Even-Arguments, Explanatory Gaps, and Pragmatic Scales

Author(s): Jonathan E. Adler

Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1992), pp. 22-44
Published by: Penn State University Press
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Even-Arguments, Explanatory Gaps, and
Pragmatic Scales1

Jonathan E. Adler

1. Even. What is the argumentative force of "even"? Why is it that

a sentence like
(1) Even many professore hâve serious réservations about the
tenure System.
appears to provide a more forceful premise to the conclusion that
"the tenure System is flawed" than that same sentence without the
"even"? The answer is not self-evident. For, if we view "even" 's
force as due to pragmatic implications, then on standard accounts2
of conventional terms- "even," "but," "however," "therefore,"
etc. - thèse do not alter truth-conditions. Hence, they do not alter
relations of logicai entailment.3
Although pragmatics looms large in the study of arguments,
little attention has been devoted to conventional terms.4 Yet, thèse
are essential and pervasive in linguistic communication. Frank
Jackson suggests a simple experiment to prove this:

Take a philosophicalpaperwithwhichyou areunfamiliar;get some-

one to blankout all thèse wordsand their kin; then try to followit.
It is not easy.5

The same point goes for arguments, even when analyzed or recon-
structed into a standardized form. Remove the "but"s, "so"s,
"therefore"s, "nevertheless"s, or "yet"s Connectingpremises, sub-
conclusions, and the conclusion, and the cohérence of the reason-
ing will be lost.
Consider, to begin, the following 'even-statement' paraphrased
from a breakfast cereal advertisement:
(2) Even Mikey likes Life cereal.
"Even" brings our attention to the fact that it is (highly) contrary-
to-expectation that the term it stresses ("Mikey") has the property
claimed ("likes Life cereal"), and yet it asserts, nevertheless, that
it ("Mikey") does hâve that property.6

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1992. Copyright © 1992 The Pennsylvania
State University, University Park PA.

22
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 23

It is contrary-to-expectation only relative to a contextually as-

sumed salient group of alternatives. Mikey is less expected than
Mary or Bill to like Life because we are told that he hates so many
foods. But he is not less expected than anyone at all that might be
suggested.
Mikey's liking Life cereal, though highly contrary to expecta-
tion, need not be at the extreme on thè scale of selectivity of eating
habits. If Joe is a member of the contextually assumed group of
alternatives, and (even) less expected to enjoy Life cereal, it would
still be appropriate to assert (2).7
A further (rhetorical) job of the "even" is to ward off doubts
about the truth of the assertion minus the "even." Knowing that
Mikey despises so many foods, you may doubt whether he likes
Life. By beginning with the "even," the speaker acknowledges
récognition of that reason to doubt, and so the speaker suggests
that he or she can allay it. Thus, a potential line of objection is
aborted. This purpose is perhaps clearest in cases where the clause
stressed by "even" appears to follow trivially from a previous asser-
tion. For example, consider the warning "No smoking permitted at
all, not even in the bathrooms"* The value of the even-clause
dépends upon assuming that some audience entertains the thought
or objection that the rule was hastily formulated without regard to
valid exceptions. By explicitly anticipating that objection, the
even-clause disarms it.9
2. Basic-even-arguments. Let us now shift from 'even-statements'
to 'even-arguments', which hâve received little attention in the lit-
erature on "even" and conventional implication (nor in argumenta-
tion generally).10 Here is an example:
(3) Even Oscar enjoyed himself . So thè party must hâve been
a success.
Oscar is a real grouch, who rarely has a good time (at least at social
functions). He is at (or near) the low end on the scale of ease of
(social) enjoyment. But the rest of thè crowd at thè party is higher
along on that scale. So if (even) Oscar enjoyed himself, they are
more sure to (or more likely to) enjoy themselves, or enjoy them-
selves to a greater extent. A party is a success when everyone, or
almost everyone, enjoys him or herself. So the party must have
been a success.
I will refer to (3), as well as (4)-(7) below, as instances of the
"basic-even-argument" because they dépend only upon the prag-
matic scale that is the essence of the workings of "even."11The
24 JONATHANE. ADLER

scale supplies thè source for why even-sentences implicate some-

thing's being contrary-to-expectation. After all, if I buy my daugh-
ter a toy truck rather than a doli, it might be contrary-to-
expectation but that alone would not render an even-statement
appropriate. The fact stressed by "even" is contrary-to-expectation
because it is located at or near an extreme on a scale. Therefore, so
thèse arguments assume, anyone or anything at positions removed
from that extreme are more assured of having thè property (or
having it to a higher degree), and it is thus less surprising that they
do hâve it.
Even-arguments that turn up in the absence of "even" are indica-
tive of its broad scope. Thus, in his récent book Change ofView,12
Gilbert Harman, after defending the importance of "nondeductive
explanations," writes:

Hempel, who has been one of the most importantdefendersof

the deductive-nomologicalmodel of scientificexplanation,. . . has
recentlysuggested(in unpublishedwork) that ail seriousscientific
explanationsare nondeductivein this way. . ,13

The "who" clause obviously provides the grounds that would jus-
tify inserting "even." (Hère it is clear that the conclusion intended
is quite weak. Harman is off ering nothing more than a reason to
take this approach seriously, not a reason to accept it.) Another
implicit even-argument uses premises with phrases like "X him-
self . . . believes that p." So, containing the term "even" in a
premise is not a necessary condition for being an even-argument.14
Given the obvious contextual assumptions, each of the following
can be understood, I believe, on this same pattern:
(4) Even better mechanics work at Shirley's Auto. So, you
should take your car there.
(5) Even the Hyundai has front wheel drive. So it's no big
deal (unsurprising) if the Subaru does.
(6) Even saying "good morning" to him became a chore. So,
divorce seemed inévitable.
(7) Even John Simon (a well-known, demanding theater
critic) liked Papp's Hamlet. So we should really think well of
it (like it; enjoy it).
For simplicity of discussion, the even-arguments I discuss are
restricted to those with a single premise in which "even" occurs
first, modifying what is intuitively the subject term, and the conclu-
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 25

