Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No.

L-2662, March 26, 1949

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of
accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxxxxxxxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the
first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts
these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO, GR No. 159618, 2011-02-01

Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x xx and shall be complementary
to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is
“subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139
signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the
Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of
the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been
effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military
personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by
the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of
surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the
Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising,
before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador
Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under
international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it
be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either
immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit. Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a
valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
 Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons––is
untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental
agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty
Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative
of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the
letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either
because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange of
notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive
agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work,
The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements – whether denominated
executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x xx
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as
an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance
with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as
petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; x xx it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by
entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome
Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor
General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x xxThe agreement is a
recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice
fairly and judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may
have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent
of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute
have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the
view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome
Statute.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING

FACTS:

The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.

The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These include housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages”
foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) limited tenure.

The compensation scheme is simply the School’s adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level
in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.

Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the School’s system of compensation is violative of the principle of “equal pay for equal
work”

RULING: Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to female employees as against a male
employee for work of equal value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in an labor organization.

Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should paid similar salaries. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer
has discriminated against an employee, it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH

SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that
the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should
be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the
provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution in promulgating the RIRR

RULING:

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by
the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system.
Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation (opiniojuris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law
which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly
provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the
ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to
prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced
by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions
cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need
of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory
provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the
RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective,
purpose and intent of the Milk Code.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as
a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to
public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.

AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights
to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in AngBagongBayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in AngBagongBayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,
a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws
is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of AngLadlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.