Heggy+et+al 2021 Environ. Res. Lett. 10.1088 1748-9326 Ac0ac9

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Egypt’s water budget deficit and suggested mitigation policies for the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam filling scenarios
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Page 1 of 41 AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-110981.R1
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Egypt’s Water Budget Deficit and Suggested Mitigation Policies for the Grand
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6 Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Filling Scenarios
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Essam Heggy (1, 2), Zane Sharkawy (3) and Abotalib Z. Abotalib (1)
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13 (1) University of Southern California, Viterbi School of Engineering, CA 90089, USA
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(2) Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Caltech, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91109,
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18 USA
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20 (3) Cornell University, Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and
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Management, NY 14853, USA
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Contact author (*): Dr. Essam Heggy, University of Southern California (USC), Viterbi
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29 School of Engineering, 3737 Watt Way, Powell Hall of Engineering, Office 502, Los
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Angeles, California, 90089-1112, USA, Tel: +1 818 812 8819, Fax: +1 213 740 8677,
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34 heggy@usc.edu
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36 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7476-2735
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41 Key words: Nile River, Water Budget, Water Stress, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
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AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-110981.R1 Page 2 of 41
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4 Abstract. The Nile River is a unique environmental system and essential water resource for its
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basin riparian nations. Population growth, changes in precipitation patterns, damming and usage
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9 rights disputes present extreme challenges in utilizing and managing the basin’s primary water
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11 resource. These stress factors are of particular concern for the highly populated Egypt, the furthest
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13 downstream recipient of the Nile’s water flow. Previously, colonial agreements had granted Egypt
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16 and Sudan the majority of water use rights on the Nile without the neighboring Ethiopia receiving
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18 any substantial allocation. Today, Ethiopia plans to increase its energy production through its Nile-
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20 powered Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). While the 74-BCM dam presents promising
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development opportunities for Ethiopia, the Nile’s altered flow will present a challenging water
deficit for Egypt—the quantification and mitigation of which are still largely unconstrained and
under intense debate. To address this deficiency, we estimate that the median total annual water
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budget deficit for Egypt during the filling period, considering seepage into the fractured rocks
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32 below and around the GERD reservoir, the intrinsic water deficit and assuming no possible
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34 mitigation efforts by the Egyptian authorities, will be ~31 BCM/yr, which would surpass one third
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36 of Egypt’s current total water budget. Additionally, we provide a feasibility index for the different
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proposed solutions to mitigate the above deficit and assess its economic impact on the GDP per
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41 capita. Our results suggest that the unmet annual deficit during the filling period can be partially
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43 addressed by adjusting the Aswan High Dam (AHD) operation, expanding groundwater extraction
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and adopting new policies for cultivation of crops. If no prompt mitigation is performed, the short-
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48 term three-years filling scenario can decrease the present cultivated area by up to 72% resulting in
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50 a total loss of the agricultural GDP by $ 51 Billion during the above-mentioned filling period. Such
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figures can cause a significant decrease in the total national GDP per capita by ~8% augmenting
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55 existing unemployment rates by 11% leading to severe socioeconomic instability.
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4 Introduction.
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5 The Nile, the longest and one of the oldest rivers on Earth, is a unique environment and
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ecosystem that crosses four climatic zones (Dumont, 2009). It is also an important source of water
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10 for eleven countries in Africa: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea,
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12 Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The main tributaries of the
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14 Nile are the White Nile, originating in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa, and the Blue Nile,
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17 Sobat, and Atbara rivers, streaming from the Ethiopian Highlands (Melesse et al., 2014).
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19 Conversely, the exploitation of the Nile is mostly concentrated in the downstream riparian
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21 countries, namely through Egypt and Sudan, which are dependent on the Nile water for 98.26%
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and 96.13% of their annual water demand, respectively (FAO, 2015). During the past decades,
upstream riparian countries, which could count on a higher endowment of freshwater resources,
were not actively involved in disputes over the Nile’s water sharing rights, but the climatic and
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anthropogenic pressures have and will potentially intensify their current and future water needs.
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33 This can trigger one of the largest water stress cases in modern era.
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36 The Nile has always been the primary source to sustain the irrigation practices in the basin for
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38 over 5,000 years (Hughes, 1992). The development of large-scale hydroelectric infrastructures
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40 began in the early twentieth century. This included the Aswan Low Dam (ALD) in 1902, followed
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43 by the Aswan High Dam (AHD) in 1961. Because of these dams, the lower part of the basin has
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45 experienced increasing environmental repercussions, particularly regarding the reduction of
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47 sediment flow downstream. This has reduced soil fertility of agricultural lands and the overall
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water provision (Smith, 1986) while accelerating the Nile delta coastal erosion and seawater
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52 intrusion (Negm, 2017; Rateb and Abotalib, 2020).
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3 The exploitation of the Nile is critical for ensuring water usage for more than 260 million
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6 people living in the riparian countries and will be even more so as populations surge in Egypt,
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8 Ethiopia, and Sudan. These nations alone are expected to reach a total population of about 340
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10 million by 2050 (Swain, 2011). This population growth, coupled with the economic development
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and the projected changes in precipitation patterns and groundwater depletion induced by global
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15 warming, are expected to increase the regional water demand and to pose additional stress and
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17 challenges on its utilization (Mazzoni et al., 2018). Moreover, the transboundary nature of the Nile
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basin and the uncertainties surrounding the evolution of its flow dynamics, with highly variable
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22 precipitation patterns in the recharge catchment basins, is causing an increasing debate on water
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rights over the river water shares. This is most notably the case with the British colonial era, which
sought to maximize Nile flow into their colonized Egypt and Sudan. Britain did so by creating an
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29 agreement with the king of Ethiopia that prevented any work on the Blue Nile that obstructed water
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31 flow into the Nile’s other tributaries (Abtew and Dessu, 2019). The agreement between two now
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33 defunct monarchies is argued to be nullified.
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36 Disputes over water rights over the Nile River started in 1959 when the two downstream
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riparian countries, Egypt and Sudan, signed the bilateral agreement “for the full utilization of the
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41 Nile water”. No water budget was specifically allocated to any of the upstream riparian countries.
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43 Throughout the years, disputes were mediated by international organizations, such as the World
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Bank, whose funding for any development project on the Nile is subject to the approval of all co-
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48 riparian states. However, Egypt has often used this requirement in its favor, limiting the
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50 construction of any large infrastructures on the river, which could impact its share of water from
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52 the Nile. Nonetheless, major efforts towards cooperation were achieved in 1999 with the
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55 foundation of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) (Swain, 2011). All the riparian states joined the
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3 initiative, except for Eritrea, which remains an observer. Since then, a growing number of
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6 infrastructure projects have been implemented or planned along the Nile.
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9 In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced a plan to construct a hydroelectric dam on the
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11 Blue Nile River named the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia’s current stated
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13 goals are to increase its hydropower generation potential in order to produce excess energy to be
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exported to the neighboring countries, to further their fishing activities and to expand the local
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18 economy road network. The unilateral decision of the Ethiopian government reflects the lack of
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20 real cooperation among the riparian states and opens up the claim for the revision of the water
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rights over the Nile. This is especially the case with such an uncertain future marked by increasing
water stress. With the projected population growth in both Sudan and Egypt, the regional water
stress is expected to rise (Mazzoni et al., 2018). Both countries also fear a reduction in their water
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29 shares during the initial filling period of the GERD.
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32 The Ethiopian government claims that no major effects will be observed regarding the water
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35 availability for the two downstream riparian countries (Abtew and Dessu, 2019). Conversely, there
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37 is a broad consensus that there will be measurable effects caused by the different filling policies
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39 of the reservoir on the water share for Sudan and Egypt (Hamada, 2017). To this day, no univocal
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environmental and/or economic impact assessments highlighting the influence of the impounding
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44 and future operation of the dam have been made. During the filling phases, the downstream
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46 discharge of the Blue Nile will be reduced, decreasing the amount of water that flows into the Nile.
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48 This will have clear, measurable effects on the water security for Egypt and Sudan in terms of both
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51 budget and quality.
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54 Between May 2011 and May 2013 and based on an invitation from the Ethiopian government
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56 to the downstream countries (i.e., Egypt and Sudan), an international panel of experts (IPOE)
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3 conducted a thorough review of the design documents and the geotechnical characteristics of the
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6 GERD (IPOE, 2013). However, the final report of the IPOE indicated that the submitted
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8 documents by the Ethiopian government lack the economic justification for the proposed power
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10 capacity of 6000 MW (IPOE, 2013). Following a few years of strong hydropolitical divergence,
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Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia converged on the establishment of the first agreement on the
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15 management of the Dam in March 2015 (Tawfiq, 2016). This mediation contained a “Declaration
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17 of Principles” to be followed as a guideline for what concerns the overall management of water
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use. There is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding the effective impacts of the GERD on
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22 Egypt’s water supply, let alone on the ecosystem of the Nile River, especially given the lack of
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published information regarding the technical specifics of the project. The international water
science community has been exploring several scenarios on the possible additional water deficit
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29 created by the dam along with mitigation proposals (e.g. Bastweesy, 2015; Bekhit, 2016; Donia
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31 and Negm, 2018). Nonetheless, none of the models that have studied this issue have considered
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33 the forecasted growth of water deficit that Egypt will experience on its own (without accounting
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for external contributing factors such as the GERD), which has to be included when considering
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38 future mitigation or adaptation solutions.
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41 The GERD is located approximately 500 km northwest of the capital, Addis Ababa, along the
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43 Blue Nile, ~20 km from the southern border of Sudan. When the dam starts operating, it will be
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the largest hydropower project in Africa (Chen and Swain, 2014) with a lateral extension of 1800
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48 m, a max wall height of 155 m, and an overall total capacity of 74 billion m3 (BCM). The project
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50 also includes two hydroelectric power stations installed at the right and left banks of the
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52 downstream river comprising of 16 Francis turbines that will grant a total installed power capacity
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55 of 6 GW, and estimated yearly potential production of 15 GWh (Salini Impregilo, 2018). Among
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3 the benefits for the downstream countries, the GERD is expected to retain most of the sedimentary
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6 silt material that flows with the Blue Nile. This would allow the hydropower dams in Sudan to
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8 produce up to ~36% more energy per year and greatly reduce the annual costs of dredging the
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10 reservoirs and canals (Kahsay et al., 2015). Furthermore, the GERD will create a more regular
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13 flow regime over the whole year for the Blue Nile in Sudan, which will also be reflected in the
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15 main part of the? Nile River. A more continuous flow should guarantee a more stable annual
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17 electricity production and irrigation water supply for Sudan. As for Egypt, the Nile flow continuity,
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regularity and sedimentation control are currently achieved by the gauge control on the AHD.
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This large infrastructure project has been under construction since 2011 and is reportedly in
final completion phase. The first phase of the GERD filling project started during the rainy summer
season of 2020 (Kansara et al., 2021), yet it is still uncertain when the subsequent filling phases
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29 will begin, and what regional environmental impacts the Nile’s altered flow will generate in both
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32 the short and long term on the downstream communities and ecosystems. As pointed out by a
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34 recent report from the MIT Abdul Latif Jameel World Water and Food Security Lab (Al Jameel,
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36 2014), four major technical concerns require a resolution: (1) Planning needed for coordinating
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the operation of the AHD and the GERD during the period of filling and eventual prolonged
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41 drought, (2) Technical agreement on the design of the GERD (seepage and spilling prevention),
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43 which relates also with the uncertainty related to the volume of water granted to Egypt and Sudan
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during the filling period, (3) Need for an agreement on the sale of hydropower from the GERD,
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48 and (4) Assessment of the potential downstream impacts on Egypt and Sudan, particularly for the
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50 agricultural sector.
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55 engineering, economics and geopolitical perspectives of the project. It is challenging to identify
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3 where the current and future policies for cooperation should aim since both the available
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6 information on the project and the potential technical-scientific support are often scattered,
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8 contradictory whenever publicly available. Even at these final stages of the project, little data or
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10 information is publicly available on the GERD to allow proper simulation of the overall
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environmental and economic impacts that the establishment of the dam will have on the three
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15 riparian countries. Due to the nationally and internationally sensitive nature of the topic, the
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17 Ethiopian government has announced only the major outlines of the project with insufficient
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technical details. Nonetheless, more information is becoming available as the project progresses,
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22 and thus future predictions are becoming more precise. For these reasons, while performing a
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thorough literature review on the GERD, we have mostly focused our analysis on the latest
available peer-reviewed publications and reports.

