CASE DIGEST : IMBONG VS OCHOA

FACTS Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law

ISSUE :  WON RH Law violates the right to health

HELD : SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-
reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -
be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There
is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the
Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the
public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be
held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It
behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency
tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court
finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the
gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination

Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public
meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense
for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to
local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes
as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in
any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of
the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount
to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade 
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term. 
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. 
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business 
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an
action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due
process 
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title 
the Act violates international and treaty obligations 
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession 
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are
real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted.

RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and
control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The
alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the
potential enemy of the State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
Binay vs Domingo Case Digest
Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations
Facts: 

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to
bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter,
the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the
Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants
of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause
since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held: 

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such
power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority
to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty
to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function
of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the
peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it
is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies
to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect
for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive
varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the
soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor
to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an
official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political
or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the respondent refused
to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public order.” Respondent
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free
use of Public Place.
SHEN V. ANTI-TERRORISM (G.R. NO. 178552; OCTOBER 5, 2010)
CASE DIGEST: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS,
JR. v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.

CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 178554; G.R. No. 178581; G.R. No. 178890; G.R. No. 179157; G.R. No. 179461

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known
as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at
the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as
Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Should the petition prosper?

HELD: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess
of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the
last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially
the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces,"
their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men
with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such
gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any
connection between the purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondent's alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the
National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be oneof common and
general knowledge; (2) it must bewell and authoritatively settledand not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their
supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372
would result in direct injury to their organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that
the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such
statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations
as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations
have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under
RA 9372.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none
of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to
stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence
of a direct and personal interest is key.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official aremerely theorized,
lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA
9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited
acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected
by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger
the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to
accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the
communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element
of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring
to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.
Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios
nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.