Donor Reporting Status

Status of Donor
Reporting to
Government
With funds from
STATUS OF DONOR REPORTING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE (2020)
Contents
Contents ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 5
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................ 8
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 9
1.1 Background Information and Objective ................................................................................................................ 9
1.2 Methodological Approach ........................................................................................................................................ 11
1.2.1 Scope ............................................................................................................................................................................. 11
1.2.2 Data Collection ........................................................................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Limitations of the Study ............................................................................................................................................. 11
1.4 Structure of Report ..................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.0 THE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS OF DONOR
FUNDED PROJECTS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF TOTAL AID BASKET IMPLEMENTED
IN SIERRA LEONE ..................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 12
2.2 Sierra Leone Donor Structure ................................................................................................................................. 12
2.3 Processes and Procedures for Implementing Donor-Funded Projects .......................................................... 12
2.3.1 Investment Project Financing (IPF) for World Bank and AfDB Funded-Projects ........................................ 12
2.3.1.1 Investment Project Proposal by the Recipient Country ................................................................................... 13
2.3.1.2 Considerations and Preparatory Appraisal Missions for IPF ............................................................................ 13
2.3.1.3 Board Approval of IPF and Negotiation Stages .................................................................................................. 13
2.3.1.4 Recipient Government’s Approval ......................................................................................................................... 14
2.3.2 EU-Funded Projects ................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.4 Implementation Arrangements of Donor- Funded Projects ............................................................................ 15
2.4.1 Implementation Arrangements of IPF as in PAD ................................................................................................ 15
2.4.2 Implementation Arrangements for EU Funded Projects – The role of NAO .............................................. 17
2.5 Profile of selected IPFs ............................................................................................................................................... 17
2.6 Performance of total aid basket to Sierra Leone, FY 2016 ................................................................................ 21
2.7 Processes and Procedures in Reporting Donor-funded Projects .................................................................... 23
2.7.1 Processes and Procedures in reporting on IPFs .................................................................................................. 23
2.7.1.1 Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR) ................................................................................................... 24
Sierra Leone Portfolio Performance Review – The World Bank ................................................................................... 24
Sierra Leone Country Portfolio Performance Review – AfDB ....................................................................................... 25
2.7.1 Processes and Procedures in reporting EU-funded Projects ............................................................................ 27
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2.8 Impact of Implementation of Donor-funded Projects ........................................................................................ 27

3.0 ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN REPORTING OF AID ......................................................................................... 28
3.1 Role of key Stakeholders in the Implementation and Reporting on Donor-funded Projects ................... 28
3.1.1 The Role of the PFMU ................................................................................................................................................ 28
3.1.2 The Role of DACO....................................................................................................................................................... 29
4.0 PARIS DECLARATION ON AID RELATIONSHIPS AND EFFECTIVENESS..................................................... 31
4.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................................................... 31
4.2.1 Limited Trust in Country Systems............................................................................................................................. 32
4.2.2 A Large Portion of Aid is ‘Off-budget’ .................................................................................................................... 32
4.2.3 Limited Degree of Coordination among DPs........................................................................................................ 32
Aid Fragmentation...................................................................................................................................................................... 32
4.2.4 Low Aid Predictability and Erratic Funding Flows................................................................................................. 32
4.2.5 Power Imbalance Fosters One-Dimensional Accountability Relationship....................................................... 33
4.2.6 Differences in understanding of National Ownership Concept........................................................................ 33
4.2.7 Lack of Mutual Trust...................................................................................................................................................... 33
4.3 Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF)................................................................................................................ 37
5.0 FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................... 37
5.1 Findings........................................................................................................................................................................... 37
5.2 Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................................... 38
5.3 Recommendations........................................................................................................................................................ 39
References.................................................................................................................................................................................... 42
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Share of total aid basket to GOSL, 2016 ............................................................................................................ 21
Figure 2: Trend in total aid basket to GOSL, 2011 to 2016 .............................................................................................. 22
Figure 3: Sectoral share of the total total aid basket in 2016 ......................................................................................... 22
Figure 4: Sector distribution of projects .............................................................................................................................. 25
LIST OF TABLESTable 1: Principles and indicators of the Paris Declaration ................................................................ 9
Table 2: Profile of selected donor-funded projects .......................................................................................................... 18
Table 3: Major performance indicators as at 31 August 2017 ....................................................................................... 26
Table 4: Preliminary assessment of status of implementation of Paris Declaration .................................................. 34
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ACRONYMS
AfDB: African Development Bank
APP: Annual Procurement Plan
AWPB: Annual Work Plans and Budget
BADEA: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
COSL: Country Office Sierra Leone
CPF: Country Partnership Framework
CPPR: Country Portfolio Performance Review
CSP: Country Strategy Paper
CT: Country Team
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DACO: Development Assistance Coordination Office
DAD: Development Assistance Database
DFID: Department for International Development
DL: Disbursement Letter
EC: European Commission
EOI: Expression of Interest
EU: European Union
EVD: Ebola Virus Disease
FA: Financing Agreement
GoSL: Government of Sierra Leone
IA: Implementation Arrangement
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICB: International Competitive Bidding
ICR: Implementation Completion Report
IDA: International Development Association
INGOs: International Non-Governmental Organizations
IPF: Investment Projects Financing
IRM: Immediate Response Mechanism
ISMs: Implementation Support Missions
KPIs: Key Performance Indicators
MAF: Mutual Accountability Framework
MDAs: Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDBS: Multi-Donor Budget Support
MDTF: Multi Donor Trust Fund
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MOPED: Ministry of Planning and Economic Development

MTDP: Medium Term Development Plan
MTRs: Mid-Term Reviews
NCB: National Competitive Bidding
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organization
NIP: National Indicative Programme
NAO: National Authorizing Office
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC: Oil Producing and Exporting Countries
PAD: Project Appraisal Document
PC: Project Coordinator
PCU: Project Coordinating Unit
PDO: Project Development Objective
PFMICP: Public Financial Management, Improvement and Consolidation Project
PFMU: Project Fiduciary Management Unit
PIM: Project Implementation Manual
PIUs: Project Implementation Units
PM: Project Manager
PPSD: Procurement Strategy for Development
PRAG: Practical guide to procurement and grant award procedures for EU external action
PSC: Project Steering Committee
RFP: Request for Proposal
RFQ: Request for Quotation
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
SOEs: State Owned Enterprises
STEP: Systematic Tracking Electronic Procurement
TA: Technical Assistance
TTL: Task Team Leader
UK: United Kingdom
UNCT: United Nations Country Team
UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The key principles ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability agreed
between donors and recipient governments including Sierra Leone are the basis of the 2005 Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness. Despite donors have come to recognize that recipient country ownership is essential to the
effectiveness of aid, they have manifested to a large extend that harmonization and coordination of their
operations is critical for the benefit of recipient countries. This a claim that is yet to be proven otherwise in line
with adhering to the principles of ownership, partnership and mutual accountability.
In Sierra Leone, effective coordination and management of external resources is critical, which is the basis for
establishing Development Aid Coordination Office (DACO) as a central hub for aid coordination and
management in Sierra Leone. Since its establishment, DACO has been struggling to solicit adequate information
from donors to effectively coordinate and report on aid effectiveness to government. Issues concerning the
vicious cycle of lack of ownership and alignment, lack of aid transparency, lack of aid predictability, limited
confidence in the use of government systems and the proliferation of investment projects are critical deterrents
to enhancing aid coordination. It was against this background of daunting challenges that the aid policy of 2009
was developed. Also, uncoordinated efforts among stakeholder institutions (EAD, DACO etc.) on how to ensure
donors officially report on aid operations and the manner in which the government respond to outcomes of the
existing reporting frameworks arrangement are critical to enhancing aid coordination and reporting. This is the
main trust of the study, to determine the status of donor reporting to government.
The desk study, through secondary information, was mainly used to synthesize and interpret the results backed
by key informant interviews. Specific multilateral projects were targeted, some of which are either completed or
ongoing. Implementation arrangements of the targeted projects were reviewed to synergize claims by DACO
and the existing prevailing realities with implementation of investment projects.
The uncoordinated reporting structures by both the government of Sierra Leone and donors, through Project
Implementation Units (PIUs), Project Steering Committees (PSCs), National Aurthorising Office (NAO),
Implementation Support Missions (ISMs), Mid Term Reviews (MTRs), Country Portfolio Performance Reviews
(CPPRs) and the Development Assistance Database (DAD) software administered by DACO, during and after
implementation of investment projects financing is not sufficient to conclude donors have not done much to
report to Government on aid effectiveness and management. It is clear that the government too has not done
enough to follow on issues raised in ISMs, MTRs and CPPR reports to improve on aid effectiveness and reporting.
Also, it is important to engage donors bilaterally in executing investment projects financing right at the inception
of the project design up to project negotiation stage especially in areas of the use of procurement systems and
mode and channel of reporting.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Information and Objective
The objective is understanding and analyzing the status of donors reporting of investment project financing to
the Government of Sierra Leone.
The key principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability
agreed between donors and recipient government including Sierra Leone are the basis of the 2005 Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness pioneered by the OECD-DAC (Bigsten, 2006; Knack, 2013). Donors committed
to making their aid practices more consistent with the principle of country “ownership,” including conformity
with partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures. An expanded version of the
commitments, the indicators associated with the commitments is shown in table 1 below
Table 1
Principles and indicators of the Paris Declaration
Principles Indicator No Indicators

1 Countries having operational development strategies
2a Reliability of a country public financial management system
2b Reliability of a country’s procurement system

