TOPIC: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Noe-Lacsamana vs. Busmente

Facts: Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides. While
Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in
court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of
the court proceedings nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005.

Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as
Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in2000 but Dela Rosa
was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb
(Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana
was forged.

Issue: The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela
Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

Held: Yes, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states “Canon 9. A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.”

The Court ruled that the term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. The Court further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law.

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, whois not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284.The only
question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of
law.

Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. In fact, it showed
that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case.

It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the
files in Busmente’s office.
 IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. PUBLICO
February 20, 1981

Facts: The records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a petition to take the Bar Examination in
1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.

His uncle, Dulcisimo B.Tapel, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of
good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was sixteen (16)
years of age, that he was eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by utilizing the
school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico when, inactual fact, petitioner had
not completed Grade VI of his elementary schooling, much less, First and Second Year High
School. When required to file a formal Complaint, Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an administrative
case against his nephew for falsification of school records or credentials.

In the meantime, Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar Examination, passed it, took the lawyer’s
oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.

In this Court’s Resolution of February 23, 1962, the name of Juan T. Publico was stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.

Approximately eleven years later, or on June 28, 1973, Juan T. Publico filed a Petition for
Reinstatement. On April 17, 1974, Juan T. Publico filed his second Petition for Reinstatement
stating that the Complaint for disbarment against him had been withdrawn by the complainant.
Petitioner filed a fourth petition for reinstatement on July 8, 1976.

For consideration now is petitioner’s fifth plea for reinstatement filed on June 1, 1979 in
addition to a letter-petition addressed to Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando dated November 3,
1979. In his Petition, Juan T. Public avers that his enrolment in Third Year High School in Manila
was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel, who accompanied him to school and
enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his remonstrations; that the
misrepresentation committed about his academic records was not his own fault alone, but was
precipitated by his uncle, who as member of the faculty of the Catanduanes Institute had access
16 years of age, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the
influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment; that he had conducted himself in a
manner befitting a member of the bar; that he had striven to serve the people and the
government as shown by the positions he held.

Held: Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it
decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be
conserved by the applicant’s participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor
at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a
person of good moral character—a fit and proper person to practice and The court will take into
consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Almost nineteen (19) years, by February 23, 1981, shall have elapsed since petitioner was barred
from exercising his profession. Cognizant that the power to discipline, especially if amounting to
disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, we find
that the evidence submitted by petitioner, particularly, the testimonials presented on his behalf,
as listed heretofore, his good conduct and honorable dealings subsequent to his disbarment, his
active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations, render him fit to be
restored to membership in the Bar, and that petitioner has been sufficiently punished and
disciplined

People vs. De Luna, et al.

Facts: It is alleged in said amended information that, on or about the22nd day of December,
1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one of these cases:

Well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to
take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions
of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and
therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions ,of the candidates
including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952,inclusive, for admission to
the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court,
promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously
disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court
directed to him and each and every one of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting
improper per conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to
and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior
courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer
before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the
Supreme Court.

Held: Appellees know that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought
admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were subsequently notified of the
resolution of the Supreme Court denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their
oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the Court, not only ofsuch fact,
but, also, that they will practice in all courts of the Philippines.

The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only before the
Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of
the Supreme Court denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a
denial of the right to take said oath, as well as a prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking
oaths before a notary public, appellees expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact,
challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and
conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as,
embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the
courts of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3,subdivision (b) of
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.

The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of
contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public"
as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney * * *
and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court
may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides, by taking "the
oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and
would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and
purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorney-at-law (U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146)

Cruz vs. Mina

Facts: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-Aof the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should
take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.

Issue: whether or not the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.

Held: Yes, Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-
lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not the is a law student. As succinctly clarified in
Bar Matter No. 730,by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

TOPIC: SOLICITATION OF LEGAL FEES

 Geffen vs. Moss

Facts: Geffen was appointed as a United States magistrate precluding him from continuing the
private practice of law. Attorney Geffen entered into a written agreement with Attorney Moss
whereby Geffen agreed to sell and Moss too buy "the physical assets, files and work in the
process of Geffen's law practice. The purchase consisted generally of a library, index of former
and present clients, office equipment, and a three-year lease. Geffen expresses an intention to
exert his influence for the continued welfare of the practice and to encourage present and
former clients to utilize the legal services of the office in the future. Geffen aggress that he will
not maintain any office for the practice of law nor hold himself out as in practice in said area.

Issue: Whether or not the sale of practice of law is valid.

Held: No, Geffen's attempt to sell the expectation of future patronage of his former and current
clients and to encourage them to patronize Moss, and Moss' attempt to purchase the future
patronage of Geffen's former and current clients and the attempt to buy and sell the good will of
a law practice which is contrary to public policy and against the spirit and intent of Rule 2, and 3
of Section 6076 of the Business and Professions a Code which prohibits the sale of a law practice
as a going business.

Both Geffen and Moss are in pari delicto, and the court will leave the parties where it has found
them neither has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.

The attempted sale of the expectation of future patronage by the former and current clients of
law office coupled with an agreement to encourage said clients to continue to patronize the
purchaser of the physical assets of the office may well be said to constitute an attempt to buy
and sell the good will of a law practice as a going business, contary to public policy and that the
portion of the agreement purposing to so do is invalid and unenforceable.

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT

Facts: The case involves Respondent Estanislao Bayot, an attorney-at-law, who is charged with
malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, regarding marriage
arrangements; to wit:

Marriage

License promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication
and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only
once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them
to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities
as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing
circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.