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29 While there is substantial uncertainty regarding the effective influence of the dam on the
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32 resulting outflow (Abtew and Dessu, 2019), there is a broad consensus that the major impacts in
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34 terms of water deficit for the downstream riparian countries will be mostly observed during the
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36 filling years (Negm and Abdel-Fattah, 2019). In general, the duration of the filling period is
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inversely proportional to the decrease of the water flow, although one has also to consider the
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41 different effects of seepage and evaporation. Since no official announcements on the filling
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43 policies have been given yet, all the considered studies have tested different, but comparable,
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filling scenarios by establishing fixed or variable impounding rates for the dam. Furthermore, other
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48 differentiating characteristics include the modeling of the climatic variability, the estimation of
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50 some unknown technical aspects of the dam infrastructure, and the types of results that they
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3 We have also observed that there are no currently published studies that consider the water
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6 budget deficit from a more global perspective by combining the downstream effects of the GERD
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8 to the existing significant water scarcity that countries like Egypt are already experiencing and that
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10 will worsen in the near future (Mazzoni et al., 2018). Egypt is already experiencing severe water
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stress, which it is currently being mitigated through the repeated reuse of the agricultural drainage
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15 water. This, in turn, affects the overall water quality by increasing its salinity and the concentration
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17 of pollutants (Hegazy et al., 2020). Furthermore, very few studies have accounted for the overall
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analysis of the additional water supply that the GERD will require to cope with the losses due to
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22 the natural seepage from the reservoir (Liersch et al., 2017). The Nubian Block, on top of which
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the GERD reservoir and dam are constructed, is composed of highly fractured igneous and
metamorphic rocks (Mohamed and Elmahdy, 2017). This hydrogeological setting could cause
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29 major leakage of water from the reservoir, which could reach up to ~25% (Liersch et al., 2017).
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31 Even though the entire reservoir will be built to store up to 74 BCM, the actual volume that will
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33 be needed to fill-up the basin may even reach up to 110 BCM if we account for the losses due to
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36 seepage and evaporation. Wheeler et al. (2020) simulated the response of the AHD during
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38 scenarios of different filling periods as well as the period after the reservoir fill including a multi-
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40 year drought scenario and arguably concluded that the risk of water shortage in Egypt, in response
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to the construction of GERD, is relatively low. Nevertheless, adoption of new agricultural policies
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45 that depend on low water-consuming crops will be feasible to avoid adverse impacts of the multi-
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47 year drought.
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50 In the present study, we evaluate the effects of the GERD on the short-term Egyptian
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52 availability of the Nile streamflow by considering different filling scenarios and strategies
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55 simulated in the most recent published literature. Then, we assess the total water budget deficit
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3 from GERD associated with the one forecasted by population growth, suggest mitigation policies
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6 and discuss the socio-economic impacts of each of the filling scenarios for the GERD.
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11 1. Methods
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2.1. Filling scenarios of the GERD
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17 The scenarios incorporated in our analysis of water resources in Egypt include the impact of the
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19 GERD filling and potential storage capacities, and are summarized as follows (Table 1):
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1. Donia and Negm (2018) assumed three storage capacity scenarios: 74, 35, and 18.5 BCM
and three filling period scenarios: 5, 10, and 20 years. The results indicated that with the
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five-year filling period of the GERD at a storage capacity of 74 BCM, the AHD reservoir
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31 will empty and will reach its minimum water level of 147 m by the fifth year.
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33 2. Keith et al. (2017) examined 7 filling rate strategies: retaining 100%, 50%, 25%, 20%,
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35 15%, 10%, and 5% of the Blue Nile inflow. Their analysis showed that annual reservoir
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fill rates of 8–15% can be beneficial for hydroelectric power generation for Ethiopia with
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40 a minimal effect on stream flow into Egypt assuming no significant impact of climate
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42 change until 2039. They also concluded that larger fill rates beyond the policy of 15% will
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have adverse impacts on the stream inflow. For example, with a 100% fill rate policy
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(equivalent to 2.5 years to reach full supply level [FSL]) will result in a 55% reduction of
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49 stream flow.
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51 3. King and Block (2014) examined five policies; three policies with impounding 5, 10 or
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54 25% of total monthly inflow, while the other two policies are conditional on exceeding the
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56 historical average streamflow (HASF) or 90% of the HASF. The results showed that the
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3 5% filling policy will not significantly affect downstream flow but also will not help
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6 reaching the FSL of the reservoir. On the other hand, the 25% policy, can reduce the
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8 average downstream flows by more than 10 BCM per year.
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10 4. Liersch et al. (2017) assumed three scenarios based on monthly minimal discharges to be
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released downstream: 75%, 50% and 25%. Each of these scenarios was simulated with
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15 three seepage rate assumptions (low, medium, and high), resulting in eighteen filling
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17 scenarios considering climate change under wet and dry conditions. The results showed
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that with the release of Q50 and Q75 of average monthly discharge, the flows might be
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22 reduced by 10–19% and 16–44%, respectively, while releasing monthly Q25 discharges
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will reduce only 5–13% of the average monthly discharge to downstream countries and the
FSL will be reached in eight years. The simulated evaporative losses during the filling
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29 process correspond to 6.5–8.7% of average annual inflows while the seepage losses ranged
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31 between negligible to 24–32% of inflows. The maximal seepage loss scenario is
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33 particularly highlighted in the present study.
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5. Omran and Negm (2018) indicated that in a scenario of filling the GERD in seven years,
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38 Egypt will face a significant shortage in water quantity associated with a reduction of 20%
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40 to 30% of electricity production from the AHD.
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6. Wheeler et al. (2016) analyzed five different annual release scenarios: 25, 30, 35, 40, and
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45 45 BCM/yr. The results indicated that reducing the risks to stream inflow into Egypt and
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47 energy generation can be achieved through combinations of agreed annual releases from
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49 the GERD as well as adopting a drought management policy for the AHD.
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52 7. Zhang et al. (2015) considered five filling policies: impounding of 5, 10, and 25% of the
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54 Blue Nile inflow and retaining quantities greater than HASF or 90% of HASF with
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3 possible precipitation changes of -20, -10, -5, 0, +5, +10, +15, and +20% by the year 2060.
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6 The results showed that impounding 10% or 25% of monthly streamflow will result in a
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8 6% or 14% average reduction in streamflow into Egypt during the first 5 years,
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10 respectively.
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8. Zhang et al (2016) proposed two scenarios with fractional impounding: 10 and 25% of
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15 inflow, one threshold filling strategy that allows any streamflow volume in excess of the
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17 HASF to be impounded in the reservoir and three absolute filling strategies: 4, 6, and 8
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years. The results indicated that the 25%, 6-year and 8-year scenarios can provide the best
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22 scenarios for both upstream and downstream countries.
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In order to assess the total water budget deficit, the best mitigation policies and the socio-
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29 economic impacts of each of the filling scenarios for the GERD, we use three methods that are
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37 2.2 Water Budget Deficit Assessment
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40 To constrain the ambiguity around Egypt’s water budget deficit arising from the GERD, we
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42 update the estimates of water budget deficit using the water budget model in Mazzoni et al. (2018)
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and considering future population projections under the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways,
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Regional rivalry (SSP3) scenario. The SSP3 scenario is favorably selected because it incorporates
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49 the highest challenges towards mitigation and adaptation, with strong regional rivalry (Mazzoni et
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51 al., 2018). Moreover, we implement the different filling scenarios in terms of time scales and
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54 retained volumes that we derive from a thorough literature review and collect the most recent
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56 analysis. Table 1 summarizes these different filling scenarios or strategies adopted by each study.
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3 We then derive the additional average annual water deficit for Egypt generated by the GERD
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6 filling and by the losses due to seepage. A special emphasis is given to the water loss from the
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8 GERD due to seepage due to two reasons. First, the seepage losses have been largely
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10 underestimated in previous studies that dealt with evaluating the impact of the GERD and second,
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the seepage-related losses can reach annually up to 15 BCM compared to a much lesser annual
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15 evaporation-related losses of only 3.8 BCM (Liersch et al., 2017).
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17 In our analysis, we only select studies published on the topic in the last 5 years since some of
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the main technical specifications of the GERD have been publicly released only lately (such as the
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22 dam total capacity). Among all considered studies, different filling policies have been explored by
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either considering an a priori fixed number of years for the duration of the filling period, by using
fractional retention rates of the total monthly stream flow entering in the reservoir that guarantees
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29 a permanent impoundment of water every month to fill-up the dam, or again by employing
30
31 threshold-based policies, with retention rates conditional to a certain fixed value, which instead do
32
33 not assure retention for storage in the years where the stream flow is lower than the selected
34
35
36
baseline. To be able to compare the outcomes of the different studies we average their results
37
38 across the climatic scenarios that they have considered in their analysis to match our use of the
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39
40 SSP3 one.
41
42
43
44
45 2.3 Feasibility Index for the Different Mitigations
46
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47 In Table 2, we summarize what are all the most plausible proposed strategies that Egypt
48
49 could undertake to mitigate the short-term effects of the GERD filling in terms of water deficit in
50
51
52 particular: AHD Operation reduction (i.e. AHD rules to be readjusted to cope with the water
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53
54 reduction), groundwater extraction expansion, crop type selection, modernizing the irrigation
55
56
57
58
59
60
14
1
2
3 system, changing fields canals to pipes, increasing wastewater reuse, rain harvesting, expanding
4
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5
6 desalination and reducing evaporation in lake Nasser. We then develop a corresponding feasibility
7
8 index calculated through a first-order duration-cost-benefit analysis of the proposed mitigation
9
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10 strategies to obtain a parametric indicator that allows us to evaluate the practicability of each
11
12
13
possible solution. The index is expressed as an inversely proportional function of the time required
14
15 for implementing the strategy (i.e., hereafter is referred to as implementation swiftness) and its
16
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17 annual costs, and directly proportional to the benefits in terms of water volume in BCM/yr:
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛽𝐷 ( )
an
𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑓(𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−1 , 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 −1 , 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠)
1
+ 𝛽𝐶 (
1
) + 𝛽𝐵 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
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𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36 The three coefficients 𝛽𝐷 , 𝛽𝐷 , and 𝛽𝐷 are set equal to 1/3 to give the same weight to each
37
38
variable. For the duration variable, we select 5 scenarios with their respective incremental abstract
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39
40
41 values: Short Term = 1, Short-Mid Term = 2, Mid Term = 3, Mid-Long Term = 4, and Long Term
42
43 = 5. For the costs, we account for both the yearly expenditure due to the capital expense (CAPEX)
44
45 costs depreciated over the lifetime span of the solution itself and the annual operating expense
46
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47
48 (OPEX) costs. We first derive a lower and upper bound for all the variables for each mitigation
49
50 strategy, we then normalize each variable to a [0,1] interval, and we finally compute the overall
51
52 feasibility index as a weighted sum of the three components. Given that there are different ranges
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54
55
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60
15
1
2
3 and values for the costs and the implementation time of each measure, a range of values is given
4
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5
6 for the feasibility index of each mitigation strategy.
7
8
9
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10 2.4 Modelling the Economic Impact
11
12
13
We use a simplified economic model to assess the impacts of the GERD’s filling scenarios
14
15 on Egypt’s GDP as function of time for agriculture. This model presents a first-order analysis
16
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17 which provides a lower limit estimate of the economic impacts based on immediately observable
18
19
changes caused by the water budget deficit to the agricultural sector (i.e., loss in crop productivity
20
21
22 due to total degradation) and not accounting for the consequences on the industrial sector that are
23
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25
26
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28
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difficult to assess due to the lack of published records. The model (Supp. Fig. 1) uses average GDP
growth rates projections from historical data for three cases: low (1.76%), medium (4.47%), or
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29 high (7.16%) growth rates from projections of Egypt’s GDP (World Bank, 2016). These
30
31 projections represent the non-GERD GDP estimates. We then calculate the decrease in GDP for
32
33 the 3, 5, 7, 10, and 21-year GERD filling scenarios. We finally calculate the GDP per capita using
34
35
36
historical data and the population projections from the 2019 Revision of World Population
37
38 Prospects (UN World Population Prospects, 2019) for both the GERD and non-GERD cases.
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39
40 Yearly water loss and equivalent land loss are approximated using relationships from Mazzoni et
41
42
al., (2018) and Hamada, (2017) respectively, where the loss of each 5 BCM would result in total
43
44
45 degradation of ~0.42 million hectares. Egypt’s total agricultural land area (~9.1 million feddan
46
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47 equivalent to ~3.822 million hectares) is valuated as Egypt’s agricultural GDP to calculate the
48
49 change in GDP due to total degradation often expressed in the local unit feddan (one Feddan is
50
51
52 equal to 4200 m2). We also assess the increase in the unemployment due to land degradation in the
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53
54 agricultural sector (which employ a fourth of the work force in Egypt) using the average number
55
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60
16
1
2
3 of farmers per feddan from the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI,
4
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5
6 2014).
7
8
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10
11 3. Results
12
13 Our investigation results pertain to three findings: the first is on constraining the water budget
14
15
16 deficit projections during the different filling scenarios, the second is on the feasibility of
us
17
18 mitigation strategies to address this deficit and the third is on the economic impact generated by
19
20 the total water budget deficit as detailed below.
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22
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28
3.1 Assessing the Water Budget Deficit an
Figure 1 shows the resulting distribution of the outputs of each considered scenario in terms of
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29
years needed to fill the GERD and the expected annual water deficit of Egyptian renewable
30
31
32 freshwater supply by this process. Clearly, each selected filling rate will have different
33
34 implications on the time to fill the reservoir and thus a proportional effect on the downstream flow
35
36 reductions. As a result, we found that the estimated required time to fill up the GERD is distributed
37
38
between a minimum of 2.5 and a maximum of 29.6 years, with a mean value of 10.86 (median:
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39
40
41 9.19, Q1: 5.79, and Q3: 13.97 years). For more details on the effect on annual flows into Egypt,
42
43 figure 2 summarizes in a box-plot format the statistical distribution of the resulting annual water
44
45
46
deficit caused by the GERD filling, the seepage inferred from Liersch et al., 2017, and the
ce
47
48 forecasted intrinsic Egyptian water budget gap derived from Mazzoni et al., 2018. The main
49
50 component of the overall water deficit for Egypt originates from the intrinsic water gap between
51
52
the internal demand and the presently available renewable water supply. This difference,
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53
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55 corresponding to 18.35 BCM/yr in median value, is currently compensated by the reuse of drainage
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60
17
1
2
3 water within the Nile Delta and by unlawful withdrawal of deep groundwater (CAPMAS, 2018).
4
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5
6 Both contribute to deteriorate the overall water quality (Mohie and Moussa, 2016). It is worth
7
8 mentioning that the above-mentioned amount of water deficit in Egypt does not include the annual
9
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10 groundwater recharge from Lake Nasser and northern Sudan to the Nubian Aquifer (Sultan et al.,
11
12
13
2013; Abdelmohsen et al., 2019; Abdelmohsen et al., 2020). It was estimated using a two-
14
15 dimensional groundwater flow model that, at lake level of 178 meters above sea level (masl), the
16
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17 Nubian aquifer receives an annual recharge of 6 BCM/yr compared to 0.7 BCM/yr, when the lake
18
19