sion is always stated explicitly. However, as a moment's reflection

would show, often, perhaps typically, these features do not hold.
My discussion is also restricted in not treating "even" construc-
tions: even if, even though, even when. One reason to believe that
these deserve separate treatment is that they work like sentence
connectives - even if [though, when] p, q- forming complex sen-
tences, while "even" alone opérâtes within single sentences. The
restriction does not affect the adequacy of our discussion, as far as
it goes, if, as the consensus opinion has it, understanding these
constructions dépends upon a prior understanding of "even."15
3. Against the minimalist (statistical) view of"even." Below I will
introduce the explanatory-even-argument which builds upon the
basic-even-argument. In explicating explanatory-even-arguments
(or even-arguments, for short), I will lean heavily on a particular
"
analysis of "even . So , I must say more about what I am packing into
this analysis, and défend it against competing alternatives. Specifi-
cally, I argue that normal usage of "even" implies, first, that the fact
(event, etc.) it emphasizes is a (controverted) expectation based on
reasons; second, that the truth of the fact is contrary-to-expectation
due to an ascribed disposition or (lawful) regularity or, more
weakly, some real connection,16 rather than a mere statistical (or de
facto/accidental) unlikelihood; and, third, that the fact is contrary-
to-expectation conventionally, notconversationally. (Briefly, acon-
versational implication (implicature) is a calculated inference from
(and beyond) what is said on the basis of mutually accepted contex-
tual assumptions and maxims of conversation that the speaker is
presumed to be obeying. Conventional implicatures are not calcu-
lated, but are attached to the meaning of particularterms. Nonethe-
less, these conventional terms, like conversational implicatures, do
not alter a statement's truth conditions.)17
Défense of my analysis18against these competitors is relevant to
thè scope of my claims, not to their truth within some (narrower)
domain. What is at issue is whether my analysis holds by virtue of
the meaning of "even," or whether it holds more as a function of
context, so that its scope is more limited.
First, instead of "even" 's implying something 'contrary-to-
expectation,' Jackson speaks of the phrase emphasized by "even"
as being less assertible than those same phrases filled by referring
to one of the salient alternatives.19But this seems too weak. One
statement can be less assertible than another only because our
évidence is too weak for one rather than the other. But to assert
26 JONATHANE. ADLER

(2) appropriately, it cannot merely be that one has less évidence as

to Mikey's taste habits compared with that of the salient others.
Rather, one is committed to having good grounds for Mikey's
being a very picky eater.
Second, a number of writers take thè basic implication to be
primarily statistical and de facto. Thus, Karttunen and Peters hold
that
(8) Even Bill likes Mary,
conventionally implicates both that
(9) Other people besides Bill like Mary,
and that
(10) Of the people under considération, Bill is the least likely
to like Mary.20
These two (alleged) implications [(9) and (10)] neatly fit together
and contrast with a dispositional (or lawful or real connection)
view: There is thè (brute) statistical fact that others like Mary
(rather than her being likeable, even if no one yet appréciâtes it);
and Bill has the lowest probability of liking her for whatever rea-
son (rather than relating the contrary-to-expectation fact to some-
thing about his nature).
Before commenting on (9) directly, let me offer another exam-
ple which clearly does not hâve the implication Karttunen and
Peters claim. If Arthur is one of the worst students in my class and
his is the first paper I grade, I might say
(11) Even Arthur got an A.
But I surely would not implicate that others besides Arthur re-
ceived As. I have not yet looked at their tests.21 Karttunen and
Peters' main évidence for their claim is that the following is a
contradiction (not a Gricean "cancellation"):
(12) Even Bill likes Mary, but no one else does.
However, granted that there is a contradiction heard it is plausible
to attribute it, in part, to our assuming that others do, in fact, know
Mary. And with that assumption, on my view too, (12) would
implicate a contradiction - Mary's being both likeable and un-
likeable.22So when we drop (cancel) that assumption, no contradic-
tion is heard:
(13) Mary just became a member of the club. Bill was the
first to meet her, and even he likes her. So, assuredly, when
others get to know her they will like her too.
Their second implication (10), and more generally, what I am
calling the statistical view, is also supported on a broader front by
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 27

drawing parallels with two other constructions: "plus" and "only."

"Plus" is very close to "and even."23 "Only" forms an elegantly
complementary syntactic relationship with "even," as Horn and
now Lycan have insightfully shown. (They are both "floaters,"
occuring just about anywhere in sentences, and they share similar
logicai (quantificational) functions).24Now both of thèse construc-
tions are well analyzed as having the minimal statistical reading-
"plus" just means "in addition" and "only" serves as a universal
quantifier, which denies that any other relevant individuai has the
selected property.
Yet compare
(14) Bill likes Mary, plus so does Jill.
with
(15) Bill likes Mary, and even Jill does.
Surely, it is clear enough that (14), unlike (15), establishes nothing
about either Mary's being likeable, or Jill's being undisposed to
like her. And similarly, compare
(16) Only Attila can solve this physics problem.25
with
(17) Even Attila can solve this physics problem.
For the latter (17), we imply (by the conventional meaning of
"even") that Attila is not bright, and so infer that the problem
isn't difficult. But with (16), if the parallel held at the level of
pragmatics, we should imply (by meaning) that Attila is bright,
and so infer that the problem is not easy. In fact, though, from
(16), we are not at all disposed to draw any inferences concerning
Attila's intelligence or the difficulty of the problem. This is not
surprising if , as I see it, "only" 's quantificational role exhausts its
meaning, and so it does not imply anything directly as to why (16)
is true. In other terminology, "even," unlike "only," has sub-
junctive or counterfactual implications as befitting a dispositional
meaning.
Paul Kay26 argues that being contrary-to-expectation is not a
(conventional) implication from the meaning of "even." He holds
instead that it is a (generai) conversational implicature due to a
familiär need to avoid controversion of Grice's quantity maxim.
He offers the following example:
(18) Everyone is remarking on Mary's improvement. Last
week she beat the number ten player and this week, as every-
one expected, she even beat the number three player.
What bothers me about this example is that I hear the "even" as
28 JONATHANE. ADLER

commenting on thè extent of thè improvement, rather than the

fact that beating the number three player is a greater accomplish-
ment than beating the number ten player. The phrase "everyone
expected" seems attached to our présent view of Mary's game
(subséquent to her improvement), while the "even" attaches to
that prior time where her great improvement is being established.
Thus, we could easily add thè word "now" between "everyone"
and "expected" but not "always."
Were Kay correct, one would expect "even" to function nor-
mally in examples where there is no controversion of a quantity
implication, and yet where the fact stressed agrées with a back-
ground expectation. But consider
(19) Lendl first played the 80th seed, and won. He then
played the 72nd seed, and even beat him too.
These conditions are met by this example. It meets Kay's scalar
conditions. There is no quantity implicature of the first Statement
that Lendl didn't beat any better player, since I'm clearly recount-
ing Lendl's games in chronological order. But because Lendl is
expected to be so much better than both the 80th or 72nd seed, we
hear the "even" not in its normal function, but as ironie.
Second, unlike normal conversational implicatures, this implica-
ture is détachable, i.e., other ways of saying the (truth-condition-
ally) same thing (by dropping the "even") do not carry the
contrary-to-expectation implicature. Third, as Lycan says, such a
conversational view

is totally implausible,since conversationalimplicaturesare calcu-

lated on the basis of whole propositionalcontent, not triggered
withoutcalculationby specialsinglewords.27

