and practice of her religion violates the establishement clause of the
constitution. The free exercise of religious belief is absolutely protected, but
the freedom to act according to such religious belief is subject to the police
power of the State.
Thus, that free exercise principle "should be dominant in any conflict with the
anti-establishment principle." as stated by American professor of
constitutional law, Laurence Tribe. This dominance would be the result of
commitment to religious tolerance instead of "thwarting at all costs even the
faintest appearance of establishment.
FOOTNOTE 187
S
CASE TITLE Fortunato R. Pamil v Hon. Victoriano C. Teleron, et. al.
DATE November 20, 1978; G.R. No. L-34854
PONENTE Justice Enrique Medina Fernando
FACTS 1. Petitioner-Appellant is Fortunato R. Pamil, an aspirant for the position of

municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.
2. Petitioner filed a suit to disqualify respondent Fr. Gonzaga based on Section

2175 of the Administrative Code stating that no elected or appointed to
a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner contended that there is no implied repeal of
Section 2175 of the Administrative Cod by the Election Code of 1971.
4. Respondents are Hon. Victorino C. Teleron, Judge of the CFI of Bohol,

branch III and Fr. Margarito R. Gonzaga who was elected to the position
of municipal mayor.
5. Respondent Judge held that the ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the
Election Code of 1971.
ISSUE Whether or not an ecclesiastical person is eligible to an elective municipal

position
RULING No, an ecclesiastical person is not eligible to an elective municipal position.
Constitution provides that the free exercise clause without discrimination or

preference shall forever be allowed.
In the case at bar, the question on the constitutionality of the provision

having failed, after falling short of one vote, it must be given full force and
application. Section 2175 of the Administrative Code remains to be accorded
respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application.
Thus, an ecclesiastical person is not eligible to an elective municipal position.
NOTE Ponente and 6 others opined: “The challenged Adminstrative Code provision
certainly insofar as it declares ineligibile ecclesiastics to any elective or
appointive office is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Footnote 188
CASE: DENMARK S. VALMORES versus DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO, IN HER CAPACITY AS
DEAN OF THE COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, AND DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, FACULTY OF
THE MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY, G.R. No. 217453
DATE: July 19, 2017
PONENTE: Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church. He was enrolled as a first-year student at the MSU-College of Medicine for
Academic Year 2014-2015.
2. Petitioner Valmores wrote a letter to the Dean of College of Medicine (the private
respondent) requesting for an exception in the event that a regular class is rescheduled
to a Saturday. The church through Pastor Nietes issued Certification in connection with
the petitioner’s request for exemption.
3. Petitioner claimed that his constitutional right to freedom of religion was violated by
private respondents when the latter refused to excuse petitioner from attending classes
and taking the examinations on Saturdays despite of the 2010 CHED Memorandum to
which guidelines were laid down for exemption of teachers, personnel and students
from participation in school or related activities due to compliance with religious
obligations.
4. Private respondents Dr. Cristina Achacoso (In Her Capacity As Dean Of The College Of
Medicine), Dr. Giovanni Cabildo (Faculty Of The Mindanao State University).
5. Respondents argued that petitioner Valmores’ case was not unique to merit exceptional
treatment and that the changes in schedule were not unreasonable because they are
due to unexpected declarations of holidays as well as unforeseen emergencies of the
professors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s claim that his constitutional right to freedom of
religion is violated.
A- Yes. The petitioner’s claim that his constitutional right to freedom of religion is
violated.
L- The Constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
A- In the case at bar, respondents’ failure to accommodate petitioner’s case
notwithstanding the Memorandum of CHED 2010 stating that whenever necessary
students are exempted from participating in school or related activities if such
activities are in conflict with their religious obligation.
C-Thus, petitioner’s claim that his constitutional right to freedom of religion was
violated.
RULING FOUND AT DEAN’S BOOK:
Page: 91 Paragraph: 3
190
CASE: ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-14639
DATE: March 25, 1919
PONENTE: Justice George Malcolm.
FACTS:
Petitioner: ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., The petitioners were relatives and friends
of the deportees.
Petitioner Action: Presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and
alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
parties.
Object/Subject: Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, 170 Women of ill repute
were kept and confined to their houses in the district of Manila by the police. The women was
ordered by the Mayor of Manila to be deported to Davao. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao.
Respondent: JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., Lukban is the Mayor of City of Manila.
Respondents Action: Argued that there is a defect in parties petitioners and that the
person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deportation of the 170 women is Illegal.
Ruling:
Yes, the Deportation of the 170 women is Illegal.
The constitution provides that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
In the case at bar, 170 women of ill repute was deported to Davao from Manila by the
order of Mayor Lukban of manila, without giving them the chance to collect their belongings
and having their consent. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It
might be Mayor Lukban is quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize him to compel the said
prostitute to isolate themselves from the other other who are not.
Thus, the deportation of 170 women in ill repute to Davao from manila is Illegal.
Footnote 191
CASE: BARTOLOME CAUNCA v. JULIA SALAZAR, GR No. L-2690
DATE: Jan 01, 1949
PONENTE: Justice Gregorio Perfecto
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Bartolome Caunca is the cousin of Estelita Flores an orphan and illiterate,
who was brought from Capiz by a maid recruiter [Estrella Justo] to Manila.
2. Caunca visited his cousin Estelita Flores in the house of Julia Salazar- private
respondent and the [Owner of Far Eastern Employment Agency]. Estelita manifested
her desire to go along with her cousin Bartolome but she was prevented by the
respondents from leaving
3. Petitioner filed an action for habeas corpus on the ground that his cousin Estelita
Flores who was detained and prevented by Julia Salazar and Estrella Justo to go with
him.
4. Respondents Julia Salazar is the owner of Far Eastern Employment Agency in Manila;
Estrella Justo is the maid recruiter of said agency.
5. Respondents disallowed Estelita from leaving the house unless upon a condition that
the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other transportation expenses of
Estelita from Buruanga to Manila be paid first before she could leave.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents violate the fundamental right of Estelita Flores to
have a free choice of abode.
A- Yes. The respondents violate the fundamental right of Estelita Flores to have a free
choice of abode.
L-The Constitution provides that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
A- In the case at bar, Estelita Flores is really indebted in the amount of P83.85 and was
prevented to go along with her cousin to which her right to transfer to another
residence deprived her right to liberty of abode.
C-Thus, the respondents violated the fundamental right of Estelita Flores to have a free
choice of abode.

