J Autism Dev Disord
DOI 10.1007/s10803-015-2623-2
ORIGINAL PAPER
Is Social Categorization the Missing Link Between Weak Central
Coherence and Mental State Inference Abilities in Autism?
Preliminary Evidence from a General Population Sample
Daniel P. Skorich1 • Adrienne R. May1 • Louisa A. Talipski1 • Marnie H. Hall1
Anita J. Dolstra1 • Tahlia B. Gash1 • Beth H. Gunningham1
 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Abstract We explore the relationship between the ‘the-
ory of mind’ (ToM) and ‘central coherence’ difficulties of
autism. We introduce covariation between hierarchically-
embedded categories and social information—at the local
level, the global level, or at both levels simultaneously—
within a category confusion task. We then ask participants
to infer the mental state of novel category members, and
measure participants’ autism-spectrum quotient (AQ).
Results reveal a positive relationship between AQ and the
degree of local/global social categorization, which in turn
predicts the pattern of mental state inferences. These
results provide preliminary evidence for a causal relation-
ship between central coherence and ToM abilities. Impli-
cations with regard to ToM processes, social
categorization, intervention, and the development of a
unified account of autism are discussed.
Keywords Autism
Weak central coherence
Theory of
mind
Categorization
Social categorization
Self-
categorization
Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a pervasive develop-
mental disorder, diagnosed on the basis of social and
communication deficits and repetitive behaviors or inter-
& Daniel P. Skorich
Daniel.Skorich@anu.edu.au
1
Research School of Psychology, The Australian National
University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
•
ests that are present from an early developmental period,
and that cause significant impairment in general function-
ing (APA 2013). Outside these diagnostic features, people
with ASD also exhibit other cognitive-perceptual abnor-
malities, including increased speed and accuracy in block
design (Shah and Frith 1993), increased speed on the
Embedded Figures Test (EFT; Morgan et al. 2003), and
unusual homonym pronunciation (Happé 1997). The social
and communication deficits of ASD have traditionally been
explained as the outcome of dysfunction in the ‘theory of
mind’ system (Baron-Cohen 1994), while the non-diag-
nostic features have often been attributed to a general
tendency towards ‘weak central coherence’ (Frith and
Happé 1994). In the current paper, we explore the rela-
tionship between the theory of mind and weak central
coherence features of ASD, and provide preliminary evi-
dence that the theory of mind difficulties are an outcome of
weak central coherence with regard to the categorization of
social information.
‘Theory of Mind’ Difficulties in ASD
The social and communication impairments of ASD
include specific deficits in social-emotional reciprocity,
non-verbal communication, the spontaneous sharing of
interests or affect, and the initiation, maintenance and
understanding of relationships. These features—which are
thought to fall on a continuum and to define a broader
phenotype rather than a categorically distinct disorder (e.g.,
Sucksmith et al. 2011)—have traditionally been understood
as outcomes of a deficit in the theory of mind system
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). People with ASD have been
shown to perform more poorly relative to typically devel-
oping (TD) people and other clinical groups on a whole
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range of theory of mind tasks, including: understanding the
relationship between seeing and knowing (Baron-Cohen
and Goodhart 1994); recognizing that others can have false
beliefs about the physical world (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985;
Happé 1995) and about the beliefs of others (Tager-Flus-
berg and Sullivan 1994); deducing complex emotional
states from facial expressions (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997);
and recognizing the mental states of people in uncomfort-
able social situations (Heavey et al. 2000). More recently,
it has been shown that these theory of mind difficulties
arise particularly in spontaneous or implicit mentalizing
tasks, but less so in explicit tasks where compensatory
mechanisms can be invoked (Schuwerk et al. 2015; Senju
et al. 2009; Sodian et al. 2015). In all cases, however, the
ability of people with ASD to represent the minds of others
has been shown to be impaired, or slower to develop, rel-
ative to TD individuals.
Baron-Cohen (1994) has argued that the fundamental
deficit leading to these outcomes is one of shared atten-
tion. In his Empathizing System model (Baron-Cohen
2005), he argues that the theory of mind system can be
separated into six cognitive components, each of which
matures during specific developmental periods. The
Intentionality Detector (ID), the Emotion Detector (TED)
and the Eye Direction Detector (EDD) develop early on,
and allow for the development of the Shared Attention
Mechanism (SAM). Baron-Cohen argues that ID, TED
and EDD are all intact in ASD, but that SAM is affected,
leading to delayed development of, or dysfunction in, the
final two components of the system: the Empathizing
System (TESS) and the Theory of Mind Mechanism
(TOMM). SAM is a system that allows for triadic ‘self-
other-object’ representations, where a perceiver comes to
understand that his or her attention is directed toward the
same object as another, or directed elsewhere relative to
the other’s focus of attention. Baron-Cohen argues, with
the support of a variety of empirical findings (Adamson
et al. 2010; Cornew et al. 2012; Osterling and Dawson
1994; Osterling et al. 2002), that it is precisely these ‘self-
other-object’ representations, and the resulting ability to
share attention with others, with which people with ASD
have trouble. As a result of delayed or impaired triadic
representations, empathy—the primary function of
TESS—and the ability to represent the full range of
complex mental states—the primary function of ToMM—
are also delayed or impaired in ASD. A specific deficit in
SAM, and a general deficit in the theory of mind system—
particularly at an implicit level (Schuwerk et al. 2015)—is
therefore a plausible, and widely accepted explanation for
the social and communication difficulties observed in
ASD (Yirmiya et al. 1998).
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J Autism Dev Disord
‘Weak Central Coherence’ in ASD
Alongside these theory of mind difficulties, a whole range
of cognitive and perceptual differences have also been
observed in ASD. Relative to controls, people with ASD
have been shown to exhibit: increased speed and accuracy
in block design (Shah and Frith 1993); increased speed on
radial frequency search tasks (Almeida et al. 2010) and on
the EFT (Jolliffe et al. 1997; Shah and Frith 1983);
decreased susceptibility to visual illusions (Happé 1996);
decreased ability to detect unusual elements of visual
scenes (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen 2001); decreased accu-
racy in homonym pronunciation (Happé 1997); and a
preference for processing the local letters in Navon fig-
ures (Plaisted et al. 1999). These empirical results show
that people with ASD have unusual cognitive-perceptual
strengths in certain areas, as well as unusual cognitive-
perceptual weaknesses in others.
This spiky pattern of strengths and weaknesses (Brosnan
et al. 2004) has traditionally been understood as a tendency
towards weak central coherence. Frith (1989) suggested that
information processing in TD individuals is characterized by
a tendency to integrate stimulus information into a coherent
whole. Frith and Happé (1994) further suggested that this
general tendency for constructing ‘‘higher-level meaning in
context’’—or what these researchers referred to as ‘‘central
coherence’’—was ‘‘weak’’, in people with ASD; a fact, they
argued, that could explain the whole range of non-diagnostic
features exhibited by people with ASD. The increased speed
in block design and the EFT, failures in detecting unusual
elements of a visual scene, and poorer global processing in
Navon tasks, for example, can all be explained as a decreased
tendency to construct a global whole. There is some con-
tention regarding the exact nature of the processing differ-
ence—with evidence emerging that weak central coherence
might be better understood as a tendency toward enhanced
perceptual functioning, rather than decreased information
integration (Mottron et al. 2006)—but there is robust evi-
dence for some form of locally-oriented processing in ASD,
and for some variant of weak central coherence (Happé and
Booth 2008; Happé and Frith 2006).
The Relationship Between ‘Theory of Mind’
and ‘Weak Central Coherence’
Since the advent of weak central coherence theory, the
relationship between weak central coherence and the theory
of mind deficits has been explored, first theoretically, and
then empirically in a handful of studies. In Frith’s (1989)
original conception, weak central coherence was the cogni-
J Autism Dev Disord
tive dysfunction at the root of all the features of ASD,
including impaired theory of mind. She suggested that the
human cognitive system is composed of a general informa-
tion processing mechanism, the primary function of which is
the extraction of higher-level meaning from stimulus arrays.
She suggested that theory of mind abilities also rely on this
ability to extract higher-level meaning in context, such that a
dysfunction in the general information processing system
(i.e., weak central coherence) would by necessity result in a
more specific dysfunction in mentalizing abilities.
Since this early theorizing, Frith and others (Brunsdon
and Happé 2014; Frith and Happé 1994; Happé and Ronald
2008) have abandoned the notion that weak central
coherence might account for the theory of mind features of
ASD, going so far as to suggest that it might be ‘‘time to
give up on a single explanation for autism’’ (Happé et al.
2006). These researchers all argue that ASD is better
understood as ‘‘fractionable’’, such that the each of the
features of the disorder represent separate, but sometimes
co-occurring, outcomes of a modular cognitive system. In
making this argument, Brunsdon and Happé (2014) point to
absent (e.g., Burnette et al. 2005), qualified (e.g., Pelicano
et al. 2006), and low to moderate (Jarrold et al. 2000)
correlations between weak central coherence and theory of
mind features. Jarrold et al. (2000) report the only set of
experiments showing a consistent and robust pattern of
correlations across measures of theory of mind and weak
central coherence. In their first experiment, they showed a
relationship between performance on Baron-Cohen et al.’s
(1997) ‘‘reading the eyes in the mind’’ test and perfor-
mance on the EFT, in a general population sample. In their
second and third experiments, they showed a similar rela-
tionship—though qualified by verbal mental age—between
a combined theory of mind score, and block design and
EFT performance, in both a general population sample
(Expt. 2) and in a group diagnosed with ASD (Expt. 3).
These results suggest that a relationship between weak
central coherence and theory of mind remains conceivable,
but, at present, the literature, such as it is, must be inter-
preted as favoring a ‘‘fractionable’’ account of the features
of the disorder, as argued by Happé and her colleagues.
Social Cognitive Accounts of the ‘Theory of Mind’
System
Despite this evidence in favor of separable deficits, how-
ever, we argue that there remain sound reasons to suggest
that weak central coherence and theory of mind processes
might be related. With the notable exception of Frith’s
(1989) early theorizing, the research thus far conducted has
focused entirely on uncovering correlations between
measures of theory of mind and weak central coherence
performance, rather than exploring the cognitive mecha-
nisms that might unite these features. Without a falsifiable
cognitive account of the dissociation between weak central
coherence and theory of mind processes, it is premature to
derive any strong conclusions about their relationship. As
such, we argue that it is necessary to evaluate the cognitive
process accounts of the theory of mind system in the social
cognitive literature, in order to identify any unifying
mechanisms that might exist.
Similar to the literature on theory of mind abilities in
ASD, the general social cognitive literature has explored
each of the dissociable components involved in mentaliz-
ing, including shared attention, empathy, and mental state
inference. With regard to shared attention, Shteynberg
(2010) has shown that an individual’s attention will be
oriented towards those stimuli experienced by similar tar-
get others, but not towards those stimuli experienced by
dissimilar target others (see also Shteynberg 2015). Simi-
larly, Tarrant et al. (2009) have found that empathic
reactions to target others are increased if those target others
are similar to the self, or members of the same social
category as the self (see also Thomas et al. 2009; Cialdini
et al. 1997). Of most interest to the current research,
however, Ames (2004) has shown that human beings will
project their own thoughts onto similar target others and
will use stored stereotypes about common social groups to
understand the thoughts of dissimilar target others.
In Ames’ first experiment, participants were presented
with a number of vignettes in which the central character
was confronted with a simple scenario. This character was
described in terms of a number of personal characteristics,
as well as in terms of his or her membership in one of a
number of common social groups (e.g., medical student,
lawyer etc.). Participants were then asked to rate how
similar they felt to the character, and how likely it was that
each of the characters, they themselves, and a typical
member of the relevant social group was thinking a variety
of thoughts. Results revealed that participants’ own
thoughts were predictive of the thoughts they attributed to
the character to the extent that they felt similar to that
character. When participants felt dissimilar to the charac-
ter, the thoughts they attributed to a typical member of the
social group to which the character belonged was predic-
tive of the thoughts they attributed to the character. In a
second and third experiment, Ames (2004) replicated these
results with direct manipulations of the similarity between
the participants and the characters. Ames interpreted the
results of these three studies as demonstrating that mental
state inferences are derived from perceptions of similarity
between the self and a target other, where the thoughts of
similar others will be projected from one’s own thoughts,
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and the thoughts of dissimilar others will be inferred from
their group memberships (see also Ames et al. 2012).
These examples are by no means exhaustive with
regard to the general social cognitive literature on theory
of mind abilities, but they do represent important and
prototypical findings within that literature. In each case,
perceptions of self-other similarity, and the related process
of social categorization, emerge as fundamental precursors
to theory of mind abilities. Social categorization is defined
here as the process of using socially-relevant cognitive
organizing principles (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, and
many more subtle stimulus groupings) to make sense of
social stimulus arrays (McGarty et al. 2015; Skorich and
Mavor 2013). In each of the above cases, the perceiver is
engaged in a process of calculating similarities and dif-
ferences between him or herself and others in a psycho-
logical frame of reference, and thereby deriving an
appropriate social categorical representation of the stim-
ulus frame on which to base his or her inferences and
empathy judgments. By categorizing the social world in
terms of known representations stored in memory, the
perceiver is able to go beyond the information available in
the situation, and make further predictions about the
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of category members. If
a target other is categorized as similar to the self, then
mental states are projected from self to other (Ames
2004), attention is shared with the other (Shteynberg
2010), and empathy is felt for the other (Tarrant et al.
2009). If a target other is categorized as dissimilar to the
self, then mental states will be based on other non-self-
categories (Ames 2004), and attention will not be shared
with (Shteynberg 2010), and empathy will not be felt for
(Tarrant et al. 2009), the other.
While these results clearly go further into the cognitive
processing domain than much of the ASD literature on the
topic, it is important to note that these findings are also
entirely consistent with understandings of theory of mind
abilities in that literature, and indeed with Baron-Cohen’s
(2005) model of the mind-reading system. Baron-Cohen
does not propose a clear cognitive mechanism through
which SAM achieves its purpose, but his conception of
SAM as representing ‘self-other-object’ relations points to
the same social categorical processing mechanism under-
lying shared attention as the social cognitive literature in
general, where self and other must be seen as categorically
similar for shared attention to arise. Fundamentally, then,
each of the key dissociable components of the theory of
mind system—and particularly SAM—relies on a social
categorization mechanism for its proper functioning, and,
as such, it is reasonable to further propose that dysfunction
in the social categorization mechanism could lead directly
to disruption in theory of mind abilities.
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J Autism Dev Disord
Categorization in ASD
For social categorization to be a plausible link between
weak central coherence and theory of mind abilities in
ASD, it would be desirable to have some evidence for its
relationship with weak central coherence, and for its dis-
ruption in people diagnosed with the disorder. Unfortu-
nately, with the exception of some indirect evidence from
the face processing domain (e.g., Hobson 1983, 1987;
Strauss et al. 2012; Teunisse and de Gelder 2001), and
from research on the self-concept (e.g., Hobson 1990;
Hobson and Meyer 2005; Lee and Hobson 1998; Meyer
and Hobson 2004), direct empirical evidence for the latter
point does not currently exist. Indirectly, however, theo-
retical and empirical research on the more general process
of categorization provides credence to both points above.
First, at a theoretical level, the concept of central coher-
ence, as defined by Frith and Happé (1994), is almost
identical to working definitions of categorization as used
by researchers in social cognition. Frith and Happé (1994)
describes central coherence as ‘‘the tendency to draw
together diverse information to construct higher-level
meaning in context’’ (pp. 121), while Oakes et al. (1994)
suggest that categorization has a ‘‘meaning-giving func-
tion’’ (pp. 124) that it fulfils by ‘‘selectively drawing out
aspects of structure […] in stimulus information […]
within the stimulus context as a whole.’’ (pp. 113). In both
cases, the process is described as being concerned princi-
pally with the construction or creation of meaning, with the
drawing together or structuring of information, and with
understanding stimuli within a specific context. Catego-
rization—like central coherence—is, therefore, a process
of organizing or grouping stimulus information in terms of
some higher-level structure, in a context-dependent fash-
ion, and is thus plausibly related to central coherence.
Second, at an empirical level, a number of researchers
(e.g., Gastgeb et al. 2012; Klinger and Dawson 2001) have
shown that individuals with ASD display impairments in
forming prototypes during category learning; a general
categorization impairment that these researchers attribute
to weak central coherence. Klinger and Dawson (2001)
presented ASD, TD and Down’s syndrome participants
with a category learning task, in which participants were
asked to make sense of a number of categories of pretend
animals based on a series of exemplars. In the prototype
condition, the animal categories were defined by a proto-
type, such that no single rule (and no single feature) was
defining of category membership. In the rule-based cate-
gorization conditions, the animal categories were defined
by a single rule, such that possessing a single feature of a
given size was defining of category membership. Results
showed that ASD children were unable to extract the
J Autism Dev Disord
prototype from the category learning task, and were only
able to successfully complete the task when a categoriza-
tion rule was available. Providing similar evidence, Gast-
geb et al. (2012) presented high-functioning ASD and
matched TD individuals with a series of dot patterns rep-
resenting exemplars of a category. Following familiariza-
tion with the dot-pattern category, participants were asked
to classify a series of stimuli as members of the previously
learnt category or as non-category members. Results
revealed that ASD individuals accurately endorsed fewer
category members than TD individuals, suggesting that
individuals with ASD had been less able to learn the cat-
egory prototype than TD individuals (see also Brosnan
et al. 2004; Gastgeb et al. 2006, 2009; Plaisted et al. 1998).
The results of Klinger and Dawson (2001) and Gastgeb
et al. (2012) together imply that individuals with ASD have
an impairment in their categorization abilities, character-
ized by a specific deficit in prototype formation. These
findings are consistent with the notion from weak central
coherence theory (Frith and Happé 1994) that individuals
with ASD have a tendency to integrate stimulus informa-
tion less thoroughly than TD individuals. Given that social
categorization is simply a special case of the more general
process of categorization (McGarty et al. 2015), it is rea-
sonable to assume that the weak central coherence that
manifests itself in impairments in general categorization
abilities among individuals with ASD could also result in
impairments in social categorization. These social catego-
rization impairments, were they shown to be present in
individuals with ASD, could in turn result in impaired
theory of mind, for reasons discussed above. The link
between weak central coherence and theory of mind defi-
cits, via the cognitive mechanism of social categorization,
would then be plausibly, though preliminarily, established.
The Current Experiment
The current experiment is designed to test the proposition
that the theory of mind difficulties associated with ASD are
an outcome of weak central coherence via a social cate-
gorization mechanism. In order to test this proposition, we
employed a widely-used social categorization paradigm,
Taylor et al. (1978) category confusion paradigm, followed
by a mental state inference task, and Baron-Cohen et al.
(2001) Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). The category
confusion paradigm allows for participants’ patterns of
social categorization to be uncovered. In the current
experiment, the paradigm was adapted in such a way that
social category prototypes could be made available at both
the global and local levels—mirroring a Navon figure—
thus allowing the relationship between AQ and local/global
social categorization tendencies (and weak central
coherence) to be explored. Similarly, the mental state
inference task, adapted from Ames’ (2004) dissimilar-other
conditions, was developed to explore the extent to which
local versus global social categories would be used to make
mental state inferences, and how these local/global ten-
dencies were related to the degree of autistic-like traits.
The AQ was employed as a measure of participants’
autistic-like traits, and as a proxy operationalization of
ASD in the current experiment’s general population sam-
ple, such that the current experiment was capturing the
broader autism phenotype (Sucksmith et al. 2011), rather
than ASD per se.
In the first phase of the experiment, the category con-
fusion paradigm was employed to present participants with
social information, which took the form of written state-
ments of ostensibly performed behaviors. Each of these
statements was attributed to a particular individual who
was said to be a member of two social categories. Once the
participant was presented with all of these behavioral
statements one-by-one, he or she was then presented with
the same statements again, but with the identity and social
category information removed. The participant’s task was
then to attribute each of the behavioral statements to the
individual who was initially said to have performed the
behavior. Participants’ patterns of errors—either within-
category or between-category—could then be used as an
unobtrusive measure of the extent to which the participant
was using the social categories to organize the social
information.
In the current experiment, unlike a typical category
confusion paradigm, the social categories were hierarchi-
cally embedded, such that participants had both global and
local categories available for use in organizing the social
information. This global/local category structure mirrors
that of a Navon figure, where individuals with ASD have
been shown to have a tendency to process at the local level
(Plaisted et al. 1999). In order to give participants an
opportunity to form one or more category prototypes at
either or both of the global and local levels, the principles
of self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987; Turner
et al. 1994) were employed. Self-categorization theory is a
widely-used model of social category use, which argues
that social categorization is an outcome of an interaction of
perceiver factors—termed ‘‘perceiver readiness’’—and
situational factors—termed ‘‘fit’’, of which there is a
‘‘comparative’’ aspect and a ‘‘normative’’ aspect (Blanz
1999). For the current experiment, comparative fit was
particularly invoked, as it relates most directly to the pro-
cess of prototype formation. Comparative fit refers to the
degree to which stimuli that co-vary with an organizing
principle (such as a category label) are on average more
similar to one another than those stimuli are to all the
remaining stimuli in the frame of reference. To have high
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comparative fit is to have a high degree of covariation
between the organizing principle and the stimulus features,
while to have low comparative fit is to have minimal
covariation. In the current experiment, each of the social
categories was made to co-vary with a personality trait
dimension, such that there was a high degree of compar-
ative fit for the social categories, which gave participants
the opportunity to form category prototypes. A hierarchical
model of personality (DeYoung et al. 2007) was used in
order to allow for comparative fit at both the global and
local levels simultaneously (Local ? Global Fit condition),
the global level only (Global Fit condition), the local level
only (Local Fit condition), or at neither level (No Fit
condition). In this way, participants were given the
opportunity to extract prototypes at either the local level,
the global level, both levels at once, or neither level; again,
in order to mirror the global/local processing opportunities
available in Navon figures, where weak central coherence
in ASD has been particularly evident.
Following the category confusion task, participants were
asked to complete a mental state inference task based on
Ames’ (2004) dissimilar-other conditions. Participants
were presented with a number of new individuals, each of
whom was said to be a member of one of the local cate-
gories and one of the global categories from the previous
category confusion task. Each of these individuals was said
to be confronted with a simple scenario. Participants were
then asked to rate the extent to which they believed these
new individuals were likely to be thinking a variety of
thoughts, each of which mapped onto the personality trait
dimensions used in the category confusion task. As such,
participants were being asked to use the category proto-
types at either the local level or the global level—should
they have formed one at either of these levels during the
previous category confusion task—to make their mental
state inferences.1 In the final phase of the experiment,
participants—drawn from the general population—were
asked to complete the AQ as a measure of their autistic-like
1
In the current experiment, we have operationalized mental state
inferences as falling somewhere on a continuum from local to global.
We do not believe, however, that mental state inferences so simply
and straightforwardly map onto this local–global continuum in all
situations. Rather, if mental state inferences rely crucially on social
categorization as we propose, then all those factors that affect which
particular social categories become salient (or activated) in a given
context should equally impact on the activation of particular mental
state inferences in context (including, for example, the accessibility of
particular categories in memory relative to others, the degree of
covariation between stimulus inputs and categories stored in memory,
the perceiver’s goals in the current situation etc.). We chose to
operationalize social categorization—and by extension mental state
inferences—in the way we have in the current experiment simply
because it most closely mirrors common operationalizations of weak
central coherence in the ASD literature.
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J Autism Dev Disord
traits, where a high AQ would indicate more autistic-like
traits.
Based on the proposal that the theory of mind difficulties
of ASD are an outcome of weak central coherence with
regard to the categorization of social information, we
propose four hypotheses. For each hypothesis, we specifi-
cally highlight the pattern in the Local ? Global Fit con-
dition, because it is in this condition that social category
prototypes are available at both the local and global levels,
and it is, therefore, in this condition that the effects of
participants’ AQ scores should be detectable. First, we
hypothesize that AQ will interact with fit condition in
determining the extent to which participants organize the
social information at the local level, the global level, both
levels, or neither. More specifically, in the Local ? Global
Fit condition, we hypothesize that AQ will be related with
a tendency to use the local categories to organize the social
information, because individuals with ASD (and, relatedly,
individuals with a high AQ) have been shown to favor the
local level in equivalent Navon tasks. In the remaining
three fit conditions, no specific relationship is predicted
between AQ and participants’ tendencies to use local or
global categories to organize the social information.
Second, we hypothesize that AQ will interact with
comparative fit condition in determining the extent to
which participants make their mental state inferences at the
local level, the global level, both levels, or neither. More
specifically, in the Local ? Global Fit condition, we
hypothesize that AQ will be related with a tendency to use
the local categories to make mental state inferences,
because individuals with ASD have been shown to favor
the local level in equivalent Navon tasks. In the remaining
three fit conditions, no specific relationship is predicted
between AQ and participants’ tendencies to use local or
global categories to make mental state inferences.
Third, we hypothesize that there will be a positive
relationship between the relative (local/global) level at
which participants organize the social information and the
relative (local/global) level at which participants make
their mental state inferences. We hypothesize further that
this relationship will be particularly evident in the
Local ? Global Fit condition, because it is in this condi-
tion that differences in social categorization and mental
state inference should be most evident.
Finally, we hypothesize that the relationship between
AQ and the relative level at which participants make their
mental state inferences that we predict in the Local ?
Global Fit condition will be eliminated when the relative
level at which participants organize the social information
is taken into account.
Should all four hypotheses be supported, it would be
reasonable to conclude that the relationship between AQ
and the level at which participants made their mental state
J Autism Dev Disord

