1

Mitsubishi ASM2 Type 0 Carrier Fighter. Model 11.

Sect ion Leader's aircraft. 12th Combined Air Corps.
Henkow. China, SlJplembor 1940 .

2
Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Carrier Fighter, Model 21 .
I - 1st Carrier 'Akagi' , A= 1st Cerrier Division.
Peerl Harbour Attack. Decomber 8th 1941 (Japanese
rim a) .

3
Mitsublsh i A,6M2 Type a Carrier Fighler, Model 2' .
Aifcrafl Carrier 'Akag i', Pearl Habour Attack. Decem·
ber 8th 1941.

4
Mit subis hl ASM2 Type 0 Calrier Fighter, Model 21,
n"" 2nd Cllrlier 'Kaga', A=lst Carrier Division,
Pearl Hnbour Attack, December 8th 194"

r"

5
Mrtsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Ca rrier Fighter, Model 21 .
r = 151 Carrie r 'Soryu ', B = 2nd Carriel Division,
Pearl Harbour Attack, December Sih 1941 .

Mil subishi A6M2 Type 0 Cstrier Fighter, Mod el 21 .

n=2nd Carrier 'Hlryu', B= 2nd Carri er Division,
Pearl Habour AnOlck, December 6t h 1941 ,
 8

1
M il subishi A6M2 Type 0 Carrier Fig hte r, Modol 21 .
1 : 1st CaHiur 'Shokaku', E __ 5th Carrie' Division,
Pen rl Harbour Attack, December STh 194 1.

2
Mltsu bishi AGM2 Type 0 Ceffie, FighTer. Model 21 .
= Si n Carr lor D I.... ,sion.
II = 2nd Cai ne. 'Zulkaku', E
Pearl Harbour Attad:, December 8th 1941.

3
M I15U bishi A6M2 Tvpa 0 Carrier Fig hter. Model 21.
1 = 15\ Carrier ' Yliwalame,u', C = 3 1d Calfier DIVISion.
Solomon Islands, July 1942. n us {;arr ial was sub·
seque ntly 'e-named ' Unyo' in A ugu st 1942 .

•
Mitsubishi AGM2 Type 0 Carrier FighTer. M odel 21.
U = 2nd CaUier 'Kasu(Jem l'llu', C = 3rd Ca rrier
Division. Southern Pacilic AreA, July 1942. ThiS
COlTier was subsequently ,e· n:Jmcd 'Taiyo' In
August 1942.

Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Carrier Fighter. Model 21.

1=1s1 Callier 'HIYo', D=4 1n Carrier ' D ivision,
Solomons, Rabau l Operations. J uly 1942 .

• Mitsobishi A6M2 Type 0 Carrier Fighter, Model 21.

Aircraft Carrier 'Hivo', SOlomons, Aabaul Operations,
JUly 1942.
,
Mlu ubishi A6M2 Type a Carrier righter. Model 21 .
Aircra ft C.urier ' Ayujo', A!eutians InvaSion. june
3-4t h 1942 . Flo wn by Peny Officer Tadayosh, Kog ...
Cl!lSh landed in bog on Akutan Island, Koga killed
In crash, lirst Reisen coplured intact.

I.

2
Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Camer Fighter, Model 21 .
U= 2nd Carrier 'Zuikaku', 1:= 1 51 Can isr Division .
Southern Pacific Arel, October 1942.

Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 eaniel Fight er, Model 21

m= 3rd Carri er 'Zuino', E = 51n
Carrier Div ision,
Southern PaC ific Area, Fall 1942.

4
Milsubish i A6M2 Typo 0 Carrier Fighter, Model 21.
/
Air cra ft Carrier 'Zuiho', Sou l hern Pac ifiC A rea.
Octo ber 1942.

5
Mitsubishl A6M2 Type 0 Cerrier Fighter, M odel 21 .
1= 1 51 Cafflor 'S hokAku', I = lSI Carrier Divisio n,
Sout hern Pacific Operations. October 1942.

6
Mitsubishi A6M2 TVpo 0 Carrier Fighter, Model 21 ,
L = 1st Carrier 'Shokllku', /II.. = lsi CArrier Division,
Aabaul, 3rd Opormion, November 1942.

,.

© WA~~D_
,
Milsubishi A6M2 Tvpe 0 Carrier Fig hter, Mode l 21 .
Trai ni ng A lrcrah Can ier possibly ' Hosho' Summer
1943.

..

2
Milsu blsni A6M2 Type 0 Carrier f ighter, Model 21.
3rd Air Corps. Aabau t, Au gust 1942 .

3
Mitsu bishi A6M2 Type 0 Canier Fig hte r, Modol 21.
3td Air Corps. Ke ndall. Celebes. March 194 2.
Note 11 victory chrysanthe mum blossoms on f in.

Mit.subishl ASM 2 Type 0 Carrier Fighter, Model 21 .

Talnon Air Corps, l ac, New Gu inea. NO\lem ber
1942. Unit later re . desig nated 251 $1 Air Corps.
h. _

Miuubish l A6M 2 Type a Carrier Fighto" Mod el 21 .

Genun Ail Corps. Fall 1944 . Genzan. Chosen.
(Wonsan, NOllh Korea.)

©w-..A. ... o -
 1
M ltsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Carrier Fig htvr, Model 21 .
6th Air Corps. New Guinea. April-October 1942.
Rabaul. New Brite in, November 1942. Unit re·
formed in November 1942 as the 2041h Air Corps.

2
Mitsublshl A6M2 Type 0 Camer Fighter. Model 21.
6th Air Corps, New Guinea, Apfl l-October 1942.

3
M ilsu bishi A6M2 Tvpe 0 CalTier f ighter, M odel 21
6th Air Corp,. New Guinea. April-October 1942.

5
M ltllu bisni A6M 2 Type 0 Carrier Fi ghter. M odErI 2,.
Oila Air Corps. Opo rationa l Trai ninJ;l U ni t , Mar ch
1944 .

Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 Carrier Fig hlllr, Model 21 .

34 151 Ai, Corps, 40 151 Fighter Squ ildron. Home
Island Defence. l 8te 1944-spring 194 5 .

©.,.,,,,R ... C_
 M ilsubishl A6M2 Tvpe 0 Carrier Flght"'l . M ode l 21 .
Ka surniga urJ A ir Corps Primary and Trans il ional
Training, Operati o nal Training Uni,. 1943-44 .

2
M/tsubishi A6M2 TVPIt 0 Canler Fi ghter. M Odel 21
Kono lke AI' Corps. Gunnery Traini ng Schoo!.
Februarv 1944

3
Milsublshi ASM 2 Type 0 Carr iel Fighter, Model 2 1.
Tsukuba Air Corps, Opera tional Tl alnlng Un it,
OCIOOOI 1943.

6
Sasebo A6M2-K Type 17 Trainel Fighter, M od el 12.
Tok.ushima Air Corps, Okinewa. Sprmg 1 945.
,...,....."1-.......

© WAq.R.'O _
 1
Sasebo AGM2- K Type 17 Trainer F.ghter, Mudel 12.
T!luku ba Au Corps. Opertllio nal T,a101II9 Unit
F1=t:=iF=it;:::::::~J~':
nuaIY 1944.

3
S8sebo A6M2-K Type 17 Trainer Fighter. Model 12.
302nd Atl Corps. Alsugi, Kanagawil and Honshu.
F=;;;::+;;:;p'~~o;:;;~"~rt'y 1945.

4
Sasebo A6M2-K Type 17 Trainer Fighter, Model 12.
T81nll0 Air Corps. Transillonal Training Unit.
fft;F=iF::::::~o:ct:Ober 1 944.

6
Sasebo A6M2 - K Type 17 Traine r Fighter, Model 12 .
Genzan Ai, Corps. Fall 1944.
~;;;:::~'"-
H

1
Nakajima A6M2 - N Tvpe 2 Fighter Sea plane, Model 11 . 5th Air Corps,
ChOStln (Korea), A.ugust 1942. In November 1942 I hi, unit became
the 452nd Air COlpS.

