TO: X

FROM: Katrina Perez

RE: Liability of Mr. X for the death of his wife, Mrs. Y

DATE: May 09, 2021

PART I – FACTS

Overview:

1. X and Y were husband and wife. A criminal complaint was brought against X
before the Prosecutor’s Office of Mandaluyong and is being accused of having killed Y.
According to the investigation of the police, their household helper stated that the
married couple was having an argument in their room when the sound of a gunshot
suddenly erupted therefrom. Their helper further stated that the couple was the only one
present in the room when it occurred.

2. Their neighbor, having seen what transpired moments after, also informed the
police about the conduct of X after the scene. He claimed that X frantically sought help
from everyone towards his wife being shot, and so he quickly gave his assistance. While
X was carrying his wife to their car, he was described as wearing only one slipper on his
foot. They brought his wife over to VRP hospital, along EDSA Street in Mandaluyong
City, recounting that X had been driving fast along the way.

3. Upon reaching VRP hospital, X immediately carried his wife and pleaded with the
doctors to save her life. However, Y failed to make it and she died at said hospital.
Thereafter, the police took custody of X right away and tested him for powder burns, the
result of which came out negative. The autopsy report on Y revealed that she had a
gunshot wound, the bullet having entered her upper lip, piercing through the parietal
lobe of the brain. As stated, X is now being accused of killing his wife, which case is
currently pending before the Prosecutor’s Office of Mandaluyong.
 PART II – QUESTION PRESENTED

4. Can X, accused of shooting his wife, Y, considering the various circumstances present
during the incident and the subsequent acts or conduct shown by him, be held guilty for
the death of the latter?

PART III – THE ARGUMENT

5. The relevant law that may be applied to the case of Mr. X would be Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code on the crime of parricide. Said article defines parricide as “[a]ny
person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall
be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”

6. To be convicted of the crime of parricide, an essential element must first be

established which is the relationship of the accused with the victim. The facts state that X
and Y were husband and wife, establishing the element of relationship. Otherwise, in the
absence of such element, the crime would only be homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, or murder if any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned under
Article 250 of the same Code are attendant. The other elements of parricide would be that
the deceased was killed by the accused, her legitimate spouse.

7. Based on the circumstances surrounding the incident that X and Y were alone in
the room arguing, followed by the sound of gunfire, and, as later revealed by the autopsy
report that a bullet went through Y’s upper lip and pierced her brain, there arises a
reasonable inference that X could be the one who shot his wife that caused her death. It
can be argued that there was intent to kill on the part of X, especially if it would be shown
that the relationship or history of the couple had been long moved by the spirit of
animosity against each other, or that the subject matter of their argument at that time was
so repulsive, so much so that X was able to entertain the thought of finally killing his wife
then and there. Moreover, the intent to kill is conclusively presumed when death
resulted, because, with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof (U.S. v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333).

8. In Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824 (2006), the Court ruled that "[i]ntent to kill is a
specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence"
which may consist of: a) the means used by the malefactors; b) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; c) the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; d) the circumstances under which
the crime was committed; and, e) the motives of the accused.

9. On the other hand, if there was no deliberate intent to kill, this fact may not totally
absolve X of his liability if it is found that he nonetheless voluntarily discharged the
firearm at Y. Discharging a firearm at someone is generally an unlawful act that one could
be held liable for, all the more when death resulted therefrom. Article 4, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any “person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.” The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that “el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused).

10. For purposes of proving the accused’s lack of criminal intent, the presence of
ordinary mitigating circumstances may be considered that could bolster the lack of intent
to kill, such as the offender having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, or that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation, under Article 13, par. 3 and par. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, respectively.
11. The aforementioned mitigating circumstances can be evinced by the subsequent
acts of X after the horrendous event transpired. It can be argued that had there really been
an intent to kill, the act of X that seemed to portray his remorse, such as frantically seeking
help from everyone to take his wife to the hospital – failing, even, to put on the other pair
of his slipper that could have been caused by his intention to act quickly – speeding on
the way thereto with the use of his car, and pleading to the doctors to save her life,
militates against the natural reaction or conduct of those who had clearly in their minds
the intention to perform such a bestial act of taking away another person’s life.

