2nd Reading

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International Game Theory Review

Vol. 18, No. 2 (2016) 1640005 (20 pages)

c World Scientific Publishing Company
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916400053

Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player

Elena Parilina∗ and Artem Sedakov†

Saint Petersburg State University
7/9 Universitetskaya nab.
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Saint Petersburg 199034, Russia

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∗e.parilina@spbu.ru
†a.sedakov@spbu.ru

Received 2 January 2016

Revised 22 April 2016
Accepted 1 May 2016
Published 15 June 2016

The theory of cooperative games with restricted cooperation has been rapidly devel-
oping over the last decades. In our study, we present a special game with restricted
cooperation — a game with a major player — a modified version of the landlord game
presented in Moulin [1988]. Cooperation of players is supposed to be restricted by a
communication structure (a star-graph) as well as a coalition structure. We adopt two
well-known cooperative allocations — the Myerson value and the ES-value — to the case
when there exist restrictions on the cooperation of players and provide their analytical
expressions. Additionally, we examine stability of coalition structures using the concept
of the Nash equilibrium and formulate conditions guaranteeing such stability for a given
coalition structure.

Keywords: Coalition structure; graph; restricted cooperation; Myerson value; ES-value;

stability.

JEL Classification Number: C71

1. Introduction
Games with restricted cooperation amount to an important and rapidly developing
class within cooperative game theory. The restricted cooperation indicates that
players are limited in cooperation with their opponents, and one can divide this
class of games into two major subclasses. The first one was introduced in Aumann
and Drèze [1974] examining games with a coalition structure (a priori unions).
The crucial idea is that each player can cooperate only with the players within
the coalition that she belongs to. A two-level cooperation was considered later in

∗ Corresponding author.

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Owen [1977]. The alternative subclass covers games with a communication structure
initiated in Myerson [1977] assuming that the cooperation of the players is possible
only via the links of the graph which determines the communication structure. In
the literature on the theory of games with restricted cooperation there are also
papers studying a combination of both types of restrictions — a coalition structure
and a graph [Vázquez-Brage et al., 1996]. Most solutions for these games use the
concept of the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953], however, there are papers proposing
other solutions [van den Brink et al., 2015; Khmelnitskaya, 2014; Koshevoy and
Talman, 2014].
The coalition structure itself may have good properties. In Hart and Kurz [1983,
1984] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] the property of stability is introduced.
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The coalition structure is called stable if any unilateral deviation of the player to any
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other coalition in the structure does not increase her payoff. Here it is necessary to
mention that the payoff of the player in the coalition structure should be somehow
defined (using a cooperative solution or by any other ways). The concept of stability
is often called “Nash stability” referring to the idea of the Nash equilibrium. We will
use that concept supposing that players’ payoffs are defined in accordance with an
appropriate cooperative solution. This stability concept has found its application in
Parilina and Sedakov [2014a] for a cost-sharing problem. Other stability concepts
are examined, e.g., in Haeringer [2001]; Casajus [2009]; Tutic [2010] and Funaki and
Yamato [2014].
In this paper, we consider a cooperative game of a special type that is a modified
version of the landlord game presented in Moulin [1988]. We call it the game with
a major player to distinguish it from the big boss game introduced in Muto et al.
[1988]. The game has a graph-restricted communication structure given by a star-
graph; the player set contains the major player, who makes any coalition profitable,
and communication among players goes via her. Then we extend the model intro-
ducing an additional type of player called the coordinator, through whom all the
players communicate with each other while the major player communicates only
with the coordinator. To formalize these models mathematically, we use graphs
because they perfectly describes the communication structure. Of course, we may
determine players’ payoffs avoiding representation of a graph structure, however,
from our perspective, dealing with graphs in these models seems more natural. Being
primarily interested in stable cooperation of the players, we analyze any coalition
structure whether it is stable with respect to two cooperative allocations — the
Myerson value [Myerson, 1977] and the ES-valuea (or the CIS-valueb ) Driessen and
Funaki [1991], providing the stability condition for the structure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides standard notation and
necessary definitions of a graph-restricted game. In Sec. 3, we present the basic
model of the cooperative game with the major player and with or without the

a The equal surplus division value.

b The center of gravity of the imputation set.

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coordinator on an undirected graph. We derive there analytical expressions for two

cooperative solutions — the Myerson value and the ES-value. The next section,
Sec. 4, is devoted to the extension of these models to the case when the player
set is partitioned into a coalition structure. In this section, we adopt cooperative
solutions providing new analytical expressions. We also examine the stability of
coalition structures and characterize all stable coalition structures with respect to
the Myerson value and the ES-value in the game. Section 5 arises possible opti-
mization problems related to the models under consideration and concludes the
paper.

