Mind, Meanin and Behavior

Mind, Meaning, and Behavior
Author(s): Wilfrid Sellars

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Dec., 1952), pp. 83-95
Published by: Springer
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REICHENBACH ON PERCEIVING 83
a dog only when he is sensibly stimulated by some

and which he also takes to be a dog. But this leaves u
expression "take (something) to be a dog."
NOTES
1 "On Observing and Perceiving," Philosophical Studies, 2:92-93 (1951). This
appeared in reply to my "Reichenbach on Observing and Perceiving," Philosophical
Studies, 2:45-48 (1951). My paper was a criticism of Reichenbach's Elements of
Symbolic Logic, pp. 274-76.
2 Professor Reichenbach's analysis is stated more exactly in his "On Observing and
Perceiving"; the general problem is stated more exactly in the other two works cited
above.
Mind, Meaning, and Behavior

by WILFRID SELLARS
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
1. In one sense of "exist" it is beyond question that both minds and

bodies exist; in another the question whether both minds and bodies or
either or neither exist is the crux of a legitimate and intricate philosophical
puzzle-the Mind-Body problem. 1.1 Accordingly, the philosopher, after
agreeing with common sense that there are both minds and bodies, mental
events and physical events, goes on to ask whether mental facts are "re-
ducible" to physical facts, or vice versa, or whether both are "reducible"
to facts which are neither. 1.11 Where the reduction in question is taken
to be explicit definition (in that broad sense which includes the Principia
definition of the number Two in terms of logical primitives, not to men-
tion the definition of Oxford University in terms of its colleges), we find
philosophers exploring such alternatives as these: (a) neither mentalistic
nor physicalistic concepts are definable in terms of the other, nor both in
terms of a third type of concept; (b) mentalistic concepts can be defined
in terms of physicalistic concepts, or vice versa; (c) both mentalistic and
physicalistic concepts are definable in terms of a third type of concept.
1.12 Materialism and Neutral Monism have in common the claim that
mentalistic concepts can be defined in terms of non-mentalistic concepts.
Neutral Monism, however, claims that concepts relating to physical objects
can be explicitly defined in terms of concepts relating to sense data. The
AUTHOR'S NOTE. This is a revised version of a paper read at the Ann Arbor meeting of
the American Philosophical Association, May 1952.
84 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
materialist denies this. 1.121 The most wide

today is Phenomenalism.. Neutral Monisms
count of the logical form to be given defin
calistic concepts in terms of concepts rela
if these concepts relating to sense data are
Monism hope to realize its program of red
istic concepts to concepts which are neither.
1.2 But before we can decide whether con
are or are not mentalistic, we must first dete
talistic concepts is to be delimited. 1.21 I s
my agreement with the classical thesis (r
Descartes and Brentano) that the distingui
is intentionality or aboutness. Thus, some
believes, doubts, desires, fears, expects, et
status of concepts relating to sense-data th
as to the role of intentionality, if any, in suc
ately clear that the concepts of the sense
are not concepts of intentional acts.
1.2211 The phrase "concepts relating to s
while the concepts of the sense-qualities a
may well be the case that the concept of
their datumness, so to speak, is a mentalis
Neutral Monism claims that mentalistic an
finable in terms of concepts relating to s
phrase "concept relating to sense-data" in t
in terms of sense qualities (and relations)"
that the datumness of sense-data is a nonin
more, since it is not plausible to claim tha
in physicalistic terms, Materialism must b
mentalistic concepts can be defined in term
gether with concepts of sense qualities, ne
being definable in terms of the other.
1.23 Thus, the Mind-Body problem is, at
intentional concepts relating to minds can
concepts, whether concepts of sense qualit
or both, and if so, in exactly what sense of
2. It is often wise to draw back pour mieu
ing this advice if we glance at the dialectics
philosophy; the familiar one of the relati
notice two similarities between the Ought-
problem. (a) In both cases one asks about t
MIND, MEANING, AND BEHAVIOR 85
of concept to another. (b) In both cases sentences employing a concept

