Johann P. Arnason (1982) Perspectives and Problems of Critical Marxism in Eastern Europe (Part One)

PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS OF CRITICAL
MARXISM IN EASTERN EUROPE (Part one)

*
Johann P. Arnason
Various critics of Marxism have singied out its inability to develop a theory ot
..reai socialism&dquo; as a particularly grave shortcoming: on this view, the insiitut.
ionaiis3tion of a Niamisz ideology’ and its embodiment in a new political system
have :urned inco epistemological obstacles for Marxist theory rather than con.
nrmations of its validity. There is no denying the prima facie plausibility of
this thesis. No account of Soviet society and its more or less divergent replicas
in Eastern Europe can overlook the crucial role of ideological and political
determinants; the reductionist aspects of classical Marxism (condensed in the
basis-superstructure model) preclude an adequate grasp of these dimensions.
and the difficulty is compounded by the involvement of Marxism itself in the
genesis of phenomena for which it has no analytical space.
The criticism is valid, but it should not be converted into a premature diagnosis.
As I will cry to show. there exists a substantial and diversified body of work
that proves beyond doubt the pertinence of Marxian concepts for the critique
of &dquo;real socialism&dquo;. Oppositional Marxist theorising about the novel experience
of pose-revolutionary societies has disclosed both the built-in defects and the
self-transformative potential of the tradition on which it draws. The following
analysis will deal with some representative products of critical Marxism in
Eastern Europe in so far as they attempt to demystify and explain the social
order within which they have developed; other themes - such as the more
general question of non-dogmatic Marxist orientations in philosophy and soc-
iolog~~ -- will be only marginally taken into account, even if they have some-
times been extensively treated bye the same authors. On the other hand, some
broader currents and background developments will be briefly discussed, not
least with a view to the ambivalences and illusions that in some cases have im-
paired the theoretical productivity of oppositional movements. In the Eastern
European context, the emergence of a critical Marxism presupposes three
different steps toward theoretical autonomy: a) a dissociation from the
politics of &dquo;reform communism&dquo;, i.e. the various intra-party reformist currents
stimulated by the crisis of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and definitively
crushed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; b) a clean break with the
Leninist branch of the Marxist tradition (more correctly: with the Leninist
adulteration of the Marxian legacy); c) a critical reconsideration of some basic
assumptions of historical materialism, especially with regard to their depend-
ence on an incomplete image of modernity. Although the three steps can to
some extent be regarded as logically consecutive, this is not necessarily reflected
68
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in their historical sequence; thus the most important variant to reform
communism, the Czechoslovak movement of the ’sixties, discarded many
elements of the Leninist model, while substantial remnants of a Leninist out.
took are sometimes to be found among oppositionists who have lost faith in
the strategies of reform communism. The third and most fundamental re-
orientation permits a considerable variety of degrees and directions, but any
suggestion of a &dquo;new orthodoxy&dquo;, analogous to the mirage stubbornly cherish.
ed by some sectors of the Western Left, is ruled out. The rediscovery of Marx
in Eastern Europe has throughout been informed with a more critical spirit
than in the West.
The historical and geographical limits of the inquiry are easy to determine.
With the exceptions of Yugoslavia and Hungary (in the former case, ideological
innovations were a direct consequence of the break with the Soviet bloc in
1948; in the latter, a reformist communist alternative, accompanied by
intellectual contestation, took shape already in 1953-1955), the oppositional
currents to be considered are responses to the new situation created by the
twentieth congress and its more or less delayed repercussions. If the year 1956
was a watershed in the history of Eastern Europe, it seems likely that the
Polish events of 1980-81 will be seen as a comparable one. albeit of a very
different kind; whatever their short-term outcome may be, they unquestion.
ably represent a new phase in the evolution of social conflicts in the region.
Between these two crucial dates, the Prague Spring and its defeat constitute
the most prominent landmark. ,
In geographical terms, the argument of this paper will be largely restricted to

Yugoslavia and the more advanced parts of the Soviet sphere of domination
(primarily Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). The history of Soviet dissent
-
in itself a very complex and challenging phenomenon - is irrelevant for our
present purposes. Beside the much stronger liberal and conservative tendencies.
its Marxist component dwindles to insignificant proportions, with the currents
to be discussed below. Dissenting Marxist views on the Stalinist and post-Stalin.
ist epochs of Soviet history are - to mention the best-known exampie -
expressed in the writings of Roy Medvedev, but their interpretative framework
has not progressed far beyond the limits of orthodoxy.1 On the other hand,
the reference to the Soviet Centre remains essential for the more articulate
critique coming from the periphery: both the ideological discourse whose
monopoly it contests and the system of domination that it combats have their
origin and their ultimate foundations in the Soviet Union.
I, The Crisis of Soviet Marxism

Some analysts have described Soviet Marxism as the ideological system par
excellence; others have opted for a more restrictive definition of the concept of
ideology and questioned its applicability to the official Soviet doctrine, at least
in its present stage.2 Since this is not the place for an extensive clarification of
69
concepts, I will only briefly state my terminological preferences: the notion of
ideology refers to cultural orientations in so far as they are a) directly con.
stitutive of forms of domination. b) give rise to explicit more or less rational.
ised justifications of the latter. The trajectory of Soviet Marxism has been
marked by a highly unequal development of the two aspects. The underlying
systemic continuity, unaffected by the Khrushchevist intermezzo and its
seouels, guarantees the survival of the first, whereas the second has gone
through a phase of temporary intensification and rationalisation, followed by a
steep decline and B.virtual bankruptcy. The manifest crisis of the official dis-
course facilitated the development of a Marxist opposition: a brief sketch of
this background is therefore the logical starting-point.
Soviet Marxism subordinates an impoverished and distorted version of the

classical Marxist theory of society to the doctrine of &dquo;dialectical materialism&dquo;,
presented as a sy tematic cosmology and as a universal scientific method. The
Various sources drawn upon in the elaboration of this system do not concern us
here. The more important problem of its specific functions and general
mechanisms of adaptation can be approached through an analysis of the two
basic principles, i.e. materialism and the dialectic. Debased and caricatural as it
is. the Stalinist conception of the dialectic still retains subterranean links with
the Hegelian system (hence the &dquo;’rehabilitation&dquo; of Hegel after Stalin’s death
did not necessitate any major readjustments). In both cases, the relativisation
of particular perspectives is combined with a claim to absolute knowledge, but
the character of both elements as well as the synthesizing procedures differ
profoundly. In the Stalinist context, the relativisation of apparent contrasts
and incompatibilities has a twofold rationale: it serves to neutralise the disson-
ances between remnants of the revolutionary tradition and practices of the
post-revolucionary state (thus Stalin invoked dialectical reason to support the
thesis that the &dquo;withering away of the state&dquo; could only be achieved through
its incessant strengthening) and to justify abruptly varying strategies in
domestic and foreign policy as expressions of fundamentally identical aims
(here several levels must be distinguished: the systemic goal, i.e. the extension
and maximisation of control, is couched in the language of a universalistic
ideology and thus rendered-less vulnerable to confusion with particular strateg-
ies ; the ideology in turn needs the Stalinist version of the dialectic to regulate
its coexistence with the unprincipled Realpolitik of the ruling apparatus).
Thus the relativising aspect of the dialectic becomes a vehicle of manipulation.

This entails a corresponding change in the status of its absolute counterpart.
Herein lies the real significance of the &dquo;materialist&dquo; thesis: as defined by Lenin
and the later systematisers of Leninism objective knowledge and absolute truth
are grounded in the &dquo;theory of reflection&dquo;, i.e, in the reduction of conscious-
ness to a copy of external reality. Distorted and incomplete reflections are
allowed for, but the possibility of absolute adequacy is built into the general
model of the relationship between consciousness and reality and codified in the
universally valid &dquo;laws of dialectics&dquo;. The canonisation of a &dquo;scientific world
70
‘-iew&dquo;, adequate overall reflection of natural and social reality, destroys the
an
dialogical element of dialectics and replaces it with a set of pseudo.nomological

axiom. The system built on these foundations has no intrinsic need for a
permanent’ confrontation with other schools of thought; it acknowledges oniy
the strategic task of demasking and passing judgment on them. On the other
hand, the cognitive monopoly of the party leadership is periodically reasserted
t,y condemning revisionist deviations and voluntaristic excesses. Towards the
end of the Stalin era, this operation seems to have been carried out more and
more for its own sake. It is very difficult to relate Stalin’s last ideological inter-
ventions (on linguistics and on &dquo;economic problems of socialism in the Soviet
Union&dquo;) to real trends or genuine issues of the times; their function seems
rather to consist in a global affirmation of scientific authority. The very in-
capability of going beyond purely repressive solutions of the post-war problems
called for a complementary strengthening of the ideological foundations in
abstracto.
This combination of irrelevant and arbitrary theorising with a self-perpetuating