2. Preliminaries
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Consider a cooperative game (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n}, |N | = n > 2 is the set
of players and v : 2N
→ R is a characteristic function defined over the power set of
N with v(∅) = 0. In the theory of cooperative games, the characteristic function
measures the worth of any subset S ⊆ N called a coalition thus the value v(S) is
often called the worth of coalition S. Let |S| = s, and if S = ∅, its size equals
zero. Suppose that there is an undirected graph g = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N, i = j} that
restricts players’ communication by transforming game (N, v) into a game (N, v, g)
with restricted cooperation. Given characteristic function v(S) and graph g or,
equivalently, given the game (N, v, g), we determine an associated graph-restricted
game (N, v g ) using Myerson’s approach [Myerson, 1977] where:


v g (S) = v(T ), (1)
T ∈S/g

and S/g is the unique partition of S such that S/g = {{i | i and j are connected in
S by g} | j ∈ S}. The construction of characteristic function v g using this approach
has a useful property: if the characteristic function v is superadditive, v g is also
superadditive.
A solution (or a cooperative solution) of the game (N, v, g) is a component
efficient allocation rule which prescribes a subset in the n-dimensional space for
each game (N, v, g). If the prescribed subset consists of one point, the solution is
called single valued. We consider the Myerson value and the ES-value as the single-
valued cooperative solutions. The Myerson value in the game (N, v, g) is the profile
µ = (µ1 , . . . , µn ) whose components are calculated by the formula:

(|N | − |S|)!(|S| − 1)! g
µi = [v (S) − v g (S\{i})], i ∈ N. (2)
|N |!
S⊆N,i∈S

The ES-value ψ = (ψ1 , . . . , ψn ) is defined as:


g
v g (N ) − j∈N v g ({j})
ψi = v ({i}) + , i ∈ N. (3)
|N |

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3. The Basic Model

3.1. Game with a major player
Now we shall consider the set N of a special type: player 1 (the major player)
differs from all other players, i.e., players from set N \{1}, which are supposed to
be identical. The latter means that for any coalition S ⊆ N and any i, j ∈ N \{1},
i = j the condition: v(S) − v(S\{i}) = v(S) − v(S\{j}) is satisfied. We also assume
that the communication structure of players is restricted by the graph g represented
in Fig. 1: the major player directly communicates with players from N \{1} while
the players from N \{1} communicate with each other only via the major player.
For example, if we imagine that the major player assigns a particular job to do, she
distributes tasks between players 2, . . . , n and controls their activity in person.
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The worth v(S) of coalition S with |S| = s is interpreted as its efficiency and is
defined as

f (s − 1) + f1 (s), 1 ∈ S,
v(S) = (4)
0, 1∈/ S.

Here functions f (s) and f1 (s) are non-negative for all s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and, addi-
tionally, f (s) is nondecreasing in s with f (0) = 0 whereas f1 (s) is nonincreasing in
s. Note that the major player as a member serves to make any coalition profitable
(the worth of the coalition becomes positive).c If 1 ∈ S, the first summand f (s − 1)
is the contribution of players from S\{1} into the worth of coalition S whereas
the second summand f1 (s) is the contribution of the major player to it. The more
players the coalition contains, the greater the impact of the first summand. On the
other hand, the more players the coalition contains (thus the more players commu-
nicate via the major player and the more players the major player controls), the less
the impact of the second summand. From (4), for the grand coalition N , it follows
that v(N ) = f (n − 1) + f1 (n). Since functions f (s) and f1 (s) are of a general form,
the characteristic function could neither be supperadditive nor monotone in some
cases.

Fig. 1. Communication graph g in the game with the major player.

c Muto et al. [1988] examines a similar class of games called “big boss games” that satisfies two
properties. The first property is that there exists only one player which makes any coalition
profitable. The second one is a condition on the characteristic function that we do not specify
here as we relax it throughout this paper.

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Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player

Using cooperative game (N, v), we define a game (N, v, g) with the major
player and with restricted cooperation (on the communication graph) in which
the characteristic function is determined by (1). It is easy to verify the character-
istic function of the associated graph-restricted game v g (S) = v(S) for all S. The
two following results demonstrate the explicit expressions of the Myerson value and
the ES-value.

Proposition 1. The Myerson value µ = (µ1 , . . . , µn ) in the game (N, v, g), i.e.,
the Shapley value in the associated graph-restricted game (N, v g ), is of the form:

n

 1

 (f (s − 1) + f1 (s)), i = 1,
 n s=1
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µi =  (5)
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
 1

n


1
f (n − 1) + f1 (n) − (f (s − 1) + f1 (s)) , i = 1.

n−1 n s=1

Proof. Consider the marginal contribution of the major player into coalition S:
v g (S) − v g (S\{1}) = f (s − 1) + f1 (s). Therefore,

n

(n − s)!(s − 1)! n − 1
µ1 = (f (s − 1) + f1 (s))
s=1
n! s−1
n
1

= (f (s − 1) + f1 (s)).
n s=1

To find µi , i = 1, we consider the marginal contribution of player i into coalition S:


g g
f (s − 1) + f1 (s) − f (s − 2) − f1 (s − 1), 1 ∈ S,
v (S) − v (S\{i}) =
0, 1∈/ S.

Therefore for i = 1, we obtain:

n

(n − s)!(s − 1)! n − 2
µi = (f (s − 1) + f1 (s) − f (s − 2) − f1 (s − 1))
s=2
n! s−2

n
1
= (s − 1)(f (s − 1) + f1 (s) − f (s − 2) − f1 (s − 1))
n(n − 1) s=2
 n

1 1

= f (n − 1) + f1 (n) − (f (s − 1) + f1 (s)) .
n−1 n s=1

The components of the Myerson value have the following interpretation. The
component µ1 defined by (5) represents the average worth of the coalition containing
the major player when a coalition of size s = 1, . . . , n counts only once. The Myerson
value prescribes to any other player i = 1 the component µi which is the difference

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E. Parilina & A. Sedakov

between the worth of the grand coalition and the average worth of the coalition
containing the major player equally shared between players 2, . . . , n.