2
Nakajima A6M2- N Type 2 Fig hter Seaplane. M odoll1 Toka Air COfPS.
Allu Island, Aleut ians. Octobeor 1942.
AIRCAM AV IAT IO N SERIES No.16
(VOL. 1)

---,

M ltsubishl A6M2 Type 0 Carner Fig hter, Model 21 . Aircraft Ca rrier Kaga.
Pearl Harbour Auac k. 8ch December 1941 Sta ndard pale grey sche me w ith
red fuselage bands

I 1811/2/-2N lIRD-SIN
IN JAPANISI NAVAL AIR SIRVICI
ACKNOW LED mMENTS
ThiS book. the first of two volumes covering the most fa mous
fighter type operated by the Japanese Naval Air Service durtng
Compiled & written by World War II containS the largest select lun of colour side view
illustraltons . photographs and data published to date Volume Two
Richard M. Bueschel w ill cover the later Types 0 the same high standard. Thanks are due
to all those who assisted With matenal and information whose names
are listed in alphabetical order below ;
Shorzoe Abe. Hideya Ando . Koku Asahi. Asahlgraph . Peter M .
Bowers J. D Canary. J Earl Capron. Fred C Dickey J r . John Ford
Illustrated by Flving A ces. Hlko \Jippon. Hlko Shonen. Noboru Jyoko Koku Fan.
Koku S onen . Knku ishik,. Dr. Hldemusa Kimura. AI Schm idt.
Richard Ward Peter Selinger. Sora . Sekal no Koku i Shashln Shuho. Seiso
Tach lbana . M Toda. Umi to Sorya. Warren E. Woolman. Aus tra lian
War Memoria l. IWM. Impertal Navy. USAF. USN .

Mitsubr sh r A6M2 Type 0 Carner Fight er, Model 21 . CaplUred by Chinese

Nationalist Air Force. Test flown by AVG pilots Olive drab uppc rsu rfaces.
pale grey under sur laces. CNAF roundel on w ings onl y. these were laler
replaced with USAF InSig nia In standard two pOStilOn stvle.

Published by. Osprey Publ ications Limited. England

EdnorialOffice. P.O. Box 5. Canterbury. Kent. [ngland J £
Subscnpllon and Busmess Office. P.O Box 25. 707 Oxford Road. Read ng . Berkshire. England
Copy. g h © Osprey Pubh ca t.ons ltd 1970 I
P otoset a"d Pr nt ed 1.>..,. BAS Pr nters Llm ,ted W allop. Hampshire
Crewmen ready 10 release Ihe ch ucks pr ior to laund In9 me 151 Allack WS'Ye of fIghters under command uj Lleut Command er Itava of the
Alcag l Pearl HarbOl <mack. Decemhcr 8th. 1941 (Shu rzoe Abe) .
MITSUBISHI A6M1/2/-2N ZERO-SEN
It was late in th~ afternoon on June 4, 1942 when Lieutenant
Colonel Sweeney of the United Stales Anny Air Corps
decidal [0 throw his four remaining B-1 7E Flying Fortress
bombers into the battle for Midway. An hour latcr twO more
patched up Fortresses look off from the tvUdway island
airficld. There wasn'[ much else left after the earl ier japanese
carrier plane attacks. The American advantage in the battle,
• code-breaking in[elligencr CO flP that re\'eaIed the japanese
plans, was of Httle con seq uen~ when it came to the sheer
weight of equipment that the Japanese were .ble to place on
the scene. 'rhe Americans were out-gunned, outnumbered
and out-manned. Reports came th rough rh. t four large
j ap.nese Fleet carriers had been hit du ring the day, .nd were
presumed losl. But nobody was sure, Sweeney ' s Fortresses
wenr looking for the Im perial Fleel, found some surface
elements and then fough t for their ti ves as they were jumped
by a Hock of the deadly "Zero Figbters. " The bartle was
obviously far from over. The Japanese appeared ro have
\;ctory within their grasp, for it was apparent that [he loss of
the carners S Oryll, K aga, Akagi and Hiryu hadn' t stopped the
intrusive assault on Midway for control of the Central
Pacific. The " Zeros" in the air proved that. T here was
apparently o o~) or perhaps even morc, Fleet carriers in the
vici nity. As the night of June 4 moved into the dawn of June
S, the small garrison at Midway brdccd for the inevi[able
invasion .
It neve r came. As Sweeney 's 8 - 17'5 left the waten tem -
porarily under enemy control, the Japanese MilSubisru-
designed and of[en Najajima-built A6M2 Type 0 Ship- Based
Figbters spullercd out their last drops of usable fuel, and
panCHckcd into the sea. "lbey were from the carrier Hiryu~
the last Ja panese carner [ 0 be rut by the American SnD
Dauntless dive bomben. that fateful afternoon, and had no
placc to land. An alarming inventory of the finest carner
combat planes ever 10 put IO sea in thei r time bubbled to the
bonom of the Pacific, taking Ihe j apanese plans for tern[orial
expansion by force of anns with them. No Japanese fighter
?Iaoe ever flew this close to the American heartland agai n.
The grea[cst naval battle since Trafalgar ended with an
\mcrican victory of magni ficent proportions, but the U nited
'ital es didn't rea lize it for a full day. In just less than six
months since the Pearl Harbour anack of Decrmber 7, 194 1
(American time), the Japanese thrust, spearheaded across it,
broad fronlS by Ihe Zero-Sell (in translation called the same
thing by the Pacific Allies-"Zero-Fighter" ), had been blunted .
It would lake another three years of bloody figh ling before i[
would all be over, but after J\Ilidway the issue was n~yer in
doubt. j apan, and the Zero- Sell, had a brief moment of great
glory, followed by a long, grinding path of retribu tion. This
is the story of [hal journey, and of what is regarded as the
best-known single aircraft of the Pacific War.
Creation of a myth
By Ihe middle 1930's American-tr.inal Mirsub ishi engineer
jiro Horikoshi had created the uniquely j apanese 9- Shi
figh ler, which ultimately reached production as the ASMI
Type 96 Ship-Based Fighler, entering uni t se,,; ce in
num bers in models up to the ASM4 in the late 1930'S.
No[ one to let a technological advantage lapse th.e japanese
Naval Air Force (J NAF) called for a replacemen[ in May
'937, and Jiro Horikosru 's staff undertook the design of
the 12-Shi fighter . By October the original JN AF speci-
fica tions were Lightened up, based on com bat experience in
China. Originally in competition with Nakajima for the
production order, Horikoshj's experience and Nakajima':,
reluctance [0 lose money on the changing projecl left Mitsu-
bishi alone in the field by the end of J .nuury 1938. By April
the basic design was approved b)' the Naval Aeronauticar
Establishment at Yokosuka , and by the summer of 1938
Mi lsubisru was cutting metal to bui ld the prototype. U nder
Horikosbi's guidance, struc ture engineers Yosh.itoshi Sone
and Yoshio Yosh ikawa made liberal use of the newly created
ESD Extra Super-Duralumin to lighten the airframe. Other
lechnical tricks were applied [0 keep the aircraft ligh[ and
enhance ilS fi ghting manoeuverability. interconnecting
struclures, wi th the wing spar an integral part of both wing
and fuselage, reduced individual assemblies wrule cradling
the [Wo w ing cannon. This alone saved over a hundred
pounds weight of fasteners and connectors. The heavy safety
devices gaining growing acceptan ce in Europe: an d America,
such as pilot annour and self-sealing fuel tanks, were ignored
in the weight-saving engineering. Lightweight plywood
auxiliary fuel tanks were even added as a lash-on to increase
the range greatly without adding the weight of additional
ai rframe tankage. The resulting completely original fighter
design weighed less than any comparable fighter in the world
while carrying the heavy specified annament of two 20mm
cannons and two 7.7mm machine guns, and quickly found
acceptance in the JNAF in a form that would have been
thoroughly unacceptable in the other major aircraft carner-
using nations such as Britain, France or the United States.
This stress on manoeuverability at the expense of strength
and safety did not cause problems for years to come, for in
the hands of good pilots the Allied enemy never really had a
chance to get a shot at the high-performing Zao-Sen. But
ultimately the cost was high, both in production and in
combat. The basic structure was a complicated single-unit
assembly and took a long time to produce per piece. It was
impossible to build major Zero-Sen components in a variety
of plants for assembly at a collecting point. With more
A6M fighters produced between 1940 and August 1945 than
any other Japanese :aircraft type-the excessive production
time added up to a loss of productive capability. In combat,
once the Allied pilots caught on to the weaknesses of the
Zero-Sen and learned that it would virtuall y crumble or
blow up under heavy machine gun or cannon fire, the losses
of the Zero-S... rapidly climbed past the point of acceptability,
until even its own pilots would rather avoid a fight than chance
their destruction. But all of that was well in the future, and
only a pundit could have guessed that the engineering marvel
presented to the JNAF as the completed 12-Shi Ship-Based
Fighter could provide the Imperial Navy with anything but
power and fame .
The first prototype, receiving the designation A6MI, was
completed in February 1939 at Mitsubishi's experimental
shops at Nagoya. On March 19 it was wheeled under wraps
by ox cart to the Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF) field at
nearby Kagantigahara where it Bew on the afternoon of April
1 piloted by civilian KatsU20 Shima, a Mitsubishi test pilot.
On April 25 Shima got the aircraft barely over 300 m .p.h.
and fell just short of the original JNAF specs for a speed of
312 m .p.h. Naval pilots began to By the A6M T in July. No
major design faults showed up, and a vibration harmonic was
eliminated by using a constant speed 3-bladed airscrew in
place of the original variable pitch 2-blader. The only real
problem seemed to be speed and the inability of the 7Bo h.p.
Mitsubishi Zuisei 13 engine to put it over the top. While a
second A6M [ prototype was being completed the JNAF gave
the go-ahead to a more powerful model as the A6M2 powered
by the 940 h.p. Nakajima Sakae 12 of 940 h .p. It became the
classic "Zero-F ighter" production model and, with little
Ove r a year befo re the pearl Ha rbOl attack the T ype 0 Ca rrie r
Fig hter wa s flying combat m iSSions over Ch ina. Th ese are 12 - Shi
pr oto Lypes, laler deSi gnated A6M2 M odel 11 . during eva lua tio n
tn als pri or to assignment In Ch ina (Seka l no Kokuki ) .
basic change from its prototype, Bew in this form until the
end of the Pacific War.
With naval acceptance of the A6MI on September 14, 1939
after 162 hours of Bying time, secret carrier trials began. The
A6M[ didn't pass, and for a while it looked as if the whole
12-Shi programme was stalled. Then, when the second
A6M I prototype, flown for the first time in October, blew up
in mid-air on March 11 , [940 killing its naval pilot, on
engineering examination was demanded. A redesign of the
wing, and strengthened spars, further improved the budding
A6M2 . With the first A6M2 t2-Shi completed in December
[939, followed by an additional A6M2 in early '940, the
design was finalizing .
The new prototype took to the air on January IB, 1940.
While trials with this, and the second prototype, were under-
way the Imperial Navy decided to jump the developmental
and combat evaluation time and ordered an additional 15
prototypes for operational testing in China. Work was
rushed, brieBy held up after the March I T explosion, and
pushed again. Originally scheduled to be sent to China in
May, in spite of delays the aircraft were ready at the end of
June. By the first week in July a cadre of select A5M4
96 Kansen pilots were being converted to the experimental
A6M2, flying in two new JNAF squadrons of the 12th
Combined Naval Aie Corps in China, created for the purpose.
Carrier trials also took place at sea on the Kaga in June, and
this time the faster, more powerful A6Mz was obviously
passing with glory. The Japanese Navy had a remarkable
new contemporary fighter ready for production less than a
year after World War II began in Europe. The seeds for
surprise were sown.
Introduction to combat
No fighter aircraft type ever entered combat receiving more
care and attention than the first group of Mitsubishi 12-Shi
A6M2 pre-production prototypes. Hand made, radically new
and each one literally a research project, the dozen or so air-
craft left for Hankow, China, overseas home of the 12th
Combined Naval Air Corps, on July 21 , 1940, under the care
of Lieutenant Tamotsu Yokoyama and Lieutenant Saburo
Shindo, their two youthful squadron commanders. Just as
they were setting up in China the final reports of the pre-
lintinary testing on the Kaga as weU as the Yokosuka Naval
Air Test Centre were completed, and Mitsubishi's new
fighter was accepted for JNAF production on July 3[, 1940
as the A6M2 Type 0 Ship-Based (Carrier) Fighter, Model II .
lt immediately became the Reisen, or "Zero-Fighter'"
although the Japanese themselves preferred the Anglicized
version and more often called it the Zero-Sen .
Production plans moved quickly, with production-model
A6M2's being built at Mitsubishi's NO. 3 Airframe Works at
Nagoya the first week in August, with finished aircraft
rushed to China to join the hand-crafted 12-Shi combat
prototypes. By the end of November almost fifty had been
built with modifications incorporated during production
based on the hundreds of flying hours stacking up in the
evaluation Bights in China. The main spar was strengthened
after September, and by late November the airframe was
modified to manually fold the wingtips to enable the Reisen
to fit standard Fleet Carner elevators. With this change the
A6M 2 became the Model 2 I, remaining in production in
this form for over two years. Vibration problems, and the
death of a Yoko,uka test pilot on April 17, '941, led to the
addition of aileron trim tabs beginning with production
airc raft No. 127.
With all of these changes accomplished the design was
frozen and arrangements were made to have the A6Ml
Model 21 produced by Nakajima also, with the first pr<>-
duction model coming off the lines at Koizumi late in Nov-
ember 1941. Experience in China, and on the carriers,
improved the breed so completely that the ultimate pro-
duction model was virtually de-bugged in less than a year
after the first pre-production prototypes took to the air in
combat over Hankow, China in August 1940. a remarkable
rate of value-analysis at a time when such sophisticated
engineering was in its infancy.
The experience in China with the experimental A6M2
models, soon joined by production A6M2 Model [I 'S, was

The A6M2 M odel 1 1 Rel <>en en tered comba t eVa ltl dllo n 10 August 1 940 III C hi na. This IS ai rcra h N o 177 0 1 the 12th Combmed Ai r
Corps sHltl oneO at Han kow. ChuliJ. September 19'10 Fu se lage band denotes SecHon Leader (5e150 -I achlbana) .
successful beyond the wildest dreams of the jNAF planners.
By the summer of '940 the war had mm-ed so far inland that
the Imperial Navy's heaviest G3M2 bombers had to attack
a well-defended Chungking without fighter escort due to the
long ranges . Arrival of the Reisens changed the picture
completely. Flying m.issions of over 1,000 miles round-trip,
Lieutenant Yokoyama led his sq uadron of t 2- Shi fighters over
Chungking on an escort mission on August 19, 1940 with
Lieutenant Shindo following w ith his squad ron the next day.
T he defending Chinese fighters odd ly remained our of sigh t
and the disappointed japanese pilots rerurned to their base
wiiliou[ the t3ste of battlc. "rhe earli er Ch.inese tactl cs had
consisted of diving passes at sitting-du ck bom bers. With the
arri val of the new japanese fighters, the Chinese held back
and avoided com bat.
It wasn't until 3lmost a month later, on Septcmber 13, that
the Zero- Sen dtew first blood . Pretend ing to lea ve the targe t
area with the bombers, the Japanese fighters under command
of L ieutenant Saburo Sbindo and Sub-Lieutenant Ayao
Shirane suddenly turned ar ound and came back over Ch un-
king about thirty minutes later. Diving out of the sun into a
sk-y crowded with Chinese fighters, the j apanese shot down
27 Polikarpov 1-1 5his and r- 16 and Curtiss H awk fIr
fighters in hal f-an-hour. The first Zero-Set! "ace" cam e out
of this single banle, when Petry OffIcer Koshiro Yamashita
shot down five of the Russian-built Chinese fighters. Yama-
shita later went on to become one of the ranking JNAF aces
of the Pacific War wi th a confi m led score of nine kills and an
unofficial rating of over ten. The t2th Combined Air Corps
fighters had gained a m a jor victory without loss to themselves .
Thcn combat got s p~lrse again, and Chinese aircraft stayed
out of the ir way. Ranging deep into Ch ina, the Japanese
fighters gained proficiency and searched vainly for targe ts.
Psychologically the japanese fe lt invincible, and their
[Tusrration at being unable to engage in aerial com bat made
itself shown in various ways. In a raid against Chengtll on
October 4, four of the japanese Zero-Scm in a fl ight led by
Superior P eny Officer I chire Higashiyama acruall y landed
on the Chinese airfield and the pilots attempted to blow up
the aircra ft while their A6M 2's sat at the edge of the fie ld
Model 11 Rersen r\lo. 16301 Ihe 1 2rh Comb rner1 Air Co rps over Hankow. Chrna. late 194 0 (S ekar no Kokuki)
-
with thei r engines ticking over. The fantastic audacity of the
Japanese carried them through, and in spite of a wilhering
ground fire they damaged some ai rcraft and gOt away while
their comrades in the air pinned the defenders down with
a constant series of strafIn g runs. In the heat of action the
srupidiry of the move was ignored . Had only one of the pilots
received a minor wound, or been killed, the Chinese at
Chengtu would h ave been left with a newly-produced
Zero-Sen prototype. Convenientl y, Chengru was also the
main experimental and aircraft evaluation base of the Chinese
Air Force.
Perhaps the most disappointed man of all was Claire L ee
Chennault, an American adviser to Chinese leader Chiang
Kai-Shek, and commander of the Chinese Air Force .
Chennault had been collecting data on the Zero-Sen since its
fi rst appearance over Chungking late in August, and was
vainly trying to learn its secret to develop counter-tactics.
With the Chengtu opporrunity missed, all he could do was
watch helplessly as the m onths rolled by and his demoralized
Chinese pi lots fe U one by one before the guns and cannon of
the A6M2. T he commando-like raid on Chengru also had a
profound effect on the Chinese, generating a defeatist
attit ude that further cut the efficiency of the Chinese Air
Force. When ZerO-SellS and AS I'v\4 96 Kansen fighters of a
detached unit of the 12th Combined Air Corps began to raid
the Ch inese training base at K unming from the new Japanese
airfields in occupied French Indo-China in October, the
spiri t of the Chinese Air Force was broken, and the Japanese
gained full command of the air over central and southern
China . By the end of '940 the JNAF had used somewhat over
a hundred 12-Sh i, M odel I I and M odel 2 1 Zero-Sms aver
China and reportedly shot down 59 Chinese aircraft wh ile
destroying tOI others. Through out the fighting not a single
Zem-Sen fighter was lost.
As the fighting tapered dOV·iD in China, the Zero-Sen still
held its record of superiori ty over its foe . Virtuall y alone in
Chinese skies throughout t941 while the Jl':AF reorganized
its forces to be prepared in the event of a Pacific War, the
Zero-Sens reportedly shot down an additional 45 Chinese
planes while destroying or damag ing 62 others on the ground

Kept secret lor well over i'I yea r of comba t se rvi ce. IhlS frr st "p ubli c"
photograph of the A6M2 was released to the Japanese press
immediately a: ter the Pearl ! l arbor Attack (Koku Asahi)
by the end of Septem ber 194 1. In one raid on Cbengru on
March 14, they sbol duwn 24 Chinese ai rcraft plus three
probables. A raid on Chengtu by J NAF heavy bombers on
May 20 was escorled by thirty A6M2' s. It wa, during this
raid that the first Zero-Sen was lost in combat, with Superior
Petty Officer Kimura's A6M2 crashing as a resull uf gruund
fire. By Septembe r, only one other A6M2 had been lost, also
to ground fire. Thousands of miles away from their hume,
the japanese owned th e skies over China.
It seemed that only a miracle could ever shoot a japanese
aircraft down in Ch ina agai n-but even that was created by
the Zero- Sen,. To combat the malaise that had taken h uld in
the Chinese Air Force afte r the attack on Chengtu in October
1940, Gcneralissimo Chiang Kai-Shek called in Chennaull
and proposed th e idea of a mercenary force of Anlerican pilots
flying m odem American planes in the defense of China. The
idea took hold, a ircraft were made available, and the American
Volunteer Group (A.V.G .) was formed. In a little over a year
the A.V .G , was demonstrating the combat deficiencies of the
Reisen in Chinese skies.
In Fleet Service
As the Zero-Sen made its backwards introduction into service
as a land fighter, the weapons system that would conquer
more global mass in six m onths than aoy army in history was
being developed : the A6M2 Model 21 and the F leet Carrier .
At the time the 1\6M2 was accepted for productiun as a
carrier fighter in the summer of 1940, following successful
trials on the Kaga, the Imperial Navy had only four large
Fleel Carriers, with numerous other light and training
carriers. By April t941 Zero-Sen comingents had been formed
un the caITiers Kaga, Akag£J Hiryu and Soryu . By the
summer of 1942 twO additional large carriers bad joined the
fleet, with the fold ing wing tips of the M odel 21 permitti ng
use of the aircraft on every fighting carrier in the Imperial
Navy.
Sheltered from combat, but given almost a year to gain
proficiency with their ahcrafl and home carriers, the rigidly
trained Japanese carrier fighter pilots gained confidence .
There was reason for lhis opLirnism. American and British
carriers were still flying biplanes, while their launch and
recovcry timing was slow, according to reports from Lieuten-
ant Commander Minoru Genda, the Navy's Assistant Naval
Ou t WIth til e old I 111 w it h the new r Ml tsublstrr 96 Karlsen A5M 4 I ypt' 96 Ca rller I-r g lrlers I ly ove rlleatl as the new A6M2 rs rea d ied fo r
serVice, Novem her 1941 (Koku Asahr)
Air Auache in London . Genda was himself a former 96
Kansen fighter pilot with combat experience in China. He
had a philosophy of lactical lighter application similar to
Chennault's in China, that of massed fighter use over combat
areas to gain tmal air control, thereby permitting bombing
or other air, sea or ground actions with impunity,
Genda's two year s in London, anll hi::, return LO japan in
1941 during the carrier conversions when A6M2 fighters
replaced the open-cockpil and fixed-gear ASM4, had a
profound effect on the first combat use of the carrier-based
A6M2 and the coming of the Pacific War. When the daring
plan to attack Pearl Harbour, conceived in January 1941 by
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, C-in-C of the Imperial Navy,
was first laid out befo re Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi,
Chief of Staff of the I tlh Ai r Fleel, Onishi asked Genda's
opinion. Genda stud ied the concept in detail, and provided
Onishi with a length y reporr on the feasibi lity of th e attack,
stressing the use of all six fleet carriers, competen t com-
manders and e"perienced pilots. By the sununer of 1941 the
atta,ck plans moved from the feasible to the actual, and
Zero-Sen carrier training was increased .
Following the commissioning of the carriers Shokaku and
Zuikaku in August 1941, the first clements of Zero-Sens were
already flying from their decks in September. ·Combat-
trained pilots from the 12th Combined Air Corps flying
Model 21'S in China were brought back to Japan and re-
assigned to the carriers on account of their invaluable
experience. Lieutenant Ayao Shirane was assigned to the
Zuikaku. Lieutcnant Fusata lida, an " ace" with 7 kills, went
to the S nryu. L ieutenant Commander Shigeru Itaya, also an
" acc", became the fighter commander of the Akagi. Now a
COInmande r, Minoru Genda became the Operations Officer
to Vice-Admiral Chuichi Naguma and was assigned to the
1st Air F leet on the Aka!?;, the flagship of th e Pearl Harhour
attack force. h was during the first week in November 1941,
in th e weapons room of the carrier, that Genda first unveiled
a scalc m odel of Pearl Harbour and begao to go over the
specific details of the forthcoming attack with the conunanders
of the various aircraft elements assigned to the six carriers.
Wllile the carrier forces were being trained for their water-
based mission, a number of land-based Air Corps of the J NAF
also began 10 receive the A6M2 in numbers. With the prime
military objectives of war in the Pacific the oil and raw
materials of the DUlch Indies, reached by way of the Philip-
pines and Malaya, arrangements were made for anacks to
coincide with the raid on Hawaii. In a plan so ambitious it
almost defies belief, re-equipping and training for simul-
taneous atlacks on all fronts got underway in the fall of 194 I.
I SI Class Petty Officer Teimei Akamatsu, third ranking
Japanese fighter pilot "ace" in C hina, gOI his first chance to
fly the Zero-Sen in October 1941. AkamatSu had been
assigned to the 3rd Air Corps at Kaooya, where the WIit was
in training fo r the assault on the Philippines. The plan was
la stretch the range of the A6M2 so that the Philippines
attack could be made in a single fligbt from Formosa, thus
avoiding the need for carriers which could then be released
for the Pearl Harbor attack. Petty Officer Saburo Sakai, wbo
was destined 10 survive the war as the JNAF's third ranking
" ace ", received the same training in the Tainan Air Corps
located at Tainan, on Formosa, Other units, including the
GetlzaTl and Karwya Air Corps, destined to open the war
from Indo-China; the Ominaco, Umura and Y okosuka Air
Corps combining combat readiness and tmining ; and the
Kasumigaura and Oila Air Corps as [raining bases, received
r igh ter s on the deck u f the I\kagt as Ihe Nagum o Force crosseu th e 'NAsl ern Pa ci fi c on IS way 10 Pearl H arbo r ( Hl ko Nippon)
variously claimed that the "Zero" was copied from lhe
Vulteee Vanguard, the Chance- Vought V.143, the Northrop
FT-l , and the Gloster F . 5134 experimental figh te r. The
suggestion that the manoeuver'dble Japanese fighter was
made of plywood and plastics, a far-reaching technological
achievement beyond the design capubility of Western nations )
even gained acceptance for a shorr period. With myths
replacing facts, the search was on for an i_ntact Z ero- Sen for
evaluation and information . The scant wreckage al Hawaii ,
and the lack of available examples for months to come, made
the aircraft the most sought-after mechanical prize of th e
earl y months of the Pacific War.
M aster of the Skies
La ter in the day after the arrack at Hawuii) and long hours
after the initial planned assault due to poor weather) Zeto-Sem
nppea red over the Philippines. In spite of the w:lfning
provided American forces by radio from Hawaii, virtually
the enti re strength of the American and Philippine air forces
were lined up on their airftelds. When the 84 Z e.-o-S",s of
the 3rd and Taillan Air Corps, flying from their Southern
Formosan bases at Tainan, Takao, Tsichu and Palau) first
arrived over their targets at Clark and Nichols Field and Iba
Field on the west coast uf Luzon, they <uddenly felt the long
over-water trip was worth the effort. 'rhey had surprised the
defending air forces during lunchtime, and in one day
American air power in the Philippines was cut back beyond
the point of usefulne". By the end of December Zero- Sens
were operating out of bases at Davao and Jolu in the Philip-
pines) to remain until the is,l ands were comp letely conquered.
T he neXL few weeks saw a surge of activity in which victory
followed victOry so repeatedly that the Ja panese began to feci
that it was their destiny to rule the East-Asian and Wt!stern-
Pacific world . The acclaimed hero of the victory was the
Zero-Sen, reported in the press, on hand at every Clclion,
and reportedly invincible in the air. The 1S t Carr ier Division)
comi ng back from Hawaii, struck at Wake Island . A deler-
mined defense led [0 assignment of the SOIJIU and H£ry u to a
repeat attack by Zero-St...,l fighters on D ecember 20. Splitting
up at Wake, the Akagi, Kaga, Zuikaku and Sholwku were by
January 20, f942, attacking sleepy Rabaul, an AustraJinn
base in New Britain. By the next day this flee t was making
aerial strikes with A6M 2 fighters at Lac, Salamaua and
l\Iladang on the east coaSl of New Guinea. 00 January 31,
nine Zero-Sens flying from Truk, the Japanese strong point
in the Western Pacific, landed at Vunakanau Airfield on
Rabaul and the build-up of this keystone Japanese base began.
While the carrier forces extended the arm of expansion in
long strokes, the land-based Air Corps of the J:--IAF moved
acruss the land b ridge of the Dutch Indies to reach the same
goals. After the Philippine operations, the Zero-Sen units
we re joined by the G enzall and Katwya Air Corps from
M alaya and Indo-China, becuming 'he Enst Indies force for
the final drive throu gh Java. It was during this m ove that the
Ta itum Ai r Corps became the unit with the greatest number
of " aces" in the J1\AF. Chinese veterans like Perry Officers
Kuniyoshi Tanaka, Saburo Sakai, and Tainan Air Corps
Commander Lieutenant Junichi Sassi were joined by
newcomers Toshio Ota, Torakichi Takulsuka, Hi royoshi
Nisruzawa and albers. Tanaka had shot down twelve aircraft
in Ch ina and added eight morc kills as the Tu;na:n Air Corps
worked its way to its adva nce base at Lac) New Guinea.
Nishizawa went on to become the leading JNAF " ace" of
the war.
Olher units were rapidly tanned and senl into the war
zones as additional Zero-Sen prod uction became available.
When the Pacific War began the Imperial Navy had 660
fighters, of which half were A6l\12 Model 2 ['s. By the end of
March ' 94> some 300 fighters had been lost in combat,
patrol and training while an add itional 3 [6 were deliverd to
the Navy. Most of the new fighters were Zero-Serfs } and unirs
were re-equipped and funned with the fighter. The [St,
6th anu ChilOSC Air Corps were assigned to the Japanese
·Mandate Islands in the " Inner South Seas," with ChilO"
fighters at newl y- won Wake I sland and others al Aur,
K wajalein, l\i.aru s, \Xlotje and olher island s in the chains.
As Rabaul was enlarged, elements of the Ge1lzan, Tainan ,
4th and 6th Air Corps flying the A6M> fo rmed the station
defense and offense units. The Hyakuri, Saeki and Y awbe
Air Corps received Zero-Sem in Japan, while the 202nd
muved uuough the Indies to the Celebes and finally Timor
in the " North of Australia" com bat theatre. [n June 1942
the M odel 2 [ equipped 753rd Air Corps was added to U1C
area to fly convoy escort and provide air cover over Western
New GuinC!"d and Northern Australia.
The most active elements of the JNAF remained the carrier
forces, with the fighters of the 1st Air Fleet striking across
th ousands of miles of water. " Navy Naughts" , as the Aus-
tralians sometimes Ct11led the Z ero-Sen) arracked Port Darwin,
Austral ia, on February 19. Later in the month the carrier
fleet supported the in vasion of Java. Then, in an attempt to
re-create the succes of Pearl Harbour, elemen ts of the fleet
headed for Ceylun, str iking at Colombo on April 5 and
Trincomalee on April 9. While the attacks were a success from
the Japanese point of view, the element of surprise was
mi ~s ing. For the fi rst time the carrier-based Zero-SeIlS had
an almost matched figh t on their hands when intercepting
British Hurricanes and Fulmars held th e success of the
anackers to a minimwn. By the time the carriers got back to
Japanese Home Waters in the third week of April, the pilot<
were the heroes uf the Empi re . They looked the part, for
th ey were rugged, matured in combat, and deeply tanned
from their man y month::, in Southern wa ters. During the
entire crui se the carrier forces never carne um.ler strong
attack) and no ship was lost.
But the tide of war was imperceptively beginning to turn.
The AWed fo rces, utterl y defeated in the opening m onths
of wnr, were firming up. When the Fleet carriers S hokakl4
and Zuikakll, plus the light carrier S hoho, of the 5th Carrier
Division went lO sea again the object was the invasion of Port
Moresby, an Allied base on the South-eastern coast of New
Guinea. Air bases there would give Japan coetrol over New
Guinea, Northern Australia and the Solomons. For the
fini[ time opposing carrier forces met in the Battle of the
Coral Sea. On the morning of May 7 American carrier planes
from the Yorkt own and LeXington hit and sank the Shoho,
v,rith the carrier's twelve Zero-Scns going to the bottom of
the sea or landing on the other carriers. The next day, the
Shokaku was badly damaged and put ou t of action. The
American carrier Lcx'inglOn was also sunk, giving the Japanese
a claim of victory. While the batLle actuaUy appeared to be a
draw, the Port Moresby invas ion arrempL was stopped and
the Japanese retreated for the first time in the Pucific War.
The battle was a costl y one, for the PI AF suffered heavy
losses in pilots and aircraft. Expecting an easy victory and
fighting enemy carrier pilots in close quarters for the first
time, the Japanese pilots were careless . During the evening En route to H flWili i the air crews were II1 luf med that thel f large t
4

of May 7 more Ll,an one A6M2 pilot attempted to land on the
American carrier Y orkl f1W71, mistaking it for the Shokaku or
Zuikoku in the haze when the rv.;ro carrier fleets were only
abou t 30 miles apart. The fa st-thinking American ~ ignalrnen
tried to flag Lhem down, but recugnizing their error the
Japanese pilots roa red away [Q safety at mast height. The
elusive intact Z"o-Sen for American study once again got
away.
By far the grea test Japanese loss v,ms the damaged Shokaku,
destined to long monLh s under repair, for now this Fleet
Carrier cou ld not be assigned LO the " Midway Operation ",
the long-planned decisive fleet engagement of the Pacific
Wa r, scheduled for less than" month later. Admiral Yama-
moto, himself a pilot, planned to invade l'Vlidway in June
[942, and bring the American fleet out to battle . The Imperial
avy, confident of victory in whatever it undertook, couldn 't
wait fo r the Shokaku . The invasion plans proceeded, and the
fteet left Japan as the largest attac king furce to eve r sail the
high seus.
The "Mid way Operation" cons i ~ ted of two thrusts, wit.h a
feint in thc far north at the Aleutian and the American base
at Dutch H arbou r. This attack was led bv the Fleet Carrier
Ry ujo, newly equipped wi th A6M2 Model 2 t fighters to
replace the '}6 Kamen figh ters in use until May, and sup -
ported by the Light Carrier Jllnyo , ne wly converted from a
tourist liner and equipped Witll 2[ Zero-SeilS. Striking b y
surprise from 400 miles away on June ), and aga in on June 4
(American time), the Japanese suffered under the extreme
weathe r and were only able to place a total of twenty A6M2
fighters and 36 bombers over the target. Lieutenant Yoshio
Shiga, commander of the fig h te rs, regre tfull y reported the
loss of a Zero-Sen in the F irst Wave attack on June 3 flown by
Petty Officer Tada yoshi Koga from the RYlljo. Koga 's A6M2
had been hit by a stray bullet, leading to loss offue/. Droppong
behind, be followed a pre-arranged plan to land on the small
island of Akutan to be picked up later by subm ari ne. On the
secoed day two of Junyo 's fighters were lost in combat, as
wdl as two bombers, while the Japanese pilots reported the
downing of five or six American fi ghters. Japanese rescue
subs, scouring the area, found no trace of the missing pilots
and gave up the search. The carrier fleet retired without loss.
Meanwhile, far to the sou th , the Midway assault began . At
davm on June 41 Lieutenant ~1a saharu Suganami of the
Snryu, u Zero·Sell flying veteran of Pearl Har bour, led the
first fig hter group of nine fighters each from the S oryu, Akagi,
Hiryu and Kaga against Mid way to support tbe D31\2 and
BSK2 bom bers. The Japanese fighters contained the American
defenders and not one of the Japanese bombers was attacked.
The light c..'1.rrit' rs Hosho and Zuilw, far to the rear, were used
(Q provide anti-sub and CAP cover for the Japanese surface
fleet. As rhe day progressed the Japanese were unab le to
locate the American carrier flect, although they were under
carrier aircraft altack. in a we lter of confusion they armed,
re-annoo and again re-armed their aircraft fo r alternating
attacks against the American fleet , Midway and the fleet
again. At the height of the third re-arroing the Japanese
carriers were caught 'by American dive bombers, and the
course of the Pacific War was changed in five minutes. The
defendin g CAP Zero-S"IS had just thwarted a repeated
series of low-level torpedo and shallow dive-bombing
anempts by the Americans, encouraged by the shouted cheers
was the Amer ica n hast! ill Pear l Harbor (Asahlglaph)
of their fellow pilots and maintenance crew ~ wa tching from
the carrier decks, when Douglas Dauntless bombers dropped
in strings from an altitude beyond interception, and had their
way with the Japanese carriers below them . The S oryu , Kaga
and Akagi were mortall y wounded, and later in the afternoon
the Hiryl/ was hit again. By the morning of Jun e 5 all fou r
Fleet Carriers had sunk or were scuttled to avoid capture.
The sole: American Carrier loss was the Ynrluown, and for
the first time the c.."3rrier forces in the Pacific were we ighted
in favour of the Americans. A desperate plan to use the
aircraft of th e Hosho for further attacks was considered, bu t
was dropped in favour o f a Japanese retreat on June s.
Beginning of the End
The loss in equipment at Midway was staggering. From
April [942 through March [94), wh ich included the Midway
losses, the J NAF expended 1,590 fighte r planes whi le only
1,747 were deli vered to the Imperial Navy. This barely met
the lusses at a time when the I\lIied stren gth was increasing.
~ot only were the carrier comp lements lost, but additional
units as well . A "Midwa y Air Corps" had even been fonned
fo r the occupation of the island, with all of the aircraft
stored below deck on the Fleet Carriers sunk in th e battle.
Fortuna tely, many of the Midway pilots were saved as their
aircraft were in the ai r. Most of them were rescued by
destroyers which picked them up from the water. The
greatest loss was on the H iryu with 60 pilots killed in the
battle. The survivors were taken back to Japan nnd re-
assigned to th e S hokaku, ZlIikaku and R:yujo [ 0 replace
losses. Others wen t to land bases in the Solomons where
they flew their now-ag ing Zero-Sen and its late r Model )2
and Model 22 varjants. Mosr of them were lost there.
T he last major carrier use of the A6M2 was in the battle of
Santa Cruz on October 26, '942 . By now the Americans had
landed at Guadalcanal and the Japanese threw the carriers
Slwkaku, Zuikaku, Zuihn and Junyo intO a battle to sever the
American sup ply lifeline to Guadalcanal in the Eastern
Solomons . Under constant attack by bombers and fighters
Hying extended-range missions from Rabaul, and then under
Japanese carrier aircraft attac:k, the American position on
Henderson Field on Guadalcanal held out against greatly
Th e early morning hou rs of Sunday. December 7 1941 . while
America slp.p l Pi lots of the 1St Carlle r D,v,sion man Ihelr planes on
the high seas (S hiJ shin Shu ho)

On the alert Grou nd crewm en ready (0 release an sign al
(Koku As.h l).
superior forces . But a new sense of American victory was
being fell, for now the Japanese loss rate of A6M2 Model 21
fighters was far exceeding the American losses. With the
carriers Sholwkll and Zuiho damaged beyond further use in
the battle in carrier-vs.-carrier aircraft duels, the Japanese
retreated. Never again would the ClZero Fighter", by now
now tagged with the Allied Code Name " Zeke" (although thc
name "Zero" retained iLS popularity for the remainder of the
war), be regarded as invincible, for now the allied pilots were
armed with information. A few weeks after the carrier-aircraft
attacks on Dutch Harbour in the Aleutians the previous
June, an American patrol plane spotted an unfamiliar shape
in a bog on Akutan Island . A ground party went in, discovered
thal the young Japanese naval Petty Officer who flew il had
broken his neck and died when his "Zero Fighter" Hipped
over on h.itting the soft surface) and brought the aircraft out.
h proved to be a newly-produced Zero-Sen built at Nagoya in
February . In july the aircrafl was under repair at the United
States Naval Air Station at San Diego, California and by
September il was flying in USN colours . Pelly Officer
Tadayoshi Koga's Model 21 from the Ry ujo gave the Ameri-
can Navy the prize it sought so long. The first performance
report was issued to American pilots on September 4) and by
October 31 a full report on the " Zeke's" performance in
combat was widely distributed. The many "Zero Fighter"
myths were put to rest, and AmeriC'dn pilots learned how to
use their slower, less manoeuverable aircraft to best advan ~
tage, for in high-speed rolls and pushovers the stronger
American aircraft had it all over the lighter " Zeke. "
After Sama Cruz the A6M2 Model 2 1 did nol disappear
from service, although it now became a supplemental aircraft
rather than the prime combal model. An aLLempt was made
to improve the performance of the A6M2 with a turbo-
supercharger as the A6M4, but the idea was dropped after
tvo'O prototypes were tested. Newer Model 32, Model 22 and
later the Model 52 variants took over the Zero- S", pro-
duction lines. Most of the later-formed Model 2 1 units,
such as the K 011Oike, Tokushima, Tsuiki and Tsukuba Air
Corps ill Japan, used the !vtodel 21 on trainjng duties. Units
stretched along the Chinese coast to Syonan, the Japanese
name for Singapore, using the lv10del 21 for anti-submarine
patrol duties as part of the ISt Escort Group, as well as
training. Some of these units, including the 309th and 38lSt
Air Corps at Syonan, and the 90lSt in China, still had Model
21 's on hand at the end of the war, although many had been
shipped to japan for Special Attack purposes.
Some uf the Model 2I'S even saw first- line combat years
after passing their prime. The 601 St Air Corps received
Model 2 1'S in February 1944, and assigned the.m to the
carriers H okaku, Shokaku and Zuikaku in April t944 to be
used in the defense of the Marianas. The 6520d and 653rd
Air Corps in the Marianas had the A6M2 in first-line service
in June 1944 as fighter-bombers, with the 652nd losing six
and the 6S3rd losing 42 out of irs original 46 in the "Marianas
Turkey Shoot" between June 18 and 20. When the 341Sl
Air Corps went to its base at Clark Field in the Philippines
in the summer of 1944 it took Model 21'S along for training,
with examples later captured there by American invasion
forces. When the 11th Air Corps was finally disbanded at
Syonan in D ecember '944, its pilots joined the 38TSt Air
Corps stationed there, while its A6M2 equipment was sent
back to Japan for Kamikaze operations, the final combat use
of the best known japanese aircraft of aU times.
Fighter on Floats
The possibility of war in the Pacific, based on the pressures
being exerted by the Western Democracies and Japan's need
for Dutch Indies oil and tin, was seriously faced by the
Imperial Navy at the time the Zern-Sen made irs first appear-
ance in the A6M2 Model 1 1 form in J 940. The need to hold
positional bases in Southern waters after the carriers had
struck, and before land-based fighters could be moved in
due to base construction requirements, led to the assignment
of a t 5-Slti specification for a ftoatplane fighter. Kawanishi
got the developmental order while Nakajima got an interim
order late in 1940 to qu.ickly produce a stop-gap float fighter
to have on hand in litt1e over I:l year. To save engineering
time the A6M2 Model 1 I mjnus its landing gear was to be
the design basis, and in February 1941 work began on
Nakajima Project AS-I as the A6M2-N. Nakajima engineers
Tajima and Niitake used every short-cut at their command,
and by December T941 the first of four prototypes was on hand
at the Yokosuka Naval Air Test centre. Wind tunnel and water
tank tests led to the use of the existing ESN T mainfloat
d esign, mounted on a single pylon, with fuel tankage in the
fioat, and modified ve rtical tail surfaces to provide the
necessary additional directional stability. On December 8
(Japanese time), only a matter of hours after the attack at
Pearl Harbor, the prototype A6M2-N made irs first fligbt.
By April the fighter was in production, with experimental
Model II prototypes scheduled for combat evaluation within
weeks in the Pacific. In July the A6M2-N was officially
accepted for JNAF production as the Type 2 Floatplane
Fighter, Model 1 J . It became generally known as the 2
Suisen.
lts test of strength was soon in coming. In much the same
manner as the 12-Sili A6M2 was whisked to China, the pre-
p rod uction A6M2-N was sent to the Solomons. On May 3,
1942, as a prelude to what was to be the unsuccessfu.l Port
Moresby invasion, Florida Island and the harbour of Tulagi
were in vaded. This strategic inlet further extended Rabaul' s
defense perimeter and gave the jNAF a base in the Solomons
that provided air cover over North-eastern New Guinea as
well as the Bism ark Islands behind it and the far reaches of
the Solomons before it. The Yokohama Ai r Corps, equipped
with twelve of the service- lesl A6M2-N float fighters, was
immediately moved in. By the time Americ..1n carrier aircraft
were counterattacking on May 4, they were being intercepted
by the 2 Suisen. Surprised by the: American presence, the
Yokohama Air Corps lost 3 or 4 of its new fighter~, which
were quickly replaced from japan.
As a fighter the z Suisen was formidab le, but as a ftoatplane
it was a shock. Armed with two 20mm cannon and two 7.7
maclline guns, the A6M2-N had a speed of 270 m .p.h. It
literally out-performed its American carrier-based opposition,
and intercepted land-based B-17E F lying Fortress bombers
as high as 20)000 feet. Because it was there and had a home
base in the area, the z Suisen owned the skies over the
Solomons. Code named " Rufe" hy the Allies, the fighter
soon showed up throughout the Southern Islands; in the
Shortiands, Rekata Bay, Poporang in the Southern Bougain-
villes and around the approaches to Rabau!. As production gOt
moving in July r942, with an improved model coming off the
Nakajima lines beginning in December and continuing
through the end of p roduction in September J943, the "Rufe"
began to show up wherever the JNAF had water close at
hand, in areas where improved ai rfields were not avai lable.
The most dramatic use of the uRufc" was in the Aleutians.
Aft~r Midway, Admi.raJ Yamamoto felt it unwise to anempt
lo mvade the Aleutians, but Naval Headquarters and his
fellow officers overruled his objections. Their goal was to
occupy American land and prevent any assaults or invasion
attempts against northern Japan across the island-hopping
land bridge stretching from Alaska to the Kuriles. Sadly
underrating their enemy, the Ja panese asswned that the biuer
weather would restrict American counter-measures and that
the 2 SUllen, in the absence of airfields, wou ld command the
skies and be able to defend the japanese bases at Kiska and
Attu. The float fighlers, accompanied by E13A2, E8NI and
FIM2 floatplanes, were ferried in during June and july 1942
Rel sens wa rming up on the dec k of th e Akagi [he morning af December SUI. 1941 . J apanese time. pri or to the Pea rl Harbo r
attack ( M. Tada ).
by the seaplane tenders Chilose, ChljlOda and Kamikawa-Marll.
At Ki ska , the Kamikawa- Maru unloaded its fi rst eight
" Rufes" for the Sth Air Corps on June IS . Commanded by
Captain Takahashi, by July J4 the 5th Air Corps had a dozen
of the fioat figh ters set up and in operation, plus all the
support equipment and supplies to m~intain the unit for an
extended period . T hey operated out of Kiska Harbor.
They arri ved none too soon. Within a week after their
arrival the Japanese at Kiska were under American air
attack, whi ch only intensified as the months passed and the
Americans bui lt airstrips closer and closer to the Japanese
occupied islands. Briefly capturing Attu Island, leaving it,
and returning again to prevent its use as an air base, the
JNAF moved the Tako Ai r Corps into Allu in October and
provided it with " Rufe" fighters . B-I7E Flying Fortress,
B-24 LiberalOr, Catalina and finally Lockheed P -38 Lightning
fighter attacks against the lonely Japanese garrisons, with
the P-38 ::;eeing its first combal use in the Pacific, kept the
Japanese units unde~ constant pressure. In the early days of
the Aleutians fighting the " Rufe" pilots held their own.
Although there were no 2 Suisen "aces", a creditab le number
of American bombers were downed by the fast fioatplanes.
On at least one occasion a "Rufe" downed a P-38, in spite of
the fact that the American fighter definitel y held the advan-
tage. Over Kiska, the 5th Air Corps maintained CAP cover
with two "Rufes" throughout the day, wi th two more going
up as soon 3 S the patrol on duty started down . By September
1942 the lOp ranking " Rufe" pilot at Kiska had shot down
two B-17'S. On September 14 the tide definitely turned.
M ounting a heavy raid of twelve 8-24'S supported by
Wa iling rOI the moment of re le ase of Re lsens on th e deck of the Akagi {R. 'Vi . Bue sc he l}.
twenty-eight P-38 and P-39 fig hters, the American Army
Air Forces destroyed four "Rufes" without combat loss,
although two of the P-38'S collided and crashed .
Attacks almost daily, and continued strafing of the Japanese
fighters, broke the back of the resistance. By March 1943 the
freque ntl y reinforced 5th, later the 452nd, and Toko Air
Corps were inoperab le . At one point seven "Rufes" were
sunk or beached at Ki ska, beyond repair, wh ile the strafed
wreckage of other " Rufes" litte red Holtz Bay at Attu .
When American forces landed at Anu in May ' 943 there
was no fighter opposition. By August the Americans landed
at Kiska, only to discover that the entire Japanese force had
moved out under cover of fog the month before and escaped
unscathed. A wrecked "Rufe" was pulled out of the sea at
Attu in June, shipped to the Alameda Naval Air Station in
California for ::;tudy, and Lhen soon forgotten . Pilots in the
superior Allied aircraft no longer worried about the makeshift
fighter.
Tn the South Pacific, the 2 Suistm suffered equally hard,
with the men of the Y okohama Air Corps, fi rst unit equipped
\\';th the fighter, becoming national martyrs. Continually on
the offensive, and almost as consistently winning, the Imperial
Navy was totally unprepared for any Allied counterattack.
On August 7, 1942 it came) and the target was the ourer
reaches of the Solomons. Just before dawn the garrison at
Tulagi reported that F lorida and Guadalcanal islands were
under beavy bombardment. When communications stopped,
8th F leet Headquarters at Rabaul could only assume that
Tulagi and the Y okohama Air Corps had been completely
overrun. American landings had been made, all eight of the
Yokohama 's "Rufes" were destroyed, and the: brutal battle
for control of Guadakanal and the Solomons had begun .
With the outer fringes of Japan's wartime empire ca ute rized,
the "Rufe" \V3 ~ no longer the advance representative: of the
JNAF in the air. Its r61e became defensive and largely passive.
in the combat zones, with the: transport carrier Kaiyo
supplying the 958th Air Corps at Rabaul, the A6M2- still
found use as an interceptor until the pull-out early in 1944.
At Paramushiro in the Kuriles the remnants of the 452nd
Air Corps ftf!\\1 interception missions from their base at
Shimushu in 1942 and 1943, flying a d07.e n " Rufes". Farther
back behind the Pacific front, " Rufes" of the 40th Air Corps,
later becoming the 936th, provided convoy escort, anti-
submarine and reconnaissance patrol from its bases at
Syonan and Drunei in North Borneo until the end of the
war. The 80 lst formerly the Y olwhama Air Corps, and the
Olnl Air Corps in Ja pan were also used for patrol, while the
" Rufes of the OISU Air Corps even doubled as B-29 inter-
cepcocs late in 1944 from their base on Lake Biwa near
Kyoto. Some of the la[e model A6M2-N fighters, 73 of which
were completed in a rush in Septembe.r 1943 '(Q tenninate
production, had full rughl flying gear for patrol duties.
Others became [rainer> for the powerful Kawanishi l\ I K I
Kyofu. floatplane fighter "Rex ", entering service early in IY45. A hove The signal IS 9 .... en Relc~se on the carner Sho kak u (Shashln
A few even survived the war, with at leasl onc of the 930th Sh u hn)
Air Corps "Rufes" ultimatel y serving under French colours
in Indo-China until the early [950'S.