inferences was mediated by the level at which participants
organized the social information. Were this mediation
relationship to emerge, it would provide preliminary evi-
dence that the theory of mind dysfunction in ASD is an
outcome of weak central coherence with regard to the
categorization of social information.
Method
Participants
One hundred and three participants were recruited from a
pool of undergraduate psychology students, and via
snowball sampling through various social media outlets
(e.g., Facebook). Sixty-two participants were female, and
forty-one were male. The mean age was 24.64 years with a
range from 18 to 65.
Design
The experiment employed a four condition (fit: local ?
global/global/local/no fit) between-subjects design, with
participants’ AQ included as a second continuous predic-
tor. The dependent variables were local–global catego-
rization on the category confusion attribution task, and
local–global mental state inference for the mental state
inference task.
Procedure
The entire experiment was conducted online, on partici-
pants’ own time, on a computer of their own choosing.
Qualtrics survey software was used to present all stimuli
and to collect all data.
were embedded within group Plibb, thus creating a hier-
archical category structure reminiscent of a Navon figure,
with the groups at the more inclusive global level, and the
situations at the less inclusive local level. Three of the
individual female names were associated with each of the
situations at the local level, such that six of the individual
female names were members of each of the groups (see
Table 1 for the 12 possible person-group-situation strings).
In order to manipulate comparative fit at both the local
and global levels, the structure of DeYoung et al.’s (2007)
hierarchical version of the Big Five personality inventory
was used. This instrument divides each of the big five
factors of Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism into a further
two aspects, thus creating an embedded hierarchical
structure with the five factors at the more inclusive global
level, and 10 aspects at the less inclusive local level. For
the purposes of the experiment, the factors of Agreeable-
ness and Conscientiousness were used to introduce the
desired covariation. Within DeYoung et al.’s (2007) model,
these factors are further divided into the aspects of
politeness and compassion, and orderliness and industri-
ousness, respectively. Ten behavioral statements mapping
onto each of these four aspects were created, such that
there were 20 behavioral statements mapping onto each of
the Agreeableness and Conscientiousness factors. The
remaining eight behavioral statements were created from
the other six aspects of the DeYoung et al. (2007) model,
and were deemed filler statements, not made to systemat-
ically co-vary at either the local or global levels in any of
the fit conditions (see Table 2 for example statements).
In order to create the Local ? Global fit condition, eight
of the 12 statements associated with situation Yof were
politeness statements, eight of the 12 statements associated
with situation Nuk were compassion statements, eight of