whose reducibility is in qtuestion characteristically have two verbs. 2.11 Just
as "Jones desires to go downtown" has the two verbs "desires" and "to go,"
so "Jones ought to pay his debt" has the two verbs "ought" and "to pay."
2.12 Just as "Smith believes it is raining" is not a truth function of "It is
raining," so "Jones ought to pay his debt" is not a truth function of "Jones
pays his debt."
2.2 If we suppose that to ask whether Ought is reducible to Is is to
ask whether Ought is (contextually) definable in descriptive terms, we
find a clash between Ethical Naturalism which claims that it is, and Ethical
Non-naturalism ("Intuitionism") which claims that it is not. 2.21 Let us
put this by saying that for the former Ought is logically reducible to Is,
while for the latter it is not.
2.22 Consider now a position according to which, while Ought is not
logically reducible to Is, nevertheless the only way in which moral obliga-
tion enters into the causal explanation of human history is via facts of the
form Jones thinks that he ought to pay his debt. 2.221 "Ought," in other
words,: enters into the antecedent or consequent of causal laws only as a
subordinate element in a mentalistic context-as, e.g., "entails" occurs in
"Jones believes that responsibility entails indeterminism." 2.222 In tradi-
tional terminology, obligation enters into the causal order only as an
element in the intentional object of a mental act. 2.223 If, as seems proper,
we so use "ethical assertion" that while "Jones ought to pay his debt" is,
of course, an ethical assertion, "Jones thinks he ought to pay his debt" is
not, then the above claim can be rephrased as the claim that although
the normative is not logically reducible to the descriptive, one can never-
theless explain the history of moral agents without making ethical asser-
tions. 2.224 Let us agree to put this by saying that although Ought is not
logically reducible to Is, Ought is causally reducible to Is.
2.3 Traditional moral philosophers, however, Naturalists and Non-
naturalists alike, have tended to assume that Ought can be causally re-
ducible to Is only if Ought is logically reducible to Is. 2.31 Thus, Ethical
Naturalists have tended to assume that it can only be possible (which
they think it to be) to explain the history of moral agents without making
ethical assertions in characteristically ethical language, on condition that
Ought is logically reducible to Is. 2.32 While Ethical Non-naturalists have
tended to assume that it is reasonable to deny (as they do) that Ought
is logically reducible to Is, only if one is prepared to deny that Ought is
causally reducible to Is. This latter, of course, they are prepared to do,
since they characteristically insist that the existence of moral concepts and
beliefs in the human mind cannot be accounted for in purely descriptive
terms. Human thinking on ethical matt

grounded in and controlled by objective values and obligations.
2.33 The inoral philosophy we have been adumbrating combines a
thesis characteristic of Ethical Naturalism with a thesis characteristic of
Ethical Non-naturalism; the causal reducibility of Ought with the logical
irreducibility of Ought. Is it a form of Naturalism? of Non-naturalism?
2.331 Would we not dodge these alternatives, and point out that the
value of a system of classification is threatened when one of its presupposi-
tions is abandoned?
3. Let us return to the Mind-Body problem. But first some general con-
siderations. 3.1 Let us now speak of terms rather than concepts. Thus, let
us discuss the logical properties of ". . . believes . . ." rather than the
status of the concept of Belief. 3.11 Among the expressions of our lan-
guage we find some which, in their primary use, appear in sentences which
have sentences or quasi-sentences as component parts. By a quasi-sentence
I mean an expression (containing a verb) which becomes a sentence when
the mood of the verb is changed. Thus "It is necessary that all giants be
tall" contains the quasi-sentence "all giants be tall." 3.111 Let us call such
expressions "connectives." Both "believes" and "and" are connectives.
Thus, "It is raining" is a component part of both "It is raining and the
temperature is low" and "Jones believes that it is raining." 3.12 Some con-
nectives are, in a familiar sense, truth functions. Others are not. The truth
of "Jones believes that it is raining" is compatible with both the truth and
the falsity of "It is raining." The falsity of "It is unusual that Jones has
come to the meeting" is compatible with both the truth and the falsity of
"Jones has come to the meeting."
3.2 The connectives which belong to the primitive expressions of the
language form developed in Principia Mathematica are all truth functions.
Let us call a language built on the pattern laid down in Principia Mathe-
matica with a certain set of primitive descriptive predicates, a PM language.
3.21 In addition to its primitive expressions, a PM language will include
expressions definable in terms of its primitive expressions. 3.22 A recur-
ring question in philosophy A. P. (after Principia) has been "Can the
language we speak be 'reconstructed' as a PM language?" 3.221 An obvi-
ous stumbling block in the way of such a "reconstruction" is the presence
in ordinary discourse of -connectives which are not truth functions. To this
category belong, as we have noticed, certain expressions characteristic of
normative, modal, and mentalistic discourse. 3.222 That it is not absurd
to hope that this goal may be achieved is suggested by the fact that "It is
unusual that Jones has come to the meeting" can plausibly be regarded
as identical in meaning (vagueness aside) with "Jones has come to the
meeting and Jones was absent from 75% of the

sentence of a kind which Principia Mathematica was designed to "recon-
struct." 3.2221 Might not the same be true of "It is necessary that Jones
has come to the meeting," "It is fitting that Jones has come to the meet-
ing," and "It is believed that Jones has come to the meeting"?
3.3 Can our language insofar as it contains mentalistic expressions be
"reconstructed" in PMese? 3.31 Let us call "Philosophical Behaviorism"
the thesis that the mentalistic expressions of our language can be defined
by PM techniques in terms of the basic PM resources of our language.
3.311 By "basic PM resources of our language" I mean those expressions
which can reasonably be reconstructed as expressions belonging to the
basic syntactical categories of PM. 3.312 No connective which is not a
truth function, and hence no mentalistic expression, belongs to the basic
PM resources of our language.
3.313 Caution would require that the following qualification be added
to the definition of "Philosophical Behaviorism (3.31) after ". . . the
basic PM resources of our language," namely: with the possible addition
of modal expressions, should these be regarded as indispensable, and as
incapable of definition in PMese. 3.3131 Fortunately, to explore the ques-
tion at hand it is not necessary to commit ourselves on the issue whether
an adequate language of science must contain modal connectives (in par-
ticular, the causal modalities) so regarded. In the remainder of this paper,
therefore, I shall assume that the requirements of scientific discourse (in-
cluding the formulation of subjunctive conditionals and the definition of
disposition terms) can be met by an extensional logic. In short, I shall
assume that the major part of the "extensionalist" program can be carried
out, and concentrate attention on that part of the program which concerns
the Mind-Body problem.
3.32 Let us use the term "(Mind-Body) Dualist" to refer to philosophers
who reject Philosophical Behaviorism and insist that at least one mental-
istic expression in our language must be construed as a primitive con-
nective. 3.321 Is one committed to Dualism if one rejects Philosophical
Behaviorism? (Assuming, of course, that Mentalism is out of the question.)
3.322 Before we attempt to answer this question, let us note that our
rejection of Ethical Naturalism did not entail an acceptance of Ethical
Non-naturalism-for we saw that both are complex theses involving a
logical- claim and a causal claim. We rejected the logical claim of Ethical
Naturalism, but accepted its causal claim; we rejected the causal claim of
Non-naturalism, but accepted its logical claim. 3.3221 The common pre-
supposition of Naturalist and Non-naturalist is causal reducibility implies
logical reducibility. We rejected this presupposition.
3.323 Notice the parallel provided by the Mind-Body problem. 3.3231

