♦♦♦

EDITORS’ SPECIAL

Albert and Whetten Revisited

Strengthening the Concept of Organizational Identity
DAVID A. WHETTEN
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah

The objective of this article is to formulate the concept of organizational identity in such
a way that it can be distinguished analytically from related concepts, such as organiza-
tional culture and image, and can be used operationally to identify bona fide organiza-
tional identity claims referents and associated identity-referencing discourse. The
proposal amounts to a stronger version of Albert and Whetten (1985), in that the
implicit links between the elements of their composite, tripartite, formulation are made
explicit and their treatment of organizational identity as a defined construct is empha-
sized. Although the proposal eschews conceptions of organizational identity formulated
from the perspective of individuals, it treats organizational identity as an analogue of
individual identity, drawing attention to the parallel functions identity plays for both
individual and collective social actors, as well as the parallel distinguishing structural
features of individual and organizational identity referents. The principle recommen-
dation is to conduct the study of member-agents’ answers to the question, “Who are
we as an organization?” within the parameters of a defined identity-claim conceptual
domain (what) and associated phenomenological markers of identity-referencing dis-
course (how, when, why).

Keywords: organizational identity; cross-level theorizing; organizational theory

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article is based on my Organizational Management and Theory Division Distinguished Speaker address
at the 2004 Academy of Management Conference in New Orleans, Louisiana. Central to both the address and this article is the
argument that organizational studies scholarship should systematically account for the unique properties of organizations-as-
social actors, as evidenced by the wide spread confusion regarding the meaning of organizational identity. I wish to thank the
following people for their feedback on previous drafts: Mike Pratt, Kevin Corley, Denny Gioia, C. V. Harquail, Dick Scott, Amy
Wrzesniewski, Shelly Brickson, Joe Galaskiewicz, Mary Jo Hatch, Majken Schultz, Peter Foreman, Johan von Rekom, Marlena
Fiol, David Ravasi, Teppo Felin, Bruce Bingham, and Brayden King.
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY, Vol. 15 No. 3, September 2006 219-234
DOI: 10.1177/1056492606291200
© 2006 Sage Publications

219
220 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY / September 2006
It is not clear why weak conceptions of ‘identity’ are
conceptions of identity.
—Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 11)
I am writing in response to a growing concern that
the concept of organizational identity is suffering
an identity crisis, in the sense that, absent a demon-
strated central, enduring, and distinctive (CED) mean-
ing, it has failed to measure up to its own definitional
standard. Although there are numerous expressions of
this concern in print, Mike Pratt’s (2003) lament, “a
concept that means everything means nothing” is typ-
ical (p. 162; see also Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000;
Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003; Hatch & Schultz,
2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). I find this to be a par-
ticularly troubling characterization given that Albert
and Whetten (1985) introduced organizational identity
as a defined construct.
My recent reading of Olof Brunninge’s (2005) disser-
tation helped me better understand the challenges fac-
ing scholars interested in studying this subject. In his
extensive literature review, Brunninge points out that,
beginning with Albert and Whetten (1985), scholarship
on organizational identity has invoked inconsistent
treatments of the concept’s distinguishing properties.
For example, he observes that in some cases, organiza-
tional identity is portrayed as a subjective property of
observers, whereas in other cases, it is described as a
verifiable property of organizations. Also, although
organizational identity is depicted by some authors as a
highly stable property of organizations, others charac-
terize it as a relatively malleable property, readily and
routinely altered to reflect shifting environmental cir-
cumstances. And although some authors propose that
an organization’s identity consists of fragmented, often
incompatible elements, others challenge this characteri-
zation, underscoring its essential contribution to coher-
ent, consistent organizational action.
Playing off the opening Brubaker and Cooper
quote, my objective is to propose a strong version of
organization identity capable of passing two related
tests of construct validity. First, operationally, it
should specify how scholars can reliably distinguish
bona fide organizational identity claims from a larger
set of claims about an organization, as well as bona
fide organizational identity-referencing discourse
from a larger set of organization-referencing dis-
course. Second, analytically, its specified conceptual
domain should be distinguishable from related
concepts, especially organizational culture, image,
and identification.
As suggested by the article’s title, my proposal
builds on a 20-year-old formulation. The Albert and
Whetten (1985) description of organizational identity
contained three principle components. Although we
didn’t use these terms, the ideational component
equated organizational identity with members’
shared beliefs regarding the question “Who are we as
an organization?”; the definitional component pro-
posed a specific conceptual domain for organiza-
tional identity, characterized as the CED features of
an organization; and finally, the phenomenological
component posited that identity-related discourse
was most likely to be observed in conjunction with
profound organizational experiences.
Looking back, it is my sense that the present lack
of conceptual clarity in the literature citing this foun-
dational article is largely due to the increasingly
common practice of treating the ideational part of
our tripartite formulation as if it were the whole, and
thus treating the whole as if it were its least-discrim-
inating part. As a countermeasure, I will emphasize
the merits of using the complete Albert and Whetten
formulation and treating organizational identity as a
defined construct (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Baron,
2004). Although I agree with Gioia, Schultz, and
Corley (2002) that the metaphorical treatment of
organizational identity has to date yielded important
insights, other forms of scholarship, involving model
building, hypothesis testing, and measurement have
not been well-served by this ideational-dominant
treatment (Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2002). My
principle interest is in fostering greater use of organi-
zational identity in conjunction with other organiza-
tional studies constructs.
So that the core of my proposal doesn’t get lost in
the details of my presentation, I’ll summarize it up
front. The concept of organizational identity is speci-
fied as the central and enduring attributes of an
organization that distinguish it from other organiza-
tions. I refer to these as organizational identity claims,
or referents, signifying an organization’s self-deter-
mined (and “self”-defining) unique social space and
reflected in its unique pattern of binding commit-
ments. In practice, CED attributes function as organi-
zational identity referents for members when they
are acting or speaking on behalf of their organization,
and they are most likely to be invoked in organiza-
tional discourse when member agents are grappling