level drops to 170 masl. Collectively, the annual groundwater recharge from Lake Nasser and the
20
21
22 northern Sudan basin can reach up to 8.5 BCM/yr during periods of intensified precipitation on
23
24
25
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28
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equatorial Africa (e.g., the period between 2012 and 2015; Abdelmohsen et al., 2019). The amount
of annual groundwater recharge from precipitation over the northern Sudan platform, which can
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29 be roughly estimated from the GRACE terrestrial water storage as 2.5 BCM/yr (Abdelmohsen et
30
31 al., 2019), will not be affected by the construction of the GERD, yet the different scenarios for the
32
33 GERD will consequently affect Lake Nasser levels and hence the annual recharge to the deep
34
35
36
Nubian Aquifer will be significantly impeded. The response of the Nubian Aquifer to the different
37
38 scenarios of the GERD filling should be investigated to estimate a reliable water deficit in Egypt.
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39
40
41 The other two components (i.e., water impounding during the filling period and seepage
42
43 from the GERD), which are instead directly related to the construction of the GERD, collectively
44
45
create an additional median water gap of ~12.15 BCM/yr during the expected length of the filling
46
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47
48 period of the dam. The decrease in streamflow for Egypt due to the seepage losses in the GERD,
49
50 not considering the outliers, could range from a minimum of 43 MCM/yr to a maximum of 10.4
51
52 BCM/yr (median: 2.5, Q1: 0.185, and Q3: 4.9 BCM/yr) assuming the total inflow to range between
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55 43.2 and 53.3 BCM and seepage rates of 1 and 32% (Liersch et al., 2017). However, the actual
56
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60
18
1
2
3 main reduction in annual water supply is due to the filling itself of the upstream dam. The estimated
4
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5
6 loss, excluding outliers, ranges between 2.72 and 22.67 BCM/yr (median: 9.64, Q1: 6.13, and Q3:
7
8 13.22 BCM/yr.). In percentage, the effects of the GERD would create an additional increase of the
9
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10 present water deficit for Egypt between +34.4% and +98.7%, of which in average ~83% is due to
11
12
13 the filling and the remaining ~17% to the seepage assuming a maximal seepage rate. If we account
14
15 for all the components, Egypt may experience in the years of filling of the GERD a total annual
16
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17 water deficit from 24. 7 to 36.5 BCM/yr (distributed in percentage as: 32% due to GERD filling,
18
19
20
8% for seepage under GERD, and 60% of intrinsic water budget deficit), which corresponds to an
21
22 average +35.5% of its current internal annual water demand. It is worth mentioning that these
23
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28
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estimates represent the worst-case scenario, where no actions are taken from the Egyptian
authorities to mitigate these expected rates of water deficits due to technical shortage or political
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29 instability. Additionally, enhanced flood events over the White Nile can positively impact the
30
31 Egyptian water budget by introducing more than 25 BCM to Lake Nasser over a period of three
32
33 years (e.g., the flooding event between 1999 and 2001; Bastawesy et al., 2008).
34
35
36
37
38
3.2 Feasibility Index
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39
40
41 Figure 3 shows the resulting feasibility of each proposed solution and the relative contribution
42
43 of each mitigation strategy that we considered for computing the index. Inspection of the feasibility
44
45
index estimations (Fig. 3) indicates that among all the proposed solutions to address the water
46
ce
47
48 budget deficit, the most practical option (feasibility index >50%) for Egypt in the short term would
49
50 be to temporarily reduce or even completely suspend the operations at the AHD to partially offset
51
52 the lower streamflow during the filling of the GERD. The loss in the Aswan basin reservoir can
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53
54
55 be recovered and distributed in the following years after the GERD starts operating when the main
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19
1
2
3 Nile streamflow will return to its regular rate. This would, of course, drastically reduce the
4
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5
6 electricity production from the Aswan hydropower plant (here accounted as cost for the proposed
7
8 strategy) and to account for all the subsequent effects of this option. Other effective solutions
9
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10 include maximizing groundwater withdrawal (feasibility index >35%), although here we do not
11
12
13
account for the environmental effects on the fossil aquifer system. However, this measure is highly
14
15 cost effective compared to other measures (Fig. 3; Table. 2), yet the total production of current
16
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17 wells cannot bridge the GERD-induced water deficit gap with a total potential of 4.65 BCM/yr
18
19
(Omran and Negm, 2018). This solution could be improved through the expansion of groundwater
20
21
22 extraction from shallow aquifers east and west of the Nile Delta (Abotalib et al., 2016; Khalil et
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25
26
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28
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al., 2021; Hegazy et al., 2020; El-Saadawy et al., 2020). Furthermore, the largely unexplored
fractured limestone aquifers east and west of the Nile Valley represent valuable corridors for
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29 expanding groundwater extraction due to: a) the fractured and karstified nature of the aquifer that
30
31 results in high groundwater yield of up to 1600 m3/day (Yousif et al., 2018), b) the abundant
32
33 recharge from the deep Nubian aquifer through artesian upwelling along faults and thus naturally
34
35
36
bringing deep water (up to 1500 m) to shallow levels (<600 m) at no cost (Hussein et al., 2017;
37
38 Abotalib and Heggy, 2018), and c) the relatively reliable water salinity for domestic and
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39
40 agricultural purposes (<3000 mg/l; Ibrahim and Lyons, 2017; Yousif et al., 2018). The feasibility
41
42
index estimation also shows that changing the agriculture system toward the cultivation of crops
43
44
45 that require less water could also be a feasible solution (feasibility index >20%). The current crop
46
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47 water use rate in Egypt is 1.4 m3/m2/yr (Mohie El Din and Moussa, 2016) and thus 53.7 billion
48
49 cubic meter of water every year is needed to irrigate the 9.1 million feddans. Replacement of the
50
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52 sugarcane with sugar beet and limitation of the rice cultivation to the official number of feddans
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53
54 (almost 1 million feddan, which is 850,000 feddan below the actual rice lands in Egypt 1.9 million
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59
60
20
1
2
3 feddan), the crop water use rate will be as low as 1 m3/m2/yr (Mohie El Din and Moussa, 2016),
4
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5
6 which only requires 38.3 billion cubic meters to irrigate the 9.1 million feddans. Other options
7
8 have a feasibility index lower than 10%, which means that they either require too much time for
9
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10 their implementation or the cost is too high, again resulting in a low efficacy in mitigating the
11
12
13
water deficit. For example, modernizing the irrigation system is a costly and time-consuming
14
15 process, where upgrading the irrigation systems of only 3140 ha in Upper Egypt costs up to 11.6
16
us
17 million US dollars (Takouleu, 2020). The current irrigation system is a surface irrigation system
18
19
(i.e., flood irrigation) that depends almost entirely on the AHD to regulate water through more
20
21
22 than 29,000 km of canals and subcanals leading to the loss of more than 3 billion cubic meters of
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Nile water annually through evaporation in addition to the water shortage at canal tail end. These
negative impacts of the surface irrigation encourage the Egyptian government to apply modern
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29 methods of irrigations such as sprinkler systems, drip irrigation and bubble irrigation (Abdelhafez
30
31 et al., 2020) as well as to line the irrigation canals (Khalil et al., 2021).
32
33
34
35
36
37 3.3 GDP and Unemployment Projections
38
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39 Growth rate GDP projections for agriculture and for total GDP per capita can be found in
40
41
42
figures 4 and 5, respectively. In the years 2022, 2023 and 2024, our first order model indicates
43
44 potential agricultural GDP losses, for the total filling period, of ~$51 billion for the 3-year filling
45
46 scenario, ~$28 billion for the 5-year filling scenario, ~$17 billion for the 10-year filling scenario,
ce
47
48 and ~$10 billion for the 21-year filling scenario. These economical losses result from the
49
50
51 degradation in crop production due to the deficit in necessary irrigation water to maintain
52
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53 agricultural activities. The above reduces the existing cultivation area as explained in sections 2.4
54
55 and 3.2 and hence the associated agricultural GDP. The losses in the agricultural sector (i.e.,
56
57
58
59
60
21
1
2
3 Agricultural GDP) will decrease the total projected GDP per capita for Egypt for the years 2022,
4
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5
6 2023 and 2024 from $ 2815, $ 2890 and $ 2968, for the case without the GERD, down to $ 2633,
7
8 $ 2703 and $ 2777 when accounting only for the agricultural losses arising from the GERD short-
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10 term filling scenarios.
11
12
13
Unemployment projections for Egypt’s agriculture are shown in Figure 6 and the supplemental
14
15 tables. Of Egypt’s 28.8 million employed, about 5.5 million work in the agricultural sector
16
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17 (CAPMAS, 2018). Approximately each ~1.4 feddan (0.6 hectares) of agricultural land employ one
18
19
person; hence the GERD proposed three-year short term filling scenario may degrade 2.8 million
20
21
22 hectares of land, which would result in 4.75 million jobs losses in downstream in Egypt. This
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25
26
27
28
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would result in an alarming loss of over three quarters of Egypt’s agricultural land and resulting
in more than 60% of agricultural workers unemployed. The total unemployment rate would rise
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29 from the current 11% to a future 25% percent.
30
31 Our economic impacts model’s accuracy is limited by a few key factors. Firstly, it does not
32
33 account for time the Nile will need to restore full flow after GERD filling ends, and as a result,
34
35
36
does not account for the economic effects in the years following the GERD’s filling. The
37
38 immediate upshoot in GDP during the year after the filling period ends is highly unlikely as many
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39
40 of the environmental and socioeconomic impacts could be irreversible. The 21-year filling
41
42
scenario, with the lowest net present value impact on Egypt’s GDP, thus appears to be the only
43
44
45 scenario with long-term manageable economic impacts to a country that is already highly stressed
46
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47 by seriocomic instabilities and rapid increase in population. Secondly, the model hypothesizes that
48
49 for every unit loss in the Nile river inflow, its distributaries will experience an equal unit loss of
50
51
52 water. The downstream impacts such as land loss and available water for industrial and municipal
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53
54 use are more likely to be manifested as a non-linear decrease at a much higher rate for every unit
55
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57
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59
60
22
1
2
3 decrease in the Nile itself. Furthermore, the model assumes that the distribution of water across
4
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5
6 agriculture, industry, and municipal use will remain unchanged. Lastly, these figures do not
7
8 include the impacts on the growing food manufacturing and processing sector which contributed
9
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10 to ~6% of Egypt’s GDP in 2019 (USDA, 2020). Other service industries connected to industry and
11
12
13
agriculture are likely to experience significant consequences because of decreased production
14
15 capabilities. As such, the results on the decrease in the GDP per capita and the rise of
16
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17 unemployment should be considered as lower limits, the economic damage considering all the
18
19
above factors will be higher.
20
21
22
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24
25
26
27
28
4. Implications and Mitigation Strategies
an
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of the GERD on the short-term Egyptian
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29
availability of the Nile streamflow by considering different filling scenarios simulated based on
30
31
32 the most recent published peer-reviewed records and considering seepage and the growth in
33
34 Egypt’s intrinsic water budget deficits. Our findings concur with several studies (e.g., Negm, 2014;
35
36 Kansara et al, 2021) that short-term filling scenarios (3 to 5 years) will cause measurable shortages
37
38
in the water supply for Egypt during the dam filling phase. This additional water budget gap is
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39
40
41 estimated to correspond to an overall increase of the present water deficit in Egypt by more than
42
43 one third (+34%) to almost double (98.7%). Of this water budget gap, on average ~83% would be
44
45
46 due to the amount of water needed to fill up the dam, while in an extreme case, up to ~17% could
ce
47
48 be lost to natural seepage within the GERD reservoir.
49
50 These water shortages will have dire consequences for Egypt’s economy, employment
51
52
rates, migration outflow and food sufficiency. The above-modeled GDP loss does not account for
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53
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55 unemployment in connected industries, such as transportation or tourism, nor for damage done by
56
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60
23
1
2
3 resulting food scarcity, as these effects lie beyond the immediate economic impact of
4
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5
6 unemployment. Municipal water loss, which is also not immediately translatable into monetary
7
8 loss, would present significant long-term detrimental effects to the affected populace. In the case
9
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10 of a large wave of unemployment, the socioeconomic stability of much of Egypt’s workforce
11
12
13
would also be at stake, and the adverse effects of reduced economic activity and increased
14
15 unemployment have the dangerous potential to become cyclical (Brand, 2015). In turn, economic
16
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17 damage in Egypt could force less spending on education, decrease small business activity and
18
19
health quality, and increase crime rates (Irons, 2009).
20
21
22 Water scarcity is specifically dire due to its effects on the behaviors of populations and
23
24
25
26
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28
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governments. The conflict for Zambezi Island, Mekong River disputes, the Euphrates-Tigris
disputes, and water riots across the world in the past few decades are all indicators that the current
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29 dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia has the potential to erupt into external conflict, while civil
30
31 unrest may also arise within Egypt (Guarino, 2016). Water loss due to climate change is already
32
33 expected to have negative effects on North Africa and the Middle East, the region most vulnerable
34
35
36
to GDP loss from further water scarcity, driving increased migration and rekindling older conflicts
37
38 (World Bank, 2016). It is essential to consider these devastating consequences in order for Egypt
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39
40 to reallocate its resources toward the mitigation solutions described in Fig. 3 and for Ethiopia to
41
42
consider slowing the GERD’s filling.
43
44
45 On the other hand, the construction of the GERD will have some positive impacts on the
46
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47 downstream countries. In Egypt, the simulated reduction of sediment accumulation in the Aswan
48
49 High Dam Lake (AHDL) by 90–97% in the year 2060, compared to the amount of sediment
50
51
52 accumulation in the year 2020 without GERD operation/construction, will arguably increase the
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53
54 lifetime of the AHD (Negm et al., 2019). In Sudan, the GERD construction and consequent
55
56
57
58
59
60
24
1
2
3 reduction in sediment accumulation in Lake Nubia (i.e., the Sudanese portion of the AHDL), will
4
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5
6 provide an opportunity for scooping out accumulated muds and silts through dredging and
7
8 constructing onshore sediment ponds that can be used for agricultural purposes and the
9
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10 development of small communities (Abulnaga, 2019).
11
12
13
We also considered numerous management actions and mitigation strategies that could
14
15 secure Egypt’s water demands by minimizing the effects of the GERD project. By using a
16
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17 feasibility index defined ad hoc, we find that the best option for Egypt would be to re-evaluate the
18
19
current operation of the AHD hydropower plant to mitigate the upcoming water shortages, together
20
21
22 with the increase of groundwater withdrawal as a backstop option to temporarily sustain the water
23
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25
26
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28
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demand. Water conservation strategies should also be incorporated especially in the agriculture
sectors by switching the national production towards crop types that require less water.
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29 If Ethiopia’s government decides on one of the shorter filling periods, possible
30
31
32 compensation methods are available to offset Egypt’s agricultural losses, which we have identified
33
34 as the primary economic downside of the three-year filling scenario of the GERD. Since Ethiopia
35
36 is currently leasing their agricultural land to multiple nations, it could provide a long-term lease,
37
38
at a preferential rate, of some of its surplus farming land for Egypt’s use as a method of direct
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39
40
41 compensation for the loss in crop production. Egypt in exchange can develop the needed
42
43 infrastructure in these farming lands to become highly productive crop areas with irrigation
44
45
infrastructure that preserves the Nile ecosystem. In the long term, this solution would also be
46
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47
48 advantageous to Ethiopia when the leased lands are restored back to Ethiopian management.
49
50
51 Alternatively, Ethiopia could make use of some of the surplus electricity generated by the
52
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53 GERD to financially compensate Egypt for its GDP loss, even though this solution is unlikely as
54
55 it requires mutual recognition of the size of the financial damages arising from the GERD, which
56
57
58
59
60
25
1
2
3 are unachievable in the current political and economic context. The GERD is expected to generate
4
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5
6 ~16,000 Gigawatt hours of electricity and 1 billion Euros in surplus sales (Pichon, 2020). Egypt
7
8 currently imports slightly over 50 Gigawatt hours of electricity (Kwakwa, 2017). Despite their
9
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10 similar populations, Egypt consumes 15 times as much electricity as Ethiopia consumes. Offering
11
12
13
subsidized electricity or an electricity allowance to Egypt would also be a viable solution that
14
15 would allow Egypt to slow the use of its own AHD and increase their yearly water access on their
16
us
17 own end.
18
19
20 While our study presents preliminary results, it unambiguously suggests an alarming
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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upcoming water budget deficit for Egypt during a three-years short term filling scenario. Longer-
filling scenarios above 7 years will allow a more manageable deficit below 10 BCM/yr that can be
mitigated using existing resources and minimize the associated socioeconomic impacts. The more
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29 technical information that can be obtained on the GERD future operational plans, the more
30
31
32 accuracy that can be achieved in modeling and forecasting the water budget deficit as well as the
33
34 associated socioeconomic impacts. However, since all findings converge on a temporal, but yet a
35
36 severe decrease in Egypt’s water supplies, it is plausible that a win-win strategy can be found to
37
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mitigate the impacts on food security and socioeconomic stability. The above requires an accurate
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41 forecast of Egypt’s water budget deficit, its impact on the agricultural sector and the total GDP, as
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43 attempted herein, in addition to addressing the nature of the short and long terms environmental
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and ecological impacts of such mega reservoir on the Nile River system itself which remain poorly
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48 constrained let alone understood at this stage.
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4 Data availability statement
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The data that support the findings of this study are available upon reasonable request from the
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9 authors.
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11 Acknowledgements
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14 The authors are very grateful to both Annamaria Mazzoni and Giovanni Scabbia of Qatar
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16 Foundation’s Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute for their helpful contributions to
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19 the early version of this document, and to Dr. Elizabeth Palmer of the University of Southern
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21 California for helpful discussions. This research is funded under a support from the Zumberge
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an
Research and Innovation Fund of the University of Southern California allocated to the Arid
Climates and Water Research Center - AWARE.

