JITENDRA CHAHUN COLLEGE OF

LAW [F.Y. LLB (2019-20)]

LAW OF TORTS: ACT OF GOD (VIS MAJOR)

Submitted to Prof. Navanitha Warrier

Submitted by Akshat Tiwary (D-210)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

SERIAL TOPIC PAGE NO

NO
1. Aim & Object 3

2. Research Question 3

3. Introduction 4

4. Act of God 5

5. Doctrine of Strict Liability 6

6. What acts can be said to be an Act of God? 6

7. Conclusion 8

8. Bibliography 9

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LIST OF CASES

SERIAL TITLE CITATION

NO
1. Rylands v. Fletcher UKHL 1 (1868) LR 3
HL 330
2. Nichols v. Marsh Land 1876 2 Ex. D 1

3. Kalloo Lal v. Hemchandra AIR 1958 Madhya

Pradesh 48
4. Fardon v. Harcourt 1932 48 T.L. R 215

5. Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway 1917 AC 556

6. Cushing v. Walker & Sons 1941 A.C 556

7. Greenwood Tileries v. Clapson 1937 1 ALL E. R 765

at 772

8. Ramlinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar AIR 1971 Kerala 197

9. Slater v. Worthington 1941 1K.B. 488

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Aims & Object
The aim of the project is to have deeper and detailed understanding of the Act of God as a
defence to an action in Tort.

Research Question
1. What is the concept of Act of God?
2. What is the Doctrine of Strict Liability?
3. What acts can be said to be Acts of God?

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Introduction
Tort is the French equivalent of the English word ‘wrong’ and of the Roman law term
‘delict’. Tort is derived from a Latin word ‘tortum’ meaning twisted, crooked or wrong. Tort,
defined by Salmond, is “a civil wrong for which the remedy is a Common Law Action for
unliquidated damages, and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of
a trust or other merely equitable obligation.”
“A claimant who fails to prove the necessary ingredients of the particular tort or torts on
which he relies will, of course, fall in his action. Even if he does prove these ingredients,
however, he may still fail if the defendant shows that he is entitled to rely upon some specific
defence. Some of these defences are peculiar to particular torts.” The definition of defence
according Winfield and Jolowicz. These defences are called “specific defences”, while other
defences are broader in scope and can be applied by a defendant on a more pervasive scale as
a defence to various torts. These are called “general defences”.
There are fifteen general defences which are available in a suit under the law of torts. The
defences are “justifications” or “grounds for immunity” from liability to an action in tort.
They are classes of wrongs which stand outside the sphere of tort. They are the various
conditions which will prevent an act from being wrongful, which in their absence, would be
an actionable tort. Under such conditions, the act is said to be justified or excused. When an
act is said to be wrongful, it is assumed that no such qualifying conditions exists. These
justifications from civil liability for acts which are prima facie wrongful are based principally
upon the grounds of public policy.
The fifteen general justifications/defences in an action in tort are:
1. Act of State
2. Judicial acts
3. Quasi-judicial acts
4. Executive acts
5. Acts done under parental or quasi-parental authority
6. Authorities of necessity
7. Necessity
8. Acts done under statutory authority (Acts authorized by statute)
9. Leave and license: Volenti non fit injuria
10. Act of God (Vis Major)
11. Mistake of fact
12. Exercise of common rights
13. Private defence
14. Plaintiff – a wrong doer
15. Acts causing slight harm

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Vis Major (Act of God) is derived from the Latin words, vais maior: vis (force) + major
(greater) i.e., an overwhelming force of nature having unavoidable consequences that under
certain circumstances can exempt one from the obligations of his duties. The term Vis Major
is a superior force. In law, it signifies inevitable accident. This term is used in the civil law in
nearly the same way that the words Act of God is used in the common law. No one is
responsible for an accident which arises from vis major. Act of God can be understood as a
natural catastrophe, which no one can prevent such as an earthquake, tidal wave, volcanic
eruption, or a tornado. Acts of God are significant because often “it is an excuse for the delay
or failure to fulfil a commitment or cause damage to a party for which another might be held
liable.