with profound, fork-in-the-road, choices—those that
have the potential to alter the collective understanding
of “who we are as an organization.” In these settings
and for these purposes, identity claims are likely to be
represented as categorical imperatives—what the
organization must do to avoid acting out of character.
This conception of organizational identity rests on
two core assumptions, extracted from organizational
theory and identity theory (Whetten, in press;
Whetten & Mackey, 2002). First, organizations are
more than social collectives, in that modern society
treats organizations in many respects as if they were
individuals—granting them analogous powers to act
and assigning them analogous responsibilities as col-
lective social actors (Bauman, 1990; Coleman, 1974;
Scott, 2003; Zuckerman, 1999). This view of organiza-
tions suggests a distinction between organizational
identity (the identity of a collective actor) and collec-
tive identity (the identity of a collection of actors). It
also highlights important functional and structural
parallels between the identity of organizational
actors and individual actors (Czarniawska, 1997).
Second, I equate identity with an actor’s subjective
sense of uniqueness, referred to as the self-view or
self-definition and reflected in notions such as self-
governance and self-actualization. Framed in this
manner, the identity of individuals and organizations
is an unobservable subjective state—a causal attribu-
tion that is inferred from its posited effects or conse-
quences, especially an actor’s “identifying
commitments” or “distinctive behavioral signature”
(Baumeister, 1998; Baumeister & Vohs, 2003; Leary &
Tangney, 2003; Mischel & Morf, 2003).
As a guide for theorizing about the identity of
organizations in this manner, I have relied heavily on
Morgeson and Hofman’s (1999) approach to cross-
level theorizing in organizational studies. A distinctive
feature of this approach is its systematic use of struc-
tural and functional analogues and its accompanying
proposition that organizational constructs borrowed
from the individual level of analysis need not have the
same structures, only the same functions (i.e., compa-
rable effects or consequences). For example, although
the functions associated with memory can be
observed in both individuals and organizations, the
form it takes is quite different (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).
Morgeson and Hoffman also propose that once the
analogous functions of an individual-level construct
have been identified at the organizational level of
analysis, their supporting organizational structures or
Whetten / ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 221
forms need to be identified. I use as my models for this
approach to cross-level theorizing Selznick’s (1957)
treatment of identity as organizational/individual
character (irreversible commitments) and Czarni-
awska’s (1997) efforts to demonstrate comparable
roles for individual and organizational identity, with
regards to an actor’s social accountability standards
and self-governance requirements.
OPERATIONAL VALIDITY STANDARD
My presentation is organized around the twin
standards I proposed in the beginning as suitable
tests of construct validity. This first section focuses on
the operational utility of the CED definition as a set
of specifications for organizational identity claims
(conceptual domain; what) and associated identity-
referencing and revealing discourse (phenomenolog-
ical domain; how, when, why). In the following
section, the proposed formulation’s ability to analyt-
ically distinguish organizational identity from
related constructs will be tested. Throughout, the
posited functions of organizational identity and the
structural characteristics of the organizational attrib-
utes capable of serving those functions will be high-
lighted. To underscore this distinction, in this section
I divide the CED definition into a functional standard
(distinctive) and a structural standard (central and
enduring).1 In the course of discussing each of these
as operational guides, specific validity standards are
proposed and illustrations are drawn from the litera-
ture. A summary of these standards and associated
guiding questions is shown in Table 1.
Functional Definitional Standard:
Distinguishing Organizational Attributes
Legitimate identity claims. The functional compo-
nent of the CED definition stipulates that the subset
of an organization’s attributes that are germane to the
study of its identity are those that have repeatedly
demonstrated their value as distinguishing organiza-
tional features. In essence, these identity referents
effectively specify to whom an organizational actor
is similar and in what ways it is different from all
others (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Lounsbury &
Glynn, 2001; Mohr & Guerra-Pearson, in press; Scott,
2001). This treatment of the core, relational meaning
222 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY / September 2006

Table 1
Using the CED Definition to Enhance the Construct Validity of Organizational Identity, Within a Functional / Structural Perspective

Functional Definitional Standard: Distinguishing Organizational Attributes

Focus Validity Standards Illustrative Guiding Questions

Conceptual Domain: Identity
Claims (What)
Attributes used by an organization to positively
distinguish itself from others. Attributes spanning
what is required and what is ideal for a particular
kind of organization.
Does this attribute reflect the organization’s
distinctive set of preferences / commitments?
Would it be considered an organization-specific
attribute? Is it a positive distinction? Is it an
essential distinction?

Phenomenological Domain: Represented as categorical imperatives, drawing Is there an imperative tone to the discourse?
Identity-Referencing Discourse attention to what must be done to avoid acting out Are positions presented as truth claims,
(How) of character, both comparatively and historically. comparable to moral obligations? Are emotions
running high?

Structural Definitional Standard: Central and Enduring Organizational Attributes

Focus Validity Standards Illustrative Guiding Questions

Conceptual Domain: Identity
Claims (What)
Attributes that are manifested as an organization’s
core programs, policies and procedures, and that
reflect its highest values. Attributes that have
passed the test of time or on some other basis
operate as “irreversible” commitments.
If this attribute were removed, would the
character / history of the organization be
significantly altered? Would it be a different
kind of organization?
Does this attribute reflect the organization’s
highest priorities and deepest commitments?
Is it a “higher level” organizational attribute, or
directly linked to one (i.e., an important
extension or expression)?
Is it considered a sacrosanct element?
Is it celebrated in organizational lore?