system of repression forms the background to the situation of Soviet Marxism
after 1953. The crisis that began with Stalin’s death entered an acute phase in
1956 and gave rise to the complex and ambivalent phenomenon of Khrushch-
evism ; it was followed by an era of retrograde stabilisation after 1964. At the
outset, the range of available options was limited by the impossibility of a
simple prolongation of Stalinism and the unthinkability of a serious challenge
to the party’s monopoly of power. Given the thorough sterilisation of &dquo;marxist.
Leninist&dquo; discourse, ideological considerations could not play a significant role
in the conflicts that took place within the space thus circumscribed. But as
soon as a dominant tendency - incarnated by Khrushchev - emerged, the new
orientation needed a distinctive ideological stamp. For this purpose. the adapt-
ive mechanisms of dialectical materialism were activated. Both the theory of
reflection and the inventory of dialectical laws could be utilized to justify
certain innovations while avoiding a radical rupture and deflecting criticism of
the past towards a substitute target. The Stalinist principle of intensified class
struggle as a by-product of socialist construction, previously defended as an
instance of the law of dialectical contradiction, was now denounced as an ex-
ample of the mechanical misapplication of the same law; the new emphasis on
specific &dquo;non-antagonistic&dquo; contradictions of socialist society was partly
designed to impose a priori limits on criticism, partly conducive to a less
mystified image of &dquo;real socialism&dquo;. Up to a point, the case for greater
autonomy of culture could be rested on distinctive characteristics of the
&dquo;aesthetic reflection of reality&dquo;, but as long as the theory of reflection remain-
ed intact, the ultimate legitimacy of ideological supervision was not questioned.
In short, a certain elasticity of basic principles as well as derivative tenets en-
sured that the ideological resources of the system were not exhausted, but it
also allowed the first steps towards a more radical contestation to be articulat-
ed in a semi-official language (the latter aspect was especially important for the
development of reform communism in Czechoslovakia). The rectified version
71
of dialectical materialism was contrasted with the &dquo;dogmatism&dquo; of the past.
This label to some extent accepted buy the incipient opposition - was highly
misleading: the ideological component of Stalinism was not based on dogma.
tised principles. but on the absolute authority of an institution, endowed with
the power to dogmatise and revise.
Apart from this general strategy of adaptation, Soviet Marxism in its post.
Stalinist phase produced some more specific responses to the crisis: it seems
appropriate to describe them
as &dquo;reaction-formations&dquo;, since their function is
clearly no pre-emption of possible criticism than the definition of
less the
positive guidelines. These developments of centre on three themes, all of which
came to the fore during the second stage Khrushchevism in the Soviet Union
(1961-1964), but were elaborated in much greater detail in Poland. Czechoslov-
akia and Hungary: the notion of a ‘°people’s state&dquo; replacing the dictatorship
of the proletariat and corresponding to a higher level of socialist development;
new &dquo;models of the functioning of a socialist economy&dquo; (W. Brus) involving a
partial rehabilitation of the market; and the conception of a &dquo;scientific and
technical revolution&dquo;, seen as a qualitative transformation of the productive
forces. Obviously, the second had a more solid experiential basis and was of
greater practical relevance than the two others, but it only concerns us here in
so far as the attempts to combine planning with a certain amount of market
regulation raised theoretical problems concerning the underlying social

structure. Despite the unequal conceptual levels, all three themes are to some
extent susceptible to different interpretations’, ranging from pure apologetics
to moderate criticism. The slogan of the &dquo;people’s state&dquo; was officially used to
reaffirm the permanent validity of a statist model of socialism, but the partial
dissociation of class and state opened the way for a less reductionist treatment
of political theory and undermined the juridical nihilism inherited from the
Stalin era. The economic reforms gave rise to widely divergent rationalisations.
The most conservative way of justifying them was to envisage a new phase of
intensive growth, demanding more complex forms of management than the
previous pattern of extensive industrialisation; at the other end of the spectrum
they were seen as belated adjustments to the incomplete and contradictory
form of social ownership that still prevailed in Soviet.type systems. Similarly,
the scientific and technical revolution was depicted as a task to be carried out
under the guidance of the party and calling for a strengthening of its leading
role, but the idea of a new stage in the development of the productive forces
would also - especially in conjunction with other arguments - be used to cast
doubt on traditional models of socialism, derived from an absolute material
basis.3
Finally, a more marginal procedure of adaptation should be mentioned: the

attempt to construct a more flexible model of orthodoxy, capable of borrow-
ing and digesting various elements of &dquo;bourgeois&dquo; theories without impairing
the coherence of the Marxist world view. This operation presupposes a relative
autonomy of its initiators vis-a-vis the political instances. Some spokesmen of
72
official or semi-official Marxism in Poland, particular3y~ prior LC 1968. experi.
mented with this strategy; well-known examples are various works of the
philosopher Adam Schaff, as well as later efforts of Polish sociologists to
demonstrate the convergence between historical materialism and a properly
understood structural.function theory. 4
ii. Critical Alternatives

1. As we have seen, some excrescences of the official ideology could,
under certain circumstances, provide an opening for genuine criticism. But it
would be misleading to write the history of critical Marxism in Eastern Europe
as a sequel to Khrushchevism and its metamorphoses. The oppositionai
currents have a history of their own; it begins with independent responses to
the post-1953 crisis and leads to increasing internal differentiation. Although
the process of separation from the &dquo;legitimatory science&dquo; of Soviet Marxism
was neither smooth nor uniform, unorthodox scurces of inspiration were avail.
able from the outset. When previously neglected or rejected parts of Marx’s
work were given their due, the very foundations of dialectical materialism were
subverted. At first, this rediscovery centred on the Economical and Philosoph-
ical Manuscripts, whereas the importance of the Grundrisse was much less
readily recognised; systematic interpretations of Marx’s theory in the light of
the latter still remain exceptional within the Eastern European context. A
better grasp of the original intentions of Marxism also stimulated interest in
less conformist branches of the tradition. Preferences and rejections were
dictated by the most obvious lessons of the Eastern European experience:
Among the interwar pioneers of anti-Stalinist Marxism, those who argued for a
generalisation of critical and emancipatory principles beyond the traditional
model of a proletarian revolution sounded more convincing than the left
oppositionists who defended this model against deformations and betrayals;
post-war Western Marxism was valued more for its partial and episodic contacts
with other traditions than for attempts to lay the foundations for an alternat-
ive. orthodoxy. Hence, among other things, the indifference to Althusser’s pro.
ject of intellectual reform, whose obvious affinities with Soviet Marxism led
Eastern European critics to underestimate its challenge to predominant
versions of Marxist humanism.
On the philosophical level, the convergences between some trends in Western

Marxism and other schools of thought are mainly of two kinds: the Marxisi.
heritage is to be adapted to the insights of phenomenology or to those of
contemporary philosophies of science. This dichotomy substantially coincides
with the most important dividing line in Eastern Europe. The de facto plurality
that tended to replace the monolithic world view of Marxism-Leninism was
never officially accepted, and it was only in exceptiunally favourable circum-
stances that the principle of p’uraJism could be openiy advocated; to the extent
that the problem was discussed, the distinction Between anthropological and
scientistic interpretations of Marxism suggested itself as the most appropriate
73
starting-point (in a loose sense, referring to affinities rather than specific con.
tents the labels phenomenological and positivistic could also be used). Our
present concern is with its reflection in different approaches to the critique of
real socialism.
For those who saw the de-ideologisation of Marxism primarily as an adaptation

to standards of scientific inquiry, more specifically with regard to the study of
post-revolutionary societies, the rehabilitation of sociology ! (previously con.
demned as a &dquo;bourgeois pseudo-science&dquo;) was an obvious conclusion. Given the
limits of this paper, the history of Eastern European sociology after 1956 will
not be discussed in detail. but some general features should be noted. Although
critical impulses were decisive in the re-emergence of sociology as an independ.
ent discipline, its subsequent cultural and political role has varied widely. In
countries that have remained relatively immune to political crises i particularly
,ne GDR and Bulgaria). the subversive potential oi sociology has by and large
been successfully neutraiised: in other cases (most conspicuously in Czecho-
siovakia during the ’sixties) it played an important role in the theoretical prep-
aration of reformist policies: the most radical claims made on its behalf have
cast it in the role of a semi-institutionalised intellectual opposition. The more
sociology succeeded in liberating itself from direct political control, the more
openly its development was envisaged as a muitipe convergence: a method-
oiogically upgraded Marxism was to be brought into contact with contempor-
ary Western sociology and national sociological traditions (of which the Polish
one was by far the most vigorous). Attempts to lay down specific principles
of a non-dogmatic Marxist sociology were counter-balanced by more syncretic
programmes, such as a structural-funetional generalisation of historical material-
ism or a less precisely defined critical and humanist orientation.55
Despite the varying orientations and degrees of autonomy, the long-term tend-
encies of the &dquo;sociological enlightenment&dquo; in Eastern Europe were unequivocal.
It undermined and discredited the Marxist-Leninist image of a consolidated
socialist society. Empirical research disclosed a hierarchical division of labour
and a maze of conflicting interests. very different from the officially proclaim-
ed harmonious co-operation of non-antagonistic classes. The reality behind
socialist principles of distribution (to everyone according to his work) turned
out to be a network of more or less institutionalised privileges. Even the liquid-
ation of the old order was much less complete in practice than in theory: some
traditional inequalities were reproduced within a new context. In short, the
sociological analysis of post-revolutionary societies brought to light various
forms of division, inequality, and domination, manifestly incompatible with the
party doctrine and at least difficult to explain on the basis of classical Marxism.
2. On the other hand, a radical critique of real socialism could not limit
itself to the appropriation of sociological insights and methods. To do so was
to avoid a fundamental question: to what extent do some basic presuppositions
and common limitations of the Marxist and the sociological tradition restrict
74
their relevance for interpretations of the Eastern European experience? This
issue has been tackled more systematically by theorists of the anthropological
current. Since the latter gave rise to the most distinctive contributions of
Eastern Eu.ropean Marxism and the most serious attempt to transcend the
Marxian problematic from within, a brief exposition of its main themes will
serve as a background to the following discussion.
The anthropological interpretations were connected by &dquo;family resemblances&dquo;