Page: 92; Paragraph: 5;
Continuation Page: 93Paragraph: 1
Footnote 192
CASE: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC versus HON. FRANKLIN M.
DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, GR NO.
81958
DATE: June 30, 1988
PONENTE: Justice Abraham Sarmiento
FACTS:
1. Petitioner- Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), is a firm
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement.
2. Petitioner assailed for the discrimination against males or females that it does not apply
to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills.
3. Petitioner challenged the Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 issued by DOLE to
which the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS." (Deployment Ban)
4. Respondents HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
5. The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondents filed a comment and admitted that
Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to travel under Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is
valid.
A- Yes. The restriction to travel under Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid.
L- The Constitution provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
A- In the case at bar, the deployment ban does not impair the right to travel because
such right is subject to the requirements of public safety in view of the protection to
female domestics who were most prone to exploitation and abuse by their foreign
employers.
C-Thus, the restriction to travel under Department Order No. 1 of DOLE was valid.

FOOTNOTE 193
CASE TITLE Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al. v Hon. Raul Manglapus, et. al.
DATE October 27, 1989; G.R. No. 88211 (178 SCRA 760)
PONENTE Justice Irene Cortes
FACTS 1. Petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, the rest of their family,
and the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) represented
by its president Conrado F. Estrella.
2. In his deathbed, ex-President Marcos wished to return to the Philippines to
die. Petitioner questioned then President Aquino’s power to bar his
return to the country. Marcos filed a petition to order the respondents
to issue them their travel documents to return to the Philippines.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner contended that such act deprived them of their
right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection
of the laws, and also the right to travel which may only be impaired by
court order.
4. Respondents are Hon. Raul Manglapus, Catalino Macaraig, Miriam
Santiago, Fidel Ramos, Renato De Villa in their capacity as Secretaries of
the President.
5. Respondents argued for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. Respondents further affirmed the
decision to ban Marcos’ return for reasons of national security and
public safety.
ISSUE Whether or not President Aquino in prohibiting the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines violates the right to travel.
RULING No. President Aquino in prohibiting the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines does not violate the right to travel.
The Constitution provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.
In the case at bar, the return of the Marcoses is a threat to the government
viewed to provide a catalytic effect which has not shown to have ceased.
President Aquino, under her oath of office, must take pre-emptive measure
for the self-preservation of the country and the protection of the people. The
refusal must be sustained on the ground that it endangers national security.
Thus, President Aquino in prohibiting the Marcoses does not violate the
latter’s right to travel.
Footenote 194
CASE: Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr. versus The Court Of Appeals, Hons. Serafin E. Camilon
And Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., As Judges Of The Court Of First Instance Of Rizal,
Pasig Branches, The People Of The Philippines, The Securities & Exchange
Comission, Hon. Edmundo M. Reyes, As Commissioner Of Immigration, And The
Chief Of The Aviation Security Command (Avsecom), G.R. No. L-62100
DATE: May 30, 1986
PONENTE: Justice Marcelo Fernan
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., [a stock brokerage house] who was
charged with estafa. Thereafter, he admitted to post bail.
2. Petitioner contended that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.
3. Petitioner filed to court motion seeking permission to leave the country to attend to
matters relative to his business transactions and opportunities in the United States
however, the motions were denied.
4. Respondents- The Court Of Appeals, Hons. Serafin E. Camilon And Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.,
As Judges Of The Court Of First Instance Of Rizal, Pasig Branches, The People Of The
Philippines, The Securities & Exchange Comission, Hon. Edmundo M. Reyes, As
Commissioner Of Immigration, And The Chief Of The Aviation Security Command.
5. The Court did not see any urgency from petitioner’s statement to warrant on the
proposed trip. Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release
of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right to travel has been violated.
A- No. Petitioner’s constitutional right to travel has not been violated.
L-The Constitution provides that neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
A-In the case at bar, the condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel because if the accused be allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
he may be placed beyond the reach of the Court.
C-Thus, petitioner’s constitutional right to travel has not been violated.
FOOTNOTE 195
CASE TITLE Ricardo Silverio v the CA, et. al.
DATE April 8, 1991; G.R. No. 94284
PONENTE Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
FACTS 1.Petitioner: Ricardo C. Silverio
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals

erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders.
Petitioner takes the posture that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed
by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on
grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of

the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
4. Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
5. Action of Respondents: More than two (2) years after the filing of the
Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times
without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the
arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his
application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent
Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the
Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused has
not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the
knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
RULING Yes, the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
Section 6 of Art. III of the Constitution states that, the right to travel must not
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, Silverio has posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his
arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered
nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his
pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country.
The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an
accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person
facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that, an accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court
where the case is pending.
Therefore, the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
FOOTNOTE 196
CASE TITLE Defensor-Santiago v Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633
DATE January 27, 1993
PONENTE Justice Florenz D. Regalado
FACTS 1.Petitioner: MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
2. Action of Petitioner: A “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from

Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion
to Set Pending Incident for Hearing” was filed by MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO immediately before the Supreme court without following
the hierarchy of courts
3. Subject/Object: A criminal case was filed against petitioner with the

Sandiganbayan for the alleged violation on RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail
for release fixed at Php 15,000.00.
4. Respondents: CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA

LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA
5. Action of Respondents: The Ombudsman filed a manifestation that alleged

Miriam's lack of injury when she came to the office was contrary to her
allegation that she wanted to post bail due to the extensive physical
injuries she suffered from a vehicular collision.
The Sandiganbayan acted on the manifestation and set Miriam

for arraignment. The petitioners filed a motion for her provisional liberty
under a recognizance and averred that her continuance to remain under a
bail bond may imply that she had intent to flee.
The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by

reason
of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to
accept
a fellowship at Harvard.
ISSUE Whether or not the hold-departure order violates petitioner’s right to travel
RULING No, the hold-departure order does not violates petitioner’s right to travel.
In the case at bar, the hold departure order is an exercise of a respondent

Court's inherent power to preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. A court has the power to prohibit
a person admitted to bail an opportunity to leave the Philippines. This is the
consequence of the bond.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She
holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of the court.
She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency
of the case.
Therefore, the hold-departure order does not violates petitioner’s right to

travel.
FOOTNOTE 197-A
CASE TITLE Imelda Marcos Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 115132
DATE August 9, 1995
PONENTE Justice Jose Catral Mendoza
FACTS 1.Petitioner: Imelda Marcos Romualdez
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a

"Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of
petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives
requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. After conviction, she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel
Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental
medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical
condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied.
Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel
Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was supported by
several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for
treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available
here.
4. Respondents: THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
5. Action of Respondents: The Court stated their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the
resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court.
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner was denied her right to travel.
RULING No, the petitioner was not denied of her right to travel.
In the case at bar, the contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact
a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and
medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion
because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The
court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's
physician in resolving her request for permission to travel.
A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the

very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases whether
the accused will be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian
reasons is a matter of court’s sound discretion.
Therefore, the petitioner was not denied of her right to travel.

FOOTNOTE 197-B
CASE TITLE Yap vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 141529
DATE June 06, 2001
PONENTE Justice Minerva Gonzaga Reyes
FACTS 1.Petitioner: FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner filed with the CA, A “Motion to Fix Bail for
the Provisional Liberty” of accused appellant pending appeal, invoking the
last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General explained that the petitioner maybe allowed to post
bail and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until the final judgement is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner was convicted of estafa for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to PhP 5,500,000.00. He filed a notice of appeal and
moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed
earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC.
4. Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
5. Action of Respondents: The CA upheld the Solicitor’s General
recommendation. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the
reduction of the amount of bail fixed by CA but was denied.
ISSUE Whether or not the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of
abode and right to travel.
RULING No, the condition imposed by the CA was not violative of the liberty of abode
and right to travel.
Section 6 of Art. III of the Constitution states that, the liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
In the case at bar, the order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on
bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision.
The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the
nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence.
Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is
not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.
Therefore, the condition imposed by the CA was not violative of the liberty of
abode and right to travel.
FOOTNOTE 199
CASE TITLE Leo Echegaray v Secretary of Justice, Et Al.; G.R. No. 132601
DATE October 12, 1998
PONENTE Per Curiam
FACTS 1. Petitioner is Leo Echegaray who was charged and convicted for the rape of
his common law spouse’s 10-year-old daughter. He was sentenced to
death penalty.
2. Petitioner filed a petition to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution as the penalty
imposed upon him is death by lethal injection.
3. Subject/Object: In the execution procedure, a manual is set for the
administration of the lethal injection to the convict. However, the
Solicitor General contended that the RA in question is unconstitutional
and also the CHR filed a motion to intervene arguing the penalty is cruel
degrading and inhuman.
4. Respondent are Secretary of Justice, Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, branch 104.
5. Action of Respondents: Public respondents, Secretary of Justice and
Director of the Bureau of Corrections were delegated to carry out the
execution by lethal injection of the convict in consultation with the
Department of Health.
ISSUE Whether or not the impending execution on the petitioner entitles him the
right to obtain a copy of the warrant of execution which is a matter of public
concern.
RULING Yes, the impending execution on the petitioner entitles him the right to
obtain a copy of the warrant of execution which is a matter of public concern.
The Constitution provides that, the right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be recognized.
In the case at bar, it is the Court that determines, in a case to case basis,
whether the matter at issue is of interest relating to the public. The records
reveal that the Court compelled the trial court to provide the petitioner a
copy of the warrant of execution bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow him to reveal or announce the
contents thereof particularly the date fixed to the public when requested.
Therefore, death convict has the right to obtain a copy of the manual in
administering the lethal injection
FOOTNOTE 200
CASE TITLE Francisco I. Chavez v PCGG, Magtanggol Guinigundo, et. al.
DATE December 9, 1988; G.R. No. 130716
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1. Petitioner is Francisco I. Chavez, taxpayer, citizen, and former government

official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies
committing unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic
subjugation of the country's economy.
2. Petitioner invoked his constitutional right to information and the correlative
duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving national
interests.
3. Petitioner sought to prohibit and enjoin respondents from privately entering
into any agreement with the heirs of ex-Pres. Marcos relating to the properties
and assets and to compel respondents to make public all negotiations.
4. Respondents are the PCGG, Magtanggol Gunigundo in his capacity as Chairman
of the PCGG.
5. Respondents did not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
heirs. They claimed, though, that petitioner’s claim is premature because there
is no showing that he asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and
agreement.
ISSUE Whether or not public disclosure of negotiations and agreements can be invoked
by the petitioner as guaranteed by the Constitution
RULING No, public disclosure of negotiations and agreements cannot be invoked by the
petitioner as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Constitution states the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
In the case at bar, the Ethical Standards Act prohibits public officials and
employees from using or divulging “confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public.”
This is one of the reasonable limitations to the right provided for by the
Constitution.
Therefore, public disclosure of negotiations and agreements cannot be invoked by

the petitioner as guaranteed by the Constitution.
FOOTNOTE 201
CASE TITLE Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250
DATE July 9, 2002
PONENTE Justice Antonio Carpio
FACTS 1.Petitioner: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, a taxpayer.
2. Action of Petitioner: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to
disclose all facts on PEA’s on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to
enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
3. Subject/Object: In 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of 50% of the reclaimed land.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a violation of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations.
4. Respondents: Public Estates Authority and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION. (PEA was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas
and to develop, improve, acquire lease and sell and all kinds of lands)
5. Action of Respondents: PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to

institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without
a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the
Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete
injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA). Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
ISSUE Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiation before a final agreement.
RULING Yes, the constitutional right to information includes official information on ongoing
negotiation before a final agreement.
Section 7 of Art. III of the Constitution states that, the right of the people to information
on matters of public concerns shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern and the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens are two constitutional rights
involved. PEA cites Chavez vs PCGG to argue that, in ongoing negotiations, the right to
information is limited to definite government propositions. AMARI also holds that the said
right cannot be invoked before the transaction is completed.
Contrary to AMARI’s argument, the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

understood that the right to information covers negotiations leading to transaction’s
completion. This right affects three types of information: a) official records; b) documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and c) government
research matters recognized as privileged information are not covered by the right.
Therefore, the constitutional right to information includes official information on ongoing

negotiation before a final agreement.
Footnote 203
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Case Title OMBUDSMAN, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR., MARY ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC
AND JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacity as Chairman and Members of the
Panel, respectively, respondents
Date June 27, 2001, GR No. 135882
Ponente Justice Bernardo P. Pardo
1. Lourdes T. Marquez, petitioner.
2. Marquez filed for declaratory relief to clear the rights of petitioners under the
bank secrecy law.
3. Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank Julia Vargas, received an Order from
Ombudsman to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera. The Ombudsman wanted to conduct such in camera inspection on the
accounts based on a trail of manager’s checks by a certain Trivinio who
purchased 51 managers checks for a total amount of P272M. Marquez agreed to
the inspection. Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman saying that the accounts in
Facts
question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the
order. The Ombudsman replied that the Bank should have preserved records
despite the accounts being dormant.
4. Honorable Aniano A. Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman, Angel C.

Mayor-Algo, Jr., Mary Ann Corpuz-Manalac and Jose T. De Jesus, JR., in their
capacity as Chairman and Members of the Panel, respondents.
5. Ombudsman issued order to direct Marquez to produce the bank documents

due to the unjustified delay by the Bank since the in camera inspection had
already been extended twice.
Whether or not the in camera inspection orders are allowed as an exception to
Issue
the bank secrecy law.
No. The in camera inspection is not allowed.
The Constitution provides that the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
In the present case, the order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera
inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia
Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the
Ruling
Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec.
3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates
Authority and AMARI. There is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the
Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to
fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with
the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would
warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Therefore, the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the

accounts is not an allowable exception of R.A. No. 1405.
Footnote 205
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E.
CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented
Case Title
by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners vs COMELEC, et. al,
respondents.
Date May 4, 2007, G.R. No. 177271
Ponente Justice Cancio Garcia
1. Bantay Republic Act Or Ba-Ra 7941, Represented By Mr. Ameurfino E. Cinco,
Chairman, and Urban Poor For Legal Reforms (UP-LR), Represented By Mrs.
Myrna P. Porcare, Secretary-General, petitioners.
2. There are 2 consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus involved in

this case. In the first petition, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and
the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously
determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the “Party-List System Act” and
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent. In the second petition, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-
0724 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names
of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups
mentioned in petitioner Rosales‘ previous letter-request.
3. Petitioner Rosales sent a letter to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec‘s

Law Department requesting a list of that groups‘ nominees. Another letter was
sent but to no avail. Thereafter, Manila Bulletin carried the front-page banner
Facts headline “COMELEC WON‘T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES”, with the following
sub-heading: “Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented.”
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in
their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to
the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales‘
earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees.
Unknown to Rosales et,al. was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-
0724 virtually declaring the nominees‘ names confidential and in net effect
denying petitioner Rosales‘ basic disclosure request.
4. COMELEC, et. al, respondents.
5. On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto,
a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Subsequent
events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to
Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees
sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees
Whether or not the Comelec is correct in refusing to disclose the names of the
Issue
nominees of party-list organizations.
Ruling No. The Comelec was wrong in refusing to disclose the names of the nominees
of party-list.
In the present case, Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in herein petitions.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
Therefore, insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are

impressed with merit.
Footnote 206
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to
Case Title the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
Date April 24, 1985, GR No. L-63915
Ponente Justice Venicio T. Escolin
1. Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity And Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI], petitioners.
2. Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive
Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders,
General Orders, Letters of Implementation, and Administrative Orders.
Petitioners contended that the issue touches the public and thereby does not
require any special circumstance to institute an action.
3. Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a

number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law.
The government argued that while the publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was “otherwise provided”, as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
In the decision of this case, the Court affirmed the necessity for publication of
some these decrees.
Specifically, the petitioners ask the following questions:
(a) What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability”?

(b) Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
Facts
laws which are not?
(c) What is meant by “publication”?
(d) Where is the publication to be made?
(e) When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggests that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
with forthwith in the Official Gazette.
4. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, In His Capacity As Executive Assistant To The President,

Hon. Joaquin Venus, In His Capacity As Deputy Executive Assistant To The
President , Melquiades P. De La Cruz, In His Capacity As Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, In His Capacity As Director, Bureau Of
Printing, respondents.
5. In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that
the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be
dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided”
in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in
the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in
only by three justices and consequently not binding. Respondents stated that
the petitioners have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus.
Issue Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.
Ruling Yes. Publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.
In the present case, the Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents
to publish the Executive Issuances of general application, and further stated that
failure for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and effect.
It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal
maxim known as ignorantia legis non excusat. Failure to publish would make
create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for transgression of the law
which he had no notice.
Therefore, the Court declared that Presidential Issuances with general

application without publication would be inoperative and null and void
FOOTNOTE 207
CASE TITLE Dominador C. Baldoza v Hon. Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano
DATE May 5, 1976; A.M. No. 1120-MJ
PONENTE Justice Antonio
FACTS 1. Complainant is Dominador C. Baldoza, the Municipal Secretary of Taal,

Batangas. She filed a complaint against respondent Judge.
2. Complainant raised respondent’s abuse of authority in refusing to allow

employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket
records of the Municipal Court to secure data pertaining to the peace and
order of the municipality.
3. Subject/Object: Respondent Judge contended that the lower court has

unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its
records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the
person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest
but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite
or to promote public scandal.
4. Respondent is Hon. Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano of Taal, Batangas.
5. Respondent reasoned that court records are among public documents

open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by
other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the
same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where
and how they may be inspected.
Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the
ISSUE inspection of the docket books infringed upon the right of individuals to
information.
No. The rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of
the docket books does not infringe the right of individuals to information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records and to documents and

papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions shall be afforded
the citizens.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the respondent did not act arbitrarily
in the premises. It is under the respondent’s prerogative to see that the
information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it. Restrictions on access to certain records may
be imposed by law to control civil insurrection.
Hence, the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection
of the docket books does not infringe the right of individuals to information.
Footnote 208
Case Title ALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Date May 29, 1987, GR No. L-72119
Ponente Justice Irene Cortes
1. Alentin Legaspi, petitioner.
2. Petitioner requested from the Civil Service Commission information on the

civil service eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of
Cebu City. The Commission rejected the request, asserting that Legaspi was not
entitled to the information. Legaspi instituted an action for mandamus from the
Court to require that the information be provided.
3. The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public

concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Facts Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles
who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
4. Civil Service Commission, respondent.
5. The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to the Court’s giving

due course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon
the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed
of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls
attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the
information he seeks.
Whether or not the petitioner has legal to access government records to
Issue
validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees.
Yes. Petitioner has legal interest to access government records to validate the
civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees.
The Constitutions provides that the right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
In the present case, the Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec.
6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions recognize the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Further, they specify that information
shall be provided, subject only to limitations provided by law. While the Solicitor
Ruling General interposed a procedural objection challenging the requester’s standing
in this petition for mandamus, the Court ruled that, in this case, the people are
regarded as the “real party in interest” and the requester, as a citizen interested
in the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in
the result. Further, government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern because the Constitution
guarantees access to information of public concern, a recognition of the
essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. That is, the
government agency denying information access has the burden to show that the
information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
information has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
Therefore, the petition was granted by the Court and ordered the Civil Service
Commission to provide the information.
FOOTNOTE 210
CASE TITLE Volkschel Labor Union v Bureau of Labor Relations, et. al.
DATE June 19, 1985; G.R. No. L45824 (137 SCRA 42)
PONENTE Justice Serafin Cuevas
FACTS 1. Petitioner was once affiliated with the Associated Labor union for Metal
Workers (ALUMETAL for short). Petitioner and ALUMETAL used the name
Volkschel Labor Union.
2. Volkschel Labor Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with

respondent companies. Consequently, major of the petitioner-Union’s
members decided to disaffiliate from the respondent federation in order
to operate on its own as an independent labor group pursuant to the
Labor Code.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners contended that a local union, being a separate

and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members
including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant.
4. Respondents are the Bureau of Labor Relations, Associated Labor Union for
Metal Workers, DMG, Inc., People’s CAR, Inc., Karbayan Inc., and RTC
Trading Inc.
5. Respondent company RTC Trading Inc. agreed to make payroll deductions

twice a month for the membership dues and other fees or fines as duly
authorized by the Union. All the deduction were transmitted to the Union
Treasurer.
Whether or not petitioner union’s disaffiliation from respondent federation