Ownership: Partner Countries exercise effective leadership over their over their
development policies.
3 Align aid flows to national priorities
Donor’s base their overall support on partener countres’ national development 4 Coordinating support to strengthen capacity
Harmonization: Donor’s actions are more harmonized, transparent and 5 Use of country systems
collectively effective.
6 Avoiding parallel implementation structures
7 Providing more predictable aid
8 Unifying aid
9 Using common arrangements
10a & 10b Conducting joint missions and sharing analysis

Managing for results: Managing resources and improving decision
making for results
11 Countries to have a result-based monitoring framework
Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for
development results 12 Countries to have reviews of mutual accountability
Source: (OECD, 2009a)
To what extent recipient governments like a donor-dependent country like Sierra Leone and donors themselves
have honoured these principles?
The Paris Declaration agenda calls for increased use of recipient systems in managing aid, but it explicitly
acknowledges that weak country systems make aid less effective. In the meantime, using those systems, despite
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their flaws, is believed to strengthen them: “Donors can help build capacity and trust by using country systems
to the fullest extent possible, while accepting and managing the risks involved” (OECD, 2009a). Elmers,
(2011: 18) further notes: “Improved country systems, in their turn, improve the transparency and accountability
of all public spending beyond aid.”
Despite donors have recognized the fact that recipient country ownership is essential to aid effectiveness and
development efforts, donor have manifested harmonization and coordination of their operations for the benefit
of recipient countries. However, this belief has been perceived otherwise in terms of fully adhering to the key
principles of the Paris Declaration. The reasons are as follows:
01 Uncoordinated practices,
particularly understanding
and fulfilling the multiple,
diverse requirements of d
03 Limited mechanisms by
recipient countries to
enforce commitments
ifferent donors made by donors.
Cleverly ensuring aid Few levers from recipient

management systems countries to ensure donors
02 04
support, donor effectively report on funds
requirements, not national meant for recipient
systems (in particular, countries and by which
“ring-fencing” and they can hold donors
parallel management accountable for their
systems) actions
Aside, donors’ incentives to use country systems (or alternatively to micro-manage aid using their own parallel
systems), depend on their perceived quality (Knack, 2013). Where a recipient country’s aid management systems
are stronger, corruption scandals tarnishing, the donors reputation are questionable, and aid-funded programs
are more likely to be selected and implemented more efficiently. Although the Paris Declaration commits donors
to use country systems and procedures “to the maximum extent possible,” it also recognizes that weaknesses in
country systems sometimes justify donors’ decisions to bypass them. Aid effectiveness is furthered by using
country systems “when these provide assurances that aid will be used for agreed purposes.” (Knack, 2013).
In terms of donor reporting to the Government of Sierra Leone, multilateral donors (the World Bank an AfDB)
do inform governments through their Project Implementation Units (PIUs), Implementation Support Missions
(ISMs) reports held quarterly or half yearly, the Medium Term Review (MTR) reports held half way down the
project life span and the Country Performance Portfolio Reviews (CPPRs) held annually. Reports for EU funded
projects are done through the National Authorising Office (NAO) and interim implementation reports and a
comprehensive final implementation report. Notwithstanding, it is clear the mandate actually rests with the
Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) established as a central hub for aid coordination and
management in Sierra Leone. (Black, Nodall, & Adu-Boahene , 2009) However, critical to achieving DACO’s
mandate are the survey assessments in determining the status of key indicators of the Paris Declaration and the
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Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), which donors have somehow supported. Issues concerning the vicious
cycle of lack of ownership and alignment, lack of aid transparency, lack of aid predictability, limited confidence
in the use of government systems are critical deterrents to enhancing aid coordination. It was against this
background of these daunting challenges that the aid policy of 2009 was developed by DACO. Also,
uncoordinated efforts among stakeholder institutions on how to ensure donors officially report on aid operations
and the manner in which the government respond to issues in the existing reporting frameworks arrangement
are suggestions to enhancing aid coordination and reporting.
The Government of Sierra Leone in partnership with the UNDP, DFID and the Delegation of the EC established
DACO in 2004 in the Office of the Vice–President. In 2007, DACO was transferred to MoFED and later in 2018,
to MoPED
To address these concerns, there was the compelling need to establish a central hub for aid coordination and
management in Sierra Leone.
With all these in mind, the extent to which the 2009 aid policy is implemented especially adhering to the key
principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration and more importantly, understanding and analyzing the status of donors
reporting on aid administration to the Government is what this study aim to achieve.
Details of how this is done are articulated in the methodology below:
1.2 Methodological Approach

The main research method of the desk study on donor reporting is synthesis and interpretation through
secondary information. For further evidence, the report utilized qualitative research methodology using rapid
assessment techniques such as key informant interviews.
In terms of scope the primary group of donor which the report covered are the multilateral institutions especially the
World Bank, AfDB and the EU etc. Specifically eight (8) projects were targeted comprising WB, AfDB and EU-funded
projects some of which are either completed or ongoing. Some of the information captured for each project includes the
Scope following: name of project; commencement date of project implementation; official project close date; project development
objectives; size of the portfolio, etc. In addition is the implementation arrangements that covers implementation structures,
roles and responsibilities of both the donor and recipient government including reporting on implementation status.
In order to effectively conduct the desk study, data was sourced mainly from the PIUs for Investment Project Financing
(IPF) anchored in MDAs, NAO and DACO anchored in the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MoPED),
Data Collection the PFMU anchored in MOF. Also, additional information was sourced from Implementation Completion Reports (ICR) of
projects that has officially come to a closure.
This report was limited to few multilateral institutions (the World Bank, AfDB and the EU) not donors or international
NGOs that go into bilateral financial arrangement with recipient government. Also, most of the bilateral and INGOs have
their local counterparts or local NGOs that implement programmes nationwide on behalf of their sponsors. This report
did not cover reporting at these levels. And the extent to which the government is able to track down systems, processes
Limitations of the and procedures of the funds flow from all these institutions along the value chain is critical to the manner in which
donors report to government on funds utilization, to whom and for which purpose. This report was limited to few
multilateral institutions (the World Bank, AfDB and the EU) not donors or international NGOs that go into bilateral
Study financial arrangement with recipient government. Also, most of the bilateral and INGOs have their local counterparts
or local NGOs that implement programmes nationwide on behalf of their sponsors. This report did not cover reporting at
these levels. And the extent to which the government is able to track down systems, processes and procedures of the
funds flow from all these institutions along the value chain is critical to the manner in which donors report to government
on funds utilization, to whom and for which purpose.
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In terms of structure, the report is presented as stated below. Section 1 looked at the background information and objective,
Structure of methods and limitation. Section 2 described Sierra Leone donor structure, the framework of implementation arrangements
of IPF including the processes and procedures for IPF implementation, and the general performance of total aid basket for
the financial year 2016. Section 3 described the various donor reporting mechanisms to the Government of Sierra Leone.
Report Section 4, summarized results of Paris Declaration and Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) and analyzed complex
issues in aid relations and aid effectiveness including aid fragmentation in Sierra Leone. Section 5 presents the findings,
concludes and makes recommendations for the study.
2.0 THE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS OF DONOR

FUNDED PROJECTS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF TOTAL AID BASKET IMPLEMENTED
IN SIERRA LEONE
2.1 Introduction
This section describes Sierra Leone donor structure, the framework of implementation arrangements of donor-
funded projects including the processes and procedures for implementing donor-funded projects and the
general performance of total aid basket for the financial year 2016.
2.2 Sierra Leone Donor Structure

Sierra Leone’s donor structure is sometimes described as an ‘inverted pyramid’. Although about 42 donor
agencies are in total recorded in Sierra Leone’s DAD, only 5 of them (DFID, WB, EC, AfDB and USAID)
account for the majority of total commitments recorded in the system (UNDP, 2009). Hence, the overall aid
profile is characterized by a high degree of concentration and dispersion. While USAID is channeling all its
assistance through NGOs, the other four donors use multiple channels and modalities. The four donors have
formed a MDBS, whose members have made progress regarding various efforts to improve coordination
and harmonization among themselves. This type of donor structure has two
potential implications. First, increasing harmonization among the few donors
that provide the majority of assistance might increase aid unpredictability.
For example, joint decisions on the fulfillment of conditions might have a
significant effect on the total aid volume.Delays or interruptions in aid flows
have particularly severe implications for fragile states like Sierra Leone. In
this scenario, harmonization might be perceived by a government as
‘ganging up’ of donors, which de facto reduces its bargaining power.
Second, the fact that there is a rather large number of donors that each provide only a small portion of the total
aid budget is likely to result in considerable transaction costs for the GoSL, due to the multiplicity of
administrative, monitoring and reporting requirements. Combined with fragmented aid delivery arrangements
and limited coordination, this scenario is likely to result in reduced overall effectiveness of foreign assistance
provided to Sierra Leone (UNDP, 2009).
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2.3 Processes and Procedures for Implementing Donor-Funded Projects

2.3.1 Investment Project Financing (IPF) for World Bank and AfDB Funded-Projects
It is stated that IPFs are committed to ensuring strong Government ownership and commitment in the
implementation of project activities, and sustainability of future result through building on existing institutional
structures, ensure broad representation of relevant institutions, and promote inter-ministerial coordination and
alignment essential to achieving overall project objectives.
IPFs aims to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development of member countries by providing financial
and related operational support to specific projects that promote broad-based economic growth, contribute to
social and environmental sustainability, enhance the effectiveness of the public or private sectors, or otherwise
contribute to the overall development of member states (World Bank, 2013). There are several processes involved
for a recipient country like Sierra Leone to attract funding for IPFs be it the WB, AfDB, EU etc. (World Bank,
2013) (GOSL, 2020). The processes are listed and explained below.
2.3.1.1 Investment Project Proposal by the Recipient Country

