Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Author(s): Susan Martin

Source: Global Governance , July-Sept. 2010, Vol. 16, No. 3, International Migration
(July-Sept. 2010), pp. 397-414
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29764954

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Global Governance 16 (2010), 397-414

Climate Change,
Migration, and Governance
^^^^^^^^^^^^^ W """a"-*"^

Susan Martin

There is growing recognition that the effects of climate change are

lead to more migration, both internally and internationally, in the
near future. These climate change-induced migrations are likel
new challenges to the international system, ranging from an incr
regular migration, to strains on existing asylum systems, to protect
for certain migrants affected. Yet the legal and normative frame
institutional roles and responsibilities, relating to climate change
migration remain poorly developed. This article provides an overvi
interactions between climate change and migration, outlines the cur
ternational response, and considers new approaches to the glob
nance framework. Keywords: climate change, migration, asylum.

AS EARLY AS 1990, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIM

(IPCC) warned that significant levels of migration could occur
changing climatic conditions.1 The concept of environmental mi
to be a controversial one, largely because of the difficulty in me
tent to which environmental factors compel people to move. Si
when the term environmental refugees was coined, experts with
mental and migration fields have differed in their characterizati
nomenon. Oli Brown puts those concerned with the interconne
groups?alarmists and skeptics.2 The alarmists see the environmen
pal cause of population movements, emphasize the forced nature
tion (thus, using the term "refugee"), and often project that hundr
of persons will be affected, frequently without differentiating bet
will move short distances to safer ground versus those who will m
of miles to new countries. The skeptics, by contrast, raise ques
models used to generate estimates of those who will be forced t
emphasize that pull factors in destination locations are often m
than push factors at home in determining whether, where, and i
people will migrate. Perhaps not surprisingly, some environment
particularly alarmist, often using the threat of mass migration
immediate action should be taken to address climate change and
mental problems. Migration experts, concerned about a pot
against migrants and misuse of terms like "refugee," which is ca
in international law, have tended to join the camp of the skeptics

397

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 398 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Recognizing the complexity in determining causality, and the broader con?

text in which the environment affects population movements, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) has offered the following broad definition of
environmental migrants: "Environmental migrants are persons or groups of
persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the en?
vironment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to
leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or perma?
nently, and who move either within their country or abroad."3
Policymakers have been slow, however, to develop national, regional, or
international laws, policies, or organizational responsibilities?that is, a system
of governance?to manage environmentally induced migration. This situation
derives in part from uncertainties about the actual impacts of the environment,
particularly as exacerbated by climate change, on migration. But even where
there is a recognition that some form of migration related to environmental
change is likely to occur, addressing these movements is hampered by the paucity
of policy or institutional responses that are deemed appropriate to these forms
of migration.
This article begins with a brief discussion of the potential impact of climate
change on migration patterns. I continue with an examination of existing capac?
ities to address these forms of movement, discussing gaps in governance. I con?
clude with recommendations for addressing climate change-induced migration.

Climate Change and Migration

While new research is emerging on the relationship between climate change
and migration,4 without such basic information as how many people are likely
to move, from where to where, and for how long, developing an appropriate
policy framework is exceedingly difficult.
It appears that there are four paths, in particular, by which environmental
change may affect migration either directly or, more likely, in combination
with other factors:

1. Intensification of natural disasters, such as hurricanes and cyclones that

destroy housing and livelihoods and require people to relocate for
shorter or longer periods;
2. Increased warming and drought that affects agricultural production, re?
ducing people's livelihoods and access to clean water;
3. Rising sea levels that render coastal areas uninhabitable; and
4. Competition over natural resources that may lead to conflict, which in
turn precipitates displacement.5