Proposition 2. The ES-value ψ = (ψ1 , . . . , ψn ) in the game (N, v, g) is of the

form:



1
 [f (n − 1) + f1 (n) + (n − 1)f1 (1)], i = 1,
n
ψi = (6)

 1
 [f (n − 1) + f1 (n) − f1 (1)], i = 1.
n

Proof. To prove the statement, we need to substitute the values v(N ) = f (n −

1) + f1 (n), v({1}) = f1 (1), and v({i}) = 0, i = 1 into formula (3).
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We may give an interpretation for the components of the ES-value which

straightforwardly follows by its definition. The component ψ1 calculated by (6)
equals the sum of the worth of the grand coalition equally shared among all play-
ers, and the worth of the coalition containing only the major player multiplied by
(1 − 1/n). The ES-value prescribes to any other player i = 1 the component ψi
which is the difference between the worth of the grand coalition and the worth of
the coalition containing only the major player equally shared between all players.

Example 1. This example was developed by Parilina and Sedakov [2014b]. Con-
sider an n-person game with the major player with functions f (s) = αs and
f1 (s) = β/s where α and β are positive constants such that α
β. After sub-
stituting functions f (s) and f1 (s) into formula (5), we obtain the Myerson value:
α(n − 1) βHn
µ1 = + ,
2 n
α β(Hn − 1)
µi = − , i = 1,
2 n(n − 1)
where Hn = 1 + 12 + · · · + n1 . To calculate the ES-value, we substitute functions
f (s) and f1 (s) into formula (6) and get:
α(n − 1) β(n2 − n + 1)
ψ1 = + ,
n n2
α(n − 1) β(n − 1)
ψi = − , i = 1.
n n2

3.2. Game with a major player and a coordinator

We now extend our model introducing the player of a special type — the coordina-
tor. In this setting, again, player 1 is the major player, players 3, . . . , n are identical,
and player 2 is referred as the coordinator. Figure 2 demonstrates the new commu-
nication structure of players (graph g  ): now the major player communicates with
other players exclusively through the coordinator, as well as players from N \{1, 2}
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Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player

Fig. 2. Communication graph g  in the game with the major player and the coordinator.

communicate with each other, whereas the coordinator directly communicates with
all players. For example, if we again imagine that the major player assigns a partic-
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ular job to do, the coordinator may appear for distributing tasks between players
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3, . . . , n, controlling their activity and reporting to the major player. In contrast to

the model without the coordinator, the major player in this setting is involved in
the direct communication only with a single player.
For this model, we consider a cooperative game with restricted cooperation
(N, w, g  ) where the characteristic function w : 2N
→ R is given by


f (s − 1) + f1 (s),
 1 ∈ S, 2 ∈/ S,
w(S) = f (s − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (s − 1), 1, 2 ∈ S, (7)


0, 1∈ / S.

Here functions f (s) and f1 (s) satisfy the same conditions whereas f2 (s), s ∈
{1, . . . , n − 1} is non-negative and nonincreasing in s. The first line in (7) has
the following interpretation: if the coordinator does not belong to coalition S, its
worth is the sum of the contribution of players from S\{1, 2} and the contribution
of the major player into the coalition. As to the second line in (7), when 1, 2 ∈ S,
the first summand f (s − 2) is the contribution of players from S\{1, 2} into the
worth of coalition S, the second summand f1 (2) is the contribution of the major
player with the coordinator, and the third summand f2 (s − 1) is the contribution
of the coordinator with players from S\{1, 2}. It follows from (7) that for the grand
coalition, its worth equals w(N ) = f (n − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (n − 1).
Using the game (N, w, g  ), now we can define the associated graph-restricted


game (N, wg ) in which the characteristic function is determined by


f1 (1),
 1 ∈ S, 2 ∈/ S,
g

w (S) = f (s − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (s − 1), 1, 2 ∈ S, (8)


0, 1∈ / S.

Proposition 3. The Myerson value µ = (µ1 , . . . , µn ) in the game (N, w, g  ) with


n  2, i.e., the Shapley value in the associated graph-restricted game (N, wg ), is of

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the form:

n−1



1 1

 (f (1) + f (2)) + s(f (s − 1) + f2 (s)), i = 1,

 1 1
n(n − 1) s=1


2



 n−1

 1 1


 (f (2) − f (1)) + s(f (s − 1) + f2 (s)), i = 2,

2 1 1
n(n − 1) s=1

µi =  (9)



 1 2

 f (n − 2) + f2 (n − 1) −

 n−2 n(n − 1)





 n−1





 s(f (s − 1) + f2 (s)) , i = 1, 2.
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s=1
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Proof. Consider the marginal contribution of the major player into coalition S:

g g
f1 (1), 1 ∈ S, 2 ∈/ S,
w (S) − w (S\{1}) =
f (s − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (s − 1), 1, 2 ∈ S.
Therefore,

n

(n − s)!(s − 1)! n − 2
µ1 = f1 (1)
s=1
n! s−1
n



(n − s)!(s − 1)! n − 2
+ (f (s − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (s − 1))
s=2
n! s−2

n
n
n−s s−1
= f1 (1) + (f (s − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (s − 1))
s=1
n(n − 1) s=2
n(n − 1)
n−1


1 1
= (f1 (1) + f1 (2)) + s(f (s − 1) + f2 (s)).
2 n(n − 1) s=1

To find µ2 , we consider the marginal contribution of the coordinator into S:


g g
f (s − 2) + f1 (2) − f1 (1) + f2 (s − 1), 1, 2 ∈ S,
w (S) − w (S\{2}) =
0, otherwise,
and we have:

n

 (n − s)!(s − 1)! n − 2
µ2 = (f (s − 2) + f1 (2) − f1 (1) + f2 (s − 1))
s=2
n! s−2
n

s−1
= (f (s − 2) + f1 (2) − f1 (1) + f2 (s − 1))
s=2
n(n − 1)
n−1


1 1
= (f1 (2) − f1 (1)) + s(f (s − 1) + f2 (s)).
2 n(n − 1) s=1

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Finally, to find µi , i = 1, 2, we use the fact that the Myerson value is the component
efficient allocation rule. Therefore for i = 1, 2, the component of the Myerson value
has the form:
1
µi = (wg (N ) − µ1 − µ2 )
n−2
 n−1

1 2

= f (n − 2) + f2 (n − 1) − s(f (s − 1) + f2 (s)) .
n−2 n(n − 1) s=1

The components of the Myerson value determined by (9) can be interpreted

as follows. The component µ1 represents the half of the sum of the worth of the
coalition containing only the major player and the weighted average worth of the
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coalition containing both the major player and the coordinator when a coalition of
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size s = 2, . . . , n has weight s − 1. According to the expression of µ2 , the coordi-

nator gains the half of the difference between two terms: The first term represents
the weighted average worth of the coalition containing the major player and the
coordinator whereas the second term is the worth of the coalition containing only
the major player. The difference between the components of the major player and
the coordinator is the worth of the coalition containing only the major player.
Finally, the Myerson value prescribes to any other player i = 1, 2 the component
µi representing the difference between the worth of the grand coalition and the
weighted average worth of the coalition containing both the major player and the
coordinator, equally shared between players 3, . . . , n.

Proposition 4. The ES-value ψ  = (ψ1 , . . . , ψn ) in the game (N, w, g  ), n  2, is

of the form:
1

 n [f (n − 2) + (n − 1)f1 (1) + f1 (2) + f2 (n − 1)], i = 1,


ψi = (10)


 1 [f (n − 2) − f (1) + f (2) + f (n − 1)], i = 1.
1 1 2
n


Proof. To prove the statement, we again substitute the values wg (N ) = f (n −



2) + f1 (2) + f2 (n − 1), wg ({1}) = f1 (1) and wg ({i}) = 0, i = 1 into (3).

The ES-value ψ  has exactly the same interpretation as the ES-value ψ. Since
the coordinator gains nothing by herself, the component ψ2 coincides with that of
any other player i = 1, 2.

Example 2. This example was developed by Grigorieva [2015]. Consider an

n-person game with functions f (s) = αs, f1 (s) = β/s and f2 (s) = γ/s where
α, β and γ are positive constants such that α
γ
β. After substituting functions
f (s) and f1 (s) into formula (9), we get the Myerson value:
α(n − 2) 3β γ
µ1 = + + ,
3 4 n

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α(n − 2) β γ
µ2 = − + ,
3 4 n
 α γ
µi = − , i = 1, 2.
3 n(n − 1)
To calculate the ES-value, we substitute functions f (s) and f1 (s) into formula (10)
and obtain:
α(n − 2) β(2n − 1) γ
ψ1 = + + ,
n 2n n(n − 1)
α(n − 2) β γ
ψi = − + , i = 1.
n 2n n(n − 1)
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4. Stable Coalition Structures in a Game with a Major Player

4.1. Adopted solutions for the game with a coalition structure
Owning to a general form of the characteristic functions v and w, a player may not
be interested in being a member of the grand coalition N (from the perspective
of her payoff). It may happen that in order to obtain a better payoff, she has to
be a member of a coalition of a smaller size. Therefore, to study this case, we will
consider a cooperative game with a coalition structure that is a system (N, v, π) or
(N, w, π), where N is the set of players, v (w) is the characteristic function and π is
the coalition structure. The coalition structure is a partition of the player set, i.e.,
π = {B1 , . . . , Bm } such that B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bm = N , Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ N, i = j.
Taking into account the communication structure given by the graph g (g  ), the
game transforms into a game (N, v, π, g) (or (N, w, π, g  )) with restricted coopera-
tion and communication. Allocating the worths of any entry Bj , j = 1, . . . , m, of π
among its members, we can adopt the Myerson value and the ES-value to the game
(N, v, π, g) (or (N, w, π, g  )) applying formulas (5), (6), (9) and (10). Introduce two
functions of an integer argument: κ(s) = f (s − 1) + f1 (s) where s = 1, . . . , n and

f1 (1), s = 1,
σ(s) =
f (s − 2) + f1 (2) + f2 (s − 1), s = 2, . . . , n,
with κ(n + 1) = σ(n + 1) = 0. Then given π and assuming that the major player
(player 1) belongs to coalition B1 ∈ π with |B1 | = b1 , the adopted Myerson value
µ(π) = (µ1 (π), . . . , µn (π)) for the game (N, v, π, g) without the coordinator can be
rewritten as
 b1


 1


 κ(s), i = 1,

 b
 1 s=1
  b1

µi (π) = 1 1
(11)

 κ(b1 ) − κ(s) , i ∈ B1 , i = 1,

 b −1 b1 s=1

 1



0, i∈/ B1 .