rather than by a common programme, and some of them rejected the label as
suggestive of a species relativism. They included reconstructions of a Marxian
concept of human nature (based primarily on the 1844 .Blanuscripts). argu.
ments for a non-reductionist conception of human individuality and its re-
lations to society and history. and more dynamic models of a &dquo;human essence&dquo;
as realizing itself in history and conferring an internal unity on the historical
process; for the most ambitious variant, an &dquo;ontology of man&dquo;, the main task
was a comprehensive thematisation of the relations between man and world,
involving a redefinition of some basic concepts of historical materialism. Part

of the common ground was a reaction against the ultra-objectivistic and deter-
ministic philosophy of history with which Marxism had come to be identified,
as well as against the correspondingly impoverished conceptions of the ‘’sub-
jective factor&dquo;. The &dquo;philosophy of man&dquo; that was e~cpected to redress the
balance had to propose alternative ways of conceptualising human action,
breaking with the traditional understanding of labour and class struggle as
directly or indirectly subordinated to laws of the productive forces. For critics
who claimed to represent the cause of genuine Marxism against the post.
revolutionary establishment, the most plausible and attractive solution was to
resurrect the Marxian concept of praxis. But the fragmentary character of
Marx’s more philosophical texts made them open to widely diverging interpret-
ations. Praxis could be defined as &dquo;conscious, goal-oriented social activity, in
which man realises the optimal potentialities of his being, and which is there-
fore an end in itself&dquo; (Mihailo Markovic) or as the complex unity of three
dimensions: the creation of a specifically human world, the realisation of free-
dom through a struggle for recognition, and the constitution of a relationship
to the world in its totality (Karel Kosik).
The theoryof objectivation, as elaborated by the Budapest school (it incorpor-

ates both the Lukacsian concept of Gegenstandiichheitsrorm and some aspects
of Lukacs’ later self-criticism) is in certain respects an alternative to the philos-
ophy of praxis. The paradigm of objectivation seems to have been preferred for
several reasons. Against the notions of unrestricted self-realisation, associated
with the concept of praxis, it was necessary to insist on the confrontation with
nature, external and internal, as a constitutive moment of human activity (this
argument was foreshadowed by Lukacs when he noted the failure of History
and Class Consciousness to give the dialectic of labour its due). Conversely, the
appropriation of nature only appears as the reverse of objectivation; if object-
ivation and appropriation are seen as &dquo;reflexive determinations&dquo; in the
75
Heglian sense (G. ’~larkus) this refers both to the primary appropriation
through objectivations and the secondary appropriation of objectivations by
individuals. From another angle, the-paradigm of objectivation relativists the
distinctions between instrumental, communicative, and expressive action: over
and above the realisation of subjective goals, both labour and more complex
forms of activity involve the materialisation of social rules and human capacit-
ies. The three aspects converge in the constitution of complex and stratified
socio-cultural reality the components of which can be graded according to
levels of humanisation and self-reflection.
This implicit critique of the philosophy

of praxis seems more pertinent to the
Yugoslav version 3 cf. the comments in section IV below). Counterarguments
are more easily derivable from Kosik’s concept of praxis: from its point of view
view, the paradigm of objectivation reduces the world to the social world, ex-
cludes the very possibility of participatory relations between man and nature
and demotes the latter to a purely limiting role; the image of social reality as a
hierarchy of objectivations privileges its institutional aspects and fades out the
background dimension of trans-institutional sociality.
The political attitudes of the anthropological current were more homogenous
than its philosophy. The imperative of humanisation became the point of de-
parture for a critical analysis of institutions and policies. When official or semi-
official ideologies of reform admitted the obsolescence of class politics in the
Leninist sense, the opposition could mount a more explicit defence of general
human values and their right to primacy in a socialist society.
For these purposes, some of its most radical spokesmen reactivated the Marx-
ian vision of communism; in the first phase, however, the Marxist legitimacy of
the humanist critique was mostly debated in terms of the concept of alienation
and its applicability to post-capitalist societies. Undeniably, the popularity of
this notion (particularly striking in Czechoslovakia in the early ’sixties) was in
part due to its role as a substitute for more specific and provocative criticisms,
but it also reflected an awareness of genuinely philosophical problems posed by
the Eastern European experience. The concept of alienation was, of course, an
eminently controversial one and different definitions had political implications.
If alienation was interpreted as a loss of autonomy, this translated into a
critique of bureaucratic domination; if it means the exclusion of the individual
from social and cultural development, real socialism was accused of perpetuat-
ing the antagonistic form of progress and failing to go beyond the superficial
break with capitalism. As the discussion developed further, the abstract con-
trast between praxis and alienation tended to give way to a more differentiated
framework, taking into account partial blocked and perverted processes of
humanisation.
A further characteristic of the anthropological current was its interest in

specific themes, neglected or outlawed by Marxism-Leninism. Prominent
76
among them was the philosophical and sociological analysts of E’1)C!ïyday lifc. A
comparison with parallel trends in Western Marxism reveals both affinities and
differences. In the former case (exemplified by the works of Henri Lefebvre)
the interest. in everyday life was motivated by a strategy of radicalisation: the
everyday world was to be transformed by a &dquo;cultural revolution&dquo;, more pro-
found than mere changes in political and economic organisation. From Eastern
European critics, the incompleteness of a revolution that left basic structures
of everyday life untouched was equally clear, but they combined this motive
with a more or less outspoken demythologisaiion of the revolutionary per-
soective. The reference to everyday life. whether defined as the phenomenal
level of social reality (Karel Kosik) or as the sphere of individual reproduction
(Agnes Heller), was thus essentially a demystifying procedure. As the domain
of elementary anthropological structures, it could be invoked against the
simultaneous deification and naturalisation of history: as a complex of inter-
penetrating activities, underlying more specialised institutions, it called for a
revision of the basis-superstructure model.
Closely related to the analysis of everyday life was the problematic of needs. In
this field Mar.c’s theoretical contributions were more substantial, but they were
re-evaluated and radicalised from a distinctively Eastern European viewpoint.
The development of needs was seen as a basic and ongoing mediation between
nature and society; the very idea of such mediations was at variance with the
dogmatic ontology of dialectical materialism. Needs in the Marxian sense, i.e.
as expressive of both man’s dependence on nature and his capacity to confer
human significance upon it, are concrete functions of autonomy and finitude.
The myths of a total control of nature or a sovereign direction of history were
incompatible with the authentic concept of labour as an activity rooted in and
conditioned by specific structures of needs. Further aspects of the concept of
need linked it with arguments for the autonomy of culture. If needs are re-
lations between man and world, experienced by man as ’inner necessities’
(Marx), they are obviously involved in and presupposed by the multi-faceted
process of appropriation of the world; some Eastern European theorists
identified this process with the cultural dimension of social consciousness, as
distinct from its ideological one. Finally, the notion of ’radical needs’, referring
to the subjective preconditions of revolutionary transformation, was conceived
as a Marxist alternative to the Leninist mixture of voluntarism and determinism.
The new image of man called for a theory of values. The value-orientations of
human action were the clearest evidence of its irreducibility to material pro-
duction or purposive rationality. This is a widely debated theme, but its
connection with the concept of praxis - or its equivalents - led to some
original developments. A representative definition was proposed by Agnes
Heller: objectivations are values to the extent that they &dquo;directly or indirectly
promote the development of human essence&dquo;6 (in her later writings, this con-
ception was superseded by a more pluralistic one, emphasising the role of
values as expressions of different forms of life). Within the limits set by an
77
anthropological concept of value and a dynamic concept of human essence,
two major trends can be distinguished. One of them emphasised the normative
aspects of values. The ability of human action to transcend material and social
constraints was primarily ascribed to its inclusion in a normative context, and
norms were interpreted as codifications of a complex and changing relation.
ship between individual, society and species. The logical outcome of this
approach was a renewal of philosophical ethics, disputing the field with
attempts to systematise the official moral doctrines. From the other point of
view, values were first and foremost manifestations of human creativity, i.e. of
praxis involving not only the transcending of nature through the creation of
as
a socio-cultural world, but also the transcending of its own historical condit.
ions through the creation of values (cf. the relevant sections in Kosik’s Dalect-
ics of the Concrete.) In political terms, this amounted to a very strong version
of the demand for an autonomy of culture.
Taken together, the theory of needs and the theory of values constituted a
strong reaction against one of the most pronounced reductionist elements in

traditional Marxism: the explanation of social behaviour in terms of interests.
Not that the concept of interest was essentially unsuited for critical use; it
played an important role in the ideology of reform communism (cf. particul-
arly the writings of Ota Sik). But the empirical question of conflicting interests
in a post-revolutionary society was in the last instance inseparable from more
general problems, concerning the theoretical function and the historical limits
of the concept of interest as such. It had come to be used as a general formula
for linking structural and subjective aspects. This was in line with the Engelsian
thesis that &dquo;relations of production manifest themselves as interests&dquo;, but a
closer look at 11arx showed that he located the concept of interest within a
much more restricted framework, determined by, the production of abstract
wealth and the fetishisation of social relations; the antagonistic correlation be-
tween private and general interests entered into the very definition of the con-
cept. This model excluded a straightforward extrapolation, and an analysis of
other forms of the social constitution of interest would have to take into
account other constituents of subjectivity. Hence the relevance of needs and
values and although the political implications were only partly spelled out, this
combination could generate a more radical version of pluralism than a purely
interest-based differentiation.7
Finally, some points of contact between the anthropological problematic and