For thèse reasons, I will continue to refer to the implication of being

contrary-to-expectation as a conventional one. Although my argu-
ments against Kay, especially the first, are not conclusive, I believe
this usage is, given my second and third reasons, less misleading.
4. Explanatory even-arguments. I turn now to explanatory even-
arguments that build upon, but go further than, basic-even-
arguments, and which will be my main concern for the remainder
of this paper:
(20) Even Stanford is trying to eut costs. So, the financial
crisis has finally caught up with collèges.
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 29

The underlying reasoning in (20) that I want to explore and

défend is as follows:
(20*) Stanford is trying to eut costs. Since Stanford is wealth-
ier and more successful than most other collèges, its trying to
eut costs (rather than college A, or , or trying to
eut costs) is highly contrary to expectation, and, so, given
other contextual dues, calls for explanation. Tacit premise:
But it is not a plausible explanation that its occurring now is
just a coïncidence. The most plausible explanation is that thè
generai financial crisis has finally caught up with thè collèges.
So, we should infer that explanation as our conclusion.
And, to generalize (20*), in abstract, artificially precise terms, thè
following reasoning is posited:
(*) @s. Since x's @ing is contrary to expectation (com-
pared with salient others), and given other contextual clues,
then that fact (rather than whether any of these salient others
@) requires explanation. Tacit premise: It cannot plausibly
be ascribed to coïncidence or chance. The most plausible
candidate is H - would not hâve @ unless H is true. So, thè
credibility of H is significantly raised.
The reasoning in (*) is akin to that for "severe tests" of a hy-
pothesis: For on any hypothesis, save thè one proposed, thè obser-
vation is highly unlikely to be true (i.e., it counts as a "severe test"
of thè hypothesis). So without that hypothesis thè occurrence
would remain puzzling. Since, though, it is true, our confidence in
thè hypothesis should increase significantly (depending upon thè
degree of surprise, i.e., upon how contrary to expectation thè
occurrence is). I leave aside as not germane whether thè conclu-
sion should be asserted absolutely or only with a certain high de-
gree of probability.
It may be objected that thè structures (20*) or (*) cannot capture
thè reasoning underlying (20), since these structures are quite com-
plex while (20) is rapidly comprehended. But it is one of thè most
important, and under-appreciated, lessons of Grice's theory of con-
versational reasoning that complex reasoning- drawing on analysis
by thè language faculty, contextual assumptions, and maxims gov-
erning conversation; and involving comparisons among alternative
interprétations- can be instantaneously comprehended.28
The central eue to, and mark of, that which calls for explanation
is thè occurrence emphasized by "even" that is (highly) contrary-
to-expectation. The occurrence is puzzling or anomalous, so in
30 JONATHANE. ADLER

need of explanation. On a merely statistical view of "even," this

mark would be absent or weakened. An occurrence of a merely
unlikely event (under a given description)29 is not puzzling or
anomalous. We are quite familiär with such occurrences, and in
fact, given enough trials, unlikely occurrences are likely to occur.
Yet I am not claiming that fulfilling this condition alone is neces-
sary or sufficient for an event's being in need of explanation. That
water boils when heated was perfectly expected, even though theo-
retically worth explaining. It is also not sufficient: It is contrary-to-
expectation that short parents will hâve a tali child. But when they
do, the occurrence is not (currently) feit in need of explanation.30
We already know enough about gene tics to account for it.
Besides the contrary-to-expectation fact, shared assumptions of
speakers and audiences render it plausible that a speaker intends
that his or her audience should recover an explanatory account of
the even-argument. Thus, I add in (20*) and (*) the phrase "given
other contextual dues." In particular, there is the speaker's stress
introduced by "even," as well as the conclusion (or something sug-
gesting it) whose relevance to the argument is already established.
These contextual dues are also important in distinguishing ex-
planatory from basic-even-arguments. The former build upon the
latter in that they dépend upon a (pragmatic) scale contrast between
an individuai near or at the extreme with those further along on the
scale. Yet, it is dear enough that an argument like (3) could be
meant as an explanatory even-argument. It is only with surrounding
contextual dues that we properly look upon the contrary-to-
expectation fact as needing explanation, rather than solely as supply-
ing a reason to infer that others, further along on thè scale, have the
correspondingproperty (e.g. , in (3), enjoying thè party). In explana-
tory even-arguments, the conclusion is subject to dispute or in ques-
tion, while in basic-even-arguments the conclusion may very well be
known, where the main question is not "why" but "how do you
know it?" Analogously , for explanatory even-arguments that others
do or would have the property in question may very well be known,
while in basic-even-arguments that is what we are inferring.
Distinguishing thèse arguments in actual cases will be neither
clear-cut nor easy, not only because of the dependence on contex-
tual dues. Any abstract pattern meant to represent some type of
everyday argument attempts to reconstruct rapid inferences drawn
by varied audiences in différent conditions. As such, the pattern
will match any one person's reasoning only very roughly.
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 31

5. Presuppositions and the force of even-arguments. Why are

even-arguments appealing or forceful? The forcefulness is to be
understood through the role of presuppositions, and the way the
cali for an explanation structures presuppositions and affects the
bürden of proof .31Our discussion of pragmatic aspects of explana-
tion in this section is also meant to elaborate on features of (*) so
far ignored.
A presupposition is an assumption normally taken for granted in
a conversation or argument. Presuppositions typically arise either
as non-focal entailments or as commitments tacitly made through
thè mutuai acceptance of Statements by ail parties to a conversa-
tion or argument. Presuppositions are important for understanding
the course of argument because they are difficult to challenge. This
is because first, and most obvious, they are not the focus of discus-
sion; second, they are, often, tacitly conceded; and third, their
déniais are not easily or simply formulated (since it is definitive of
paradigm examples of presuppositions that thè [small scope] déniai
or contrary has the same presupposition).32
For our purposes, the presuppositions within even-arguments
that are most important are not those of the even-sentence itself . It
is, rather, the presuppositions of accepting that even-sentence as
indicative of an "explanatory-gap." For, in generai, the even-
sentence is going to be easily accepted without récognition of the
large commitments implicated. To accept the question "How do
you explain the fact that p?" (e.g., "How do you explain the fact
that Mikey likes Life?") présupposes that requires explanation
and so in the absence of an alternative explanation a gap or bürden
of argument remains.33
The sensé of a need for explanation is projected against a back-
ground contrast between the contrary-to-expectation event and
that which is expected (or normal) instead. In a différent context,
Robert Nozick34notes that it is quite common for théories to posit
one thing as a normal or naturai state, and contrast it with a dévi-
ant state in need of explanation:35

Questionsof the form 'WhyX ratherthan Y?' find their home

withina presumptionor assumptionthat Y is naturai.36

Thus, the familiär contrast between Newtonian and Aristotelian

accounts of whether rest or motion is in need of explanation; or
between pre- and post-Freudian views of whether the présence or
32 JONATHANE. ADLER

absence of childhood sexuality calls for explanation. (In thè case of

even-arguments thè obvious contrasting ["ratherthan"] state is thè
expected one in which thè fact or event does not obtain). Nozick
observes, more pertinently to his topic, that it comes naturally to
us to ask the question "why is there something rather than noth-
ing?" We understand that question as presuming that "nothing" is
naturai, while "something" is a déviation. By so structuring our
question, we orient ourselves, prior to spécifie évidence, to certain
phenomena being in need of explanation, and others as naturai
states, not in need of further aecounting.37
By analogy, the why-question generated by our even-argument
orients us toward explanations rendering the fact or event under-
standable in terms of its conformity with further knowledge of
regularities or expectations. And it orients or biases us against
explanations in terms of chance or random processes. Abo ve, I
captured what I take to be this presupposition in even-arguments
through an explicit Statement of thè tacit premise denying that
coïncidence is a plausible explanation.
It is a disputed question in the philosophy of science whether or
not chance processes can supply an explanation.38Yet there is no
real question that if chance processes do explain, then practically,
if not formally, they do so in a différent way than deduetive-
nomological (or even, induetive-statistical) explanations. For one
différence, the explanans does not supply us with grounds for ex-
pecting the explanandum. While the significance of that différence
is crucial in the philosophy of science, for us the crucial différence
is pragmatici Explanations in terms of chance or random processes
are not naturai competitors with explanations in terms of connect-
ing assumptions or lawlike generalizations.
Though the explanations each off ers are contraries, one (a "con-
necting" explanation) accepts the presupposition of the "why?"
question while the other (the "chance" explanation) dénies it.39
The presupposition being that there is a phenomenon in need of
explanation. Take an example from thè cognitive social psychology
literature- the "sophomore slump."40 Why did Rookie X, who
had such a sensational freshman year in baseball, do so much
worse the next year? What is in need of explanation, according to
the question, is his change from sensational to ordinary. (Notice
that it would not be naturai to ask, "Why did Rookie X do equally
well the second year?") Naturai competitors include that 'Success
and fame spoiled him,' The pitchers/hitters made the necessary
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 33

adjustments,' etc. On any of those answers, the question is appro-

priate (i.e., its presuppositions are accepted).
Now contrast those naturai competitors with the answer favored
by the psychologists: Regression to the mean. As Nisbett and Ross
put it ". . . by chance alone, some médiocre athlètes will perform
exceptionally well in their first year but perform less well in subsé-
quent years."41The normal conversational way to off er this expla-
nation is to deny the question: "Look, there is no 'why' to it! X's
doing worse the next year is just thè workings of chance." (Indeed,
given this explanation, the "why" question would be appropriate
not for a change in performance, but for the performance remain-
ing the same.) Although this answer and thè previous ones are
logicai competitors (they cannot both be correct), they are not
naturai ones.42
Thus to grant the propriety of the why-question suggested by the
even-premise is to bias oneself against a certain range of answers.
Correlatively, it is to place any critic of the even-argument in an
awkward position to object. For the critic, who accepts the even-
premise, must off er a hypothesis that dénies the presupposition
that something is in need of an explanation. But that presupposi-
tion is already conceded. The force of the even-argument is then
subtly bolstered in the acceptance of its basic, and usually uncontro-
versial, main premise. Thus, consider the implicit argument sug-
gested by the advertising from which (2) is choosen:
(21) Even Mikey likes Life. So, it must taste good.
Naturai competitors with the explanation offered by the conclu-
sion are, for example, that Life is inexpensive or that it is nutri-
tious. These competing explanations share the presupposition that
there must be a (non-chance) explanation for the observed phe-
nomena. In accepting the even-premise, while denying the infer-
ence drawn, one is expected to off er in place of the arguer's conclu-
sion, one of thè other naturai competitors. Instead, a critic of the
argument in (21), who believes, for example, that it is just happen-
stance that Mikey acted this way, must deny a presupposition that
is already granted.
For so pedestrian an example, thèse obstacles involving presup-
positions and explanatory gaps are easily overcome. So too where
phenomena, e.g., the outcomes of baseball games, are well known
to be affected by external, chance occurrences. Where, however,
the phenomena selected are less familiär to an audience, thèse
obstacles provide correspondingly tougher hurdles.43For example,
34 JONATHANE. ADLER

(22) Even "and" does not function as thè logicai "&." So,
formal logic probably does not provide a good model for
naturai language connectives.
More generally, although barriers to denying or overcoming pre-
suppositions are not logicai or semantic, but pragmatic- matters
of complexity or the breaking of the flow of argument or conversa-
tion- they should not be dismissed as insignificant.44In the course
of normal conversation or argument, where serious time and pro-
cessing constraints enter, différences in ease of expression and
compréhension can make a significant différence, especially as the
presuppositions increase in number, complexity, and subtlety.
(The difficulty of finding a simple and naturai déniai of a presuppo-
sition is precisely what animâtes the fallacy of many questions.)
6. Application: Ad hominem arguments. The supposition of an
explanatory gap is especially forceful where the even-argument
involves emphasis (by "even") on an agent's judging or believing
contrary to his own biases or disposition. It is then naturai to be
puzzled as to why the agent so chose. Argument (21) is of this type,
as is, for example,
(23) Even George's father believes that he is guilty. So, he
probably committed the felony.
Argument (23) is not an appeal to authority, since it does not rest
upon the agent's specialized expertise, or the propriety of defer-
ring to the judgments of others in this domain.45
Even-arguments like (23) exhibit a complementary pattern of
reasoning with those ("abusive") ad hominem challenges that dis-
miss an argument due to the arguer's alleged bias. For example,
when a physician Dr. Y cornes out opposed to a new national
health insurance and cities as reasons its detrimental effects on
patients' health or finances, the accusation of bias can be alleged:
(24) Dr. Y only opposes that plan because it'll eut doctor's
salaries. So, probably his argument is specious.
These reveal a complementary pattern in the following way: (23)
supports its conclusion by virtue of an agent's believing it contrary
to his disposition or bias. The support arises from the supposition
that the best explanation of the belief is the fact asserted in the
conclusion. The abusive ad hominem (24) seeks to undermine an
argument by virtue of an agent's defending it where it is consonant
with his disposition or bias. The undermining involves providing a
competing explanation, to the expected one, for why he believes it.
The complementary relationship of (23) and (24) is further evi-
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 35

