Istvdn Bibd and the Jewish Question

in Hungary:
Notes on the Margin of a ClassicalEssay

by Ferenc Feher

IstvdnBibd was one of the most importantnon-Marxist,leftisttheorists

of EasternEurope in the last thirtyto fortyyears.The need for this kindof
presentationof his ideas is, of itself, highlyindicativeof the extentto which
original ideas are falsified and suppressedby governmentsand official
apparatuses of Eastern Europe. Bib6 (1911-1979) was born into a
ProtestantHungarianfamilyand was broughtup in Hungary,Vienna and
Switzerland.He studied historyand other social sciences and from youth
on belonged to the Transylvanianbranch of Hungariansocial theory,
which is characterisedby an affinityto Cartesianrationalismanda firmbut
realisticHungarianpatriotismwhich, in contrastto the often short-sighted
and foolhardychauvinismof the Hungarianmotherland, learnedhow to
live between world powers withoutblind illusionsor servile self-abandon-
ment. His early developed sense of the so-called socialquestion which,in
Hungary,was in the main identicalwith the problemof the peasantryand
agrarian reform. This is why he belonged or was very close to the
movement of populist writers of the thirties, without sharing that
romantic-anticapitalistirrationalismwhich (in spite of, or together with,
their social radicalism)led some of them to an alliancewith Fascismand
infected nearly all of them with anti-Semitism.
Bibd's central value was democracy, and though always en garde
against the theory of the dictatorshipof the proletariat, he felt a certain
sympathywith communistsof the PopularFront mold. Duringthe warhe
participatedin what Hungarianresistance there was; Bibd himself was
later to criticize it as consistingof salon conversationsspiced with anti-
German witticisms.His first creativeperiod was between 1945and 1948,
when he publisheda series of importantstudiescontaininga fairlycoherent
theory of a new democracy.His concept of democracydifferedfrom both
people's democracy, a camouflagebehindwhich communistpartydicta-
torship reigned supreme, and parliamentarypluralismin the classicliberal
tradition. In Bibd, both the theoreticallygeneralized Swissexperience of
his youth (direct democracy)and a socially radicalimpetuswere still at
work. Of course, this theory broughthim into frequentcollisionswith the
3
4 Feher

Hungariancommunistswho, despitetheirrelativeinsignificancein number,

were a repositoryof most importantpowers immediatelyafter 1945. To
begin with, the state securitypolice was in theirhand,and they always'had
the ears' of the omnipotentSoviet military,which remaineda legitimate
occupying force until 1948. It is a miracleof sorts that Bibd nevertheless
continued to enjoy the approval of the Hungarian communists, as
evidenced by his remainingunimprisonedand unscathedwhile neverthe-
less a proscribed person in political and ideological circles during the
terrible years between 1948 and 1953. This treatmentwas at least partly
attributable to his personality. Anyone who met Bibd would have
recognizedhis unselfishpersonalintegrityand total absorptionin the ideas
which radiated from his schoolteacher-likebeing. It is possible that the
communistleaders, mostly ruthless,pragmaticMachiavellians,considered
him a harmless dreamerrather than a rival. They made a mistake. The
time was soon to come when Bibd showedthathe couldact as a statesman,
perhapsbetter than those who had to rely on the bayonetsof an occupying
army and who immediatelyfled when the stormthen conjuredup finally
broke out. In 1956, under Imre Nagy's second pluralistic government,
Bibd became a ministerof state withoutportfolio, a representativeof the
leftist Peasants'Partywhichexistedmore in statementsthanin reality.He
also worked out a Program,a draft for negotiationsbetween the Soviet
world-power and a new Hungaryborn in anti-Stalinistrevolution.The
draftwas a masterpieceof politicalrealism.Had the Soviet leadershadany
intention other than crushingthe Hungarianrebels by armedforce, they
would have foundit a highlyreasonabledocument.But theydid not, so Bibd
(who heroically smuggled out a Memorandumto the United Nations'
Hungarian session) was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment.
FortunatelyBibd spent only six yearsin prison;for the remainingfifteenhe
livedas a reclusein the secrecyof his study,wherehe wroteimportantstudies
on the internationalorganizations.These were circulatedat home as manu-
scripts,were smuggledout by friendsand supportersand appearedin print
abroad. I had the opportunityto meet him a few times in his lastyears:his
unpretentiouspersonaldignity, his shabbyclothes and the visiblepoverty
borne with indifferenceprovideda reassuringcontrastwith the pretentious
display of prosperityby the corrupted Kadarist intelligentsia.

I. The Political Aspect

The essay "The Jewish Question in Hungary" was written and
published in 1948. As far as "official"publicationsare concerned,it was
Bibd's "swan song." There was good reason indeed to write a study of this
problem. 500,000 Hungarian Jews had been deported and gassed, mostly
in Auschwitz in 1944, making Hungary's the third greatest quota of the
Holocaust after the Polish and Russian contingents. In addition, although
the deportation was a German action led personally by Eichmann, the
"transportation expert," there was a marked official Hungarian co-
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 5

responsibilityfor it. Parts of the Hungarianruling classes, especially its

forces of coercion, had been deeply infiltrated and corrupted by the
Gestapo and other Nazi secret services; they franticallytried to remain
voluntaryallies even after March 1944, when Hitler occupiedHungary.
Their most significantcontributionto the alliance lay in domestic anti-
Semitism, since the Hungarianarmy hardly fought any longer on the
Eastern front and was generallyheld in contemptby the Germancaste of
officers. Thus the gendarmerieconfinedruralJewryin hastilyimprovised
ghettos, reducedthem to inhumaneconditions,preparedlistsof personsto
be deportedand actuallydrove themwith bayonetsinto the wagonswhose
destinations, like the purposeof the "trip"could be no mysteryto anyone
after such preliminaries.
But Bibd also documents amply that the Hungarianarmy and the
gendarmerie persecuted Jews even prior to the German occupation,
sometimes actingcontraryto the instructionsof theirsuperiorofficers.The
latter armedforce had for decadesbeen a politicalweaponin the handsof
the Hungarianrulingclasses, andservedmostlyto keep the extremelypoor
and rebelliouspeasantryin checkratherthanas a law-enforcementagency.
They handed over tens of thousandsof Jews from the northernpart of
Hungaryto Germanauthoritieswith scarcelyany doubtsthat they were to
be gassed in Polish camps. Referringto the Jews' "uncertaincitizenship
status," the officercorpsorganizedand carriedout pogromsandmassacres
(as in the city of Novi Sad, now in Yugoslavia)or sadisticallykilled the
"soldiers"(actuallyslave laborers)of those "laborbattalions"consistingof
Jews and non-Jewishleftists which were attached to the 2nd Hungarian
army fighting on the Stalingradfront, at the so-called "Don-curvel."In
fact, it is rarelyif ever emphasizedthat Hungary'slargesthomogenouswar
casualtywas not the 200,000men of the 2nd HungarianArmywipedout in
the post-Stalingradcatastropheof the Germanallies but the half-million
HungarianJews-a casualtypartlyinflictedby Hungariansthemselves.
Hungarian national responsibilityin the Jewish question was un-
doubtedly enormous. True enough, Hungarywas not the Soviet-Union,
and some of the main perpetratorswere publicly tried and hanged as
murderers of Jews, not just as "war criminals" in general. In the
atmosphere of parliamentarypluralismin the first post-war years, the
specific "Jewishfate" was givenwide presscoverage.But on the one hand,
there was no theoreticalanalysisof what happenedby any representative
Jewish or non-Jewish personality of Hungariancultural life, leftist or
rightist, and on the other hand, there was a growing and increasingly
palpable "tacitconsensus"amongpeople who disagreedon everyquestion
other than the Jewish problem. According to this consensus, it was
"unhealthy"to rehash"thisstory";one wouldratherturnthe history-book
page containingthis gloomy chapterof nationallife, eitherbecauseit was a
tiny part of the general story of Fascism as super-capitalism(the leftist
argument), or because it produced "bad press" for ourselves (so the
nationalistsargued).
6 Feher

There was good reason, then, for Bibd, the Cartesiandemocrat, to

analyze the catastrophe which brought extinction to the majority of
HungarianJews and stood as a moral and politicaltest for all Hungarians
-one which they failed. This is the conclusionof Bibd'sinvestigation.But
what explains the choice of the point of time, 1948? If we take into
consideration that this was the period of the gathering storm, of a
communisttakeover so clearlyapproachingthat even people with incom-
parablyless politicalforesightand talent thanBibo saw it coming,we may
rightlyguess that "The JewishQuestionof Hungary"was rathera parable
with multifarious"moral"lessons. (Parable and its allegoricaldidactics
alone were left for a publicanalystof social ills at that time of mummified
parliamentarism,not oratio recta.) What were the "lessonsto be drawn"
from this parable?Firstly,that all socialproblemscan resultin catastrophe
if a nation cannot work out a democratic model of resolving them:
somewhat too general, but an unmistakableand highlytopicalwarningat
that time. Secondly, that parliamentaryforms are not in themselves
sufficientfor this purpose;a more directdemocracy,radicalmovements,a
general tendencyof equalizingsociallyand culturallyunderprivileged strata
are needed as well. A thirdlesson:a type of "communication model"has to
be politicallydeveloped(we willreturnto thisbelow)in whichall interests,all
opinionsoccupya legitimaterole, howeverhystericalor ideologically distorted
they may be; the sole exceptionis thatwhichtends to oppress all otherinter-
ests and opinions, a restrictionwhichappliedabove all to Nazi or pro-Nazi
political forces.
One may object that while these "lessons"are undoubtedlysublime
and worthy of universalconsideration,they are too abstractin the case of
the particularsubject matterof Bibd's study. Yet I believe that the choice
of the Jewish question in Hungaryas the subject was far from random.
Bibd, as a profoundlythinkingradicaldemocrat,had a norm:it is always
the relationto the "persecutedpar excellence"thatwilldecidewhetherthere
are democraticstandards,expectations,etc. in a nationor society, whether
it "deserves"to be democraticallygovernedor despoticallyruled. This is
obviously not a "definitionof democracy"but rathera "borderlinevalue,"
and one whichcan be used in an operativesense. It is preciselyin this sense
that in Bibd's assessment the Scandinaviancountries and Holland as
democraciespass the test brilliantlywhereasHungary,as a traditionally anti-
democraticcountry,-failed in itsentirety,notonlyas faras itsrulingclassesare
concerned, althoughthey of coursebore the bruntof responsibility.'

1. It is preciselyin this sense that Sartre,in his Reflexionssur la questionjuive (1944)to

which I returnrepeatedly,expressesdeep doubtsregardingthe democraticcharacterof the
Frenchpluralistliberaldemocracy.Very understandably,he takes into considerationnot so
muchthe mainrepresentatives of Vichybut that'generalopinion'which,whiledeeplyshocked
by the fate that befell the Jews, neverthelesstold the Jews not to be 'selfish'by placing'their
interests'(i.e.: theirphysicalsurvival)before'generalFrenchnationalinterests,'whichcould
only be left unimpairedif Jews were swiftly shipped to exterminationcamps. Sartre's
description has very strikingly'Hungarian'couleurslocales, which demonsratesthat the
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 7

A moralizingtinge may be detected in Bibd's assertionthat a nation

"deserves"or "does not deserve"democraticgovernment.Not by chance.
Without arrogatingto himself the role of a "national preceptor"who
allegedly knows everythingbetter, who foresees everythingsooner than
the rest of the population (which is so unbearablein certaindissentersof
today), Bibd belonged to the moralistsof a belated Enlightenmentwho
deliberatelyignoredor opposed the majoritypoll becauseit was hysterical,
infected with demagogy, suicidal, sometimes even criminal.The reason
for this is not haughtinessbut firmconviction.Theremustbe someone,he
felt, who is not a prophet, a saint, or a sage but at least speaksthe language
of bons sens which, alas, is the best distributedcommodityof the world
only in Descartes' opinion. As we shall see in more detail in the
methodological analysis of the Jewish question, Bibd's originalintention
was to dissent and characterizean ethos (a collective ethical entity, in
Hegel's terminology: Sittlichkeit)in its relation to others, not moral
decisions, which are bound up with the individual.
Two factors,however, interferedwith Bibd'sintention.The firstshould
be mentioned here only briefly, since it will be analyzed later. In a
universalisticworld-epochin whichpracticallyall ethoses striveto acquire
all universallyvalid values for themselves, even if in great disarrayand
inner confusion, it is impossibleto put (national)ethoses into hierarchical
sequence without a secret racism. (And vice versa: one of the main
functions of racistdoctrinesis preciselyto make sucha hierarchypossible).
In concrete, historical terms we may legitimatelyspeak of the "moral
degradation" of a nation, (e.g., of the German nation's "moral state"
during Nazi rule), but we cannot speak "characterologically"without
lapsing into racism or "counter-racism."And if the measure is an ethos
other than the previous-or subsequent-behavior of that same one, we
are tacitlyassuming,at least withinwhatI call "universalisticworldorder,"
that the values invoked are theoreticallyacceptedand simplynot practiced
in the criticized ethos. Then there is the second factor influencingthe
attitude of the moralist:subjectivemoral judgmentof ethoses as wholes
always takes place in the historicalhour of theircollectivedegradationand
self-abasement. In such moments, however well we realize theoretically
that the moral demandswe pose to the communitywhich has apparently
lost its common and moral sense are derived from the community'sown
past or at least from its previouslyacceptedvalues, the Ought seems to be
abstractlylooming over concrete, flesh and blood history(even if blood is
provided by this history's victims). Let me quote a classic example of
Bibd's "moralizing" analysis. As an extremely unselfish and morally
hypersensitive member of Hungarian officialdom, he makes his own
professional stratum co-responsible for the Jewish victims who could not
obtain false papers from these officials (testifying, for instance, to their

problem is not simply identical with the existence of certain democraticparliamentary

institutions.
8 Feher

being "Aryan,"to their variousmerits,say fromWorldWarI, exempting

them from deportation,etc.). Realistically,Bibddistinguishesthe phrasein
which the otherwise repressiveand reactionaryHungarianstate observed
at least its own laws and rules from the later one under German
occupation, when no legalityexisted any longerand the state powerwas in
the handsof murderers.In the firstperiodthe officialno doubtshuthis eyes
to many sufferings,but at least he acted accordingto a professionalmoral
code. In the latter, however, moral condemnationis relevant: "The
majority of officials held on to their aversion to all sorts of fraud and
forgery. They did not face the fact that this would have meant only the
deception of a murderousstate of thugs. Ratherthey felt that they would
remainmorallypurer,convincingthemselvesthatin a given case fraudand
forgery made no sense and was of no use. Very few of themwent so far as
to regard the state power as a bunchof gangsters,its decrees as so many
pieces of rag, and disobedience against it, willful deception, forging
documents, etc. as a moral duty."2 But, one may ask, is this a realistic
Ought? Is a postulatefeasiblewhichdemandsthat a stratumnot follow its
professional moral code but act in a way diametricallyopposed to it,
especially when there are no fixed, externallygiven criteriato make clear
the turning point at which a state power has yielded the last vestiges of
moral authority?Do not moralistsmanoeuvrethemselvesinto a positionof
sterility, the position of precisely those Jewish prophets of the Old
Testamentwhose cursesand warningsleft theircontemporaries unaffected?
The answercan only be "yes"and "no." On the one hand, whenevera
state sinks into the moral degradationof being ruled by a bunch of
gangsters-an event happening with frighteningfrequency in Central-
Eastern Europe whence these considerationsstem, it will always find
officials to put its blood-thirstylaws in "legal"form, judges to "try"and
sentence its victims,and hangmento executethem. In this sense, the words
of the (non-Kantian)rigor are wasted in a moral desert. On the other
hand, the moralistis needed in orderto sustainthe ethicalnormlest there
be no politicalresurrection.Withoutthe officialwho forgesdocuments,the
soldier who "desertsthe banner"and even dons an enemyuniformto fight
his own country, or the conspiratoragainst"lawfulorder," there is only
one agent left and possiblythe worstsince drivenby revenge:the surviving
victim. Germany and its democracy, problematicas it may be, is the
greatest example of this practical use of "abstract"and "unrealistic"
moralizing. When Bibd, the moralist, condemns his own "Hungarian

