Research MSI QCA

Perceived legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives in the global
South: A configurational analysis
Abstract
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are recognised as important regulators in global food and
agriculture value chains by developing and implementing sustainability standards. These initiatives are
private governance arrangements involving corporations, civil society organisations and sometimes
other actors. Mostly, MSIs are initiated by Northern-based multinational corporations and NGOs. These
initiatives are generally perceived as ‘best practice’ in setting sustainability standards as they bring
together key market and social and environmental NGOs to jointly tackle severe global sustainability
challenges. Nevertheless, MSIs face several challenges constraining their acceptance as legitimate
governance arrangements, which relate in particular to the Southern stakeholders of MSIs. As legitimacy
is regarded as critical in the success of MSIs, it is important to create a better understanding of how
legitimacy is established. This paper uses crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) to study
configurations of conditions that can explain the legitimacy of MSIs as perceived by Southern
stakeholders. From an extensive literature review, three main conditions that are claimed to enhance the
legitimacy of MSIs are identified: inclusion, accountability and participation. The outcome under
investigation is whether or not the sustainability standards that arise from transnational governance
systems are accepted by Southern stakeholder groups, measured by their compliance to MSI standards.
For this study twelve MSIs in the food and agriculture sector have been selected. Using publicly
available information provided by the selected MSIs, for each MSI data was gathered on the three
conditions and the outcome. Every condition and the outcome were then defined as a binary variable for
each MSI: either it was present, or absent. Each MSI was then re-conceptualised as a configuration of
the conditions and the outcome. Through Boolean minimisation, necessary and sufficient conditions for
an MSI to attain legitimacy among southern stakeholders were then identified. No necessary and
sufficient conditions could be identified for explaining legitimacy. However, a combined absence of
inclusion and participation was found to be necessary and sufficient for explaining the absence of
legitimacy. These findings imply that organising and MSI to be more democratic and inclusive of
southern stakeholders is no guarantee that its standards will also be accepted by southern stakeholders.
Keywords: sustainable development, multi-stakeholder initiatives, democratic legitimacy, input legitimacy, output
legitimacy, Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Name: Dorine Leeuwerik

Student number: 488650
Master thesis – Global Business & Sustainability
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Thesis Coach: Greetje Schouten
Co-reader: Marieke de Wal
November 1st, 2018
Perceived legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives in the global South: A configurational analysis
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3
2 Theoretical framework .................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives ................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 MSI input legitimacy ............................................................................................................... 6
2.4 MSI output legitimacy ............................................................................................................. 7
2.5 The relationship between MSI input and output legitimacy.................................................... 8
3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Data collection ......................................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis ........................................................................................... 9
3.3 Case selection ........................................................................................................................ 10
3.4 Variable selection .................................................................................................................. 13
3.5 Measurement ......................................................................................................................... 14
3.6 Data analysis.......................................................................................................................... 15
4 Results ........................................................................................................................................... 15
4.1 Descriptive analysis ............................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis ......................................................................................... 20
5 Discussion ..................................................................................................................................... 29
5.1 Findings ................................................................................................................................. 29
5.2 Limitations............................................................................................................................. 30
5.3 Future research ...................................................................................................................... 32
6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 32
References ............................................................................................................................................. 34
Appendix I: operationalisation of input and output legitimacy indicators ............................................ 37
Appendix II: data collection sources ..................................................................................................... 38
Appendix III: ‘thresholdsetter’ output ................................................................................................... 41
Appendix IV: calibration of conditions and outcome ........................................................................... 44
Appendix V: process of resolving contradictory configurations ........................................................... 46
2
1 Introduction
Standard setting in food and agriculture value chains by private governance arrangements is becoming
more common in the pursuit of a solution for the currently unsustainable resource use in the global
production systems. Private governance arrangements are “transnational private governance systems
that derive their policy-making authority not from the state, but from the manipulation of global markets
and attention to customer preferences” (Cashore, 2002, p. 504). These arrangements, in this study
referred to as multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), are especially dependent on the legitimacy of their
practices as to justify their authority for setting standards within a certain field. Legitimacy is “a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.
574), and is seen as critical in the success and effectiveness of sustainability standards (Bäckstrand,
2006a). On the other hand, the effectivity of a standard legitimises its existence.
While sustainability standards have been commonly accepted in western countries, they stumble
upon resistance amongst stakeholders in the global South (Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011; Vellema &
Van Wijk, 2015; Bäckstrand, 2006a; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013a, 2014; Biermann & Gupta, 2011;
Schouten & Bitzer, 2015). Southern stakeholders, for a large part producers, actually have the most
critical role when it comes to creating a more sustainable food and agriculture supply chain, as they are
the ones that have to apply the criteria that arise from the standards. Yet, prior research has given little
to no attention to the extent to which southern actors accept and consent to these standards. Instead, it
has looked into the creation of legitimacy, which mainly happened through incorporating western
democratic principles within the standard-setting process (Biermann & Gupta, 2011). The underlying
assumption of this proposition is that when the governance structure and decision-making processes are
designed along democratic principles, the standard will also be perceived as legitimate (Biermann &
Gupta, 2011; Zürn, 2004). But does a legitimate standard-setting process of MSIs actually lead to
acceptance and consent amongst southern actors? Do they indeed perceive this process as legitimate?
These questions are translated into the concepts of input and output legitimacy, distinguished
by Scharpf (1999). Input legitimacy refers to “participating stakeholders and the participatory quality of
interactions” and output legitimacy refers to “outside actors and the extent to which they accept the new
initiative as an entity on its own as well as the problem-solving capacities of its activities” (Schouten &
Glasbergen, 2011, p. 1893). This study aims to assess whether or not certain factors of input legitimacy
contribute to the output legitimacy of sustainability standards in the food and agriculture sector as
perceived by southern stakeholders. Thus, the following research question was formulated:
“What factors contribute to the legitimacy of voluntary sustainability standards in the food and
agriculture sector as perceived by southern stakeholders?”
3
Legitimacy as perceived by southern stakeholders, in the proposed research question, corresponds to the
concept of output legitimacy. The factors that will be assessed are derived from the concept of input
legitimacy. Hence his study can be seen as an assessment of whether higher input legitimacy of MSIs
indeed leads to higher output legitimacy among southern stakeholders.
Practical relevance
Both an assessment is made of the output legitimacy of such MSIs and the aspects of input legitimacy
that may or may not contribute to it. Next to evaluating whether these aspects are effective in building
output legitimacy, this research also contributes to a larger body of research regarding the potential of
such initiatives to succeed in reaching broader environmental and societal goals and indeed transform
an entire commodity chain. The outcome of this research may contribute to a better understanding of
the legitimacy challenges faced by MSIs regarding stakeholders in the global south and how to anticipate
on them.
Academic relevance
The relationship between input and output legitimacy has already been tested and proven in the context
of EU governance (Lindgren & Persson, 2010), but, although suggested and theorised (Mena & Palazzo,
2012; Bäckstrand, 2006a, 2006b; de la Plaza Esteban et al., 2014; Marin-Burgos, 2015; Beisheim &
Dingwerth, 2008), no such research has been conducted in the context of MSIs. More specific, whether
factors of input legitimacy have the potential to contribute to higher output legitimacy among southern
actors has not been subjected to research yet. Previous studies in this field mostly aimed at building
theories on the creation of legitimacy through democratisation of the standard-setting process and
ensuring participatory quality, and not so much at the evaluation of whether these practices indeed lead
to a higher legitimacy among the key stakeholders in the field they seek to govern. By evaluating the
current assumptions about legitimacy-building within MSIs and the factors that contribute to that, this
study will add to the current body of academic research on this subject.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives

For the past decades, private governance arrangements have been making their appearance in the field
of global (environmental) governance. More often than not, governments have been found to be either
not willing or not able to regulate business conduct in order to mitigate negative environmental and
social externalities. Many governments lack an effective and efficient approach or suffer from
corruption. This way, governance gaps or regulatory vacuums arise. Partly due to this absence of state
regulation, private actors are increasingly stepping in to fill the institutional void (Martens et al., 2017).
4
Private governance arrangements have been discussed in academic literature under a variety of
names. In this study, the term multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) will be used. MSIs are defined as
“private governance mechanisms involving corporations, civil society organizations, and sometimes
other actors, such as governments, academia or unions, to cope with social and environmental challenges
across industries and on a global scale” (Mena & Palazzo, 2012, p. 2).
As MSIs do not have policy-making authority like governments do, and thus not the ability to
govern by formulating legally binding laws their constituency has to adhere to, for a large part they
resort to so-called ‘soft law’ in order to regulate a certain field (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Mena &
Palazzo, 2012; Martens et al., 2017). Thus, various industries are now increasingly being regulated by
private regulatory standards or voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), produced by MSIs. Whether
such a standard is successful in regulating a certain field, is to a great extent dependent on whether the
MSI can achieve legitimacy to operate in that specific field (Cashore, 2002).
2.2 Legitimacy
Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception1 or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Achieving legitimacy is especially important for non-state
regulatory bodies like MSIs. Because they cannot derive legitimacy from state authority, they must be
granted “the right to rule” by the addressees of their regulations in order to ensure compliance to those
regulations. When addressees perceive regulations as legitimate, they obey to them (Bäckstrand, 2006a).
Thus, legitimacy is an essential prerequisite in the effectivity and survival of the MSI as a regulatory
body (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Black, 2008).
Scharpf (1997, p. 19) distinguished between the input-oriented and output-oriented side of
legitimacy, with input referring to the idea that “political choices should be derived, directly or
indirectly, from the authentic preferences of citizens and that, for that reason, governments must be held
accountable to the governed” and output referring to “effective fate control”. Simply put, input
legitimacy is based on a fair process, and output legitimacy is based on an effective performance
(Partzsch, 2011).
Scharpf’s conceptualisation of legitimacy was based on EU governance. In general, MSIs face
the same demands regarding legitimacy as governments (Zürn, 2004). However, given the fact that
classic democratic theory is based on the notion of the nation-state, legitimacy criteria cannot simply be
transferred to the domain of MSIs (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Moreover, the legitimacy of MSI is much
more complex. In the following paragraphs, the legitimacy of MSIs will be dissected along the concepts
of input and output legitimacy.
1
In this research, it concerns the perception of southern stakeholders in specific.
5
2.3 MSI input legitimacy

Input legitimacy focuses on procedural demands in terms of an inclusive, transparent and accountable
decision-making process within the MSI (Bäckstrand, 2006a). The importance of such mechanisms is
affirmed by their incorporation in the ‘Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental
Standards’ produced by the ISEAL Alliance (2014), a meta-governance organisation focusing on
creating best practices for MSIs.
Input legitimacy is argued to consist of a wide array of aspects: participation, efficacy,
accountability, transparency, inclusion, openness to consultation, fairness, deliberation, (balanced)
representation, access, information sharing and (external) stakeholder involvement among others
(Bäckstrand, 2006a; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Collins et al., 2017; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Von
Geibler, 2013; Potts et al., 2014; Schmidt, 2012; Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011; Kalfagianni & Pattberg,
2013a; Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Black, 2008; de la Plaza Estaban et al., 2014; Partzsch, 2011; Bennett,
2011; Martens et al., 2017). Studying the conceptualisation of these aspects in academic literature
showed that, although being given different names, a lot of these aspects overlap and actually describe
the same phenomena. By grouping and renaming the aspects that describe the same phenomena, they
could be narrowed down to three all-encompassing main concepts: inclusion, accountability and
participation. These are the three aspects of input legitimacy that will be assessed in this study. It should
be noted that this research focuses on the accessibility of those mechanisms for southern actors. This is
considered in the conceptualisation of each of these mechanisms. Below, these concepts are explained
separately.
2.3.1 Inclusion
Representative and balanced inclusion of stakeholders in the decision-making processes of MSIs is
widely believed to be necessary to ensure legitimacy of the rules that result from those processes and
the MSIs themselves (Bäckstrand, 2006a; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008;
Bennett, 2017; ISEAL Alliance, 2014; Partzsch, 2011; Von Geibler, 2013; Biermann & Gupta, 2011;
Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013a; Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011). The idea is that if all actors and
perspectives were included in the process on an equal basis (or were granted the opportunity to be
included), they will accept the legitimacy of the outcome of that process (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). It is
also argued that stakeholders develop some kind of ‘ownership’ of the outcome when they have been
included, which should be beneficial to their perception of its legitimacy (Bäckstrand, 2006b; Beisheim
& Dingwerth, 2008).
One aspect of inclusion that needs to be specifically addressed is the region of origin of the
representatives and the degree to which actors of different regions have equal access to membership
and/or certification (Biermann & Gupta, 2011). If southern actors are not sufficiently included and
represented, they will most likely not perceive the MSI as legitimate (Partzsch, 2011).
6
2.3.2 Accountability
It is suggested that stakeholders are more likely to accept rules that have been established through a
transparent and accountable process, thus enhancing legitimacy (Bäckstrand, 2006a; Black, 2008;
Biermann & Gupta; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; ISEAL Alliance, 2014; Von Geibler, 2013; Beisheim &
Dingwerth, 2008; Partzsch, 2011). Providing stakeholders that are affected by MSI decisions with the
possibility to hold the MSI and its members accountable for their actions, and to signal their concerns,
should increase their willingness to accept the eventual outcome of those decisions (Beisheim &
Dingwerth, 2008).
Transparency is critically important to this process (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Biermann &
Gupta, 2011) as it allows stakeholders to obtain more information on MSI processes (Black, 2008).
Disclosure of information enables stakeholders (both members and non-members) to critically assess
MSI activities and whether their interests are considered and respected in the decision-making process
(Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Logically, for this accountability mechanism to function, it should also be
properly accessible for southern actors.
2.3.3 Participation
As Mena & Palazzo (2012) argued, while stakeholders are included in the MSI, they may have been
marginalised in the decision-making process. Therefore, it is also important to embed inclusive
processes of participation in the MSI, and give all stakeholders equal opportunity to exercise influence
on the decisions made. When affected stakeholders have had a voice in these deliberative processes, the
rules that result from them can be viewed as legitimate (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Biermann & Gupta,
2011; Von Geibler, 2013; de la Plaza Esteban et al., 2014; Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011; Beisheim &
Dingwerth, 2008). According to Beisheim & Dingwerth (2008), allowing those stakeholders to have
their say in decision-making and standard-setting processes will lead them to recognise the outcomes of
those processes as reasonable, and accept those outcomes because of their appropriateness. Additionally,
such processes could facilitate a consensual orientation among involved stakeholders, aligning them
with the objectives of the MSI and thus increasing acceptance.
Essential to this mechanism is that non-members of the MSI also have access to these processes,
as MSI regulations reach far beyond the membership and are highly consequential for the affected
stakeholders (Martens et al., 2017). As with the other two aspects of input legitimacy, this mechanism
must be constructed in a way that ensures equal participation and sufficient input from southern
stakeholders.
2.4 MSI output legitimacy

The mechanisms of input legitimacy described in the previous paragraphs are assumed to increase output
legitimacy. Output legitimacy describes the effectiveness or problem solving capacity of the governance
system (Bäckstrand, 2006a), and focuses on the outcomes of regulations (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).
7
Output legitimacy, in this study, is defined as acceptance of the MSI by southern actors, and measured
by compliance. As MSI regulations are voluntary, actors who comply can be viewed as accepting of the
MSI and its regulations, which means they have granted the MSI legitimacy (Kalfagianni & Pattberg,
2014). If many actors choose to comply, the MSI can be regarded as having effectively taken a regulatory
role, and thus as having attained output legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).
An additional aspect to take into account regarding the acceptance among southern actors is
smallholder certification. A large part of the southern stakeholders involved in or affected by the
standards of MSIs consists of small-scale producers, or smallholders. As MSIs generally aim to promote
inclusion, smallholder certification has a legitimising dimension (Djama et al., 2016). When the MSI is
granted legitimacy in the eyes of smallholders, logically, the degree of certification among smallholders
would also be higher. Therefore, smallholder certification should also be considered when evaluating
output legitimacy among southern stakeholders.
2.5 The relationship between MSI input and output legitimacy

The assumption that is being evaluated in this study is the relationship between MSI input and output
legitimacy. MSI input legitimacy is expected to increase output legitimacy through mechanisms of
inclusion, accountability and participation. Not only is this relationship widely assumed in literature on
the legitimacy of MSIs, it has also been explicitly suggested based on theoretical and empirical findings
(Bäckstrand, 2006b; Beisheim & Dingwerth; de la Plaza Esteban et al., 2014; Marin-Burgos et al., 2015;
Mena & Palazzo, 2012).
The conceptualisation of MSI legitimacy and the assumed relationship between input and output
legitimacy has been visualised in a conceptual model. This model is shown in Figure 2.1.
Input legitimacy
Inclusion
Accountability
Output
legitimacy
Participation
Figure 2.1. Conceptual model.
8
3 Methodology
3.1 Data collection

The primary source of data for this study will be archival data, complemented by secondary data in case
of any data gaps (Bryman, 2012). Most MSIs publicly provide information about their governance
structure, decision-making processes, produced standards and realised outcomes, either on their website
or on request. All the information on the relevant conditions and indicators is gathered, kept in one
document and sorted by MSI. The data is collected one case at a time, and for each case a standardised
procedure is followed. First the website of the MSI is explored to get a picture of where the relevant
information can be found. As much information as possible is gathered from the website of the MSI
itself. Next, relevant MSI documents are gathered, which usually consist of annual reports, impact
reports, statutes and standard development procedures. If after reviewing these documents the required
information still isn’t found, an attempt is made to fill the gap using secondary data from sources such
as research institutes, public databases and scientific articles. In the event that there is still information
missing, the MSI will be contacted to request the missing information.
3.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In order to assess the conditions2 under which MSIs are perceived as legitimate by southern actors,
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used. This is a comparative case-oriented approach (Marx,
2008; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Marx, Rihoux & Ragin, 2013) and could help to gain a better
understanding of the configuration3 of certain conditions that lead to a higher or lower output legitimacy,
by exploring the similarities and differences across comparable cases by comparing configurations
(Marx, 2008). In this sense, it is a comparative case-study design (Bryman, 2012). QCA could also be a
useful tool to evaluate existing legitimacy building theories (Marx, Rihoux & Ragin, 2013) and is most
suitable for the abovementioned research question as legitimacy is a complex concept, and it is probably
a combination of factors that lead to a higher or lower output legitimacy. Quantitative research using
statistical techniques would not be suited as there is only a small amount of cases that can be compared
within the field of MSIs. QCA provides a quantitative approach of qualitative data and can therefore be
seen as a qualitative alternative for assessing causality. Next to being a good fit for small-N case studies,
QCA also allows for the possible existence of alternative combinations to the same outcome
(equifinality), a possibility that multiple regression (a conventional statistical technique) does not
account for (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).
2
It should be noted that ‘conditions’, ‘(independent) variables’ and ‘factors’ describe the same phenomenon and
are used interchangeably.
3
‘Configuration (of conditions)’, ‘combination of conditions’, ‘path’, ‘solution’ and ‘(explanatory) model’
describe the same phenomenon and are used interchangeably.
9
QCA is perfectly suitable for analysing qualitative data – the only requirement is that the data
can be converted to categories (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). The technique originally developed by Ragin
in 1987 (Marx, Rihoux & Ragin, 2013) was crisp-set QCA (csQCA), which only allows the use of
dichotomised data. In the case of continuous or categorical variables, this means that a threshold for
dichotomisation needs to be determined. The value of each variable is then either higher of lower. Later,
this technique was further advanced and refined with the development of fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) and
multi-value QCA (mvQCA), which both enable the assessment of multi-value variables and the relative
importance of (a combination of) these variables to a certain outcome. Some studies prefer one of the
latter because they allow multiple values and thus more variation, which does justice to the complicated
and multifaceted reality of qualitative data. This research, however, opts for a csQCA design exactly
because of its unyielding nature. Depending on the threshold a variable either is present (1) or absent
(0) in a case. Although the dichotomisation of qualitative data inevitably leads to a loss of information
richness (which could be partially mitigated by employing fsQCA or mvQCA instead) there are also
advantages to this approach. Because precisely through this dichotomisation, the data analysis becomes
more transparent and the results become clearer than when fsQCA or mvQCA is used, where a condition
might be present to a greater or a lesser extent instead of being ‘in’ or ‘out’. This also makes csQCA a
useful and practical tool for policy-making. It provides insight in whether or not a contextual condition
matters in achieving a certain outcome; the answer is a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ instead of a relative
importance.
Crucial to this design is the operation of case selection and variable selection, which will be
covered in the following paragraphs along with an explanation of the methods used for data collection
and analysis.
3.3 Case selection

This particular design makes use of multiple comparable cases with a variety of outcomes. The cases
were selected by purposive sampling (Bryman, 2012). Cases were needed that could contribute to theory
building, and it was important that the selected cases had different outcomes and shared the same
background characteristics in order to make proper statements on the factors that contribute to output
legitimacy. When a number of variables is held constant, it is possible to ‘control’ for the influence of
these variables (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This then allows for the difference in outcome between the
cases to be attributed to the remaining variables. The following criteria were used:
• The initiative targets global value chains;
• Involves multiple stakeholder groups;
• Works on sustainability issues regarding food and/or agriculture;
• Focuses on a single commodity;
• And develops and implements voluntary sustainability standards.
10
Next, the variation in outcome had to be considered, because it’s the absence or presence of this outcome
that needs to be explained (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). There has to be enough variation in both the
variables and outcome under investigation, otherwise it’s not possible to attribute variation in the
outcome to a certain configuration of variables. Thus the definition of the outcome had to be defined
early in the process. The outcome under investigation is the output legitimacy of MSIs, i.e. whether or
not the MSI in question is accepted by southern stakeholders. Output legitimacy is viewed as the
‘problem-solving capacity’ of the MSI (Bäckstrand, 2006a). For the purpose of this study, output
legitimacy was defined as acceptance of the MSI by southern actors, which in turn was measured by
standard uptake of standard-compliant products (as was done by Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2014).
Initially, eleven cases were identified which met all five criteria and appeared to exhibit varying
outcomes: the Aquaculture Stewardship Council, Better Cotton Initiative, BonSucro, Floriculture
Sustainability Initiative, Forest Stewardship Council, Global Coffee Platform (formerly 4C
Association), Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, Marine Stewardship Council, Roundtable on
Responsible Soy, Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials, and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil.
The possibility to leave cases out and add new cases later on in the process was left open. Case
selection is an iterative process. This open, iterative and transparent process is one of the assets of QCA.
The researcher is required to constantly go back and forth between the data under analysis and the cases,
which creates a so-called ‘dialogue’ with the cases and forces the researcher to remain critical of the
added value of each case during the analysis (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).
This dialogue did indeed eventually lead to some changes in the inclusion of cases. Later on, it
was decided to also include the MSI ProTerra in the analysis as it fit all the criteria and was judged to
make a relevant contribution to the data, increasing the amount of cases to a total of twelve. After
completing the data collection it appeared that three cases, Floriculture Sustainability Initiative, Global
Coffee Platform and Global Roundtable on Sustainable Beef, did not meet the criterion of ‘developing
and implementing voluntary sustainability standards’ after all. For that reason it was decided to exclude
these cases from the analysis, bringing down the amount of analysed cases to a total of nine.
A short description of each of the twelve MSIs is provided in Box 3.1.
Box 3.1. Description of the selected cases.