denced by the way the type of premise each involves can be used to
deny the other. Thus, one could reject the even-premise of (23) by
asserting "What do you mean - 'Even George's father . . . ?'-
they haven't spoken for years" (so the father's action is really
consonant with his disposition). While the crucial premise of (24)
could be denied by asserting "Even those who favor socialized
medicine are troubled by the plan." This last Statement illustrâtes a
valuable rôle of even-statements in arguments generally. They are
useful for claiming the independence of a judgment from a bias,
e.g., finding this health plan flawed is independent of one's posi-
tion on a national health plan generally.46
Circumstantial ad hominem (or tu quoque) challenges are also
fruitfully viewed in relation to even-arguments. The standard illus-
tration is the Sportsman's Rejoinder from Whately:

(25) A hunter accused of barbarityfor his sacrificeof innocent

animaisfor his own amusementor sport in huntingreplies to his
critic:"Whydo you feed on the flesh of harmlesscaule?"47

There are a number of blatantly fallacious implications that the

hunter can be intending through this accusatory question.48 For
one thing, the assumption that the cases are parallel should be
questioned: There is a prima facie moral différence between killing
for amusement and killing for food. But what we are interested in
is the generai form of challenge this reasoning realizes, and
whether there are some legitimate or, at least, not blatantly falla-
cious uses of that form of challenge. So let us set aside fallacies
both obvious and parochial to spécifie instances of the circumstan-
tial ad hominem,
The dominant view assimilâtes the fallacy in (25) to something
akin to that in the abusive ad hominem such as (24). The circum-
stantial ad hominem rejects an argument due to a failing of the
arguer, thus committing a fallacy of irrelevance. Aside from poorly
fitting many examples,49 the dominant view fails to render plausi-
ble the persistence of such reasoning. For a fallacy this gross
should hardly be persuasive either as justification for rejecting an
argument or conclusion; or even, less tendentiously, as simply an
attempt to divert discussion. In fact, rarely are convincing and
realistic examples provided in which the conclusion, if the ad
hominem is meant as an argument, fits the analysis. Typically, the
conclusion is either tacit or not a direct daim that the critic's
36 JONATHANE. ADLER

argument is worthless. Consequently, in formulating explicitly the

conclusion so as to create a blatantly fallacious argument, those
who favor this analysis will run afoul of the "principle of charity."
It dictâtes that one give préférence to interprétations in which the
belief s and arguments ascribed to others are reasonable, not (liter-
ally) unbelievable.50
Recently, a more attractive, more generous view of the propri-
ety of the circumstantial ad hominem has been defended, which
returns us to earlier treatments.51 There is, on this view, a legiti-
mate use of the circumstantial ad hominem in which it amounts to a
déniai of sincerity or credibility.52It thus amounts to a shift in the
bürden of proof from the target of criticism (e.g. , the hunter) to his
or her critic (e.g., the eater of meat). I want to build on this view,
while diverging from it.
In many examples of the circumstantial ad hominem, the credibil-
ity or sincerity of the critic is especially salient and vulnérable. This
daim is to be argued for based on the assumption that thèse ad
hominem challenges can often be understood as tacitly involving
an even-argument:
(26) Even you eat meat. So. ...
What is the scale along which the critic is at or near an extreme? It
is, I suggest, something like the scale of moral uprightness- the
critic is ascribed the status of a moral paragon. What justifies the
ascription? First, in generai, the critics threatened by such ad
hominem challenges are directly (personally) criticizing another's
actions, commitments, or strongly-held beliefs. The criticism has a
moral charge upon it, often, if unfortunately, taken as a personal
attack.53 Second, there is an influential, though highly problem-
atic, social attitude toward criticism, particularly of this "sensitive"
kind: The critic's rôle forces upon him or her a posture of righteous-
ness, leading to his or her own behavior and attitudes being held
up to a higher standard.54
Two lines of reasoning may now originate from this ascription to
the critic of being a moral paragon, both fitting the schema (26).
Given the ascribed posture, it is then contrary-to-expectation that
the critic would eat caule. But the critic does, so there is an ex-
planatory gap.
The first line of reasoning closes the gap by denying the originai
supposition of his or her right to serve as a moral spokesman.55
Although this analysis is close to récent views, it differs in starting
from a position that raises- only as prelude to undermining- the
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 37

critic's credibility. That makes good sensé of why the strictly cor-
rect rejoinder that "two wrongs do not make a right," while avail-
able, hardly seems satisfying. It is strictly correct because if X's
action is wrong (assuming it is) by virtue of its going against a
correct principle, it does not make Y's action right when he or she
violâtes that principle. (Indeed, how could it make it anything
more than excusable?) But it is unsatisfying: It is awkward for X,
as a critic, to appear to accept with indifférence thè failure to live
up to his or her own principles.
Something like this initial raising of credibility is also required
for récent views. (And, perhaps, it can be drawn out from their
emphasis on the activity of argumentation, as contrasted with the
pure logic of the argument). For precisely why is the critic's credi-
bility so fit a target for the circumstantial ad hominem accusation?
After all, it is the content of the critic's charge which cames his or
her argument. AU that is (strictly) needed to register it against the
hunter is that the critic can sincerely assert it, and hence, believes
it. But there is hardly any plausibility to the suggestion that mere
assertibility is impugned by the fact that one does not live accord-
ing to what is asserted. For obviously there are any number of
reasons why one does not act directly in accordance with a belief.
(Does my eating chocolaté cake impugn thè [mere] assertibility for
me of the statement that "chocolaté cake is bad for you"?)
The second line of reasoning dépends upon the assumption that
the critic is demanding that the agent criticized act differently
than he or she does. Such an argument assumes some form of the
Kantian dictum that Ought' implies 'can'. Now this second line of
reasoning challenges the critic, albeit dimly and, usually, uncon-
vincingly, by contraposing the Kantian dictum: 'cannot' implies
'not the case that ought'. The fact that the proponent (the critic)
doesn't do what he or she demands of others (to refrain from
causing the death of harmless animais) is treated as évidence that
that action cannot feasibly or fairly be demanded as what any-
one - and the hunter, in particular- ought to do. Ceterisparibus,
patterns of action that moral paragons recommend, but which
they themselves do not perform,56are taken to be ones which ask
too much of ordinary persons. That is, one part of the explana-
tion for why even the critic her- or himself is responsible for the
needless killing of animais is that the morality that forbids such
acts is too demanding. Since the principle that 'ought' implies
'can' is taken as implicit in the critic's argument, the circumstan-
38 JONATHANE. ADLER