Vulnerability or resilience to these situations?that is, the capability to cope

or adapt to them?will determine the degree to which people are forced to

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 Susan Martin 399

migrate. The availability of alternative livelihoods or other coping capacities

in the affected area generally determines the scale and form of migration that
may take place. For slow-onset events, such as intensified drought and rising
sea levels, as compared to such natural disasters as hurricanes, cyclones, and
typhoons, or human disasters, such as conflict, the urgency to migrate may be
less pressing since the environment and the harms associated with it change
more slowly. But if alternative livelihoods are not available within a reason?
able time frame for the would-be migrant, then migration may be the best or
only option available, even in slow-onset situations.
It is important to keep in mind that migration can have positive as well
as negative consequences for the affected populations and the communities
to which they migrate. The negative impacts stem particularly from emer?
gency mass movements, generally those related to the rapid-onset natural
disasters and to competition for resources that may result in conflict. These
movements most closely resemble refugee movements and often require
large-scale humanitarian assistance. The negative impacts may also be more
extreme if receiving communities, particularly urban areas, are unprepared
to absorb large numbers of spontaneous migrants. The more positive im?
pacts occur when migration is a voluntary coping strategy that allows people
time to weigh alternatives and use migration as a way to reduce household
risk.6
It is also important to keep in mind that climate change-induced migra?
tion is not a single event. Different issues arise at each stage of environmental
migration. The first stage is premigration, when actions to prevent, mitigate,
and help individuals adapt to environmental hazards take place. Prevention of
the underlying causes of environmentally induced migration is the most criti?
cal need in managing the issues covered in this article, but it will require con?
siderable political will, time, and resources to take the steps that are needed to
protect the environment.
Adaptation and disaster risk reduction deal more specifically with migra?
tion. Adaptation refers to "initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability
of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change ef?
fects."7 Disaster risk reduction involves "systematic efforts to analyse and
manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to
hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of
land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events."8
Identifying vulnerabilities is essential in each case since the "characteristics
and circumstances of a community, system or asset. . . make it susceptible to
the damaging effects of a hazard."9 Adaptation and disaster risk reduction can
involve steps to reduce the need for individuals to migrate to get out of harm's
way, or it can involve migration as an adaptation or risk reduction strategy that
allows a community or household to cope with changes and, perhaps, reduce
risk for others.

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400 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Movement is the second stage of the life cycle. Migration can be planned
or spontaneous, involving individuals and households or entire communities.
It can be internal, with people moving shorter or longer distances to find new
homes and livelihoods within their own countries, or it can be international,
with people seeking to relocate to other countries. It can proceed as an orderly
movement of people from one location to another, or it can occur under emer?
gency circumstances. It can be temporary, with most migrants expecting to re?
turn home when conditions permit, or it can be permanent, with most migrants
unable or unwilling to return. Each of these forms of migration requires sig?
nificantly different approaches and policy frameworks. Depending on the spe?
cific situation, the environmental migrants may resemble labor migrants,
seeking better livelihood opportunities in a new location, or they may resem?
ble refugees and internally displaced persons who have fled situations beyond
their individual control.
Most migration occurring from climate change is likely to be internal, al?
though a portion will undoubtedly be international. In the most extreme cases,
particularly in the context of rising sea levels, an entire population of island
nations may need to be relocated. The third stage of the life cycle involves re?
turn or settlement in another location and the integration of migrants. The de?
cision as to whether return is possible involves a range of variables, including
the extent to which the environmental causes?either direct or through other
channels?is likely to persist. Policies in the receiving communities and coun?
tries, depending on whether the migration is internal or international, will also
affect the likelihood for return or settlement in the new location. In addition to
immigration policies, the policies affecting return and settlement include land
use and property rights, social welfare, housing, employment, and other frame?
works that determine whether individuals, households, and communities are
able to find decent living conditions and pursue adequate livelihoods. Integra?
tion is also affected by plans and programs to mitigate future dislocations from
environmental hazards, coming full circle on the life cycle to a focus on pre?
vention, adaptation, and risk reduction.
In this article, I define global governance to include legal frameworks and
institutional roles and responsibilities to manage climate change-induced mi?
gration. I organize the article around the three stages described above: premi
gration, with a particular emphasis on adaptation, movements within borders,
and movements across borders, including (re)settlement and (re)integration of
migrants.

Premigration
The Copenhagen Accord, adopted at the fifteenth session of the Conference of
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Decem?
ber 2009, highlighted the importance of adaptation strategies:

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 Susan Martin 401

Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts
of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and
international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the imple?
mentation of the Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of
adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in
developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, espe?
cially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We
agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustain?
able financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the im?
plementation of adaptation action in developing countries.10

National adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) are the principal mech?

anisms through which low-income developing countries identify adaptation
needs and programs. The governing legal accord is the UN Framework Con?
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that NAPAs "provide a
process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that
respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change those for
which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage."11
As of October 2008, thirty-eight countries had submitted plans.12 NAPAs have
serious limitations as a mechanism for identifying the full range of adaptation
needs and plans. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) assessed NAPAs in
its 2007/2008 Human Development Report:

First, they provide a very limited response to the adaptation challenge, focussing
primarily on "climate-proofing" through small-scale projects. . . . Second, the
NAPAs have, in most countries, been developed outside the institutional frame?
work for national planning on poverty reduction. The upshot is a project-based
response that fails to integrate adaptation planning into the development of
wider policies for overcoming vulnerability and marginalization.13

NAPAs nevertheless remain one of the few planning instruments for

LDCs that are facing the prospect of large-scale dislocations due to climate
change. The Copenhagen conference in December 2009 made some progress
in identifying funding mechanisms to support adaptation initiatives. Paragraph
8 of the Copenhagen Accord specifies:

Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as
improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support en?
hanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emis?
sions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation,
technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced
implementation of the Convention.