2. Bibd Istvdn, "A zsidokerdes Magyarorszagon" (in what follows I am going to refer to
the title only in English: "The Jewish Question in Hungary") in I. Bibd, A harnadik akt,
London p. 239. Italics mine. To spare further comments, let me recall Kant's famous and
paradoxical thesis that "the deposit cannot be embezzled" and his standpoint in the debate
with Benjamin Constant, according to which one should not lie even if a murderer is asking
for the whereabouts of one's neighbors. It will be clear that Bibd in his moralism is rather
"anti-Kantian" than Kantian; his categorical imperative is based on a substantive, not on a
formal principle.
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 9

ethos," this does not mean a hierarchyin favorof othersbut an indigenous

injunction of Ought to follow principleswhichare acceptedin theory but
are not observed in a continuoushistoricalpractice.3
There is a crucial constituent of Bibd's model of radicaldemocracy
which he, being unphilosophicalby nature, would have simply called
objectivity or the principleof audiaturet alterapars, but whichin the wake
of Habermas, one is inclined to term, as a system, domination-free
communication. Although a man of the Enlightenment,Bibd is guided
neither by excessive anthropologicaloptimism nor by pessimism, but
rather by resignation.It is preciselythis resignationthat leads him to the
conviction that if one intends to achieve the goals of radicaldemocracy,
there is no other option left but objectiveanddomination-freecommunica-
tion between all standpoints.For as frailas humanbeingsare morallyand
psychologically,it is an option whichstill standssome chanceand is worth
trying. Hence the peculiar but importantfeature of Bibo's study, one
which will inevitably disturb the biased Jewish reader but which is,
nevertheless, an integralpart of his intention.His addresseesare not only
Jews and philo-Semiticdemocratsor socialistsbut to some extent also the
anti-Semite, who has to be convincedof his/her "opticaldistortion."4Of
course, Bibd is skepticalenoughto realizethat not justany communication
will result in healing the wounds or resolving millenial conflicts. As a
determined man of the Enlightenment, he is ready to formulate the
guidelines to the conditions under which (and under which alone)
communicationbetween the partieswill be successful.What follows is an
extremely lucid example of the "model of communication"containingall
possible variations."Let us split up the questioninto groupsbasedon who
can say what to whom in the struggleagainstanti-Semitism.What can a
non-Jew say about this to another non-Jew? One should first avoid
approachingone's next-of-kinwith gestureswhichreinforcethe onesided-
ness of non-Jewish experience and the distorted abstractionsstemming
from it. Rather one should seek to remindoneself and all others of the
concrete humancontent of everythingwhichis Jewishand its fundamental
identity with all other human conditions. The non-Jew should raise the

3. The best exampleof this dualityis the one Bibd mentionshimself:the dualitybetween
the offical recognitionof the Hungariancitizensas equal,as personsundera code of law, and
the treatmentof huge masses of them (first of all, peasants)as subjectsof a feudal state
without any rights.I do not deny that there are sometimesdeceptivepassagesin Bibd which
appear as if he were attributingparticularseparatemoral virtues (and vices) to certain
national ethoses. This stems in part from slipshodformulations,in part from the failureto
distinguishbetween non-universalisticand universalisticworld-epochs,to which we shall
return later.
4. While I totally agree with Bibd's impartiality,I think that his definitionof the anti-
Semite differsfrom that of Sartre'ssubstantiallyand here I agreewithSartre,not withBibd.
This insufficientdefinition(whichtacitlyacceptsthe Jewishprejudicethat anyonewho is not
philo-Semiticis anti-Semitic)causes certaintheoreticalconfusionsto which I am going to
return. But I agree with Bibd's deeper intention: to "convince,""re-educate"(not to
terrorize)the "manof prejudice."
10 Feher

question whether, behind the overestimationof offences caused by Jews

cannot be found a refusalto recognizethe humanequalityof Jews He
(the non-Jew F. F.) should communicateand indefatigablyrepeat all ... the
facts regarding the horrendous amount of Jewish suffering;he should
speak of all the human insults which, in the form of the usual negative
moral judgments and moral denigrationof Jews, add to their physical
torments and human losses ...
What could a non-Jew say to a Jew? He can speak about the facts of
non-Jewish experience without any sort of generalization,interpretation
and moral conclusion:simply about the ways that the Jew appearsin the
world of non-Jews; about what is experiencedby the non-Jewishworld,
what is regardedas characteristicof Jews; what is recognizedand envied,
what is consideredto be unusual,offensive and incomprehensiblein Jews
by this world... The non-Jew should state his responsibilityfelt for
Jewish sufferings without asking anythingin return, especially not that
Jews should forget and forgivewhat they have suffered ... The utmosthe
can ask them to do is not to isolate their cause from that of others, but to
identify their sufferingswith those of all who suffer,theirhumiliationswith
those of all who are being humiliated,their seeking for justice with the
endeavorsof all otherswho seek justice. Whatcan a Jew say to a non-Jew?
He could speak of the reality of Jewish experienceand its direct human
content ... he should speak of the horriblefactsof Jewishsufferingin the
distant and near past... he should not, however, try to convince non-
Jews of the validityof his ideas about the causesof anti-Semitismin which
non-Jews figure in all too unpleasant and Jews in an all too pleasant
light.... Finally, can there be anything productivesaid by a Jew to
another Jew with regard to the struggle against anti-Semitism?... My
hunch is that no Jewish moral preachercan start with anythingbut that
which is the beginning and the end of all meaningfulinfluence:give up
being confinedto your own subjectiveexperiencesanddo not mistakeyour
own mental productsfor reality ... But these fundamentaltheses can be
made concrete for Jews only by other Jews."s
In describingBibd as a defenderof Jewishequalityin his capacityas a
democrat,we must also counterSartrewhen he writes:"Nevertheless,the
Jews have one friend, the democrat.But he is a miserabledefender.To be
sure, he proclaimsthat all humanbeingshave equalrights... But his very
declarations show the weakness of his position. He has chosen... the
spirit of analysis.He has no eyes for the concretesynthesespresentedhim
by history. He knows neither Jew, nor Arab, nor Negro, nor bourgeois,
nor worker, only man ... He resolvesall collectiveentitiesinto individual
elements ... for him, individualis nothingbut the sum total of universal
traits. It follows from this thathis defence of the Jewssaves the Jew as man
and annihilateshim as a Jew."6 In spite of his Cartesianeducation,whichis

5. I. Bibd, "The JewishQuestion in Hungary,"op. cit., pp. 298-300.

6. Jean-PaulSartre,Reflexionssur la questionjuive, (Paris, 1954),pp. 66-68.
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicaEssay /I

the very hotbed of the analyticalspirit,Bibd is a differenttype of democrat

and a genuine and worthydefenderof Jews. Firstly(in markedcontrastto
the tacit presumptionof his own definitionof the anti-Semite)he is not a
"philo-Semite,"he is not a sentimentalprotectorof Jews who remainson
the whole unaffected by general human suffering while exclusively
involved in his "pet victim."This one-sidednessis the reasonthatthe philo-
Semite cannot provide a universal-syntheticworld explanation.However,
Bibd can and he understands"Jewishdestiny"in terms of this universal
explanation.Secondly,unlikeLenin, anotherdefenderof Jews, Bibd is not
obsessed with the idea of assimilationbut rather suggests a variety of
solutions. Finally, he is "vaguelysocialist"and the adjectiveis not meant
pejoratively. At least in his youth, his ideal was the transcendenceof
capitalism, not throughany dictatorship,but ratherthroughwhat he calls
"consensualrevolution"and "revolutionbasedon agreement,"-a kindof
socialist 1688. At the same time he refrainsfrom tying this ideal to any
particularsocialist doctrine.
The following is a brief presentationof the stages in Bibd's accountof
the "Jewishquestion" in Hungaryin the 20th century.The first phase is
initiated by the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the
establishment of the aggressively conservative dictatorshipof Admiral
Horthy; a dictatorshipdecoratedwith a pseudo-parliamentary system. In
characterizing the "status" of anti-Semitism duringHorthy'sregimewhich
its
began deplorable tenure with a brutal white terroragainstcommunists,
socialists, and non-leftist Jews, Bibd terms the Jewish question a social
problem. On the one hand, Horthy "punished"the HungarianJewryfor
its allegedly unpatrioticbehaviourduringthe war and especiallyduringthe
revolutions-in other words, for the unusuallyhigh percentageof Jews in
the leading strata of both revolutions: the October 1918 bourgeois-
democraticrevolutionand the communistone of March1919. He did this
by excluding them, first practically,then later (throughthe continuous,
even if partial, introduction of the "Nuremburglaws") formally and
"legally" from public life. On the other hand, his regime did not touch
upon the wealth and, as a result, the social influenceof Jewishcapital.This
is a true description but a questionableuse of terminologyin that it is
intrinsicallyconnected with Bibd's most dubious category, "Jewish ex-
perience," which I am going to analyze (and criticize) later. For the
moment I would only add that anti-Semitismcan always be just as
"projective"as "social."The distinctionsimplymeansthis: anti-Semitism
can sometimes be in the forefrontof social life, even in countrieswhere
there are practicallyno more Jews. (Poland in 1968-9 is an example of
this). In such cases anti-Semitism as an active and wide-spread feeling is
obviously a projection of hatred, anxiety, inner confusion and turbulence
in the society in question, and stems from different sources. These
"malfunctions" can not be articulated in a manner adequate to their genuine
nature but are projected on to the Jew as a universal and traditional
symbol of the "origin" of social ills.
12 Feher

There is, however, another type of anti-Semitismfor which there is

some factual materialto corroboratethe "validity"of its fantasywhich is
centered on hatred and persecution.This is the type of anti-Semitismthat
constantlyrefers, for instance,to the unusuallyhighpercentageof Jews in
the secret police of certain communistcountries, or the unusuallyhigh
percentage of Jews among the wealthy bankers and industrialistsof a
certain capitalistcountry. I would argue againstBibd that whereasanti-
Semitism cannot be exclusivelysocial, in that it must entail, by the very
nature of this attitude, "projective"elements as well, it can be purely
projective without any social frame of reference.It is my convictionthat
this was the case in Hungarybetween 1919and 1941.A wide-spreadand
ever-growing social opinion made the Jews in general responsible for
palpable Hungarian social ills which had, in fact, been caused by
Hungarian capitaism. (This is the social aspect). For example, "Jewish
capital" was accused of responsibilityfor the loss of a great part of
Hungary'soriginalterritory,a totally projectiveprocedure.
The second phase startedin 1941,whenHungaryjoinedNazi-Germany
in its war againstthe Soviet-Union(and symbolicallyits Westernallies). It
ends in 1944-45 underGermanoccupationwhen the Nazi organizationsof
the "final solution," widely assisted by various types and groups of
HungarianFascists,murdered(in Polishand Austrianannihilationcamps,
on the Eastern Front, in pogroms and massacres in so-called "front
operational territories," such as Yugoslav cities and villages in the
Budapest ghetto) nearly 600,000 Hungarian Jews. For an accurate
understandingof the situation and within it, the denouementof Jewish
collective Calvaryit is necessaryto considerthe followingfactors. First,
Hungary'srulingstata were Anglophileratherthan pro-Germanand only
when they had to accept as necessity (in the second part of the 1930s)
Germany's prevalence and superiormilitarypower in the area, did they
turn towards Hitler instead of Great-Britainand France. But even then,
they had not cut the umbilical cord which tied them to the English
conservatives, and in the moment that they realized that the German
victory was no longer a certainty(after Stalingradand the destructionof
the Hungarian2nd armyat the Don), they startedclandestinenegotiations
with Churchill.In regardto Jews, this meant an increasingconcessionto
Hitler's racistpolicy: the continuousbut neverwhole-heartedintroduction
of Nuremburg laws, on the one hand, and a (not morally motivated)
hesitation to cross the thresholdof a "finalsolution"on the other. It is this
hesitation that saved the Budapest Jewry, decimated as it was in the
ghetto, yet intact as a main body. They were kept as "exchangeobjects"
and "tokens of good will" for the negotiations with Churchill. Secondly,
the Hungarian landed-gentry, the backbone of Horthy's dictatorship-of
the army, administration and police forces-had been intermarried with
Jewish money for at least three generations. Radical Nazism, with its
widely extended Nuremburg legislation, would have placed this very
stratum into the traps of "Aryan laws." Hence it had good reason to fear
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 13

Nazism proper. Finally, HungarianNazism, insignificantin number,loud

and vulgar in its demagogy,was much too plebeianand much too radical
(in the sense that Roehm's SA meant radicalismwithin Nazism) for the
Hungarianruling classes. They preferredtheirown procedures,theirown
way of handlingmatters.This is why they kept domesticNazism at arm's
length from "their own" Jews (or let them loose upon them only
occasionally, let us say, upon the-partly leftist-prisoners of "labour
battallions"whom the HungarianSS, the militantsof the "Arrow-Cross"
movement could murderunpunishedon the EasternFrontin 1942).When
the historicalhour struckfor the Arrow-Crossscum of the earth to take
over the country (after October 15th is the date of Horthy'sfailed coup
against the Germans)they did what they could on behalf of a Hungarian
"final solution" althoughthe work had alreadybeen done in part by the
Germansand in additiontheyno longerhadtimeandfacilitiesto completeit.
Bibd lives up to his own norms: for him, the second phase, the
Holocaust of the HungarianJewry,is the absolutecriterionfor the moral
decay of Hungarian society. This, not territoriallosses, is the greatest
catastrophe, for it was in this that Hungary as a whole nation became
co-responsible for Fascist crimes. He speaks of collective responsibility
(and as a strictmoralist,rejectsout of hand, the effortsof those who would
suggest silence in order to protectthe "Hungarianreputation"),butnot of
collective guilt. As a theological category applied to social bodies,
collective guilt can only cause unjust acts and outburstsof unacceptable
revenge rather than mete out just punishment.Collective responsibility
means the exact and rational assessmentof varyinglevels and extent of
responsibility.Withinthis, Bibd, a noble-heartedand generousman, does
not even stop to discussthe fate of the actualperpetratorsof Nazi crimes;
for him, the very idea of Verjiihrung (statuteof limitations)is an affrontto
humanity. But very realistically justly, he was also not readyto accept
and
this murderous minority as in any characteristic of a Hungarian
ethos. He correctly argues that there was, indeed, Hungarian re-
sponsibility, but not of the German type, (which was not "collective
guilt" either). In the case of German-Nazicrimes, both the incomparably
wider and ongoing characterof the criminal acts and the amount of
involvement by considerable social strata in them makes the direct
responsibilityfor the worstconsequencesa muchmoreimmediateand a far
wider national (and individual)problem.At the same time, and in perfect
harmony with the distributivejustice of his rationality,Bibd defines the
exact portion of responsibilityfor the Horthyistrulingclasses.They were
no murderersin the Nazi sense (even if they were indulgenttowardsNazi
crimes in the Hungarianarmy, gendarmerie,etc. for which they bear full
responsibility). But they made concessions to Nazi racism. Admittedly,
they did it mostlyfor tacticalreasons,since Nazi vehemenceand radicalism
surpassedthe rhythmof theirmore conservativemould of anti-Semitism.
Nevertheless, they made concessionswhichcould have only been justified
in retrospectif they had resultedin rescuingthe bulkof the persecuted,and
14 Feher