Act of God
According to Salmond, “Act of God” involves those acts which a man cannot avoid even by
taking reasonable care. Such accidents are the result of natural forces and are unconnected
with the agency of man. Thus, the following are the two essential elements of the defence:
 There must be operation of natural force;
 The incident must be extraordinary and not which could be anticipated and reasonably
guarded.

The Act of God was recognised by Blackburn Judge in Rylands v. Fletcher1. The facts of the
case were that B, a mill owner, employed independent competent contractors to construct a
reservoir to provide water for his mil. In course of work, the contractors came across some
old shafts and passages on B’s land. They communicate with the mines of A, a neighbour of
B, although no one suspected this for the shafts appeared to be filled with earth. The
contractors did not block them up, and when the reservoir was filled, the water from it burst
through the old shafts and flooded A’s mines. Here Blackburn Judge ruled that “the
defendant can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default
or perhaps the escape was the consequence of vis major or the Act of God.”
Nichols v. Marsh Land2 is the leading case on the point. In this case, an artificial lake was
created on the plaintiff’s land due to storage of rain water coming from a natural stream.
Once there was an extraordinary heavy rain, which could never have been reasonably
anticipated, as result of which the embankments of the lakes burst out and water began to
overflow on the plaintiff’s land. The flow of water carried away four bridges of the plaintiff.
It was held that the defendant was not liable as the loss was caused by the act of God which
could not be anticipated by the defendants, but, if the rainfall is normal at a place, then
defence of act of God cannot be taken for loss caused by rain.
It can be seen in the case of Kalloo Lal v. Hemchandra3, due to heavy rainfall, the wall of
defendant’s house collapsed, resulting in death of two of plaintiff’s sons. The plaintiff sued
the defendants for damages. The defendant pleaded the defence of act of God. It was held that
the defendant was liable because the people living there ought to have anticipated such a
rainfall. The defence of act of God is available in case of extraordinary rain which is not

1
UKHL 1 (1868) LR 3 HL 330
2
1876 2 Ex. D 1
3
AIR 1958 Madhya Pradesh 48

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possible for man to anticipate. The defence of act of God is available in those cases which are
the result of natural forces and does not occur due to interference of man.

The Doctrine of Strict liability

This doctrine has been widely extended to such activities which are considered abnormally
dangerous or hazardous. Such activities necessarily involve a risk of serious harm to other
people, which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care and are not in the
scope of common usage. Strict liability does not depend upon such factors, such as reckless,
intent to do the act, knowledge of the action, etc. Liability, in this case, is simply based upon
the risk involved with respect to the actions. The judgement in the case of Ryland v.
Fletcher recognized that liability was not absolute and is subject to certain exceptions that
were established later on.
Further, an inevitable accident in any form is not a defence to any claim which is based on
the rule of absolute liability (a modified version of the doctrine of strict liability to match the
current era) as laid down in the case of MC Mehta v. Union of India and it is not subjected
to any exceptions of the rule of strict liability.
In another case of Fardon v. Harcourt,4 the defendant parked his salon motor-car in a street
and left his dog inside. The dog had always been quiet and docile. As the plaintiff was
walking past the car, the dog, which had been barking and jumping about in the car, smashed
a glass panel and a splinter entered the plaintiff’s left eye, which had to be removed. In an
action for damages, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover, as a motor car with a dog
in it was not a thing which was dangerous in itself, and such an accident was so unlikely,
there was no negligence in taking such precautions against it. As the Court observed, “People
must guard against reasonable probabilities, but they are not bound to guard against fantastic
probabilities.”

What acts can be said to be an Act of God?

Whether a particular occurrence amounts to an Act of God is a question of fact, but the
tendency of the courts now days is to restrict the ambit of the defence, not because of strict
liability is thought to be desirable but because increased knowledge limits the unpredictable.
In Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway 5, the defendant, the municipal
corporation, in laying out a park constructed a concrete paddling pond for children in the bed
of a stream and obstructed the natural flow of water therefrom. Owing to a rainfall of
extraordinary violence, the stream overflowed at the pond and as the result of the operations
of the authority a great volume of water, which would have been carried off by the stream in
its natural course without mischief, poured down a public street into the town and damaged
the property of the plaintiff, a railway company. It was held that the defendant, the municipal
authority was liable for the damage because it was not an act of God, but the consequence of
human act. If by constructing a pond, the natural flow of stream water had not been
obstructed, the property of the plaintiff would not have been damaged. The defendants could
4
1932 48 T.L. R 215
5
1917 AC 556