The parties to the accord pledged to provide US$30 billion for the period
from 2010 to 2012, with funding allocated between adaptation and mitigation.

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402 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

The most vulnerable developing countries, such as the LDCs, small-island de?
veloping states, and African countries, will be given priority for adaptation
programs. Developed countries also committed to a goal of mobilizing jointly
$100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. To
what extent projects related to migration will be funded is unknown.

Internal Migration
Different systems of global governance pertain to internal and international
movements of people. For the most part, there are no systems of global gov?
ernance that address internal migration, which is an internal matter of state
sovereignty. The limits of sovereignty are not absolute, however. The Univer?
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides clear guidance in Article
13 that "everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state." Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) affirms that "everyone lawfully within the terri?
tory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence." The ICCPR provides certain exceptions:
"The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant." To the extent that climate change produces conditions that under?
mine national security, public order, or public health, which may be the case
in extreme natural disasters or conflict, then governments would have the right
to enact provisions that would require people to move.
A further relevant framework is the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis?
placement and the recently adopted, but not yet in force, African Union (AU)
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa. Internally displaced persons are described as "persons or groups of
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an inter?
nationally recognized State border."
Since the definition encompasses people who are forced to leave their
homes because of natural or human-made disasters, the guiding principles and
AU Convention, when it comes into force, apply to some of those who will mi?
grate as a result of climate change. In fact, the AU Convention explicitly rec?
ognizes that there will likely be displacement from climate change, stating in
Article 4: "States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who
have been internally displaced due to natural or human-made disasters, in?
cluding climate change."

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 Susan Martin 403

The World Bank and the regional development banks have promulgated
guidelines in measuring the adequacy of resettlement plans adopted in the con?
text of large-scale development programs. These guidelines are pertinent to the
management of resettlement in the environmental context. The roles of other
international organizations with regard to internal migration as a result of cli?
mate change are in evolution, much as are the legal frameworks. The most de?
veloped governance structure pertains to situations of forced displacement
from natural disasters and conflict that may be related to climate change. The
UN emergency relief coordinator established a cluster system in 2005 to co?
ordinate relief operations that include natural disasters and conflict. Lead
agencies are assigned to each cluster, which include health, shelter, nutrition,
agriculture, education, camp management, water, sanitation and hygiene, and
protection, particularly of internally displaced persons. Evaluations of the
cluster approach indicate that it has improved coordination but that the clus?
ters vary in their effectiveness.14 Interesting for the purpose of this article, the
protection of persons displaced by factors other than conflict remains an area
without special designation. Although the UN High Commissioner for Refu?
gees (UNHCR) is the designated lead in conflict situations, the lead in cases
of natural disasters and other situations will be determined on a case-by-case
basis. In the event of large-scale displacement from climate change, such an
approach might lead to significant gaps in protection of those who are forced
to migrate.

International Migration

The International Legal and Normative Framework

There are no international instruments that specifically address international
migration stemming from climate change or other environmental factors.
Those migrating because of environmental factors have the same rights and re?
sponsibilities as others who cross international borders. As with other mi?
grants, they enjoy all of the human rights applicable in international law. The
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) define the basic rights of all persons. They include
the right to life, liberty, and security; the right not to be held in slavery or servi?
tude; the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, de?
tention, or exile; freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state; the right to marry and to found a family; and the right to work, free
choice of employment, and just and favorable conditions of work. These rights
are provided without distinction of any kind regarding such things as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori?
gin, property, or birth (Article 2 of the UDHR).

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404 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