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4 References
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40 57. Wheeler, K.G., Jeuland, M., Hall, J.W., Zagona, E., Whittington, D., 2020.
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4 FIGURES
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40 Figure 1. Filling duration and resulting additional annual water deficit for Egypt caused by the GERD filling under the
41 considered published scenarios. Top and right plots describe the estimated Probability Distribution Function of each variable
42 (Gaussian kernel density estimate), respectively.
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Figure 2. Annual water deficit for Egypt during the GERD filling period by source. Note that for each box-plot, the line inside the
box represents the median, the triangle delineates the mean, the box edges represent the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers
extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted individually in crosses. References:
1Liersch et al., 2017; 2Mazzoni et al., 2018. The left box (GERD) refers to the annual water deficit induced by water impounding
in the GERD reservoir during the filling period (numbers are statistically derived from available scenarios in Table. 1. The
middle box (Seepage) refers to the annual water deficit resulting from seepage losses in the GERD reservoir after 1Liersch et al.
(2017). The right box refers to the current intrinsic water deficit in Egypt after 2Mazzoni et al., 2018.
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52 Figure 3. Calculated Feasibility Index for each proposed mitigation strategy, 0 being non feasible and 1 being feasible.
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$90B
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11 $40B
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17 2026
2019
2020
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2029
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2032
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20 Non-GERD 21-Year Filling 10-Year Filling
21 7-Year Filling 5-Year Filling 3-Year Filling
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GERD.
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Figure 4. Projection of the evolution and losses in the agricultural GDP for Egypt under each of the filling scenarios of the
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30 3500
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33 3300
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3100
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40 2900
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43 2700
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46 2500
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47 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