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The adopted Myerson value µ (π) = (µ1 (π), . . . , µn (π)) for the game (N, w, π, g  )
with the coordinator takes the form:
 b1




1
σ(1)
1
(s − 1)σ(s), i = 1; 1, 2 ∈ B1 ,

 +

 2 b1 (b1 − 1) s=1






b1

 −
1
σ(1)
1
(s − 1)σ(s), i = 2; 1, 2 ∈ B1 ,

 +

 2 b1 (b1 − 1) s=1

 
µi (π) = 1 2
b1



 σ(b1 ) − (s − 1)σ(s) , i = 1, 2; 1, 2 ∈ B1 ,

 b1 − 2 b1 (b1 − 1) s=1







 b1 > 2,
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

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


 σ(1), i = 1; 2 ∈ / B1 ,



0, i = 1; 2 ∈/ B1 .
(12)

One can also obtain the adopted formula of the ES-value. For the game (N, v, π, g)
without the coordinator, the value ψ(π) = (ψ1 (π), . . . , ψn (π)) has the form:



1
[κ(b1 ) + (b1 − 1)κ(1)], i = 1,



 b1

ψi (π) = 1 [κ(b ) − κ(1)], i ∈ B1 , i = 1, (13)

 b
1

 1


0, i∈ /B , 1

and the adopted ES-value ψ  (π) = (ψ1 (π), . . . , ψn (π)) for the game (N, w, π, g  )
with the coordinator is given by:

 1

 [σ(b1 ) + (b1 − 1)σ(1)], i = 1; 1, 2 ∈ B1 ,

 b


1


1
 [σ(b1 ) − σ(1)], i = 1; 1, 2 ∈ B1 ,
ψi (π) = b1 (14)




σ(1),
 i = 1; 2 ∈ / B1 ,




0, i = 1; 2 ∈/ B1 .
From (11)–(14), we may observe that different coalition structures may prescribe
different payoffs to the players. Therefore, some coalition structures are preferable to
players and some are not. For this reason, we distinguish such preferable structures,
referring to them as “stable”. The idea of stability that we use in this paper is
the stability against any unilateral deviation of the players (Nash stability). We
shall now define the stable coalition structure with respect to the Myerson value
µ(π) = (µ1 (π), . . . , µn (π)) in the game (N, v, π, g). Let B(i) ∈ π denote the coalition
containing player i.

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Definition 1. Coalition structure π = {B1 , . . . , Bm } is stable with respect to

the Myerson value µ(π) = (µ1 (π), . . . , µn (π)) if for each i ∈ N the inequality
µi (π)  µ̃i (π) holds. Here µ̃(π) is the Myerson value in the game (N, v, π̃, g) such
that π̃ = {B(i)\{i}, Bj ∪ {i}, π−B(i)∪Bj } for any Bj ∈ π ∪ ∅, Bj = B(i), and
π−Bi = π\Bi ⊂ π.

Similar definitions can be formulated for the Myerson value µ (π) in the
game (N, w, π, g  ) and for the ES-values ψ(π) and ψ  (π) in games (N, v, π, g) and
(N, w, π, g  ), respectively.

4.2. Stable coalition structures in the game without the coordinator

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The next two statements characterize stable coalition structures with respect to the
Myerson value and the ES-value in the game without the coordinator.

Proposition 5. For the game (N, v, π, g) with the major player, the coalition struc-
ture {B1 , . . . , Bm }, where |Bk | = bk , k = 1, . . . , m, and 1 ∈ B1 , is stable with respect
to the Myerson value iff
 b


k +1 b1
1 1

max κ(1); κ(b1 + 1); max κ(s)
κ(s)
κ(b1 ).
k=2,...,m bk + 1 b1 s=1
s=1

In particular, {N } is stable iff κ(1)
n1 ns=1 κ(s)
κ(n), whereas the structure
bk +1
{{1}, B2 , . . . , Bm } is stable iff max{κ(2); maxk=2,...,m bk1+1 s=1 κ(s)}
κ(1).

Proof. Consider the coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm } where 1 ∈ B1 and find the
conditions when it is stable with respect to the Myerson value. First, examine the
deviations of the major player. If she leaves the coalition B1 and joins a coalition Bk ,
bk +1 b1
k = 2, . . . , m, her payoff becomes bk1+1 s=1 κ(s) comparing with b11 s=1 κ(s) in
coalition B1 . To make this deviation of the major player nonprofitable, the following
inequality should be satisfied:
b1 b

k +1
1
1
κ(s)  max κ(s). (15)
b1 s=1 k=2,...,m bk + 1
s=1

If the major player leaves B1 and acts as a singleton, her payoff becomes κ(1)
b1
contrary to b11 s=1 κ(s) in coalition B1 , and to make the deviation nonprofitable,
the inequality
b1
1

κ(s)  κ(1) (16)
b1 s=1

should hold.
Second, examine the possible deviations of player i = 1. If the player belongs to
the coalition B1 , but wants either to join a coalition Bk , k = 2, . . . , m or become a

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1
singleton, her payoff becomes zero instead of b11−1 [κ(b1 ) − b11 bs=1 κ(s)] in B1 . To
guarantee the deviation nonprofitable, the following should be true:
 b1

1 1

κ(b1 ) − κ(s)  0,
b1 − 1 b1 s=1
or in the equivalent form:
b1
1

κ(s)
κ(b1 ). (17)
b1 s=1

If player i = 1 deviates from Bk and joins B1 , her payoff becomes b11 [κ(b1 + 1) −
1
b1 +1
s=1 κ(s)] contrary to the zero payoff in coalition Bk , k = 2, . . . , m. Again,
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b1 +1
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to make the deviation of the player nonprofitable, we should have:

 b1 +1

1 1

κ(b1 + 1) − κ(s)
0,
b1 b1 + 1 s=1
or in the equivalent form:
b1
1

κ(s)  κ(b1 + 1). (18)
b1 s=1

Other deviations (when player i ∈ Bk joins B
, k,  = 1) will not contribute into

the deviator’s payoff. Thus taking into account the inequalities (15)–(18), we state
that the coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm } where 1 ∈ B1 is stable with respect to
the Myerson value if
 b


k +1 b1
1 1

max κ(1); κ(b1 + 1); max κ(s)
κ(s)
κ(b1 ).
k=2,...,m bk + 1 b1 s=1
s=1

The stability conditions for the grand coalition and the coalition structure
{{1}, B2, . . . , Bm } are derived in the similar way. The only difference is in admissi-
ble deviations of players. For the structure {N }, all players should not benefit from
being singletons. For {{1}, B2 , . . . , Bm } to be stable, any player i = 1 should not
benefit neither from being a singleton nor from joining any coalition that she does
not belong to, while the major player should not benefit from joining any coalition
Bk , k = 2, . . . , m.

Proposition 6. For the game (N, v, π, g) with the major player, the coalition struc-
ture {B1 , . . . , Bm }, where |Bk | = bk , k = 1, . . . , m, and 1 ∈ B1 , is stable with respect
to the ES-value iff
b1
κ(b1 + 1)
κ(1)
κ(b1 ) and κ(b1 ) − κ(1)  max [κ(bk + 1) − κ(1)].
k=2,...,m bk + 1
In particular, {N } is stable iff κ(1)
κ(n), whereas the structure {{1}, B2 , . . . , Bm }
is stable iff κ(1)  max{κ(2); maxk=2,...,m κ(bk + 1)}.

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Proof. The proof repeats that of the previous proposition except different inequali-
ties guaranteeing nonprofitable deviations and thus it is not provided here. However
the complete proof is available upon request.

Example 3. Here we find stable coalition structures in the game presented in

Example 1 with functions f (s) = αs and f1 (s) = β/s where α and β are positive
constants such that α
β.
Proposition 5 provides the following result. The coalition structure {N } is stable
α(n−1)
with respect to the Myerson value iff β
2(1− Hn
)
whereas the coalition structure
n
{{1}, B2 , . . . , Bm } is stable iff β  2α. We may notice here that the coalition struc-
ture {B1 , . . . , Bm } where 1 ∈ B1 and 2
b1 < n is not stable with respect to the
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Myerson value, thus there are no other stable coalition structures.

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As to the ES-values, we apply Proposition 6. The coalition structure {N } is

stable with respect to the ES-value iff β
αn whereas the coalition structure
{{1}, B2 , . . . , Bm } is stable iff β  maxk=2,...,m α(bk + 1). The coalition structure
{B1 , . . . , Bm } where 1 ∈ B1 and 2
b1 < n is also not stable with respect to the
ES-value, thus there are no other stable coalition structures.

4.3. Stable coalition structures in the game with the coordinator

Similar to the previous two propositions, we formulate the statements characterizing
stable coalition structures with respect to the Myerson value and the ES-value in
the game with the coordinator.

Proposition 7. For the game (N, w, π, g  ) with the major player and the
coordinator, the following statements are true:
• The coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm }, where |Bk | = bk , k = 1, . . . , m, and 1, 2 ∈
B1 , is stable with respect to the Myerson value iff

b1
2
max{σ(1); σ(b1 + 1)}
(s − 1)σ(s)
σ(b1 ).
b1 (b1 − 1) s=1
2
n
In particular, {N } is stable iff σ(1)
n(n−1) s=1 (s − 1)σ(s)
σ(n), whereas
the coalition structure {{1, 2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff σ(2)  max{σ(1); σ(3)}.
• The coalition structure {B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm } where 1 ∈ B1 , 2 ∈ B2 is stable with
respect to the Myerson value iff
 b


1 +1 b

2 +1
2 2
σ(1)  max (s − 1)σ(s); (s − 1)σ(s) .
b1 (b1 + 1) s=1 b2 (b2 + 1) s=1
In particular, the structure {{1}, {2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff σ(1)  σ(2).