This document is a form of request to the donor financier from the recipient country (borrower) for financing a
particular investment project. The proposal should have defined development objectives, any type of activities
productive and necessary to meet the development objectives of the project, the impact of the project on the
acceptable member country’s fiscal sustainability, acceptable oversight arrangements in place, including fiduciary
arrangements to ensure that IPF proceeds are used only for the purposes for which the financing is granted,
with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency.
2.3.1.2 Considerations and Preparatory Appraisal Missions for IPF

Donors’ assessment of the proposed project is based on various country and project-specific considerations,
including consistency with a donor’s strategy in support of the country, project development objectives, taking
into account technical, economic, fiduciary, environmental, and social considerations, and related risks. The
assessment is conducted through a preparatory mission by the donor’s team to the borrower country.
Consultations and bilateral meetings are held with key stakeholders of the borrower country on the technical
and economic analyses, financial management, procurement and risks etc. The preparatory appraisal mission
from the donor to the borrower country will inform a draft Aide Memoire and circulated to the relevant
stakeholders of the borrower country for review and comments. A draft PAD is prepared that contains the
country strategic context, project development objectives, project description, project implementation, key risks
and mitigation measures, and appraisal summary.
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2.3.1.3 Board Approval of IPF and Negotiation Stages
Approval: At this stage, the PAD is submitted to the Board of Directors of the donor for approval. The Executive
Directors decide whether to approve the loan. If rejected, which is rare, further consultations will be held with
the recipient (borrower) country team to review the PAD in line with the strategy of the donor and possibly
expand scope of discussions to flesh the technical, economic, fiduciary, environmental, and social considerations,
and related risks.
Negotiations: If approved by the donor, negotiations are held between the donor team and the recipient
country team. The documents that are preconditions for negotiations are the PAD, Financing Agreement (FA) and
Disbursement Letter (DL). It is at negotiation stage that the conditions and date of effectiveness of the project is
finalized. One of the effectiveness conditions to kick-start the project is to develop a PIM and the setting up of
PIU to lead on the project management. During the negotiation stage, other aid effective conditions may be to
implement key outstanding reforms that the Government may have reneged on. Also, environmental and social
safeguard depending on the type of IPF. Though the nature of financing (credit/loan and or grant) of the project
would have been pre-determined, the need may arise from the borrower to substitute loan for grant, where
applicable, depending on the borrower’s lobbying power. For projects financed through Multi Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF), a possible effectiveness condition would be for the government to sign the MDTF Grant Agreement as
condition prior to effectiveness of the credit
Signing: Signing of legal agreements for IPF takes place after all required authorizations have been issued after
negotiations; and provided there are no payments on loans to the borrower, or guaranteed by the member
country, that are overdue by 30 days or more, unless, in exceptional circumstances, Management approves the
signing and reports such information to Executive Directors.
2.3.1.4 Recipient Government’s Approval

The outcome of the final negotiations would inform approval of the project by the recipient Government. The
approval stage is in three forms namely: The Executive Approval; Parliament Ratification; and Legal Opinion. At
any point in time at least two of the stages shall be met especially Parliament Ratification and Legal Opinion.
Certain projects like emergence response projects may not require either executive approval.
2“financing” means any loan, credit, or grant made by the Bank from its resources or from trust funds funded by other donors and administered by
the Bank, or a combination of these;
3The term Bank means IBRD and IDA (whether acting in its own capacity or as administrator of trust funds funded by other donors)
4Borrower” means a borrower or recipient of donor financing for an investment project, and any other entity involved in the implementation of the
Project.
5a report on the outcome of preparatory missions for investment project financing
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2.3.2 EU-Funded Projects
The EU support to Sierra Leone are mainly in 2 forms: Direct Budget Support and Technical Assistance to
institutions (NSAs, local councils etc.) through Expressions of Interest (EOIs). For both budget support and TA
the following procedures and processes apply for all EU support to Sierra Leone.
The EU announces its financing programme, which is mostly a 7 years programme. The currently ongoing
financing programme is the EU National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Sierra Leone (2014 – 2020). The
European Commission has concluded a new financing instrument, the Neighborhood Development and
International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) that will guide its next programming for the next 7 years
(2021 to 2027) (GOSL-EU, 2014).
The programming process starts with the pre-programming phase that is conducted internally between the
EU delegations and the EU headquarters in Brussels, particularly the External Action Service (EEAS) in
charge of the political dimension of the EU cooperation. This phase aims at defining the key political
objectives of EU cooperation in each partner country programming (EC, 2013).
A political dialogue is launched with the central government, the local authorities and other development
actors (civil society, private sector, etc.) to agree on a common political objective consistent with the EU
interests
The in-country programing phase involve dialogue sessions with the EU delegation and the Government
team including local councils and NSAs. This phase is meant to identify strategic and priority areas and
sectors for interventions to be financed by the EU cooperation. For the EU NIP for Sierra Leone
(2014 – 2020), the priority sectors are: Focus sector 1 – Governance and Civil Society; Focus Sector 2 –
Education; Focus Sector 3 – Agriculture and Food Security; and Specific Transport Intervention
The in-country programing phase involve dialogue sessions with the EU delegation and the Government
team including local councils and NSAs. This phase is meant to identify strategic and priority areas and
sectors for interventions to be financed by the EU cooperation. For the EU NIP for Sierra Leone
(2014 – 2020), the priority sectors are: Focus sector 1 – Governance and Civil Society; Focus Sector 2 –
Education; Focus Sector 3 – Agriculture and Food Security; and Specific Transport Intervention
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The consultations will be informed by an agreement between the EU and the Government of Sierra Leone
referred to as the General Orientations for Cooperation for the period in question. For the EU NIP for
Sierra Leone (2014 – 2020) and for the NDICI (2021 – 2027)
The orientations are drawn from various articles and annexes to existing agreements. For the EU NIP
(2014 – 2020), the orientations were drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 4 of
Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, revised and signed
in Luxemburg on 25 June 2005 and revised and signed in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010
x(GOSL-EU, 2014)
At the end of the identification, formulation and financing phases of the project cycle a financing agreement
is drawn up and signed between the European Commission and the Government of Sierra Leone. The
technical and administrative provisions (TAP) annexed to the financing agreement describe and include the
work programme, the procedures and conditions for implementation and financing, the provisional
technical and financial execution timetable, the tasks and activities and a budget estimate for the project or
programme (EC, 2017)
2.4 Implementation Arrangements of Donor- Funded Projects
2.4.1 Implementation Arrangements of IPF as in PAD

As articulated in the PADs, there is a whole section devoted to implementation arrangements of investment
projects. A summary is presented in the boxes below, which summarizes the key issues common to all projects
in terms of implementation and institutional arrangements.
Box 1: Implementation Arrangements for IPF

Establish a Project Steering Committee (PSC), Technical Committee (TC) and PIU. The PSC provide
high-level directional oversight to the project. The TC provides strategic, facilitative, and problem
solving support to the project and the PCU lead day-to-day management of the project. The host
ministries of the projects, through the PCU shall be responsible for the overarching strategic
coordination and oversight of the project
The PIUs will have a direct and regular reporting relationship with project sub components/MDAs
and will also report to the PSC biannually or as needed and requested by the PSC.
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To ensure appropriate supervision, especially in the overall direction of project implementation,

ISM and MTR are eminent by the donor staff mostly conducted twice year and at the middle of the
project life span, respectively.
Use of Country Systems: For procurements involving national procurement procedures below the
defined thresholds, national procurement systems may be used as defined by the PPSD. Open
competitive approach to the market will be Donors preferred approach as it provides all eligible
bidders/proposers with timely and equal opportunity to provide the required goods or services
Planning and Budgeting: Sub components Annual Work Plans and Budgets (AWPB) is prepared and
approved based on the policy guidelines and strategy planning as laid-out in the PIM, and consistent
with the provisions of the PFM Act of 2016.
Before approval, consultations are held with sub-components/MDAs leads/focal persons and relevant
stakeholders. The draft AWP is submitted for review and approval by the PSC and or the head of the
ministry that directly oversee implementation of the project. Subsequent approval is given by the Task
Team Leader (TTL) of the project.
The approved AWP will inform preparation of the Annual Procurement Plan (APP) which captures all
procurement related activities in the AWP for implementation. The approved APP is uploaded in
Systematic Tracking Electronic Procurement (STEP). Approval should also be granted by the Bank
after activities are uploaded in STEP.
Before commencement of implementation of the approved AWP and APP, the following processes
are eminent
i. Request in the form of a concept note from sub-components leads/focal persons to the Project
Coordinator (PC) to commence implementation of a particular activity
ii. PC, where applicable review concept note consistent with the approved AWP and forward to TTL for any
subsequent review and No Objection
iii. Upon granting No Objection, the PC informs the component lead/focal person on the decision of the
TTL and agrees on how to commence implementation. For procurement related activities, the fiduciary
team completes the procurement process and facilitates signing of contract. However, for big
procurements (ICB), donors especially the Bank will give no objection at every stage of the procurement
process before the contract is awarded. Contract management now rests with the PC of the project in
collaboration with the sub-component of the project to ensure the contract is administered consistent
with contractual provisions. For non-procurement related activities, the fiduciary unit facilitate the
process of ensuring sub-component lead/focal person execute the activity. After which an activity report
is prepared by the focal person of the project in addition to all returns associated with implementation
of the activity and submitted to the PC.
Note: Despite the blanket approval given by the TTL and government of the AWP and APP, no activity should
be implemented by the PCU without the prior approval by the TTL
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2.4.2 Implementation Arrangements for EU Funded Projects – The role of NAO
The National Authorising Office (NAO) is pivotal in executing EU funded projects. NAO, which is
anchored under (MoPED) is the principal management and executing agency within the framework
of the co-operation between the EU and the various stakeholder Government institutions.
For the implementation of specific activities like the case the EU NIP for Sierra Leone (2014 – 2020),
tenders are awarded through the NAO website
NAO must put in place a financial management including an effective and efficient internal control
system for the management of the operations for which they are in charge.
The procedures for the award of procurement contracts, whether financed by the imprest component
or by specific commitments, must comply with the practical guide to procurement and grant award
procedures for EU external actions (PRAG) applicable on the date of the launch of the relevant
procedures. However, within the imprest component, the procurement rules and procedures of the
partner country (central operations) may be used instead if they have been positively assessed by the
European Commission. In such a case, a description of or a reference to the applicable rules and
procedures shall be included in the technical and administrative implementing arrangements of the
programme estimate.
6The NAO was established by article 35 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, which inter alia, states that Government of each ACP state shall
appoint a National Authorising Officer to represent its affairs in all operations financed from the Fund resources managed by the commission and
the Bank.
For contracts worth up to the equivalent of EUR20,000, use of standard contract templates included
in the PRAG is by default not compulsory. In case of non-compliance with the procurement
procedures set forth in the PRAG or this section the costs related to the relevant contract will not be
eligible for EU funding
In the case of procurement contracts financed by the imprest component, the Head of Delegation
together with NAO may agree to lower the award thresholds stated in the PRAG in the interest of
sound financial management
For procurement contracts financed by the imprest component, the contract notices will not be
published on the EuropeAid website. Furthermore, the obligations regarding the submission of
documents for prior authorisation by the European Commission as stated in the PRAG do by default
not apply
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Ceilings for contracts to be managed within the imprest component
The following procurement contracts have to be financed with specific commitments. These contracts will
be signed by NAO but the related payments will be executed by the European Commission:
For financing decisions taken after the 1st January 2013: service contracts worth the equivalent of
EUR300,000 or more; supply contracts worth the equivalent of EUR300,000 or more; and works contracts
worth the equivalent of EUR300,000 or more
Service contracts concluded through framework contracts (BENEF), expenditure verifications and
evaluation contracts have also to be financed with specific commitments as they have to be concluded and
managed by the European Commission (for and on behalf of the Government of Sierra Leone).
2.5 Profile of selected IPFs