even then only partially.Since, however, just the opposite was the case,
Bibd arguedthat they also sharedthe responsibilityfor the "administrative
measures"whichwere given a semblanceof legalityby the signatureof the
notables in the Horthy-regime.
Bibd uses a very illustrativedescriptive-sociological method to define
the exact amountof responsibilityon the partof the "generalpublic,"the
"population."He raisesthe question:what could a Jew expect if he or she
was excaping from the Nazis, say, in Denmark and in Hungary."If for
example, in Denmark, a country which did not fight, a persecutedJew
were confrontedwith havingto escape throughthe firstopen gate and then
asking for asylum in the first house he happenedto pass, there is a strong
likelihood that he would get it in one way or another.Even if he had not
found help in the form of total self-sacrifice,at least he could find people
who would identifywith his case and who wouldtry to take careof him. To
a certain extent, he could also expect indifference,rejectionof his appeal
or cautious avoidance of any responsibility.But he would consideras an
exceptional catastrophe the chance that he might be denounced to his
persecutors. By contrast, in Hungarya Jew could count on indifference,
rejection and avoidanceof any responsibilityas averageprobability(if he
had the courage at all to knock on doors of unknown persons); on
denunciationas a relativelysmaller,neverthelessstill real chance;and on
support as an unexpected, unhoped-for"strokeof luck."'7One need add
nothing to these statementsby a patriotic,non-JewishHungarian.Briefly,
but without concessions, Bibd also analyzesthe relativelysmaller,rather
"negative" co-responsibilityof officialdomand the churches:they simply
obeyed orders, but their social role (as bearersof legality and religious
morality) would have demanded far more from them. And in a very
democratic manner, Bibd is also criticalof the victim:of the herd-like,
passive obedience of HungarianJewry, which did not fight and with few
exceptions did not even escape. Instead they obeyed the orders of
murderers,a symptomof theirlackof autonomyand democraticeducation,
and of a kind of overassimilationinto Hungariantraditions-that social
order which only knew subjects, not citizens. The story of Hungarian
Jewry started with a morbid, "sociallypathological"type of assimilation
and ended (for the bulk of HungarianJews) with annihilation,at least
partly, because of habits acquiredthroughthis assimilation.
The word assimilationpoints alreadyto the thirdstage, whichin 1948,
when Bibd wrote his study, was largelyan open matterto be decidedin the
future. The crucial question was the following: what are the Jewish
perspectives?According to Bibd's repeatedly analyzed method, in uno
actu, this was a question for Hungariandemocracy,namely, that of the
vitalityand commandingvalidityof democraticnormsin Hungariansociety
or their total absencefromit. Once againthen, the parableaboutthe future

7. I. Bibd, "The JewishQuestion in Hungary,"op. cit., p. 237.

 Noteson theMarginof a ClassicalEssay 15

and the chances for democracywas not accidentallywrittenon the fate of

the "persecuted par excellence," the Jew.8 At this point, Bibd, the
historian and sociologist, the skepticalrealist of political theory gives an
answer far superior to Sartre's radical and rigorous, but exclusively
moralizingoption. The Sartreantext is lucidand leaves no doubtaboutthe
only solution open to a Jew: "Jewish authenticityconsists of choosing
oneself as a Jew, in other words, of realizingthe Jewish condition. The
authenticJew abandonsthe myth of universalman:he is awareof himself
and wills himself in historyas a creature,historicaland damned;he ceases
to escape from, and be ashamedof, his own next of kin. He has understood
that society is wrong;he substitutesa socialpluralismfor the naivemonism
of the inauthentic Jew; he knows that he is excluded, untouchable,
shameful, proscribedand he re-claimshimselfas such. All of a sudden,he
renounces his rationalistoptimism:he sees that the worldis fragmentedby
irrational divisions, and by accepting this fragmentation, in that he
proclaims himself Jew, he appropriatessome of its values and dividends;
he chooses his brothersand his equals:they are the other Jews;he "bets"
(parie) on human greatness by accepting a life which is by definition
unliveable-for he takes his pride from his humiliation."'Sartre'stragic
colours, the grandeurof his morphology,fit one situationspecifically:the
historicalhour of the Warsawghetto uprising.It was then that, for the first
time, the millenial underdog struck back, thus testifying against being
subhuman;that a communityof Jews in the processof becomingauthentic
chose themselves, their existence, this scandalof moralworld order (and
by the same act: their obliteration)and thus also chose humangreatness
and dignity. All these old-fashionedwordsfor whichalone it is worthliving
are in this case adjectivesof a borderlinesituation.(WherebyI do not at all
deny the moral relevance of Sartre'sprecept in more "daily"situations).
But what would be the sociologicallygeneralizableoptions?Here we have
to listen ratherto Bibd, the skepticalrealist. His firstremarkseems to be
entirely negative:there is no primacyof Jewishemancipationas compared
with the general process of human emancipation(by which, we already
know, he means a "certaintype" of socialism).Anti-Semitismcannot be
eliminated from a "Jewish"position. But the negative statementcan be
formulatedpositively as well, even if it is not, or but rarelyformulatedby
Bibd: a "new world" is needed in order that Jewish humiliation,Jewish
suffering, together with all other types and classes of humiliationand
suffering, should disappear. Bibd stresses very emphaticallythat this
methodologicalviewpointdoes not mean the acceptanceof the communist
recipe which tells us to remainsilent about the Jewishquestion.Jews were
one group of victims among many, and do not deserve any distinguished

8. Was Bibd awareof the fact thathe hadjoineda long and respectableline of democrats
who appliedthe same parableto theirown age and society, thatLessinghad been the firstto
do with his Nathanthe Wise?There is no answerto this in his writtenwork.
9. Sartre, op. cit., pp. 169-70.
16 Feher

place in the narrativeof sufferings.For Bibd, the Jew remainsthe victim

par excellence;his Calvarythe storyaboutthe limitsof humannature,and
what is beyond. But more importantthan the above valid but much too
general formulationis what Bibd has to say about the "Jewishways out"
of a situation created by the Holocaust. Emphasisis laid on the plural.
Bibd does not belong to the type of friendsof Jewsfor whomthereis one,
and only one, salutary solution. His non-doctrinairesocialism rests
(without a philosophicalelaborationof the problem)on the recognitionof
a pluralityof humanneeds, and he consistentlyapplieshis principleto the
Jewish problem. I wish to emphasizehow unusualthe pluralismof needs is
in this particularcase. Generallyspeaking,withina liberal(or even liberal-
conservative)state of affairs,problemslike assimilationor emigration,etc.
are easily resolved and-until they collide with other (state or group)
interests-have no dramaticdimensions. But in the particularcase of
Jews, precisely because they became either the universalscapegoat, the
prime target of projectivehatredor the scandalof civilization-its shame
personified-passions tended to extinguishcalculativereason and every-
one believed themselves in possession of one absolute remedy:a "final
solution" or an "ultimateliberation."To give Sartre'sparaphrase,in this
regard both open enemies and false friendsof Jews strive for the actual
extinction of the Jew, in one way or the other, but always throughthe
applicationof one exclusiverecipe.
Bibd's pluralismstarts with the analysis of assimilation,and under-
standablyso: Withoutany specialknowledgein the field, I thinkit is fairto
say that up until the Holocaust,the empiricalmajorityof Jewschose (or at
least experimentedwith) assimilation.Howeverafterwards,and precisely
because of what happened, assimilation,once seemingly so smooth a
process, became a problemeven for the assimilated.At this point, Bibd's
unmatched"sociologicalrealism"comes to the fore: in the wide literature
on the problem there is practicallyno one to comparewith him when it
comes to the analysis of its practical options. His hypercriticalmind
immediatelyavoids the usual, and totallysterile, bifurcationof alternatives
-the eternal pitfall of this debate-into assimilationor not assimilation.
He knows perfectly well that an infinite amount of argumentcan be
mobilized equally for and against,with the resultthat the problemcannot
be solved on an abstractlevel. Instead,he raisestwo other highlyrelevant
questions: what kind of assimilationand assimilationto what?Here he
distinguishes between organic and rational assimilation.The first is an
unattainable ideal and a dangerousone. It stems from an irrationalist
mythology and almost inevitablyresults in xenophobia.Since Bibd is an
enemy of racism (he is unable to look for the reason for it among the genes)
and yet seeks to fathom the causes of such an aggressive mythology, he
introduces a distinction which I find unsatisfactory from a scientific and
philosophical standpoint, but productive as far as its sociological yield is
concerned. The distinction is between connate or ethnic manifestations,
which are (or have become) instinctive and communal patternsof behaviour
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 17

(ways of "social procedures,"language, rules regardinggames, prestige

and honour, humancontacts,modelsof behaviour,communalgoals, ideal,
discipline, etc.). Assimilation cannot in fact be based on the first set of
characteristicsand if it is, if the goal of those to be assimilatedor the
requirement of the assimilatingcommunityis the attainmentof such an
"organicmerger," then the result can only be a new flare-upof irrational
hatred against the "irreparablyalien." Bibd is unambiguousconcerning
what he means by rationalassimilation:"The line of demarcationbetween
these two groups of communalcharactertraits is, of course, fluid. This
much is certain,however, namely,that it is, firstof all, the secondgroupof
characteristicsthat provides the bulk of qualities to which one can and
should assimilate. To become assimilateddoes not mean to "eject" all
characteristicor recognizablefeatures; to become undiscriminable,"or-
ganic." All this is not the essence, but is at best a late and collateral
phenomenon accompanyingassimilation.Assimilationshouldnot prevent
someone from retaining his characteristicnose, characteristiccuisine,
characteristicstyle of life, characteristicset phrases,alien expressions-in
other words, all those physical and ethnic manifestationsof life, which
have no or very little sociologicalrelevance. Assimilationmeans partici-
pating in the life process of a real and active community; getting
acquainted with, practicing and accepting its patterns of behaviour,
conventions, requirements."'•Here I shall note only the most important
theoretical conclusion to be derived from this viewpoint. In a rough
typology, the conceptionsof nationcan be dividedinto two, diametrically
opposed types: the contractualand the organic. (For the last, it would be
more appropriateto use the wordpatriaor Vaterland.)The firstis based, at
least in principle,on the free decisionof citizens-despite all the intricate
implicationsof contracttheories and even if contractdoes not exclude by
its very character collective egoism, jingoism and the like. At least it
guarantees constitutionally certain fundamental rights with regard to
national affiliation, includingimmigrationand emigration.It is a highly
rational, although not "business-like"relation in which emotional ele-
ments, unselfishdedication,takingrisks, and in momentsof danger,even
sacrificingone's life are also not absent. In the second, the counterfactual
prevails in an emotionally intensified way (sometimes heightened to
hysteria). This is why for irrationaland tyrannicalreasonsthis relationis
often problematic. The requirement of patria is (and herein lies the
counterfactualelement) that the state subjectshouldacceptits historically
given status as something "deeper"than the self-chosenattitudewhichis
"alien" (in Eastern-CentralEurope: mostly "Jewish,""individualistic,"
"suspicious," "inorganic," etc.). It was not by chance that I used the term
"state subject" instead of citizen. Even after the countries in question
achieved some kind of a constitution, they remained for a variety of

10. I. Bibd, "The JewishQuestion in Hungary,"op. cit., p. 303.

18 Feher

historical reasons, "organic,"and in this sense, intolerantand half-feudal

towards those living within their borderlines."IWhen Bibd arguesagainst
organic Jewish assmilation,he also arguesagainst"patria"and for a free
"contractual"type of nation.This commitmentis especiallyvaluable,since
it does not come from some "suspicious,""inorganic,""alien"element
but from an enthusiasticHungarianpatriotfor whom the Hungarian(and
Protestant-Transsylvanian)past is precious and who is absorbed by its
reliquia and lingo.
On this basis, it can also be made clearto whatJewsshouldassimilateif
they choose to do so. First of all, to the languageand the "elementary
norms of habit" of the new community.Further,to its basic "networkof
solidarity." In Bibd, the impartialdemocrat,this is meant as a critiqueof
what is popularlycalled "Jewishclannishness."The latteris, by the way, so
far from being an exclusivelyJewish characteristicthat its most extreme
and dangerousexamples were providedby Germanminoritesin Czecho-
slovakia, Poland and Hungary during the Hitler regime. They opposed
their justified and often violated minorityrightsto the legal and political
existence of the "mother"state. Finallyand veryimportantly,Bibd stresses
in his typical "moralizing"way not only the responsibilityof the assimilant
but (unlike the majorityof works dealingwith the problem)the responsi-
bility of the assimilatingcommunityas well. There the basic categoryis
reciprocity:the receiving communityhas to give material and spiritual
"accomodation," and above all, protectionfor those assimilatingto it.
Once again, Bibd becomes a severe moral and politicalcriticof his own
community.He arguesthat it was to be predictedfromthe beginning,that
is to say, from the late 19th centuryonwards,that Jewishassimilationin
Hungary (one may add in Eastern-Europein general)would not succeed,
so "unbalanced"or lacking in democraticnorms was the inner life of
Hungarian community. Hungarianlife and assimilationto it produced
hundredsof thousandsof "halfassimilants"(Sartrewouldsay: inauthentic
Jews). They were people who left the (originally religious) Jewish
community without appropriatingor aspiringto appropriateanotherand
subsisting, economically sometimes very prosperously,in a culturalno
man's land. And when the HungarianJewrywas abandonedto the mercy
of the Nazis-for which, as we know fromBibd'sanalysis,all strataof the
Hungariancommunitywere equallyresponsibleeven if they did not share
in it equally-this community betrayed the principle of reciprocityon
which alone non-organic-rationalassimilationmay rest.
Bibd draws the obvious and oft repeated conclusion that Zionism