ISSUE valid?
Yes, petitioner union’s disaffiliation from respondent federation is valid.
Under the Constitution, the right of the people to form unions and
associations shall not be abridged.
In the case at bar, it is against the spirit of the labor law to restrict petitioner’s
right to self-organization. This right is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee to freedom of association. Withdrawal from the federation is not
prohibited. The right of a labor union to disaffiliate from the mother union
or from the federation is well-settled.
Therefore, petitioner union’s disaffiliation from respondent federation is
valid.
Footnote 213
CASE: PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP V NLRC AND PHILIPS
EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION GR NO 188957
DATE: JUNE 25, 1992
PONENTE: DAVIDE JR., J.:
FACTS:
1. PETITIONER: PHILIPS INDSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INCORPORATED
2. FILED A PETITION AGAINST NLRC AND PHILIPS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION
3. ALLEGING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT SERVICE
ENGINEERS, SALES REPRESENTATIVES AND CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES ARE QUALIFIED TO BE PART OF EXISTING BARGAINING
UNIT.
4. NLRC AND PHILIPS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION
5. NLRC RENDERED DECISION THAT THE SERVICE ENGINEERS, SALES
REPRESENTATIVES AND CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ARE QUALIFIED
TO BE PART OF EXISTING BARGAINING UNIT.
ISSUE:
WON SERVICE ENGINEERS, SALES REPRESENTATIVES AND CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES ARE QUALIFIED TO BE PART OF EXISTING BARGAINING UNIT?
B- No. SERVICE ENGINEERS, SALES REPRESENTATIVES AND

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO BE PART OF
EXISTING BARGAINING UNIT.
L- ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE, INCLUDING
THOSE EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR, TO FORM
UNIONS, ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCITIES FOR PURPOSE NOT CONTRARY TO
LAW SHALL NOT BE ABRIDGED.
A- IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE INCLUSION OF THE SERVICE ENGINEERS,
SALES REPRESENTATIVES AND CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES TO BE
PART OF EXISTING BARGAINING UNIT, THEIR AFFILIATION TO THE
UNION WILL NOT ASSURE THEIR LOYALTY TO IT IN VIEW OF EVIDENT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST, MAKING INCLUSION CONTRARY TO LAW (ART
245 OF LABOR CODE).
C-Thus, SERVICE ENGINEERS, SALES REPRESENTATIVES AND
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO BE PART OF EXISTING
BARGAINING UNIT..
Footnote 215
Case Title: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC,
BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 85279
Date: July 28, 1989
Ponente: Justice Irene Cortes
Facts: Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can
enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the
striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the
Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building.
the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more
of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the
children’s allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries
of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court,
which had jurisdiction over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employees have the right to strike
Ruling: No. Government employee have the right to form union but not to strike. The
Constitution provides that the right of the people including those employed in the public and
private sectors to form unions, association, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. In the instant case, the employees of the SSS are government employees,
thus, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being
prohibited by law. Therefore, the strike being made by the SSSEA is contrary to law and it was
not valid.
Footnote 218
CASE DIGEST PAPER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
CASE TITLE: In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1),DATE: December 20, 2001
PONENTE: FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioner IBP Board of Governors
2. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
3. For stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of
Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining
to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same.
4. Respondent: Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines
5.
6. Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
RULING:
A – NO, the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
L – As constitution provides the right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
A - The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fee as one of the requirements.
C – Therefore, The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in
violation of his constitutional freedom to associate.
FOOTNOTE 219
CASE TITLE BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'

UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE
WORKERS' UNION, Defendant-Appellant
DATE September 12, 1974
PONENTE Justice Calixto Zaldivar
FACTS 1. Defendant-Appellant: ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION
2. The Union appealed directly to this Court and raised the following to wit:
a. The Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations;
b. That RA No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which
ban their members from joining labor unions;
c. That a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining agreement
cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the
amendment introduced by RA No. 3350 and that unless Republic Act
No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country
would be wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or employ
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor
organizations.
Note! RA 3350 Amended par. 4 Subsection (a) of Sec. 4 of RA 875 That nothing in
this Act or in any Act or statute of the Republic of the Philippines shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Section
twelve, but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.
3. Subject/Object: The Court of First Instance's decision of prohibiting

defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff-
Benjamin Victoriano from his present employment and sentencing the
defendant to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of
such action
4. Plaintiff-Appellee: BENJAMIN VICTORIANO
5. Contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form
lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right
not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience
does not allow his membership therein
Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on
ISSUE freedom of association?
No. Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the constitutional provision on
RULING freedom of association.
Constitution dictates that the right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private sectors to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In the case at bar, dissociating from or not joining a labor union because
they are members of Iglesia Ni Cristo which prohibits affiliation of their
members in any such labor unions, despite close shop agreements is not
violative of the constitutional provision on freedom of association as provided
in Republic Act No. 3350 because members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers.
Therefore, freedom of association was not violated by RA No. 3350.

FOOTNOT 227 (A)
E
CASE TITLE Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip v The City of Pasig, et. al.
DATE January 23,2006; G.R. No. 136349
PONENTE Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez
FACTS 1. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of
land, 4,521 square meters, located at Pasig City, Metro Manila.
2. Petitioner, after being notified of the intention to expropriate a portion of

her property, replied that the area of her lot is neither sufficient not
suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.” Petitioner appealed to the CA after her motion for dismissal
was denied by the RTC.
3. Subject/Object: Pursuant to an Ordinance enacted by the SB of Pasig, the
respondent intended to expropriate a portion of the petitioner’s property
for sports and development and recreational activities.
4. Respondent are the City of Pasig, Hon. Marietta A. Legaspi, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Pasig City Branch 165, and the CA.
5. Respondent filed with the trial court an order for the condemnation of the
property and the court decided the case in their favour.
ISSUE Whether or not the LGU of Pasig City has an inherent power to expropriate.
RULING No, the LGU has no inherent power to expropriate.
Constitution states that the private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
In the case at bar, the City of Pasig has no inherent power of eminent domain.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of the government unless the
exercise is delegated. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is a “genuine necessity” and this necessity must be of a public character. With
this in view, the respondent failed to establish a genuine necessity to justify
the condemnation of her property.
Therefore, LGU of Pasig City has no inherent power to expropriate.