the Marxist interpretation of European history deserve at least a brief mention.
Inasmuch as new light was thrown on the historical background of anti-capital-
ist ideas and movements, the results were at least indirectly relevant to the
critique of real socialism. Agnes Heller’s book on renaissance man is a case in
point. Robert Kalivoda’s analysis of the Hussite movement and its antecedents
pursued similar aims within a more restricted area.8 Both authors drew upon
Marx’s Grundrisse for a more adequate understanding of the transition from
feudalism to capitalism.
78
The early emergence of dynamic concepts of man and radical perspectives of
human liberation, antedating full-scale capitalist development but also partly
anticipating its socialist critics could only be accounted for in terms of the
anthropological content of the underlying historical process.
3. If the events of 1968 spelled disaster for reform communism, they also
changed the whole outlook of the Marxist opposition. The invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, followed by a systematic reconstruction of the Stalinist cncien regime.
was a drastic reminder of the obstacles to reform and the possibilities of regess-
ion. This lesson was not lost upon the critical theorists of the ’seventies, but
their ways of assimilating it differed considerably. In some cases, anthropolog-
ical Marxism was rejected as a philosophical illusion and a diversion from the
crucial task of analysing social conflicts and mechanisms of domination. The
philosophy of praxis. and the politics of reform communism were jointly con-
signed to the dustbin of history. Against this view, I shall argue that a properly
conceived anthropological framework remains indispensible for the critique of
real socialism, and that the most promising of the post-1968 theories are those
who manage to combine philosophical interpretation with structural analysis.
To begin with, the partial affinities between anthropological Nlarxism and re-
form communism should not be mistaken for an ultimate identitv. For the
reformers of the ’sixties, humanistic ideologies were a highly convenient form
of legimitation (cf. the famous slogan &dquo;socialism with a human face&dquo;), but the
insights and questions of the philosophy of praxis (in the broadest sense) are
not reducible to this political function. Apart from other criteria, the variants
of the anthropological paradigm can be tested for their intrinsic capacity of
self.reflection and radicalisation in response to such major setbacks as that of
1968. Some prominent contrasts will be noted below.
However, the differences between Marxist critics of the post-reform era are not
simply a matter of greater or lesser receptivity to the legacy of the ’sixties.
They also reflect divergent theoretical programmes. By common consent, the
primary task was to conceptualise the structures of domination that had partly
resisted, partly absorbed the reformist initiatives, but this still left various
options open.
Although the new approach was in some ways more congenial with the tradit-
ion of the anti~talinist Left than the critical supporters of reform communism
had been, the historical distance precluded a direct resumption of Trotskyist
and post-Trotskyist discussions. The key concept of transitional society was
clearly inapplicable to post-Stalinist and Eastern Europe.
post-iihrushchevist
To domestic critics, real socialism appeared monolithic social order with
as a
highly developed mechanisms of self-reproduction; as events in Czechoslovakia
had shown, dysfunctionalities within this order could escalate into a general
crisis, but the sequel had no less clearly shown its capacity of regeneration and
the systematic elimination of alternatives. If structural strains and contra-
79
dictions were to be explained, this could no longer be done in terms of an un.
decided contest between capitalist and socialist tendencies. Equally unaccept.
able was a solution sometimes adopted by leftist critics of Trotskyism: the
interpretation of Soviet-type societies as an extreme form of capitalism. On
this view. the revolutionary upheavals had in the long run only served to
accelerate the concentration and bureaucratisation of capital, blocked in the
traditional strongholds of capitalism by endogenous factors. A closer acquaint-
ance wuh the system led to the conclusion that such theories might contain a
rational kernel (the discussion in each of the sections which follow will detail
this more carefully), but they failed to account for some crucially important
phenomena. Measured by the criteria of capitalist rationality, the persistent re-
tardatior, of Eastern European societies was painfully obvious; so, too, was the
retention and consolidation of various pre-capitalist patterns - both cultural
and social that blocked the road to authentic modernity.
-
If the most typical explanatory strategies of Western Niarxism were in-

two
adequate. the non-Marxist theory of totalitarianism - propounded in varying
versions by both rightist and leftist adversaries of the Soviet system - was not
a satisfactory alternative either. While the label could be used for purely
descriptive purposes, the theoretical constructions built on it were either too

narrow or too vague. In the sense of a system of government based on perman-
ent ideological mobilisation and mass terror, totalitarianism was a characteristic
of the Scaiin era, rather than an enduring systemic feature; if the notion referr-
ed only to a society of total control, it threw no light on the specific structure
of the Soviet model.
The most traditional of the remaining options was a critique of bureaucratfc

domination. In contrast to Trotsky’s thesis, Eastern European variations on
this theme had to make sense of a much longer and more sobering experience.
To reduce the bureaucratic apparatus to the ultimately passive expression of a
stalemated class struggle was transparently absurd, and its political initiatives
could not be explained as simple reactions to external constraints. But even an
appropriateiy revised concept of bureaucracy proved too restrictive. Though
cussociated from the logic of capital, it was in the last analysis too closely
linked to the historical context of capitalist development to be of much use in
interpreting a new social formation. It could only grasp the dynamics of the
latter in a negative form: as the elimination of obstacles to complete hegemony
of the bureaucracy as a social force. And when the constitutive principles of
real socialism were subjected to a more thorough scrutiny, general definitions
of bureaucratic rationality were at best partially applicable.
Less vulnerable to such criticisms were theories that focused on the changed
relationship between state and society. The phenomenon of statist, i.e. the
absorption of civil society by the state, was clearly more characteristic of the
Soviet model than was the mere growth of bureaucracy. But it was not the
&dquo;solution of the riddle&dquo; of real socialism. It still had to be explained how social
80
forces operated within the statist framework; what was the raison d’etre of the
soecific model of development that had been imposed; and last but not least,
B~hV the state was institutionally and ideologically. subordinated to the party.
_=,11 three questions touch upon the role of ideological determinants.
The hypothesis of a new class society suggested itself as a plausible solution.

The state and the party were the viewed as complementary forms of orsanisa-
tion of the ruling class. and the emergence of Soviet Marxism as the trans-
formation of a revolutionary theory into a legitimating ideology. Theories of
this kind had appeared on the periphery of the ieft opposition during the inter-
war year, but their Eastern European counterparts adopted a different per-
spective : for them, the new form of class domination was a non-capitalist type
oi modern society, rather than a posicapiiaiisc alternative to socialism. Even
with this proviso. the argument proved difficult to sustain. At the very least. it
had to be admitted that the various aspects of class in the Marxian sense -
structural, institutional, behavioural, and ideological -- did not coalesce in the
same way as in capitalist societies.
From a less orthodox point of view, this fragmentation was the sign of more
fundamental changes. The focal point of social division and domination seemed
to have shifted from the relations between state and society or betweEn class
and class to those between institutions and the individual. The politicisation of
society and the periodic explosions of social conflicts were obvious and import-
ant facts, but the mainsprings of the syscem were located at the anthropologic-
al rather than the socio-political level. This line of thought found expression in
the definition of real socialism as a dictatorship over needs, formulated by the
Budapest school.
III. The Blind Alleys of Polish Marxism.

I. One of the pioneers of the Marxist opposition in Eastern Europe,
Leszek Kolakowski, later arrived at very sceptical conclusions about its histor-
ical role. As he now sees it, the quest for a genuine and autonomous Marxism -
the revisionist movement, as he prefers to call it was a misguided and self-
-
undermining enterprise from the outset. Its temporary political function con-
sisted of giving voice to the demands for democratisation, national sovereignty,
and economic reforms; on the philosophical level, revisionists criticised the
theory of reflection, determinism, and ’‘attempts to deduce moral values from
speculative historiographical schemata&dquo;. However, &dquo;revisionism could be effect-
ive only as long as the party took the traditional ideology seriously and the
apparatus was in some degree sensitive to ideological questions. But revisionism
itself was a major cause of the fact that the party lost its respect for official
doctrine and that ideology increasingly became a sterile though indispensable
ritual. In this way revisionist criticism, especially in Poland, cut the ground
from under its own feet ... Revisionism itself, on the other hand, had a cert-
ain inner logic, which, before long, carried it beyond the frontiers of Marxism
81
... instead of Marxism being enriched or supplemented, it dissolved in a
welter of ideas&dquo;.9 _
In I~olako‘vski’s view, the very existence of revisionism was thus dependent on