Importantly, UDHR Article 13 also declares that "everyone has the right
to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's own coun?
try." The declaration does not require any other country to admit people who
exercise their right to leave. Similarly, UDHR Article 14 states that "everyone
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution,"
but there is no corresponding obligation on the part of states to offer asylum.
A number of countries have ratified conventions sponsored by the Interna?
tional Labour Organization (ILO) specifically protecting the rights of migrants.
Forty-nine countries have ratified the Convention Concerning Migration for
Employment (Revised) No. 97, and twenty-three countries have ratified the
Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion
of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers No. 143. The In?
ternational Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers builds on the ILO's
conventions. It reaffirms basic human rights norms and embodies them in an in?
strument applicable to migrant workers and their families. The underlying goal
of the convention is to guarantee minimum rights for migrant workers and
members of their families who are in either a legal or irregular situation. Its im?
plementation could significantly encourage basic humane treatment of all mi?
grant workers. However, the number of states ratifying the convention is still
disappointingly small.15 No major destination country of migrants has yet
signed the convention, raising further questions about its effectiveness.
The convention defines the rights of migrant workers under two main
headings: "The human rights of migrant workers and members of their fami?
lies" (Part III), which reaffirms the human rights of all migrants regardless of
their legal status, and "other rights of migrant workers" (Part IV), which sets
out additional rights applicant only to migrant workers in a regular situation.
Documented migrants are defined as those "authorized to enter, to stay and en?
gage in a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law
of that State and to international agreements to which that State is a party" (Ar?
ticle 5). To the extent that environmental migrants use such programs, they
would be covered under the provisions of the convention.
Environmental migrants who use irregular means of entry may be covered
under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Es?
pecially Women and Children and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Mi?
grants by Land, Sea and Air, both of which supplement the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and went into force in De?
cember 2003 and January 2004, respectively. Within a few years of their adop?
tion, the trafficking and smuggling protocols have garnered considerable
support, with more than 100 signatories and 67 and 59 parties, respectively.
Some environmental migrants may be covered under the 1951 UN Con?
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.16 The conven?
tion defines refugees as persons who were unable or unwilling to avail
themselves of the protection of their home countries because of a "well-founded

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 Susan Martin 405

fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion

or membership in a particular social group." States have no obligation to admit
refugees, but they do have an obligation not to refoule (return) a refugee to
"frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac?
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion." While few persons seeking protection because of purely
environmental reasons are likely to meet the definition, those fleeing because
of competition for resources arising from climate change may qualify if they
are unable to access resources because of a protected characteristic (i.e., race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opin?
ion). In Africa, the scope of coverage might be greater because the 1969 Or?
ganization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa includes anyone who, "owing to external aggres?
sion, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is com?
pelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another
place outside his country of origin or nationality" (emphasis added). To the ex?
tent that climate change seriously disturbs public order, persons forced to leave
their homes may be covered.
At the national level, immigration laws of most destination countries are
not conducive to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants, unless
they enter through already existing admission categories. Typically, destination
countries admit persons to fill job openings or to reunify with family members.
Employment-based admissions are usually based on the labor market needs of
the receiving country, not the situation of the home country. Family admissions
are usually restricted to persons with immediate relatives (spouses, children,
parents, and, sometimes, siblings) in the destination country.
Humanitarian admissions are generally limited to refugees and asylum
seekers; that is, those who fit the definition in the UN Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees: persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on the
basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Most environmental migrants will be unlikely to meet the
legal definition of a refugee under national law because their coverage is re?
stricted under international law.
Some countries have established special policies that permit individuals
whose countries have experienced natural disasters or other severe upheavals
to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation. The United States,
for example, enacted legislation in 1990 to provide temporary protected status
(TPS) to persons "in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely
return to their home country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environ?
mental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions." Environ?
mental disaster may include "an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other
environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary,

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406 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

disruption of living conditions in the area affected."17 In the case of environ?

mental disasters, as compared to conflict, the country of origin must request
designation of TPS for its nationals.
Importantly, TPS only applies to persons already in the United States at
the time of the designation. It is not meant to be a mechanism to respond to an
unfolding crisis in which people seek admission from outside of the country.
It also only pertains to situations that are temporary in nature. If the environ?
mental disaster has permanent consequences, a designation of TPS is not
available, even for those presently in the United States, or it may be lifted.
When the volcano erupted in Montserrat in 1997, TPS was granted to its citi?
zens and was extended six times. In 2005, however, it was ended because "it
is likely that the eruptions will continue for decades, [and] the situation that
led to Montserrat's designation can no longer be considered 'temporary' as re?
quired by Congress when it enacted the TPS statute."18
Another significant factor is that the designation is discretionary, to be
made by the secretary of homeland security. Countries or parts of countries are
designated, allowing nationals only of those countries to apply. Currently, the
designation is in effect for citizens of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
TPS was originally triggered by the earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001 and
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 in the other countries. It has been extended until 9
September 2010 (El Salvador) and 5 July 2010 (Honduras and Nicaragua).
Notably, TPS was not triggered for the hurricanes that destroyed large parts of
Haiti in 2004 and 2008, although it was granted to Haitians following the
earthquake of 2010. Given the temporary nature of the grant and its applica?
tion only to those already in the country, TPS has only limited utility in ad?
dressing environmentally induced migration.
At the European Union level, the 'Temporary Protection Directive estab?
lishes temporary protection during 'mass influxes' of certain displaced per?
sons. The term 'mass-influx' refers to situations where masses of people are
suddenly displaced and where it is not feasible to treat applicants on an indi?
vidual basis. It was decided that 'mass-influx' was to be defined on a case-by
case basis by a qualified majority of the Council."19
Sweden and Finland have included environmental migrants within their
immigration policies. Sweden includes within its asylum system persons who
do not qualify for refugee status, but have a need for protection. Such a person
in need of protection "has left his native country and does not wish to return
there because he or she: has a fear of the death penalty or torture, is in need of
protection as a result of war or other serious conflicts in the country, [or] is un?
able to return to the native country because of an environmental disaster."20
The decision is made on an individual, not group basis. Although many recip?
ients of this status are presumed to be in temporary need of protection, the
Swedish rules foresee that some persons may be in need of permanent solu?
tions. Similarly, in the Finnish Aliens Act, "aliens residing in the country are

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 Susan Martin 407

issued with a residence permit on the basis of a need for protection if . . . they
cannot return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster."21
A number of countries provide exceptions to removal on an ad hoc basis
for persons whose countries of origin have experienced significant disruption
because of natural disasters. After the 2004 tsunami, for example, Switzerland,
the UK, and Canada suspended deportations of those from such countries as
Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Maldives, Seychelles, Indonesia, and Thailand. A
number of governments announced similar plans after the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no international law that
would compel or even encourage other governments to follow similar policies.
To date, there are no examples of legislation or policies that address mi?
gration of persons from slow-onset climate changes that may destroy habitats
or livelihoods in the future. For the most part, movements from slow-onset cli?
mate change and other environmental hazards that limit economic opportuni?
ties are treated in the same manner as other economically motivated migration.
Persons moving outside of existing labor and family migration categories are
considered to be irregular migrants. In the absence of a strong humanitarian
basis for exempting them from removal proceedings (which is unlikely in the
slow-onset situation), these migrants would be subject to the regular systems
in place for mandatory return to their home countries. Because their immediate
reasons for migrating would be similar to that of other irregular migrants?that
is, lack of economic opportunities at home and better economic opportunities
abroad?there would be little reason for destination countries to manage these
movements outside of their existing immigration rules.

Institutional Roles and Responsibilities

Just as the international legal frameworks for addressing climate change
induced cross-border migration are weak, so are the institutional roles and re?
sponsibilities at both the international and the national levels. With the excep?
tion of the refugee regime, in which clear responsibility is given to the
UNHCR, there is no existing international regime for managing international
movements of people, let alone those compelled to move by the effects of cli?
mate change.
This is not to say that there is a total absence of governance. There is a
plethora of international organizations that have some responsibilities related
to international migration. Perhaps the most important international organiza?
tion in this area is the IOM. The IOM's constitution sets out its role as a service
organization operating on behalf of states. Its first two purposes and functions
pertain to its original role in making arrangements for the transfer of migrants,
refugees, and displaced persons. The IOM would also provide, at the request
of and in agreement with the states concerned, migration services such as re?
cruitment, selection, processing, language training, orientation activities, med?
ical examination, placement, activities facilitating reception and integration,

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408 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

advisory services on migration questions, and other assistance as is in accord

with the aims of the organization. It would also assist in voluntary return mi?
gration, including voluntary repatriation.
The IOM's constitution also gives it a role to provide a forum to states as
well as international and other organizations for the exchange of views and ex?
periences, and the promotion of cooperation and coordination of efforts on in?
ternational migration issues, including studies on such issues in order to develop
practical solutions. With respect to this last function, it has launched a policy di?
alogue with governments on policy issues. Importantly, the organization has ex?
panded significantly in terms of both staff and membership, which includes
more than 130 member states and observers. The IOM has been a focal point for
discussion of environmental migration since 1992 when it cohosted a series of
consultations on the interconnections between the environment and migration,
in the context of the UN Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Since then, the IOM has published working papers
and books on climate change and migration, and worked with UN agencies and
experts to define more precisely the category of environmental migration.
In addition to the IOM, there are a number of agencies within the UN sys?
tem that have responsibilities regarding migration. Among the more signifi?
cant, the ILO has a specialized office, the International Migration Program,
which "provides advisory services to member states, promotes international
standards, provides a tripartite forum for consultations, serves as a global knowl?
edge base, and provides technical assistance and capacity-building to con?
stituents."22 The UN Population Division in the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (DESA) is responsible for collecting data on international migra?
tion and took the lead within the UN Secretariat for organizing the High-Level
Dialogue on Migration and Development. The division also hosts an annual
meeting for coordination of data and research on international migration.
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) sup?
ports the mandates of the UN special rapporteur on the human rights of mi?
grants and the UN special rapporteur on trafficking and services the Committee
on Migrant Workers, the treaty body supervising compliance with the Interna?
tional Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) co?
ordinates activities related to human trafficking and human smuggling, as the
key agency responsible for implementation of the UN Convention Against
Transnational Crime and its smuggling and trafficking protocols. None of these
agencies have evidenced a particular interest in the interconnections between
climate change and the areas of their specific responsibilities.
Recognizing the complex set of organizational responsibilities, the Global
Migration Group (GMG) was established to promote coordination and iden?
tify gaps in the international system. The GMG grew out of an existing inter
agency group, the Geneva Migration Group, established in April 2003 by the