Footnote 229
CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, Petitioner, v. V.M. REALTY
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DATE: July 20, 1998 G.R. No. 127820
PONENTE: JUSTICE ARTEMIO PANGANIBAN,
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: Municipality of Parañaque
2. Action of the Petitioner: Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for
expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land
(Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000
square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700.
3. Subject/ Object: Alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes
for the homeless through a socialized housing project, petitioner pursuant to its Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated
sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept.
4. Respondent: V.M. REALTY CORPORATION
5. Respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defense and a counterclaim, alleging in
the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to
a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993
is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff.
RULLING:
NO, the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a
substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff is not meritorious.
Under the constitution, Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In the instant case, there is no such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Parañaque
enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain.
The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action. There was lack of compliance with sec. 19,
R.A. 7160, where the Municipal Mayor filed a complaint for eminent domain over two parcel
of land on the strength of a resolution passed by the Sanggunian Bayan, because what is
required by law is an ordinance.
Therefore, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but
"inferior" domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
FOOTNOTE 241
CASE TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
DATE G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
PONENTE REYES, J. B. L., J.:
FACTS 1. PLAINTIFF: The People of the Philippines
2. Action of PLAINTIFF: Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with
violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building
without permit from the mayor.
3. Subject/Object: Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with

violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building
without permit from the mayor. After his incumbency, Fajardo applied
for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the
town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied due to the reason that it
“hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the public
plaza”.Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of
Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur
which penalizes a person who constructs a building without permit from
the mayor.
4. Defendant : Juan Fajardo incumbent mayor of the municipality of Baao,
5. Action of Respondents: Appellants proceeded with the construction of the

building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and
hitherto they had been living on leased property.
WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of
ISSUE property.
RULING No. Ordinance No. 7 is not valid exercise police power in its regulation of
property.
According to the Law, Private property shall not be taken for public use
In the case at bar, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it

operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellants property without just compensation
Therefore, Ordinance No. 7 is not valid.
242
CASE: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and
RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-60077
DATE: January 18, 1991
PONENTE: Justice Abdulwahid Bidin
FACTS:
Petitioners: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government owned and controlled
entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is vested with the power of eminent
domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction,
operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the
Philippines.
Petitioners Action: National Power Corporation (NPC) seeking the reversal or
modification of the March 9, 1986 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 54291-R
entitled "National Power Corporation v. Sps. Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit",
affirming the December 4, 1972 Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2709, entitled National Power Corporation v. Matias
Cruz, et al.
Object/Subject: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,
plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia
Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax declarations Nos.
907, 4281 and 7582, respectively. As the construction will be completed the private
respondents will be limited to plant not higher than 3 meter below the transmission lines.
Respondents: SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents Action: Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent
domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said
portion of their land, subject however to payment of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the property is entitled to a just compensation.
RULING:
YES, the owner of the property is entitled to a just compensation.
Article 9 of the constitutions provides, private property shall not be taken for public use
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain, nevertheless the imposition of that below said transmission lines, no plant
higher than 3 meters is allowed deprives defendants of their proprietary rights.
Thus, the owner of the property is entitled to a just compensation.
FOOTNOTE 258
CASE TITLE Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc., et. al. v Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
DATE July 14, 1989; G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343)
PONENTE Justice Isagani Cruz

FACTS 1. Petitioners are the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.,
Juanito D. Gomez, and others. They invoked their right of retention to
own rice and corn lands as long as they are cultivating or intended to
cultivate.
2. Petitioners challenged the actual taking of their private agricultural lands

depriving them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment; thus, they should
be entitled the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners contended that the owners of the expropriated

properties to accept just compensation would be in the form of money,
which is the only medium of payment allowed.
4. Respondent is the Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
5. Public respondent argued that P.D. No. 27 removed any right of retention
from persons who owned agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares. And
because vast areas of agricultural lands will be expropriated and the
government is aware of its financial limitations that there would not be
enough money to pay in cash, balance payments will be made in shares of
stock, bonds, negotiable at any time.
Whether or not petitioner’s contention is right that cash is the only medium
ISSUE of payment in attaining just compensation.
No, petitioner’s contention is not right that cash is the only medium of
payment in attaining just compensation.
Under the Constitution, private property shall not be taken for public use
In the case at bar, expropriation in the agrarian reform under the CARP law is
a revolutionary kind. The expropriation will not only affect small segment but
all private agricultural landowners of the entire Philippines. Because the cost
will be so tremendous if the compensation will be paid fully in cash, the CARP
law allows payment partly in cash and partly in shares of stock, LBP bonds, tax
credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Therefore, the petitioner’s contention is not right that cash is the only
medium of payment in attaining just compensation.
FOOTNOTE 269
CASE TITLE Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht v Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al.
DATE May 20, 1998; G.R. No. 108015
PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS 1. Petitioners are Cristina De Knecht and son Rene Knecht. Petitioners owned
a parcel of land, 8,102 sq. meters, covered by the expropriation.
2. Petitioners questioned the public auction of the Treasurer of Pasay after

they failed to pay the real state taxes. The Knechts only learned about it
upon receipt of the orders after they failed to redeem the property at
the auction.
3. Subject/Object: The parcel had been subjected to several conveyances

after the auction of the treasurer of Pasay. The petitioners challenged
the validity of the orders of the land of registration, the sell from the
Sangalangs to the Barbieras, to the Salem Investment Corporation and
Spouses Nocom; thereby intervening in the just compensation of the
expropriation.
4. Respondents are the Hon CA, Hon. Manuel Dumatol as Judge of RTC, two
other judges of the RTC of Pasay, Spouses Nocom, Salem Investment
Corporation, Spouses Babiera, and Spouses Sangalang.
5. Spouses Nocom and Salem Investment Corporation were paid just

compensation for the expropriated property. The CA dismissed the
appeal of the Knechts for lack of legal interest.
Whether or not the Knechts are entitled to the payment of just compensation
ISSUE the land subject of this case.
No. The Knechts are no longer entitled to the payment of just compensation
RULING of the land subject of this case.
The Constitution dictates that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
In the case at bar, the Knechts no longer have any legal interest in the
property because at the time of the expropriation their claim of ownership
had already been resolved and put to rest. They are no longer entitled to be
impleaded as parties or to payment of just compensation. The Knecht’s
possession of the land and buildings was based on their claim of ownership
not on any juridical title as lessee, mortgagee, or vendee.
Therefore, the Knechts are no longer entitled to the payment of just

compensation of the land subject of this case.
Footnote 279
CASE TITLE: CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA, ALL
SURNAMED SERRANO, respondents.
DATE: June 20, 2001 G.R. No. 142304
PONENTE: JUSTICE VICENTE V. Mendoza,
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: the City Council of Manila enacted the Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo, covered by TCT Nos.
70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold
and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the
City of Manila.
2. Action of the petitioner: City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against
the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202
and 138273.
3. Subject/ Object: the City Council of Manila enacted the Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo, covered by TCT Nos.
70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold
and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the
City of Manila.
4. Respondent: Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed are
Serrano
5. Action of the respondent: Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the expropriation of Lot l-C would render respondents, who are actual
occupants thereof, landless; that Lot l-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279
provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in
highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriations; that respondents would only receive
around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot l-C which consists of only 343.10 square
meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of the entire residential
land but only that in excess of 300 square meters.
ISSUE:
1. WON prior determination of existence of public purpose is necessary before the issuance of
writ possession.
RULLING:
NO, the determination of existence of public purpose is not necessary before the issuance of
writ possession.
Under the constitution, Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In the instant case, the law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition
precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession. Therefore, premature for the court of
appeals to insist on findings whether the petitioner resorted to the other modes of
acquisition provided in RA 7279. This hearing, is not a hearing to determine if a writ of
possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the requirements for
socialized housing. Once the requisites above are complied with, then the writ of possession
shall issue as a ministerial duty.
Therefore, petitioner’s contention in determination of existence of public purpose is not
necessary before the issuance of writ possession.

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Footnote No.

PONENTE: Justice Reynato Puno

DATE March 27, 1985; G.R. No. L-68828

PONENTE Justice Venicio Escolin

In the case at bar, the restriction imposed is established in the interest of

Therefore, disallowing petitioners’ entry to St. Jude Chapel is not a violation of

Under the Constitution, No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

DATE August 12, 1959; G.R. No. L-13954

PONENTE Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor

FACTS 1. Petitioners-appellants are Genaro Gerona and others. They belong to

2. Petitioners’ children attending community school in Masbate refused to

4. Respondents-appellees are the Hon. Secretary of Education and others.

FOOTNOTE 179, 181, 185

CASE TITLE Alejandro Estrada v Soledad S. Escritor

DATE August 4, 2003; A.M. No. P-02-1651

PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno

4. Respondent is Soledad S. Escritor, court interpreter of the above station.

Constitution provides that no law shall be made respecting an establishment

In the instant case, firstly, freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to

Therefore, voluntarism in religion is protected by the establishment clause.

RULING Yes, freedom of choice is protected by the free exercise clause.

Constitution provides that no law shall be made respecting an establishment

In the present case, free exercise clause principally guarantees voluntarism.

The constitution provides that No law shall be made respecting an

In the case at bar, respondents action of making there cohabitation valid by

CASE TITLE Fortunato R. Pamil v Hon. Victoriano C. Teleron, et. al.

DATE November 20, 1978; G.R. No. L-34854

PONENTE Justice Enrique Medina Fernando

FACTS 1. Petitioner-Appellant is Fortunato R. Pamil, an aspirant for the position of

2. Petitioner filed a suit to disqualify respondent Fr. Gonzaga based on Section

4. Respondents are Hon. Victorino C. Teleron, Judge of the CFI of Bohol,

ISSUE Whether or not an ecclesiastical person is eligible to an elective municipal

RULING No, an ecclesiastical person is not eligible to an elective municipal position.

Constitution provides that the free exercise clause without discrimination or

In the case at bar, the question on the constitutionality of the provision

Thus, an ecclesiastical person is not eligible to an elective municipal position.

RULING FOUND AT DEAN’S BOOK:

RULING FOUND AT DEAN’S BOOK:

RULING FOUND AT DEAN’S BOOK:

PONENTE Justice Irene Cortes

DATE April 8, 1991; G.R. No. 94284

PONENTE Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera

FACTS 1.Petitioner: Ricardo C. Silverio

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals

3. Subject/Object: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of

PONENTE Justice Florenz D. Regalado

FACTS 1.Petitioner: MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

2. Action of Petitioner: A “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from

3. Subject/Object: A criminal case was filed against petitioner with the

4. Respondents: CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA

5. Action of Respondents: The Ombudsman filed a manifestation that alleged

The Sandiganbayan acted on the manifestation and set Miriam

The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by

In the case at bar, the hold departure order is an exercise of a respondent

Therefore, the hold-departure order does not violates petitioner’s right to

PONENTE Justice Jose Catral Mendoza

FACTS 1.Petitioner: Imelda Marcos Romualdez

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a

A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the

Therefore, the petitioner was not denied of her right to travel.

DATE October 12, 1998

PONENTE Per Curiam