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49 Non_GERD 3-Year Filling 5-Year Filling
50 7-Year Filling 10-Year Filling 21-Year Filling
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Figure 5. Short-term projection of the evolution and losses of Egypt’s total GDP per capita under each of the GERD filling
53
scenarios only considering the losses in the agricultural sector (i.e., agricultural GDP).
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1
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70.00
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7 % Unemployment 50.00
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9
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10 30.00
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12 20.00
13 10.00
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15 0.00
16 3 5 7 10 21
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17 Filling Scenario (years)
18
19 % of Agriculture Sector Unemployed
20 % Total Unemployed, GERD
21 % Total Unemployed, No GERD
22
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Figure 6. Anticipated unemployment rates and increase in total unemployment per filling scenario for Egypt. Unemployment
projections based on World Bank’s historical data and employment per acre for the agricultural areas in Egypt.
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1
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4 TABLES
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8 Table 1. filling scenarios considered in our water budget deficit analysis.
9
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10 Reference
Num. of
Description
11 Scenarios1
12 3 storage capacities scenario: 74, 35, and 18.5 BCM2. 3 filling period
13 Donia and Negm, 2018 6 (4)
scenarios: 5, 10, and 20 years.
14
7 filling rate strategies: retaining 100%, 50%, 25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, and 5%
15 Keith et al., 2017 7 (6)
of the Blue Nile inflow.3
16
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17 3 policies as fractions of total monthly inflow: impounding of 5, 10 or 25%
18 King and Block, 2014 5 (4) 6. 2 policies with retention rates contingent on exceeding the HASF4: retain
19 any quantity greater than HASF or of 90% HASF.
20 3 scenarios based on monthly minimal discharges to be released downstream:
21 monthly exceedance probabilities of 75%, 50% and 25%.5 3 scenarios based
22 on seepage rate assumptions: low, medium, and high. 6 2 hydro-climatic
23
24
25
26
27
28
Liersch et al., 2017
Omran and Negm, 2018