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 Susan Martin 409

heads of the ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UN Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD), UNHCR, and UNODC. In 2006, membership in the Geneva Mi?
gration Group was expanded to include the DESA, UNDP, UN Population
Fund (UNFPA), and World Bank. Following a recommendation by the Global
Commission on International Migration for strengthened coordination, the
group was renamed the Global Migration Group that same year and expanded
to include the UN Regional Commissions, UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UN
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).
While some participants in the GMG have noted that the group has too
large and diverse a membership to be effective, it is still the case that the GMG
is missing representatives who would be useful in gaining progress on issues
related to climate change and migration. The GMG has listed a number of rel?
evant documents pertaining to these issues, including reports from a number
of the member organizations. Yet absent from the GMG are the UN Environ?
ment Programme (UNEP)23 and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, which have
significant interest in these issues. This is unfortunate because UNEP has col?
laborated with members of the GMG on specific projects. Their involvement
in discussions on migration is at least as relevant as those of the other special?
ized agencies that participate in the GMG. To address the concern that the
GMG has grown too large, and has too many members with peripheral inter?
est in migration, it might make sense to invite specialized agencies only when
issues connected to their core agendas are to be discussed in the GMG.

Conclusion
Discussion of policies to manage environmental migration is in its infancy. As
understanding increases of the various ways that environmental change affects
migration patterns, and vice versa, governments are beginning to think through
how to manage the implications of these interconnections. Much of the atten?
tion to date focuses on internal migration, largely in the context of adaptation
strategies and, to a lesser degree, movements that may arise as a result of nat?
ural disasters and climate change-induced conflict. Few potential destination
countries have explicit policies to manage climate change-induced migration,
unless affected populations migrate through the normal immigration policies
that give preference to family reunification and employment-based admis?
sions. While potential destination countries have asylum or resettlement sys?
tems to manage admission of persons who cannot return home because of a
well-founded fear of persecution, none have systems in place to manage ad?
mission of persons who cannot remain or return home because of environ?
mental threats. At best, destination countries have policies to defer deportation
of those coming from countries with natural disasters, but these are generally
postdisaster and ad hoc in their implementation. In sum, no major destination

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410 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

country has a proactive policy designed to resettle persons adversely affected

by environmental hazards.
The system of global governance is at an equal or, perhaps given the paucity
of global governance more generally on migration, greater level of infancy.
The emerging UN systems for responding to internal displacement from con?
flict and natural disasters have not fully engaged issues related to climate
change. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has a website
that focuses on the humanitarian dimensions of climate change,24 but the mate?
rials on climate change-induced migration are rudimentary at best. The GMG
has not taken up these issues to any significant degree, nor have governments
in the state-owned consultative process, the Global Forum on Migration and
Development, although there will be a roundtable on climate change and mi?
gration at its meeting in Mexico in November 2010.
Given the current gaps, more attention needs to be placed on identifying
and testing new frameworks for managing potential movements. Attention
needs to be given to both sides of the environment and migration nexus: iden?
tifying adaptation strategies that allow people to remain where they currently
live and work, and identifying resettlement strategies that protect people's
lives and livelihoods when they are unable to remain. Since internal migration
is the most likely outcome for those affected by climate change and other en?
vironmental hazards, highest priority should be given to policies and programs
aimed at managing these issues within the most affected countries.
Nevertheless, some international migration may well be needed, particu?
larly for the citizens of island nations, necessitating identification of appropri?
ate admissions policies in potential destination countries. Highest priority
should be given to identifying likely patterns of migration. Particular attention
should be placed on identifying who cannot be relocated within their home
countries, either because of widespread habitat destruction (again, as in the
case of certain island states) or because relocation would pose security risks
that could provoke violence or even conflict. Some attention should also be
addressed to the slow-onset situations in which loss of livelihoods generates
emigration pressures. In the absence of legal opportunities to immigrate, at
least some portion of those who lose livelihoods as a result of climate change
and other environmental hazards will likely become irregular migrants. The
challenge in these cases is determining whether these individuals should be
given consideration over others who migrate in search of better opportunities.
There is reason for skepticism that many destination countries will answer this
question in the affirmative. With the exception of their refugee and asylum
policies, countries tend to frame their admissions policies around their own
national interests, prioritizing admission of persons who will contribute to eco?
nomic growth, meet labor shortages, or have close family ties in the destination
country. While exceptions may be made for environmentally induced migrants
whose situation most resembles that of refugees, there is less likelihood that