Aquaculture Stewardship Council
ASC is an independent international non-profit organisation that, in collaboration with the industry, NGOs,
academia, producers and the public, develops standards to address environmental and social impacts of
aquaculture around the globe. The organisation was established by WWF and the Dutch Sustainable Trade
Initiative (IDH) in 2010, as a result of the Aquaculture Dialogues. It currently has seven operational standards,
with salmon, tilapia and pangasius accounting for most of the ASC certified production (Potts et al., 2016).
ASC aims to “transform aquaculture towards environmental sustainability and social responsibility using
efficient market mechanisms that create value across the chain” (Aquaculture Stewardship Council, n.d.).
11
Better Cotton Initiative

BCI is a member-based multi-stakeholder initiative that involves industry representatives, NGOs and producers
to transform global cotton production by developing standards for cotton production and verifying compliance
with these standards. Its mission is to “make global cotton production better for the people who produce it,
better for the environment it grows in and better for the sector’s future” (Better Cotton Initiative, n.d.). BCI was
founded in 2005 as a result of a roundtable initiative led by WWF and established in 2009 as an independent
organisation. The Better Cotton standard was first launched in 2010. Next to developing standards, they provide
training and improvement programmes for farmers.
Bonsucro
Bonsucro is a member-based multi-stakeholder initiative that works with NGOs, farmers, millers, traders,
buyers and support organisations from across the sugarcane value chain to promote sustainable sugarcane
production worldwide. Together, they develop standards to ensure sustainable sugarcane practices. The
initiative was first established in 2005 under the name Better Sugarcane Initiative, and transformed in Bonsucro
with the launch of its first standard in 2011. Its mission is to “ensure that responsible sugarcane production
creates lasting value for the people, communities, businesses, economies and eco-systems in all cane-growing
origins” (Bonsucro, n.d.).
Floriculture Sustainability Initiative

FSI is an international non-profit organisation that aims to increase sustainably sourced flowers and plants by
having members certify their flowers and plants with one of its standards. The organisation was initiated in
2012 by 25 stakeholders from the floriculture sector, with the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) as one
of the major players in the start-up process. In 2013, it was established as an independent organisation. Members
of FSI share “the goal of finding more sustainable solutions for farmers, for the environment, and for the future
of the sector, and [..] the ambition to have 90% flowers and plants responsibly produced and traded by 2020”
(Floriculture Sustainability Initiative, n.d.).
Forest Stewardship Council

FSC is a member-based multi-stakeholder initiative which aims to foster sustainable forest management and
timber production. It is a global non-profit organisation which was founded in 1993. The organisation works
together with social and environmental NGOs, businesses, forest owners and managers, processing companies,
academia and the public to develop standards for environmentally and socially responsibly managed forest and
timber. Through these standards, they promote “environmentally appropriate, socially, beneficial, and
economically viable management of the world’s forests” (Forest Stewardship Council, n.d.).
Global Coffee Platform

GCP is a multi-stakeholder, member-based platform which unites traders, roasters, retailers, NGOs,
governments and sustainability initiatives to achieve more sustainable practices in the coffee sector (Global
Coffee Platform, n.d.). It is the result of the merger between the member-based, standard-setting 4C Association
and Sustainable Coffee Program of the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) in 2016. GCP produces the
Baseline Common Code, a set of principles baseline reference to mainstream sustainable coffee production and
processing. This baseline is “a commonly agreed set of baseline principles and practices which define the
minimum level of sustainability which all coffee production in the world would reach, as a contribution to move
the coffee sector” (Lernoud et al., 2015).
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef

GRSB is a member-based multi-stakeholder initiative which was created in 2012, and aims to improve
sustainability of the global beef value chain. It brings together producers, commerce and processing companies,
retailers, NGOs, academia and allied initiatives to foster a dialogue on sustainable beef. They define sustainable
beef as a “socially responsible, environmentally sound and economically viable product” along five principles
and the corresponding criteria (Global Roundtable of Sustainable Beef, n.d.). These principles and criteria
12
provide a framework for the creation of regional and country roundtables, which are to further establish specific
indicators and metrics.
Marine Stewardship Council

MSC is an international non-profit organisation which develops standards to certify multiple wild catch species.
With these standards, the aim is to “contribute to the health of the world’s oceans” and “transform the seafood
market to a sustainable basis” (Marine Stewardship Council, n.d.). The standards are developed with the help
of stakeholders from environmental NGOs, academia, governments and the fishery and market sectors. MSC
was founded in 1997 by WWF and Unilever, and established as an independent organisation in 1998 (Potts et
al., 2016).
ProTerra
ProTerra is a member-based multi-stakeholder initiative, founded in 2012, which mainly operates in the soy
production sector. Its aim is to “ensure adoption of better agricultural practices, better working conditions and
worker safety at farms and mills to ensure preservation of the environment for future generations” (ProTerra
Foundation, n.d.). To this end, ProTerra brings together stakeholders from all parts of the value chain to develop
the ProTerra standard, provide training and foster awareness. Although the standard is applicable to multiple
commodities (they also certify small amounts of sugarcane), it is primarily used for the certification of soy
production. Therefore ProTerra is also deemed as fitting the case selection criterion of focusing on a single
commodity.
Round Table on Responsible Soy

RTRS is a member-based initiative which was founded in 2006 as a result from the Responsible Soy Forum.
The initiative includes stakeholders from all across the soy value chain and members from civil society to
promote responsible production, processing and trading of soy on a global level. For this purpose, the RTRS
Standard for Responsible Soy Production was developed, and launched in 2010. This standard is globally
applicable and assures “soy production that is socially equitable, economically feasible and environmentally
sound” (Round Table on Responsible Soy, n.d.).
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials

RSB is a member-based initiative operating globally in the energy sector to ensure sustainable biomaterial
production. To this end, it develops standards for global sustainability certification in collaboration with
businesses, NGOs, academia, governments and UN organisations. It is one of the few standards that have set
specific performance requirements for the mitigation of greenhouse gases (Potts et al., 2014). RSB was founded
in 2007 and, through its standards, wants to drive “the development of the bioeconomy for a better world
through certification, sustainability solutions, innovation and partnerships” (Roundtable on Sustainable
Biomaterials, n.d.).
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

RSPO was founded in 2004 by WWF and Unilever, and is a member-based initiative that operates in the palm
oil sector. It unites producers, processors, manufacturers, retailers, banks/investors and environmental and
social NGOs in this sector in order to transform global markets to mainstream sustainable palm oil. The social
and environmental criteria for sustainable palm oil are established in the RSPO standard, which has been in use
since 2007. The application of these criteria are ought to “minimize the negative impact of palm oil cultivation
on the environment and communities in palm oil-producing regions” (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil,
n.d.).
3.4 Variable selection

Because initially there were only twelve cases (later reduced to nine), the conditions had to be limited
to three in order to be able to connect different outcomes to different configurations (Rihoux & Ragin,
2009). With more conditions the amount of possible configurations would be too large for the amount
13
of cases, making it impossible to draw conclusions on potential links between certain conditions and the
outcome (‘limited diversity’).
In order to select the conditions, the so-called ‘perspectives’ approach (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009)
was adopted: conditions were derived from the main theoretical perspectives on input legitimacy in
empirical literature. Thus, the three aspects of input legitimacy identified in the literature review were
selected to be used as conditions: inclusion, accountability and participation. These were the three main
conditions that were claimed to enhance legitimacy, which is what MSIs rely on for their success
(Bäckstrand, 2006a; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008).
Inclusion encompasses that southern stakeholders from all across the value chain have access to
and are included and represented in the MSI and its decision-making processes. Accountability is about
the justification of decisions vis-à-vis southern stakeholders and providing them with the opportunity to
signal their support or dissatisfaction. Participation concerns the ability of southern stakeholders to
participate on an equal basis and the provision of opportunities to present their arguments and contribute
to the decision-making process.
Like the selection of cases, the selection of variables is an ongoing process (Rihoux & Ragin,
2009). The variables and cases under investigation may be altered later in the process of analysing the
data. For instance, it might occur that no information can be found on a certain indicator, that it needs
to be adjusted because it’s either too inclusive or exclusive (and there needs to be enough variance), that
it turns out to be the wrong indicator or that it needs to be narrowed down or more explicitly defined.
3.5 Measurement
A list of the conditions and their indicators, informed by reviewing academic literature and policy
documents, is given in table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Indicators of input and output legitimacy.

Condition Indicator References
Inclusion Board representation by region Mena & Palazzo (2012); Martens et al.
(2017); Potts et al. (2014); Biermann &
Gupta (2011); Kalfagianni & Pattberg
(2013a); ISEAL Alliance (2014); Partzsch
(2011); Collins et al. (2017)
Accessible membership Kalfagianni & Pattberg (2013a); ISEAL
Alliance (2014)
Accountability Inclusive grievance mechanism Potts et al. (2014); ISEAL Alliance
(2014); Partzsch (2011); Collins et al.
(2017)
Public disclosure Potts et al. (2014); Mena & Palazzo
(2012); ISEAL Alliance (2014)
Participation Voting power Mena & Palazzo (2012); Biermann &
Gupta (2011)
14
Stakeholder participation Potts et al. (2014); Martens et al. (2017);

ISEAL Alliance (2014); de la Plaza
Estaban, Visseren-Hamakers & de Jong
(2014); Collins et al. (2017)
Output legitimacy Standard uptake Mena & Palazzo (2012); Kalfagianni &
Pattberg (2013a); Kalfagianni & Pattberg
(2014)
Smallholder certification Djama et al. (2016)
The full explanation of the operationalised indicators of input and output legitimacy can be found in
Appendix I.
3.6 Data analysis

After completion of the data collection, each case will be re-conceptualised as configurations of the
conditions. Every condition and the outcome will be defined as a binary variable. Since the data consists
of continuous and interval variables, a threshold for dichotomisation needs to be determined for each
condition (‘calibration’). This is done through finding the point on which a change in outcome occurs.
After doing this for all conditions, the thresholds are checked for robustness (Skaaning, 2011). If the
thresholds turn out to be robust, the conditions of all cases are operationalised as either 1 (present) or 0
(absent), based on the thresholds. These scores will then be entered in QCA software (Tosmana)
developed by Cronqvist (2018) which produces truth tables and conducts the Boolean minimisation. A
truth table lists the possible combinations of the conditions and the cases in which these combinations
occur. Through Boolean algebra, minimisation is conducted until no further models can be eliminated.
This process generates explanatory models of the conditions that are found to be necessary and sufficient
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) in order for an MSI to attain output legitimacy amongst southern stakeholders.
The resulting explanatory models, so both models that explain the presence of output legitimacy and
models that explain the absence of output legitimacy, can then be interpreted based on the specific
configuration of conditions.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis

Although Qualitative Comparative Analysis studies configurations of conditions across cases, it is still
a qualitative approach. Thus, the connection with the qualitative nature of the data must not be lost
through this analysis. Therefore, prior to studying the configurations, each case will be described on the
basis of the gathered data on input and output legitimacy in Box 4.1. The raw data is summarised in
Table 4.1.
15
Box 4.1. Description of cases along the conditions of input and output legitimacy.*
Aquaculture Stewardship Council
ASC states it means to maintain an equal balance in its governance structure. This balance is not reflected in its
board: none of the eight members is from the global south. ASC also does not allow any members. Members of
the Supervisory Board, Advisory Groups and committees are all elected, nominated, co-opted or appointed by
the Supervisory Board. These bodies also make all decisions within ASC. They do allow for participation,
consultation and decision-making of external (southern) stakeholders in boards and committees and standard-
setting processes. However, without providing the opportunity to become a member and exercise direct
influence on decision-making processes, this approach seems rather hollow in attempting to gain sufficient
participation from southern stakeholders. Altogether, the governance structure and processes are not at all
inclusive of southern stakeholders. As a result, power remains with a small club of northern stakeholders. ASC
does have a grievance mechanism that’s quite inclusive of southern stakeholders, and they disclose a substantial
amount of information about their course of business. However, this does not make up for a structure that’s
otherwise very exclusive. Not surprisingly, the standard uptake indicates low acceptance by southern
stakeholders. Although the initiative had a growth rate of 98% per annum over 2012-2015, ASC-production
volume remains marginal at 1% of global aquaculture production.
Better Cotton Initiative

