STATCON
JULY 26,2021
CASES:
GENERAL
1. NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE (CIR)
KEY POINT:
The intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.
Under Sec 10, Art 8 of 1987 constitution:
“the salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the SC and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During
their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased.”
It is plain that the constitution authorizes
Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but
such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval.
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously
issued a directive to the Fiscal Management
and Budget Office to continue the deduction
of withholding taxes from salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and other
members of the judiciary. This was affirmed
by the Supreme Court en banc on December
4, 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and
qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52,
19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC,
National Capital Judicial Region, all with
stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries. With the filing of the petition,
the Court deemed it best to settle the issue
through judicial pronouncement, even if it
had dealt with the matter administratively.
Issue: WON the intention of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution is to exempt justices
and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935
Constitution.
Held: NO
The ascertainment of the intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect.
The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.
In the present case, Section 10, Article VIII
is plain that the Constitution authorizes
Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but
such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval. It would
be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the
light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
Thus, the debates, interpolations and
opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was
to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for prohibition.
COMPARATIVE PROVISIONS:
The 1935 Constitution provided:
 ... (The members of the Supreme
Court and all judges of inferior courts)
shall receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance
in office ...  (Emphasis supplied).
1 
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same
provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of
the Associate Justices of the Supreme
court, and of judges of inferior courts
shall be fixed by law, which shall not
be decreased during their continuance
in office. ...  (Emphasis ours).
2  primary task in constitutional construction is to
And in respect of income tax exemption,
another provision in the same 1973
Constitution specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of
any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall
be exempt from payment of income
tax. 
3 again reproduced hereunder:
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which
petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of
the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts
shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased.  (Emphasis
4  it is plain that the Constitution authorizes
supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a
provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the
1973 Constitution, for which reason,
petitioners claim that the intent of the framers
is to revert to the original concept of "non-
diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission relevant to Section 10, Article
VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII,
of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court and of judges of
the lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor
subjected to income tax. Until the
National Assembly shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice shall
receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate
Justice ______________
pesos.  (Emphasis ours)
5 
The debates, interpellations and opinions
expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The 10 
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization
of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. it 11 
may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers. 12 
1avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII,
of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is
The salary of the Chief Justice and of
the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts
shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased. (Emphasis
supplied).
Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but
such rate must be higher than that which they
are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those
appointed after its approval. It would be a
strained construction to read into the provision
an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as
stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of
judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates
the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as
13 
affirmed in Endencia vs. David  must be
14 
declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to
the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share
the burden of general income taxation
equitably.
2. FILOTEO JR.
SANDIGANBAYAN
KEY POINT
Penal laws are those imposing punishment
for an offense committed against the state
which the executive of the state has the
power to pardon. In other words, a penal law
denotes punishment imposed and enforced
by the state for a crime or offense against its
law.
RECIT READY
Filoteo was a police investigator in Manila.
He was one of the suspects being charged
for violating the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law for hijacking a
postal delivery van. The Sandiganbayan
found him guilty of the crime, in which one
of the evidence that was used against him
was his sworn statement admitting the
crime. On appeal to the SC, he claimed that
the rights of an accused under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which
includes the right against an uncounseled
waiver of the right to counsel is applicable
to him retroactively, even though his
custodial investigation took place in 1983 --
long before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. This is for the reason that it is
favorable to him as an accused pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.
Facts: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo Jr., a police
investigation of good standing and
competence was charged as mastermind for
hijacking a postal delivery van on May 1982
which contained pension checks for U.S.
government pensionados. During the
custodial investigation, petitioner executed a
sworn statement waiving his right to counsel
under Sec. 20 art 4 of the 1973 Constitution.
In the defense of the petitioner, he alleged
that he was abducted by force and was not
informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to be accompanied by
counsel. He also contents that he was forced
and tortured to admit in participation in the
hijacking.
On June 1987, petitioner was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged against him and his co accused.
On appeal to the SC, the petitioners claim
that the rights of an accused under Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which includes the right against an
uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is
applicable to him retroactively, even though
his custodial investigation took place in
1983 -- long before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. This is for the reason that
it is favorable to him as an accused pursuant
to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Issues: WON Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution should apply to the
accused retroactively.
Held: NO.
While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony who is not a
habitual criminal, what is being construed
here is a constitutional provision specifically
contained in the Bill of Rights which is
obviously not a penal statute. A bill of
rights is a declaration and enumeration of
the individual rights and privileges which
the Constitution is designed to protect
against violations by the government, or by
individuals or groups of individuals. It is a
charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the state. Penal
laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly
are those imposing punishment for an
offense committed against the state which
the executive of the state has the power to
pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes
punishment imposed and enforced by the
state for a crime or offense against its law.
As such, the law cannot apply retroactively
in this case