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 Susan Martin 411

governments will make an exception for those who resemble economic mi?
grants. Yet at least in the case of island states that are affected by rising sea lev?
els, the absence of an appropriate international response could render large
numbers of people stateless because they are unable to remain at home, but
have no legal recourse for entry elsewhere.
In moving toward more coherent frameworks, the lessons of the past will
be useful, particularly in the context of those countries that foresee the possi?
bility that planned resettlement, including international movements, may be
needed. More systematic examination of previous planned resettlement pro?
grams?in the context of transmigration and development projects?would
help ensure that climate change-induced resettlement programs do not fall
victim to problems identified in these initiatives. Michael Cernea cites eight
interrelated risk factors associated with resettlement from development proj?
ects: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity,
increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property, and so?
cial disintegration.25 Under the worst-case scenarios, when the long-term needs
of the relocated have not been taken into account, the displaced have been at
serious risk of "becoming poorer than before displacement, more vulnerable
economically, and disintegrated socially."26
Identification of best-case examples of resettlement?that is, programs that
respected the rights of the resettled and resulted in an improved economic and
social situation?is as important as identification of pitfalls experienced in pro?
grams that failed. Guidelines promulgated to protect those who are involuntar?
ily resettled from development projects or who are displaced from natural
disasters should be examined systematically to determine their applicability to
the resettlement programs proposed by countries fearing the worst conse?
quences of climate change. Technical assistance and training to the ministries
that may be responsible for resettlement is essential to make certain that: (1) all
alternatives are exhausted before people are required to relocate, (2) affected
populations are involved in the planning, and (3) all steps are taken to ensure
appropriate preparations and implementation.
The promulgation of such guidelines and the development of policies to
respond to environmental migration will require new modes of international
cooperation. Given the weak legal and institutional situation today, and the
looming prospect that climate change will significantly contribute to increased
internal and international migration, efforts to build an effective system of
governance should begin soon. Whether a new convention on climate change
related displacement is desirable or, for that matter, feasible are questions that
beg easy answers.27 The history of international conventions related to migra?
tion is a mixed one, determined largely by whether the movements are forced
or voluntary. While the refugee convention and trafficking protocol are widely
ratified, the conventions on labor migrants have had low levels of ratification.
Because climate change-induced migration will likely have elements of both

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412 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

forms of migration, depending on whether the trigger is slow or rapid onset,

the future of such a convention would be questionable.
Beyond feasibility, a number of other issues would need to be addressed
before determining that a new convention is the best way to improve gover?
nance related to climate change-induced migration. First, how should climate
change migrants be defined? For that matter, what term should be used in cat?
egorizing this form of migration, particularly given the other factors that are
usually at play in explaining movements? Would the same approach work for
internal and international movements? Who among those who migrate be?
cause of climate change or related environmental reasons are deserving of in?
ternational protection? And, the list goes on.
The promulgation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
may be a more effective model for addressing the development of international
standards related to climate change-induced migration. The Guiding Princi?
ples built on existing human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law to develop
norms and standards that apply to internally displaced persons. Although they
are not themselves binding, the Guiding Principles bring together pertinent
law in a manner that has allowed governments and international organizations
to set standards that are consistent with international norms. The adoption of
the AU Convention on Internally Displaced Persons, which is based largely on
the Guiding Principles, demonstrates that this approach has given credibility
to the norms established. It is particularly relevant for this article that the AU
Convention has incorporated protection of those displaced by climate change
into its provisions. A similar process that would also address international
movements could be equally effective in developing a legal framework for ad?
dressing climate change and migration. ?

Notes
Susan Martin holds the Donald G. Herzberg chair in international migration and serves
as director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the School of For?
eign Service at Georgetown University. She also directs the university's Program on
Refugees and Humanitarian Emergencies. Her publications include Refugee Women
(2003), The Uprooted: Improving Humanitarian Responses to Forced Migration
(2005), and numerous monographs and articles on immigration and refugee policy.
1. Oli Brown, Migration and Climate Change, Migration Research Series No. 31
(Geneva: International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2008), p. 11.
2. Ibid.
3. IOM, "Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment," 2007, MC/INF/288,
available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/
microsites/IDM/workshops/evolving_global_economy_2728112007/MC_INF_288_EN
.pdf.
4. For example, Vikram Kolmannskog, "Climate Change, Disaster, Displacement,
and Migration: Initial Evidence from Africa," UNHCR Research Paper No. 180
(Geneva: UNHCR, 2009); David Corlett, Stormy Weather: The Challenges of Climate