The board of BCI allocates three seats to each membership category, and up to three additional independent
members. As of now, there are fourteen members in total, six of which are from the global south. Not equal to
the amount of northern board members, but it’s a step in the right direction. Furthermore, BCI puts a lot of effort
in making certification and membership accessible to all stakeholders, for instance through strategic investments
in trainings and capacity building programs, and adjusting the membership fee to membership category. All
members have one vote in the General Assembly and can this way have their say in the decision-making, which
aims at reaching consensus. Input from external stakeholders and especially under-represented stakeholders or
disadvantaged groups is pro-actively sought after, by using various and appropriate means. Overall, BCI seems
to have realised a governance structure that’s very inclusive of southern stakeholders. This also includes the
grievance mechanism. However, BCI’s discloses only a limited amount of the required of MSI information.
This lack of transparency does not seem to restrain BCI in realising a substantial standard uptake. Better Cotton
accounts for 14% of global cotton production, indicating high acceptance by southern stakeholders.
Bonsucro
Bonsucro doesn’t charge a membership fee for farmers with less than 100 hectares, which is noteworthy.
Additionally, the certification of smallholders is supported by offering a separate production standard for
smallholders. Although these are inclusive practices, the highest decision-making body is still very exclusive.
With only a third of the board members being from the global south, the Bonsucro board is not very
representative of southern stakeholders. Each class of members is entitled to elect 3 persons for appointment as
members of the Members’ Council. The Members’ Council is only assigned with the task to provide advice,
views, recommendations and informed opinions to the (Technical Advisory) Board and does not seem to have
any executive decision making power. Together with the fact that Bonsucro also does not have sufficient
mechanisms in place that encourage input by stakeholders outside of the membership, this indicates that
southern stakeholders have limited ability to participate and exercise influence on decision-making processes
in Bonsucro. The MSI’s grievance mechanism strives for an equitable handling of complaints and measures
have been taken to provide equal access and does seem to be inclusive of southern stakeholders, and a fair
amount of information is disclosed online. As was the case with ASC, this does not make a difference for the
acceptance of southern stakeholders, which can be considered as low at a standard uptake of 2,7% of global
sugarcane production.
Floriculture Sustainability Initiative

FSI is a member-based initiative, but membership is not very accessible for southern stakeholders. The lowest
possible membership fee is still €750,-, which most stakeholders from the global south probably can’t afford.
There are also no programmes in place to lower the barrier for them to become a member or get certified. In the
16
membership and board there is a division between Northern Growers and (sub)Tropical Growers, but still only
two of the six board members are from the global south. The participatory processes do not include external
stakeholder. The membership rules mention that there is a grievance mechanism, but this procedure is nowhere
to be found. This is not surprising as very little information is disclosed altogether. Not only was FSI initiated
by northern stakeholders, the whole initiative does not even seem to have the intention to include southern
stakeholders in any part of the process. This might pose less of a problem since the FSI does not produce its
own standard and instead promotes the use of approved standards produced by other MSIs, but it remains to be
seen how it will reach its objective of 90% sustainably sourced flowers and plants by 2020 if southern
stakeholders are structurally excluded.
Forest Stewardship Council

The governance (structure) of FSC suggests the organisation is very much aware of the balance between the
regional North and South. Both regions are equally represented in the board, and much effort is put into
providing equal access to the membership. The statutes explicitly mention that membership fees must not
discriminate against southern members, and members who are not able to attend the General Assembly due to
financial reasons can apply for financial support (priority given to southern members). Within the General
Assembly, votes are weighted to ensure north and south each hold 50% of the vote. There are also plenty of
opportunities for external (non-member) stakeholders to participate, input from all regions and sectors is highly
valued. Most important and relevant MSI information is disclosed and the grievance mechanism is built on the
principle of trying to resolve concerns and disputes at the lowest and most informal possible level, which makes
the mechanism more accessible to southern stakeholders. At first glance is seems FSC’s efforts are reflected in
the standard uptake, as FSC has achieved an uptake of 16%. However, as will be explained later in the analysis
(Appendix V to be specific) only a very small proportion of FSC certified timber is produced in the global
south. This indicates a low acceptance of FSC by southern stakeholders.
Global Coffee Platform

The regional balance in the GCP board is not entirely equal, but relatively southern interests are quite well
represented with six of fourteen board members being from the global south. The membership fee varies for
membership category, but GCP is not as accessible as desired as no substantial measures are taken to encourage
southern stakeholders to become member or get certified. This is a limitation for the inclusion of that stakeholder
group. The grievance mechanism mainly relies on formal procedure and does not seem to provide the
opportunity for informal resolution on a lower level, which does not take into consideration the lower access to
formal means of many southern stakeholders. With the addition that very little information is disclosed, the
accountability and transparency of the MSI are very low. Beneficial to southern interests is the fact that in a few
points in decision-making and standard-setting processes GCP pro-actively tries to generate input from external
and/or affected stakeholders. Members can also voice their opinion in the Membership Assembly, where they
each get one vote. Unfortunately, acceptance by southern stakeholders could not be measured. Since the merger
of 4C and SCP into GCP, the 4C standard and its operations are completely separated from 4C
Association/GCP. This means there was no standard uptake to be assessed.
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef

The data suggests that GRSB is very much focused on northern producers and markets. Southern interests are
strongly underrepresented in the board with only three southern board members (out of sixteen). GRSB seems
to put no extra effort in involving and including southern stakeholders in specific. The grievance mechanism is
not inclusive of southern stakeholders in any way, and might very well be non-operational, based on the
available information. There is poor disclosure of detailed information on GRSB, its members, processes and
results. External stakeholder participation in MSI decision-making and standard-setting processes is mentioned,
but the specifics are left out and thus this remains quite unclear. Frankly, given the data the motives of GRSB
may be questioned altogether. Not only does it not give sufficient attention to southern stakeholders, it also does
not produce a concrete standard. The principles that are formulated are very vague and lack a vision, measurable
goals and performance standards, even compared with GCP and FSI.
17
Marine Stewardship Council

As is the case with ASC, it is not possible to become a member of MSC. Together with the very low proportion
of southern board members (two out of eleven), this implies that not all stakeholders have equal access to the
decision-making processes of MSC, and are largely excluded. This means that the power within this MSI can
remain in the hands of a select few (northern) stakeholders. There are ample opportunities for external
stakeholders to participate in the MSI, but securing input from external stakeholders is not enough. There is no
point in such mechanisms if stakeholders cannot directly exercise influence on MSI decision-making processes
by becoming a member and voicing their opinions and voting in a General Assembly of sorts. It is clear MSC
strives to be very transparent, as it discloses most of the information relevant to MSI processes and performance.
The grievance mechanism, however, leaves much to be desired in terms of accessibility for southern
stakeholders; it is not possible to launch complaints at a local level and complaint procedures are not even made
available in local languages. At first sight, standard uptake does not seem to suffer from all this, as 12% of
global wild catch is MSC certified. However, when zooming in it appears that less than 10% of that percentage
is produced by southern stakeholders, as was the case with FSC (also explained in Appendix V). This indicates
a low acceptance by southern stakeholders.
ProTerra
Southern stakeholders are thoroughly underrepresented in and excluded from ProTerra. Six of seven board
members are northern, and no specific program is in place to encourage and increase certification and
membership among southern stakeholders. ProTerra discloses very little information, indicating low
transparency. Regarding the grievance mechanism, it is mentioned that resolution for conflicts is made near to
the source and with the participation of the parties involved. But no evidence is found of processes that enable
complaints to be received at local level through informal means. Therefore, it seems that both MSI information
and the grievance mechanism are not very easy to access for southern stakeholders. No information was found
on members’ right to vote and election of the Board or a General Assembly; all power within ProTerra seems
to lie with the board. Though, there are some processes in place that ensure input from external stakeholders,
for instance via committees. Looking at the standard uptake of ProTerra, this has remained quite stable over the
past few years at 1,08%, indicating that the acceptance of the MSI by southern stakeholders is low.
Roundtable on Responsible Soy

RTRS is the only MSI where the number of southern board members (ten) exceeds the amount of northern
board members (five). This shows RTRS acknowledges, at least in this respect, the importance of sufficient
representation and inclusion of southern stakeholders, also in the highest decision-making body of the MSI.
This is further supported by the fact that there are a lot of processes through which stakeholders can get help in
getting certified (group certification, progressive entry levels, a project supporting smallholders and preparing
them for certification). RTRS is also exemplary with respect to southern stakeholders on other aspects.
Accountability mechanisms as the grievance procedure and the disclosure of information, and participatory
processes as participation of external stakeholders and decision-making power of members all seem to be
thought through and built on providing all stakeholders with equal access to these processes. However, the
standard uptake of RTRS certified products is still low at 1,16% of global soy production, also indicating low
acceptance by southern stakeholders.
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials

RSB seemed to do very well regarding all conditions of input and output legitimacy. However, later in the
process of data analysis it appeared that RSB didn’t do as well on inclusion and participation of southern
stakeholders as initially thought (this is explained in Appendix V). There was only one southern board member
out of five board members in total, indicating southern interests are underrepresented in the highest decision-
making body of the MSI. RSB did develop a specific smallholder standard to adapt the standard to smallholders
and helping them achieve sustainable practices, which makes the MSI and certification more accessible to a lot
of stakeholders. RSB has a decision-making structure similar to Bonsucro, restraining members from directly
participating by working with delegates instead of a General Assembly in which all members can participate.
This constrains the participation of (southern) stakeholders. The grievance mechanism seems to be built to
18
provide equal access to southern stakeholders. RSB discloses a considerable amount of information on their
website, but surprisingly enough not on their standard uptake. Had it been a considerable amount, it probably
would have been disclosed. This means that acceptance of RSB by southern stakeholders is most probably low.
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

RSPO has received criticism in the past that its processes were not inclusive enough of southern/local/affected
stakeholders. Therefore, this aspect has been given more attention by the MSI. Still, the board remains largely
occupied by northern stakeholders (ten out of fifteen). But there is also a very elaborate community outreach
and engagement plan to increase involvement of stakeholders in producing countries, indicating that work is in
progress to improve inclusion of southern stakeholders. A lot of attention is paid to the public disclosure of
information; clearly the RSPO strives to be as transparent as possible. The grievance mechanism is designed to
be a fair, impartial and transparent process and also supports RSPO members (with specific attention paid to
growers), local communities and other stakeholders to effectively use this mechanism. Furthermore, members
are each granted one vote in the General Assembly, and members as well as non-members (external
stakeholders) are granted the opportunity to participate in committees, decision-making and standard-setting
processes. The standard uptake of RSPO certified palm oil is 19% of global palm oil production, which is by
far the highest standard uptake any of the MSIs reviewed in this study has realised.
* Data sources per MSI are listed in Appendix II.
Table 4.1. Input legitimacy conditions, Raw Data (3 conditions).