Phenomenological Domain:
Identity-Referencing Discourse
(When, Why)
Invoked by member-agents “when nothing else
will do,” as decision guides / justifications, in
conjunction with profoundly difficult situations.
The dominating topic of conversation when
seemingly “nothing else matters,” in the face of a
credible identity threat.
Have “lesser” decision guides been tried and
discarded? Is this the “court of last appeal” for
resolving conflicting proposals pertaining to a
fork-in-the-road decision?

a. Characteristics of legitimate organizational identity claims (identity referents) and organizational-identity referencing discourse.

of identity is consistent with the Latin suffix -id used
for nouns, denoting a member of a specific family,
class, or category, as well as a related meaning of
character as “all those qualities that make a person,
group or thing what he or it is and different from others”
(Oxford American Dictionary, 1980, p. 104). It is also
reflected in the conception of identity as a “unique
social space” found in individual identity scholar-
ship (Brewer, 1991; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg &
Terry, 2000, 2001; Pratt, 1998, 2001) and related socio-
logical treatments of organizational identity (Baron,
2004; Hsu & Hannan, 2004; Polos, Hannan, & Carroll,
2002; Zuckerman, 1999). This characterization is cap-
tured nicely in Rao, Davis, and Ward’s (2000) state-
ment: “Organizations acquire a social identity from
the industry to which they belong, the organizational
form they use, and through membership in accredit-
ing bodies” (p. 270).
Albert and Whetten’s (1985) focus on distinctive
identity claims foreshadowed Brewer’s (2003) princi-
ple of optimal distinctiveness, drawing attention to
the tension between humans’ equally compelling
needs for assimilation and uniqueness. Within the
organizational studies field, this tension is reflected
in the notion of “strategic balance,” characterized by
Deephouse (1999) as “organizations should be as dif-
ferent as legitimately possible.” It also underscores
the logical affinity between organizational identity
and contemporary views of sustainable competitive
advantage (Barney & Stewart, 2000). In summary, the

distinguishing validity standard stipulates that if
specific organizational attributes are not considered
essential for distinguishing the focal organization
from others, there is no theoretical value in referring
to them as identity referents.2
According to identity theory, distinguishing has a
second, equally important, meaning stemming from
the need for positive self-regard or high self-esteem
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Thus, in addition to distin-
guishing the focal organization from similar organi-
zations, it is posited that bona fide identity referents
must portray it as a distinguished social actor (a point
convincingly argued by Czarniawska, 1997, p. 52,
and closely related to Podolny’s 1993 treatment of
organizational status). Thus, it is posited that an
organization’s identity claims encompass the attrib-
utes required of all organizations of a particular type
as well as the ideal attributes associated with that
type (the ideal hospital, museum, or grocery store). It
follows that although widely shared negative charac-
terizations of an organization (e.g., highly bureau-
cratic) may explain member turnover, they do not
constitute an organizational-identity explanation of
member turnover.
The use of this dual meaning is nicely portrayed in
a study of stock exchange listings by Rao et al. (2000).
A distinguishing feature of a publicly traded corpo-
ration is which stock exchange their stock is listed on.
In the United States, rapidly growing technology
firms typically list their stock with the NASDAQ
stock market, whereas established, more mainstream
firms prefer the New York Stock Market. The authors
of this study note that firms seek to enhance their
prestige by switching from the NASDAQ and offer
insights into the details of these moves.
Legitimate identity-referencing discourse. Embedded
in Czarniawska’s (1997) comparison of individual
and organizational identity is a provocative proposi-
tion: Proper identification is especially critical for the
survival of organizations, because unlike individu-
als, “an organization can not legitimately claim to be
autistic or boast of defective ‘other perception’
(‘nobody understands us,’ Bruss, 1976)” (p. 52). Said
differently, although chronic mistaken identity is
troublesome for individuals, it is a fatal flaw for
organizations.
Given that the key to an organization being prop-
erly recognized is being properly classified
(White,1992; Zuckerman, 1999) and that the primary
threat to proper classification is uncharacteristic
Whetten / ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 223
action (“acting out of character”), we can expect to
see identity referents invoked in organizational dis-
course as categorical imperatives. They are categorical
in the sense that they reference distinctive social cat-
egories (we are a credit union, not a bank) and/or
they are stated as implied categorical distinctions (we
are a decentralized bank). The imperative form of
organizational identity claims stems from their link
to adopted social forms and associated accountability
standards. It follows that identity-referencing direc-
tives signify the boundaries of appropriate action for
a particular organization—what it means for this
actor to act-in-character (Douglas, 1987).
Logically, there are two bases for determining
appropriate organizational actions: comparative and
historical. The comparative frame of reference (“We
must do X because it is consistent with what’s
expected of X-type organizations, like us”) can be
roughly equated with an organization’s legitimacy
requirements (Suchman, 1995) or accountability
requirements (Czarniawska, 1997; Polos et al., 2002).
The equally important historical frame of reference
(“We must do Y because it is consistent with our orga-
nization’s history of strategic choices, like this”) high-
lights the logical interface between organizational
identity and organizational integrity (Goodstein &
Potter, 1999; Paine, 1994; Selznick, 1957), stewardship
theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), and normative con-
ceptions of organizational character (Wilkins, 1989).
What these integrity-evoking arguments share in com-
mon is a temporal conception of acting in-character,
commonly expressed as “honoring the past” or “doing
what’s right for the organization.”
The categorical-argument validity standard stipu-
lates that the practical meaning of identity referents
must be sufficiently understood among organizational
decision makers that their use as decision aids prevents
an organization from being misclassified as a social
actor or misused as a social tool. The principal value of
identity referents as shared decision premises lies in
their generally accepted meaning within an encom-
passing social-cultural milieu (Kogut & Zander, 1996;
Porac, Ventresca, & Mishina, 2002). As a point of
emphasis, although the meaning of some kinds of
identity referents, especially organizational traits and
competencies, is inherently ambiguous and susceptible
to change with time, the penalties for incoherent,
inconsistent, organizational practice are so severe that
they in effect place an upper limit on the level of ambi-
guity that can be tolerated within identity-referencing
organizational discourse (Czarniawska, 1997).
224 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY / September 2006
The corollary imperative-argument validity
standard stipulates that identity-based directives are
obligatory, not advisory (Brickson & Brewer, 2001;
Polos et al., 2002). A distinguishing characteristic of
identity-based discourse is the inference that this is
what the organization must do to avoid becoming
indistinguishable, unrecognizable, unknown. A sub-
text of these discussions is that if an organization fails
to honor its distinguishing commitments, it risks
becoming unpredictable and untrustworthy. It is thus
likely that identity-referencing organizational discus-
sions are noted for their emotional charge, especially
when they pertain to consequential, strategic choices,
as described more fully in the next section.
In conclusion, with regard to the distinctive
“hows” of bona fide identity-referencing discourse,
it is posited that identity-based arguments are
characterized by an imperative tone, associated with
commonly understood categorical standards, and put
forth as truth claims, on a par with moral obligations.
Structural Definitional Standard: Central
and Enduring Organizational Attributes
Legitimate identity claims. The structural compo-
nent of the CED definition specifies that central and
enduring organizational attributes are most capable of
satisfying an actor’s identity requirement of being
readily recognized by all interested parties (Ashforth
& Mael, 1996; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Said differ-
ently, if something isn’t a central and enduring fea-
ture of an organization, then practically speaking, it
isn’t likely to be invoked as a distinguishing feature,
and thus it falls outside the domain specified for this
concept. The core point here is that organizations are
best known by their deepest commitments—what
they repeatedly commit to be, through time and
across circumstances.
Thus, in line with path-dependent conceptions of
organizational evolution (Aldrich, 1999; Baum, 1996;
Stinchcombe, 1965), organizing and identifying can be
thought of as parallel, if not identical projects.3 This
parallelism can be expressed as a postulate: An orga-
nization’s identity denotes the kind of organization
that has to this point been formed; organizing is the
process by which organizations make themselves
known as a particular type of social actor. Thus, orga-
nizational identity referents can be thought of as the
institutionalized reminders of significant organizing
choices (Baron, 2004; Friedland & Alford, 1991;
Powell & Dimaggio, 1991; Whetten & Mackey, 2002).
As a point of emphasis, this postulate argues against
inferences in the literature that organizational iden-
tity claims are the product of image management
initiatives—after-the-fact efforts to formulate an
attractive appearance.
The central definitional standard directs our atten-
tion to what members consider to be essential knowl-
edge about their organization (van Rekom &
Whetten, 2005). The research convention of “causal
mapping” helps us visualize an organization’s cen-
tral attributes. Using data collected from members,
this methodology produces an ordered array of orga-
nizational features, such that the relative centrality of
a feature reflects its presumed role in “causing”
(explaining; accounting for) less central features
(Reger & Huff, 1993). In a classic application of this
research tool, Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller
(1989) examined 17 Scottish manufacturers of wool
sweaters. This group of firms was selected for study
because they constituted a distinctive niche in the
knitwear industry, organized around the following
shared, core, consistently expressed preferences: high
quality, classic design, fully fashioned cashmere.
These firms further expressed their shared identity as
a “generic recipe”: “purchase yarn from local spin-
ners, sell sweaters that will appeal to classically
minded, high-income consumers, create a flexible
production system that can manufacture garments in
small lots, hire exclusive agents around the world to
market these products, and temper the aggressive-
ness of one’s approach to pricing” (p. 414).
According to the enduring definitional standard,
legitimate identity claims are, generally speaking,
those organizational elements that have withstood
the test of time. Feldman (2002) has observed that we
commit to our deepest memory the things we dare
not forget. In analogous fashion, organizations inten-
tionally perpetuate their central and distinguishing
features, preserving for tomorrow what has made
them what and/or who they are today. With time,
these acts of preservation are likely to take on myth-
ical proportions, endowing them with a sacrosanct
quality, manifested as “trumping rights” over lesser
commitments and priorities. Retrospectively, it is
likely that identity claims will be depicted as morals
embedded in well-told stories of the defining
moments in an organization’s history (Kimberly,
1987), as the central themes highlighted in an organi-
zation’s autobiographical accounts (Czarniawska,
1997), or as a distinctive set of organizing principles

authored by formative organizational leaders
(Buenstorf & Murmann, 2005).
Along these lines, Whetten and Mackey (2005)
found that for a group of S&P 500 firms, the best pre-
dictor of consistently high corporate social perform-
ance ratings during the 1990s decade was information
obtained from corporate autobiographical accounts.
Specifically, the histories of firms with consistently
high ratings reported that comparable social practices
were first initiated during the tenure of the organiza-
tion’s founder. Of particular note, there was no signifi-
cant difference between the ratings of firms reporting
that these practices started after the founder’s depar-
ture and firms whose histories never mentioned these
practices. These results underscore Stinchcombe’s
(1965) observations regarding the long term, path-
defining imprint of a founder’s initial commitments.
They are also in line with Baron’s (2004) observation
from his extended study of technology firms that
“authentic” identities are most likely to be adopted
early in the history of an enterprise.
It is important to note that the enduring defini-
tional standard does not stipulate that only very old
organizational features will be experienced by cur-
rent members as central and distinguishing features.
Rather than waiting for the verdict of natural selec-
tion, organizations are capable of signaling their
intent to make recent commitments endure. As noted
by Selznick (1957), an organization’s commitments
are made “irreversible” by the degree to which they
are made central to an organization’s policies, proce-
dures, and practices. For example, in 1994, when the
Jonkoping International Business School in Sweden
was formed, 1st-year students reported that the
school’s enduring commitment to international edu-
cation was reflected in its degree requirements, the
makeup of its faculty, exchange program agreements
involving universities in other countries, and so forth
(Brunninge, 2005). In line with this example, we can
posit that today’s central organizational characteris-
tics are likely to be viewed, retrospectively, as endur-
ing organizational characteristics in the future (van
Rekom & Whetten, 2005).
One way to visualize the central and enduring
structural standard is to think in terms of a hierarchi-
cally ordered set of CED organizational attributes,
roughly paralleling the social, relational, and per-
sonal attribute-sets constituting an individual’s com-
posite identity (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Brewer &
Gardner, 1996; Brickson, 2000; Mischel & Morf, 2003;
Stets & Burke, 2003). The highest level of this nested
Whetten / ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 225
array includes adopted social forms, social cate-
gories, and comparable group memberships; the
middle level includes established ties with organiza-
tions and institutions; and the lower level includes
distinguishing organizational practices, competen-
cies, and traits, including organization-specific attrib-
utes of members, products, and services. We might
also think of these three types or levels of identities as
broad categories on a “menu of available organiza-
tional forms” embedded in cultural knowledge
(Aldrich, 1999; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lounsbury &
Ventresca, 2002; Porac et al., 2002; Rao, Monin, &
Durand, 2003). Recalling the parallel between organ-
izing and identifying introduced earlier, we can posit
that a properly organized/identified organization
includes selections from all three parts of this menu
and that the logical structure of the menu guides the
formation of a coherent organization/organizational
identity. In particular, the menu specifies both what is
possible (“venture capitalist” was not on the menu in
Romania in the 1980s) and what is appropriate, given
previous choices (“all you can eat” or “take out”
would be considered inappropriate organizing
choices for a five-star French restaurant). As illus-
trated by these examples, according to taxonomy the-
ory, higher level choices constrain and give meaning
to lower level choices (i.e., subsequent choices
must be backwards compatible), and lower level
choices elaborate, extend, and clarify higher level
choices—in line with Baron’s 2004 treatment of iden-
tity sharpness.4
Thus we see that higher level identities can be
thought of as logically prior choices (more central)
and as temporally antecedent choices (more endur-
ing). This observation suggests that efforts to under-
stand a particular organization’s identity claims
should begin at the top of an organization’s nested
arrangement of CED attributes. In contrast, the task
of identifying legitimate identity claims is made
more difficult when we focus on lower level traits,
practices, or competencies, in isolation. For example,
following a merger, suppose that key employees
complain, “This organization doesn’t value our
minds anymore,” or “We’ve lost our customer
focus.” Without the benefit of a top-to-bottom exam-
ination of the premerger organization’s attributes, it
is difficult to judge whether this apparent postmerger
shift in focus constitutes a loss of bona fide organiza-
tional identity claims.
This depiction of hierarchically ordered identity
claims draws attention to a critical component of my
226 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY / September 2006
cross-level theory. Higher level organizational
attributes, including adopted social forms and organ-
izing logics, can be considered structural analogues
of “inherent” individual attributes, such as gender
and ethnicity, on the grounds that the perceived
switching costs associated with the replacement of
these core identifying features are so high that the
prospect of doing so is, practically speaking,
unthinkable. For example, consider the implications
of an organization switching from being a sporting
goods retailer to a school, from being a bakery to a
software firm, or from being a bank to a welfare
agency. It is only slightly less difficult to imagine the
mass disorientation that would result from Harvard
University adopting the University of Phoenix
model of education, from Notre Dame or Boston
College renouncing their affiliation with the Catholic
Church, from 3M rescinding its commitment to inno-
vative products, or State Farm reversing its long-
standing commitment to being a mutual insurance
company.
Legitimate identity-referencing discourse. At the heart
of Albert and Whetten’s (1985) phenomenological
treatment of organizational identity practice is the
notion of profound organizational circumstances.
Their examples focused on organizational life-cycle
transitions, such as the retirement of an organiza-
tion’s founder. Their core argument was that bona
fide identity-referencing discourse is most readily
observable during periods of organizational upheaval.
What, in retrospect, was missing from their discussion
was a systematic characterization of profound orga-
nizational experience. I will attempt to correct this
oversight by explicitly positing a link between the
central and enduring definitional elements and their
associated phenomenological markers—what I refer
to as the “when” and “why” of identity-referencing
discourse.
As a beginning reference point, there is wide-
spread evidence that decision makers tend to match
their choice of decision premises with the perceived
requirements of their decisions (March & Simon,
1958; Simon, 1997). For example, core personal val-
ues are likely to be invoked when deciding to marry
but not when selecting the wedding date or caterer.
In similar manner, it is posited that decision makers
in organizations are most likely to invoke organiza-
tional identity referents when lesser decision prem-
ises (e.g., price comparisons, customer preferences,
maintenance, and support implications) are deemed
to be insufficient, and they are unlikely to invoke them
when lesser decision premises are judged to be suffi-
cient. Organizational identity is, thus, a blunt decision
aid—it is of little value in making routine or incre-
mental decisions, but it is indispensable for most fork-
in-the-road choices, especially when a contemplated
course of action might be considered out-of-character
by a legitimating audience. This characterization of
profound organizational experience suggests three
organizational settings where identity-referencing
discourse will be especially visible.
First, identity referent applications. I have in mind
exceptionally difficult strategic challenges and
opportunities, including life-cycle transitions. These
are cases in which decision makers conclude that
nothing else but relevant identity referents will do as
decision guides. The widely cited study of the New
York City Port Authority’s response to a homeless
person’s crisis (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) is a good
example, in the sense that the underlying premise
guiding their selection of appropriate responses was
that they were a transportation organization, not a
social welfare agency. As a second example, in a
recently published study, Ravasi and Schultz (2006)
report that during the span of two decades, Bang and
Olafson, a Danish high-end audio electronics firm,
faced three major operational crises. For example, in
1972, the company’s principle distributors pressured
the firm to develop a more diversified product mix,
pointing to the success of SONY and other Japanese
audio firms. In each instance, senior management
commissioned an internal task force to conduct a his-
torical analysis of the firm’s core organizing princi-
ples and values. The results of their reports were
used to formulate Bang and Olafson-appropriate
responses.
Second, identity-referent threats. These typically
involve the threatened loss of high-level identity ref-
erents, for example, proposed changes in the qualify-
ing requirements for not-for-profit organizations or
minority-owned government contractors, or the
threatened loss of mission-central relationships, such
as sole-source provider or distributor agreements. In
these cases, the need to resolve a real or potential
identity crisis dominates the attention of decision
makers, often to the point where seemingly nothing
else matters (Bouchikhi & Kimberly, 2003; Fiol, 2002).
An in-depth identity-threat case study was recently
reported by Corley and Gioia (2004). They describe

the challenges facing a divested business unit as it
struggled to establish an independent identity. They
carefully document how the emerging organization
was required to change both their identity labels and
the meanings associated with them. Of particular
note, they describe how organizational leaders self-
consciously modeled the appropriate use of the new
identity claims as decision guides. Another instruc-
tive example is reported in Brunninge’s (2005) study
of Handlesbanken, a Swedish bank distinguished by
its emphasis on decentralized branch banking opera-
tions. When their competitors began offering Internet
banking services as a way to economize and central-
ize core banking functions, Handlesbanken found
themselves torn between their customers’ demands
for these services and their identity claims. Following
extensive deliberations, a creative, identity-consis-
tent approach was adopted, featuring a seamless net-
work of branch bank Web sites, personalized with
local pictures, announcements, and news.
Third, identity referent incongruence. There are some
organizations that, by design, violate the coherent
identity prerequisite for effective self-governance.
This is the distinguishing characteristic of hybrid
identity organizations (e.g., family-businesses,
church-universities, professional arts organizations).
Meyer and Scott (1983) aptly describe the predica-
ment facing these organizations: “The legitimacy of a
given organization is negatively affected by the num-
ber of different authorities sovereign over it and by
the diversity or inconsistency of their accounts as
how it is to function” (p. 202). Albert, Godfrey, and
Whetten (1999) expanded Albert and Whetten’s
(1985) description of organizational hybrids by
adding three distinguishing characteristics: incom-
patible, inviolate, and indispensable identity claims
(Albert & Adams, 2002). Anecdotal examples suggest
that these organizations are, as one observer put it,
“perpetually one major decision away from provok-
ing a massive identity crisis—tantamount to civil
war” (Glynn, 2000; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; Pratt
& Foreman, 2000). Whereas most organizations fac-
ing difficult choices can rely on their core commit-
ments to adjudicate conflicting proposals, hybrids must
actively prevent decisions from becoming test cases
of their allegiance to incompatible identity claims.
In conclusion, for the typical organization iden-
tity-referencing discourse is most likely to be
observed in conjunction with novel, controversial,
Whetten / ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 227
consequential strategic choices, and/or threatened
changes in the organization’s self-defining social
classification. In the latter situation, the massively-
destabilizing possibility of becoming a different kind
of organization rivets decision makers’ attention on
what they would otherwise take for granted. The
premise underlying this phenomenological treat-
ment of organizational identity-referencing discourse
is that too often what organizations claim to be
when nothing is on the line is not how they act when
everything is on the line. Coming at this from a dif-
ferent angle, although the mention of distinctive
organizational features in a single official publication
is surely not enough to qualify them as legitimate
identity claims, given their role as guides for appro-
priate organizational action, it is inconceivable that
legitimate identity claims would not appear in multi-
ple publications.5
ANALYTICAL VALIDITY STANDARD
Thus far, the practical value of a stronger, more
discriminating, conception of organizational identity
has been examined in light of the operational challenges
researchers face in determining what constitute bona
fide organizational identity claims and associated
identity-referencing accounts. In this section, the ana-
lytical utility of the proposal will be tested, as a guide
for distinguishing organizational identity from
related concepts. Despite the publication of several
treatises on this subject (Hatch & Schultz, 1997, 2000;
Schultz, Hatch, & Larsen, 2000; Whetten & Mackey,
2002), readers of the organizational identity literature
continue asking for help locating the conceptual
boundaries between organizational identity and
related concepts, notably, organizational culture and
image. (For a related treatment of organizational
identification, see Dyer & Whetten, in press; Foreman
& Whetten, 2002; Whetten, in press.)
In the case of organizational culture, it is important
to highlight two different meanings of culture used
in organizational identity scholarship (Barney &
Stewart, 2000; Fiol, Hatch, & Golden-Biddle, 1998;
Hatch & Schultz, 2000). On one hand, scholars who
view the world through a cultural lens tend to
characterize organizations as cultures and organiza-
tional identity as the self-referencing aspect of
organizational culture. On the other hand, when
culture is treated as one of many comparable
228 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY / September 2006
properties of organizations, it is typically portrayed
as a particularly distinguishing property (e.g., IBM’s
culture). The proposed treatment of organizational
identity is more compatible with the second treat-
ment of organizational culture and offers the follow-
ing distinction between identity and culture. When
member agents invoke elements of their organiza-
tion’s culture in ways, for purposes and at times that
are consistent with the specified uses of legitimate
identity claims, then these cultural elements are
functioning as part of the organization’s identity. In
other words, according to the CED definition,
members are most likely to invoke specific cultural
elements of their organization as distinguishing
features when they are experienced as central and
enduring organizational attributes. This treatment of
organization-specific cultural features echoes Burton
Clark’s (1972) classic treatment of “organizational
sagas” as a form of differentiation among elite
private colleges (e.g., the “Swarthmore saga”).
Within the organizational identity literature, the
concept of organizational image generally refers to
shared cognitive representations or views of an
organization. Notably, image is sometimes equated
with organizational identity and sometimes held out-
side identity (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994;
Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley,
2000; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Schultz et al., 2000;
Soenen & Moingeon, 2002). Paralleling the analogous
treatment of organizational culture, scholars who
view the social world through an ideational lens tend
to characterize organizational identity as a particular
image or set of images having to do with “who we are
as an organization,” for example, current versus
future or ideal views of “who we are.” In contrast,
when identity and image are formulated as compara-
ble organizational properties, image is typically char-
acterized as either a projected representation of an
organization targeting outsiders, or as a reflected rep-
resentation of the organization expressed by out-
siders, akin to reputation (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, &
Whetten, 2005; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Thus, it is
common for studies of identity and image formulated
in this manner to examine the congruence between
insider and outsider views of an organization.
The proposed treatment of organizational identity
suggests that to avoid advancing a low-discriminat-
ing, ideational-dominant, conception of organiza-
tional identity, identity should not be equated with
image, and the comparisons among insider and out-
sider views of an organization that are most germane
to one’s understanding of organizational identity are
those involving bona fide CED organizational attrib-
utes. In addition, it is important to note that the con-
ventional view of identity as a subjective,
retrospective explanation of past actions suggests
that discrepant other-views seldom change self-
views, and when they do, the mediating link is
altered behavior (Baumeister, 1998). (Were it other-
wise, identity’s essential role in self-governance
would be severely compromised.) Here’s a simple
illustration. Upon learning that their relations with
customers are very poor, a company might put in
place superior customer-relations practices. With
time, this sustained initiative might lead to “cus-
tomer focused” becoming a CED attribute. Thus, we
see that the proposed conception of organizational
identity unequivocally distinguishes between
attributes and attributions, and it makes no provision
for a direct causal link from attributions to attributes.6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
My endeavor to expand, clarify, and above all,
strengthen the Albert and Whetten (1985) formula-
tion of organizational identity has three core features.
First, I have attempted to formulate a level-free con-
ception of identity, in the sense that I’ve used the
CED definition to specify the essential properties of
individual and organizational identity. In addition, to
demonstrate its practical implications for organiza-
tional studies, I used the definition to derive validity
standards for qualifying legitimate organizational
identity claims and associated organizational-iden-
tity referencing discourse. Stated as a maxim, the
CED definition stipulates that claims of organiza-
tional distinction must pass the additional test of
being expressions of central and enduring organiza-
tional attributes, or alternatively, central and endur-
ing organizational attributes must be considered
useful reference points for distinguishing the focal
organization from similar others. By implication, we
can say that not all institutionalized organizational
features qualify as identity referents, but all identity
referents must be institutionalized features of an
organization.
Second, I have focused on the identity of organiza-
tions, as compared with identity in organizations, in
an attempt to side-step reductionist treatments of this
subject (for a related discussion of identity in organi-
zations, see Whetten, in press). This is part of a larger

project to better understand the unique properties of
organizations (Heath and Sitkin, 2001), particularly
those stemming from the observation that organiza-
tions are constituted as social artifacts but function as
commissioned social actors in modern society
(Whetten & Mackey, 2002, 2005; Whetten, in press).
One of the most difficult aspects of framing organi-
zational identity from the perspective of an organiza-
tional actor is properly accounting for the subjective
(“I”) frame of reference, at the core of identity theory
and suggested by persistent questions such as “Who
speaks for an organization?” and “Who gets to spec-
ify an organization’s identity?” The response offered
here directs our attention away from the “who” to
the “when” “how” and “why” of identity-revealing
organizational discourse. In addition, it is posited
that the perspective-taking process member-agents
engage in when called upon to speak or act on behalf
of their organization is not that different from role-
related shifts in perspective—from “my views” to
“the VP of Marketing’s views.”
Third, I have attempted to draw a thick boundary
between what organizational identity is and what it
is not. Specifically, with the aid of the CED definition
I have argued that identity referents are known by
the distinctive functions they perform, the distinctive
way in which they are structured, and the distinctive
organizational circumstances that provoke their use.
As a consequence, the proposed conception of orga-
nizational identity lends itself to model building,
hypothesis testing, and empirical measurement. In
addition, it should also enhance the concept’s utility
as an interpretive perspective by fostering more con-
sistent and distinctive “organizational identity” rep-
resentations.
In conclusion, I wish to draw to the foreground an
important implication of this initiative—namely,
strong concepts dictate conservative applications.
Consistent with a posited pattern of exceptional
identity-claim use in organizations, it follows that
organizational identity is most appropriately
invoked in organizational scholarship as an excep-
tional explanation. For example, although we don’t
require the notion of organizational identity to
explain multiple, conflicting views of organizations,
it is indispensable for explaining multiple, conflicting
identity claims in hybrid organizations. And
although we don’t generally need organizational
identity to explain employee resistance to change, it
sheds important insights into the disorienting effects
of losing a CED organizational attribute. Also,
Whetten / ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY 229
although many strategic decisions can be adequately
explained using standard economic models, some
appear to be intentional expressions of the organiza-
tion’s distinctive character.
As a point of emphasis, let me place this proposi-
tion in an historical perspective. Erikson (1968)
reported that he formulated the concept of identity
because he needed the therapeutic category identity
crisis to fully explain the profound sense of disorien-
tation observed in the war-altered soldiers he was
treating as a therapist. These men were more than
homesick or battle fatigued. War had made them
strangers to themselves. Individuals who had years
ago left the farm, the printer’s shop, or the classroom
to fight for freedom didn’t recognize the person
returning from battle. On a less grand scale, Albert
and Whetten (1985) needed the concept of organiza-
tional identity to explain what we perceived to be
irrational responses to a seemingly insignificant
budget cut at our university (Whetten, 1998). When
we framed our observations as indicators of an orga-
nizational identity threat, what we were observing
began to make sense. The lesson suggested by these
parallel accounts is this: Under girding a strong por-
trayal of organizational identity is the notion that it is
used, by organizational members and scholars alike,
when other explanations simply won’t do.
NOTES
1. Let me clarify my use of Albert and Whetten’s (1985)
central, enduring, and distinctive (CED) terminology. First,
I tend to use the term distinguishing, rather than distinc-
tive, to capitalize on its dual meaning: different from; bet-
ter than. Second, with regards to enduring, although some
organizational identity scholars have expressed a prefer-
ence for the term continuous, I find no substantial differ-
ence in their definitions. The same can be said for core and
central. Thus, in the end, I have elected to follow the Albert
and Whetten practice of using these terms interchangeably,
while giving preference to the more common use of central
and enduring in the literature citing the CED definition.
Third, I will continue Albert and Whetten’s treatment of
central attributes constituting essential knowledge about
an organization (see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 6,
including footnote 29).
2. As an extension of Whetten and Mackey’s (2002)
effort to distinguish between identity and reputation, I pro-
pose centering the domain of organizational identity in
organizational attributes, and the domain of organizational
reputation in organizational attributions (Elsbach &
Kramer, 1996; Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003;