Trainer for Two

The expanded training requiremenls of the Pacific War led
to the only non-combatanl model of the A6M2 Z ero-Sen
series. Two airframe ~ modified to carry an instructor to the
rear and sludent in front were produced at the 21 st Naval
Air Arsenal at Omura ea rl y in 1942 in much the same manner
as the A5M4-K had heen developed from the A5M4 fighter.
Assigned a 1942 17-Shi project number, the high-speed
trainer was accepted for production as the A6M2-K latcr in
the yea r, s[rangely retairung the Type a production designa-
tion as the Type a Trainer-Figh[er M odel II. Officially
named the Rt. · jrensen, it became known as the Zero-Reno
The cannon and wheel covers of the combat model were
removed to save weight, although me machine guns were
retained for training. The 21S[ Arsenal pUI the new trainer
intO production la[e in [942 and ultima[ely produced 236
more between February 1943 and October 1944. An improved
model entered production at Hitachi early in 1944 with 272
produced there between May 1944 and th e end of July, [945 .
The Im perial Navy placed orders with Hitachi for 665 of
the trainers in this period, but bombings and the inability Above A" Akagl figh ter. one of nme IClk es off ,n the rHst Wav e
to set up the lines fas t enough caused the finn to lose over aga1051 Hawdll (v ia R. Ward)
half of this po[ential business.
Physically, the A6M2-K looked much like its Zero-Sen
parent, although 3 long canopy to protecl the instructor Below I ilklng off from the deck of Ihe Shokaku on the way to Ih e
(while leaving the student out in the open air) and horizontal ooeni ng bailie 01 the Pacific War (M Toda)
fins on the fuselage to control an annoying tail fluner al[ered
its appearance somewhat. The availability of lhe new con-
version trainer enabled the J NAF to undertake an experiment
in training that would hopefully speed up the process.
A6M2-K trainers were assigned to combat units and students
were then assigned directly to these units after completion of
primaty and intermediate training. The goal was to conduct
all conversion training in rhe line units, thereby shaving three
to six months from a I i -year training schedule. With pilols
of na[ural ability the idea worked, but in lhe main the
procedure took longer, wasted valuable fucl , and led [ 0 man y
unforrunate accidents. Ry late 1944 an acute shorlage of fuel
curtailed this advanced training and the on-the-job training
programme ill combat uni ls was re-e valuared . Fuel was
allocated to the training establishmen ts, and soon the pi lots
had been CUI [0 t5 flying hours per month . Most units
retained Zero-Rell trainers as pilor refreshers, while: others
used them for Special Attack trairung for the mass suicide
missions anticipuled in the event of an invasion of Japan .
The A6M2-K held the distinction of being the last develop-
ment of th e famous A6M2 series to remain in production ,
wid, the las[ example rompleled less than three weeks before
the end of d,e war. Few W orld War II aircraft maintained
such a record.
~~~~ a
g.§.§.§. a
SPECIFI,CATIONS: IIlt••blshl AlII Typ. 0 Shl,-b.s.d (C.rrier) Fight.r R.I••• (Z.ro-Filhter) end lIodific.tions. NOTE: All di.ensions in orilinal J.pen ......tric. Di ... nsions .nd climb in ••t.rs (.). w.llilts in
killlrl,ms (kg). distinCIl in kilom"... (km) end s,.eds in kilom".r. - p.r-haur (km/hr.) 0". In
,.r.n~I .. ls .r•••ti ... tes or '"roli... te.
Cj;'ijj'(ij'C n
~::.~~ ~
ASMI12-Shi ASM212-Shi ASM2 ASM2 ASM2 ASM2a ASM4 ASM2-N ASM2 ASM2-N ASM2-K ASM2-K ASM2-K
~G;l;~ ~ Model and S2ecs Proto!l:2es Prototypes Model 11 Model 21 Model 21 Model21A Model 41 15-Shi Model 11 Model 21 17-Shi Model 11 Model 21
~~~~
-1-1-1-. 'a
g Crew 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Span (M) 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000
~~;§~ S length (M) 8.78 9.0S 9.0S 9.0S 9.0S 9.0S 9.0S 10.10 10.131 9.150 9.150 9.150
Cl»CDCD(J)
OOO;!. go 'Height (M) 3.43 3.509 3.509 3.509 3.509 3.509 3.509 4.30 4.30 4.305 3.509 3.509 3.509
(')()()m
Q) Q) Q) x
..
.. Wing Area (M)2 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44 22.44
~.~.~.~
~::;'::;'3'
3.• Weight Empty (kg)
Weight loaded (kg)
I,S52
2,343
1,671
2,389
I,S71
2,389
1,680
2,410
1,680
2,410
1,921
2,4S0
1,921
2,4S0
1,819
2,334
Weight loaded Max. (kg) 2,880

---I»
cCi'<c'cE'~
=r=r=r_
(DctlCD_
:':':'0
Max. Speed (km/hr)
Cruising Speed (km/hr)
Climb (m/min.)
513/3S00m
5000/7'15"
533/4550m

SOOO/7' 27"
533/4550m

SOOO/7' 27"
520/4550m

6000/7' 27"
520/4550m

SOOO/7' 27" 3000/3' 57"

435/4000m
5000/S' 43"
47S
SOOO/7' 5S"
47S

~~~~ 2x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.72x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.7

00 O~. Armament-M.G. (mm) 2x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.7 2x7.7
a.C.a.CD
(1)(1)(1) .... Armament-Cannon (mm) 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20 2x20
---"
~~:::::cC'
Armament-Bombs (kg) 2x30,or 2x30, or 2x30,or 2x20, or 2x30, or 2x30,or
2x30, or 2x30, or 2x30, or 2x 30, or 2x30
. . . :T 2xSO 2x60 2x60 2xSO 2xSO 2xSO 2xSO 2xSO 2 xSO 2xSO
om-a; Power Unit-Mfr. Mitsubishi Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima
Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima
;:::;':T ~~.... Type MK21uisei13 NKlcSakae12 NKlcSakae12 NKlcSakae12 NKlcSakae12 NKlcSakae12 NKlcSak"e12 NKI cSakae12 NKlcSakae12 NKlcSakae12 NKlc Sakae 12 NKlcSakae12 NKl c Saka. 12
Q.l l>::T CI)

~:::;.()~ H.P. 780 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940
.... (')0 0
0 0 3::1
0 .... C"'c.
.... "C -''0
Aircraft-Mfr. Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Field Modif. Mitsubishi Nakajima Nakajima Nakajima Sasebo Sasebo Hitachi
~!"io Nakajima
~ z a.- First Built March'19, 1939 Dec. 1939 July 31, 1940 Nov. 1940 April 17, 1941 (1943) 1942 Dec. 1941 July 1942 Dec. 1942 Jan. 1943 Feb. 1943 May 1944
~P?:~ Number Built 2 17 47" 127 (1425)" (35)t 2tt 4 107 220 2 23S 272
'"Di '0
G)()~
~
g. S. Q -< 'Reinforced wing spar beginning with aircraft No. 22. "Oiffered from earlier Model 21 by having aileron tabs. tlong barrel 20-mm cannon. ttModel 2'1 with turbosupercharger.
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