12. With respect, however, to the lowering of the penalty for the crime of parricide in
the event of a conviction, the mitigating circumstances would be rather immaterial,
inasmuch as the higher penalty of death is currently suspended by R.A. 9346 (Death
Penalty Law); the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole to be imposed
in lieu thereof. In this case, even if there are two or more mitigating circumstances, a court
cannot lower the penalty by one degree. (Article 63, par. 3, Revised Penal Code; People v.
Formigones, 87 Phil. 685) In U.S. v. Relador, 60 Phil. 593, where the crime committed was
parricide with the two mitigating circumstances of illiteracy and lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, and with no aggravating circumstance, the Supreme Court
held that the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.

13. In the Rivera case, though it was sufficiently shown that the petitioner fired a 12-
gauge shotgun at the victim, there was simply no other evidence on record that tended
to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. On the contrary,
none of the prosecution's witnesses testified that the petitioner had indeed aimed and
fired the shotgun to kill the victim.

14. With X and Y being the only ones in the room when the gunfire incident took place,
X currently being the only one available to prove directly the commission of the act
alleged, the prosecution might have to present such other circumstantial evidence in
place of testimonies coming from eye-witnesses pointing specifically to X that he did, in
fact, shoot Y. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the
accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
not on the accused to prove his innocence.

15. It will be notable information that when the police took custody of X and tested
him for powder burns, his result came out as negative. The result of the paraffin test can
be presented as evidence for the defense to negate the connection of X having shot his
wife. A negative result can mean that X was nowhere near the gun when it was fired, or
that he ever held the gun at all. In this regard, it could be that it was Y who shot at herself,
possibly committing suicide by firing upward near her mouth, considering the trajectory
of the bullet which had its point of entry at the victim’s upper lip and piercing the parietal
lobe of her brain.

16. An inspection of Y’s cadaver can also be conducted to determine the presence of
powder burns on her body. However, an absent finding could also mean that the victim
was near the shooter although not close enough to produce powder burns on her wound,
or that the gunshot residue deposited on them had worn off, depending on how long
they remain on a person. It was held by the Supreme Court in Sabang v. People, G.R. No.
168818, March 9, 2007, that the fact that there were no powder burns on Butad’s body
indicates that the shots were fired at a distance of more than two (2) feet and not at close
range as the defense suggests.

17. The negative result, therefore, may or may not be exculpatory of X’s guilt that he
was the one who shot his wife. It could mean that Y merely kept her distance at the time
she was shot by X, although the size of the room where the incident took place will have
to be looked upon to measure the distance possible. The nature of the wound may also
be considered, for it could indicate that X fired the gun at close range, pointing upward
as it passed through Y’s upper lip and the bullet was able to pierce her brain. Then again,
the likelihood of Y shooting herself in that positioning could also be a possibility as
previously mentioned.
18. Additionally, the absence of powder burns could also be presented in the
accused’s favor, for there appears to be no large interval of time for the residue to wear
off (assuming, arguendo, that initially there were powder burns on X and that he did
nothing to rid himself of it) between the gunfire incident – insofar as there is testimony
that Y was brought by X and their neighbor to the hospital in a swift manner, i.e., the
neighbor’s statement that X had been driving fast, assuming as well that the hospital is
not far from their residence – and the immediate taking of custody of X thereafter by the
police to test him for powder burns.

Conclusion:

19. On these facts, the court will probably acquit the accused for the evidence is
lacking altogether in proving his guilt. The pieces of evidence and circumstances that can
be gained from the facts – the negative result for powder burns, the angle of the gunshot
wound, and testimony describing his conduct after the scene – when sewed together, all
point to the conclusion that X could not have been the one that shot, or at the very least,
did not intend to kill, Y.

PART IV – LIST OF AUTHORITIES

LAWS

Article 4, par. 1, Revised Penal Code

Article 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code

Article 13, par. 6, Revised Penal Code

Article 246, Revised Penal Code

Article 63, par. 3, Revised Penal Code

 JURISPRUDENCE

U.S. v. Gloria, [1904] 3 Phil. 333

Rivera v. People, [2006] 515 Phil. 824

People vs. Formigones, [1950] 87 Phil. 685

U.S. vs. Relador, [1934] 60 Phil. 593

Sabang v. People, [2007] G.R. No. 168818