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have anticipated it. In spite of this, they did so, and hence, liable for negligence. It was their
duty “so to work as to make proprietors or occupiers on the lower level as secure against
injury as they would have been had nature not been interfered with.” In Nichols v.
Marshland, the accident was the consequence of act of God or working of natural forces,
while in this case, the obstruction in the natural flow of stream water was the result of human
act.
Similar considerations apply to an extraordinary high wind in Cushing v. Walker & Sons6,
where it was held that “before wind can amount to an Act of God, the wind must not merely
be exceptionally strong, but must be of such exceptional strength that no one could be
reasonably expected to anticipate or provide against it, such as the extraordinary tide in
Greenwood Tileries v. Clapson7.
In the case of Ramlinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar8, the plaintiff had booked goods with
the defendant for transportation. The goods were looted by a mob, the prevention of which
was beyond the control of the defendant. It was held that every event beyond the control of
the defendant cannot be said to be act of God. It was held that the destructive acts of an
unruly mob cannot be considered an act of God. It was observed that: “Accidents may happen
by reason of the play of natural forces or by the intervention of human agency or by both. It
may be that in either of these cases, an accident may be inevitable. But it is only those acts
which can be traced to natural forces and which have nothing to do with the intervention of
human agency that could be an aid to be acts of God.”
In the case of Slater v. Worthington,9 due to extraordinary severe snow-storms, snow had
accumulated on the roof of the defendant’s premises. No steps were taken to remove the
snow or to warn the public of its presence. The plaintiff, while standing on the pavement
outside the premises and looking through the window of the defendant’s shop, was injured by
the falling of the snow which had accumulated on the roof. The snow could have been
removed from the roof, but it was not done. The plaintiff claimed damages. It was held that
the accumulation of snow constituted a public nuisance of which, in view of the severity of
the storms, the defendants must be deemed to have had knowledge; that there was a duty on
the part of the defendants to safeguard members of the public using the pavement from the
danger occasioned by the snow; and that as they failed to abate the nuisance, the defendants
were held liable both in nuisance and negligence: and that the plea that the storms were acts
of God was no defence, as it was the snow that had accumulated, not the storms, which
directly caused the injury.

6
1941 A.C 556
7
1937 1 ALL E. R 765 at 772
8
AIR 1971 Kerala 197
9
1941 1K.B. 488

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Conclusion
According to Sir Fedric Pollock, act of God “is an operation of natural forces, so unexpected
that no human forces or skills could reasonably be expected to anticipate it.” If, in the
prosecution of a lawful act, a purely accidental casualty arises, no action can be supported for
any injury arising there form. But, if the act done is unlawful, an action lies.
In law, the essence of an act of God is not so much a phenomenon which is sometimes
attributed to a positive intervention of the forces of nature but a process of nature not due to
the act of man and it is this negative side which deserves emphasis. The criterion is not
whether or not human foresight and prudence could reasonably recognise the possibility of
such an event. Even in such limited form, however, this defence shifts the basis of tort from
responsibility for the creation of risk to culpable failure to control that risk. This has been
criticized on the ground that an accidental escape caused by the forces of nature is within the
risk that must be accepted by the defendant when he accumulates the substance on his land.
An inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will
of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from
happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can’t be prevented by human
skill or foresight. Whereas an act of God is an accident which is caused by the operations of
the extraordinary natural forces and its effects include total destruction or loss at a very high
scale as these are unpredictable and cannot be controlled. But with the development of
science, it might become possible one day to predict an act which may be caused due to the
actions of natural forces and perhaps, and even controlling such natural forces up to a certain
extent.

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Bibliography
 Dr. J.N. Pandey, Law of Torts & Consumer Protection Act, Central Law Publications,
9th edition, 2014.
 General Defenses in Torts by Aditi Agarwal
https:/ www.lawctopus.com/academike/general-defenses-in-torts/

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