Dualists buttress the denial that mentalistic expressions are logically re-
ducible to PMese with the claim that a causal account of the world must
make use of mentalistic expressions. 3.32311 This is, of course, true even
of the Epiphenomenalistic variety of Dualism-though it ceases to be so
if "physical world" is substituted for "world." 3.3232 On the other hand
Philosophical Behaviorists buttress the assertion that the world is causally
explainable in PMese, with the claim that mentalistic expressions are
logically reducible to PMese.
3.33 May it not, however, be possible to hold that while mentalistic
expressions are not logically reducible to PMese, nevertheless a causal
account of the world (including psychological phenomena) can, in pnn-
ciple, be given in PMese.
3.331 Let us use the function "m has A(O)" to say that in mind m
there occurs d mental act of kind A of which the intentional object is 0.
Thus, A iAigit (for the moment) be illustrated by believes and 0 by it is
raining, so that "m has A(O) says of mind m that it believes that it is
raining."
3.332 Now Behaviorism as a substantive thesis is the claim that in an
ideally complete psychology it would turn out that to each mentalistic
function "m has A(O)" there corresponded a PM function "#b" such
that
(A) m has A(O) m #b

where the values of "m" and "b" are pairs of minds and bodies which
"belong" to each other. It follows that for every law involving a mental-
istic function there would be an equivalent law in PMese. 3.3321 Let us
refer to this claim as the thesis of Scientific Behaviorism. It must by no
means be confused with the thesis of Philosophical Behaviorism. The latter
differs in two respects: (1) It is a stronger thesis. For the '=' of schema
A it substitutes the '=' appropriate to statements of analysis. (2) It is not
prospective. It claims that what we now say by using mentalistic expres-
sions we can now say by using PM expressions. To be sure, it adds "'in
principle." The reference, however, is not to future developments or to
an ideal knowledge, but to the disjunctive complexity of the appropriate
PM expressions. Mention is also made of "open texture."
3.3322 We shall also refer to Scientific Behavionrsm as the thesis of
the causal reducibility of mental events to bodily events, where causal
reducibility does not preclude logical reducibility (cf. Burks).
3.333 In the argument to follow, I shall be assuming that the thesis
of Scientific Behaviorism is true. I shall attempt neither to establish its
truth, nor even to make it plausible. To those readers who are disinclined
to accept it, I can only say that they may find the following pages interest-
ing as a philosophical counterpart of "If Napoleon had won the battle of
Waterloo . . ." 3.3331 If Scientific Behaviorism were true, what would
follow for the Mind-Body problem? 3.3332 If one were to assert
m has A(O)- b
and yet deny the logical reducibility of "im has A(O)" to "O
not be committed to Dualism in its epiphenomenalistic form?
3.33321 Can the joint thesis of the causal reducibility but logical irre-
ducibility of the mental to the bodily be held otherwise than as Epi-
phenomenalism?
3.4 As our first step toward answering this question, let us examine that
crude form of Scientific Behaviorism according to which the PM func-
tions correlated with mentalistic functions concern the linguistic utter-
ances of the body and their role in its economy. 3.41 Consider, for ex-
ample, the claim that the following equivalence obtains
(B) m believes it is raining -b tends to utter "es regnet"
3.411 What is the import of such a statement as "b tends to utter 'es
regnet' "? Clearly the utterance "es regnet" is not being considered here
as a mere sequence of squeaks and whistles such as a parrot might emit.
It is conceived to be a meaningful sequence of sounds. 3.412 The natural
way of making this fact explicit is by reformulating (B) to read
(B') m believes it is raining b tends to utter "es regnet" and

"es regnet" means it is raining
3.4121 If we explore the right hand side of (B'), the first thing we note
is that the second clause ("'es regnet' means it is raining") contains the
connective "means" which is clearly not a truth function. 3.4122 Next we
note that to say of an utterance that it "means it is raining" clearly conveys
information about how the utterance is being used. 3.41221 Thus,
(B'-R) b tends to utter "es regnet" and "es regnet"
means it is raining
asserts that b tends to utter 'es regnet" and conveys psychological infor-
mation about b's use of "es regnet."
3.41222 But granted that (B'-R) conveys psychological information
about b's use of "es regnet," does it follow that (B'-R) makes a psycho-
logical assertion about b's use of "es regnet"? 3.4123 Let us agree, for the
moment, to make this inference. In other words, let us agree that "b's
utterances of 'es regnet' mean it is raining" makes a psychological assertion
about b's utterances of "es regnet." 3.4123

of the analysis above, we note that Scien
to an equivalence of the form
"Es regnet" uttered by b means it is r
where the right-hand side says of b that

to utterances of "es regnet." 3.41232 Cons
man who utters "II pleut." We are in any
tions to write down the equivalence
"II pleut" uttered by b means it is raining - @("il pleut," b)
But clearly the Scientific Behaviorist is committed to the thesis that if

"es regnet" uttered by Germans has the same meaning as "il pleut" uttered
by Frenchmen, then the habits of the latter with respect to "il pleut"
share a common generic feature with the habits of Germans with respect
to "es regnet." Let us represent this common feature by "K('. . .,' b) ."
Then we can write down the equivalences
"Es regnet" uttered by b means it is raining= K ("es regnet," b)
"II pleut" uttered by b means it is raining= K("il pleut," b)
or generally,
." uttered by b means it is raining = K(". . .," b)
3.41233 Notice, therefore, that
"It is raining" uttered by b means it is raining K("It is

raining," b)
3.412331 Now, when I say

Jones' utterances of "es regnet" mean it is raining
I am mentioning "es regnet" and using "It is raining" to convey what is

meant by "es regnet" as uttered by Jones. According to Scientific Behavior-
ism, if what I say of Jones' utterance is true, then the utterance "It is rain-
ing" which I use is the manifestation of habits generically identical with
Jones' habits with respect to "es regnet." 3.4123311 Notice that since
utterances convey information about language habits by virtue of being
manifestations of these habits, an utterance may (potentially) convey
more information than is appreciated (actually conveyed) at a given stage
of human knowledge. Thus (to exaggerate), "'Es regnet' uttered by Jones
means it is raining" might today convey only that Jones has the 'same'
habits with respect to "es regnet" as the speaker has with respect to "it is
raining," but might convey in the future that Jones has habits of (specific)
kind and with respect to "es regnet."
3.412332 And when the Scientific Behaviorist is in a position to propose

specific equivalences of the form
id ..." uttered by b means * F(". . .," b)
they will be subject to the condition that they can only be true if the
"pragmatically consistent," that is, if the "***" used on the left-hand side
is a manifestation of the kind of habit mentioned on the right-hand side.
By virtue of this fact they will be more than "mere" material equivalences.
3.412333 Yet they are neither laws of nature nor, in any usual sense of the
term, logical equivalences. They are validated not by showing that the left-
hand side can be constructed out of the same (PM) primitives as the right-
hand side, but rather by knowing the circumstances in which it is correct
to use the left-hand side. 3.4123331 As an illuminating parallel it can be
pointed out that although "x is here" said by Smith who is at s is, in a
strong sense, equivalent to "x is at s," nevertheless it is not, in any ordinary
sense, logically equivalent to it.
3.4124 Now the truth of the matter, of course, is that while
(C) b's utterances of "es regnet" mean it is raining
conveys psychological information about b's utterances, it does not make a

psychological assertion about b's utterances. We must abandon the in-
ference momentarily sanctioned in 3.4123. 3.41241 Semantical assertions,
such as (C), convey psychological information about language users, but
they are not psychological assertions.' They do this by virtue of the feature
of their use pointed out above (3.412331). 3.41242 When Jones says to me
Smith's utterances of "es regnet" mean it is raining
I can infer that Smith uses "es regnet" as I use "It is raining," even though
Jones is not making an assertion about the way in which Smith uses "es
regnet."
3.41243 It should now be pointed out that it is not only linguistic events
in the narrow sense of the use of conventional languages that are correctly
said to "mean such and such.". If we use the term "symbol" for items which
are correctly said to mean such and such (whereas "sign" means symptonm
of such and such, and is not a semantical expression), then the class of
symbol events is radically more inclusive than that of linguistic events in
the narrower sense. It is only if "language" is taken in the broader sense
of the use of symbols, that it is plausible to identify thought with the use
of language.2
3.5 Before we can put the results given above to good use, we must take
another look at mentalistic discourse. 3.51 It is a familiar fact that many
mentalistic expressions are definable in terms of other mentalistic expres-

sions. Indeed, a scrutiny of the psychological (and philosophical) literature
devoted to the descriptive phenomenology of the mental suggests that an
adequate basis for the definition of all mentalistic terms can be found in
"act of thought" (which we shall abbreviate as "thought") and "about,"
together with non-mentalistic expressions. 3.511 Thus, "x is a thought
about 0" would be the form of a basic sentence of mentalistic discourse.
A thought in this sense is a mental episode. Furthermore, to say of x that
it is a thought is not to ascribe any dispositional features to x.
3.5111 Yet it may be the case that in order to be correctly characterized
as a thought, x must be a complex state of affairs with dispositional as well
as purely episodic components. Compare our remarks in 3.4124 above on
semantical statements. To say of certain grunts and groans that they mean
it is raining is not to ascribe any dispositional feature to these grunts and
groans, although it is only if they are the manifestation of certain habits
that it is correct to say of them that they mean it is raining. 3.512 Mental-
istic verbs relating to motivation ("desires," "chooses," "hates," etc.)
would be defined in terms of the tendency of thoughts about conduct to
bring about conduct.
3.52 As a matter of fact, further reflection suggests that our list of two
mentalistic primitives is redundant, and that the single term "about"
would suffice. It would be absurd to speak of a thought which was not
about something. Can we not therefore define an act of thought as an
event which is correctly said to be about something? 3.521 And a mind as
a continuant which has thoughts?
3.522 But what is aboutness but meaning? Thus (3.4124) to say of an
event e that it is about something (and hence that it is a mental event)
is not to make a psychological assertion about e, even though it is to con-
vey psychological information about e. 3.5221 To say of an event e that
it is about something is not to describe e. In general, to make semantical
assertions about psychological events is not to describe these events, thouglh
it is to convey information the assertion of which would describe them.8
3.5222 But if in saying of an event that it is about something we are
not describing the event, it follows that to say of an event that it is mental
is not to describe it in a way which precludes a correct description of the
event in bodily terms. In other words, "x is mental" does not stand to
"x is p" (where "qO" is definable in terms of bodily states) as "x is green"
to "x is red."
3.5223 Indeed, it follows that every mental event must (in principle)
be describable in non-mentalistic terms. 3.5224 And while, of course, it
does not follow from the above alone that mental events must (in prin-
ciple) be describable in terms of bodily states (for