the political hegemony of reform communism and the intellectual hegemony
of Marxism, but at the same time the movement helped to destroy both pre-
conditions. Although the first-hand experience of the author might seem to
land some authority to this diagnosis, it is in my opinion a highly misleading
simplification. As will be shown later on, the three-cornered relationship be-
tween reformist factions in the ruling communist parties. Marxist critics of the
system, and intellectual resources of the Marxist tradition did not everywhere
conform to the Polish pattern (Kolakowski seems willing to make an exception
only for ~ ugoslavial. And even in the case of Foland, the problem is more com-
plex than Kolakowski’s description would suggest.
A genuinely reform-communist power in Poland. Con.
leadership never gained
trary to widespread expectations, Gomulka’s policy after 1956 was directed to-
wards restoration rather than reform. The short-lived entente between the
party and the revisionists was based on a misunderstanding, and its breakdown
marks the beginning of a prolonged crisis of the Marxist opposition. Kolakow.
ski’s model does not distinguish between this predominantly negative exper-
ience and the more positive learning processes that resulted from authentic
breakthroughs of reform communism.
_
Whatever the complexities of the process, the final outcome is beyond dispute:
the specifically Marxist component of Polish dissent has virtually disappeared.
Admittedly, a similar development has taken place elsewhere in Eastern Europe,
but the Polish case is the most extreme. The massive-social movement that
emerged in 1980 certainly includes strong democratic.socialist forces, but they
have so far been very reluctant to formulate their views and aims in a Marxist
language. Kolakowski interprets this state of things as an irreversible and well.
deserved decline due to general shortcomings of Marxism rather than to any
peculiarities of the Polish background. Contrary to this thesis, it can, in my
opinion, be shown that the defeat was in a certain measure self-inflicted. The
following analysis is unavoidably selective, but I will single out some examples
of built-in restrictions that weakened the Marxist opposition. To some extent,
the Polish theorists that will be discussed anticipated later developments in
other countries, but the reverse of the medal was a tendency to excessive
simplifications and premature synthesizing.
2. , Kolakowski’s own version of revisionism conforms to this pattern.
While the later phases of his intellectual development do not concern us here, 10
his initial approach to the critique of real socialism is both interesting in its
own right and historically important. In 1956, his distinction between intellect-
ual and institutional aspects of Marxism was one of the first attempts to re-
define the relationship between theory and politics. Despite the strong
82
on scientific method and on the uncompleted task of bringing Marx-
emphasis
ist theory into line with it, the hard core of &dquo;intellectual Marxism&dquo; was phil-
osophical rather than methodological. When the Marxian outlook was dissoc-
iated from. totalitarian politics and pseudo-scientific metaphysics, its distinctive
content appeared to be a particularly radical kind of historicism: &dquo;the convict.
ion that human nature is a product of the history of human society and that
the whole received world view is a &dquo;socially subjective&dquo; construction. In other
words: it is the product of a collective labour that organises reality according
co biological and social needs, and imprints this pattern upon the mind. Con-
sequently, the whole extra-human world is a human product&dquo;.11 The
epistemological implications of this &dquo;anthropological realism&dquo; were developed
by Kolakowski in a well-known essay on &dquo;Karl Nlarx and the Classical Definit-
ion of Truth&dquo;. 12 Here the concept of &dquo;nature as a product of man&dquo; is present-
ed as a radical antithesis of the theory of reflection and simultaneously as an
&dquo;extreme form of overcoming Platonism&dquo;.
There is no need to elaborate on the weaknesses of this conception (to mention

only one point: how is the idea of a determinate human nature to be reconcil-
ed with the image of pre-social
a and pre-historical &dquo;chaos&dquo;‘?) Nevertheless,
Kolakowski’s interpretation of Marx is an instructive tour de force. If the para-
digm of production constitutes the original kernel of historical materialism,
later developments can be seen as tending either towards the radicalisation or
the relativisation of this conceptual framework. Kolakowski’s &dquo;anthropological
realism&dquo; was the most extreme and unreserved version of the first alternative:
those aspects of the human context that others have invoked against the ex-
cesses of productivism - the cognitive appropriation of the world, the express-
ive dimension of action, the participatory character of social auction - are all
engulfed by a totalised concept of production. But this totalisation is at the
same time a de-differentiation. For Marx, production was a &dquo;process between
man and nature&dquo;, for Kolakowski it became the unilateral creation of a natural
order by man. Within this model, there is no scope for an analysis of the labour
process as a structured interaction of subject and object (he alludes to a &dquo;dia-
logue between human needs and their objects&dquo;, but given the ontologically
derivative character of the latter, the dialogue must in the last instance be a
monologue). The same applies to structural disparities or tensions between the
material and the social levels of production. In short, the differentiations and
constraints traditionally associated with the concepts of productive forces and
relations of production are devaluated. And since a historical-materialist theory
of real socialism would obviously have to start with a critical application of the
paradigm of production, Kolakowski’s over-generalisation of the latter destroys
a potential link between
philosophy and social analysis.
To compensate for this, philosophy is granted the status of a &dquo;humanistic
science&dquo;. Its task is to interpret the world and thereby to contribute to the
formation of moral attitudes. The cosmology of dialectical materialism is to be
replaced by an anthropocentric world view. But if the content and the functions
83
of the world view change, this must also affect its structure. Instead of the
quest for all-embracing principles, the primary concern is now the clarifica-
tion of basic distinctions; between science and ideology, between Sein and
So/~n. and between realism and utopia. The insistence on such irreducible
polarities gives a pluralistic twist to Kolakowski’s anthropology .
Kolakmvski’s later critique of ~1arx is based on reversed premises rather than
a reinterpretation. Although he now distinguishes more clearly Between various
motive in Marx’s thought - domination of nature, self-creation, and the
reconciliation of individual and community - he still contrasts its humanist
and hiscoricist stance with the later system of dialectical materialism. It is
~iolakowski’s own image of man and history that has changed. When he con-
demns Marxism en bloc as a &dquo;self-deification of man&dquo; that in practice reveals
itself as &dquo;the farcical aspect of human bondage, and as a misconceived project
of emancipation that paves the way for totalitarianism,&dquo; this verdict is grounded
in a radicals pluralism that admits no unifying models of human nature or
human essence. In both phases, Kolakowski’s philosophy is oriented towards
cultural criticism rather than social analysis; his growing disillusion regarding
the post-revolutionary society is reflected in a more pessimistic appraisal of the
whole socialist tradition.
The essay on &dquo;Hope and Hopelessness&dquo;13 published in 1971, is perhaps the

most revealing document of Kolakowski’s transition from the Marxist to the
post-Marxist phase. Moreover, it is his only attempt to sum up both strengths
and weaknesses of the Marxist critique of &dquo;bureaucratic socialism&dquo;. His re-
capitulation of the Marxist case does not refer to specific sources, but it is
obviously more than a simple restatement of his own previous opinions; it
seems probably that he was aware of arguments put forward by the left wing of
the Polish opposition, particularly in the Open Letter of Kuron and Modzelew-
ski (cf. the discussion below).
Kolakowski equates a non-apologetical Marxist stance with the thesis &dquo;that the
Communist system in its present form is unreformable&dquo;. As long as the posit-
ion of the ruling apparatus is analysed in terms of a combination of class
theory and structural analysis, this conclusion seems inescapable. Since the
political monopoly of the oligarchy is essential for maintaining its exclusive
control over the means of production and the allocation of surplus, no partial
expropriation can be tolerated. All developments that could conceivably lead
to the emergence of countervailing powers - economic reforms, cultural
liberalisation, and a freer exchange of information - are obstructed and if con-
cessions have to be made, the apparatus will consistently strive to minimise
their impact. A system that tends towards the maximisation of control and
conformity is self-defeating in the sense that it leads to a general decline of
intellectual and moral standards; this can even escalate to the point of total
breakdown, but if a revolutionary initiative is forestalled or crushed, the
system will inevitably revert to its normal state.
84
Kolakowski does not contest this description of the mechanisms of bureau-
cratic socialism. What he objects to are the implicit reductionist premises of
those who argue against the possibility of reforms. As he points out, the
question of a society’s transformative capacity can never be settled on the level
of objective structures; it always involves the beliefs and attitudes of people
living in it. The history of capitalism shows the limits of the classical Marxist
argument: its course has been much more decisively shaped by the class
struggle than by any &dquo;natural laws&dquo; of the system. Kolakowski goes on to
suggest - and this is the most interesting part of his argument - that the
structure of bureaucratic socialism makes predictions based on systemic trends
even more problematic. A &dquo;system whose basic forms of action are directed
against society&dquo; requires more complex and all-encompassing mechanisms of
control than any earlier form of oppression, but for the same reason it provok-
es a more spontaneous and universal grass-roots resistance. And as this resist-
ance grows stronger, it can more easily exploit the internal contradictions of
the system, exacerbated by the general antagonism between society and the
apparatus. Kolakowski singles out three such contradictions: the inability of
the oligarchy to reconcile the imperatives of unity and security, the conflict be-
tween pressures for ideological modernisation and the canonical status of Marx-
ism -- Leninism, and the contradiction between industrial progress and the
system of political power.
Undeniably, later events in Poland have to some extent strengthened Kolakow-

ski’s for a reformism based on active. resistance. But his theoretical analysis
case
of real socialism has not really progressed beyond this point. The notion of a
system ’’whose basic forms of action are directed against society&dquo; is at best a
first approximation. It serves to underline the novelty of the phenomenon,
rather than to explain its modus operandi.
3. Although Kolakowski was by far the most articulate and influential