230 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY / September 2006
Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999). Thus, whereas an organiza-
tion’s reputation may affect members’ perceptions of the
organization and their associated levels of satisfaction,
only legitimate organizational attributes serve as appropri-
ate guides for member-agents’ actions.
3. These parallel processes share several key assump-
tions, including the following: (a) initial conditions, espe-
cially founders’ selection of social forms, have long-term
developmental consequences (Buenstorf & Murmann,
2005; Stinchcombe, 1965), (b) radical departures from an
organization’s developmental trajectory are uncommon
occurrences, most likely provoked by environmental
discontinuities (Baum, 1996) and (c) successful “core
changes” in organizations are rare (Barnett & Carroll,
1995). It is also worth noting that this postulate suggests a
limited role for concepts such as “provisional self” (Ibarra,
1999) and “possible self” (Markus & Nurius, 1986) in the
conceptualization of organizational identity (see
Baumeister, 1998: 682). Absent any inherent material attrib-
utes, organizational actors are constituted as social arti-
facts, identifiable by the persistent consequences of their
self-defining commitments. It follows that whereas an
organization’s identity can be used to predict an organiza-
tion’s choice of future plans, schemes, and dreams, it is
inappropriate to equate organizational identity with state-
ments of aspiration or intention.
4. Representing an organization’s identity as a hierar-
chically ordered composite helps us reconcile the fact that
organizations, like individuals, possess multiple identities,
with a core assumption in identity theory that actors
strongly prefer a coherent, internally consistent self-view
(Baumeister, 1998: 682; Ryan & Deci, 2003). Hence, I view
discussions of how organizations manage conflicting iden-
tities (e.g., Pratt & Foreman, 2000; Balmer & Greyser, 2002)
as applying to hybrid identity organizations, introduced
later, rather than to organizations generally.
5. An alternative to organizational scholars actually
chasing ambulances to the scenes of major organizational
crises is to provoke the feeling that an ambulance is on its
way. This might involve the detailed retelling of a recent
crisis or the use of realistic, fork-in-the-road, decision-mak-
ing scenarios. In addition, after a top management team
has brainstormed a list of likely CED organizational attrib-
utes, it might involve requiring them to go through some
type of forced choice exercise, challenging them to prove to
a skeptic’s satisfaction that each nomination satisfies the
CED standard and corresponding phenomenological indi-
cators. The point here is that our collection of organiza-
tional identity data should mirror the defined attributes
and predicted distinctive uses of bona fide identity claims.
6. Before closing I need to acknowledge the “chicken
and egg” question lurking in the shadows: Which
comes first, organizational practices or organizational iden-
tity claims? Broadly viewed, this issue pervades the
whole of organizational studies, as reflected in microlevel
behavioral consistency theory (Salancik, 1977; Weick, 1995)
and macrolevel structuration theory (Giddens, 1984).
Within the organizational identity literature, it is picked up
in the distinction between sensemaking (constructing
shared views of an organization from members’ experi-
ences) and sensegiving (making members’ experiences sen-
sible through the application of extant shared views) (Fiol,
2001; Gioia & Chittipedi, 1991; Hatch & Schultz, 2000). As
noted earlier, identity theory tends to treat extant identity
referents as subjective, retrospective, explanations of a per-
son’s distinctive pattern of life-shaping commitments
(chicken à egg). On the other hand, I am arguing that extant
identity referents provide guidance for member-agents
when they are expected to prospectively act on behalf of
their organization (egg à chicken). As reflected in these
seemingly contradictory but arguably complementary per-
spectives, one of the advantages I see in the identifying =
organizing” postulate is that it encourages an ongoing dia-
logue about how the chicken and the egg of identity claim
usage are related, both generally and specifically.
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DAVID A. WHETTEN is a professor of organizational behavior and
director of the Faculty Center at Brigham Young University. Prior to
joining the Marriott School of Management in 1994, he was on the
faculty at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign for 20 years,
where he served as associate dean of the College of Commerce, Harry Gray
Professor of Business Administration, and director of the Office of
Organizational Research. He was the founding editor of Foundations
for Organizational Science and served as editor of the Academy of
Management Review. His pioneering and award-winning manage-
ment text, Developing Management Skills (Prentice Hall, 2005),
coauthored with Kim Cameron, is in its seventh edition. He has been very
active in the Academy of Management, serving as program chair in 1998
and president in 2000.