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 Susan Martin 413

Change and Displacement (Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press,
2010).
5. See Clionadh Raleigh, Lisa Jordan, and Idean Salehyan, Assessing the Impact
of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008);
Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, and Koko Warner, Control, Adapt or
Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration? (Bonn, Germany: United Nations Uni?
versity, 2007); Brown, Migration and Climate Change: Graeme Hugo, Migration, De?
velopment and Environment, Migration Research Series No. 35 (Geneva: IOM, 2008);
Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith, and Richard Black,
Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows, Migra?
tion Research Series No. 33 (Geneva: IOM, 2008).
6. Andrew Morton, Philippe Boncour, and Frank Laczko, "Human Security Pol?
icy Challenges," in Climate Change and Displacement, Forced Migration Review No.
31 (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, October 2008), pp. 5-7.
7. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Fourth Assess?
ment Report: Working Group II Report, "Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Ap?
pendix 1: Glossary," (2007), p. 869, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-app.pdf.
8. UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), "Terminology
on Disaster Risk Reduction," 2009, available at www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/
terminology-2009-eng.html.
9. Ibid.
10. Copenhagen Accord, following the United Nations Climate Change Conference,
December 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/107.pdf.
11. UNFCCC, "Chronological Evolution of LDC Work Programme and Concept
of NAPAs" (2010), available at http://unfccc.int/cooperation_supportAeast_developed_
countries_portal/ldc_work_programme_and_napa/items/4722.php.
12. All NAPAs referenced herein can be accessed at http://unfccc.int/national_
reports/napa/items/2719.php.
13. UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008, chap. 4, "Adapting to the In?
evitable: National Action and International Cooperation," available at http://hdr.undp
.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Chapter4.pdf.
14. Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, Katherine Haver, Dirk Salomons, and Victoria
Wheeler, "Cluster Approach Evaluation" (London: Overseas Development Institute,
2007), pp. 1-2.
15. States parties are Azerbaijan, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burk?
ina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri
Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Turkey, Uganda, and Uruguay.
16. The protocol eliminated geographic (that refugees be from Europe) and time
(pre-1951) limits on the convention, making it a universal document.
17. Immigration Act of November 29, 1990, Public Law 101-649, Section 302.
18. "Termination of the Designation of Montserrat Under the Temporary Protected
Status Program; Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation," Federal
Register 69, no. 128 (6 July 2004).
19. Quoted in Vikram Kolmannskog, "Climate Change-related Displacement and
the European Response," paper presented at Society for International Development Vi
jverberg Session on Climate Change and Migration, The Hague, January 2009, p. 4.
20. Aliens Act (2005:716), issued 29 September 2005, with amendments, up to
and including Swedish Code of Statutes 2009:16; Chapter 4: Refugees and Persons
Otherwise in Need of Protection.

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414 Climate Change, Migration, and Governance

21. Kolmannskog, "Climate Change-related Displacement and the European

Response."
22. UNHCHR, The Global Migration Group, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cmw/GMG.htm.
23. UNEP's program related to climate change and migration has three principal
objectives:
1. Research, hotspot identification and assessment of high priority vulnerable
countries and subnational regions for targeted UNEP assistance on ecosystems
management and climate change adaptation;
2. Awareness raising in the international humanitarian and development commu?
nity of the importance of environmental sustainability in rural development and
its role in forced migration movements; and
3. Country project development to assist in policy direction, plans, and programs
in identified priority countries and subnational regions toward ecosystems man?
agement and climate change adaptation.
24. OCHA, "Climate Change: Coping with the Humanitarian Impact," available
at http://ochaonline.un.org/OCHAHome/InFocus/ClimateChangeHumanitarianImpact/
tabid/5930/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
25. Michael Cernea, "Risks, Safeguards and Reconstruction: A Model for Popula?
tion Displacement and Resettlement," in M. Cernea and C. McDowell, eds., Risks and
Reconstruction: Experiences ofResettlers and Refugees (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2000); Courtland Robinson, Risks and Rights: Causes, Consequences, and Challenges
of Development-induced Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003).
26. Robinson, Risks and Rights, p. 1.
27. For arguments in favor of a convention, see David Hodgkinson, Tess Burton,
Heather Anderson, and Lucy Young, "The Hour When the Ship Comes In': A Con?
vention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change" (2010), available at http://www
.ccdpconvention.com/documents/CCDP_Convention_Summary.pdf.

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