Polish revisionist, his trajectory - from a partial rediscovery of a premature
break with Marx - was not the only one of its kind. A brief look at some other
theorists of the opposition will show that their strategies of revision and updat-
ing were in the last instance similarly defective.
The views of the radical left wing of the Polish opposition were most succinctly
formulated in Kuron and Modzelewski’s Open Letter to the Polish Workers
Party written in 1964.14 The authors later adopted a very different political
position, and the programme of the Open Letter had no appreciable impact on
developments in Poland. It was nevertheless a pioneer attempt to analyse East-
ern European societies as antagonistic formations sui generis, and some of its
arguments prefigured later discussions in other countries. Its highly simplified
form of class analysis is related to the more complex models of the ’seventies in
a similar way as Kolakowski’s neo-Marxist
anthropolgy to the Czech and
Hungarian alternatives.
85
The historical background of the Open Letter was the regressive policy of the
Gumolka leadership after 1956 and the resultant loss of illusions about any re-
forms from above. From a revolutionary Marxist point of view, class analysis
was the most plausible key to this new situation. Kuron and Modzelewski
argued that the ultimate obstacle to reforms was the power of a new ruling
Class, the &dquo;central bureaucracy&dquo;, defined rather restrictively as &dquo;the elite which
dominates the party and the state, which is free from any social control and
which monopolises all socially significant positions in the economic and the
political sphere ... &dquo;.1~ Since the Marxist concept of class presupposes the
paradigm of production, the applicability of the latter to Eastern European
societies must be established. The main difficulty is obvious: both the relations
of production and the development of the productive forces are politically
determined to such a degree that no significant correlations between them can
be specified within an autonomous economic subsystem. Conversely, a third
component of the paradigm becomes much more important than it was in
Marx’s analysis of capitalism: the goal of production, i.e. the orientations of
productive activity that function as criteria of utility, rationality and value. In
the case of Eastern European societies, the goal of production represents the
fusion of political and economic determinants. Kuron and Modzelewski deter-
mined it as production for the sahe of production; they recognised the pro-
gressive and irreplaceable role of the central bureaucracy in the initial phase of
post-revolutionary industrialisation, but maintained that the original social
function had been transformed into an exclusive interest of the dominant class.
Thus the expansion of production had to become an end in itself, uncondition-
ed by either exchange value or use value. The interests of the other two main
classes on the scene, the technocracy (i.e. those who fulfilled managerial and
supervisory functions) and the working class, were directed towards consump-
tion ; hence they resisted the primacy of accumulation.
Instead of the bankrupt reformist strategy, Kuron and Modzelewski advocated

a proletarian revolution in the classical sense. Their image of the authentic
workers’ state was strongly reminiscent of council communism, with a stronger
emphasis on pluralist elements, but opposed to any form of parliamentary
government. How the consumption-oriented working class was to become cap-
able of taking such action against a ruling class committed to the development
of the productive forces, remained unclear (the same could be said about the
technocracy, whom Koron and Modzelewski saw as the main beneficiary of the
Yugoslav system). But the most serious weakness of the model lay in the very
definition of the ruling class. During phases of exceptionally rapid industrializa-
tion - such as that experienced by Poland in the early ’fifties &dquo;production
-
for the sake of production&dquo; might seem a plausible description of its goals, but
the observable long-term trends of the system suggest a different interpreta-
tion ; the primacy of production is conditioned by and intertwined with the
primacy of control. The twists and turns of official economic policies are not
explainable in terms of a pure logic of accumulation; the expansion of product-
86
ion is less an end in itself than the most effective way of strengthening and
legitimating the power of the ruling apparatus.
Although Kuron and hrodzelewski’s subsequent abandonment of the Marxists

perspective was less spectacular than Kolakowski’s, the common pattern - the
transition from a Marxist critique of the system to a post-Marxist reformism -
is typical of the Polish opposition as a whole. The most conspicuous exception
is «’lodzimierz Brus. In various writings published during the ’sixties and
’seventiesl6 he defended a conception best described as an ideal model of re-
form communism. Such models, constructed by oppositional theorists in the
absence of real forces with a reform communist programme, are not unknown
elsewhere Icf. the discussion of Bahro’s Alternatiue in Part 11 of this article),
but in this case, the traditionalist premises are particularly clearly stated. Brus
proposes to analyse both the history of real socialism and its present predica-
ment in the light of Marxian assumptions about the productive forces and their
impact on society. His central thesis is that a genuine socialisation of the means
of production - as distinct from their mere nationalisation - is necessitated by
the development of productive forces in the contemporary era; it is a perman-
ent task of the post-revolutionary society, rather than its initial achievement.
This argument entails two major revisions of the official doctrine. Firstly, the
strict dichotomy of plan or market is rejected. The conscious regulation of
social production cannot be equated with planning in the Soviet sense; it can
and should also to a significant extent be exercised through the mediation of
market mechanisms. Secondly, political_ democratisation becomes an integral
part of the process of socialisation: &dquo;The law of necessary conformity of pro-
ductive forces and the relations of production operates in the direction of
adapting the political system to the demands of the development of productive
forces at the given stage&dquo;. 17 In the present circumstances, this adaptation calls
for &dquo;effective social control over government&dquo;, which in turn presupposes free-
dom of speech, freedom of association, and the rule of law. For Brus, the
economic rationality of genuine democracy is mainly grounded in two &dquo;de-
velopnient needs&dquo;: the problem of motivation and the problem of information
flows in the process of decision-making.
The notion of a developmental autonomy and primacy of the productive

forces, questionable on general philosophical grounds, becomes doubly
problematic when applied to Eastern European societies. As used by Brus, it
obscures the historical originality of both the protagonists and the adversaries
of democratisation; his conceptual framework minimises both the coherence
and the specific contradictions of the model of development imposed by the
ruling apparatus.
IV. Yugoslav Contributions

’
1. For well-known reasons, the development of Marxist theory in Yugo.

slavia has differed from the general Eastern European pattern. Here I will deal
87
only with the most important part of the Marxist opposition: the so-called
praxis. school, a group of philosophers and sociologists that shared some basic
theoretical and political orientations, but disagreed on many secondary issues.188
Their relations with the party leadership and the official doctrine have been
ambivalent and unstable but quite unlike the &dquo;double bind&dquo; described by
soiakowski. The innvoations from above were substantial enough to create a
certain space for contestation of the regime in the name of its own principles.
This situation obviously had its advantages as well as its drawbacks. On the one
hand, the unique status of semi-legicimate dissent and the public sphere
associated with it enabled the Yugoslav opposition to play a role that could not
be envisaaed within the Soviet sphere of domination. This was the basis of its
international resonance. But the critical symbiosis with an unorthodox
communist system - which did not exclude sharp conflicts with the leadership
-
was predicated on theoretical assumptions that came to seem increasingly
problematic during the ’sixties and ’seventies. They have so far prevented the
Yugoslav opposition - or at least its more typical representatives - from radic-
alising its critique of real socialism along the lines sketched above (cf. section
11 ).
The rupture between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was the result of Stalin’s
attempt to independent revolution into line; the &dquo;Yugoslav model&dquo;
bring an
originated from the embattled leadership attempt to strengthen its social
basis. Limited but genuine concessions were made in order to mobilise popular
support; the important aspect of this strategy was the institutionalisation
most
of certain forms of self-management. This proved to be a lasting and ideologic-
ally explosive deviation from the Soviet pattern, but the official doctrine in-
verted the facts of the case. The historical reality was that a Stalinist party had
carried out a revolution on its own and subsequently, in response to a grave
external threat, experimented with a partial and controlled democratisation;
this exceptional conjuncture was interpreted as the rediscovery of classical and
universally valid guidelines for the transition from capitalism to socialism. The
&dquo;Yugoslav road to socialism&dquo; was identified with the Marxist vision of the
&dquo;withering away of the state&dquo;. By the same token, Soviet-type societies
appeared as large-scale historical anomalies not as new social formations.
Despite the occasional use of such labels as &dquo;bureaucratic despotism&dquo; and
&dquo;state capitalism&dquo; for propagandistic rather than theoretical purposes, the per-
spective that was bound to prevail was that of a deformed or perverted social-
ism. However sharply the alternatives might diverge, they were still subsumed
under the traditional dichotomy of capitalism or socialism.
While the opposition has of course been characterised by a more critical attitude
and a higher degree of conceptual precision its main arguments belong to the
same universe of discourse as the programme of the party. The underlying para-
digm is best defined as a distinctive version of the theory of transitional society
-
more fluid and manipulable in the case of the party theorists, more explicit
and rigorous in the case of the opposition, but in both cases significantly
88
different from the Trotskyist or post-’Trotskyist versions. Although the internal
differentiation of the Praxis school should not be overlooked, the predominant

tendency. has been to regard revolutions on the Leninist pattern as socialist and
the post-revolutionary societies as containing at least a socialist potential, in-
completely realised in Yugoslavia and systematically paralysed in the Soviet
bloc. This potential has been largely equated with the institutions of self-
management. Not that the opposition has refrained from criticising the per-
formance of those institutions: much of its controversy with the authorities has
resolved around this point. But such criticism could be pitched at different
levels. The simplest strategy was to confront the deficient practice of self-
management with the officially accepted principles. In a more radical vein. the
whole Yugoslav model could be questioned: was it not structurally flawed in
that subaltern and particularistic forms of self-management merely comple-
mented the bureaucratic domination exercised by the party-state apparatuses?
The logic of this system was clearly at odds with such fundamental socialist
goals as the humanisation of the economy, the harmonisation of interests and
the unrestricted development of participatory democracy. Finally, the very
notion of self-management and the tradition behind it contains a host of
problems. Inasmuch as it tends to reduce the organisation of production and
the self-institutionalisation of society to a common denominator, it shares a
well-nigh universal weakness of socialist thought: a reductionist approach to
the political dimension. And it is precisely this constitutional blindness to the
specificity of the political problem that facilitates a regressive politicisation of
society in the name of the &dquo;leading role of the party&dquo;.
Yugoslav critics have concentrated on the first and the second line of the argu-
ment. 19 Their reluctance to explore the third reflects a particular kind of
reductionism: not the instrumentalist conception of the political sphere that
leads to an outright denial of its autonomy, but the equation of this autonomy
with a state of alienation.20 The overcoming of alienation is expected to bring
about the absorption of politics into a more general &dquo;self activity of the human
community&dquo; (A. Kresic).
If self.management was seen as the essence of socialism, bureaucracy was the