Phase 1: Category Confusion Task

Table 1 The 12 person-group-situation strings used in the category
confusion task
The first phase of the experiment was an adapted version of
Name Group Situation
Taylor et al.’s (1978) category confusion task. Participants
were presented with 48 behavioral statements of the form Louise A member of group Smedd In situation Yof
‘‘[Female Name], a member of group [five-letter non- Cathy A member of group Smedd In situation Yof
word], in situation [three-letter non-word], [behavior]’’. Anna A member of group Smedd In situation Yof
The 12 female names used were chosen from a list of the Holly A member of group Smedd In situation Nuk
25 most common English language female names. The Kristen A member of group Smedd In situation Nuk
five-letter non-words used to designate the groups were Nicole A member of group Smedd In situation Nuk
Smedd and Plibb. The three-letter non-words used to des- Emma A member of group Plibb In situation Teg
ignate the situations were Yof, Nuk, Teg, and Faz. Non- Laura A member of group Plibb In situation Teg
words were used to designate both the groups and the sit- Sophie A member of group Plibb In situation Teg
uations in order to remove the possibility that participants Alice A member of group Plibb In situation Faz
could use any pre-existing expectations to make sense of Sarah A member of group Plibb In situation Faz
the social information. Situations Yof and Nuk were Susan A member of group Plibb In situation Faz
embedded within group Smedd, and situations Teg and Faz

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Table 2 Example behaviors

used in the category confusion
task
Big five aspect Example behaviors
Politeness Intentionally avoids ill-mannered and discourteous behavior
Takes the time to gently respond to others without aggression or antagonism
Compassion Expresses empathy and offers support and comfort to her peers
Wholeheartedly contributes to the well-being of others
Orderliness Chooses to follow established guidelines rather than improvise solutions
Endeavours to keep the environment around her neat and tidy
Industriousness Sets her own goals and keeps trying until she achieves them
Meets her deadlines and works with initiative and independence

the 12 statements associated with situation Teg were
orderliness statements and eight of the 12 statements
associated with situation Faz were industriousness state-
ments. The remaining four statements for each of the sit-
uations were taken from the remaining pool of statements,
which covered all ten aspects (and all five factors) of the
Big Five. This covariation pattern meant that, at the local
level, situation Yof was relatively polite, situation Nuk was
relatively compassionate, situation Teg was relatively
orderly, and situation Faz was relatively industrious, and, at
the global level, group Smedd was relatively agreeable, and
group Plibb was relatively conscientious. In this way,
comparative fit existed at both the local and global levels
simultaneously in this condition. A covariation level of
66 %—which was used across all 3 conditions in which a
pattern of covariation was desired—was chosen over a
perfect covariation pattern of 100 % to remove the possi-
bility that an explicit rule could be used to make sense of
the social information (cf Gastgeb et al. 2012; Klinger and
Dawson 2001).
In the Global fit condition, four of the 12 statements
associated with situation Yof were politeness statements
and four were compassion statements. The number of
politeness and compassion statements for situation Nuk
was the same as for situation Yof. Four of the 12 statements
associated with situation Teg were orderliness statements,
and four were industriousness statements. The number of
orderliness and industriousness statements for situation Faz
was the same as for situation Teg. The remaining four
statements for each of the situations were taken from the
remaining pool of statements, which covered all ten aspects
(and all five factors) of the big five. This covariation pat-
tern meant that, at the local level, there was no difference
in politeness or compassion between situations Yof and
Nuk, and no difference in orderliness or industriousness
between situations Teg and Faz, but, at the global level,
group Smedd was relatively agreeable, and group Plibb
was relatively conscientious. In this way, comparative fit
existed only at the global level in this condition.
In the Local fit condition, the compassion statements
associated with situation Nuk in the Local ? Global fit
condition were swapped with the industriousness state-
ments associated with situation Faz in that condition. The
remaining statements retained the same pattern of associ-
ation as in the Local ? Global fit condition. This pattern of
covariation meant that, at the local level, situation Yof was
relatively polite, situation Nuk was relatively industrious,
situation Teg was relatively orderly, and situation Faz was
relatively compassionate, and, at the global level, there was
no difference in agreeableness or conscientiousness
between group Smedd and group Plibb. In this way,
comparative fit existed only at the local level in this
condition.
In the No fit control condition, the politeness, compas-
sion, orderliness and industriousness statements were
divided evenly between all the situations, such that there
was no pattern of covariation at either the local or the
global level in this condition (see Fig. 1 for a graphical
representation of the covariation pattern in each condition).
In all conditions, the 48 statements were randomized
and presented on-screen one-by-one. Each statement stayed
on-screen for 11 s, with a 500 ms inter-statement interval.
Phase 2: Attribution Task
In the second phase of the experiment, participants com-
pleted an adapted version of the attribution component of
Taylor et al.’s (1978) category confusion task. Participants
were presented with the 48 behavioral statements from the
previous task, along with a further 24 filler statements, with
all person, group and situation information removed. Par-
ticipants were then asked to indicate, for each statement, if
the statement was one they had seen before, by clicking
with their mouse on ‘‘seen before’’ or ‘‘not seen before’’
options displayed on-screen below the statement. If par-
ticipants indicated that the statement was not a statement
they had seen before, they moved onto the next statement.
If participants indicated that it was a statement they had
seen before, they were then asked to attribute the statement
to the person-group-situation string with which it had been
associated in the previous task. The person-group-situation
strings were presented in four columns below each

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J Autism Dev Disord
Fig. 1 The local/global covariance structure of the four comparative fit conditions
behavioral statement, in a different random order for each
statement. Participants indicated their response by clicking
with their mouse on the string of their choice. The 72
statements were randomized and presented on-screen one-
by-one. Each statement stayed on-screen until participants
made a response.
Phase 3: Mental State Inference Task
In the third phase of the experiment, participants were
presented with eight novel people, each of whom was said
to be confronted by a different scenario. The eight people
were all female, with names chosen from the same list of
the 25 most popular English language female names as
used for the names in phase 1. Two of the people were said
to be in situation Yof, two in situation Nuk, two in situation
Teg, and two in situation Faz. As in phase 1, the people
in situations Yof and Nuk were said to be members of
group Smedd, and those in situations Teg and Faz were
said to be members of group Plibb, such that 4 of the novel
people were in each of the groups. The scenarios with
which each person was confronted consisted of a short
description of an event about which that person could have
had any of a variety of thoughts. Below each scenario was
a list of ten thoughts—a different set of ten thoughts for
each scenario—each of which was created to capture each
of the ten aspects of DeYoung et al.’s (2007) hierarchical
Big Five model. Participants were asked to rate the like-
lihood that each of the novel people would have each of
these ten thoughts on a 7-point scale from (1) ‘‘very
unlikely’’ to (7) ‘‘very likely’’. The scenarios were ran-
domized and presented on-screen, one-by-one. The same
set of ten thoughts was always associated with the same
scenario, but the order of the thoughts for each scenario
was randomized (see Table 3 for an example scenario).
Phase 4: Autism-Spectrum Quotient and Demographic
Information
In the fourth and final phase of the experiment, participants
were asked to complete Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001) Aut-
ism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). The AQ is a 50-item mea-
sure designed to assess the degree of autistic-like traits that
those in the general population possess. Participants were
asked to indicate their agreement with each of the 50
statements by clicking with their mouse on one of the four
points on a scale from ‘‘Disagree Strongly’’ to ‘‘Agree
Strongly’’. The 50 items were presented in the same order
as used by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). Following the AQ,
participants were asked to indicate their gender, their age,
and whether English was their first language.
Results
Calculation of Measures
In order to test the four hypotheses, it was necessary to
calculate three measures from the raw data: local–global
categorization index, the local–global mental state
123

Table 3 Example scenario and accompanying thoughts used in the mental state inference task
Scenario
Julie is a member of group Plibb and finds herself in situation Teg. She
sees someone getting pulled over for speeding
inference index, and participants’ Autism-Spectrum Quo-
tient (AQ). The categorization index was created to capture
the way in which participants categorized/organized the
social information presented in the category confusion task.
The mental state inference index was created to capture the
way in which participants used the local and global cate-
gories to make their mental state inferences. The AQ was
borrowed from Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) in order to assess
the degree of autistic-like traits possessed by participants.
These measures were calculated as follows:
Categorization Index
Taylor et al.’s (1978) error difference measure was adapted
for use within the hierarchically-embedded category con-
fusion task used in the current experiment. Each partici-
pant’s errors in the attribution phase were counted. These
were then divided into within-situation errors (incorrect
person, correct situation), between-situation/within-group
errors (incorrect person, incorrect situation, correct group),
and between-group errors (incorrect person, incorrect sit-
uation, incorrect group). The number of within-situation
errors was then corrected for the higher probability of
between-situation than within-situation errors by dividing
them by the baseline ratio of possible within-situation to
between-situation errors. The number of within-group
errors was corrected for the higher probability of between-
group than within-group errors by dividing them by the
baseline ratio of possible within-group to between-group
errors. A local error difference score was then derived by
subtracting the uncorrected between-situation errors from
the corrected within-situation errors, such that a higher
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Thoughts
‘‘I shouldn’t stare for too long because it’s rude’’ (politeness)
‘‘I feel really sorry for them, they must feel really embarrassed’’
(compassion)
‘‘Road rules are important because they create stability out of chaos’’
(orderliness)
‘‘Sometimes you might need to speed to get tasks done on time’’
(industriousness)
‘‘It’s interesting to consider whether laws and regulation are always the
best way to achieve social justice’’ (intellect)
‘‘There is real beauty in the way speed cameras use the same medium
as something as wonderful as music’’ (openness)
‘‘If I got caught speeding I would have such a good laugh with the cop’’
(enthusiasm)
‘‘If that were me I’d convince the cop not to charge me’’ (assertiveness)
‘‘The thought of getting caught speeding really angers me’’ (volatility)
‘‘I’m so worried about getting caught speeding, it would be the worst
thing in the world’’ (withdrawal)
score would indicate that information was being organized
at the local level. A global error difference score was
derived by subtracting the between-group errors from the
corrected within-group errors, such that a higher score
would indicate that information was being organized at the
global level. Finally, the (local–global) categorization
index was created by subtracting the global error difference
from the local error difference. A positive score on the
categorization index would therefore indicate that partici-
pants were organizing the social information more at the
local level and less at the global level. A negative score
would indicate that participants were organizing the social
information more at the global level and less at the local
level. A score of zero would indicate that participants were
organizing the social information equally at the local and
global levels.
Mental State Inference Index
In order to assess the extent to which participants were
using the local categories or the global categories to make
their mental state inferences, meta-contrast ratios were
calculated. Within self-categorization theory (Turner et al.
1987, 1994), the meta-contrast ratio is defined as the ratio
of the average inter-category differences to intra-category
differences; as such, it captures the extent to which the
members of a category are perceived to be relatively
similar to each other and relatively different from the
members of a comparison category. First, a local meta-
contrast score was derived by following three steps: (1) the
average absolute difference between likelihood ratings for
those people who were said to be in the same situations was
J Autism Dev Disord
calculated across the trait dimensions relevant to the fit
condition; (2) the average absolute difference between
likelihood ratings for people who were said to be in dif-
ferent situations (but in the same group) was calculated
across the trait dimensions relevant to the fit condition; and
(3) the average absolute differences between the likelihood
ratings for people in different situations was divided by the
average absolute differences between the likelihood ratings
for people in the same situations. A higher local meta-
contrast ratio would indicate that the thoughts of the novel
category members were being derived from knowledge of
the content of the local categories.
Next, a global meta-contrast score was derived by fol-
lowing four steps: (1) the average likelihood rating across
people who were said to be in the same situation was cal-
culated for each of the trait dimensions; (2) the average
absolute difference between the average likelihood ratings
for the situations within the same group was calculated
across the trait dimensions relevant to the fit condition; (3)
the average absolute difference between the average likeli-
hood ratings for the situations in different groups was cal-
culated across the trait dimensions relevant to the fit
condition; and (4) the average absolute difference between
the likelihood ratings for the situations in different groups
was divided by the average absolute differences between the
likelihood ratings for the situations in the same group. A
higher global meta-contrast ratio would indicate that the
thoughts of the novel category members were being derived
from knowledge of the content of the global categories.
Finally, the mental state inference index was created by
subtracting the global meta-contrast from the local meta-
contrast. A positive score on the mental state inference
index would therefore indicate that participants were
inferring the thoughts of the novel people more from the
local category and less from the global category. A nega-
tive score would indicate that participants were inferring
the thoughts of the novel people more from the global
category and less from the local category. A score of zero
would indicate that participants were inferring the thoughts
of the novel people equally from the local and global
categories (for more information on calculating meta-
contrast ratios, see McGarty 1999).
Autism-Spectrum Quotient
The AQ was calculated as described in Baron-Cohen et al.
(2001). One point was given for responses of ‘‘Disagree’’
and ‘‘Disagree Strongly’’ on the 26 reverse-coded items.
One point was given for responses of ‘‘Agree’’ and ‘‘Agree
Strongly’’ for the remaining 24 items. These points were
then added together to create an aggregate AQ score, such
that a higher score would indicate more autistic-like traits.
AQ scores in the current sample ranged from 2 to 32, with
a mean of 16.74. Baron-Cohen at el. (2001) propose that a
score of 32 is a statistically useful cut-off between the TD
population and the ASD diagnostic category. This suggests
that the current sample would likely contain few, if any,
participants who would meet the diagnostic criteria for
ASD.
Categorization of Social Information
In order to ascertain the extent to which participants were
organizing the social information from the category con-
fusion task at the local or the global level, an overall
analysis and a number of planned comparisons by condi-
tion were conducted on the categorization index. An
overall ANCOVA revealed a significant effect of fit con-
dition, F (3, 95) = 7.89, p = .00009, g2 = .199, a mar-
ginally significant positive relationship between AQ and
the categorization index, F (1, 95) = 2.89, p = .09,
g2 = .03, and a significant interaction between fit condition
and AQ, F (3, 95) = 8.28, p = .00006, g2 = .207. Overall,
participants organized the social information more at the
global than the local level across all conditions, but this
was particularly evident in the Local ? Global fit
(M = -1.71) and No fit (M = -1.53) conditions, relative
to the Global fit (M = -.41) and the Local fit (M = -.56)
conditions. Of more theoretical interest, however, was the
significant interaction, which was deconstructed by fit
condition:
Local ? Global Fit
A significant effect of AQ on the categorization index
emerged in the Local ? Global fit condition, F (1,
22) = 12.03, p = .002, g2 = .353. Figure 2 shows that the
relationship between AQ and the categorization index is
positive, which suggests that higher AQ is associated with
more local and less global organization of the social
information.
Global Fit
A significant effect of AQ on the categorization index
emerged in the Global fit condition, F (1, 30) = 9.19,
p = .005, g2 = .235. Figure 2 shows that the relationship
between AQ and the categorization index is negative,
which suggests that higher AQ is associated with less local
and more global organization of the social information.
Local Fit
No significant effect of AQ on the categorization index
emerged in the Local fit condition, F (1, 24) = .46,
p = .51, g2 = .019.
123

Fig. 2 The relationship between Autism-Spectrum Quotient and local–global categorization across the four comparative fit conditions
No Fit
No significant effect of AQ on the categorization index
emerged in the No fit condition, F (1, 19) = .804, p = .38,
g2 = .041.
Mental State Inference
In order to ascertain the extent to which participants were
inferring the thoughts of the novel category members more
from the local or the global categories, an overall analysis and a
number of planned comparisons by condition were conducted
on the mental state inference index. An overall ANCOVA
revealed a significant effect of fit condition, F (3, 94) = 5.01,
p = .003, g2 = .138, no effect of AQ, F (1, 94) = .002,
p = .961, g2 = .000026, and a significant interaction between
fit condition and AQ, F (3, 94) = 4.79, p = .004, g2 = .133.
Overall, there was a tendency for participants to make
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J Autism Dev Disord
inferences more on the basis of the global than the local cate-
gories. This pattern was evident in the Local ? Global fit
(M = -2.9), the Global fit (M = -.21) and the Local fit
(M = -.15) conditions. Only in the No Fit condition was there
a tendency for participants to make inferences more on the
basis of the local than the global categories (M = .75). Of more
theoretical interest, however, was the significant interaction,
which was deconstructed by fit condition:
Local ? Global Fit
A significant effect of AQ on the mental state inference
index emerged in the Local ? Global fit condition, F (1,
22) = 7.61, p = .011, g2 = .257. Figure 3 shows that the
relationship between AQ and the mental state inference
index is positive, which suggests that higher AQ is asso-
ciated with more locally-derived and less globally-derived
mental state inference.
J Autism Dev Disord

Global Fit Mediation Analysis

No significant effect of AQ on the mental state inference
index emerged in the Global fit condition, F (1,
30) = 1.26, p = .271, g2 = .04.
Local Fit
No significant effect of AQ on the mental state inference
index emerged in the Local fit condition, F (1, 24) \1,
p = .997, g2 = .00000072.
No Fit
No significant effect of AQ on the mental state inference
index emerged in the No fit condition, F (1, 18) = .299,
p = .101, g2 = .143.
A mediation analysis was conducted in order to test whe-
ther the relationship between AQ and the mental state
inference index observed in the Local ? Global fit condi-
tion was mediated by the categorization index in that
condition. The first two criteria as set out by Baron and
Kenny (1986)—that is, (1) a significant relationship
between the IV and the DV, and (2) a significant rela-
tionship between the IV and the mediator—were fulfilled
by way of the significant relationship between AQ and the
mental state inference index and the significant relationship
between AQ and the categorization index described above.
The third criterion—that is, a significant relationship
between the mediator and the DV—was also fulfilled: a
bivariate correlation analysis revealed a significant positive
correlation between the categorization index and the

Fig. 3 The relationship between Autism-Spectrum Quotient and local–global mental state inference across the four comparative fit conditions

123

mental state inference index in the Local ? Global fit
condition, r (24) = .471, p = .02. The final criterion was
also fulfilled: the previously significant relationship
between AQ and the mental state inference index became
non-significant when the categorization index was entered
as a covariate, F (1, 21) = 2.39, p = .137, g2 = .1. Taken
together, these results suggest that the relationship between
AQ and the mental state inference index is fully mediated
by the categorization index in the Local ? Global fit
condition.
Discussion
The current experiment was designed to test the notion that
the theory of mind difficulties associated with ASD are a
result of a difference in social categorization tendencies,
which itself is related to weak central coherence. We
proposed specifically that the degree of autistic-like
traits—captured by the AQ—would predict the pattern of
social categorization in the Local ? Global Fit condition,
which in turn would predict the pattern of results on the
mental state inference task in that condition. All four
hypotheses were broadly supported. AQ interacted with fit
condition in determining the extent to which participants
organized the social information at the local level relative
to the global level, particularly in the Local ? Global fit
condition, where AQ positively predicted local social cat-
egorization at the expense of global social categorization.
AQ also interacted with fit condition in determining the
extent to which participants made their mental state
inferences at the local level relative to the global level,
particularly in the Local ? Global fit condition, where AQ
positively predicted local mental state inference at the
expense of global mental state inference. The pattern of
social categorization also predicted the pattern of mental
state inferences, with more local social categorization
predicting more local mental state inference and more
global social categorization predicting more global mental
state inference. This relationship between categorization
and mental state inference was particularly evident in the
Local ? Global fit condition. Finally, the relationship
between AQ and the pattern of mental state inference in the
Local ? Global fit condition was fully mediated by the
pattern of social categorization, such that the positive
relationship between AQ and local mental state inference
was eliminated when local/global social categorization was
taken into account.
Taken together, these results provide preliminary evi-
dence for the central proposition of the current research
that the theory of mind difficulties associated with ASD are
an outcome of weak central coherence via a social cate-
gorization mechanism. It is quite clear that participants’
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AQ scores predicted their tendencies to organize the social
information at the local level relative to the global level
when there was competing covariation at these levels. This
first finding is consistent with research on the more general
process of categorization (Klinger and Dawson 2001), and
on the processing of Navon figures (Plaisted et al. 1999),
that individuals with ASD (in this case, individuals with a
higher AQ) have a tendency to engage in less integrated
and more local processing. It is also quite clear from these
results that participants’ AQ scores predicted their patterns
of mental state inference. This finding is consistent with the
general and widely-supported notion that individuals with
ASD show differences in their theory of mind abilities
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). Finally, these results also
make it quite clear that participants’ patterns of social
categorization are related directly to their patterns of
mental state inferences, and that, in fact, the relationship
between AQ and the patterns of mental state inferences is
largely due to the way in which participants organized the
social information. This latter finding represents the novel
contribution of the current research, and points to the
possibility that at least some of the so-called ‘‘fractionable’’
components of the disorder could be united under a single
cognitive framework. In addition, the current experiment
has a number of important implications for our under-
standing of general theory of mind abilities and of social
categorization, and should also open up new avenues of
enquiry with regard to diagnosis and intervention.
Implications
The implications of this research can be divided into those
relevant to general cognitive processes, and those relevant
to ASD. Given that the results of this experiment are pre-
liminary—a point to which we return in the limitations
section below—all the implications discussed here should
be interpreted with appropriate care.
General Theory of Mind Abilities
First, the current experiment has important implications for
our understanding of general theory of mind abilities.
These results support the general consensus in the social
cognitive literature that theory of mind abilities rely cru-
cially on a process of social categorization (e.g., Ames
2004). The positive relationship between participants’
patterns of social categorization and their patterns of
mental state inferences demonstrates that human beings
employ social categories to infer the thoughts of category
members. Importantly, the current experiment goes beyond
existing understandings by linking mental state inference
directly to the more fundamental cognitive process of
comparative fit detection which underlies social
J Autism Dev Disord
categorization. In so doing, the current research suggests
that the pattern of covariation in a social stimulus set lar-
gely determines the way in which a social category pro-
totype is formed, which in turn affects the nature and
content of the thoughts that are inferred. The current
experiment also extends previous understandings by
showing that there can be a conflict between competing
category prototypes—in this case at different levels of
abstraction (i.e., global vs. local)—which can be resolved
by the perceiver’s information processing tendencies—in
this case related to autistic-like traits. Understanding theory
of mind processes in this way allows for highly developed
connectionist models of category learning (e.g., Love et al.
2004; Van Rooy 2012) to be applied where previously their
relevance had not been recognized. Overall, these results
provide direct evidence for Frith’s (1989) contention that
the theory of mind system is embedded within a more
general information processing system, the main function
of which is extracting higher-level meaning in context.
Social Categorization
In establishing a direct relationship between ASD, theory
of mind abilities and social categorization, the current
experiment also has the potential to provide new insights
into the process of social categorization. The current results
can be interpreted as demonstrating that ASD is, at least in
part, a disorder of social categorization. This novel char-
acterization of ASD means that the process of social cat-
egorization can be better understood by exploring the
consequences that arise when its functioning is disrupted in
the disorder. It is likely that studying ASD in this way
could lead to a better understanding of, at the very least, the
process of prototype formation, and the related cognitive
process of comparative fit detection. Examining the con-
sequences that arise following disruption of a cognitive
system is a common way for cognitive phenomena to be
studied—for example, memory and amnesia (Schachter
1987); face processing and prosopagnosia (Palermo et al.
2011); attention and unilateral neglect (Aimola-Davies
2004)—but one that has so far been impossible for social
categorization. The current results, and research building
on them, suggest that this gap could soon be filled.
Implications for ASD
The most important implications of the current research
relate to existing understandings of ASD. Currently, ASD
is characterized as a multi-faceted condition, consisting of
a variety of distinct but co-occurring features. It is most
widely viewed as a disorder of theory of mind processes
(Baron-Cohen 2005), but the idea that it is also a disorder
of general information processing is also gaining traction
(e.g., Van de Cruys et al. 2014). Happé and colleagues
(Brunsdon and Happé 2014; Happé and Booth 2008)
describe ASD as ‘‘fractionable’’ suggesting that it consists
of dissociable components, at each of the behavioral,
cognitive and neurological levels of analysis. The current
experiment, however, suggests that at least some of the
features—that is, those associated with weak central
coherence and theory of mind dysfunction—could be uni-
ted within a more parsimonious cognitive model, in which
social categorization plays a central role.
A more unified cognitive account of ASD based around
a social categorization dysfunction could lead to a variety
of new avenues for research, novel hypotheses, innovative
diagnostic tests, and improved intervention. By linking
ASD to social categorization, topics commonly explored in
social cognition—such as impression formation, stereo-
typing, self-construal etc.—could also be explored in ASD.
Understanding ASD as a disorder of social categorization
could also lead to novel hypotheses with regard to the
significance of the over- or under-connectivity in neural
circuitry observed in the disorder (see, for example,
Casanova et al. 2002), and also its genetic basis. Similarly,
it may be possible to develop diagnostic tests for ASD
based around reliable categorization/prototype formation
paradigms, such as the category confusion paradigm used
in the current experiment. Finally, by linking ASD to social
and self-categorization, promising new interventions based
around social and self-categorization principles—includ-
ing, for example, self-complexity buffering (Linville 1987)
and the social identity approach to health and well-being
(Jetten et al. 2012)—could be employed to decrease the
much higher rates of anxiety (Gillott et al. 2001) and
depression (Ghaziuddin et al. 2002) among individuals
with ASD. Overall, the implications for ASD of the more
unified account of the disorder implied by the current
research could be profound.
Limitations
As noted at the beginning of the previous section, the
results of the current experiment, though promising and
with the potential for important implications, provide only
preliminary evidence for the central proposition that the
theory of mind deficits of ASD are an outcome of weak
central coherence. As such, it is important to note the most
significant limitations in the current research, both as a
cautionary note, but also as the foundation for future
directions.
Non-clinical Sample
First, and most obviously, the current results were obtained
with a non-clinical sample. As such, the generalizability of
123

the results to individuals with ASD is not immediately
clear. The AQ was, however, developed to assess the extent
to which TD adults possess the characteristics associated
with ASD, and, as such, these results should be taken as
having some relevance to ASD itself, if only as very pre-
liminary evidence of the proposition in question. The AQ is
commonly used in research on ASD as a proxy measure for
clinical diagnosis (e.g., Almeida et al. 2010; Jarrold et al.
2000), and is commonly interpreted as providing prelimi-
nary evidence for phenomena that affect those on the ASD
spectrum, with the caveat that caution should always be
taken when generalization is attempted. We argue that the
same degree of caution should be applied when attempting
to generalize these results beyond the TD population.
Confounding Factors
Relatedly, in the current research we did not control for
potential confounding/covarying factors that are typically
taken into account in similar research. IQ, general range of
vocabulary, individual differences in processing style, and
other similar factors could all plausibly have impacted on
the results of the current experiment. The use of a highly-
educated non-clinical sample, who are not likely to have
had any trouble completing the experimental tasks, means,
however, that many of these factors are less likely to have
had particularly potent influences on these results. Addi-
tionally, the inclusion of these factors in most research
commonly results in a suppressor effect, thus increasing the
effects of the centrally important theoretical variables,
rather than decreasing them. In the current research, this
would result in stronger relationships between AQ, social
categorization, and patterns of mental state inference,
rather than weaker ones. Nonetheless, the absence of these
control factors means that caution should be taken in
interpreting these results.
Lack of Clarity Surrounding Weak Central Coherence
More importantly than the absence of certain control vari-
ables in the current research is the lack of clarity sur-
rounding the concept of weak central coherence. Weak
central coherence has variously been described as a deficit in
global processing; a preference for, or tendency towards,
local processing; a deficit in holistic processing; a relative
absence of Gestalt grouping; a decreased ability to draw
together component features into a coherent whole; and,
more recently, as a tendency towards enhanced perceptual
functioning (Mottron et al. 2006). These different under-
standings of the concept have led to a variety of distinct (but
related) operationalizations, which variously tap into dis-
embedding abilities (e.g., Morgan et al. 2003), group-
ing/categorization abilities (e.g., Klinger and Dawson
123
J Autism Dev Disord
2001), local/global processing tendencies (e.g., Plaisted
et al. 1999), and as a priori differences in the threshold
necessary for identification of factors such as radial fre-
quency (e.g., Almeida et al. 2010). In the current experi-
ment, weak central coherence was operationalized through
the category confusion paradigm in a way most consistent
with the notion that it is a preference for (or tendency
towards) local processing, which maps most directly onto
the categorization and local/global processing operational-
izations of Klinger and Dawson (2001) and Plaisted et al.
(1999) respectively. Had we operationalized weak central
coherence in a different way, the pattern of results could
have been profoundly altered. It is important, therefore, to
interpret the results explicitly in terms of the specific defi-
nition, and the specific operationalization, of weak central
coherence that we chose. It is equally important to note,
however, that the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of
weak central coherence arises from the literature on the
topic—where its fundamental nature is still being debated—
rather than from our own experimental shortcomings.
Theory of Mind Deficit Versus Differential Mental State
Inference
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the current results
do not in fact demonstrate a deficit in theory of mind
processes, but rather reveal only different patterns of
mental state inference as a function of AQ. In part this is
due to the general population sample, such that no specific
deficit would a priori be expected. It is plausible,
nonetheless, that the current results can be reconciled with
the notion of theory of mind deficits in ASD, and therefore
with the more central proposal that weak central coherence
is a precursor to theory of mind deficits. When a person is
engaging in social categorization, their task is to categorize
other people and their behaviors in terms of relevant and
meaningful social categories, in order to make inferences
about their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Categorizing
other people in this way is a more complex task than cat-
egorizing objects or other static sets of stimuli, because
people have the ability to self-categorize (Turner et al.
1987). The fact that others can self-categorize means that,
unlike a static object, the fundamental nature of the stim-
ulus to be categorized changes. The task then for a per-
ceiver engaged in social categorization is to capture the
way in which the target is self-categorizing in that moment.
For example, if a perceiver is attempting to predict the
emotional reactions of a person on a soccer field when a
goal is scored, he or she will need to capture how that
person is self-categorizing; that is, as a member of one
team rather than the other. Only by capturing a target’s
self-categorization can the thoughts, feelings and behavior
of that target be inferred (McGarty 1999).
J Autism Dev Disord
The fact that mental state inference requires a perceiver
to capture a target’s self-categorization further entails that
the task of mental state inference will be easier to the
extent that there is a match between any general tendency
in the (local/global) level of social categorization at which
the perceiver categorizes another and any general tendency
in the level of self-categorization at which the target cat-
egorizes him or herself. That is, if a perceiver has a general
tendency to categorize others at a more global level, and
those others also have a general tendency to categorize
themselves at a more global level, then the perceiver’s
mental state inferences are more likely to be accurate. To
the extent that there is a mismatch between these general
tendencies, there will be a decrease in accuracy. The cur-
rent results suggest that a higher AQ is associated with a
tendency to categorize others at a more local level, and a
lower AQ is associated with a tendency to categorize others
at a more global level. If these general tendencies were also
reflected in self-categorization tendencies, then the so-
called deficit in theory of mind abilities among individuals
with ASD could arise simply as a result of an a priori,
baseline mismatch between the level at which people with
ASD categorize others and the level at which TD indi-
viduals generally categorize themselves. This suggestion is
obviously contentious; in the absence of direct measures of
self-categorization tendencies among individuals diag-
nosed with ASD, the results of the current experiment
cannot speak to them directly, but they nonetheless allude
to intriguing avenues for new research in this area.
Future Directions
The limitations noted above suggest a number of avenues
for future research. First, it is crucially important to repli-
cate the current experiment with a sample of participants
diagnosed with ASD. The current results only hint at the
possibility that weak central coherence and theory of mind
processes might be causally related in ASD. The AQ is a
commonly used and reliable tool for gathering preliminary
evidence for phenomena associated with ASD, but
nonetheless, direct evidence for the causal relationship of
interest can plainly only arise from exploring that rela-
tionship among those diagnosed with the disorder. Relat-
edly, it is important that any research conducted with a
clinical sample of this sort also controls for other possible
confounding factors—such as IQ, verbal abilities etc.—for
which we did not control in the current experiment.
Future research exploring the relationship between weak
central coherence and theory of mind processes should also
attempt to pin down the true nature of weak central
coherence, and should operationalize it in a variety of ways
to ensure that the relationship remains, irrespective of the
specific operationalization. In future experiments, weak
central coherence could be operationalized as the degree of
comparative fit—where it may be that individuals with
ASD require a higher level of fit before a prototype can be
detected (Almeida et al. 2010)—or as the ratio of signal to
noise—where individuals with ASD may in fact be more
adept at disembedding the signal from the noise, just as
they are more adept at the EFT (e.g., Morgan et al. 2003).
Relatedly, it is also important to establish empirically that
social categorization is in fact related to weak central
coherence, which could be achieved by exploring the
relationship between patterns of social categorization in a
category confusion paradigm and traditional measures of
weak central coherence, such as the EFT and Navon tasks.
Finally, future research should be directed toward
exploring shared attention, as a precursor to mental state
inference and as the cognitive process thought to be most
directly affected in ASD (Baron-Cohen 2005). This could
be achieved by adapting the category confusion paradigm
to include the self, such that a participant would be given
the opportunity to self-categorize. In the current experi-
ment, all the targets were other individuals, such that no
self-categorization—that is, understanding the categorical
relationship between self and others in a psychological
frame of reference—was possible. By adapting the cate-
gory confusion paradigm for self-categorization, partici-
pants’ patterns of local versus global self-categorization
could be measured. The relationship between these patterns
of self-categorization and patterns of shared attention could
then be explored. Research of this sort would fundamen-
tally bolster the central claim of the current paper that weak
central coherence is a crucial precursor to all aspects of
theory of mind, including SAM, the component thought to
be specifically disrupted during development.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the notion that the theory of mind
difficulties observed in ASD were the result of weak central
coherence with regard to the process of social categorization.
We presented an experiment in which we manipulated com-
parative fit between a number of hierarchically embedded
social categories and social information—at the local level,
the global level, or at both levels simultaneously—within a
category confusion task. We then asked non-clinical partici-
pants to infer the mental state of novel category members, and
measured participants’ AQ. The experiment showed that AQ
was positively associated with the degree of local relative to
global categorization and the degree of local relative to global
mental state inferences, when there was competing covaria-
tion at the local and global levels. We also found that the
pattern of social categorization predicted the pattern of mental
state inferences in this condition, thus providing preliminary
123

evidence for a direct, causal relationship between weak central
coherence and theory of mind abilities. These findings have
important implications for the development of a more unified
account of ASD, thus challenging the currently dominant
‘‘fractionated’’ view of the disorder. These results must be
replicated—particularly with a clinically diagnosed sample of
individuals with ASD, and in similar paradigms exploring
other theory of mind processes such as shared attention, and
with other measures of weak central coherence—before any
strong conclusions about the singular versus multi-faceted
nature of ASD can be drawn. Nonetheless, we hope that the
current paper will motivate other researchers in the field to
reconsider whether it really is yet ‘‘time to give up on a single
explanation for autism.’’
Acknowledgments We would like to thank Anne Aimola-Davies,
Laura Birchall, Alex Haslam, Ken Mavor, Katie Stalker, Lidan
Zheng, Carla Mazefsky and two anonymous reviewers for their
insightful comments on this research.
Author Contributions All authors made substantial contributions
to the design of the experiment reported in this paper; to the acqui-
sition, analysis, and interpretation of the data; to the drafting of the
manuscript, and to all revisions made; and all authors have given final
approval of the version to be published.
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