Wheeler et al., 2016
18 (4)
1
5
an
scenarios: wet or dry. In our analysis we only used 4 scenarios including Q75
and Q50 under wet and dry conditions and assuming maximal seepage (32%)
in all scenarios.
5 annual release values: 25, 30, 35, 40, and 45 BCM/yr.

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29 5 filling policies: impounding of 5, 10, and 25% of the Blue Nile inflow and
30 Zhang et al., 2015 5 (4) retaining quantities greater than HASF or of 90% HASF5. 8 possible
31 precipitation changes -20, -10, -5, 0, +5, +10, +15, and +20% by year 2060.7
32 2 scenarios with fractional impounding: 10 and 25% of inflow. 1 threshold
33 Zhang et al., 2016 6 filling strategy that allows any streamflow volume in excess of the HASF to be
34 impounded in the reservoir. 3 absolute filling strategies: 4, 6, and 8 years.
35
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38
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1 In parenthesis the number of scenarios considered in our study.
50
2 Scenarios with 35 and 18.5 BCM capacity are not considered in this study.
51
3 5% fill rate is not considered in this study given their unlikeliness of adoption (>50 years filling duration)
52
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53 4 HASF: Historical Average Stream Flow.
54 5 25% scenario not considered in our study since filling would not be reached before 20 years.
55 6 Seepage effects considered on a separate analysis.