main obstacle to its realisation. Although the label &dquo;bureaucratically deformed
socialism&dquo; was not unanimously accepted by the Praxis school it conveys the
general trend better than any other definition. Yugoslav discussions of bur-
eaucracy drew upon various motives of the Marxist tradition: bureaucracy as
an expression of the split between man’s individual and social
being (the young
Marx); as a form of wage-labour and part of the universe of reification
(LukacS); as based on the political expropriation of the working class (Trotsky).
In its more specifically post-revolutionary form, the bureaucratic syndrome
was obviously a source of new social conflicts, both latent and overt. From this
Point of view, the contrast between Yugoslavia and the Soviet model appeared
as a difference in the degree of bureaucratisation but also as a difference in
89
kind, since Yugoslav society permits a certain articulation of interests and
demands that elsewhere are systematically suppressed.
To stress the partial consensus of leadership and opposition is not to suggest

that it remained undisturbed. The repressive measures taken against the Praxis
group during the first half of the ’seventies were the outcome of a Iona-drawn-
out conflict whose turning-point can perhaps be dated in 1965. The economic
reforms of that year, officially presented as a further step towards decentralisa.
cion, were criticised by the Praxis Marxists as a regressive substitute for the ex.
tension of self-management to higher political levels. For them the new
emphasis on the role of the market was inspired less by abstract principles of
economic rationality than by a specific ideology of economism. The successes
of this ideology, characterised on the anthropological level by a pseudo-social-
ist version of homo oeconomicus and on the political level by the advocaczr of
an unrestricted development of commodity production, called for a sociologic-
as explanation. While some critics linked it with the technocratic elements of
Yugoslav society, others went further and diagnosed the rise of a &dquo;new middle
class&dquo;, striving to emulate the liberal bourgeoisie. The reawakening of national-
ist tendencies seemed to point to the same conclusion.
2. If the political ideas of the Yugoslav opposition were at least commens-

urable with the more moderate revisionism of the party, the questioning of
philosophical principles went much further. For the Praxis school, the auton-
omy of philosophical thought did not signify a retreat from politics; rather it
was an essential precondition for the accomplishment of a political mission.
The insistence on philosophical grounding was a logical reaction to inconsist-
encies of the party doctrine. The first official criticism of the Soviet model was
couched in a superficially radical language, only to be toned down when a
modus viver~di was stabilised; a much more cautious line was taken in regard to
the basic tenets of dialectical materialism. This mixture of philosophical con-
servatism and political opportunism was from the outset unacceptable to more
radical critics. The Prcrxzs theorists attacked it in the name of a more coherent
project linking the humanistic intentions of Marxian socialism with the human-
istic foundations of Marx’s philosophy. In this sense, their main efforts lay
within the range of the anthropological current, as described above, even if
some of them rejected the idea of a systematic anthropology as too restrictive.
In the following, I will discuss Mihailo Markovic’s concept of praxis and its
implications; although it does not embody common assumptions of the Praxis
school - there is no such consensus - it is particularly illustrative of the Yugo-
slav approach to anthropological problems, as distinct from the views that pre-
vailed elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
To begin with Markovic distinguishes the normative concept of praxis as self-

realisation from the epistemological concept of practice (the activity of chang-
ing an object) as well as from the concepts of Labour and material production
90
; necessary conditions for human survival).21 The second point is especially
important: it entails a separation from the paradigm of production, hence also
from its possible application to post.revolutionary societies. Divested of this
problematic, the concept of praxis becomes a synthesis of expressive and norm.
ative action. More precisely: it denotes the metanorm of human self-realisation.
As a normative concept of human nature, it &dquo;presupposes certain fundamental
human capacities that are essential determinants of human nature, that exist in
each normal human being in the form of latent predispositions&dquo;. 22
Since it
the selective accentuation of certain determinants, it does not eliminate
implies
the need for a descriptive and comprehensive concept of human nature (includ-
ing its darker sides and &dquo;negative dispositions&dquo;). The value concept of man
must be adjusted to the factual basis, as registered by the descriptive concept;
on the justification of the evaluative choice as such, Markovic is less explicit,
but it appears to involve the criteria of democratic consensus, as well as those
of the philosophical tradition.
z normative concept of human nature is obviously congenial to a political

opposition that reduces the established order to shortfalls and distortions of a
fundamentally sound project. The naturalisation of basic values serves both to
underscore their universality and to reduce the significance of social obstacles
and historical alternatives. Conversely, the much more qualified optimism of
Czech and Hungarian oppositionists prior to 1968 was associated with more
complex anthropological models. In G. Markus’ reconstruction of Marx’s
anthropology, the emancipatory project is not derived from basic assumptions
about human nature; rather the concept of human essence is consubstantial
with and inseparable from a future-oriented understanding of history. It de-
notes the anthropological content of the image of history as progress. The
interrelations between the interpretative and the evaluative aspects are more
complex than in a normative concept of human nature. The same can be said
about Kosik’s ontology of man: His concept of praxis is not a purely normative
one; it refers- to a network of relations between man and world, rather than
latent dispositions of the human individual as such, and it allows for differ.
entiated and changing relations between socio-historicai reality and cultural
values. Praxis in this sense is an interpretative horizon, not a metanorm.
:flarkovic cites the following examples of fundamental human capacities that

must be included in a value-concept of man: Unlimited development of the
senses; reason, i.e. &dquo;the ability to analyse situations ... and to solve problems&dquo;,
imagination, &dquo;man’s ability to transcend ... the limits of the given&dquo;. The
capacity for communication; creativity; the ability to harmonize interests; the
capacity to evaluate and choose; the ability to develop a critical self-conscious-
ne5s.’3 Apart from the intuitive character of the selection, the argument is in-
conclusive in a more important respect: All these capacities are ambivalent in
the sense that they are open to autonomous or heteronomous development
Nane of them is ex natura rei immune to the subsumption under a system of
domination.
91
3. As far as the critique of real socialism is concerned, the most interesting
departure from the general pattern of the Praxis school is Svetozar Stojanovic’s
theory of statism.24 Its starting-point is a reinterpretation of Stalin’s revolu-
tion from above at the end of the ’twenties and the social regime that emerged
from it. Stojanovic defines the process as a &dquo;statist revolution&dquo; and the result
as statism, i.e. a new form of class society, dominated by a class whose
economic privileges depend on political power, rather than the other way
round. The core element of the relations of production is a collective class
property distinguishable from private property as well as irom a genuinely
social appropriation of the means of production. The state apparatus extended
its power to all areas of social life and thereby transformed itself into a new
ruling class. Concomitantly, the ideological legacy of the socialist revolution
was adapted to a new tegitmatorc~ role. The new forms of oppression and
exploitation were concealed behind the &dquo;statist myth of socialism&dquo;. In reality,

statism is a pose-capitalist and non.socialist form of social organisation; in its
ideological self-presentation, it appears as the only legitimate model of social.
ism.
Although the Soviet road to statism is the most clear-cut and historically
important example, other forms of transition and more flexible variants of the
system are possible. Anti-colonial revolutions have in many cases given birth to
statist societies that do not conform to the Soviet pattern in all respects.
Stojanovic even considers the hypothesis that advanced capitalist societies -
more properly described as state capitalist, in the sense of a combination of
two principies of organisation - might evolve towards a liberal -democratic
form of statism. And as for the Soviet model, itself, he envisages two possible
solutions to the present crisis of its &dquo;politocratic&dquo; structures: a technocratic
and a militaristic one.
The most convincing part of this theory is the polemic against the notion of a
&dquo;deformed socialism&dquo;. It is not difficult to show that the power of the ruling
apparatus exceeds the limits of parasitism or distortion. But the concept of
statism begs a crucial question. It merges two categories that originally belong
to different contexts. Class theory - at least in its conceptually rigorous and
empirically fruitful versions - presupposes dichotomous class relations. In
other words: classes exist only in and through their conflictual interrelations.
This complex of relations is structurally different from those between state and
society. There is nothing a priori absurd in the ideal of a new social formation
that relativises the distinction between the two polarities class against class
state against society - but then the need for a far-reaching reconceptualisation
is obvious. To start with a definitional equation of class and state is to put the
cart before the horse. Moreover, a structural change of this magnitude cannot
but affect other dimensions of social life as well. A transformation of ideology
and its role is at least suggested by the description of the &dquo;statist myth&dquo;, but
Stojanovic does not pursue the subject further.
92
In this sense, the concept of statism prematurely closes the horizon of a
critique of real socialism. Its unsuiiability for a more detaiied structural
analysis seems confirmed by the general thrust of Stojanovic’s own argument.
While the internal mechanisms of the system are only very roughly sketched,
its cultural antecedents - particularly the ideology of &dquo;authoritarian-pauperist°
ic communism&dquo;, exemplified by the pre-Stalinist Bolshevik party - are much
more extensively discussed.
NOTES
This is the first of a two-part study of the traditions of critical Marxism
in Eastern Europe. The second part will focus on the intellectual con-
text of the Prague Spring, the Budapest School and the neo-Leninist
and inverted Leninist (Bahro etc.) filaments in the tradition.
1. Among Soviet emigres, Vadim Belotserkovsky and Leonid Plyushch can