able in terms which were neither mentalistic nor definable in terms of
bodily states), this does follow from the above together with the thesis of
Scientific Behaviorism.
3.5225 Notice, of course, that if Scientific Behaviorism is to be plausible,
we must include in the class of bodily states such activities as seeing colors,
hearing sounds, tasting tastes, and having images. 3.52251 Prichard has
correctly pointed out that seeing a color is not cognizing a color. Ducasse's
insight that tasting a taste is like waltzing a waltz was vitiated only by his
failure to appreciate that tasting a taste is not cognizing a taste. 3.52252 To
see colors, hear sounds, etc., is, in one sense of this everyday term, to be
conscious, but not cognitively conscious. The latter involves aboutness, the
former does not. Seeing a color is not a mental activity. 3.522521 The
epistemological notion of the givenness of colors, sounds, etc., must not
be confused with the notions of seeing colors, hearing sounds, etc. Given-
ness is a form of cognitive consciousness and requires mention of aboutness
in its analysis.
3.52253 Seeing a color cannot be defined in physico-chemical terms, or,
for that matter, in terms of overt behavior. But it is a mistake to suppose
that "bodily state" (in ordinary usage) means state definable in either of
these ways. 3.52254 Since sensory states do not occur apart from what
would readily be called bodily states, and since they are not mental states,
the decision to use "bodily state" to include them would not be absurd.
3.52255 If, on the other hand, one decided to exclude them from bodily
states, then Scientific Behaviorism would have to be reformulated in terms
of "states of the body" and "states of the sensorium," as something like
the latter would have to be the continuant language for sensory events.4
3.6 To sum up our results: If Scientific Behaviorism is correct, and
if our account of sentences of the form ". . . means " or ''. . . is
about " is correct, then every mental event can (in principle) be de-
scribed in terms of expressions which are definable in terms of bodily
states. 3.61 We have thus shown how it is possible to accept Scientific
Behaviorism, that is (3.3322) the thesis of the causal reducibility of the
mental, yet deny the logical reducibility of the mental, without being
committed to Epiphenomenalism (cf. 3.33321). And we have shown how
it is possible to reject Philosophical Behaviorism without being committed
to Dualism (cf. 3.321).
4. The logical irreducibility of mentalistic discourse to Behaviorese, in-
sisted on by traditional dualisms, turns out, if the argument above is sound,
to be exactly the logical irreducibility of semantical metalanguages to
PMese.
4.1 Now, while we often use semantical

tion which could (in principle) be formulated in PMese, and while this
use constitutes the application of the semantical language form, it must
not be inferred that what is said by semantical discourse could, in prini-
ciple, be said in PMese. 4.11 Just as from the fact that the use of norma-
tive discourse conveys a great deal of information about the speaker and
his community, and from the fact that the normative form of discourse
gains application through functioning in motivation,5 it must not be in-
ferred that what is said by normative discourse can be said in psychological
and socio-psychological discourse about motivation. 4.111 That which is
said by "Jones ought to pay his debt" could not be said in even an ideal
PMese. 4.12 That which is said by "'It is raining' is true if and only if
it is raining" or even by "'It is raining' means it is raining" could not be
said in even an ideal PMese.
4.2 It is indeed important to see that (in principle) the world, includ-
ing human behavior, could be described and predicted without using se-
mantical discourse. But the proper way to interpret this fact is not by
propounding an "extensionalist thesis" according to which everything can
be said without using semantical discourse, but rather offering a careful
account of the interrelationships which would obtain between semantical
discourse and an ideal behaviorese. 4.21 In general, the task of the phi-
losopher is to explore without prejudice the syntactical and pragmatical
relationships which obtain between the various forms of discourse, de-
scriptive, semantical, normative, modal, etc. 4.211 Surely the hankering
to give bad marks and a pseudo-conceptual status to other forms of dis-
course merely because they are discerned not to be descriptive discourse
belongs with other left-wing deviations in the Madame Tussaud's Wax
Work Museum of the analytic movement.
NOTES
It is my hope that this distinction between what is asserted, and what is conveye
but not asserted, by semantical statements in ordinary usage throws some light on what
I was trying to say in Section IV of my "Realism and the New Way of Words,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8 (1948), (reprinted in Readings in
Philosophical Analysis, edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, and published by
Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1949).
2 Implicit in this paragraph together with 3.41231-3.41232 and 3.41241 is the
semantical (not psychological) distinction between linguistic types (linguistic func-
tions) and token-classes which I have developed in several papers, most recently in
"Quotation Marks, Sentences and Propositions," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. 10 (1950); and "The Identity of Linguistic Expressions and the Paradox
of Analysis," Philosophical Studies, vol. 1 (1950).
'This paragraph, together with 3.4243 and 3.522521 is a restatement of the thesis,
argued in "Realism and the New Way of Words," that the semantical (as opposed to
psychological) concept of a token is the centml concept of an epistemology which is
ESSAY COMPETITION 95
to avoid both forms of psychologism dist