CASEID INC ACC PAR O_LEGIT
Board Inclusive Inclusive Public Voting Stakeholder Standard
representa- membership grievance disclosure power participation uptake
tion mechanism
(%) (out of 2) (out of 4) (out of 9) (out of 2) (out of 4) (%)
ASC 0 0 3 7 0 4 1
BCI 42,86 2 4 5 1 4 14
Bonsucro 33,33 2 3 6 0 2 2,7
FSC 50 2 4 8 2 4 16
FSI 33,33 0 0 1 1 0 n/a*
GCP 42,86 1 1 3 1 3 n/a*
GRSB 18,75 1 1 4 1 3 n/a*
MSC 18,18 0 2 8 0 4 12
ProTerra 14,29 1 1 3 0 3 1,08
RTRS 66,67 2 4 8 1 4 1,16
RSB 20** 2 4 6 0** 4 0***
RSPO 33,33 2 3 8 1 4 19
*As these MSIs do not produce a standard, no output legitimacy (indicated by standard uptake) could be measured.
** Initially, board representation was assigned a value of 40% and voting power a value of 1. This was adjusted
later in the QCA process.
***RSB did not disclose any information on standard uptake. It was assumed that had it been a considerable
amount, it would have been disclosed. Therefore, RSB received a 0 on standard uptake.
Labels for conditions:

CASEID: Case identification (MSI) abbreviations: ASC Aquaculture Stewardship Council; BCI Better Cotton
Initiative; FSC Forest Stewardship Council; FSI Floriculture Sustainability Initiative; GCP Global Coffee
Platform; GRSB Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef; MSC Marine Stewardship Council; RTRS Round Table
for Responsible Soy; RSB Roundtable for Sustainable Biomaterials; RSPO Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil
INC: Inclusion
ACC: Accountability
PAR: Participation
O_LEGIT: Output legitimacy
19
4.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis
4.2.1 Building a dichotomous data table

As can be seen, the data displayed in Table 4.1 consists of continuous and interval variables. For a crisp-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, these variables need to be dichotomised, that is, be assigned with
either a 1 (which indicates presence) or a 0 (which indicates absence). To achieve this dichotomisation,
for each variable (or condition in QCA terminology) a threshold will have to be set. The setting of
thresholds, or calibration, is one of the most arbitrary processes involved in QCA methodology, and
therefore needs to be grounded in sufficient empirical and/or theoretical evidence (Rihoux & Ragin,
2009; Skaaning, 2011). In order to improve the replicability and thus the reliability of this study, this
process is presented as transparent and comprehensive as possible, while trying to remain concise
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).
As the conditions consist of qualitative concepts, and the indicators set to measure these
conditions are self-defined, there are no theoretical grounds that justify a fixed cut-off point for where a
condition is present or not (which basically comes down to whether a certain aspect of the governance
structure or processes of an MSI is democratic or not). Therefore, in this study, the calibration mainly
relies on empirical (case-based) knowledge (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Skaaning, 2011). However, the
thresholds still have to make sense theoretically, and artificial or mechanical cuts (like the mean or
median) should be avoided (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). In order to visualise
the distribution of the cases along the continuum, the ‘thresholdsetter’ tool of the Tosmana software
(2018) was used, of which the results are displayed in Appendix III. This distribution was taken into
consideration for the calibration of each condition, to check whether there appeared any clusters of cases,
natural breaks in the data and to make sure that setting a threshold at a certain point made sense. The
calibration process for all indicators is explained in detail in Appendix IV. This process resulted in the
following dichotomisation thresholds:
• [INC]: Inclusion: 1 if board representation is equal to or above 40% and inclusive membership
is 2; otherwise 0.
• [ACC]: Accountability: 1 if inclusive grievance mechanism is equal to or above 3 and public
disclosure is equal to or above 6; otherwise 0.
• [PAR]: Participation: 1 if voting power is equal to or above 1 and stakeholder participation is
equal to or above 3; otherwise 0.
• [O_LEGIT]: Output legitimacy: 1 if standard uptake is above 10%; otherwise 0.
Applying these thresholds to the raw data results in a dichotomisation of the data, shown in in Table 4.2.
20
Table 4.2. Input legitimacy conditions, Dichotomised Data (3 conditions).

ASC 0 1 0 0
BCI 1 0 1 1
Bonsucro 0 1 0 0
FSC 1 1 1 1
FSI 0 0 0 n/a*
GCP 0 0 1 n/a*
GRSB 0 0 1 n/a*
MSC 0 0 0 1
ProTerra 0 0 0 0
RTRS 1 1 1 0
RSB 1 1 1 0
RSPO 0 1 1 1
*As no output legitimacy could be measured, these cases will be excluded from further analysis.
4.2.2 Constructing a truth table

Synthesising the dichotomised data from Table 4.2 (excluding the data of FSI, GCP and GRSB), a table
is constructed which lists the occurring combinations of conditions (configurations) and the
corresponding cases. This is called a truth table. The results are displayed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Truth Table of the Boolean Configurations.

MSC[1], ProTerra[0] 0 0 0 C
ASC, Bonsucro 0 1 0 0
RSPO 0 1 1 1
BCI` 1 0 1 1
FSC[1], RTRS[0], RSB[0] 1 1 1 C
In this truth table, the nine cases are transformed into five configurations. The following information
can be extracted from the truth table:
• There are two distinct configurations with a [1] outcome. One corresponds to RSPO and the
other to BCI;
• There is one configuration with a [0] outcome. This configuration corresponds to two cases:
ASC and Bonsucro;
• There are two contradictory configurations: configurations which consist of the same
combination of conditions, but differ on outcome. These two configurations (marked with a [C]
on outcome in the truth table) account for a total of five out of the nine cases. What’s more, the
premise of both configurations is problematic for the explanatory power of the model. One
contains [0] values on all conditions, and while it produces a [0] outcome for ProTerra, it
produces a [1] outcome for MSC. The other contains [1] values on all conditions, but only
produces a [1] outcome in the case of FSC. For RTRS and RSB, it produces a [0] outcome.
21
The data from Table 4.3 are visualised in the form of a Venn Diagram, displayed in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. Venn Diagram corresponding to Table 4.3 (3 conditions).*

* Venn diagram produced by the ‘visualizer’ tool, Tosmana software (2018)
Next to displaying the data from Table 4.3 in a visual manner, Figure 4.1 provides an additional insight.
The white zones in the Venn Diagram represent the “logical remainder” or [R] configurations. These
are non-observed configurations, since none of the cases correspond to these particular combinations of
conditions. In this case the nine observed cases correspond to five configurations, which means there is
a total of three logical remainder configurations. These configurations will later be used in the analysis
of the data. But before starting the actual analysis, an attempt has to be made to resolve the contradictory
configurations, as any cases involved in such configurations will have to be excluded. Given the case-
oriented nature of this approach, this would be an undesirable situation.
4.2.3 Resolving contradictory configurations

As mentioned before, two initial contradictory configurations emerged after the construction of the truth
table:
• 0, 0, 0: MSC[1], ProTerra[0];
• 1, 1, 1: FSC[1], RTRS[0], RSB[0].
There are different strategies to differentiate the involved cases, a combination of which is applied in
the process described in Appendix V. Following this process, all of the contradictions were successfully
resolved. The adjustments made to resolve the contradictory configurations result in a revised table with
22
dichotomised data (Table 4.4) and a revised truth table (Table 4.5). No revised Venn Diagram is
displayed as it does not provide any new information; the nine cases still cover the same five
configurations. Only a small change in the distribution of cases across the configurations has taken place,
which can also be observed in the truth table (Table 4.5).
Table 4.4. Input legitimacy conditions, Dichotomised Data (3 conditions, revised).

ASC 0 1 0 0
BCI 1 0 1 1
Bonsucro 0 1 0 0
FSC 1 1 1 0**
FSI 0 0 0 n/a*
GCP 0 0 1 n/a*
GRSB 0 0 1 n/a*
MSC 0 0 0 0**
ProTerra 0 0 0 0
RTRS 1 1 1 0
RSB 0** 1 0** 0
RSPO 0 1 1 1
*As no output legitimacy could be measured, these cases will be excluded from further analysis.
**This value was adjusted as a result of resolving the contradictory configurations, described in Appendix V.
Table 4.5. Truth Table of the Boolean Configurations (3 conditions, revised).

MSC, ProTerra 0 0 0 0
ASC, Bonsucro, RSB 0 1 0 0
RSPO 0 1 1 1
BCI` 1 0 1 1
FSC, RTRS 1 1 1 0
Thresholds:
INC = 1: board representation is equal to or above 40% and inclusive membership is 2; otherwise 0.
ACC = 1: inclusive grievance mechanism is equal to or above 3 and public disclosure is equal to or above 6;
otherwise 0.
PAR = 1: voting power is equal to or above 1 and stakeholder participation is equal to or above 3; otherwise 0.
O_LEGIT = 1: standard uptake is above 10%; otherwise 0.
4.2.4 Minimisation procedures

Using the truth table from Table 4.5 with its five configurations, the Tosmana software (2018) is asked
to minimise both the [1] configurations and [0] configurations. Because of the probability of causal
asymmetry (explanation of an outcome does not automatically explain the absence of an outcome) the
minimal formula for a [0] outcome should not be deduced from that of the [1] outcome (Rihoux &
Ragin, 2009; Skaaning, 2011). Therefore, separate minimisation procedures will be performed for both
types of configurations. In these procedures, the following operators for Boolean algebra are used:
logical “AND” is represented by the [*] symbol, logical “OR” is represented by the [+] symbol and the
23
connection between (a combination of) conditions and the outcome is expressed as the [→] symbol
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Furthermore, the presence of a condition is indicated with uppercase letters,
the absence with lowercase letters.
Analysis of the presence of output legitimacy

Prior to starting the minimisation procedures, an analysis of necessary conditions is performed, using
the measures of consistency and coverage. Consistency represents the degree to which the cases sharing
a given condition or configuration display the same outcome (Ragin, 2006). In order for a condition (or
configuration of conditions) to be regarded as necessary, the consistency should at least be higher than
0,75, and preferably higher. Then the coverage should be considered, which represents the degree to
which a condition or combination of conditions account for instances of an outcome, and thus gives an
indication of the empirical relevance or importance (Ragin, 2006). To calculate the consistency and
coverage for the presence and absence for each (combination of) conditions, fs/QCA 3.0 software (Ragin
& Davey, 2017) is used. The results are shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Analysis of necessary conditions for presence of output legitimacy.

Condition Consistency Coverage
INC 0,33 0,50
inc 0,17 0,50
ACC 0,17 0,50
acc 0,33 0,50
PAR 0,50 1,00
par 0,00 0,00
Maintaining the minimal consistency threshold of 0,75, no necessary conditions for output legitimacy
could be identified. Presence of participation has perfect coverage (is present in all cases with a [1]
outcome), but this finding is negligible due to its low consistency of 0,50 (even though it’s the highest
observed consistency of all conditions).
It might be the case that no condition in itself, but only a combination of conditions is necessary
for achieving output legitimacy. To find out, the minimisation procedure needs to be run. This yields
the following result:
INC * acc * PAR + inc * ACC * PAR → O_LEGIT

(BCI) (RSPO)
This Boolean notation reads as follows. Output legitimacy is observed:

• In MSIs that combine inclusion [INC] AND a lack of accountability [acc] AND participation
[PAR] in their governance structure;
24
• In MSIs that combine a lack of inclusion [inc] AND accountability [ACC] AND participation
[PAR] in their governance structure.
Both explanations correspond to one case; respectively BCI and RSPO.
The next step in the analysis is to perform the minimisation procedure again, this time including the
logical remainders. By allowing the software to include these non-observed cases in the minimisation,
a shorter or more ‘parsimonious’ solution can be achieved. The minimisation will then be based on a
one or more ‘simplifying assumptions’: assumptions the software makes regarding the outcome of a
logical remainder (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). One simplifying assumption was left out of the minimisation
including the logical remainders: INC * acc * par → O_LEGIT. This was a contradictory simplifying
assumption (CSA) since it was also included in the minimisation of the [0] configurations with logical
remainders. As will be explained in the next paragraph, this contradiction was resolved by leaving it out
of the minimisation of the [1] configurations. Including one simplifying assumption (inc * acc * PAR
→ O_LEGIT) in the minimisation procedure leads to the following solution:
acc * PAR + inc * PAR → O_LEGIT

(BCI) (RSPO)
This solution further reduces complexity by identifying two combinations of two conditions that lead to
output legitimacy. Output legitimacy is observed:
• In MSIs that combine participation [PAR] and a lack of inclusion [inc] in their governance
structure;
• In MSIs that combine participation [PAR] and a lack of accountability [acc] in their governance
structure.
Again, both explanations only correspond to one case. The solutions of both minimisation procedures
are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7. Solutions for the presence of output legitimacy.

Complex solution path 1 Complex solution path 2 Parsimonious solution
Without logical INC inc PAR
remainders acc ACC
PAR PAR
With logical acc inc
remainders PAR PAR
Cases explained BCI RSPO BCI + RSPO
Consistency 1,00 1,00 0,50
Coverage 0,50 0,50 1,00
25
The consistency and coverage of these solutions read as follows:

• All the cases that display a combined presence of inclusion and participation with an absence
of accountability have a [1] outcome on output legitimacy. This solution covers half of the cases
with a [1] outcome;
• All the cases that display a combined presence of accountability and participation with an
absence of inclusion have a [1] outcome on output legitimacy. This solution covers half of the
cases with a [1] outcome.
The two solutions both have a perfect consistency of 1,00, but this is solely caused by the fact that both
solutions only cover one case. This is not unusual in small-N research. But because the two solutions
identified both only correspond to one case, we only obtained two specific explanations for each specific
case. Therefore, it is an accumulation of descriptions rather than an explanation. In addition, the
coverage does not provide much information regarding empirical importance because of the limited
explanatory power of both solutions.
The aim of QCA is to identify key regularities by generalisation, and thus obtain a parsimonious
solution to explain a certain phenomenon. When comparing the two paths, one regularity can be
identified; the presence of participation. This leads to the following parsimonious solution:
PAR → O_LEGIT
(BCI+RSPO)
No consistency can be established for this solution. Because the solution is not found to be necessary,
there is no need for an assessment of its coverage. Consequently, no necessary and sufficient conditions
or combination of conditions were identified for output legitimacy.
Analysis of the absence of output legitimacy

As was done with the analysis of the presence of output legitimacy, first the necessity of the presence
and absence of all the individual conditions is assessed. This analysis is shown in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Analysis of necessary conditions for absence of output legitimacy.

Condition Consistency Coverage
INC 0,67 0,29
inc 0,83 0,71
ACC 0,83 0,71
acc 0,67 0,29
PAR 0,50 0,29
par 1,00 0,71
With a consistency well above the minimum threshold of 0,75 for tests of necessity, three necessary
conditions for the absence of output legitimacy can be identified: a lack of inclusion, a high degree of
26
accountability and a lack of participation. An especially interesting observation is that in all cases with
a [0] outcome on output legitimacy, participation is absent. This resonates with the parsimonious
solution for the presence of output legitimacy. Even though said solution did not pass the consistency
threshold, this similarity reinforces the result of a lack of participation as a necessary condition for the
absence output legitimacy. Each of these conditions covers 71% of the cases that display a lack of output
legitimacy, which indicates a relatively high empirical importance.
However, since QCA is a configurational method, the role of individual conditions should not
be (over)interpreted; the focus lies of the interplay of these individual conditions with the other
conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Additionally, the strength of QCA lies with exploring and
comparing cases in a configurational manner while maintaining a strong link with the specific empirical
cases. Measures of consistency and coverage are designed to help researchers make sense of the studied
cases, and thus are a descriptive rather than an inferential tool (Ragin, 2006).
To take a closer look at the interplay of conditions, the minimisation procedure is run, which
results in the following formula:
inc * par + INC * ACC * PAR → o_legit

(ASC,Bonsucro,RSB+MSC,ProTerra) (FSC,RTRS)
This Boolean notation implies the following. A lack of output legitimacy is observed:
• In MSIs that combine a lack of inclusion [inc] and participation [par] in their governance
structure;
• In MSIs that combine inclusion [INC], accountability [ACC] and participation [PAR] in their
governance structure.
The first solution corresponds with five cases: ASC, Bonsucro, RSB, MSC and ProTerra. The second
one corresponds to two cases: FSC and RTRS.
As was done in the minimisation of the [1] configurations, now the logical remainders will be included
in the minimisation of the [0] configurations. Earlier it was mentioned a contradictory simplifying
assumption (CSA) occurred the minimisation of [1] configurations and [0] configurations with logical
remainders. The simplifying assumption INC * acc * par was initially included in both minimisation
procedures, so the assumptions regarding the outcome value of this logical remainder were
contradictory. This is problematic as it implies both the presence and absence of output legitimacy can
be explained with the same exact combination of conditions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). To resolve this
CSA a ‘theoretical case’ is added to the truth table. Given the perfect consistency of the absence of
participation as a condition for a lack of output legitimacy, and the relatively high consistency and
coverage of the presence of participation (though it does not pass the threshold) as a condition for output
legitimacy, it is a more plausible assumption that this formula would lead to an absence of output
27
legitimacy. Therefore, the CSA configuration is assigned a [0] outcome and included in the minimisation
of [0] configurations. Including two simplifying assumptions (INC * acc * par + INC * ACC * par →
o_legit) in the minimisation procedure leads to the following solution:
par + INC * ACC → o_legit

(ASC,Bonsucro,RSB+MSC,ProTerra) (FSC,RTRS)
The inclusion of logical remainders results in the removal of a condition from each of the two solutions,
and thus manages to reduce complexity. A lack of output legitimacy is observed:
• In MSIs with a lack of participation [par] in their governance structure;
• In MSIs that combine inclusion [INC] and accountability [ACC] in their governance structure.
The first solution corresponds to ASC, Bonsucro, RSB, MSC and ProTerra and the second solution
corresponds to FSC and RTRS. These solutions, together with the results of the minimisation without
logical remainders, are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7. Solutions for the absence of output legitimacy.

Complex solution path 1 Complex solution path 2
Without logical inc INC
remainders par ACC
PAR
With logical remainders par INC
ACC
Cases explained ASC, Bonsucro, RSB + FSC, RTRS
MSC, ProTerra
Consistency 1,00 1,00
Coverage 0,71 0,29
No more parsimonious solution could be formulated since these two solutions have nothing in common.
The consistency and coverage of these solutions read as follows:
• All the cases that display a combined absence of inclusion and participation have a [0] outcome
on output legitimacy. This solution covers 71% of the cases with a [0] outcome;
• All the cases that display an absence of participation have a [0] outcome on output legitimacy.
This solution covers 71% of the cases with a [0] outcome;
• All the cases that display a combined presence of inclusion, accountability and participation
have a [0] outcome on output legitimacy. This solution covers 29% of the cases with a [0]
outcome;
• All the cases that display a combined presence of inclusion and accountability have a [0]
outcome on output legitimacy. This solution covers 29% of the cases with a [0] outcome.
28
This methodology allows for existence of equifinality and causal complexity, which means that multiple
paths can lead to the same outcome (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). However, in this case the two solutions
are contradictory; one solution indicates the combined absence of two conditions leads to a [0] outcome,
the other indicates the combined presence of all three conditions leads to a [1] outcome. Therefore, it is
necessary to be prudent in the interpretation of these results. The coverage of path 1 (0,71) is much
higher than the coverage of path 2 (0,29). The former is of much higher empirical importance than the
latter, since it covers a larger proportion of the instances of an outcome (Ragin, 2006). However, this
does not mean that path 2 has no theoretical relevance.
These results lead to the finding that the combined absence of inclusion and participation is a
necessary and sufficient combination of conditions to explain a lack of output legitimacy. The absence
of participation, absence of inclusion and presence of accountability by themselves were also found to
be necessary and sufficient conditions for a lack of output legitimacy. However, the (combined) presence
of these conditions is by no means a guarantee for attaining output legitimacy, given the fact that two
cases with a combined presence of all three conditions also lead to a lack of output legitimacy and no
(combination of) conditions turned out to be necessary and sufficient for achieving output legitimacy.
5 Discussion
5.1 Findings
In this research the assumed relationship between MSI input legitimacy and output legitimacy among
southern stakeholders was assessed, using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the collected
data on nine MSIs. The analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions of input legitimacy for attaining
output legitimacy among southern stakeholders yielded the following results. No necessary and
sufficient (combination of) conditions could be identified that lead to the outcome of output legitimacy,
understood as acceptance of the MSI by southern stakeholders. However, there were conditions that
were found to be necessary and sufficient for explaining a lack of output legitimacy: a combined absence
of inclusion and participation. These results show that the incorporation of certain aspects of input
legitimacy into the MSIs (governance) structure does not necessarily lead to output legitimacy among
southern stakeholders. There are several explanations for this finding.
Instead of higher input legitimacy leading to higher output legitimacy, there might actually a
trade-off between the two (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013b; Schmidt, 2012; Biermann & Gupta, 2011;
Bäckstrand, 2006a; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008). The proposition of a trade-off between the two is
supported by the finding that for RTRS and FSC, while having attained high input legitimacy with all
three conditions present, no output legitimacy could be observed. A trade-off can be explained by
processes of extensive inclusion and participation undermining output legitimacy, by making MSI
processes less efficient and reducing their problem-solving capacity (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008;
Lindgren & Persson, 2010).
29
Additionally, RTRS is known to have legitimacy issues and has faced large-scale opposition,
though not from the side of southern stakeholders in specific. This could partly explain the low standard
uptake, together with the fact the market demand for soy is quite low due to low product visibility
(Schouten & Glasberen, 2012). But then again, similar issues were observed for the RSPO, while the
RSPO has a relatively high standard uptake.
Alternatively, MSIs that on paper may appear to have attained input legitimacy (by securing
processes like inclusion, accountability and participation), may in practice not act according to the
principles and procedures communicated to the public. This discrepancy is also demonstrated in the
recently published report ‘Looking good on paper’ (Van der Wal, 2018), and may explain why the
findings did not verify the assumption that higher input legitimacy would lead to higher output
legitimacy. It does, however, strengthen the often voiced criticisms that MSI fail to monitor compliance
to their standards, reducing their function to mere window-dressing (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). These
criticisms are further fuelled by the observation that three of the twelve selected MSIs (FSI, GCP and
GRSB) turned out to produce no regulations whatsoever – deeming membership of those MSIs non-
committal. Organisations may become members on their own terms, while still enjoying the benefits of
being part of an initiative that claims to tackle sustainability issues within the targeted value chain in
question, like increased consumer recognition.
The finding that the combined absence of inclusion and participation (dimensions of input
legitimacy) can explain the absence of output legitimacy among southern stakeholders is in line with the
finding of Marin-Burgos et al. (2015) that a lack of inclusion and participation explained the contestation
of legitimacy by local actors in the Colombian National Interpretation of the RSPO Principles and
Criteria. This finding suggests that while the presence of mechanisms of inclusion, accountability and
participation in MSIs do not guarantee output legitimacy, the absence of these mechanisms will most
likely ensure there will be a lack of output legitimacy. Therefore, it is still important to design MSIs to
be inclusive of southern stakeholders.
The findings of this study corroborates earlier findings of other studies that MSIs like FSC and
MSC, while having realised substantial standard uptake, have trouble connecting to and gaining support
from southern stakeholders (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Kalfagianni & Pattberg). Most other MSIs, except
RSPO and BCI, have not been able to realise a notable standard uptake at all, reflecting a low degree of
output legitimacy among southern stakeholders altogether. Nevertheless, MSIs and the standards they
produce still are the most viable option in the pursuit of building more sustainable food and agriculture
value chains. Thus, we should continue putting effort into trying to construct more legitimate and
effective MSI procedures.
5.2 Limitations
Firstly, QCA can be quite arbitrary at some points in the application of the methodology, due to the
fickle nature of the decisions that have to be made in this methodology to reduce complexity (Skaaning,
30
2011). Although arbitrariness and bias cannot be fully ruled out, various measures were taken in order
to keep the limitations of this methodology in check. An attempt was made to maintain maximum
transparency, for instance by also providing the matrix with the raw data of all cases and a detailed
discussion of the calibration process (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
Second, even though some cases have all been assigned a 1 or a 0 for a condition, there may
still be a lot of variation between cases with the same score. The binary assessment of the condition
neglects this variation in data, simplifying reality and leading to a loss of information richness. For
instance, when comparing the raw data, FSC performed a lot better on the accountability condition than
Bonsucro, even though the condition was judged to be present for both cases. However, csQCA doesn’t
allow for any nuance.
Third, only a limited amount of conditions (three) could be included in the configurational
analysis, because there were only twelve cases (later adjusted to nine). There might be other (legitimacy-
unrelated) factors that haven’t been taken into consideration that have a bigger influence on output
legitimacy than the dimensions of input legitimacy identified, like market demand (Bernstein &
Cashore, 2007), competitiveness with rival MSIs (Smith & Fischlein, 2010; Reinecke, Manning & Von
Hagen, 2012) and the emergence of Southern sustainability standards (Schouten & Bitzer, 2015).
Fourth, in the end the cases might have displayed too little variation on the outcome condition,
with only two of the nine analysed cases having attained output legitimacy. Ideally, a configuration
corresponds to more than one case, so that not just an individual description of a case is obtained. The
general rule of thumb is that at least a third of the cases has to display a certain outcome (Rihoux &
Ragin, 2009). This issue was unforeseen, as initially there appeared to be enough variation in output
legitimacy among the selected MSIs.
Finally, it may be possible that the indicator standard uptake does not actually (or accurately)
measure output legitimacy. For instance, the finding that RSPO has attained output legitimacy and thus
is accepted by southern stakeholders is not in line with previous findings, which indicate that RSPO has
instead faced large scale opposition from southern stakeholders (Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011).
However, it might be the case that although facing opposition, there is also a large part of southern
stakeholders that are actually accepting of the MSI. In addition, the fact that a certain standard-compliant
product has a large uptake may also mean that it’s easy to certify or that the standard is just very lenient,
instead of southern stakeholders accepting the standard. Finally, standard uptake also does not
necessarily reflect problem-solving capacity of the MSI in terms of realising substantial environmental
and developmental outcomes, because these impacts are seldom measured (Bäckstrand, 2006a). But as
of now, using the available data and this specific methodology, this is the best option for measuring
output legitimacy.
31
5.3 Future research

Based on the findings of this study on the relationship between conditions of input legitimacy and output
legitimacy of MSIs among southern stakeholders, some recommendations for future research are made.
Qualitative research into this subject could be a valuable addition to the findings of this study,
for instance by conducting interviews with stakeholders from within the MSIs and southern
stakeholders. This way, the findings of this study could possibly be verified, further explained and
underlying structures could be uncovered. Within this research, the focus could also be placed on the
possible trade-off between input and output legitimacy.
Future research could also focus on finding alternative explanations for the creation of output
legitimacy, since apparently input legitimacy is not sufficient, or at least the conditions of input
legitimacy identified in this study. Other conditions could be included, like comprehensiveness and
stringency of standards and quality of audits (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013a), market demand (Bernstein
& Cashore, 2007) and the existence of rival MSIs (Smith & Fischlein, 2010; Reinecke, Manning & Von
Hagen, 2012) or competing southern sustainability standards (Schouten & Bitzer, 2015). Alternatively,
each condition of input legitimacy used in this study could be split up in two conditions by separating
the indicators. Including more conditions could improve the explanatory power of the model, but this
also means that the amount of cases will have to be expanded to avoid the problem of limited diversity
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).
Additionally, there might be other ways to measure output legitimacy and the defined conditions
of input legitimacy. The focus on standard uptake as a measure for effectiveness (output legitimacy) is
quite limited, but broadening this operationalisation to an all-encompassing perspective on the output
legitimacy of MSIs (including environmental and social impacts) fell outside the scope of this study. It
might be fruitful to make an attempt at measuring the perceived input legitimacy – that is, the degree to
which stakeholders perceive input legitimacy at an MSI. This might differ greatly from the input
legitimacy on paper, and thus explain why higher input legitimacy does not seem to determine output
legitimacy.
6 Conclusion
This study focused on whether or not certain factors (of input legitimacy) contribute to the legitimacy
of voluntary sustainability standards in the food and agriculture sector as perceived by southern
stakeholders. It was found that in this context, high input legitimacy does not necessarily lead to high
output legitimacy among southern stakeholders.
The findings of this study imply that designing the governance and decision-making processes
of MSIs along democratic principles such as inclusion, accountability and participation, does not
guarantee the MSI and its standards will be accepted by southern stakeholders. This might mean that the
already established power structures within these initiatives are far too stubborn to be eliminated only
by building in procedures aimed at including southern stakeholders. Thus, the dominance of Northern
32
stakeholders is preserved, which hinders the acceptance of the MSI by Southern stakeholders. Or
perhaps it means that multi-stakeholder initiatives initiated by Northern stakeholders will never be fully
accepted by Southern stakeholders, because they will always be perceived as neo-colonial attempts to
(re)gain influence in the global South.
The consequence is that as long as multi-stakeholder initiatives continue to operate as a
regulatory body, they will have to deal with legitimacy challenges, regardless of whether the MSI is
organised to be democratic and inclusive of Southern stakeholders. We should therefore continue trying
to create a better understanding of legitimacy challenges faced by MSIs, in order to increase their
capacity to effectively tackle sustainability challenges in the global food and agriculture sector.
33
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36
Appendix I: operationalisation of input and output legitimacy indicators

Table A.1. Operationalisation of input and output legitimacy.*
Condition Indicator Operationalisation
Inclusion Board representation by region Percentage of board members who are from the global north compared with the
Input legitimacy
percentage of board members from the global south.

Accessible membership - The cost of becoming a member is in proportion with the constituency the aspiring
member belongs to
- An outreach program is in place to allow smallholders and other hard-to-reach
stakeholders to get certified and/or involve them in decision-making processes
Accountability Inclusive grievance mechanism - Public access to policy and procedures for complaints on certification decisions
- Complaint procedures made available in a local language
- Ability to launch complaints at local level
- Acceptance of complaints launched by informal means
Public disclosure The MSI discloses (online or on request):
- List of Board members
- List of committee members
- Lists of certified/verified enterprises
- Lists of complaints/appeals/resolutions
- Certification decisions
- Minutes of Board and committee meetings
- Standard setting and review procedures
- Independently audited full financial statements
- Annual reports
Participation Voting power - Members have the right to vote in a General Assembly of sorts
- Balanced voting based on the division between the global north and south
Stakeholder participation - Public feedback mechanisms
- External stakeholder participation on boards and committees
- External stakeholder consultation in standard-setting processes
- External stakeholder decision making in standard-setting processes
Compliance Standard uptake Standard-compliant production volume as a percentage of global production volume,
Output
legitimacy
taking the amount of years the standard has been in use into consideration.
Certified smallholders Standard-compliant production volume produced by smallholders as a percentage of
total standard-compliant production volume, compared with global production volume
produced by smallholders as a percentage of global production volume.
*The definition of the thresholds (the turning point at which a condition/indicator is either present or absent) has yet to take place – this will be done during the process of
calibration (as mentioned in the steps of data analysis)
37
Appendix II: data collection sources

Table A.2. Sources used for data collection on MSIs.
Source Date accessed
https://www.asc-aqua.org/about-us/governance/ September 2018
ASC
ASC Supervisory Board Regulations

ASC Complaints Procedure
https://www.asc-aqua.org/what-you-can-do/participate/provide-input/
Potts et al. (2016)
ASC Deed of Incorporation
ASC Director's Report and Combined Financial Statements 2016
FAO Fishstat
https://bettercotton.org/about-bci/who-we-are/bci-council/ September 2018
BCI
BCI Statutes
BCI Annual Report 2017
https://bettercotton.org/get-involved/membership-offer/
https://bettercotton.org/about-better-cotton/better-cotton-standard-
system/capacity-building/
Potts et al. (2014)
https://bettercotton.org/grievances/
BCI Grievance Management Process
BCI Principles & Criteria
BCI Standard Setting and Revision Procedure
https://www.idhsustainabletrade.com/annual-report-2016/sectors/cotton/
https://bettercotton.org/about-bci/frequently-asked-questions/
Articles of Association September 2018
Bonsucro
https://www.bonsucro.com/team/
https://www.bonsucro.com/join-the-network/#step-1
Bonsucro Structure of Decision Making
Standard Development and Revision Procedure
Bonsucro Complaint Resolution Process
Potts et al. (2014)
Bonsucro Members’ Council Terms of Reference
Bonsucro Production Standard for Smallholder Farmers
Potts et al. (2016)
Bonsucro Outcome Report 2017
https://ic.fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc/governance/board-of-directors August 2018
FSC
FSC Statutes (2017)

https://ic.fsc.org/en/for-business/fsc-tools/certifying-small-forests
FSC Special Programs for Smallholders
FSC Dispute Resolution System
Processing Policy for Association Complaints in the FSC® Certification
Scheme
https://ic.fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc/governance
Potts et al. (2014)
Process requirements for the development and maintenance of National Forest
Stewardship Standards (2009)
https://ic.fsc.org/en/what-is-fsc-certification/consultations
Potts et al. (2016)
Certification: a solution for smallholders and community managed forests
(2015)
https://ic.fsc.org/en/news-updates/market-news/id/1884
38
FSC Facts & Figures July 2018

http://fsi2020.com/about/ July 2018
FSI
Membership Rules for members of the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative

FSI Articles of Association
http://fsi2020.com/
http://fsi2020.com/basket/
FSI Projects Overview
https://www.globalcoffeeplatform.org/about-new/#gcp-board July 2018
GCP
By-laws of the Board of the Global Coffee Platform

Statutes
GCP Membership registration, membership types, fees and payment compliance
policy
Terms of Participation
GCP Complaint Procedure
By-laws for the membership assembly of the Global Coffee Platform
GCP Baseline setting procedure
Baseline Common Code
https://grsbeef.org/Leadership/ May 2018
GRSB
https://grsbeef.org/JoinGRSB
By-laws of the Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (2015)
GRSB Global to Local report (2015)
https://grsbeef.org/Technical-Working-Groups
Definition of Sustainable Beef: Principles and Criteria Process Summary
GRSB Sustainability Report (2016)
Response to the GRSB Principles and Criteria for sustainable beef (2014)
https://www.msc.org/about-the-msc/our-governance July 2018
MSC
https://www.msc.org/about-the-msc/our-history
Potts et al. (2016)
MSC Standard Setting Procedure
https://www.msc.org/standards-and-certification/developing-our-standards
https://improvements.msc.org/about-the-process
FAO Fishstat
MSC Annual Report 2016-17
MSC Complaints Procedure
FAO Sustainability Pathways: Factsheet Smallholders (2012)
http://www.proterrafoundation.org/what-we-do/board/ April 2018
ProTerra
Terms of Reference – ProTerra Certification Governance Board

Stichting ProTerra Foundation Bylaws (2016)
http://www.proterrafoundation.org/membership-application-form/
http://www.proterrafoundation.org/members/#full-member
http://www.proterrafoundation.org/revision-standard-v4/
http://www.proterrafoundation.org/non-gmo/certification/
https://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/latest.pdf
Potts et al. (2014)
http://rsb.org/about/who-we-are/board-of-directors/ March 2018
RSB
Second generation biofuel markets (2016)

RSB membership application form
https://rsb.org/membership/aboutmembership/
RSB Grievance Procedure
Potts et al. (2014)
Articles of Association (2017)
http://rsb.org/about/who-we-are/assembly-of-delegates/
39
http://rsb.org/certification/call-for-public-comment-certification/
Procedure for Development and Modification of RSB Standards (2014)
RSB Theory of Change (2015)
RSPO Statutes March 2018
RSPO
https://rspo.org/about/who-we-are/board-of-governors
https://rspo.org/about/how-we-work
https://rspo.org/members/categories
RSPO Membership Rules
https://rspo.org/members/dispute-settlement-facility
https://rspo.org/members/complaints
https://rspo.org/about/impacts
https://rspo.org/file/acop2016/sectoral/ACOP_Digest_2016_FA-
v180314_lores.pdf
https://www.rspo.org/certification/how-rspo-certification-works
https://www.rspo.org/smallholders/rspo-certification-by-the-number
https://www.rspo.org/smallholders
Statutes March 2018
RTRS
http://www.responsiblesoy.org/about-rtrs/governance/executive-
board/?lang=en
http://www.responsiblesoy.org/certification/production/?lang=en
RTRS Group and Multi-site Certification Standard (2014)
Progressive entry level for the RTRS production standard certification (2017)
http://www.responsiblesoy.org/about-rtrs/members/registration-form/?lang=en
https://www.solidaridadnetwork.org/soy-producer-support-initiative
Potts et al. (2014)
Grievance Procedure
http://www.responsiblesoy.org/about-rtrs/members/?lang=en
https://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/latest.pdf
Lernoud et al. (2015)
http://www.responsiblesoy.org/mercado/volumenes-y-productores-
certificados/?lang=en
http://www.responsiblesoy.org/about-rtrs/history/?lang=en
40
Appendix III: ‘thresholdsetter’ output

In this Appendix the output of the ‘thresholdsetter’ tool of the Tosmana software (2018), showing the
distribution of cases along the continuum for each indicator, is displayed. The bold vertical line
represents the median; the thin vertical line with a value assigned to it represents the threshold. The
figures show that for a few indicators, the median coincides with the threshold, as shown in figures A.3,
A.4 and A.5. This is purely coincidental, as the median wasn’t used as a threshold for any of the
conditions.
Inclusion
Figure A.1. Setting a threshold for the INC Condition (indicator board representation)
Figure A.2. Setting a threshold for the INC Condition (indicator inclusive membership)
41
Accountability
Figure A.3. Setting a threshold for the ACC Condition (indicator inclusive grievance mechanism)
Figure A.4. Setting a threshold for the ACC Condition (indicator public disclosure)
Participation
Figure A.5. Setting a threshold for the PAR Condition (indicator voting power)
42
Figure A.6. Setting a threshold for the PAR Condition (indicator stakeholder participation)
Output legitimacy
Figure A.7. Setting a threshold for the O_LEGIT Outcome (indicator standard uptake)
43
Appendix IV: calibration of conditions and outcome

For all conditions with two indicators, that is INC, ACC and PAR, both of the indicators of the condition
need to be present in order for the condition to be assessed as present. If there is only one indicator
present, or none at all, the condition is absent.
As for the indicator board representation, ideally, the share of southern stakeholders in the board
should be 50% or higher. The amount of northern and southern board members should at the very least
be equally distributed, given the range of interests they ought to represent. In a lot of cases a higher
percentage of southern board members would even be desirable, since the vast majority of the
stakeholders in the value chain they seek to govern comes from the southern region. However, it is also
important to look at the relative performance of MSIs on this indicator. As 40% is already a step in the
right direction (and still a better score than most MSIs) it is decided to place the threshold on this
percentage. This way, the indicator is prevented from being too discriminatory, while remaining its
integrity.
Most of the other indicators were operationalised as a set of criteria that had to be assessed for
each case. Logically, the more criteria are met for each indicator, the more the indicator can be seen as
present. Regardless of the distribution of cases along the continuum, for these indicators to be present,
it was decided that at least 75% of the criteria had to be met (with the number being rounded up if not
an integer). When fewer criteria are met, this means there are limited processes in place in the MSI to
ensure input legitimacy. Theoretically, it would not make sense to code an indicator as present when
this is the case, which is why the indicator will then be seen as absent.
Two exceptions to this rule were made; for the indicator voting power and the indicator public
disclosure. One of the two criteria for voting power, namely balanced voting, was met in only one of the
twelve cases. Placing the threshold on 2 would be too strict in the context of this indicator, since balanced
voting appeared to be rather exceptional. Therefore, it was decided that for this indicator it would also
suffice if only one criterion was met. In the case of public disclosure, the highest score was 8 out of 9
criteria. Placing the threshold on 7 would make the indicator too exclusive, while the cases with 6 criteria
met also displayed a relatively high degree of transparency, and did well on the other indicator for ACC
(inclusive grievance mechanism) as well. Hence, the threshold for public disclosure was placed on 6.
Although QCA scholars generally advise against using natural breaks in the distribution of cases
for setting the threshold, this technique was applied anyway for the threshold of output legitimacy. In
this case there were two very clear clusters of cases on two ends of the continuum. Because the size of
this break (9,3% between the highest value on the lower end of the continuum and the lowest value on
the higher end of the continuum) and the dense distribution of especially the lower values, it was decided
this natural break was sufficient ground for setting the threshold. Thus, the threshold was set at 10%.
Initially, the calibration process in this study was designed to include a robustness check, in the
form of slightly changing the threshold for each indicator and checking if the minimisation procedure
would then still produce the same results. However, on second thought the inclusion of this check was
44
reconsidered, because the very nature of csQCA is what makes the technique less robust than fsQCA
(Skaaning, 2011). Also, the range of outcomes is quite limited for most indicators (0-2 or 0-4).
Therefore, it is not possible to make a minor change to which the same theoretical justifications could
be applied (Skaaning, 2011); moving the threshold just one point up or down would already result in a
major relative change. Another possible robustness check would be to change the frequency threshold:
only consider the configurations that cover an amount of cases equal to or higher than the threshold
(Skaaning, 2011). However, because of the low number of cases (12), the better option is to consider all
configurations as relevant. Additionally, raising the frequency threshold to two would mean that the two
configurations that lead to a [1] outcome (either of which corresponds to only one case) would have to
be excluded. In that case, the minimisation procedure explaining the presence of the outcome cannot be
performed. Therefore, it was decided to not apply any robustness checks at all, and to stick to the
previously set thresholds.
45
Appendix V: process of resolving contradictory configurations

The following process was followed to resolve the contradictory configurations:
1. FSC[1], RTRS[0], RSB[0]: 1, 1, 1. After a first re-examination of the cases involved in this
contradictory configuration, one possible source of the contradiction was located. In the case of
RSB, a data error had occurred for the indicator board representation. Instead of two, only one of
the five board members is from the global south, which means that the representation of the global
south in the board comes down to 20%. As a result, inclusion is adjusted to [0] for RSB, leading to
a new configuration of 0, 1, 1. Further re-examination of the outcome and case data of FSC and
RTRS provided an additional explanation for the contradiction. In the case of FSC, zooming in on
the market data shows that only 14% of the FSC-certified forest area is situated in the global South
(Lernoud et al., 2015). This means the percentage southern stakeholders who choose get certified
and thus ‘accept’ the standard is considerably smaller than assumed. Therefore, the indicator that
was initially used to measure output legitimacy does not actually properly reflect the output
legitimacy of the standard as perceived by southern stakeholders. With the additional data
considered, the outcome on output legitimacy will have to be adjusted to a [0] for FSC. As this
matches the outcome for RTRS, there are no further contradictions in this configuration;
2. RSB[0], RSPO[1]: 0, 1, 1. After the attempt to resolve the previous contradictory configuration,
which lead to the adjustment of inclusion of RSB to 0 instead of 1, this new contradictory
configuration emerged. This prompted a closer look into what had been missed, and what hadn’t
been considered in the initial operationalisation of the conditions and outcome. Remarkably,
contrary to all the other cases that scored a 1 on participation, RSB doesn’t have an opportunity for
its members to exercise direct voting power via a General Assembly of sorts. Instead, within each
of the five constituencies members get to elect three representatives for the Assembly of Delegates,
which functions as a General Assembly. However, this governance structure raises the barrier for
members to participate directly in decision-making processes, because a) only a small selection of
the members can participate and b) you have to be elected in order to participate. This resembles the
situation with the Bonsucro Members’ Council, which resulted in a 0 on participation. Just having
‘voting power’ is not enough; only voting power which provides members with direct access to
participation in decision-making processes. The participation condition is therefore revised to fit
this new operationalisation. Consequently, participation for RSB is adjusted from 1 to 0, once again
leading to a new configuration for RSB: 0, 1, 0. No new contradictory configurations emerged
following this second reconfiguration of RSB;
3. MSC[1], ProTerra[0]: 0, 0, 0. Following the strategy that was applied to resolve the contradiction
between FSC and RTRS, at first the case data for the outcome are further inspected. As was the case
with FSC, after the standard uptake of MSC certified products is differentiated by region, it appears
89% of the production comes from 10 northern countries (Potts et al., 2016). Hence, for MSC the
outcome is also adjusted to [0], eliminating the last contradiction in the observed configurations.
46

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Research MSI QCA

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Perceived legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives in the global

South: A configurational analysis

Name: Dorine Leeuwerik

2.1 Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives

2.3 MSI input legitimacy

2.4 MSI output legitimacy

2.5 The relationship between MSI input and output legitimacy

Figure 2.1. Conceptual model.

3.1 Data collection

3.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

3.3 Case selection

A short description of each of the twelve MSIs is provided in Box 3.1.

Box 3.1. Description of the selected cases.

Better Cotton Initiative

Floriculture Sustainability Initiative

Forest Stewardship Council

Global Coffee Platform

Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef

Marine Stewardship Council

Round Table on Responsible Soy

Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials

Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

3.4 Variable selection

Table 3.1. Indicators of input and output legitimacy.

Stakeholder participation Potts et al. (2014); Martens et al. (2017);

3.6 Data analysis

4.1 Descriptive analysis

Better Cotton Initiative

Floriculture Sustainability Initiative

Forest Stewardship Council

Global Coffee Platform

Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef

Marine Stewardship Council

Roundtable on Responsible Soy

Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials

Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

Table 4.1. Input legitimacy conditions, Raw Data (3 conditions).

Labels for conditions:

4.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

4.2.1 Building a dichotomous data table

Table 4.2. Input legitimacy conditions, Dichotomised Data (3 conditions).

4.2.2 Constructing a truth table

Table 4.3. Truth Table of the Boolean Configurations.

Figure 4.1. Venn Diagram corresponding to Table 4.3 (3 conditions).*

4.2.3 Resolving contradictory configurations

Table 4.4. Input legitimacy conditions, Dichotomised Data (3 conditions, revised).

Table 4.5. Truth Table of the Boolean Configurations (3 conditions, revised).

4.2.4 Minimisation procedures

Analysis of the presence of output legitimacy

Table 4.6. Analysis of necessary conditions for presence of output legitimacy.

INC * acc * PAR + inc * ACC * PAR → O_LEGIT

This Boolean notation reads as follows. Output legitimacy is observed:

acc * PAR + inc * PAR → O_LEGIT

Table 4.7. Solutions for the presence of output legitimacy.

The consistency and coverage of these solutions read as follows:

Analysis of the absence of output legitimacy

Table 4.8. Analysis of necessary conditions for absence of output legitimacy.

inc * par + INC * ACC * PAR → o_legit

par + INC * ACC → o_legit

Table 4.7. Solutions for the absence of output legitimacy.

5.3 Future research

Appendix I: operationalisation of input and output legitimacy indicators

percentage of board members from the global south.