perhaps be regarded as spokesmen of a neo-Marxist current.
2. For the first approach, cf. the works of Alain Besancon, particularly les
origines intellectuelles du leninisme, Paris 1977, and Present sovietique
and passe russe, Paris 1980. The second is defended by Cornelius
Castoriadis: "H n’y a ideologie que lorsque il y a tentative de justifica-
tion rationnelle" et rationalisante des visees d’ un groupe ou d’une
classe (qu il s’agisse de preserver l’etat de choses existant, ou de le
modifier)" C. Castoriadis, Devant la guerre, (Vol. 1, Paris 1981). Judged
by this standard, the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the contemporary
Soviet regime is no longer an ideology. While the change diagnosed by
Castoriadis — an atrophy of the justificatory function - is undeniable,
it is still within the bounds of ideology in the more general sense, as
explained above.
3. All three themes were most extensively discussed in Czechoslovakia.
The transition from the Khrushchevist notion of the "people’s state" to
a more critical approach is best documented in various writings of
Zdenek Mylnar, published during the ’sixties. The most influential
analyses of "socialist commodity production" were written by Ota Sik.
For systematic exposition of the theory of the "scientific and technical
revolution" cf. Civilisatton at the Crossroads by Radovan Richta. et. al.
first published in Prague in 1967 (English translation, New York 1969).
4. Piotr Sztompka, System and Function — Toward a Theory of Society,
(New York 1974), cf. also the "adaptive interpretation of historical
materialism", defended by Leszek Nowak and others (L. Nowak, "The
Theory of Socio-Economic Formations as an Adaptive Theory " in
Revolutionary World, Vol. 15, Amsterdam 1975 "Epochs and Forma-
tions : An Attempt at a Non-Marxian Generalization of Historical
Materialism", in Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rational-
ism, Wien 1979; P. Buczkowski — L. Nowak, "Werte und Gesellschafts-
klassen", in Arbeit, Handlung, Normativital, (Frankfurt 1980), also
various articles in Vol. 45 of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the
93
Sciences and the Humanities). It should be noted that Nowak’s inter.
pretation is not devoid of critical undertones: his remarks about a
society where the accumulation of power has become the primary
systemic goal clearly allude to the Soviet model.
5. All three tendencies were most clearly exemplified in Polish sociology.
6. Agnes Heller, Das Alltagsleben, (Frankfurt 1978), p. 51.

7. Leszek Kolakowski’s writings of the late ’fifties were pioneering con-
tributions to the anthropological discussion, but this area was most
thoroughly covered by Hungarian authors. Marxism and Anthropology
by Gyorgy Markus, published in Hungarian in 1965, (revised English
translation Assen 1978, Italian translation 1979), is the most system-
atic exposition of the conceptual foundations of a Marxist anthropol-
ogy. On the key anthropological themes, cf, particularly the following
works of Agnes Heller: Everyday Life,Published in Hungarian in 1970,
German translation: Das Alltagsleben. Frankfurt 1978; English trans-
lation to be published in London 1981). The Theory of Need in Marx
(written in 1971. first published in Italian in 1974. English translation
London 1976). Towards a Marxist Theory of Value (Published in
Hungarian in 1970, English translation in a special issue of Kinesis
1972). Karel Kosik’s Dialectics of the Concrete (Prague 1963, English
translation Boston 1976) argues in the perspective of an "ontology of
man", rather than an anthropology, but the themes of everyday life,
need and value are discussed.
8. Agnes Heller, Renaissance Man (published in Hungarian in 1970,
English translation London 1978), Robert Kalivoda, Husitska ideologie,
Prague 1967.
9. L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. III, (London 1979), p.
465.
10. On Kolakowski’s intellectual development, cf. Guido Neri, Aporie della
realizzazione, (Milano 1980), pp. 103-129; also G. Schwan, Leszek
Kolakowski, Eine marxistische Philosophie der Freiheit, (Stuttgart
1971), and H. Skolimowski, "Leszek Kolakowski. Le phenomene du
marxisme polonais", in Archives du philosophie, 34 (1971), pp. 265.
279.
11. L. Kolakowski, Der Mensch ohne Alternative, (Munchen 1960), p. 15.
12. Published in English in L. Kolakowski, Marxism and Beyond, (London
1969), pp. 59-87.
13. Published in English in Survey, (1971), pp. 37-52.
14. Polish edition published in Kultura. Paris, 1966; English translation in:
Revolutionary Marxist Students in Poland Speak Out, (New York
1968); German translation: Monopolsizialismus, (Hamburg 1969).
15. Quoted from the German translation, p. 13 (the English edition seems
defective).
16. W. Brus, The Market in a Socialist Economy, (London 1972); published
in Polish in 1969, The Economics and Politics of Socialism, (London
1973) (articles written from 1966 to 1971). Socialist Ownership and
Political Systems, (London 1975) (unpublished in Polish).
94
17. W. Brus, Socialist Ownership... , p. 209.
18. The Yugoslav edition of the journal Praxis was published from 1964 to
1975, the international edition from 1965 to 1974. The most inform-
ative account of the history of the school is G. S. Sher Praxis, London
1977: Collections of articles and essays by Praxis theorists have appear-
ed in various Western languages: Reuolutionare Praxis, ed. by G.
Petrovic, (Freiburg 1969), Etatisme et autogestion, ed. by R. Supek,
(Paris 1973); Praxis, ed, by M. Markovic and G. Petrovic, (Boston
1979).
19. For one of the most outspoken and radical critiques of the Yugoslav
model, cf. the article by L. Pesic-Golubovic, "Leridees socialistes et la
realite". in Etatisme et autogestion, pp. 323-360.
20. Cf. the article by A. Kresic, "Politique et communaute humaine". in
Etatisme et autogestion, pp. 85-116. In a similar vein, Mihailo Markovic
has identified the Weberian image of politics with the state of political
alienation. This view, however, has not been unanimously accepted by
the Yugoslav opposition; cf. particularly Mihailo Djuric’s essay "Homo
politicus", in Praxis, ed. Markovic/Petrovic, pp. 101-120 where "polit-
ical man" is invoked as a corrective against homo faber, and homo
oeconomicus.
21. Cf. Markovic’s introduction to Praxis, pp. XXVIII-XXIX. On various
aspects of his philosophy of praxis also his books From Affluence to
Praxis, (Ann Arbor 1974), and The Contemporary Marx , (Spokesman
Books 1974). It should be noted that other philosophers of the Praxis
school have adopted a much more critical stance towards concepts of
human nature or human essence and advocated a more phenomenol-
ogical reading of Marx; cf. particularly the writings of Gajo Petrovic and
Milan Kangrga.
22: Praxis, p. 25.
23. Cf. ibid., p. 25-26.
24. S. Stojanovic, Between Ideals and Reality, (New York 1973).
Geschichte und Parteibeurisstsein, (Munchen 1978).
95

Johann P. Arnason (1982) Perspectives and Problems of Critical Marxism in Eastern Europe (Part One)

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Johann P. Arnason (1982) Perspectives and Problems of Critical Marxism in Eastern Europe (Part One)

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PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS OF CRITICAL

MARXISM IN EASTERN EUROPE (Part one)

In geographical terms, the argument of this paper will be largely restricted to

I, The Crisis of Soviet Marxism

Soviet Marxism subordinates an impoverished and distorted version of the

Thus the relativising aspect of the dialectic becomes a vehicle of manipulation.

dialogical element of dialectics and replaces it with a set of pseudo.nomological

This combination of irrelevant and arbitrary theorising with a self-perpetuating

regulation raised theoretical problems concerning the underlying social

Finally, a more marginal procedure of adaptation should be mentioned: the

ii. Critical Alternatives

On the philosophical level, the convergences between some trends in Western

For those who saw the de-ideologisation of Marxism primarily as an adaptation

The anthropological interpretations were connected by &dquo;family resemblances&dquo;

involving a redefinition of some basic concepts of historical materialism. Part

The theoryof objectivation, as elaborated by the Budapest school (it incorpor-

This implicit critique of the philosophy

A further characteristic of the anthropological current was its interest in

strong reaction against one of the most pronounced reductionist elements in

Finally, some points of contact between the anthropological problematic and

If the most typical explanatory strategies of Western Niarxism were in-

descriptive purposes, the theoretical constructions built on it were either too

The most traditional of the remaining options was a critique of bureaucratfc

The hypothesis of a new class society suggested itself as a plausible solution.

III. The Blind Alleys of Polish Marxism.

In I~olako‘vski’s view, the very existence of revisionism was thus dependent on

There is no need to elaborate on the weaknesses of this conception (to mention

The essay on &dquo;Hope and Hopelessness&dquo;13 published in 1971, is perhaps the

Undeniably, later events in Poland have to some extent strengthened Kolakow-

3. Although Kolakowski was by far the most articulate and influential

Instead of the bankrupt reformist strategy, Kuron and Modzelewski advocated

Although Kuron and hrodzelewski’s subsequent abandonment of the Marxists

The notion of a developmental autonomy and primacy of the productive

IV. Yugoslav Contributions

1. For well-known reasons, the development of Marxist theory in Yugo.

differentiation of the Praxis school should not be overlooked, the predominant

If self.management was seen as the essence of socialism, bureaucracy was the

To stress the partial consensus of leadership and opposition is not to suggest

2. If the political ideas of the Yugoslav opposition were at least commens-

To begin with Markovic distinguishes the normative concept of praxis as self-

z normative concept of human nature is obviously congenial to a political

:flarkovic cites the following examples of fundamental human capacities that

exploitation were concealed behind the &dquo;statist myth of socialism&dquo;. In reality,

1. Among Soviet emigres, Vadim Belotserkovsky and Leonid Plyushch can

6. Agnes Heller, Das Alltagsleben, (Frankfurt 1978), p. 51.

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