tial ad hominem challenge can be relevant to his or her argument,

and not merely his or her credibility as an arguer, contrary to
traditional and récent accounts.
However, there are a number of assumptions upon which the
above interprétations of the circumstantial ad hominem dépend,
and which if unacceptable undermines either the interprétation, or
the appropriateness of the ad hominem. In particular, ascription of
the even-argument depended upon the critic's own action being
given a special evidentiary rôle. In cases where it is common knowl-
edge that strong independent évidence exists for the principle the
critic espouses, the critic can, with equanimity, deny the even-
premise, and bite the bullet on the charge of practical inconsistency.
Consider the father who, having advised his child not to smoke,
faces the child's retort, "But y ou smoke." Assume this is meant as
a challenge and an expression of puzzlement, but not as sarcasm.
The parent can proceed to remind the child both of the overwhelm-
ing évidence of the dangers of smoking and the fact that many have
successfully stopped smoking. In view of this, the parent may con-
tinue, his own actions are hardly going to be forceful grounds at ali
concerning the wisdom of smoking, or the feasibility of quitting.
Unlike the charge of logicai inconsistency, the successful charge of
practical inconsistency need not constitute more than a temporary
shift in the bürden of proof .
8. Conclusion: Evaluation, Understanding, and "Psychologism."
In a récent article, meant to praise, review, and set an agenda
for informal logic, Douglas Walton57writes,

To study the logic of reasoningimplies a normativepoint of view

wherebythe reasoningis judged as weak or strong, good or bad,
valid, fallacious,etc. With the rise of mathematicallogic as a disci-
pline, a sharpwedge was drivenbetweenthe logicaiandthe psycho-
logical points of view on studyingreasoning.Whilethere are over-
lappingconcernsand interests,stili it is importantto see clearlythat
the logicaipoint of view on reasoningis distinctivelydifférentfrom
the psychologicalpoint of view.58

The orientation suggested by this passage, and in line with much

else said concerning logic, argumentation, and informai logic, is in
tension with the emphasis of this study. My emphasis has been to
understand even-arguments, with only passing and casual remarks
about évaluation. At the level of generality one must assume to
encompass ali even-arguments, there isn't much Substantiveévalua-
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 39

tion possible. Aside from the matter of the assertibility of the even-
premise, the goodness or badness of even-arguments dépends too
much upon content and contextual assumptions.
Further, in order to understand even-arguments I hâve had to
appeal to empirical facts about normal human beliefs and atti-
tudes. For example, my analysis assumes that there are common
beliefs as to what needs explaining and the proper form such expia-
nations should take. Although Walton is focused on évaluation,
and his admonition against the relevance of psychological factors
decidedly vague ("distinctively différent"), the resources we ap-
pealed to are in some tension with Walton's (and many others)
"
"non-psychologism .
Actually, the approach taken hère is closer to naturalism, in the
tradition of Hume, than psychologism of the kind opposed fa-
mously by Frege and, eventually, Husserl. For the beliefs and
attitudes that I invoked are the shared inheritance of humans,
-
arising in thè most basic of our intelligent activities conversing,
explaining, communicating, reasoning. These provide presumptive
grounds in favor of certain normative conclusions. For example,
the conclusion of argument (20) that "the financial crisis has finally
caught up with collèges" can be opposed either by the alternative
that "Stanford just overspent in the eighties" or that "It is just
happenstance that Stanford is now cutting costs." Assuming that
we are constrained to corne to a judgment, the latter alternative
incurs a stronger bürden of proof than the former alternative just
mentioned or the conclusion actually offered. For the latter alterna-
tive ("It is just happenstance. . .") violâtes our presupposition that
an explanation is called for.
This study less noticeably finds a naturalistic influence in the
idea that cognitive Systems must economize on information to be
gathered and evaluated. It is a basic function of conventional terms
like "even" to increase enormously our expressive power, at little
cost in time or effort. Example (2) has the same truth-conditions as
"Mikey likes Life cereal" but by conventionally implicating that
this is unexpected - since Mikey hâtes so many foods - speakers
help audiences to assimilate efficiently more information.59Audi-
ences not only corne to believe that Mikey likes Life, but that he
does so because it tastes very good, as he dislikes so many foods.
AH for a two-syllable word!
Facilitation of inference is a crucial need when we look at argu-
mentation, like conversation, as highly constrained communica-
40 JONATHANE. ADLER

tion. Practicalities and exigencies govern all real argumentation, so

that we standardly and non-consciously attempt to pack a lot of
information in brief , rapid exchanges. Even in writing, though less
so, authors are usually constrained by thè space demands of their
forums. The need for cognitive economy is then a quite generai
constraint on arguments, so that it is plausible to believe that it
plays a rôle in shaping many systematic features of argumentation,
as well as pragmatics.60Thus, the main purpose in granting pre-
sumptions is just to foreclose an investigation which, though rele-
vant, would be costly, effortful, and would greatly delay debate or
inquiry.61
Analogously, one reason ad hominem challenges or arguments
are so populär, and not unreasonably so, is that our time and
resources are limited so that it is désirable to economize on argu-
ments that one takes seriously enough to be worth pursuing. If a
speaker or arguer is noticeably stupid, biased, or pigheaded, that is
an efficiently applied, however fallible, basis for ignoring, though
not judging, his or her argument.
Now, it seems to me that a valid approach to real argument
évaluation would have to be sensitive to cognitive interests, con-
straints, and limits. Many of the even-arguments offered here
would provide pretty good reasons to believe their conclusions in
some contexts of everyday conversation and reasoning. But none
would do so where specialized interests or responsibilities demand
higher standards. That George's father (23) believes he is guilty is
a good enough reason for me to believe, for the nonce anyway,
that he is guilty, as I am interested in this matter only for purposes
of taking part in local town gossip. But this even-argument is sim-
ply inadmissible as a reason to believe for a respectable Journalist,
let alone a jury or judge.
At least in these limited ways, évaluation must be naturalistic. We
cannot impose a single standard for adequate évidence or reasons
indifferent to (cognitive) purposes. And our evaluative conclusions
as to the acceptability of arguments, like our attempt to understand
and reconstruct arguments, must be rationally grounded, in part, in
basic human beliefs, attitudes, and judgments.

DepartmentofPhilosophy
BrooklynCollege, C.U.N.Y.
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 41

Notes
1. Thanks to Dan Boone, L. Jonathan Cohen, Catherine Z. Elgin, and Eugene
Garver for their comments. I am especially indebted to a référée for extensive and
exacting comments leading to substantial revisions.
2. See, for example, Frank Jackson, Conditionals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987) and Lauri Karttunen and Stanley Peters, "Conventional Implicature," in
Syntax and Semantics: Vol. 11 Presupposition (New York: Académie Press, 1979):
1-56; and William G. Lycan, Logicai Form in Naturai Language (Cambridge MA:
The M.I.T. Press, 1984), chap. 5, sec. 3. All develop Gricean aecounts. See Part I,
especially chapter 2, of H. Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge
MA: Harvard UP, 1989).
3. Throughout this paper, the terms "implicates" or "implicature" or "implies"
will be used to refer to Gricean conversational or conventional inferences; "sug-
gests" refers to some looser contextual, perlocutionary, inferences from what is
said; while "entailment" will be reserved for the strict logicai or semantical notion
that if '' entails 'q' then it is not possible (inconsistent) for 'p' to be true and 'q'
false.
4. Note, for example, Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst's slightly
dismissive attitude toward conventional implicature in their Speech Acts in Argu-
mentative Discussions (Foris: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1983), 133.
5. Jackson, Conditionals, 95.
6. For rigorous analyses of "even" see Jonathan Bennett, "Even If," Linguistics
and Philosophy 5 (1982): 403-18; Paul Kay, "Even." Linguistics and Philosophy 13
(1990): 59-111; especially sec. 1.1 and for emendations, sec. 2.4; William G.
Lycan, "Even and Even If." Linguistics and Philosophy, fortheoming. Stephen
Barker's "Even, Still, and Counterfactuals," {Linguistics and Philosophy 14 [1991]:
1-38) is a penetrating critique of Bennett, and one whose final analysis should be
compared to Lycan. My références to this spate of absorbing and closely argued
papers in Linguistics and Philosophy may misleadingly suggest a mastery of them.
In fact, the more I study this material, the more assured I am, in Socratic fashion, of
how little I know.
7. Kay, "Even," argues against the view that what "even" emphasizes need be at
an extreme. Instead, on thè scalar model he défends, it is appropriately provided,
very roughly, that the clause emphasized by thè "even" is less informative without
the "even" than with it. However, he concèdes that normally there will be a conver-
sational implicature of a location at an extreme. See Kay, ibid., 89-90, especially
note, 32, p.9O.
8. On the négation in "not even" being only internai or of small scope, see Larry
Hörn, "A Presuppositional Approach to Only and Even," Papers from the 5th
Regional Meeting (Chicago Linguistics Society, 1971): 98-107.
9. My point concerns a motivation for introducing such apparent redundancies.
For an analysis of the semantics, see Kay "Even," 79-81; and Lycan, "Even and
Even If," sec. 5.
10. Kay, "Even," eritieizes an approach within linguistics by Oswald Ducrot in
which "even" is analyzed in terms of argumentative implication.
11. The idea of "even" as imposing some scale oecurs in various forms through
most of the linguistic writing on "even." Aside from Kay, "Even," especially sec-
tion 1 (and section 3, p. 82 for a survey of past work), I hâve found especially
helpful Gilles Fauconnier, "Pragmatic Scales and Logicai Structure." Linguistic
Inquiry 6 (1975): 353-75 (see p. 364 for the initial application to "even").
Fauconnier's account lends itself, as he recognizes, to an interprétation in terms of
conditional probability (such an interprétation is implicit in my analogy between
fexplanatoryl even-arguments, and measures of the severity of tests in sec. 4).
12. Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1988).
13. Ibid., 69-70. Harman does say more on behalf of this position, but only a
little more.
14. The point being made in thèse two paragraphs applies equally to explanatory
even-arguments introduced below.
42 JONATHANE. ADLER