56 7 Results averaged among different climatic scenarios.
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40
1
2
3 Table 2. Proposed mitigation strategies (continues on next two pages).
4
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6 Reference Description Duration Costs Benefits
7
8 Pump stations with floating intake
no mitigation vs. water deficit
9 design
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10 Additional intakes for existent pumps no mitigation vs. water deficit
11 Loss from 11.5% to 44.3% of
produced energy in AHD per
12 AHD rules to be readjusted to cope
Short Term year -> 1026 to 3952 2.8 - 22.2 BCM/yr.
13 with the water reduction
GWh/yr-> 71.8 to 277
14 Abdelhaleem
M$/yr.8
15 and Helal, 2015
More reliable water management
16 Unknown
us
policies
17 Water management of based on
18 principle of equitable use
Unknown
19 Win-win strategy by Egypt and
20 Unknown
Ethiopia
21 Agreement on GERD capacity Unknown
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Water harvesting project in the Nile
basin
an Long term 4.05 $/m3 (Singapore) or
(10-30 yrs.) 5.45 $/m3 (Berlin)9
Current use 1
BCM,
max 1.8 BCM/yr.10
5 BCM/yrproduced
wastewater:
dM
29 3.7/yrBCM treated
30 -> 1.3
31 Strategy 8.57 B$ CAPEX + 340 M$ BCM/yrpotential
Reuse of wastewater
32 203011 OPEX14 source.12 2030
Donia and
33 Annual wastewater
Negm, 2018
34 to reach 11.7
BCM/yr(11.6
35
BCM/yrtreated). 14
36
Planned for 268
37
Long Term 10 - 20 $/m3 CAPEX + MCM/yr.14
38 Water desalination expansion
(2 to 5 yrs.) 0.65 - 0.77 $/m3yrOPEX13 Potential of <3.5
pte
39 BCM/yrby 202015
40 Modern systems
41 New irrigation methods (e.g. drip efficiency of 80%
42 Long Term 8.5 to 17 B$16
irrigation) -> could save 8.8
43 BCM/yr.
44
45 8 Assuming an average electric price of 0.07 $/KWh.
46 9 From Zhang et al., 2017.
ce
47 10 From Abdel-Shafy et al., 2010.

48
11 From AbuZeid and Elrawady, 2014.
49
12 From Elbana et al., 2017.
50
51 13 Based on “The Cost of Desalination”, Advisian. Available online: https://www.advisian.com/en-gb/global-
52 perspectives/the-cost-of-desalination Article accessed on [2018/11/27]

Ac
53 14 From Mazzoni et al., 2018.
54 15 Retrieved from Verdier, 2011.
55 16 Calculated based on 17 Mha of cultivated land and assuming a cost for modernizing the irrigation systems between
56 500 and 1,000 $/ha.
57
58
59
60
41
1
2
3 Changing crop patterns to use less 1.623 B$ for rice +
4 Short Term 14.8 BCM/yr.18
water 636 M$ for sugarcane17
pt
5 Use modern irrigation systems See similar entry above
6 Eliminating/Diminishing cultivation of
7 rice and other water consuming plants See similar entry above
8 (e.g. sugarcane)
9 save 42% of water
cri
10 El-Nashar and
Converting small field surface canals to Long Term Similar to above: 8.5 to 17 losses
11 Elyamany,
pipes (>5 yrs.) B$19 -> could save 7.4
12 BCM/yr.21
2017
13 Reuse drainage water and treated
See similar entry above
14 wastewater
15 Water condensers next to evaporation Very low
Short Term Low costs
16 areas production
us
17 Expand the use of groundwater See similar entry above
18 Desalination capacity expansion See similar entry above
efficiency >35%
19 Ibrahim and
Using fixed furrow irrigation system -> could save 9.36
20 Emara, 2010
BCM/yr.
21
Construction of desalination plants See similar entry above
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Keith et al., 2017
2017
Omran and
Technological innovation (irrigation
systems, farming practices,
desalination)
Liersch et al., Modifying the operations of the
Rosaries and Sennar dams (Sudan)
an See other entries for more details on each specific solutions
Short Term
(1 year)
Unknown
Potential 3.65 -
dM
4.65 BCM/yr
29 Negm, 2018
(1.65 BCM from
Maximizing the use of groundwater Short Term 0.1 to 6 M$/yr.19
30 fossil aquifers and
31 2-3 BCM from the
32 Nile Aquifer)20
33 Maximizing the use of rainwater in
See above
34 Egypt
35 Reduce evaporation at Lake Nasser:
36 Omran and
changing water levels at AHD,
37 cultivating special crops on the lake See other entries for more details on each specific solutions
Negm, 2018
38 surface, closure of a secondary channel
(cont.)
(khor), circular foam sheet.
pte
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
ce
47
48
49
17
50 Calculated at price of 257.7 $/Tn for Rice and 40.37 $/Tn for Sugarcane -> production of 6.3 MT of rice and 1.57
51 MT of Sugarcane in 2016.
52 18 Self-calculation.
Ac
53 19 Calculated using 3.65 and 4.65 BCM as target, with an average yield per well of 5000 to 60000 m3/day -> 167 to
54 2548 wells -> well cost from 17000$ to 70000$ CAPEX and no relevant costs for OPEX -> 2.9 to 178 M$, which is
55 distributed on an average lifespan of 30 years.
56 20 From El-Nashar and Elyamany, 2017.
57
58
59
60

Heggy+et+al 2021 Environ. Res. Lett. 10.1088 1748-9326 Ac0ac9

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53 The construction of the GERD triggered inconclusive debates on the hydrological,

available peer-reviewed publications and reports.

Climates and Water Research Center - AWARE.

to climate variability. Sci. Total Environ. 677, 530-544.

47 future challenges. Journal of advanced research 7, 403-412.

47 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

Omran and Negm, 2018

5 annual release values: 25, 30, 35, 40, and 45 BCM/yr.

53 4 HASF: Historical Average Stream Flow.

55 6 Seepage effects considered on a separate analysis.

47 10 From Abdel-Shafy et al., 2010.

52 perspectives/the-cost-of-desalination Article accessed on [2018/11/27]

53 14 From Mazzoni et al., 2018.

54 15 Retrieved from Verdier, 2011.

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