11. For a "rough typology" the United States and Switzerland serve as the best examples of
the first, and Eastern-European countries and Germany for the second type. But it would be a
mistake to simplify matters into a division between democratic (or liberal) and backward-half-
feudal countries. For reasons, amply analyzed by Tocqueville, overcentralized France with all
its democracy had patria- rather than nation-character and movements which constantly re-
emerged on the French political scene.
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 19

thrives on the ruins of misconceivedJewish assimilation.While such a

conclusion may not have been unique, the conditionsunderwhich it was
formulated and spelled out, however, testified to a uniquecourage.Bibd
defends the right to Zionist organization,even againstthe Communistsin
1948 (!), the year when Stalin'smyrmidonsmurderedShlomo Mikhoels,
the head of the Soviet Jewish culturalcommunity,executed 24 leading
Jewish culturalactivistsand intellectualsin the so-called"JewishCrimean
conspiracytrial" and destroyedthe whole of Jewishculturalautonomyin
the Soviet-Union. Bibd may have been unawareof these facts, but it could
not have escaped his attention-he was politicallytoo sensitivefor this-
that hostile winds had startedto blow from the Soviet Union towardsthe
Eastern-EuropeanJewry.
While Bibd is not uncriticalof Zionism, the second massive "Jewish
way out" of the post-Holocaust,he does not feel himselfentitledeither on
moral or scholarlygroundsto criticizethe idea itself. For him, the bruntof
reprobation must fall on its manner of realization. Zionists ought to
understand, he writes, that an overzealous recruitingwould discredit
precisely one of the greatest merits of the doctrine, namely, that it is
conceived as a free and contractual nationalism. Should it be driven
beyond its limits and transformedinto an "organic"principle, (which is
obviously counterfactual,given that the majority of even the surviving
Jews did not choose Israel) it would lose all its emancipatorythrust.
Bibd does not rule out for the Jews a third, collective way out of the
psychological-intellectualmisery of the post-Holocaust:not Zionist emi-
gration nor rational and contractual assimilation, but rather ethnic
separation within a confederativesystem. Not only does he considerthis
ethnic separationto be perfectly in harmonywith the Jews' fundamental
humanrights(in sharpcontrastwith the Soviet-Union,whichdegradedthis
tendency into a symbolicghetto for Jews), but he was also capableof an
impartialand distanced analysisof its preconditionsand traps. Basically,
Bibd sees two preconditionsfor such an ethnicseparation,neitherof them
absolutely obligatoryand both very likely: lingualseparationand massive
relapseinto religion.The firstneeds no furthercommentary.The second, in
addition to the difficultyit raises for the "enlightenmentprocess"so dear
to Bibd, is complicatedby anotherfactor. If Bibd refrainsfrom general-
izing about religions, he does note that religious neology, rather than
having emancipated Jews, presented them with a problem. While no
longer a binding moral formularegulatinglife in its entirety, religionstill
divides Jew from non-Jew. Thus while Bibd is not denyingthe legitimacy
and the relevance of ethnic separation,he does warnagainsta numberof
difficulties provoked or intensified by it in view of the "consensual"
transitionto the type of vague "democraticsocialism"he had chosen.
Finally, to complete this overview,Bibd mentionsanothersignificantif
ungeneralizable way out, namely the lifestyle of what he calls the
"dissimilant." This type is overwhelminglycharacterizedby negative
features. (Actually, this is the one closest to Sartre'sauthenticJew). It is
20 Feher

not rooted in any national community; it is not assimilated, although it is

also not Zionist or ethnic separatist. In the majority of cases, the
sociological equivalent of this "dissimilant" is a cosmopolitan intellectual
with an awareness of all the traps stemming from being Jewish. It is
indicative of Bibd's impartial theoretical "magnanimity" that even if he
regards this type as transitory, and even if, as a sociologist and political
theorist, he has a predilection for generalizable options, he still includes
this overwhelmingly intellectual phenomenon in this typology.
As I continue the Jewish story in Hungary and turn to its fourth and
fifth state, I do so with less skill and breadth of information-and
inevitably with less impartiality. Nevertheless, the story must be recounted
up to the present. The fourth stage begins with the Communist takeover in
Hungary in 1948 and ends with the 1956 revolution. In this period, on the
communist side, that ever prominent feature of Hungarian Communism,
namely the hypertrophic presence of Jewish elements, was even increased.
This occurred at the most sensitive and conspicuous points of social life, in
the Politbureau and in the AVH, the dreaded secret police, both leading
positions of the ideological appartus. While not wishing to advocate any
kind of numerus clausus, I would still call this situation a malignant
hypertrophy. As early as the 1919 revolution, the number of Jewish
communist and social democratic people's commissaries and deputy
commissaries was so overwhelming, (nearly exclusive) that the white terror
could easily equate communism (or socialism in general) with Jewry. In the
great purges of the 1930s Stalin usually preferred as survivors non-Jews to
Jews, but in the Hungarian case, even his omnipotence proved to be futile:
all contending factions, the whole reservoir of Hungarian Communism
consisted mainly of Jews. It is thus that Rakosi came to power, a classic
case of half-assimilation and "clannishness," whom Berija (in the usual
Heydrich-like lingo prevailing in the secret police and upper stratum of
"realized socialism,") called the "first and last Jewish kind of Hungary" at
the time. Stalin's allegedly unlimited power over all Communist parties in
every area once again proved to be a myth. When it came to Jewish
predominance, the otherwise cowardly and pathologically servile Rakosi
was inflexibly obstinate. Bibd may not have known, but Rakosi had to
know what happened to Jewish activists in the Soviet-Union. Nonetheless,
it remained strict party policy that as long as he had absolute power (up
until June 1953) no data about the increasingly anti-Semitic overtones of
Soviet political life was to reach the ears of the senstive Hungarian
"general public." It is most telling that while Rakosi was pushing other
communist leaders (Beirut, Gottwald) into having their own show-trials,-
not wanting to remain alone (in the company of his Bulgarian colleagues)
-when it came to the Slansky-trial with its unmistakably anti-Semitic
character, the trial itself was dealt with at length while the aspect of anti-
Semitism was toned down to a minimum. It was only the "Jewish doctors'
plot" in early 1953 which forced Rakosi to realize that he could not go any
further with his Jewish-centered policy without seriously endangering
 Notes on the Margin of a Classical Essay 21

himself. He hastily concocted a Hungarian"Jewishplot" (partlyamong

secret police officers who had outlived their usefulness),but when Stalin
died, the "Jewishplot" collapsed. Rdkosi'sunchallengedrule came to its
end as well.
There was an unformulatedideology, even a moralizingbias behind
this unmistakableselection of Jewish cadres. This is why I called this
practice malignanthypertrophy.The HungarianCommunistleaderswere
the negative counterpointto Bibd: they too had a moralizingview of the
"Hungarianethos," only this was of a totally negative character.The
"Hungarians,"so they opined, are an "organicallyFascist"people. This
opinion has a long historyand actuallystartswith Bela Kun'sunparalleled
abdication speech of August 1, 1919, the day the HungarianSoviet
Republic collapsed, in which he declared the Hungarian proletariat
"undeserving"of its revolutionand revolutionaryleaders. Many factors,
which cannot be analyzed here, made HungarianCommunismnot only
isolated in its own country but insensitive, indeed rather hysterically
aggressivetowardany just or unjustmanifestationof Hungariannational-
ism. When, in fact, Hungaryturnedout to be Hitler'slast ally, they felt an
unconcealed glee and in a very unpleasantway made no secret of their
satisfaction at being "historicallyjustified."As a second element of the
same hypertrophy,it followedfromthis that they adopteda position,once
again in "secret consensus," which without the mention of names was
specifically and justly criticized by Bibd. For them, the Jew was the
"reliableman." There was a clandestineopinionin "highercircles"that a
Jew can be anything-greedy, money-hungry,a bit cosmopolitan, (an
epitetonornansmentionedin briefas a lip-serviceto Sovietpropagandabut
basically toned down in the Rdkosi-press)-but a Jew cannot turn
nationalist.This was so, they argued,becauseapartfromother reasonshe
would not be accepted by other nationalists.
This cynical wisdom had a predictable conclusion: in spite of the
marked presence of Jewish intellectualsin the opposition preparingthe
ground for the revolutionbetween 1953-55, the 1956 revolutionwas the
first moment after 1945 (apart from three pogromsbetween 1945-47) in
which anti-Semitismpublicly appeared on the streets. This happened
simply because many Hungarians,even those demandinga democraticor
vaguely socialist transformation,tended to describe Rdkosi's rule as a
"Jewishregime."The questionas to whatextent a systemwhichcontained
an overwhelmingJewishpresence in its police, press and leadingpolitical
bodies, could be termed"Jewishrule"had alreadybeen raisedin the hour
of preparationby the hypersensitiveBibd. But the case has to be reopened
now in retrospect.
It would be perhaps too cheap to point to the carefullydistributed
presence of Jews amongthe victimsof the show-trials(two were Jewsfrom
the five executed as a result of the Rajk-trialalone). Bibd has a rational
(measurableand generalizable)criterionfor what sensibly can be called
"Jewishrule." Is such a rule advantageousandprofitablefor the whole(or
22 Feher

at least the overwhelming majority) of Jews as an ethnic group as opposed

to others? This is the question, the answer to which decides whether a rule is
Jewish or non-Jewish in character. If we raise this question, the following
facts immediately come to mind. First, Jewish martyrdom, the Holocaust
in general and its Hungarian version in particular, became anathema at the
moment that the Communist party seized political power. Secondly, and
more importantly, the Hungarian government, this allegedly "Jewish
dictatorship," showed an astounding ambivalence regarding the past. On
the other hand, they did sign the peace treaty, thereby acknowledging
formally their responsibility for deeds of former pro-Nazi governments.
This was a demand of the victorious allies which they had to meet. They
also produced half-way open, half-way covert propaganda about "Hun-
garian responsibility" for participating in the war; for certain Hungarian
atrocities such as those, for instance, committed for the most part in the
Ukraine by Hungarian soldiers against Ukrainian peasants. But the acts
committed by Hungarians and Germans against Hungarian Jews became
non-events not only in the press. The Hungarian government, reeking of
Jewish clannishness, disclaimed any and all responsibility for the surviving
Jews. There were certain vague legal acts (such as a decree in 1946 issued
by the then Parliament about compensation to be paid to Jews), but
nothing in fact happened. This in spite of the fact that the survivorsconstituted
a community for the most part without financial support, since without
bread-earners (the percentage of young men among those exterminated by
the Nazis was exceptionally high), Jewish families under the "first and last
Jewish king of Hungary" did not receive financial support of any kind.
Moreover, official and very serious obstacles were put in the way of
accepting West-German Wiedergutmachung (financial compensation) for
fathers, husbands, sons and other relatives murdered in Nazi camps.
In actual fact, even the intention to apply for such compensation was
regarded as an act hostile to the state. So in this allegedly Jewish rule, the
surviving Jewish community (steadily diminishing from 200,000 in 1945 to
the present 60,000 or about) whose members, according to a popular myth,
have money even under their skin, were, if not employed by the
communist party top hierarchy, double pariahs of a society, and at any rate
poor. 2 It is highly characteristic of the outcome of Bibd's radical-
democratic expectations, that in the dark night of the early 1950s
everything promising turned to its deplorable opposite and that there was
not a single oppositional intellectual, Jew or non-Jew, who would have
mentioned, during the "Hungarian Spring" of 1953-56, this burning
shame of national life.
Kiddrism, as a fifth phase of the Jewish question in Hungary in the 20th
century, brought new elements into this complex problem. The Kiddrist

12. The fact that Jewishreligiousinstructionwas destroyedand that Zionistorganization

was no longer tolerated,'shouldnot be mentionedhere. In this regard,Jewsonly sharedthe
niceties of a general situation.
 Notes on the Margin of a Classical Essay 23

"consolidation"in this regardcan be summedup in one sentence: it is a

melange of Leninist "philo-Semitism,"a carefully measured political
numerusclausus, plus a continuationof the total suppressionof any public
discussionor analysisof the problem.In other words, it is a dogmatically
assimilationistsystemwhichfunctionswithoutdogmaticescapadesinto the
superfluous and without oppressinga communitywhose presence after
1956 in Hungariansociety becamerathermore "projective"than"social."
On the other hand, with all its good will and preciselytogetherwith it, it
shows all the inner contradictionsand final impotenceof a merely"philo-
Semitic"regimewhichis basedon conservativecoercionand manipulation.
But in order to understandthe whole intricacyof the Kdddristposition,
one has to take into considerationthat it was preciselythe time of Kdddr's
advent to power in 1956-57 that the final shape was given to Sovietanti-
Semitism.WilliamKorey, in his excellent and quite uniquelydocumented
book The Soviet Cage, gives the story of the officiallysupportedand even
officially organized Soviet anti-Semitism.But one of his remarksshows
that he is perhapsnot fully awareof all the implicationsof his own story.
The remarkreads as follows: "The twin aspects of Soviet policy of Jews
stand in fundamentalcontradictionto one another.On the one hand,there
is the attempt to bringabout the forcibleassimilationof Jews throughthe
eliminationof specificJewishinstitutionsand the obliterationof references
to Jewishtradition,especiallyJewishmartyrdom.On the otherhand,there
is the enforcementof patternsof discrimination,based preciselyupon the
nationalityidentificationin passportsand questionnaires.And the patterns
of discrimination are accompanied by a propagandacampaign which
stimulatesand strengthenslocal sourcesof anti-Semitism,includingthose
sources which give effect to and, indeed, extend the patterns."'3 But what
is formulatedhere as an antinomy(forcibleassimilationand discrimination)
is actuallythe "dialectical"formulafor all conservativeanti-Semiticpolicy
which excludespogromsand finalsolutionsbut whichwantsto keep awake
anti-Semitic hatred for projective purposes. The historicallocus of this
policy can only be correctlyunderstoodwith a briefsketchof the phasesof
Soviet anti-Semitism.Judged by the most authoritativesources (such as
Korey's book or Schwartz'smore naive but very valuable and amply
documented essay published during Stalin's lifetime, in New York:
Antisemitismv SovietskomSoiuze,) there can be hardlyany doubt about
the fact that Jews felt the Leninistperiod and its immediateaftermathas
their emancipationfrom a Zarist rule which openly incited to pogroms.
They were representedin all segmentsof the country'slife and in political
and intellectualstratawereeven overrepresented. In the 1930s,despitethe fact
that Stalin's personal anti-Semitismbecame increasinglyvisible in the
internecinepartystrifeagainstJewishopponents,nothingbasicallychanged.
The bloodbathwas so universalthatJew andnon-Jewalike felt threatened.

13. WilliamKorey, The SovietCage (New York, 1973),p. 174.

24 Feher

The negativeturn, in a doublyparadoxicaland deeplytragicway, came

in the anti-Hitlerwar and it was initiatedfrom below, not from the top.
There is overwhelmingevidence to supportthree facts. First, it is beyond
doubt that the Nazi occupation,whichwas at firstacceptedby wide strata
at least with uncertainhopes, for the firsttime aftera quarterof a century's
oppression by Cheka and GPU-methods,gave vent to traditionalRussian
(Ukrainian, etc.) anti-Semitism.The usual identificationof the Soviet
regime with Jewrywas widespreadin occupiedterritories.At least in two
republics,Lithuaniaand the Ukraine,significantgroupsof the population
participatedin the mass exterminationof Jews and the situationis best
described in terms of Bibd's morphologyof the Hungarianattitude to
Jews. Secondly, it seems to be documentedirrefutablythat the partisan
movement was either indifferenttowardsthe fate of Jews (but even in this
case they did not tolerate, or hardly,Jews in the Ukrainian,etc. partisan
groups) or were directlyhostile, even menacingtowardsJewswho lived in
so-called "familycamps"in the endlessRussianand Ukrainianforestsand
who had formed their own partisan groups. In addition, there is no
substantial evidence of the Soviet governmenthaving put any kind of
special pressureon its own partisansto includeor even protect escaping
Jews since they were dependent on them, at least as far as armament
supply was concerned. Thirdly, it has been proven beyond the slightest
doubt that throughoutthe warthe Sovietpresssystematically suppressedall
evidence of the Holocaust. The story of this unprecedentedgenocidewas
merged into a sufferingen general.But therewas a deeperimplicationstill
behind this silence: the Soviet governmentactuallymade a compromise
with popular anti-Semitism and started to "assimilate"some of its
elements into its own, official, politics.
The next phase came between 1948-1953, followinga short post-war
armistice between Jews and authorities during which Jewish culture
seemed to flourish. Its point of departore was the above mentioned
physicaleliminationof the best Jewishmilitantintellectuals(all pro-Soviet
and emotionallycommunist)in the so-called"Crimea-trial" and it reached
its peak in the "doctors'plot," where there is evidence of both incipient
"popular"pogromsand a mass deportationof Jewsprepared(or planned)
by Stalin. ConsideringStalin'sways of settling "socialills," this is surely
more than a mere fairy tale.
As in so many spheres, here, too, Krushchevput an end to Stalinist
practices on the one hand, and introducedelements of a conservative
consolidationof the system on the other. However, there is a far greater
continuityin Krushchevand his successorsin regardto the Jewishproblem
than in many other fields. The new system, combining forcible assimilation
and discrimination without plans (or fantasy images) for mass extermina-
tion, is constituted in a number of ways. The first is the separation of Soviet
Jewry (some 2,000,000 people) from the bulk of the population by official
designation, the most important of which is the designation "evrei" (Jew)
in the Soviet citizen's identity card, "internal passport," a label based on
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 25

and checked and re-checked by very far-reaching,"Nuremberg-like"

investigationof one's ancestors.In principle,such a "label"in the identity
card does not mean discrimination,but simply the indication of the
nationality group affiliation of the given Soviet citizen. But in the
particularcase of Soviet Jews it serves to point out the targetof (popular
and official) discriminationand eventual persecution.The explanationis
simple: for a number of reasons (some of which I am acquaintedwith,
others not) the "Birobidshan-plan,"the idea of a separate Jewish
autonomousregion, failed to attractSovietJewry.As a result,Soviet Jews
constitute only de jure not de facto a nationalitygroup;they only "enjoy"
all the disadvantagesof forcibleoffical separationfrom all other (Russian,
Ukrainian, etc.) nationalitiesthey would merge into.
Secondly, an elaboratesystem of numerusnullusand numerusclausus
is built on this forcible separation. Numerusnullus prevails in political
leadership,among the higherranksof armyand navyofficercorpsand the
KGB, the Foreign Ministryand diplomaticservices.'14Numerusclaususis
applied to all leadinguniversitiesandtertiaryeducationalinstitutions,even
though here a contraryconsideration,a tacit acceptanceof Jewish self-
stereotype intervenes:Soviet authorities(just as chauvinisticJews) believe
that Jews are-somehow "by nature"-more clever than non-Jews "in
abstract matters," such as mathematics,and since they badly need good
intellectuals in many fields, especially in those connected with military
speech, the system of numerusclausus is constantlyoverruled.Thirdly,
there is a practicestartedunderKrushchev,but intensifiedever since, that
the Soviet mass media regularlypublisharticles,satiricaldrawingsetc.-
under the rubric"Zionist"-which publicizepreciselythe same (or very
similar)anti-Semiticstereotypesas had the Nazi Stuermer,for whichJulius
Streicher, the only "ideological"defendantof the Nuremburg-trials, was
justly executed. More than being simply derisive in a hostile manner and
inciting to anti-Jewish hatred, the "anti-Zionist" propagandaputs the Jew
into the context of an "infernalinternationalconspiracy."All this takes
place very much in the spirit of the ominous "Protocolsof the Elders of
Zion" invented and forged by the Black Hundred,under Zarismand its
atmosphereof pogroms.Of course, all this was widelyexploitedand put to
sinisteruse by the mainideologistsof Nazism,RosenbergandGoebbels.Its
reappearancein official ideology implies the dangerof pogroms, even if
the Soviet state retains for itself the right to violence against its own
citizens. But it is highly indicativeof what Ilya Ehrenburghas maintained
confidentially.I mean Ehrenburg,this monumentof inauthenticassimila-
tion, the man who secretly identified with the feelings of Laschik
Roitschwanz, the Lemberg tailor, the "eternal Jew," and who wrote
outright racist pamphletsagainstthe boche in the war but simplydenied

14. In all this, one can relyon Korey'sbook whichdrawsits datapartlyfromthe analysisof
(available) statisticalpublications,partly from the statementsof dissidents,such as Roy
Medvedev, this courageousLeninistdefenderof Jewishrights.
26 Feher

publicly that there was special Jewishmartyrdom,Jewishsolidarityand a

Jewish question. After the victory of Israel in the 1967 war, Ehrenburg
made the following confidentialremarkto AlexanderWerth: "Well, it's
just as well they didn'tallow themselvesto be exterminatedby the Arabs,
as they were in the Hitler days. Although there were plenty of excellent
Jewish soldiers in the Red Army, and many of them were even made
Heroes of the Soviet Union, there is still this unpleasantfeeling that it's
"natural"for Jews to be massacred.If, followingin Hitler'sfootsteps, the
Arabs had started massacringall the Jews in Israel, the infectionwould
have spread:we would have had here a wave of anti-Semitism."'5It must
be added that the "natural"way out for a visiblydislikedminority,namely,
the emigration to "their own land" (with which, at least as a temporary
solution, an ever increasingpartof Soviet Jewryfeels sympathy)is not only
forbidden, but is in itself evidence of the "Fascistideologyof Zionism"-
the main charge against this "alien community"in the organicbody of
Soviet Life. The main function of Soviet anti-Semitismcan easily be
deciphered from all this within the whole of the post-Stalinperiod. This
functionalreadyloomed largein Krushchev's"anti-corruption campaign,"
during which the death penalty was reintroducedfor economic crimes;
crimes which money-centeredcapitalismonly punishes with shorter or
longer imprisonments.In this campaign,the percentageof Jews executed
for such crimeswas, accordingto Korey, 50% in the Russian,80% in the
Ukrainian Republic. This obvious "judicial" bias displays the usual
characterand functionof conservative"projective"anti-Semitism.In case
of unresolvablesocial tensions,one mustalwayshavea universalscapegoat
ready. Separateit from the main body of society;declareit alien from the
reform, if only by virtueof its beingseparated;reprimandit repeatedlyand
publicly for being an "alien body" but do not let it either assimilateor be
released from the bonds of citizenship. On the other hand, do not
exterminate it. Quite apart from the bad press you get for such things
nowadays, with whom are you going to replace them? And if someone
believes this to be satiricalexaggerationof a merelylatenttendency,let me
say that the victims are not interested in the "incognito" of their
persecutors.They simplytranslatethe "text"of persecutioninto a perhaps
simplisticbut understandablelanguage.I can also point to one particular
incident, quoted frequentlyand corroboratedby manysources.Duringthe
Moscow "negotiations"between the Soviet leadershipand the captured
Dubcek-group, Kosygin was said to have exploded in the best Black
Hundred manner when he saw Frantisek Kriegel arriving.He yelled:
"What is this Jew from Galicia doing here?"
Only against this background can Kidhrism and its policy on the Jewish
question be assessed objectively. In this regard, KidIr, a man for whom it
is a matter of genuine inner bathos that he feels himself a "Leninist," can
enjoy the satisfaction that he is more "Krushchevite" than Krushchev

15. In: Korey, op. cit., p. 215, (italics mine-F.F.)

 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 27

himself. For the Soviet general secretary'sotherwise genuinely claimed

Leninism was phony. When it came to the Jewishquestion, Lenin, a man
devoted to forced assimilation,was neverthelessa philo-Semite.Krushchev
was an anti-Semite. Kiddr's philo-Semitismis immediatelyvisible within
the Hungarianscene, where overt manifestationsof both Soviet and anti-
Soviet anti-Semitism are coercively suppressed.'6And Kdddristphilo-
Semitismis not simplycautioussilence duringperiodswhen the dirtyflood
of old-time and anti-Jewishpropagandais flowing copiouslyfrom Soviet,
Czech and Polish mass media. Koreymentionsa seriesof publicactsof the
Hungarianleadership:the ample Hungarianpresscoverageof Eichmann's
trial, which was either a non-event in the Soviet-Unionor a mere pretext
for attacks against Adenauer; the very carefulwordingof the Hungarian
standpointfollowingthe 1967Israeli-Arabwar, whichmadeit unmistakably
clear that the Hungariangovernment'spro-Arabicforeign policy would
not mean tolerance towardsmilitantanti-Semitismin the disguiseof anti-
Zionism (and in fact did not). Hence it was not accidentalandindeedwas a
warningto the Hungarianleadership,at that time increasinglyin disfavor
with Breshnev, when on February3, 1972Pravdareferredto the "intrigues
of Zionism" supposedlyincreasingin Hungary.17
On the other hand, the Kdddristcase study demonstratesthat without
democraticsafeguardsthe best intentionsof "higherauthorities"will not
eliminate the Jewish question. More profoundlystill, it testifies to the
impossibility of eliminating the Jewish question (even its "projective"
version) throughphilo-Semitismpure and simple. Followingboth Leninist
convictionsand politicalshrewdness(Leninclearlyurgedthat the situation
not be turned into a social conflict, a situation which in turn became,
because of the small number of the Jews, only projective) Kdddrdid
everything he could. He went to the limits of his possibilities,something
that cannot be said for the overcautious Hungarian leadership. The
omnipresent agents of the Hungariansecret police not only noted, they
also understood what a certain lecturer of "Marxism-Leninism" meant
when she allegedly said that all revisionistsare Zionists (the person in
question was "seriouslywarned," a doubtfulsupportfor Jews, to say the
least). There is no numerusnullusin Hungarianpoliticallife, whichin itself
is always an absolute indicatorof anti-Semitichatred. However, there is a

16. Not long ago, at a conference of Hungarian emigr6s, I heard the allegation against
Kdddr that he selected the victims of the post-1956 trials according to their Jewish or non-Jewish
origin, protecting the latter. I can not reject this chargeout of hand, as some people did at this con-
ference, for the simple reason that no one is acquaintedwith the statisticsof retributionsexcept the
Hungarian leadership, hence no one knows the real proportions.However, I doubt the validityof
the accusation.
17. Korey, op. cit., p. 153. Probably it was also a belated answer to an incident in which the
Hungarian leadership behaved ambiguously according to Moscow standards. In December,
1970, after the death sentences in the Leningrad hijacking trial, G. Lukacs and members of
his Budapest School, nearly all Jews, protested to the Hungarian Political Bureau against the
death penalty in a collective letter, a fact which the Soviet authorities had to be acquainted with
and which the Hungarian leadership answered to in an evasive and non-committal way.
28 Feher

cautious numerusclausus at the top, which is there in order to avoid the

bad "popularpress" of the Rakosi leadership.Even this can be given a
benevolent interpretation.Kirdrism no longer feels itself so tragically
isolated from the "nation,"as had been Rakosi'sregime.It does not have
stereotypes of Hungaryas a "Fascistnation,"at least it is not motivatedby
such fantasy images in its action.
But there is one revealingfact whichcannotbe explainedawayby the
notion of "complyingwith Soviet wishes":the Jewishquestionremained,
even historically,anathemafor Hungarianculturallife. Withthe exception
of a few books, the last20 yearshave seen hardlyanypublicationaboutthe
fate and historyof HungarianJewry.No sociologyof the HungarianJewish
communityis tolerated.There is, to be sure, a rabbinicalinstructionwhose
freedom of activityand level is unparalleledin "realsocialism,"but thisfits
the general pattern of Kdddristtolerance towards religions. No public
utterance of the fact that the Jewish problem has existed since 1945 is
admitted in the Hungarianpress. Even if HungarianJews could, with a
historicaldelay, accepta partof Germanrecompensationfor their(or their
relatives') suffering,no legislativeact has ever been passedduringKdddr's
nearly quarterof a centuryleadershipto make up for the negligenceof the
"Jewish king," Rakosi: namely, to declare pubiclythat HungarianJewry
was Hungary'sprime victimand greatesthomogenouswar casualtyand as
such, the nation owes at least some symbolic compensationto their
survivingrelatives and offsprings.
Why the silence if Kdddrismis a philo-Semiticregime?Simplybecause
of Soviet pressure?I do not think so. Some of the reasonsare obvious.
Kdddrism,as all EasternEuropeandictatorships,is most hesitantto admit
the existence of any inner social tension. It is even less ready to tolerate
public and democraticdebate about the sore pointsof social life, let alone
give in to autonomistictendencies. (Of course, because of the silence
imposed upon them, no one knowswhetherthereare suchin the verysmall
HungarianJewish community).But there is another reason for my firm
conviction. Historically,Kdddrismfinds itself at a point the Soviet leader-
ship was at duringthe war. In spiteof the lackof anti-Semitictendencies,it
has to yield to the pressureof a new anti-Semitismfrom below, which is
increasinglymilitantbut whichis not necessarilyanti-Kdddrist.To makethe
sociological formula complete, let me emphasizethat I do not mean the
simple, self-producingpopular anti-Semitismwhich exists in pubs and
football stadiums, nor do I refer to antediluvianvestiges of the Horthy
times. There is now in Hungarya new anti-Semitismof the middleclasses
(among them intellectuals) which is multifacetedand as anti-Semitism
alwaysis aimed at differenttargets.On the one hand,it is vehementlyanti-
Marxist and anti-socialist, and in the usual manner of anti-Semitic
radicalism, produces hybrid monsters of imagination by coupling incom-
patibles: oppositional intellectuals are linked with the regime they are
opposed to on the grounds that they are both nominally Marxist, or at least
socialist and, by implication, Jewish. On the other hand, as I mentioned,
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 29

this increasingnew wave of anti-Semitismis not necessarilyanti-Kdddrist.

Partly it considersthe dissidents(an unusuallyhigh numberof whom are,
accordingto long-termHungariantraditions,Jewish)to be "alienelements"
and is totally mistrustfulof them. In January,1977, Hungariandissidents
organized a collective action of solidarity with Charter 77, whose or-
ganizers and signatories alike were, in fact, for the most part Jews. A
celebrated Hungarian intellectual, known for his critical opinions, was
asked in a confidentialcircle of friendsin Pariswhy he did not join them.
He answered:"I do not join suchJewishactions."Kdddrismis regardedin
part by many nationalistand anti-Semiticmiddleclasspeople as providing
a maximumof comfortin EasternEurope. For them, servilityis Hungarian
and "trouble-making"is alien, in other words, Jewish. Let me again
emphasize that this is not a pro-communistor an anti-communistattitude,
but one which can easily and cynicallycoexist with governmentpolicies
(and with which a communist and philo-Semiticgovernment coexists
happily). It stands opposed to Jewish "turbulence"which, in its "reckless
political ambition," from generation to generation turns oppositional.
These are the new nightmarishproductionsof many a nationalistHun-
garian intellectual, in which the Bela Kuns of bolshevism and anti-
bolshevism are merged into one (not an unusualcocktailin the historyof
anti-Semitism).Here the languageof second-ratepubswiththeirreferences
to "kikes" once again becomes de derniercri.
It does not take any special acumenor analytictrainingto see that we
are confronted here with a classic-and multi-faceted--caseof projective
anti-Semitism. In part it is the hostility felt because of their own social
impotence, which is naturallyprojectedon to those who took the risk. As
with all projectionsof this sort, it is conceivedin bad faith and needs the
traditionalscapegoatfor purposesof rationalization.What comes through
the filters of a distortedattitudeis equallyan act of bad faith:an intended
dissent which does not have the guts for it. A classicself-manifestationof
this is the following. The "nationalproblem"(i.e., independence)is an
unresolved problem; it cannot even be resolved under given Eastern-
European conditions.Nevertheless,let us supportthe government(which
is at least halfway patriotic and defends some of the national interests)
rather than joining these "uprooted"ones who are constantlyinvolvedin
Czech, Polish and other alien affairs. Understandablyso, since they are
alien themselves, in other words, Jews. This is a classicprojectiveattitude
which satisfies the need for hatredarisingfrom one's feeling of impotence
and gives the false self-assuranceof being a "critical"element. It also
guarantees the peace with a governmentwhich is ill at ease about this
tendency (of which they, readingconfidentialpolice reportsof intellectual
conversations, know incomparablymore than I), but which is not foolish
enough to admitits existenceand producea new tensionwith the "critical"
intelligentsia, which is one of its pillars.
One may ask if this whole complexis of any importance?Is its detailed
analysis not the result of a Jewish persecutioncomplex fantasizingabout
30 Feher

dangers from all directions? Undoubtedly, in itself and in its present

dimensions, it is not of primaryimportance.But is is a symptomand a
latent danger. It is a symptom of the inner weakness of opposition in
Hungary:the projectionof fears in the formof hatredagainstthe "alien,"
who is also the weaker, is a well-knownand amply explained analytical
formula. It is a latentdangeras well whichcan become actualized,as it did,
for instance, in Poland in 1968-69, when precisely these strataand this
attitude were mobilized in a hystericalflare-upof anti-Semitismagainst
non-Jewish, rebellious intellectuals.Istvdn Bibd, one of the most clear-
sighted Hungarian political minds that ever existed, was aware of the
meaning of this symptomand of this latent danger.Whenhe was askedby
friends how he could imagine the first steps of his possible come-backto
Hungarian ideological life, he was said to have answered:"Reprintmy
'JewishQuestion in Hungary.'Unfortunately,it has not lost its relevance."

II. The MethodologicalAspect

The highest complimentthat can be paid to IstvdnBibd (and a correct

locating of his intellectual achievement) is to say that he has only one
competitor: Sartre's Reflexions sur la questionjuivre.'8 The basic dif-
ference between them is this: historyis totallynon-existentin Sartre.In his
truly immortal essay, one of the great gestures of this great life, whose
absence we have to feel so painfully now, he gives the philosophical
morphology of the modern state of Jewish affairs from the aspect of a
leftist-radicalexistentialism. For Bibd, the whole complex can only be
understood in terms of historicalsociology. As a result, their scenarios
have very differentprotagonists.In Sartre,it is the anti-Semitewho is the
focal point. The Jew is only his product, his derivative (in his/her
inauthentic Jewish being). With Bibd, it is the confrontationof Jew and
non-Jewthat createsthe whole complex,and in a non-individualistic sense,
a collision of collective entities or ethoses. Both standpoints are in
harmonywith theirrespectiveauthors'historicalbackground.For Sartre,a
French thinker for whom the great revolution separatedthe millennial
period from the present (which is called by Bibd by its popular name
Middle Ages), the whole pre-1789problematiccan be "textbookish"and
irrelevant. Only what happened from the Dreyfus affair to Petain and
Laval is relevant. (Here, of course,one musttry to understandthe termsof
a methodology, not accept its explanation). For Bibd, an Eastern-
European, specificallya Hungarian,where "MiddleAges," semi-feudal-
ism, fragmentedemancipation,unresolvednational(andnationalminority)
problems, imperfectpluralismand sham-constitutionalism grewfromthose

18. Here I am not going to discuss,even briefly,the Jewishmysticalconceptions.Theyare

either specificbranchesof one tree, mysticismin general,or, if they assumea special"Jewish
substance,"counterracists.
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 31

famous "MiddleAges" into the present-this was an impossibleapproach.

It is thus that Bibd, who (in spite of his careful academic training)
remained a "philosophicalsomnambulist,"came closer to or ratherbetter
preparedthe groundfor, certainfertile solutionsthan his competitor,one
of the greatest philosophicalmindsof this century.(Whichagaindoes not
mean, as will be seen below, that at crucialpointsI am not goingto criticize
Bibd, relying on Sartre.)
The main terms of Bibd's standpoint are the following.19 Firstly,
accordingto him, there is no generaldefinitionof Jew in the modem age.
The definition is dependenton the approachto the problem:for a racist,it
is a racial, for a Hassidic mysticist a religious, for a Zionist a national
problem. Bibd's suggestionis (and in this regardhe is influencedby Marx)
that historyand its productshave to be understoodin termsof conflicts.It is
conflict,that produces social strata (or classes) and separatescompetitive
ethoses, not the other way round. This is why he understandswhat is
Jewish by analyzingthe conflictof Jew and non-Jewas collectiveentities.
This is why he makes an inventoryof the usual explanationof the Jewish
problem (historicalmaterialist,historicistoperatingfrom the fact of the
traditionallydeveloped hostility between Jewish and Gentile, psychoan-
alytic-projective) but rejects all of them as insufficientand one-sided.
Bibd establishes a three-scale method of investigationand distinguishes
between two periods of the problem. "I considerthe correcthierarchy(of
the steps of searchfor explanation-F. F.) to be, first, a graspof the social
development and positional changesof Jewryas a social community,the
conditions of its being intertwinedwith other communities,with surround-
ing society, and the mutualimpactof individualand communalpatternsof
behaviour stemming therefrom. Finally all this should be placed in the
universal process of social evolution."20There is no need to be petty
regarding minutia (such as the somewhat misty content of "social
evolution"), nor do I want to be an orthodox advocate of historical
materialism. This methodologicalprogramis historicistand collectivistic
enough for me to fulfill one fundamentalfunction:it clearlydistinguishes
between two epochs (the Middle Age and the modem, overwhelmingly
described by Bibd as capitalist),the firstof whichis non-universalistic,the
second universalistic.In my opinion, the difference between these two
categories introduced by me into Bibd's train of thought has a crucial
bearing on the understandingof the Jewish problem. I call the period (a
"world-epoch") universalistic in which values, patterns of behaviour,
moral prescriptions, systems of needs and habits tend to spread in all
countries and geographicalregions, in which culturesco-exist throughan

19. I am not going to analyzeSartre'sconceptionsystematically.Partly,thisessayhadbeen

written in memory of IstvdnBibd, whose works are not availablefor the Westernreader.
Partly, Sartre and his phenomenologicalconstructionof the anti-Semiteand the Jew will
reappearin this paper duringthe analysisof moot points.
20. IstvdnBibd, op. cit., 262.
32 Feher

interrelationof mutual"exploitation"in thatthey transplant(sometimesin

a confused milange) the others' good into their own soil and in which
practicallyeverything that is "valuable"in the other must somehow be
fitted into "our own," even if it contradictsmany of "our"life premises.
Non-universalisticis its opposite. Rigidly separatedcultureslive side by
side between which there is no commerce, not even tacitly tolerated
osmosis, but rather,for reasonsof principle,a relationof mutualand total
exclusion.2'
This is all the more importantsince Bibd pointsout that whatevermay
accurately be called medieval (Christianand Moslem) anti-Semitismand
what can be better describedas the "problematicintertwining"of three
cultures (Christianand Moslemwith Jewish)full of conflictoften violently
acted out, is to be understoodby startingout from the fundamentalsocial
fact that it was ritual community (not a national or tribal state) that
provided the key social organization pattern of the period. "Ritual
communitieshad in the whole of medievalEuropea crucialimportance,and
the Middle-Eaststill lives in such, fromMoroccoto India.The determining
impact of these communitieshas been previouslyfelt all over the world,
and in the Middle-Eastis still more importantin manyplacesthanany kind
of national and racial line of demarcation.It encompassedand organized
incomparablymore aspects and manifestationsof human emotional and
volitional life and communal solidarity than did the state, which has
representedfor a very long time a mere power structure.In this respect,
rite means, not European religious confession or denominationin the
present meaning, but rather a community which determines, beyond
religious aspects, convictions of confession and the whole of human-
individualand collective-way of life: its socialmorals,everydayhabits,or
what, to use a fashionableterm, we would call humanethniccharacteris-
tics."22 While this extraordinarilydeep insight into medieval social
organizationsprovides a basic clue for the understandingof Jewishsocial
destiny (and a great many other problems), it also "conjures up"
unexpected mysteries of social developmentwhich I cannot even try to
fathom here. But in orderto graspthe specificityof medievalJewishlife, it
is necessary to introduce the abovementionedcategory of "non-univer-
salistic." The Jewish social situation from the diaspora(beyond which,
Bibd is right, only Jewish mysticistspush the questionany further)to the
period of emancipation, can be fully understood in terms of a non-
universalisticritual communitywhere emphasisis laid on both noun and
adjective. Jewish, Christianand Moslem cultures,all three, lived in non-
universalisticritual communitiesin which the interrelationshipbetween
state (the relatively separated political sphere) and ritual community, and

21. To my mind, there is no doubt thatthis distinctioncan be best explainedby historical

materialism,whatever the limitationof this doctrine. It is capitalistproductionaimed at
universalizationthat createsthe all-pervasiveculturaluniversalizationof the period.
22. I. Bibd, op. cit., p. 263.
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 33

as a result, the interrelationshipbetween these co-existingcultureswas

most different. As I shall be giving a somewhatmore detailed analysisof
the Jewish situation, a few remarksshouldsufficeregardingthe other two.
Firstly, only for brief historical moments could Christianand Moslem
culturesunite politicalstate and the whole of ritualcommunity(for reasons
which are only partlyclear to me and whichcannotbe enumeratedhere).
This separationhad differentimplicationsfor the two ritualcommunities.
Within Islam, to sketch the situation in grand abstraction, political
despotism had mostly been combined with a contemptuousindifference
towardsthe innermoraland religioushabitsof the conquered.This is what
Bibd called the "less ideological," the "less complicated"characterof
Moslem establishment.It is in this indifferencethathe locatesthe sourceof
relative intoleranceaccordedthe Jewsby the Moslemsfor manycenturies.
In (Western) Christianity the separation between state and church
(spirituallyrepresentingthe whole of ritualcommunity)meant,on the one
hand, the introductionof pluralityand individualfreedominto the system,
for which it paid with its intensified religious-ideologicalcharacter.The
latter made it impossible for Christianity to show the neglect and
indifferencetowardsJews that the Moslemshad. In the broadestsense this
provided the basis for the paradoxicalsituation that for centuriesJews
suffered more at the hands of the "religionof love" than from martial
Islam. Secondly, not being universalisticdid not mean that these cultures
were not "spreading"and conquering;it only meant that they were not
reciprocal.As opposed to manyAsian cultures(whichneveror hardlyever
trespassed on their geographical-racialborderline) both Moslems and
Christians aspired to exclusivity. This meant, however, in the case of
Moslems only political rule, in the case of the latter the exclusive
dominationof Christiannormsand habits(up to the exterminationof the
alien, the "pagan"one). It will become clear again from all this, I think,
why Jewry under Christianrule inevitably had to suffer from violence
("outbursts of anti-Semitism,"as one would say with modernization)
whose systematicrecurrencewouldhave perhaps,withoutreligiousreform
blunting the edge of religious zeal for exclusivity, led either to total
religious assimilationor the equally total expulsionof all Jews from the
sphere of WesternChristianity.Before turningto an analysisof the Jewish
ethos between the diasporaand the beginningsof emancipation,one factor
crucialfor Jewishdestinyshouldbe understoodwith regardto Christianity.
For this latter, ideologicallyoverheated,ritualcommunityof Christianity,
which was exclusivisticbut not universalistic,in other words, which only
wanted to eliminate the heathen, not to assimilateit in a true "give-and-
take" process, the religiouslyalien did not simplyprovoke the shock one
normally feels when confronting the unusual. It was eternal scandal and
constant provocation.
I shall now offer a sketchy typology of the "medieval" Jewish ritual
community, with all the necessary deficiencies of such a broad overview.
Firstly, it was a strictly monotheistic universe, something which was
34 Feher

accepted as their (imperfect)forerunnerboth by Moslemsand Christians.

But this was a dangerousproximity.The Jew couldnot simplybe regarded
as an "erring pagan" with his many deities, who could be reformedby
authoritarian instruction. The Jew was perverted and perverting (es-
pecially for the Christian),since once havingreachedthe closest possible
vicinity to Truth (they had Christwho is Truth),they turnedagainstit and
crucifiedthe Redeemer. Not condescendingcontempt,as was the case with
the pagan, but rather hatred was the Jews' lot for this perversionand
obstinate wickednessin the eyes of Christianity.The Church,trueenough,
did not simply reduce matters to the notion that "the Jews crucified
Christ," but the Christiancommunitynever could overcomeits hatredat
the very sight of a people whichhad Jesus Christas its own and could not
but crucifyhim. In addition,the only JewishGod was an incorporealbeing
who had never turned into blood and flesh (as had the ChristianGod).
Thus we find the traditionallywidespreadJewish inclinationfor abstract
speculation (which was, however-one need only read Isaac Bashevis
Singer-strictly confined to the religious,who never harbouredelements
of an enlightenmentof theirown) but also the conflictwith the muchmore
popular and sensuous, even though equallyspeculativeChristianity.
Secondly, Jewishritualcommunitywas basedon a religionwhichwas a
religion of legality (in the Kantian sense of the world), a religion of
customaryprescriptions,not of conscienceand inwardness.One of the
possible interpretationsof the Jesus-tragedy(which, for instance,returns
in Bach'sJohannes-Passion)is thatJesus, as a powerfulsubjectof morality
who declared himself to be the incarnationof the "new law" and who
introduced unheard-of categories such as charisma, the "strength of
belief," etc. was an unbearableprovocationfor the Jewishreligon,which
observed rules devoid of subjective overtones of conscience. This is,
however, in itself an uneliminablesourceof conflicts,of hostilitybetween
the Jewishand Christianritualcommunities.Even thoughthe latterturned
Jesus Christ's subjective moral roster into the foundation of a new
collective ethos, it alwayspreservedthe individual'ssubjectiverelationto
the collective morality(hereinlies one of its greatemancipatorymissions).
As a result, it could react with nothingbut hatredand suspicionto Jewish
"submissionwithoutdedication,"whereasthe whole attitudewas for Jews
(even for Jews who decided to let themselvesbe Christianized)irrational,
inhumanand absurd.On the other hand, Jewishethos acquiredveryearly
the collective wisdom not to transform their religious legality into a
political one. They gave up all politicalaspirationsfor nearlytwo thousand
years. The "law" they had (and in the name of whichthey demandedthe
crucifixion of "Rex Iudeorum") was and remained a religious law without
political implications, and its inner-worldly consequences did not transcend
in principle the walls of the ghetto. To a great extent this wisdom
contributed to Jewish survival. It created the millennial stereo-
type of the "cowardly" Jew who cannot lift a finger in his/her
own defence (and as such provoked a great many aggressive acts),
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 35

but did not make its obliteration a necessity for the contending
ethoses.
But, thirdly,Jewryturnedout to be indomesticableas far as its religion
was concerned. Here it is immaterial how many Jews converted to
Christianityunderduress,for the only objectivewayto assessthisis to take
the opposite route: to understand the miraculousfact that the ritual
community,small as it remainedin number,still survived.Of course,there
were good reasons for this miracle. Jewish religion was not only just as
exclusivisticin its eschatologicalbeliefs, just as dogmaticin its "epistem-
ology" as the Christian, it had in addition a vivid and flamboyant
Messianistic spirit (Michel L6wy analyzed it in a fine study in
NGC 20) whereas the "Messianisticspirit" (given the Advent of the
Messiah as an event in the past) was sparkling as a future perspective only in
Christian sects. At this point, the previously mentioned "wisdom of
survival"prevailedonce again in the Jewishritualcommunity:the Jewish
religion was not a convertingone. Of course, there were solid external
reasons for them not to be. Once again, it is sufficientto readSinger'sThe
Slave to see what a mortaldangera Jewishcommunitywas exposed to if it
tolerated converts (let alone if it incitedto conversion).But this argument
is not absolute, for many sects fought and converted up until their
complete physical extinction. The spirit of the Jewish ritual community
shaping the individualpsyche of Jews for nearlytwo thousandyearswas a
strangemixtureof uttersubmissivenessoutsidethe (spiritalor actual)walls
of their ghetto and passive but daringstubbornnessto the point of death
when it came to the ultimateprinciplesof the religiouscommunity.
Fourthly, Jewry as a ritual communitywas an "unsettled"one. They
showed no specific affinityto any area, ethnicgroup, nation, etc. The Jew
was the alien par excellence.This was a collective trait of Jewryas ritual
community which so deeply determinedtraditionalJewish intellect and
inclinationsthat it remaineda traitwith an unusuallyhigh amountof Jews
far after the assimilationprocess started.This remainedso even after the
ritual communityas such disintegreatedand no longershaped(at least not
necessarily)the individualJew'spsychology.Goebbels'infernalbut always
sharp intellect grapsed at least one aspect of somethingactuallyexisting
when he coined the sloganof hatredabout "Jewish-Bolshevik plutocracy."
Jews, feeling the fascinationof alienness-even decades after getting out
of the ritual rootlessness-found the two channels through which one
could "find roots" without being nationally affiliated in great number:
money and socialism.
Finally, as a combinedupshotof the variousalreadymentionedfactors
(inclination to abstract thinking, coercively circumscribed social existence
which excluded Jews from many professions, self-determination through
religion) there came about a limited rationalism and pragmatism as a
characteristic feature of Jewish ethos. Here I would briefly mention two
aspects of this element. There is a limited rationalism inherent in Jewish
ritual community, although the latter strives to keep critical reason within
36 Feher

the boundariesof religioustradition.Once again, Singer'schroniclesare

great documentsof this tension, warningus not to overestimate"natural"
Jewish affinity to Enlightenment.If we think of the unceasingconflicts
between the greatestJewishintellectsand the ritualcommunity(say, from
Maimonides to Spinoza), we get the same picture. Further, Jewish
"calculative-pragmatic" rationalismfinds its way easily into the financial
world. This is in brief the basis of Sombart'sstory about the Jews' role in
triggering capitalism (if we now abstract from his famous distinction
between "organic" and "inorganic"capital, which was to play such a
sombre role later). As is evident, all this is but a reformulationfrom a
different angle of what has been said above.
It is from these constituentparts that there emerges a circumscribed,
distinct and isolated Jewish existence in a historical cosmos, whose
differentiaspecifica is that it does not entail toleranceand a reciprocal
learningprocess, even as a norm. As a result, the cosmossurroundingthe
Jews feels not only alienness, which in a universelackingtoleranceand
reciprocity as a norm is irritation in itself. This world also has the
perception of a ritual community,which is firstly, self-conscious,even
proud (in its own disguised way) of its distinctness. Secondly, this
communityis close enoughto Christianethos (I now leave the Moslemout
of considerationdeliberately)to containsome of its basiccategories,but in
a transformed, or accordingto Christianlingo, distortedway. For this
reason, it does not need "instruction,"but requires"harshmeasures"to
keep its perversion in check. Finally, this irritatingand ideologically
self-conscious ritual enclave has no political-militarymeans to defend
itself, which makes it an easy prey and provokesaggression.
All this has to be said in order to criticizethe weakestpoint of Bibd's
conception. Accordingto him, the conflictbetweenJewsandnon-Jewshas
three, equally important, constitutive elements: medieval anti-Jewish
religious bias, the "disturbances"of modem development (which is a
euphemismfor the antinomiesof capitalismand, for the last 60 years, the
conflicts within the new society calling itself socialism) and the (non-
Jewish)experiencecollectedaboutJews. Now it is the thirdcategorywhich
I partly want to transformin its meaning, partly clarify as far as its
conceptual status is concerned and partly reject.23 In my opinion, the
category of "Jewish experience"has a certain limited explanatoryrele-
vance for the clarificationof the natureand roots of medievalanti-Jewish
feeling, but is not somethingdistinctfrom what Bibd calls religiousanti-
Jewish bias. The latteris based-within a universein which,let me repeat,
tolerance and reciprocityare not even norms-on the perceptionand
statement of the others' alienness and this alienness is in itself the

23. Let me make it very clearthat it is not Jewishbiasthat motivatesme in thiscriticism.I

do not deny at all that if we take humangroups,one of them exclusivelyJewish,the other
non-Jewishin their practical-moralintercoursewe shall find as many negative,repulsive,
inhumane, etc. featureson the Jewishside as on any other non-Jewishone.
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 37

substance of anti-Jewishreligiousbias and of "Jewishexperience."These

are not two distinct factors but one. The Christian ethos, which is
exclusivistic but not universalisticand which operates in terms of a
dogmatic epistemology knowing only "true believers," "heretics" and
"pagans," perceives that the Jew is alien. This very act is the negative
experience about Jews in itself in a world in which ritualcommunitiesdo
not tend to appropriateall values of the others, but on the contrary,
deliberately exclude certain values of the other ritual communities.24
Alienness is in itself the basis of hierarchyand (negative)judgementand
doubly so in the case of a ritual communitywhich is submissiveand
obedient politically, but provocatively obstinate as far as its "false"
religious ideas are concerned.This will be made the universalscapegoatfor
"worldly ills." In this unified role, where perceptionof aliennessand its
negative-biasedjudgementare two aspectsof one act, the term"causation"
can be accepted. In all pre-enlightenmentethoses from which norms or
tolerance and learningfrom alien experienceare absent, the statementof
the other's alienness is cause for an instantaneoushostilitytowardshim or
her on varyinglevels of intensity.This is true if we conceiveof "cause"as
an explanatoryprinciplethat feeds back the individualbehaviorto what is
regarded as right, and wrong, in the given ethos. Even in the present
world, we are witness to outburstsof a type very similarto medievalanti-
Semitic pogroms such as those against expatriateChinese communities,
these Jews of Asia, by pre-Enlightenment(Indonesian, Malaysian,
Vietnamese, etc.) ethoses which are caused by exceptionallyintensive
feelings of hatred againstthe alien.
When we come to the secondworld-epoch,the universalistic-capitalistic
one, Bibd's explanation about the Jewish experience as a causative
principle loses all its relevance and takes on dangerous, namely racist,
connotations.25 The reasonfor this is simple:the newperiodis characterized
by emancipationand the disintegrationof ritualcommunities,also by the
universalacceptanceof toleranceand a reciprocallearningprocessat least
as a norm. (We need not dwell on the well-knownfact that this norm is
violated daily.) But in this new universe, in which ritualcommunitiesno
longer exist and individualizationproceeds to an unprecedentedextent,
common value and need systems can not be perceivedor stated in social
entities, nor can any "commonmoralsubstance"be found. The feeling of
being alien is no longer justificationfor outburstsof violence againstthe
alien, not even in the eye of one's own (national,ethnic, etc.) community.

24. As far as sexual ideals, monogamousor polygamousmarriage,maritalvirtues, and

equality (at least before God), etc. are concerned(to mentiononly some of the concrete
values of the ethoses in question),therecan be no doubtaboutthe differentrole these values
play in differentethoses. Some of them are acceptedin all, and interpretedin a similarway,
others are only part of one or the other, some are exalted as bases for hierarchies.
25. Needless to say, all this happensin spite of the author'sintentions.Bibd simplyfalls
victim here to an exaggeratedimpartiality.
38 Feher

At least this is the case in post-Enlightenmentcommunitiesand "normal"

-i.e. non-Fascist-periods whereas, as I have argued,it was justification
indeed in the previous world-epochs.Perhapsit is not too far-fetchedto
assume that racistideologies serve (especiallyin countriesin whichnation
is more an organicthan a contractualbody) as substitutesfor this missing
homogeneity of disappearedethoses based on ritualcommunityand also,
by implication, as (false) lines of divisionbetween the allegedlysuperior
and allegedly inferiorcollective entities. Only if one accepts(whichBibd
most certainly does not intend to do) these false and mystical (racial)
"substances"which are distinct and stand in a moral hierarchyin each
ethnic-nationalgroup as comparedto the other(s), can one speak of the
"Jewishexperience"as a causeof anti-Semitism.If, however,one accepts
the universalistic character of the modem world epoch, in which no
distinctive value cosmos can be ascribed to any national body whose
constituentswould not at least be claimedby all others, can "experience"
of any type serve as a cause of a generalizednegativestereotype,regardless
if the point of departure is an individualor a collective experience. If
medieval "Gentiles" stated correctly that Jews were "alien" in every
aspect of their confession and ritualcommunitybased on this confession,
this was not only factuallytrue but it also implieda relativejustificationfor
the hostility against them, given the structureof rationalityin any pre-
Enlightenment,non-universalisticworld-order.In that sense, it was cause.
If the young Goebbels stated that Gundolf unjustly rejected him as a
doctorandusbecause he had excellent intellectualcapacities(whichwas a
factual truth, as many Jews had the misfortuneto "experience"on their
skin), and thereforeJews are unjust and a malignanttumor in the social
body to be eliminated;if anti-Semiticgroupsstate correctlythatJewshave
a predilectionfor intellectualwork, thatthey are regularlyover-represented
in intellectualfields, and thereforeare lazyand shouldbe sent to camps"to
teach them mores," the premiseis not a cause but a pretextfor destructive
generalizationand projection.(It is not accidentalthat in our universalistic
epoch people are as touchyas they are aboutany kindof generalizations).
As a result this latter attitude is not accompaniedby aversion,our usual
reaction to what we feel to be simplyalien, but by hatred.
It is my firm conviction that Sartre is absolutely right when he
characterizes the anti-Semite in the following way: "This commitment
(that of the anti-Semite against the Jew-F. F.) is not provoked by
experience . . . The (Jewish) experience is very far from generating the
notion of the Jew; on the contrary, it is the notion that explains the
experience . . . So it is the idea made of Jews which seems to determine
history, and it is not historicaldata from which the idea was born .. ."26
And this morphology is not a sentimental gesture of philo-Semitic

26. Sartre, op. cit., pp. 14-18.

 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 39

magnanimosity,it is not a wreathplaced on the statue of the persecuted.

Sartre, the thinker, is of much too hard a core to resort to shallow and
simple emotional gestures. While Bibd was superiorto him in drawingthe
broad historical outlines of the problem, he missed, in his traditional
rationality,the whole complexityof modernlife whichSartregraspsin one
firm gesture with his centralprotagonist,the anti-Semite.As I mentioned,
here Bibd commitsthe Jewishmistake;he tacitlyidentifiesthe anti-Semite
with all those who are not philo-Semites and who have no positive
stereotype of Jews (even thoughthis is fairlyinconsistentpersonally,for he
was not himself philo-Semiticin the sentimentalsense of the word). But
the "manof aversion"is the averagehero of non-universalistic ethoses and
has very little to do (if anythingat all) with the modernanti-Semite.The
latter is the rightistradicalwho lives in the chosenpassionof hatredagainst
the Jew and for whom this "vision" is central and the focal point of
illuminationhe sheds on his universe.
I would like to emphasize three components of Sartre's detailed
characterization.The first is the following: "The anti-Semitehas chosen
hatred, for hatredis a religion."27 But the anti-Semiteis not only a man of
hatred, he is also a man of fear: "Thisis a manwho is afraid,of course,not
of Jews but of himself, of his consciousness,of his freedom.. ."28 And
finally and perhaps most importantly:"Of course, all the enemies of the
Jew do not demand his death publicly.However, the measuressuggested
by them and which aim at his humiliation,debasementand communication
are the derivativesof that assassinationthey are inwardlycontemplating:
these are symbolic murders. Only the anti-Semitehas his own image of
himself: he is a criminalfor good motives. It is not his fault, at anyrate, if it
is his mission to reduceEvil by Evil ... He knowsthat he is evil, but since
he does evil for the sake of goodness ... he considershimself to be the
holy evil."29
In analyzing this remarkable phenomenology, one is entitled to
disregard the sociological aspects. They are secondary to Sartre'smain
intentions, sometimesmistakenor exaggeratedand often "too French"to
be generalizable(althoughthey are superiorto those of Bibd at least in one
respect: they clearly show that anti-Semitismdoes not occur only when
democracy is missing, but that the problem is more complex.) The chief
merit of Sartre'sphenomenologyis the transcendenceof the usuallevel of
discussinganti-Semitismin socialisttheory. Up until his essay, the general
level (if not necessarilythe wordingof the arguments)was determinedby
Bebel's dictum that anti-Semitism is the socialism of the fool. This
formulation suffers from the following ills. First, it reduces the whole
complexityof the problemto the povertyof intellectualcontent, which, in

27. Sartre, op. cit., p. 22.

28. Sartre, op. cit., p. 64.
29. Sartre, op. cit., p. 59/60.
40 Feher

the wake of the undeniablefact that intellectualsof the rankof Hamsun,

C6line, etc. joined militantanti-Semitism,is no longer tenable. Second,
"low intellectuality"does not account for the heat of the hatred; the
dedication to the evil cause; the Hegelian twist of serving the "good"
through evil means; the operatic invention and artisticdesign of mass
annihilation.Nor does it, thirdly,explainthe wide sociologicaldiversityof
those having joined anti-Semitismas a militant way of life, from the
genuinely poor in spiritto the intellectuallysophisticated.Sartre'sformula
accountsfor all these factors.Whenhe describesanti-Semitism as a belief(a
non-institutionalizedreligion),a religionof the GrandInquisitor(a religion
of the "fearof freedom"),a religionwhichis inextricablyboundup withevil,
he actually invertsMarx'sthesis of religiousalienation.In Marx'sconcep-
tion, "man"finds humanspeciesbeing, his/her"bestpart"in religionin an
alienatedform. But, irrespectiveof alienation,the intentionis aimedat the
good. What does the anti-Semitefind in the religionof hatred,or fear of
freedom? A new demonology,the myth of the infernalin an increasingly
atheistic epoch. As in many other aspects,the awakeningof religion,here
too, has not broughtemancipationin itself,sincemundaneemancipationhas
not come true. Istvin Bibd is right when he emphasizesthat even if
Christianprejudiceis responsiblefor anti-Semitism(moreprecisely:it is an
integralpartof this religion),the essenceof Christianity
cannotbe exhausted
by this prejudice.The justified(andnon-apologetic)characterof thisremark
is never more clear than when one considersSartre'sargumentabout the
anti-Semite's"negativereligion"-demonology to the end. By this I mean
the move to the extreme,to the momentwhen Hitler, in a paganescapade,
cuts the umbilicalcord which up until then still somehowtied anti-Jewish
feeling to the religionof the God-Son, to the religionof love. It is in this
moment of pagan freedom that the "final solution" is conceived and
executed.
What made the Jew, the representativevictimof the Christianethos,
once again the victim par excellencein an epoch which is increasingly
atheist? We gain sociological insight into this in reading Bibd and we
obtain an ultimate philosophical explanation by interpretingSartre's
theory about the "negative religion" of the anti-Semite: these two
outstanding presentationsof one of the greatest humantragediesdo not
contradicteach other. For Bibd, the sociologicalreasonsare the following.
First, Jewish affinity to "alienness,"to non-affiliationwith any national
community persists (at least in a considerablepart of Jewry) despite
assimilationtendencies, and especiallywhen its firstwaves fail. Hence the
stereotype of "homeless,""rootless,"sometimesthatof the "borntraitor"
(in the Soviet edition: the cosmopolitan). Second, its urban character
imposed on Jewry by the Christian community; its forcible exclusion from
the Christian village turns into an advantage in that it becomes involved in
haute finance and is over-represented in intellectual professions. Hence the
stereotype of the "lazy" or the "scheming" Jew who "has money even
under his skin." Finally, Bibd, the genuine democrat, reproaches the Jew
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 41

(because of a deep solidaritywith the persecuted)for sufferinghis lot too

obediently. From this submissivenessstems the dangerousstereotypeof
the easy prey which tempts aggression.For Sartre, we know it already,
there is no "Jewish experience": it is the anti-Semitewho creates the
(inauthentic) Jew in his image and whose "religionof hatred" creates
Jewish experiences. As a result, sociological evidence is for Sartre
irrelevant. But as far as historicaltendencies are concerned,his answer
does not fundamentallydiffer from that of Bibd. The believer in the
"religion of hatred," the rightistmilitant of "religiousatheism"simply
takes over the universalscapegoatof positivereligionfor his own negative
religion, demonology.There will be no end to these practices,both Sartre
and Bibd state (the latter at least in one period of his life) except in a
"classless society," which makes regularoutburstsof hatred (no matter
whether of "social" or "projective"character)a negligible human by-
product.

What is the actual background(broaderthan the Hungarianscene)

againstwhich these thoughtswere put down on paper?Firstand foremost
is the feeling that the moderatehopes greatanalystsof the Jewishquestion
such as Bibd or Sartre raised more than 30 years ago have altogether
waned. As a radicalJewish observerof Jewish affairs(and without even
claimingspecialknowledgein this field,) one can say with resignation,that
unfortunately,we are livingin historicaltimes in whichthere is once again
a "Jewishquestion." What are its constitutiveelements?
First, there is once again a region in which anti-Semitism(in its pre-
Auschwitz form) has in barely disguised form become official policy,
namely, in the Soviet-Union and its Eastern European satellites. The
forms of this vary from country to country.30"Soviet" anti-Semitism
ranged from practicallyopen discriminationthrough"internalpassports"
(a system complementedwith more covert forms of discrimination)to a
kind of "philo-Semitism"whichrepressesboth Jewishself-articulationand
overt anti-Semitism,while constantlyreproducinganti-Semitismagainstits
own will. In some of these countries (Poland, Lithuania,the Ukraine)
traditional"popular"anti-Semitismbenefitsfromovert and covertofficial
support, making a "tacit coalition" with it and taking increasingly
aggressive form. From Korey's book we know that the petition of 26
LithuanianJewishintellectualsagainstanti-Semiticpoliciesin 1968wasnot
signed because of a fear of pogrom. That this fear is far from being
unfoundedhas also been documentedby Korey:the existenceof at leastone
pogrom is known to have occurred in Plunge, Lithuania in

30. There was, of course, a "Jewishquestion"in the Arab countrieswhichdisappeared

with the "de-Judification"of these countriesand which was, to my knowledge,complete.
There is also gatheringevidenceof the flare-upof anti-Semiticmeasuresin Iranin whicha
rightist-radicalgovernmentoppressesall sorts of minoritiesanyhow.
42 Feher

1958.31Press releaseson "Zionists"in Polandin 1968-69 testifiednot only

to a Stuermer-liketone of the "socialist"media,but also to the existenceof
an unpleasantlydetailed knowledgeof certainpeople's Jewish past who
survivedthe Holocaust and who wantedto erase it fromtheirmemorybut
who could not skip out unnoticed from the grasp of this "omniscient
mind." An additionalgravesign of deteriorationanda furtherdegradation
of inner democratic norms lies in the fact that we can find a "mirror
symmetry"between official and oppositionalanti-Semitism.Despite the
great Russian intellectuals such as Sakharov, Medvedev, Nekrasov,
Yevtushenko, and Sinyavksy,who have kept alive the Tolstoyantradition
of stigmatizinganti-Semitismas Russianmalady"above"and "below,"in
Solshenytsin'sattitudeand statements(withall due regardto his unforget-
table contributionto Russianemancipation)there are signs of a hopeless
bigotry similarto the Soviet leadershe hatesmost. Nor is this all. The new
development of the last 10-15 years,with its so-calledlink between"anti-
Soviet" Zionist (i.e. Jewish)agitationand "worldZionism,"-this relapse
into the lingo and misty but emotionally arousing hints of the Black
Hundredand the "Protocolsof the Eldersof Zion"aboutJewishaspiration
for world domination,which transformsa nationalism(Zionism), uncriti-
cally accepted in the case of Arab states, into "racism"-cannot but pave
the road to events which perhaps even those who prepare the socio-
psychologicalconditionsfor them do not intend.
Second, it is clear that one great hope of world Jewry has withered
away in the last decade, namely, the hope that with the establishmentof
Israel as the Jewishstate, anti-Semitismwould abate and Jews, regardless
of whetherthey lived in Israelandwere its citizens,wouldbe treatednot as
specimens of a race and targets of hatred but as (actual or possible)
members of a national community. To my knowledge, one aspect of
Entebbe, so illuminatingin this regardwhile emotionallyplayed up, has
rarely (if ever) been analyzed.Even if we look beyondthe dismalsightof
"German revolutionaries"isolatingJews from non-Jews(in order not to
evoke the sight of earlier national-socialist"Germanrevolutionaries"in
SS-uniform)at the Entebbe airport,we cannotdisregardthe fact that they
were looking for Jews (specimensof a race), not for Israelis(citizensof a
state). Needlessto say, hadtheydonethe latter,thiswouldnot havemadethe
action any more humaneor acceptable.Mypoint,here, however,is thatEn-
tebbe was a spectacularpracticalsuccessfor Israelas a stateanda justas sym-
bolicandspectacular denialof its hopesthatIsrael'sveryexistencewouldchan-
nel racist hatred back into the normalframeworkof nationalistconflicts.

31. Korey, op. cit., 174. And if one argues that this was not an officially organized action
(which is a certainty), perhaps not even encouraged by the authorities and maybe even
punished by them, the fact still remains that the Soviet press, while always making such a
strong case about "anti-Soviet" crime, for instance, at the time of the Plunge-pogrom about
crimes of embezzlers, almost all with Jewish names, kept perfect silence about the fate of
pogromists.
 Noteson theMarginof a ClassicalEssay 43

One might well ask whetherthis is indeed the questionfor the agenda,
ratherthan its contrary.As Saidhas asked:shouldwe not see Zionismwith
the eyes of its victims32-is this not the duty of democratsand socialists,
Jewishor non-Jewish?I thinkit is both appropriateandbindingto state the
following as my personal conviction.The Palestiniancase must be solved
within the frameworkof an autonomousstate of their own. No jingoism,
no oppression is acceptable on the part of Israeli military or civilian
authorities. A state born out of moral indignationand sympathyfor the
eternal underdog, created by the survivingremnantsof pogromsand gas
chambers, simply underminesthe bases of its own existence (more than
other states) if it becomes oppressive and retaliatesagainst the Fascist
actions of terroristcommandoestowardchildrenby bombingwomen and
childrenin refugeecamps.3-All thismakesIsraelbothresponsiblefor its own
oppressivepolicy and co-responsiblefor some of the deeds of the American
strategyon whichit hasperforceto relyin its "strugglefor life."Certainlyit ex-
poses the Stateof Israel
(and withit a considerablepartof the remainingworld-
Jewry) to new and Yet
gravedangers. having saidthis,let me immediatelyadd
a pessimisticprediction.Whilethereis no peacewithoutsolvingthe Palestinian
question, there must be seriousdoubtswhether,withits solution,therewill
be peace and reconciliation(Or, formulateddifferently,whetherpowers
interested in tension, not in peace, would ever allow eventualpeace). It is
hard not to detect a new upsurgeof generalanti-Semitismwhichis projec-
tive in characterand multidimensionalas faras its goals are concerned,but
which is unified in one sense-its pro-Palestinianemancipatoryfervouris
mostly a pretext for pushingvariouspolicy objectives.
32. EdwardW. Said, "Zionismfromthe Standpointof its Victims,"Social Text1 (Winter
1979), 7-58.
33. As a generalprinciple,one canstatethatwhilepoliticshasmoralprinciplesandmoralim-
plications,politicsis notbasedon morality.But thestatusof Israelas a stateis specialevenmore
so thanwas the statusof the UnitedStateswhichhadbeen"'philosophically deducted"fromnat-
ural law and the principles of Enlightenment.(This latter circumstancewas, by the
way, not at all without influenceon later Americanpolicy and createda constantframeof
reference for democratic, even for radical-socialist,aspirations).Israel was born of a
collective feeling of retrospectiveresponsibilityfor the Holocauston the part of a "public
opinion"which remainedunconcerned(or irresponsiblyoptimistic)aboutJewishfate untilit
was too late. Jews can argue that a belated and world-widepang of conscienceis not their
moral situation, it is something alien imposed on them and that they want to behave
"normally,"i.e. with the normalegotismof nationalbodies. Yet they cannotchangethe fact
that many a pragmaticrusede guerre,(suchas the use of "counter-terrorist" "hit-teams")is
not permittedthemwithoutIsraellosingits basisof existence,somethingwhichis not the case
for other luckiernationsemployingdirtymethods.In this regard,it is very interestingthat,
whereas there was some formalprotestagainstthe "illegal"characterof this action,no one
protested seriouslyagainstEichmann'skidnapping,whichcorroboratesnegativelymy thesis
about the moral foundationof the State of Israel. One would think that it is especially
prohibitive for Israel to have close relationswith a Fascist state such as South-Africa.
Undeniably,this is a specialburdenon the shouldersof the averageIsraelicitizenwho would
behave as an average member of any average interest group, not as a moral principle
personified.But one has to say in the spiritof the protagonistof thisstudy,Istv~nBibd:such
actsarebeyondmoralityandforthatreason,evenpolitically unacceptable inthespecialcaseof Israel.
44 Feher

Before I proceed to analyze this unholy alliance,let me point out the

undeniable features of false zeal on the part of the, highly different,
advocates of the Palestiniancause. (Particularlysince I wouldlike to avoid
any "counter-conspiracy"theory againstworld Jewry). Needless to say,
these are the remarksof a layman,not of an expert. First, whateverthe
serious (stupid and selfish) mistakes of variousIsraeli governmentsand
pressure groups, forgotten is the fact (which plays a crucialrole in the
emergence of the whole Palestinianproblem)that Israelacceptedand the
Arab countries rejected the originalUN-decision regardingthe situation
in Palestine. It has also been forgottenthat the War of Independencein
1948 was a result of this negativeArab attitude,and that at least a partof
the Palestinianpopulationleft voluntarilyas a protest againstthe Israeli
victory. (Others were forced to leave). This circumstancedoes not, of
course, change the miseryof those livingfor thirtyyearsin refugeecamps
and no one has the right to make a hierarchybetween "firstclass" and
"secondclass"sufferings.But at the veryleast it modifiesthe false formula
of innocent victims versus aggressive"Zionistimperialists."More impor-
tantly, however, hardly any of the "Zionist imperialists"have been as
pernicious, brutally exploiting and cynically manipulatingtowards the
Palestinians as most of their Arab "brothers."Apart from the fact that
they received their most bloodletting from Jordanians,not Israelisand
apartfrom the roughtreatmentthey got fromthe Syriansin Lebanon,they
are also constantly kept at arm's length and on the front line as living
objects of demonstrationfor Zionist brutality.No Arab countryhas made
any real effort to solve the Palestinianproblemwithinits own reach,for the
simple reasonthat they wouldforfeittheirmostpowerfulmeansof general
blackmail. Secondly, it is undeniable that while Palestinians suffer
injustice, Israelfights for its physicalexistence.It is a fact so well-known
that it needs no corroborationthat in 1967 the aim of the Arab invaders
was to push Israel into the sea, in other words, a new Holocaust.(Whats
more the statementshave been repeatedup Untilthe present).In 1973they
had more common sense than to advertisetheir aimspriorto victory,but
the fact that the PLO and otherArab "hard-liners" neveracceptedIsrael's
right to existence speaks for itself. And I do not think that anyonehas the
moral right to suggest that the victim of the Holocaust should remain
passive since "thingswill turnout to be less seriousthanthey seem to be."
Things seemed to be less serious in 1938than they later turnedout to be.
Such advice, often given to Israel,is particularlyhypocriticalon the partof
a world which, at the end of the war, made gentle hints to the victimwho
perished by the millions in Nazi camps that he passivelylet himself be
destroyed without sufficient resistance. Third, practically all analysts
terming Israeli nationalism (Zionism) a racist ideology, show a suspiciously
naive and uncritical attitude towards the projective and highly insincere
character of Arab nationalism. It would be cheap (although an undeniable
fact) to refer to the directly Nazi stereotypes (provided by Nazi experts
 Notes on the Marginof a ClassicalEssay 45

employed by Nasser's Egypt) of Jews as a way of combatingthis Arab

nationalism.The problemis more complex.Nevertheless,it comesto mind
that the highly heterogeneousArab forces-sometimes each others'most
bitter enemies and living in the constant convulsion of palace coups,
conspiracies and counter-conspiraciesof cliques of officers, feudal auto-
cracies and modem half-totalitariantyranniesof variousmoulds,but never
in democracies-need theirenemiesand have no need whatsoeverfor their
own main ally and token victim, the Palestinian.On the one hand, the
unmanageableimpulsetowardpeasantrevolutionlatent in the Palestinian
organizationsis a dangerfor authoritariangovernmentsof all kinds. Arab
governments, in irreconcilableinternecine strife, need the Palestinian
"cause" as a lever and a means of blackmail-they do not need the
Palestinians. But they do need Israel, precisely in the sense that the
militantanti-Semiteneeds the Jew in Sartre'smorphology.Forwhatwould
unite them, at least symbolically,if this so salutaryenemy disappeared?
This is, by the way, the only but not satisfactorycounter-argumentto Arab
plans for a new Holocaust.This is an unsatisfactoryguarantee,for thiswas
precisely the dilemma of the militant anti-Semite at the time of the
Kristallnacht-pogrom in 1938, a dilemmawhichwas most radicallysolved
in the hope for new prospectivetargets.Finally,one mustpointto a curious
aspect, namely the frequentlyoverheatedtone and unconcealedhatredof
the anti-Israeldiscourse. Often, as in the case of many German "left"
extremists, it is crystal clear that their vehemence against "Zionist
imperialism"is simplyold-fashionedanti-Semitisma rebours.
How could these facts, knownto every Israelischoolboyand schoolgirl
(but sometimeseven appearingin moresophisticateddicoursestoo) escape
the attention of so many analysts?If we now disregardthose who are
simplybought (by Arab or by Sovietmoneyor by both) andwhosenumber
is not necessarilysmall and if we ask ourselves seriouslyhow 3,000,000
people (together with their-diminishing-"know-how" superiority)can
be presented as "mortal danger" to 100,000,000 having inexhaustible
financial resources and sophisticatedweaponry, then we either have to
assume an anti-Jewishworldconspiracy,whichis a figmentof understand-
ably feverishJewishminds,or we have to look elsewherefor explanations.
In my opinion, the real reasonscan be foundin a historicallyaccidental
meeting and alliancebetween two powerfactors,both usinganti-Semitism
in its projective form, but both doing so for differentreasons.The causes
and character of Soviet anti-Semitismhave been analyzedbriefly here.
Obviously, it was not Soviet anti-Semitismthat motivatedSoviet intrusion
in the Middle-East. On the contrary, economically and strategically
motivated Soviet intrusionused a meanswhichmade its movementsin the
area easy and unresistedand which attractedpossible allies of different
moulds-a means which long since has been a handytool for channelling
social contradictionsinto the harmlesspipelines of social demagogy at
home. MilitantArabicanti-Semitism,as I have analyzedit, was a relatively
46 Feher

late development as compared to the Jewish situation under Christian

domination, which makes it even more important to understandits
particularcharacter.The change from an attitudewhich toleratedJewish
presence with contempt but generally without pogroms and excessive
violence, into one in which anti-Jewishbathos and commitmentseems to
be the major cementing force between highly divergent, seemingly
incompatible, forces cannot be accountedfor either by the Jewish ritual
community's turning into a political one or by the Palestinianquestion.
(Not even if one adds the problemof Jerusalemas a religiouscenter). Nor
is it an easy task to explainhow this anti-Jewishattitudecan be motivation
enough to strike a bridge between Soviet aspirationsand many Moslem
dictatorships(such as Ghadaffi's)which were originallyand ideologically
vehemently anti-communist.
I think that the Islamic-Arabicworld (obviouslythese are not identical
concepts) is now living through its great crisis due to the fact that it
possesses (in the form of oil wealth) the adequate means to become
industrialized at the same time that its traditional social structures
(subjected to the most divergent political forms of rule, some of them
modernizing, some of them deliberatelypreservingits archaiccharacter)
resist the simple transferof Western(or communist)waysof life. In terms
of this essay, the Moslem Arabic world does not want to become
universalistic.It is this tendency,what observershave otherwisecalledthe
upsurge of fundamentalism,which finds its most clear and extremist
manifestationin Khomeini'srightistradicalism.Now Israel,in the wake of
the Jewishcommunity'sdrasticchangeinto a Western-rationalistic political
entity is in part the tip of a dart, sensitive on their own skin and more
importantly,a target for the projectionof hatredfor all non-universalistic
fundamentalistsintendingto preserveIslamicorderintactin its archaicor
somewhat modernized form.34 It was not the aim of this essay to give
"practicalsuggestions"to peoples of a regionas to whatto do or not to do,
only to make remarkson the marginof a classicalessay. Its authornever
forgot that the attitudeto our civilization'spersecutedpar excellenceis the
test of the validityor non-validityof our democraticnorms,not to speakof
radical convictions.

34. Needless to say, I do not want to make any statementat all regardingIslam's(as a
religious doctrine)capacityto elaborateor at least to tolerateways of life whichtend to a
universalisticworld-order.