15. Bennett, "EvenIf," and Lycan,"Evenand Even If," both make this point.
16. See here Barker,"Even,Still, and Counterfactuals," sec. 7.
17. I assumesome familiaritywith thèse Griceannotions. For an overviewsee
StephenC. Levinson,Pragmatics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983),
Chap.3.
18. The originalityof my analysisconsistslargelyin what I select from others.
19. See Jackson,Conditionals.
20. Karttunenand Peters, "ConventionalImphcature,"11-12.
21. 1 believe this examplewas offeredby Jim Higginbothamin a fleetingairport
conversationin whichI raisedthe obiectionandofferedanother.inferior,example.
22. I should add that both here and in regardto Kay's examples,below, I find
particularlyproblematicthe methodologyof intuitionsregardingwhethercertain
Statementsare contradictory.Givenenoughembedding,seemingcohérenceis gen-
erallyenoughfor us not to judge a sentencenon-contradictory. Also, it is hardto
determinewhethercontradictionsascribedto an assertiondépendupon extrinsic
assumptions.But I cannotpursuemy problemswiththat methodology.
23. See Kay, "Even,"sec 2.2 (see, though,note 14);andLycan,"EvenandEven
If." Notice that "plus"constructionsentailthatothersdo hâvethe relevantfeature,
but it. unlike"even."cannotstandalone.
24. See Hörn, "A PresuppositionalApproachto Only and Even," and Lycan
"Evenand Even If." Notice that Lycan'sdiscussiontakes accountof Kay'scriti-
cismsof Horn'sproposai.
25. Jackson'sexamplefrom Conditionals,p. 46, slightlyaltered.
26. Kay, "Even,"82-84.
27. Lycan,"Evenand Even If," p. 2, note 2. However,I am troubledby the fact
thatwhen Lycandoes discussKay'sposition,he does not referto this commentas
criticism.
28. A Griceanaccountof simplemetaphorswouldbe the dosest analogueof my
explanatory-even-arguments since the compréhensionof a metaphormust begin
withpuzzlementas to why a (cooperative)speakerwoulduttera Statementthatso
blatantlyviolated a maxim(typically,but not always,the maximof quality),and
thenit wouldinvolvea searchfor an interprétationthatexplainedawaythe seeming
violation.See Grice, Studiesin the WayofWords.
29. For brevityI shall drop this qualification,thoughit is very importantin the
logic of explanation.See Carl Hempel, Aspects of ScientificExplanation(New
York:Free Press, 1965),especiallythe title essay.
30. The sense of what needs explainingis a pragmaticand epistemicnotion-
relativeto the audience'sinterests,andbackgroundknowledge.Withinthe philoso-
phy of science, the dominantview would be, I believe, that it is more accurateto
speakof a theoryas a determiningwhatis and is not in need of explanationwithin
its domain.See sec. 5.
31. WilliamC. Lycan,LogicaiFormin NaturaiLanguage(CambridgeMA:The
M.I.T. Press, 1984),chap.4 arguesconvincinglyandat lengthagainstthe notionof
semanticpresupposition. However,even he allowsvalue in a pragmaticnotionof
presupposition(see p. 96). See also Levinson, Pragmatics,chap. 4, for a good,
comprehensivecriticaisurvey.
32. On this point see Karttunenand Peters, "ConventionalImplicatures."
33. On presuppositionsin explanationsee PeterAchinstein,TheNatureof Expla-
nation(London:OxfordUniversitvPress, 1983),chao. 2, sec. 4.
34. RobertNozick, PhilosophicalExplanation(CambridgeMA: Harvard,1981),
121-27.
35. A relatedthème is implicitin StephenToulmin'snotionof "idealsof naturai
order,"introducedin his Foresightand Understanding (BloomingtonIN: Indiana
UniversitvPress. 1961Ì.
36. Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanations,127.
37. For intriguingévidence as to how the simplestof sentences(e.g., Bill likes
Tom) are understoodas carryingan explanatorybias, see RogerBrownandDebo-
rahFish, "ThePsychologicalCausalityImplicitin Language,"Cognition14 (1983):
237-73.
 EVEN-ARGUMENTS 43

38. The debate I hâve in mind is between the traditional model, defended by
Hempel, and those promoting a "relevance" model. See the essays in Wesley
Salmon, Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (Pittsburgh: The Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). For an excellent overview of the history of the
debate leading to a highly favorable view of the possibilities of chance explanation
and a powerful challenge to the Hempelian model, see Wesley Salmon's Four
Décades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 1989).
39. On thè pragmatice of explanation, see Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation
and Bas C. Van Frassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1980). Much of this work dérives originally from ideas of Sylvain Bromberger. See,
for example, his "An Approach to Explanation," in R.S. Butler, ed., Analytical
Philosophy-Second Séries (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962): 72-105.
40. See Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Stratégies and
Shortcomings of SocialJudement (Enelewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 164.
41. Nisbett and Ross, ibid., 164.
42. I am suggesting that there should be a priority to thèse explanations for
conversational reasons, a factor ignored in thè criticai tone taken by the psycholo-
gists of subjects' responses. For more on this thème see Jonathan Ë. Adler, "Ab-
straction is Uncooperative," The Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 14
(1984): 165-81; and "An Optimisas Pessimism: Conversation and Conjunction," in
Rationality in Reasoning, Ellery Eells and Tomasz Maruszewski, eds. (Warsaw:
Poznan, 1990): 251-82.
43. Maclntyre provides an amusing tale suggestive of the force and danger of
accepting presuppositions regarding explanation:
. . . Charles II once invited the members of the Royal Society to explain to
him why a dead fìsti weighs more than thè same fìsti alive; a number of subtle
explanations were offered to him. He then pointed out that it does not.

Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 88 (p. 92 in the second édition). Charles L.
Hamblin (Fallacies [London: Methuen, 1970]: 38-39) cites other versions of the
taie (and draws the analogy between thèse and the Fallacy of Many Questions).
44. Lycan, Logicai Form in Naturai Language, chap. 4, sec. 4 and 5, displays
some tendency to dismissiveness.
45. For discussion of appeals to authority, see John Woods and Douglas Walton,
"Argumentum Ad Verecundiam," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1974): 135-53. As
the référée observed, argument (7) would count as an appeal to authority were the
"even" dropped.
46. The appeal to bias or interests assumes, firstly, that we want to further or
protect our biases; and, secondly, that évidence or arguments are susceptible to
manipulation, whether intended or not, which could further or protect our biases.
See also Eugene Garver, "Points of View, Bias, and Insight," unpublished.
47. Douglas N. Walton, Arguer's Position: A Pragmatic Study of Ad Hominem
Attack, Criticism, Réfutation, and Fallacy (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1985),
319; Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (New York: Jackson, 1836).
48. See Walton, Arguer's Position, for good discussion.
49. Well documented by Walton, Arguer's Position.
50. See W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge MA: The M.I.T. Press,
1960); and Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, (London:
Oxford University Press, 1984).
51. See the discussion in Hamblin, Fallacies, 41-42 and 170-75 with référence to
the views of Joseph and Whately.
52. Walton, Arguer s Position; Trudy Govier Tu Quoque, Credibility and Argu-
ment" International Society for the Study of Argumentation Newsletter (June 1988):
2-13.
53. "Unfortunately," not just because often unwarranted, but also because the
analysis obscures two distinctions: one between criticizing a position and criticizing
44 JONATHANE. ADLER

a person; and the second, between criticizing(the moralityof) an action and

criticizing(the moralityof ) the agentwho performsthat action.
54. "He that is withoutsin amongyou, let him firstcast a stone."John8:3-11.
Consideralso the assumptionsbehindthe child'sretort"Ittakesone to knowone."
55. Giventhe low regardmanyhâvefor thè cognitivevalueof ethical"opinions,"
it could also be that the (alleged) failureto act accordingto avowedprinciplesis
takenas évidenceof the falsityof those principles.
56. Assuming,andrecali,only for the sake of argument,thatthe actionof hunter
andmeat-eaterare relevantlysimilar.
57. DouglasN. Walton,"Whatis reasoning?Whatis an argument,"TheJournal
ofPhilosophy87 (1990):399-419.
58. Ibid., 404.
59. Jackson,Conditionals,94-95.
60. This is a thème made central to pragmaticein Dan Sperberand Deidre
Wilson'sRelevance(CambridgeMA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1986).
61. See Edna UllmanMargalit,"On Presumptions,"TheJournalof Philosophy
80 (1983):143-63.