A total of 16 investment projects were the focus on the study. They include the following:
Public Financial
Health Service
Management Solar Park
Delivery and
Improvement Freetown
Systems Support
& Consolidation Project (SPFP)
Project (HSDSSP)
Project (PFMICP)
Smallholder
EU NIP Governance Commercialization and
and Civil Society Agribusiness Energy Sector Utility
Programne Development Project Reform Project
(SCADeP)
EU-NIP Bandajuma-
Sierra Leone Skills
Liberia Road and
Development
Bridges Rehabilitation
Project (SDF)
Project
Details of few of the donor-funded projects in terms of PDOs, portfolio size, are presented in table 2.
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Table 2
Profile of selected donor-funded projects
Impl. Project Fund Project Project

No Project Name PDO Costs source Eff. Date close date
MDA
Public Financial Management To improve budget planning and

WB/ID; 19th Sep 31st
US$28.5
1 Improvement & Consolidation
Project (PFMICP)
credibility, financial control
accountability and oversight in
MOF
million AfDB, EU 2014 Mar 2021
government finances in Sierra Leone
Health Service Delivery and (i) Increase the utilization and improve
Systems Support Project (HSDSSP) the quality of essential maternal and
child health services; and (ii) In the event
US$15.5 WB/IDA 2nd Nov 2 30th June
2 of an eligible crisis or emergency, to MOHS
million WB/TF 016 2021
provide immediate and effective
response to said eligible Crisis or
emergency
To increase power production on Grid

Solar Park Freetown US$9 ADFS, 18th Sep 31st Dec
3 Project (SPFP)
connected power & training of EGTC
Staff
MOE
million GoSL 2016 2019
EU-NIP Governance and To support democratic processes, NAO/ €27

EU Nov 2017 Dec 2020
4 Civil Society implementing civil registration and
improving public service delivery
NCRA/
NEC/
million
NCRA
Smallholder Commercialization To promote smallholder commercialization

and Agribusiness Development by fostering productive business linkages
5 Project (SCADeP) between smallholder farmers and MAFFS
US$55
million
WB, DFID
29th Nov
2016
21st Nov
2021
selected agribusiness firms and other
commodity off-takers in Sierra Leone”.
To improve the operational performance

6 Energy Sector Utility Reform
Project
of the Electricity Distribution and Supply
EDSA/
MOE
US$40
million
WB-Credit
15th Dec
2014
31st Aug
2020
Authority (EDSA).
EU-NIP Bandajuma-Liberia Road It provides for the upgrading of 100km of

and Bridges Rehabilitation roads between Sierra Leone and Liberia, €105
7 Project and the construction of three new
NAO
million
EU Nov 2014 Dec 2020
bridges
Sierra Leone Skills Development To increase access to demand-led skills

8 Project (SDF) training and build the foundations for a US$24 WB/IDA; 31st Dec 31st Oct
MTHE
demand-led skills development system in million GOSL 2018 2023
Sierra Leone
2.6 Performance of total aid basket to Sierra Leone, FY 2016

The total value of all projects (multilateral and bilateral) implemented in Sierra Leone in 2016 stood at US$521.5
million. Of this, the Multi Donor Budget Support Partners (AfDB, DFID, EU and the World Bank) accounted for
about 74 percent (US$385.7 million) of which DFID contributed about 57.2 percent (GOSL, 2017). (See figure 1).
The Arab Coordination Group, which remains a visible development partner to the GOSL, in 2016, provided an
estimated US$46.5 million to support key investment projects in Agriculture, Energy, Water, Health and Road
Infrastructure (GOSL, 2017). Others including bilateral donors accouted for 10 percent.
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Figure 1: Share of total aid basket to GOSL, 2016
Over the years (2011 to 2016), total aid basket to Government has been increasing with the highest support
recorded at the height of the Ebola epidemic (2014 and 2015). In all the years, DFID support (direct budget
supprt and investment projects) continue to account for the highest. See figure 2.
Figure 2: Trend in total aid basket to GOSL, 2011 to 2016
Sectoral allocation of total aid basket to the Government revealed that social services (health, ebola response,
education, water & sanitation and water) accounted for about 46.9 percent (US$244.4 million). Of this, health.
1 This includes the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, Oil Producing and Exporting Countries Fund (OPEC), Abu Dhabi Fund and the
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) 8Others include Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); ECOWAS Bank for
International Development
(EBID); Germany; Irish Aid; Japan; Korean EXIM Bank and USA
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total aid basket accounted for 47.5 percent. This is followed by road network and infrastructure (US$77.7 million)
and Agriculture, Rural Development and Food Security (US$39.4 million). See figure 3
Figure 3: Sectoral share of the total total aid basket in 2016
2.7 Processes and Procedures in Reporting Donor-funded Projects

2.7.1 Processes and Procedures in reporting on IPFs
IPFs implementations are reported through various means. It could be during and after project implementation.
The various reporting mechanisms are stated below:
i) The PC on a weekly, quarterly and monthly basis regularly update the TTL of the project and
subsequently the head of the beneficiary ministry on the progress on activities implementation.
j) At the end of every quarter, progress report is prepared by the PC on progress on project
implementation ensuring that activities implemented are geared towards achieving the PDO(s)
k) The project TC that comprise staff of government side meets every quarter to assess progress status.
Usually the PC is secretary to the committee. Subsequently the PSC meets half-yearly to review progress on
project, identify weaknesses, if any and advise on how to address weaknesses
l) ISMs are held half yearly largely comprising staff of the donor resident in the recipient country and
abroad. The missions assesses progress on project implementation, identify risks, if any and make
recommendations on how to mitigate the risks. In some instances, the outcomes of the ISMs may lead to
reviewing activities earmarked for implementation. The end of the ISMs informs a report (aide memoire)
presented in a wrap-up meeting with high-level government officials and the mission team members. It is
expected of government to review the aide memoire, through the PC and keep track on key action points
including status of implementation of the results milestones
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m) MTRs are also held by staff of the donor(s) financing the project half way during official lifetime of the
project. The missions are meant to review progress on implementation of project half way into implementation
of the life span of the project. The outcome of such missions, depending on the mission’s assessment, may lead
to possible restructuring of the project that may alter the PDO, the results milestones and any likely extension
of the project especially if the mission realized disbursement position in low for the project.
n) There is also CPPR done annually coordinated by donors for all PIUs to present update on project status
in terms of implementation, disbursement, challenges and mitigation measures.
o) For projects that implementation is consistent with the official project close date, ICR is prepared that
assesses project performance; timeliness of delivery of the project; project impact benefits; structure and
delivery mechanisms and adequacy in achieving the PDOs; project sustainability and challenges encountered;
and the key findings, lessons and recommendations
Description of the content of specific donor reporting requirements follows.
2.7.1.1 Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR)

Sierra Leone Portfolio Performance Review – The World Bank
As part of the World Bank’s effort to ensure good performances of the active projects in portfolio, World Bank
staff use to carry out a review of the whole portfolio every year. This review, called CPPR, is conducted to ensure
that the portfolio quality is being maintained and to identify any portfolio wide problems that need to be dealt
with. CPPR is a process where engagement and discussion is held with client PIUs and Government officials for:
(i) consulting the project implementers on the constraints they are facing; and (ii) seeking their proposals for
possible solutions and ways of addressing the issues (World Bank Group, 2017).
CPPR is undertaken as a joint exercise with the participation of the Government officials, representatives of PIUs
and World Bank Country Team (CT). This is in line with the objective of closely collaborating with the relevant
counterparts and promoting strong government ownership that is critical in building capacity as well as ensuring
that the proposed measures and actions are implemented in the future.
CPPR takes stock of the progress made since previous reviews in terms of addressing the most important
implementation issues faced by the portfolio and the overall quality of project supervision as well as the
effectiveness of portfolio risk management. It helps to strategically reassess the critical risk factors of the portfolio,
re-evaluate its development effectiveness and propose measures and actions that can be taken when a new IDA
program is developed. CPPR once conducted can inform Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs).
The World Bank and the Government of Sierra Leone conducted the FY 2019 CPPR in August 2019. The
objectives were three-fold: (i) help WB clients/partners to get more results on the ground; (ii) improve the quality
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and implementation performance of the Bank funded portfolio; and (iii) establish a more systematic follow-up
mechanism for engagement on portfolio matters with the Government as well as within the Country Team. The
CPPR cover IDA lending (grants and credits) operations, both national and regional, and Trust Funds. It focused
on practical issues of portfolio management and implementation, including its alignment against cost and timing
of delivery. Key representatives from sector ministries, PIUs’ staff, PFMU staff, staff of the key directorates of MOF
and members of the World Bank Sierra Leone Country Team participated in the CPPR. The CPPR meeting was
co-chaired by the Financial Secretary (FS) and Principal Financial Secretary (PDFS) and the World Bank Country
Representative in Sierra Leone. The World Bank presented an overview of the Sierra Leone portfolio and PIUs’
presented status of each projects currently being implemented in Sierra Leone. The detailed outcome of the
presentations is yet to be prepared and officially discussed between Government and the World Bank
Sierra Leone Country Portfolio Performance Review – AfDB

A participatory CPPR workshop was held in mid-September 2017 for all AfDB projects implemented in Sierra
Leone. It involved broad-based consultations with all stakeholders, including Government officials and project
implementation teams (PITs) to ensure ownership of the key recommendations. The detailed deliberations also
helped to identify several cross-cutting issues that are impeding the implementation of the portfolio. The
discussions focused on identifying time bound and specific measures to address portfolio implementation
challenges. The exercise led to the formulation of the 2017 Country Portfolio Improvement Plan (CPIP) that
articulates actions aimed at improving project quality at entry, and accelerating implementation by enhancing
disbursement and procurement (African Development Bank Group, 2017)
Portfolio characteristics
Results from the detailed deliberations show that at 31 August 2017, the AfDB active portfolio comprised 19
operations with a total commitment of UA161.91 million. The portfolio is mainly funded by the ADF window
totaling UA124.09 million including a PBA of UA88.23 million, a Transitional Support Facility contribution of
UA29.86 million, and a Regional Envelop contribution of UA6 million. There are 13 investment projects in the
portfolio representing 97.36 percent of the total, and 4 small institutional support operations account for the
remaining 2.64 percent. The country has also accessed AfDB window for UA22 million to finance the only
private sector operation (CECASL Heavy Fuel Oil Power Project) and a FAPA grant (UA0.71) as a contribution to
the Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme. As noted earlier, the portfolio has 3 projects funded
under the ADF regional envelop and 2 other multinational operations. COSL does not monitor the
implementation of the two multinational projects and these are excluded from the analysis. The sectorial
distribution of the projects is depicted in figure 4 below.
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Figure 4: Sector distribution of projects
Overall portfolio performance

Key performance indicators show that portfolio performance has somehow regressed since the
midterm review of the CSP in 2015 (Table 1). There is one project at risk, the Rural Water
Supply and Sanitation Project that was classified as potentially problematic in May 2017, mainly
due to poor performance in procurement, and notably the limited capacity of the implementing
partner to manage the contracts of the key service providers. Average time to effectiveness and
the average time from approval to 1st disbursement are 6.10 months and 7.38 months,
respectively. The average age of the portfolio is 2.69 years old.
Table 3
Major performance indicators as at 31 August 2017
Indicator August 2017

Average size of portfolio (UA million) 9.33
Cumulative disbursement (%) 32.75%
Projects managed from COSL (number ) 6
Age of the portfolio (years) 2.75
Ageing projects (%) 0
Projects at risk (number) 1
Projects at risk (%) 13.45
Cancellable projects (number) 9
Average time to effectiveness (months) 6.10
Average time to first disbursement (months) 7.38
IP 2.87
DO 3.00
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Cumulative disbursement
The cumulative disbursement ratio in August 2017 was 32.75 percent, representing a decline of
8.41 percent from 41.16 percent in December 2016. The factors attributing to this slowdown
include (i) completion and exit from the portfolio of fast-tracked EVD projects and other projects;
(ii) implementation delays for projects approved since 2015 that have stalled disbursement and;
(iii) slow performance of the 3 regional operations in the portfolio, with a disbursement rate of
only 0.43 percent.
Status of failed projects

A total of 5 projects were flagged for cancellation in August 2017 due to various issues including
delays in signature, first disbursement, and slow implementation as evidenced by low or no
disbursements. Since then, efforts to turn them around have been intensified and there has been
significant progress with the submission of disbursement requests at the end of the year. COSL
continue to monitor the situation closely and ignited discussions with Government in cases where
cancellable was deemed necessary.
Performance monitoring and evaluation of projects

The overall portfolio rating has increased steadily and stood at 2.87 (on a scale of 0-3) in 2017
compared to 2.40 in 2013. The improved portfolio rating reflects COSL’s proactivity in portfolio
management including interfacing with the Country Team and the EAs. Moreover, COSL has
used its presence in the country to undertake routine follow-up and monitoring. Quarterly
portfolio review meetings have been institutionalized to facilitate the timely identification of
solutions to project implementation challenges. Close interaction with the EAs has also ensured
the timely submission of quality quarterly progress reports which underpin portfolio monitoring
and evaluation. COSL also regularly engages stakeholders in fiduciary clinics and coaching
(African Development Bank Group, 2017).
2.7.1 Processes and Procedures in reporting EU-funded Projects

During implementation of the programme estimate, the imprest accounting officer must draw up
and submit summary interim implementation reports and a comprehensive final implementation
report. The technical and monitoring reports shall provide as a minimum: a summary report on
the activities carried out, problems encountered and solutions found; the activities carried out
should be related to the provisional timetable and explanations given for any delays; monitoring
of planned activities, which includes comparing the results obtained against the objectives, using
the monitoring indicators set out in the logical framework (EC, 2015).
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Summary interim implementation reports have to be drawn up regularly and presented with
each request of further pre-financing instalment. The final implementation report has to be
submitted at least 60 days after the beginning of the closure phase of the programme estimate
(EC, 2015).
2.8 Impact of Implementation of Donor-funded Projects

The impact of implementation of IPFs could be seen from Implementation Completion Reports
(ICRs). This includes status of PDO, rating of projects result framework and intermediate
indicators, ratings of the project performance in ISMs, the actual disbursement of the project at
end of project official closure, any likely ineligible expenditures that may be accrued and lack
of absorptive capacity to fully utilized the project amounts that may lead to refund to donors of
such amounts.
The impact of implementing EU-funded projects are visible as presented in the website of NAO.
For instance positive impact of the Bandajuma-Liberia Road and Bridges Rehabilitation Project is,
it will enhance living standards and reduce poverty by facilitating access to basic social services,
improving trade and economic integration of the West African region and in particular between
the North and South of Sierra Leone, reducing the cost of transport, travel time and vehicle
operating costs and improving road safety. The increased economic activity generated by the
projects will help reduce rural-urban migration, particularly among women with dependent
children. Positive environmental impacts include: reduced dust along the road plan; reduced
accident spills and contamination of ground water and soils; and improvements in drainage and
water management.
3.0 ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN REPORTING OF AID

This section describes the various donor reporting mechanisms to Government:
3.1 Role of key Stakeholders in the Implementation and Reporting on Donor-funded
Projects
Key institutions in Government have been one way or the other coordinating aid development
and reporting to the Government of Sierra Leone. Aid work of the PDMU, the Economic Affairs
Division (EAD) and PFMU of MOF, DACO of MoPED; NAO; and aid coordination and reporting
desk at MFAIR. Of all this, DACO is pivotal to ensuring the reporting of aid is coordinated
between donors and the Government of Sierra Leone. The PFMU is also central to ensuring
information on IPF is transmitted to DACO.
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3.1.1 The Role of the PFMU

It is common practice that donor funded projects are implemented through standalone PIUs that
are outside the structure of implementing MDAs and hire staff external to the affected ministries
(PAD and PIMs). The government was of the firm view that programme implementation by PIUs
alongside government structures would enhance administrative and operational coordination
and provide greater opportunities for capacity building and institutional development that will
make projects more likely to be sustainable (PFMICP/PFMU, 2020).
However, it is quite evident the established PIUs supplant rather than supplement existing
capacity as expected. Their operations outside of government structures has resulted in lack of
learning and of coordination across agencies, eroding performance since project staff are not
directly under the purview of public service. This appears consistent with conclusion of a study
by the World Bank across all countries while PIUs have facilitated monitoring and implementation
of donor-financed projects, they have failed dismally in terms of any positive long-term impact
on capacity building and institutional development in line ministries.
For instance, between the periods 2011-2015, over US$10.0 million was cancelled by various
donors (World Bank and AfDB) in programme and project aid to Sierra Leone due to absorptive
capacity and ineligible expenditures. Also, Government lost over US$2.0 million under the
Education Fast Track Initiative Project financed by the World Bank while the AfDB cancelled over
UA7.0 million for various projects due to lack of absorptive capacity. Within that same period,
the Government of Sierra Leone refunded over US$5.0 million to World Bank and IFAD for
ineligible expenditures. Also, Government did not only lose US$8.0 million grant amount under
the West African Regional Fisheries Projects in 2014 but the ministry responsible for Finance
refunded to the World Bank US$5.3 million for ineligible expenditures under the same project.
In 2017, the World Bank and the EU have requested Government to refund over US$1.0 million
dollars for ineligible expenditures resulting from mis-procurements for various projects.
The Bank in collaboration with the Government, in 2009, had earlier embarked on integrating
the fiduciary services of selected World Bank projects, as pilot, by way of establishing the
Integrated Projects Administration Units (IPAU) housed in the ministry responsible for finance.
This arrangement translated into the establishment of the PFMU to take over the fiduciary
services and related workloads for designated World Bank and other donor funded projects
across government including the AfDB, EU, etc. The PFMU anchored in MOF shall be responsible
for providing Procurement, Financial Management, Monitoring & Evaluation, and Internal Audit
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functions to all World Bank and other donor funded projects in country. To date, the PFMU is
providing fiduciary functions to about 12 to 15 donor funded projects (PFMICP/PFMU, 2020).
With this arrangement, how should DACO relates to PFMU to source first hand information on
development IPFs to aid reporting?
3.1.2 The Role of DACO

Since its establishment in 2004, DACO served as a forum for the Government and donors to
discuss the inflow of aid and aid effectiveness. In 2005, a LAN-based DAD was established in
DACO to track project-level information on results and funding flows (commitments and
disbursements) by donor, implementer, sector and location. DAD was used to track foreign
assistance, whereby DACO collected data through an Excel spreadsheet and entered it directly
in the system. Within a few months, however, it became apparent that hosting the database
locally was impossible, due to the insufficient IT environment. The option to host the system
elsewhere was considered, but not pursued due to lack of funding. Ultimately, the system was
abandoned and the server shut down (UNDP, 2009). As soon as new funding became available
through the multi-donor funded project “Support to DACO”, DAD was revived. In 2007, a
web-based version of DAD was installed, whereby the system was hosted on servers located
within the premises of the system developer in the US. It was reported the web-based version
allows development partners to enter data directly into the system, thereby avoiding a parallel
paper-based process.
DACO is currently staffed with 3 personnel (Director, Deputy Director and a Senior Economist).
Additional 5 technical staff has been recruited to boost up the staff strength of DACO. For DACO
to be able to effectively deliver on its mandate, staff should be assigned as desk officers to each
of the prominent donors supporting Government. This is currently not the case; instead the
donors themselves have to recruit desk officers to aid the work of DACO. Notwithstanding it is
expected of each donor to be regularly updating the DAD software on basic information on
donor support to the Government of Sierra Leone. The cooperation required from the donors is
not forthcoming. Donors have been slow to come on board and often underrate the importance
of provision of accurate and timely aid information in practice. This is further exacerbated by
multiple systems of reporting both by Government and development partners, leading to
‘reporting fatigue’. Consequently, information reported for ODA is often of low quantity and
quality. A lack of coordinated reported information relating to NGOs is a further problem,
creating severe constraints for effective aid coordination. Also, the channeling of a large portion
of aid through non-Government mechanisms illustrates the need for stronger mutual trust.
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Standard Operating Procedures that would define roles and responsibilities regarding data entry
and validation did not exist until May 2009. DACO experienced difficulties in getting complete
and sufficiently disaggregated data from the development partners in time, which affected its
capability to produce analytical reports. To date, DACO has formulated five (5) annual
Development Assistance Reports for 2004/05, 2006, 2007 and 2016 in addition to the Aid
Development Policy. These reports are primarily descriptive and indicate aggregated
disbursements by donor and sector. One reason for the comparably low data quality is that the
Data Entry Focal Persons assigned by the development partners are often administrative staff that
does not have sufficient understanding of the programmatic side of the projects they are entering
into the system (UNDP, 2009). The dashboard of DACO reporting on donor-funded projects is
shown in the box below.
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4.0 PARIS DECLARATION ON AID RELATIONSHIPS AND EFFECTIVENESS

4.1 Introduction
This section summarizes results of Paris Declaration and Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF)
and analyzes complex issues in aid relations and aid effectiveness including aid fragmentation in
Sierra Leone.
4.2 Results of Paris Declaration

The issues from the Paris Declaration survey results are articulated below:
4.2.1 Limited Trust in Country Systems

The extent to which donors make use of national systems is still behind target. It is clear that
donors, for subjective reasons continue to disregard the use of national systems despite the high
ratings in PFM and procurement systems.
4.2.2 A Large Portion of Aid is ‘Off-budget’

Almost half of the total aid coming into the country was ‘off-budget’, (does not come through the
consolidated revenue fund administered by the Bank of Sierra Leone). This same trend continues
considering the proliferation of investment financing projects of the key donor partners (the WB,
EU, AfDB etc.). This leaves much uncertainty about the extent to which aid is conforming to
GoSL priorities and leads to weak national ownership of some programmes. It also creates
budgetary difficulties, by way of unforeseen recurrent expenditures. In order for foreign aid to
be aligned with national priorities, a basic first step should be its inclusion in the national budget.
4.2.3 Limited Degree of Coordination among DPs

There is limited degree of coordination among development partners, which is reflected in the
low percentage of aid used for coordinated technical cooperation (indicator 4), the low number
of joint missions and analytical work (indicators 10a and 10b). Coordination is considered to be
a particularly important factor in light of the high degree of aid fragmentation.
Aid Fragmentation
In light of the large and diverse development partner structure, the sector-specific total aid
baskets appear quite fragmented. In sectors where increasing fragmentation leads to growing
competition between development partners, the effect can be that development partners, and
the government MDAs counterparts, become increasingly focused on the results of their own
projects, losing sight of the broader and more strategic objectives of the national programme.
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4.2.4 Low Aid Predictability and Erratic Funding Flows

There is very low extent to which donors are providing predictable funding. Although some
donors commit to provide long-term assistance to Sierra Leone, actual annual disbursements
often do not match with commitments and planned disbursements, leading to under-spending
of many donors, which results in limited in-year predictability for the GoSL. Overall, funding
flows are quite erratic. There have been several cases, where donors delayed or suddenly
stopped the disbursement of funds, especially during election periods and supports associated
with grants. For instance for 2 projects, PFMICP and SCaDEP, DFID and EU that agreed to
provide grant support to the projects pulled out half way down implementation of the projects.
As a result, project support can be as volatile as budget support. Severe effects on the project
implementation were in this case prevented, as the remaining donor decided to fill the funding
gap. Volatile aid funding can undermine attempts to build more institutionalized and predictable
policy and budget processes.
4.2.5 Power Imbalance Fosters One-Dimensional Accountability Relationship

Sierra Leone has not yet put in place a joint framework to assess government and development
partner performance in strengthening aid effectiveness. The effectiveness of aid largely depends
on the quality of relationships between aid ‘provider’ and the aid ‘recipient’. Much of the focus
on the Paris Declaration to date, however, has been on issues surrounding donor harmonization
and coordination. Hence, there has been a tendency to view the problems associated with aid
delivery as being overly technical whilst ignoring the power relations and political issues. The
fact that GoSL is so highly dependent on aid clearly poses a challenge for real shifts in power
relations to take place. If the government is not able to challenge the demands of donors, the
much promoted concept of ‘partnership’ between government and its donors’ remains simply a
nice theory but is meaningless in practice.
4.2.6 Differences in understanding of National Ownership Concept
The level of aid dependency also means that the government has very little power or space to
negotiate with donors. No interviewee could think of a case where the government had refused
aid because it did not like the terms on offer. This makes it difficult to assert full ownership of the
national development process. Development agencies in Sierra Leone, as well as in other
countries, are obviously struggling with the concept of national ownership, which is often
interpreted very narrowly. Donors frequently refer to ‘ownership’ when they would like the
government to ‘take the lead’ on a specific issue. However, donors demand more ‘leadership’,
mainly where they would like to see the government take action on issues high on the donors’
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agenda. But, in fact they are frequently unwilling to fully accept government leadership and
ownership and often undermine it through interventions that are not in line with national
priorities, unpredictable aid disbursements, and fragmented aid delivery through parallel
structures.
4.2.7 Lack of Mutual Trust
Aid relationships in Sierra Leone are characterized by huge asymmetries and a significant lack of
trust between the GoSL and development ‘partners’. The limited confidence of development
partners in the government finds its expression in the comparable high amount of aid that is
channeled through NGOs, though in some cases, it is a choice from a donor who believe that
civil society is an important player of the democratic check and balances process, or for the
community-based service delivery approach. Also, the limited use of country systems and the
preference for using parallel structures, as well as the high number of conditionalities, in
particular in the context of budget support are options for limited confidence in a country system.
The GoSL has difficulties to get timely and detailed information on what development agencies
are doing, which makes the government suspicious. Further, the government is concerned with
donors’ conditionalities impinging upon its sovereignty. Hence, a ‘chicken and egg’ situation
exists with the prevalent lack of trust between the government and the donors, and donors
continuing to affix heavy conditionalities to their aid, setting up parallel project units to control
their aid and trying to mold policy-making, which undermines national ownership and distorts
accountability relationships.
Table 4 below depicts preliminary assessment of status of implementation of the Paris Declaration
for the past 3 to 4 years.
11While the term ‘mutual accountability’ becomes more and more the “key term in the aid architecture”, actual progress is still weak due to the lack of
a political perspective in the context of foreign assistance. Mutual accountability is probably the least recognized of five focus areas in the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Meyer, Stefan and Schulz, Nils-Sjard (2008): Ownership with Adjectives. Donor Harmonization: Between Effectiveness
and Democratization. Synthesis Report, FRIDE Working Paper 59, March 2008.
30 Page
Table 2
Profile of selected donor-funded projects
Indicator Grading
No Principles Indicators Remarks
no system
Capacities building is a process.

Countries having
However capacities over the years
1 operational development
have been built of technical staff in
strategies
MDAs and PIUs
Reliability of a country A more focused project in reforming

2a
Ownership: Partner Countries exercise effective
leadership over their over their p u b l i c fi n a n c i a l PFM systems over the years. There is
development policies. management system FM Act of 2016 and Regulation of
Donor’s base their overall support on partener 2018. Expenditure management
countres’ national development automated and improved in about 57
Harmonization: Donor’s actions are more M DA s through IFM IS rollout ,
harmonized, transparent and collectively
implementation of TSA;
effective.
implementation of ASYCUDA World
and set up foundation for ITAS etc.
Procurement assessment reports

indicating significant savings made by
government from undertaking bad
Reliability of a country’s procurement; introduction of quarterly
2b procurement system price norms; zero tolerance to the use
of restricted procurement method;
roadmap for government electronic
procurement system
Aid flows for the past years were

more linked to outcome of
Align aid flows to national consultations in project preparatory
3 priorities missions, which presumably emanate
from national development agendas
(A4C, A4P, MTNDP, 2019-2023)
No such evidence of coordinated

support by donors to strengthen
capacity. Donors sometimes behave
s e l fi s h l y i n ow n i n g t h e i r ow n
Coordinating support to
4 strengthen capacity
programmes irrespective of the
duplications they may envisage as
result of their actions. Each partner
seeks to establish its own expertise in
each sector in which it has a presence
WB and AfDB projects precede over

country systems for NCBs and ICBs.
5 Use of country systems
For RFQs/RFPs country systems are
normally used
Difficult to avoid especially so when

Avoiding parallel donors have different sets of results
6 implementation frameworks to measure performance
structures of their projects
31 Page
Indicator Grading
No Principles Indicators Remarks
no system
Donors (EU, DFID) that do provide

Providing more predictable
grants element of funding through
7 aid
the MDTF most times pull out their
funds at the middle of project
implementation. This is eminent with
the PFMICP and SCaDEP
Through MDTF, the World Bank has

been instrumental to be used as the
8 Unifying aid implementing partner on behalf of
other donors like AfDB, EU, DFID for
some core IPFs
Ownership: Partner Countries exercise effective Donors have different arrangements

leadership over their over their development in implementation of their projects
policies.
depending on how projects are
Using common
Donor’s base their overall support on partener
countres’ national development 9 arrangements
designed structured. However,
Harmonization: Donor’s actions are more
through MDTF, WB has been seen to
harmonized, transparent and collectively be used by AfDB, EU and DFID as
effective. implementing agency
Joint missions are not usually

10a & Conducting joint missions
conducted. However, during missions
especially the World Bank Missions,
and sharing analysis
10b other partners are invited to be part
of missions
No such evidence of coordinated

support by donors to strengthen
capacity. Donors sometimes behave
Countries to have a result- se l fi shl y in ow ning their ow n
4 Managing for Results
11 based monitoring programmes irrespective of the
framework duplications they may envisage as
result of their actions. Each partner
seeks to establish its own expertise in
each sector in which it has a presence
Not all donors have signed the

Countries to have reviews
5 Mutual Accountability 12 of mutual accountability
Improved Governance Accountability
Pact
Source: Author’s assessment, 2019
4.3 Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF)

As part of government’s engagement strategy with DPs, a Mutual Accountability Framework
(MAF) was adopted in 2014. The MAF responds to the wishes of all parties that the framework
should draw on the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” agreed at the Fourth High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Pusan, Korea, in December 2011, with a view to ensuring
Sierra Leone’s continued progress towards graduation out of “Fragile State” status. In turn, the
DPs also made strong commitments to support Sierra Leone in achieving its objectives and
32 Page
aspirations as encapsulated in the A4P.

The MAF was last updated by DACO in 2014. It is evident Government has not signed one for
implementation of its MTDP, 2019-2023.
5.0 FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Findings
The following are the specific findings associated with reporting on aid effectiveness:
Donors’ relationship with recipient government on aid administration
All key issues of concerns on aid administration and effectiveness reported in the 2008 Paris
Declaration Survey (power imbalance, low aid predictability and erratic funding flows,
existence of parallel structures, limited degree of coordination among development partners,
aid fragmentation, limited trust in country systems and the large junk of aid not channeled
through the consolidated revenue fund among others) have not reported much improvement
in the implementation of donor funded projects
Government still yet to sign MAF for the implementation of the MTDP
Design and implementation of donor funded projects
PADs, General Orientations of Cooperation, Financing Agreements and other negotiation

documents are not articulated in a way to capture mutual accountability clauses and
reporting clauses including format on how donors would report to Government
There are so many approval stages in executing investment projects. Multiple approvals from
AWPs and requests for implementing activities in already approved AWPs tend to
undermine government ownership of the projects.
Donor reporting
ISMs, MTRs and summary interim and final implementation reports are forms of reporting on
progress on implementation of donor funded projects. It is evident these missions are
attended by the PIUs and mission teams and the outcomes are comprehensive reports (aide
memoire) officially communicated to Government
The CPPR undertaken every year by donors especially the WB and AfDB and progress
reports on progranmes implementation on NAO website for EU funded projects, have
proven to be the most comprehensive and coordinated way of reporting to Government on
progress on implementation of investment projects. However, the CPPR reports are not
timely prepared by donors and submitted to Government for necessary action.
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Coordination among government institutions

There is lack of proper coordination among key institutions (DACO, NAO, PFMU, EAD etc.)
tasked to gather the relevant information on aid size, effectiveness and performance.
Human and logistic capacities of DACO are inadequate to adequately champion aid
effectiveness, coordination and facilitate donors reporting of aid to the government of Sierra
Leone. How effective can DACO deliver on its mandate when the Government rely on
donor support to fund DACO operations?
Inability on part of Government to honor its obligation during implementation of investment
projects. For most AfDB projects, there is always provision for the Government to provide
counterpart funding to the project, which in most instances not forthcoming. Also delays in
the signing of withdrawal applications have all continued to slow down project
implementation, which also results to government requesting for no-cost project extension
and or Additional Financing to existing projects. This in turn makes the government look less
able and trust-worthy (another vicious cycle)
Development Partners (DPs) believed data entry process in Development Assistance
Database (DAD) has not been sufficiently institutionalized. DAD is not yet an integral part of
the wider aid coordination architecture and does not effectively function as a tool to inform
evidence-based dialogue. Donors strongly believed DAD is not functioning properly.
5.2 Conclusion
The reporting structures by both the Government of Sierra Leone and donors, through PIUs,
Project Steering Committees, summary interim implementation and final reports, ISMs, MTRs,
CPPRs and the DAD software administered by DACO, during and after implementation of
investment projects, uncoordinated, is sufficient not to conclude on the claims that donors
have not done much to report to Government on aid effectiveness and management.
However, given the lack of mutual trust, the high level of aid dependency coupled with weak
government structures and capacities, and the resultant donor behavior, which is not always
conducive to fostering nat1qional ownership, state-building and mutual accountability; it is
not surprising that Sierra Leone has not moved forward more quickly in improving the aid
system and in implementing more effective aid coordination and management mechanisms
including how donors report on aid management.
It is clear that the government too have also not done enough to follow on issues raised in
ISMs, MTRs and CPPR reports to improve on aid effectiveness and reporting. The government
should do more to engage donors (WB and AfDB) bilaterally to exercise flexibility in
executing investment projects right at the inception of the project design up to project
34 Page
negotiation stage especially in areas of the use of procurement systems and mode and channel
of reporting.
5.3 Recommendations
The recommendations below, if adopted by all stakeholders (donors and government) could
improve on the performance of investment projects and the achievement of the milestones/
indicators of the 2005 Paris Declaration.
Donors’ relationship with recipient government on aid administration
1. In light of the significant lack of trust and the risk of getting stuck in a ‘blame-game’, where
each side waits for the other to make the first move, it is recommended that a Joint Aid
Effectiveness Action Plan be formulated, which outlines concrete actions to be taken by both
GoSL and development partners and defines related timelines and responsibilities. The plan
would serve as a main tool to facilitate the implementation of the aid policy and would form the
basis of a mutual accountability framework. A joint GoSL-development partner task force on
harmonization and aid effectiveness should be formed and assigned to prepare the plan, as well
as facilitate and monitor its implementation
2. It is important that development agencies are much more aware of the influence of local
politics on growth and development, as well as of the resulting timescales required for state-
building. Taking the importance of local politics into account may require a rethinking of
common approaches to growth and good governance. Good governance, as typically practiced
by development agencies, has often been based on an unspoken assumption that it is possible
and desirable to transplant institutional models from OECD countries to the developing world.
However, experience has shown that OECD-type institutions are often not suited to developing
countries, and work differently in different social and political environments.
3. Development agencies need to develop shared approaches to political economy analysis,
which is a prerequisite for effective engagement and a “do no harm” approach.
4. Development agencies should prioritize country knowledge. This might require them to
reduce the number of bilateral programmes or otherwise rationalize country coverage, and to
make some far-reaching changes in human resource management policies. Prioritizing country
knowledge could also mean hiring locally for leadership position (though this comes with the
risk of taking highly skilled staff from national system), and/or recruiting only national consultants
to design implementation or assessment programs. Increasing the amount of time that individual
members of staff currently spend in country would be a good starting point.
5. Development agencies should make serious efforts to reduce sector fragmentation, by
concentrating and harmonizing their supports on few sectors. Establishment of the PFMU should
35 Page
be strengthened
6. Development partners should collaborate and coordinate to provide timely and disaggregated
information on their assistance, in order to enable the government to record foreign aid in the
domestic budget and foster its alignment with national priorities, as well as to give the
government a chance to address the coordination challenge.
7. Having a broader donor base reduces the dependency towards a small number of donors,
though it increases coordination challenges. In this regard, the government should make sure
that it has the necessary strategy, mechanisms and capacities in place to ensure that this
approach does not increase the coordination challenge and fragmentation of aid and
investments.
8. Development agencies should make a greater effort to ensure predictability of funding flows
in particular with regard to actual versus planned disbursements both annually and within the
programme/ project cycle.
9. Development agencies should be more sincere about fostering national ownership, while
realizing that it is not an established fact, but a goal that requires dedicated activities by the
government and development agencies to be achieved.
10. Development agencies should put special emphasis on strengthening domestic accountability
by strengthening CSOs, media and parliament, while being careful not to undermine this
accountability by attaching too many conditionalities and parallel structures. Development
agencies could do much more to limit the potential damage of their own behavior on local
incentives for progressive change.
11. Development agencies should reassess the way in which they support CSOs. Support to
CSOs could be earmarked for specific programmes in the investments projects
12. Government should sign MAF with donors for the implementation of the MTDP
Donor-funded projects design and implementation

1. Mutual accountability clauses, donors’ commitment to projects, clauses on use of country
systems and how donors should report to Government including format of reporting should be
articulated in the key projects documents especially the PAD and Financing Agreement. If a
donor has initially agreed to finance a particular project, such financing shall continue till project
end.
2. For loans taken by Government approvals of AWPs and APPs by donors should be one off.
PIUs should be given the autonomy to execute activities approved in AWPs. This by itself will
reduce other administrative bottlenecks in activities implementation.
36 Page
Donor reporting
1. In addition to reporting clauses articulated in key negotiation documents (PAD, Financing
Agreements), Government, through the PIUs, should strengthen implementation of the outcomes
of ISMs, MTRs and interim implementation and final consolidation reports. PCs should regularly,
through PSCs, report to the supervisory ministry on actions related to Government and
strengthen follow ups with sub components/focal points in the implementation of actions. In fact
one of the KPIs for extension of contract of PCs should be implementation of actions in ISMs and
MTRs reports.
2. Donors to ensure CPPR reports are timely prepared and officially submitted to Government
for necessary action. Also, Government to organize a stakeholder workshop of all PIUs and
parent ministries to discuss the outcomes of all CPPRs undertaken annual and ensure PIUs
implement the recommendations as stated.
Coordination among government institutions
1. The Government to ensure bilateral meetings is held (preferably) on a quarterly basis among
all the key stakeholders institutions (NAO, EAD, PFMU, DACO) on aid financing and reporting.
More importantly for DACO to be given the platform to source primary data from those
institutions on the status of all donor-funded projects implemented nationwide. In the medium to
long term, Government should consider harmonizing the operations of EAD, PFMU, NAO and
DACO
2. DACO’s presence to be felt in all processes involved in the design and implementation of all
donor-funded projects. That is DACO MUST be part of all aid negotiations, ISMs, MTR missions
and CPPR discussions with PIUs. It should be through those meetings and missions they would
be adequately informed on donor activities in implementation of investment projects in addition
to strengthening bilateral relations with the donors. In this case serious attention should be given
by Government to strengthen the human and logistics capacities of DACO to be able to fully
deliver of its mandate of aid coordination, effectiveness and reporting
3. It is important for the government to put priority in fulfilling its obligation to all projects that
require Government counterpart. Evidence shows this aspect is lacking and is responsible for
forestalling implementation of most AfDB projects. This could easily be accomplished if
Government commitments to those projects are provided for in the annual budgets of the parent
MDAs and ensure the funds are subsequently accessed by the PIUs.
4. There is need to align data entry process with budget cycle. In order to institutionalize a data
entry process, it should be aligned to other established government processes, such as the
budget cycle. In this regard, information could be requested twice a year, to inform the budget
preparation and to allow annual reporting.
37 Page
5. Provide training local IT staff in DAD software: Currently, the GoSL has to rely on the
US-based software developer for technical support, which significantly contributes to the
maintenance costs. Comprehensive training enables local staff to make changes to the system,
such as adding a filter or data entry field, independently. Further, local staff is better equipped to
handle potential technical problems. This option should in particular be considered once the
DAD servers are relocated to Freetown, which is likely to increase national ownership of the
system.
6. Consider adding Paris Declaration Indicators: DAD’s contribution to improving aid
effectiveness can be further enhanced by adding a Paris Declaration Indicator module.
7. Government to review and act on its commitments made to the Paris Declaration especially
taking ownership of its projects thereby ensuring country systems are fully utilized in executing
projects.
References
African Development Bank Group. (2017). Sierra Leone Update on the 2013-2017 Country Strategy
Paper (CSP) to end 2019 and 2017 Coutry Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR). African
Development Bank Group.
Bigsten, A. (2006). Donor coordination and the uses of aid. Göteborg University , Economics,
Göteborg .
EC. (2013). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE
OF THE REGIONS. Brussels: European Commission.
EC. (2015). Practical guide to procedures for programme estimates. Directorate General for
International Cooperation and Development - EuropeAid. Eurpean Commission.
EC. (2017). PRAG Ptractical Guide. European Commission International Cooperation and
Development.
GOSL. (2009). Government of Sierra Leone aid Policy. Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development (MOPED), Development Aid Coordination Unit. Freetown: Government of Sierra
Leone.
GOSL. (2020). Review of Preparation of Investment Projects Financing (IPF). Ministry of Finance,
Project Fudiciary Management Unit (PFMU), Freetown.
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GOSL-EU. (2014). 11th European Development Fund: National Indicative Programme (2014-2020).
Nirobi: Sierra Leone - European Union.
Govrnment of Sierra Leone (GOSL). (2017). Development Assistance Report 2016. Development
Assistance Coordination Office (DACO). Freetown: Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development (MOFED).
Knack, S. (2013). Building or Bypassing Recipient Country Systems: Are Donors Defying the Paris
Declaration? Human Development and Public Services . Washington D.C: The World Bank
Development Research Group.
OECD. (2009a). Aid Effectiveness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration.
Paris: OECD.
PFMICP/PFMU. (2020). Background of the Establishment of PFMU. Ministry of Finance, PFMU,

Freetown.
UNDP. (2009). End of Project Evaluation of DACO & Review of Sierra Leone's Aid Cordination
Architecture. Freetown: UNDP.
World Bank. (2013). Operational Manual: Investment Project Financing. World Bank.
World Bank Group. (2017). Sierra Leone Update on Country Portfolio Performace Review
(CPPR). Workld Bank Group.
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2.8 Impact of Implementation of Donor-funded Projects ........................................................................................ 27

MOPED: Ministry of Planning and Economic Development

Principles Indicator No Indicators

2a Reliability of a country public financial management system

2b Reliability of a country’s procurement system

7 Providing more predictable aid

9 Using common arrangements

10a & 10b Conducting joint missions and sharing analysis

Source: (OECD, 2009a)

Cleverly ensuring aid Few levers from recipient

1.2 Methodological Approach

2.0 THE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS OF DONOR

2.2 Sierra Leone Donor Structure

2.3 Processes and Procedures for Implementing Donor-Funded Projects

2.3.1.1 Investment Project Proposal by the Recipient Country

2.3.1.2 Considerations and Preparatory Appraisal Missions for IPF

2.3.1.3 Board Approval of IPF and Negotiation Stages

2.3.1.4 Recipient Government’s Approval

the Bank, or a combination of these;

5a report on the outcome of preparatory missions for investment project financing

2.3.2 EU-Funded Projects

2.4 Implementation Arrangements of Donor- Funded Projects

2.4.1 Implementation Arrangements of IPF as in PAD

Box 1: Implementation Arrangements for IPF

To ensure appropriate supervision, especially in the overall direction of project implementation,

2.4.2 Implementation Arrangements for EU Funded Projects – The role of NAO

Ceilings for contracts to be managed within the imprest component

2.5 Profile of selected IPFs

Programne Development Project Reform Project

Impl. Project Fund Project Project

Public Financial Management To improve budget planning and

To increase power production on Grid

EU-NIP Governance and To support democratic processes, NAO/ €27

Smallholder Commercialization To promote smallholder commercialization

To improve the operational performance

EU-NIP Bandajuma-Liberia Road It provides for the upgrading of 100km of

Sierra Leone Skills Development To increase access to demand-led skills

2.6 Performance of total aid basket to Sierra Leone, FY 2016

Figure 1: Share of total aid basket to GOSL, 2016

Figure 2: Trend in total aid basket to GOSL, 2011 to 2016

Figure 3: Sectoral share of the total total aid basket in 2016

2.7 Processes and Procedures in Reporting Donor-funded Projects

Description of the content of specific donor reporting requirements follows.

2.7.1.1 Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR)

Sierra Leone Country Portfolio Performance Review – AfDB

Figure 4: Sector distribution of projects

Overall portfolio performance

Indicator August 2017

Status of failed projects

Performance monitoring and evaluation of projects

2.7.1 Processes and Procedures in reporting EU-funded Projects

2.8 Impact of Implementation of Donor-funded Projects

3.0 ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN REPORTING OF AID

3.1.1 The Role of the PFMU

3.1.2 The Role of DACO

4.0 PARIS DECLARATION ON AID RELATIONSHIPS AND EFFECTIVENESS

4.2 Results of Paris Declaration

4.2.1 Limited Trust in Country Systems

4.2.2 A Large Portion of Aid is ‘Off-budget’

4.2.3 Limited Degree of Coordination among DPs

4.2.4 Low Aid Predictability and Erratic Funding Flows