notes 2 and 3).
'It may not be out of place to point out that the account of the Mind-Body problem
given in Section IX of "Realism and the New Way of Words" (see also the second
paragraph of note 22 to page 455 of Readings) differs from that of the present paper
only in its greater obscurity. Its primary flaw was to suppose (p. 453 of Readings) that
a dualism of sense qualities and brain events qua describable in physicalistic terms,
would be a mind-body dualism.
?See my "Obligation and Motivation" in Readings in Ethical Theory, edited by
Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), p. 516.
Essay Competition
The editors of Philosophical Studies take pleasure in announcing the

third annual essay competition sponsored by this journal. Prizes will be
given for the best brief essays (not to exceed 2500 words) of an analytical
character on a philosophical topic postmarked on or before June 15, 1953,
by a graduate student in this country or abroad who does not, at the time
he submits his essay, have the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent.
FIRST PRIZE: Publication in Philosophical Studies, a $50 United States
Government Defense Bond (or, for foreign students, its equivalent), and a
ten-year subscription to Philosophical Studies. SECOND PRIZE: A $25 United
States Government Defense Bond (or its equivalent) and a ten-year sub-
scription to Philosophical Studies. THIRD PRIZE: A five-year subscription to
Philosophical Studies. One- and two-year subscriptions will also be awarded
to essays receiving honorable mention. The editors reserve the right to
publish any essay submitted in the competition. Candidates who are not
notified by December 1, 1953, of intent to publish are free to submit their
manuscripts for publication elsewhere. Judges for the competition are
C. G: Hempel (Yale), Albert Hofstadter (Columbia), Frederick Will
(Illinois).
Entries should be typewritten, double-spaced, on one side of the paper
only, and should be submitted in triplicate. The three copies of the manu-
script should be signed with a pseudonym, sealed in an envelope marked
"Essay Competition," and enclosed in an envelope for mailing together
with a small sealed envelope with the pseudonym on the cover and con-
taining the contestant's name and address, and the name of the institution
at which he is pursuing his graduate studies. Mail to The Editors, Philo-
sophical Studies, 100 Wesbrook Hall, University of Minnesota, Minne-
apolis 14, Minnesota, U.S.A.

Mind, Meanin and Behavior

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Mind, Meanin and Behavior

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Mind, Meaning, and Behavior

Author(s): Wilfrid Sellars

a dog only when he is sensibly stimulated by some

Mind, Meaning, and Behavior

1. In one sense of "exist" it is beyond question that both minds and

materialist denies this. 1.121 The most wide

of concept to another. (b) In both cases sentences employing a concept

terms. Human thinking on ethical matt

meeting and Jones was absent from 75% of the

3.323 Notice the parallel provided by the Mind-Body problem. 3.3231

(A) m has A(O) m #b

(B) m believes it is raining -b tends to utter "es regnet"

(B') m believes it is raining b tends to utter "es regnet" and

about b's utterances of "es regnet." 3.4123

"Es regnet" uttered by b means it is r

where the right-hand side says of b that

"II pleut" uttered by b means it is raining - @("il pleut," b)

But clearly the Scientific Behaviorist is committed to the thesis that if

." uttered by b means it is raining = K(". . .," b)

3.41233 Notice, therefore, that

"It is raining" uttered by b means it is raining K("It is

3.412331 Now, when I say

I am mentioning "es regnet" and using "It is raining" to convey what is

3.412332 And when the Scientific Behaviorist is in a position to propose

id ..." uttered by b means * F(". . .," b)

(C) b's utterances of "es regnet" mean it is raining

conveys psychological information about b's utterances, it does not make a

mentalistic expressions are definable in terms of other mentalistic expres-

ciple) be describable in terms of bodily states (for

4.1 Now, while we often use semantical

to avoid both forms of psychologism dist

The editors of Philosophical Studies take pleasure in announcing the

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