Proof. To prove the first part of the statement, we consider the coalition struc-
ture {B1 . . . , Bm }, 1, 2 ∈ B1 . First, consider the deviations of the major player. If
she either leaves coalition B1 and becomes a singleton or joins any coalition Bk ,

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1
k = 2, . . . , m, her payoff changes from 12 σ(1) + b1 (b11 −1) bs=1 (s − 1)σ(s) to σ(1). To
make her deviations nonprofitable, the following inequality should be true:
b

1
2
σ(1)
(s − 1)σ(s). (19)
b1 (b1 − 1) s=1

Second, consider possible deviations of the coordinator. If she either leaves B1 to

become a singleton or joins any other coalition, her payoff changes from − 21 σ(1) +
1
b1
b1 (b1 −1) s=1 (s − 1)σ(s) to zero. And to make the deviations nonprofitable, we
should have:
b

1
2
σ(1)
(s − 1)σ(s).
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(20)
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Third, consider the deviations of any player i, i = 3, . . . , n. If i ∈ B1 and she leaves

B1 either to become a singleton or to join any other coalition, she gets zero payoff
b1
contrary to b11−2 [σ(b1 ) − b1 (b21 −1) s=1 (s − 1)σ(s)] that she gets in coalition B1 .
These deviations are nonprofitable if
b

1
2
σ(b1 )  (s − 1)σ(s). (21)
b1 (b1 − 1) s=1

And fourth, if player i ∈ Bk , i = 3, . . . , n, k = 2, . . . , m, leaves Bk to become a

singleton, her payoff does not change, whereas if she joins coalition B1 , her payoff
b1 +1
becomes b11−1 [σ(b1 + 1) − (b1 +1)b
2
1 s=1 (s − 1)σ(s)] contrary to zero in Bk . The
latter deviation is nonprofitable when:

1b
2
σ(b1 + 1)
(s − 1)σ(s). (22)
b1 (b1 − 1) s=1

Other deviations (when player i ∈ Bk joins B
, k,  ∈ {3, . . . , m}, k = ) will not

contribute into the deviator’s payoff. Thus taking into account inequalities (19)–
(22), we state that the coalition structure {B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm } where 1, 2 ∈ B1 is
stable with respect to the Myerson value if

b1
2
max{σ(1), σ(b1 + 1)}
(s − 1)σ(s)
σ(b1 ).
b1 (b1 − 1) s=1

The stability conditions for the grand coalition and the coalition structure
{{1, 2}, B2, . . . , Bm } are derived in the similar way, and they are to some extent
special cases.
Now to prove the second part of the statement, consider the coalition structure
{B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm } such that 1 ∈ B1 , 2 ∈ B2 . First, consider the deviations of the
major player. If she either becomes a singleton or joins coalition Bk , k = 3, . . . , m,
her payoff does not change. However, if she leaves B1 to join B2 , her payoff becomes

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1 1
b2 +1
2 σ(1)+ (b2 +1)b2 s=1 (s − 1)σ(s) contrary to σ(1) in coalition B1 . To guarantee
that the deviation is nonprofitable, the following inequality should be true:
2 +1
b

2
σ(1)  (s − 1)σ(s). (23)
(b2 + 1)b2 s=1
Second, consider possible deviations of the coordinator. If she either becomes a sin-
gleton or joins coalition Bk , k = 3, . . . , m, her payoff also does not change. However,
b1 +1
if she leaves B2 and joins B1 , her payoff becomes − 21 σ(1)+ (b1 +1)b
1
1 s=1 (s−1)σ(s)
contrary to zero in coalition B2 . To guarantee this deviation nonprofitable, we
should have:
1 +1
b

2
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σ(1)  (s − 1)σ(s). (24)

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(b1 + 1)b1 s=1

Any other unilateral deviations do not change the deviator’s payoff. Therefore tak-
ing into account inequalities (23) and (24), we state that the coalition structure
{B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm } such that 1 ∈ B1 , 2 ∈ B2 is stable with respect to the Myerson
value if
 b


1 +1 2 +1
b

2 2
σ(1)  max (s − 1)σ(s), (s − 1)σ(s) .
(b1 + 1)b1 s=1 (b2 + 1)b2 s=1
The stability condition for the coalition structure {{1}, {2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is derived
from the previous inequality as a special case.

Proposition 8. For the game (N, w, π, g  ) with the major player and the
coordinator, the following statements are true:
• The coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm } where |Bk | = bk , 1, 2 ∈ B1 is stable with
respect to the ES-value iff
σ(b1 + 1)
σ(1)
σ(b1 ).
In particular, {N } is stable iff σ(1)
σ(n), whereas the coalition structure
{{1, 2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff σ(3)
σ(1)
σ(2).
• The coalition structure {B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm } where 1 ∈ B1 , 2 ∈ B2 is stable with
respect to the ES-value iff
σ(1)  max{σ(b1 + 1); σ(b2 + 1)}.
In particular, the structure {{1}, {2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff σ(1)  σ(2).

Proof. The structure of the proof again is very similar to that of the previous
proposition, and thus the proof is not provided here. However it is available upon
request.

Remark 1. One may be interested in finding conditions when the grand coalition
is stable. If the Myerson value is considered as the solution, in the game without the

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coordinator grand coalition {N } is stable when the average worth of the coalition
containing the major player is between the worth of the coalition containing only
her and the worth of the grand coalition. When we introduce the coordinator, the
grand coalition becomes stable when the weighted average worth of any coalition
containing the major player is between the worth of the coalition containing only
her and the worth of the grand coalition.
If we consider the ES-value being the solution of the game then in the game
without the coordinator the grand coalition is stable when its worth exceeds the
worth of the coalition containing only the major player. In the game with the
coordinator, the grand coalition is stable under the same condition with the only
difference that function σ replaces κ.
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Example 4. In this example we find stable coalition structures in the game with
the major player and the coordinator presented in Example 1 for functions f (s) =
αs, f1 (s) = β/s and f2 (s) = γ/s where α, β and γ are positive constants such that
α
γ
β.
Using Proposition 7, we can state the following. The coalition structure {N }
is stable with respect to the Myerson value iff β
α 4(n−2) 3
4
+ γ n−1 . The struc-
ture {{1, 2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff γ  max{β/2, 2α}. We may notice that
the coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm } where 1, 2 ∈ B1 and 3
b1 < n is not
stable with respect to the Myerson value. The reason is that the inequality
b1
σ(b1 + 1)
b1 (b21 −1) s=1 (s − 1)σ(s)
σ(b1 ) is equivalent to the following one:
3γ
(b1 −1)(b1 −2)
α
b1 (b3γ 1 −1)
which never holds for such b1 .
Now consider the cases when the major player and the coordinator belong to
different coalitions. The coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm }, 1 ∈ B1 , 2 ∈ B2 , is stable
with respect to the Myerson value iff γ
mink=1,2 {−α (bk −1)(b 3
k −2)
+ β bk4+3 }. In
particular, {{1}, {2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff γ
β/2.
To find stable coalition structures with respect to the ES-value, we use Proposi-
tion 8. The coalition structure {B1 , . . . , Bm } is stable with respect to the ES-value
where 1, 2 ∈ B1 iff 2α(b1 − 1) + 2γ 2γ
b1
β
2α(b1 − 2) + b1 −1 . In particular, the
2γ
grand coalition {N } is stable iff β
2α(n − 2) + n−1 , and the coalition structure
{{1, 2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff 2α + γ
β
2γ.
Similarly, consider the cases when the major player and the coordinator belong
to different coalitions. The coalition structure {B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm }, 1 ∈ B1 , 2 ∈ B2 ,
is stable with respect to the ES-value iff β  maxk=1,2 {2α(bk − 1) + 2γ bk }, and in
particular the coalition structure {{1}, {2}, B2, . . . , Bm } is stable iff β  2γ.

5. Concluding Remarks
In the paper, we have considered a class of games with a major player in a char-
acteristic function form. The characteristic function has a general (not necessarily
superadditive) form. The major player makes any coalition profitable by being a
member of it. Introducing a communication structure in the form of a star-graph in

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which the major player is the central node, we restricted cooperation of the players
and obtained explicit forms of cooperative solutions — the Myerson value and the
ES-value. The next step of our study was to consider a game with an additional
type of player — a coordinator. In the game with the coordinator, the communica-
tion structure of the players is still a star-graph, however the coordinator becomes
its central node, and communication among players ran through this player. For
this model, we have also obtained explicit forms of the same cooperative solutions.
Cooperative solutions have also been found for these two models (with or
without the coordinator) when there are communication and coalition structures
restricting cooperation of players at the same time. We have used a concept of sta-
bility of the coalition structure which is close to the idea of the Nash equilibrium.
We characterized all stable coalition structures with respect to the Myerson value
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and the ES-value for the models under consideration. We may state the stable coali-
tion structures are appropriate for the players in the sense that there is no player
who may benefit from her unilateral deviation. In the paper, we focus on finding the
conditions when a particular coalition structure is stable and we do not examine if
the case when no stable coalition structure exists is possible.
We may formulate some additional problems which can be investigated in detail
and addressed with the following questions. When is the game with the coordinator
preferable (in general) to the game without the coordinator? To answer this question
one needs to analyze the inequality w(N )  v(N ). When will the major player
benefit from assigning the role of the coordinator to one of the players from N \{1}?
The question may be answered after analyzing the inequality µ1  µ1 in the case
that if the Myerson value is considered as the cooperative allocation. One may
alternatively be interested in answering the following question: When will the major
player benefit from assigning the role of the coordinator to a new (n + 1)th player?
We have noticed that the coordinator affects players’ payoffs, therefore, we may also
study when the player, say, player 2 agrees to be the coordinator. This happens
when µ2  µ2 , in that case the Myerson value is considered as the cooperative
allocation just to illustrate the idea. Again, a similar problem can be studied when
the coordinator is engaged as a new (n+1)th player. The next question may concern
other players: Do players benefit if the coordinator exists? Or will the inequality
µi  µi , i = 1, 2 hold? Similar problems can be considered for the games with a
given coalition structure. What is more important from our perspective is not to be
restricted in selecting a coalition structure in view of a specific goal. For example,
one can formulate a problem of maximization of the component of the major player
in the game without the coordinator (µ1 (π)) or with her (µ1 (π)) such that coalition
structure π is stable with respect to the Myerson or ES-value. This problem can be
classified as nonlinear or combinatorial.
It is worth noting that the set of the problems is not limited to those mentioned
in the present section. However, we are limited in finding the analytical solutions
because functions f (s), f1 (s) and f2 (s) are initially defined in a general form.

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After specifying the form of these functions, we can solve these problems (if they
have solutions) either analytically or with the use of appropriate software optimiza-
tion tools and packages.

Acknowledgments
We are thankful to two anonymous referees guest editors for their valuable com-
ments and suggestions. The research was supported by Saint Petersburg State Uni-
versity (Grant No. 9.38.245.2014) and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research
(Grant No. 16-01-00713).

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