LANGUAGE
3. J.M TUASON & CO. INC VS.
LAND TENURE
ADMINISTRATION
KEY POINT
One of the well-settled constitutional
contructions is verba legis, that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.
RECIT READY
Petitioner is the owner of a land called
Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They seek to
nullify RA 2616 which directs the
expropriation of two lots inside the estate.
Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution,
“The Congress may authorize, upon
payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals” Petitioner contends that said
law is unconstitutional because the provision
in the Constitution refers to “lands” not
landed estates.
Facts: RA 2616 took effect without
executive approval— expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by
petitioner JM Tuason & Co. (to be
subdivided into small lots and sold to their
occupants) was authorized by Congress in
view of social and economic problems.
Respondent Land Tenure Administration
instituted the proceeding for the
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate RA
2616, as directed by the Executive
Secretary.
Petitioner JM Tuason & Co. filed special
action for prohibition of RA 2616 with
preliminary injunction against the
respondents to restrain expropriation
proceedings
RA 2616 was decided unconstitutional by
the lower court, granting the writ of
prohibition.
Issue: WON RA 2616 is unconstitutional
because it violates the petitioner’s rights to
due process and equal protection of law?
Held: NO
The question is one of constitutional
construction. The Constitution clearly states
that “land” not “landed estates” can be
expropriated. It has a broader scope,
allowing the legislature to expropriate more
types of land. The law does not distinguish
between different types regardless of how
big or small it may be, as long as there is a
need to address a growing social problem
such as inequality.
The question is one then of constitutional
construction. It is well to recall
fundamentals. The primary task is one of
ascertaining and thereafter assuring the
realization of the purpose of the framers and
of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution.
We look to the language of the document
itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed
in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say.
It does not admit of doubt that the
congressional power thus conferred is far
from limited. It is left to the legislative will
to determine what lands may be
expropriated so that they could be
subdivided for resale to those in need of
them. Nor can it be doubted either that as to
when such authority may be exercised is
purely for Congress to decide. Its discretion
on the matter is not to be interfered with.
The language employed is not swathed in
obscurity. The recognition of the broad
congressional competence is undeniable.
The judiciary in the discharge of its task to
enforce constitutional commands and
prohibitions is denied the prerogative of
curtailing its well-nigh all-embracing sweep.
4. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
KEY POINT
Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis
estanima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers.
Facts: The two petitions in this case sought
to declare unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the
ordinary functions of his position, a member
of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies
of which the President is the Chairman.
The petitioners alleged that the cited
provision of EO 284 contravenes the
provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which
declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly
or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
The petitioners maintained that the phrase
“unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article
VII meant that the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents, on the other hand,
maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution” in Section 13,
Article VII makes reference to Section 7,
par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are
concerned. The provision relied upon by the
respondents provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Issue: Does the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar
as Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-
XB?
Held: NO
The intent of the framers of the Constitution
was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as
holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution” of Sec. 13,
Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad
exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987
Constitution. The former is meant to lay
down the general rule of holding multiple
offices applicable to all elective public
officials and employees while the latter is
meant for the exception of the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. To construe
otherwise would be to render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose
of the framers of the Constitution. E.O. 284
is therefore declared null and void.

5. DAVID VS. SENATE

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
KEY POINT
Even when a reading of the plain text is
already sufficient, contemporaneous
construction may still be resorted to as a
means for verifying or validating the clear
textual or contextual meaning of the
Constitution
It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed
in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails
What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they
say. Thus, these are the cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum.