Int. Journal of Game Theory, VoL 3, Issue 3, pao.e 129-!40, Physica-Verlag, Vienna.

The Nucleolus in Games with Major and Minor Players 1)

By Z. GALIL, Ithaca 2)
Abstract: In this paper, we consider n-person weighted majority games with major and minor players.
We prove under certain conditions that if the minor players split into equal "mini-minor" players the
nucleolus' components which correspond to the major players do not change.

1. Introduction
The nucleolus of an n-person cooperative game was defined in SCHMEIDLER
[1969]. In this paper we deal with weighted majority games which consist of
several major players and many minor players. In Section 2 we recall some
well-known definitions and results upon which we base our arguments. Sections
3 and 4 include the main theorem and its proof. We are going to prove that when
the game is "precise" 3) and if it is not a unanimity game, an equal division of
equally weighted minor players does not change the nucleolus, i.e., the major
player's share is the same. Table 5.1 in Section 5 shows the results of computations
of nucleoli of a special set of games in which there are two major players, the
weight of a minor player is 1 and the weights of major players and the quota are
integers.
Section 6 is a discussion on the proof and on the conditions of the main theorem,
including some interesting examples.

2. Preliminaries
Let G = (N,v) be an n person cooperative game, where N = {1..... n} is the
set of players of G. Any S ___N will be called a coalition and we denote by F = 2 N
the set of coalitions of G. v is a characteristic function - a real function defined
on F. We assume that v(S) = 0 for ISt < 14), v(S) > 0 for all S t F, and v(N) = 1.
Let y = (Yl ..... y,) be an n-tuple of real numbers, and let S e F ; we write
y(S) = ~ Yi.

i) This paper is a part of the author's M. Sc. thesis prepared at Tet-Aviv University under the direction
of Professor R.J. AUMANN.
2) ZvI GALIL, Department of Computer Science, Upson Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
14850.
3) i.e., if any minimal winning coalition which contains minor players has a total weight equal to
the quota.
4) When A is a set we denote by !AI the number of its elements.
130 Z. GALIL

A payoff vector is an n-tuple of real numbers x = (xl, ...,xn) satisfying xi >_ 0

for i = 1, ...,n, and x(N) = 1. We denote by X the set of all payoff vectors of G.
For x ~ X let O(x)~R 2~ be the vector whose components are the numbers
e(S,x)= v ( S ) - x(S), S~F, arranged according to their magnitude, i.e.,
Oi(x) >_ 0i(x ), 1 < i < j < 2n. For a ftxed x the number e(S,x) is called the excess
of S.
The lexicographical order on R2~(<L) induces a quasi-order ( 4 ) on R n as
follows: x ~ y if and only if O(x) <L O(y).
The nucleoIus of G, X (G), is the set of all points in X which are minimal in X
according to the order ~ defined above.
For x ~ X let sir(x) = max {e (S, x) l S ~ F, i ~ S, j ~ S}. The kernel 5) of G, ~ (G),
is defined as the set of all payoff vectors x e X, such that so(x ) < sji(x), or xj = 0
for every i, j e N, i 4: J.
We shall use the following properties of the nucleolus [SCHNNDLF.R 1969]:
(a) The nucleolus includes exactly a unique payoff vector.
(b) JV(G) c_ ~ff(G).
We now recall some well-known definitions: Let G = (N,v) be an n-person
game. G is constant-sum if v(S) + v(N~S) 6) = v(N) for all S s F . G is simple if v
takes the values 0,1 only. G is monotonic if v(S) < v(7) for all S, TE F with S c_ T.
For simple monotonic games, we define W = W(G) as the set of all winning
coalitions, i.e., W = {SE F, v(S) = 1}. Also, L = L(G) = / ~ W i s the set of losing
coalitions; finally M W = M W(G) is the set of minimal winning coalitions,
i.e., S s M Wif and only if S ~ Wand any subset of S (except S itself) belongs to L.
G is a unanimity game if W(G) = {N}.
A weighted majority game G = (N,v) is a simple monotonic game for which
there exists a vector w e R n with non-negative components (the weights), and a
positive number c (the quota) satisfying w (S) >_ c if and only if S e W. [c; w] 7) is a
representation of G. We shall be interested in normalized representations, i.e.,
w(N) = 1.
In this paper we shall refer to [c;w] as a weighted majority game. Thus many
weighted majority games define the same v and hence are equivalent as simple
monotonic games.
In the sequel all the games mentioned are weighted majority games.
A dummy is a player who does not belong to any minimal winning coalition,
and a veto player is one who belongs to every winning coalition.
We shall use the following properties of the kernel in weighted majority games
[MASCHLER and PELEG, 1966, 1967]:
(a) If x ~ Jr(G), then w~ < ws =~ x~ < xj; in particular w~ = wj ~ x~ = xj.
(b) I f i is a dummy and x e iF(G), then x~ = 0.
5) The kernel was inlroducedin DAWSand MASCHLER[1965].
6) The conventional substraction of sets.
v) This notation was introduced in SUAPLEV[1962].
 The Nucleolus in Games with Major and Minor Players 131

(c) If there exist rn veto players, then J~(G) = {x} where x~ = 1/m if i is a veto
player and xi = 0 otherwise.
(d) When G is monotonic, x ~ ~ r ( G ) :,. sij(x) = sj~(x). (Note that weighted majority
games are monotonic).
A weighted majority game is homogeneous if w(S) = c, V S ~ M IV.
It was proved in PELEG [1968] that if G is a constant-sum, homogeneous,
weighted majority game, then the nucleolus of G is the unique normalized homo-
geneous representation of G which assigns a zero share to each dummy of G.

3. Def'mitions, Notations and Auxiliary Results

We shall be interested in a game G of the form [c;w], where w = ( W I , . . . , W m ,
~,.~.,~) e R ~+ % and in short w = (~,e, n), ~ ~ R% wi > e > 0, i = 1..... m. We shall
write N = M ~ R where M is the set of major players (IM I = m), and R is the
set of n minor players with equal weight, e. A minor player will be denoted by
r (r ~ R). X will stand for the set of payoff vectors of G.
We define ,~ = { x l x ~ X , x = (s If follows from property (a) of the
kernel, as stated in Section 2, that ~ff(G) _ X.
Let k be a constant positive integer. If every minor player in G splits into k
equally weighted "mini-minor" players we obtain another game G*; i.e., G*: [c; w*]
where w* = (v~,e*,n*), e* = @, n* = nk. We shall write N* = M u R* where R*

is the set of n* mini-minor players with equal weight, e*. All notations used for G
will be retained for G* but with a star as superscript (F*, M W*, etc.).
Note that there is a one to one mapping from .~ onto X*:
0~
x = (Yc,ot, n)*-*x* = (2,~*,n*) where ~* =
k"

IfS ~ F and we replace every minor player r s S by k mini-minor players r* ~ R*,

we obtain a coalition of G* which we denote by S*. If f2 _c F we shall write
(a)* = {S*IS ~ ~}.
Note that (M W)* = {S*[S ~ M W} while M W* is the set of minimal winning
coalitions in G*. Also F* r (F)*, etc.
For an S ~ F which does not contain all minor players and an integer p,
0 < p < k, let Ts,p be a coalition in G* obtained by adding p new mini-minor
players to S*. (The set of all Ts,p's is exactly F*\(F)*).
Note that Ts,p and S* are not uniquely determined. No confusion will be
caused since the identity of the mini-minor players is not important. By referring
to Ts,p we usually mean a coalition of this form, hence we don't specify p, but we
always assume that 0 < p < k.
Let w = (fv, e,n), S ~ F and x = (Yc,~t,n)eX. The following results are direct
consequences of the previous definitions:
132 Z. GALIL

w(S) = w*(S*), (3.1)

w*(Ts,p) = w(S) + pc*, (3.2)
x(S) = x*(S*), (3.3)
x*(Ts,p) = x(S) + pot*, and (3.4)
e(S,x) = e(S*,x*). (3.5)
Definition :

A game G:[c;w], w = (~,e,n), is said to be precise if any minimal-winning

coalition S which contains minor players satisfies w(S) = c.

Lemraa 3.1 :

If G is precise, then (a) S wins if and only if Ts,p wins, (b) M W* = (M W)*,
and (c) G* is precise.

Proof'.

If S wins, then w*(Ts,p) = w(S) + pe > c, which implies that Ts,p wins. On the
other hand, if Ts,p wins, then S ' = S w {r} wins, because w ( S ' ) = w ( S ) + e =
w(S) + ke* > w(S) + pc* = w*(Ts,p) > c. But ifS loses; then S' must be minimal-
winning, since r has the smallest weight in G. But G is precise ~ w(S') = c which
is a contradiction. Hence S must win, and part (a) is proved.
It follows from (3.1) that (M W)* _c M W*. M W* does not contain any Ts,p,
because if Ts,p wins, then S wins (by part (a)) and Ts,p cannot be minimal-winning.
Hence P c M W * ~ P = S* and S~ M W ( b y (3.1)). Therefore, M W * c_ ( M W ) *
which leads to equality, and part (b) is proved.
Now, let P c M W*, P c~ R * 4 ~b. It follows from part (b) that P = S* for
S c M W a n d S c~ R ~ (~. w(S) = c since G is prefflse. But w(P) = w(S*) = w(S) = c,
and therefore, G* is precise, proving part (c).
In the sequel we shall make use of the following result, which follows from (3.3),
(3.4) and Lemma 3.1 part (a):

e(Ts,p,x*) = e(S,x) - pot*. (3.6)

If we take {e(S,x) I S c F } and arrange it in decreasing order we obtain a vector
b(x) = {bi(x)}l= 1. Note that b~(x) > bj(x) for i < j since equal excesses are taken
only once. Let B(x) = {Bi(x)}l= 1 be a partition of F defined by B~(x) = {SIS c F,
e(S,x) = hi(x)} i = 1..... I. Clearly bl(x) = 01(x) and

Bl(x) c~ M W 4 = 4 . (3.7)

Indeed, S c W and T c L ~ e(S,x) > 0 > e(T,x), and P, Q c W and P ___Q=:-

e(P,x) >_ e(Q,x).
 The Nucleolus in Games with Major and Minor Players 133

A direct consequence of (3.7), (3.5) and Lemma 3.1 part (b) for precise games is

b,(x*) = b l ( x ) . (3.8)

Lemma 3.2:
If G is a game without veto players and x e ker (G), then Bl(x ) c_ W.

Proof:
If there exists S t BI(X ) ~ L, then bl(x) = e(S,x) < O. But bl(x) >_ O, so that
bt(x) = 0. It follows that Q s W=~ e(Q,x) > 0=, e(Q,x) = 0=', x(Q) = 1. Obvi-
ously there exists an i such that xi > 0. For each P ~ F such that i q P we have
x(P) < 1 and P q W. Hence i is a veto player, a contradiction that proves the
lemma.

4. The Main Theorem

Theorem:
Suppose that G is precise and is not a unanimity game. Then x s i F ( G ) if and
only if x* E ~/~(G*).

Remark:
In the following proof we shall use the results of three propositions, which
are part of a series of lemmas and propositions to be proven immediately after
the proof of the theorem.

Proof."
Let x ~ W ( G ) and y*~./V'(G*). JV'(G)c_ ~,T'(G)~ X imply that x = (~,~,n).
Similarly y = (y, fl, n).
The proof is trivial in the case in which there are veto players, for, since minor
players cannot be veto players (otherwise the game would be a unanimity game),
the result follows directly from the form of the kernel in a game with veto players,
as outlined in Section 2. Hence, we may assume that there are no veto players.
By Lemma 3.2 Bl(x) ~ Wand BI(v*) ~ W*. (We shall use it in Proposition 4.4).
In Proposition 4.4 we shall show that a = 0 if and only if fl = 0, and in Pro-
position 4.9, we shall prove that a, fl > 0 implies that a = ft. But Proposition
4.8 will show that i f a = fl, then x = y. Hence x = y and x * ~ W(G*), completing
the proof of the theorem.
In all the propositions in this section x, y, a and fl will refer to those mentioned
above, i.e., x = 02,a,n) and y* = (~*,fl*,n*) are the nucleoli points of G and G*
respectively.
134 Z. GALIL

Proposition 4.1 :
hi(x) = bl(y) = bl(x*) = bl(y*).

Proof:
x e X ( G ) ~ bl(x) < hi(y), and y* e X(G*) ~ bl(y*)_< bl(X*). But according
to (3.8), b~(x)= b~(x*) and b~(y)= hi(y*). Thus we obtain immediately the
desired equality.

Proposition 4.2:
Bl(X) c_ Bl(y) and Bl(y*) c_ Bl(x*).

Proof:
Suppose to the contrary that B l ( x ) \ B l ( y ) r r Define a payoff vector

Z ~ x~ +. y By Proposition 4.1, and since e(S,x) is linear in x, we have for

S e Bt(x ) c~ Bl(y), e(S,z) = e(S,x) +

2 e(S,y) = b~ (x). According to the definition
of the numbers {bi(x)},. S r c~Bl(y) implies that e ( S , x ) < h i ( x ) and
e(S,y) < b~(y)= bl(x), and one of the two inequalities must be strict. 'Hence
e(S,z) = e(S,x) +
2
e(S,y) < bi (x). Therefore, - if B1 (x) c~ B1 (y) = th, then
b l ( z ) < b l ( x ) ; and if B l ( x ) c ~ B l ( y ) - ~ b , then b l ( z ) = b l ( x ) , but B l ( z ) =
Bl(x ) c~ Bl(y ) and IBl(z) l < In~(x)I. In both cases O(z) < L O(x) contradicting the
fact that x e X(G).
The second part of the proposition is proved in a strictly analogous manner.

Lemma 4.3:
Suppose that G is not a unanimity game, and zeJe'(G). Then there exists
S e Bl(z) satisfying R c~ S r ~bs). (i.e., we may add a minor player to S).

Proof:
We assume to the contrary that each S e Bl(z) satisfies R ~ S. Since G is not
a unanimity game, there exists P e Bl(z), P ~ N. But R s P, and hence there is
i e M , i e P . Since r e P , i~P, and P e Bl(z), we have
s,i(z) = max {e(S,z)lSe r, reS, ie S} = e(P,z) - max e(S,z) = bx(z).
On the other hand, since we assumed above that S e Bl(z)=~ R ~ S, any Qe F
which does not contain at least one r e R must satisfy Qr and thus
s) S = N\S.
 The Nucleolus in Games with Major and Minor Players 135

e(Q,z) < bl(z). Therefore, si,(z) < bi(z) and Sir(Z)< Sri(Z). Since ze 3f~(G), this
contradicts property (d) of the kernel as stated in Section 2. This completes the
proof.

Remark:
Since ~/ff(G) c X(G), the result of Lemma 4.3 holds for z~ X(G).

Proposition 4.4:

= 0 if and only if fl = 0.

Proof:
We shall proceed indirectly. Suppose that fl = 0 (fl* vanishes as well), and
> 0 (ct* > 0 as well). Then by Lemma 4.3 there exists P c Bi(Y*) such that
R* c~ P ~ ~b, i.e., r* exists such that P' = P u {r*} :~ P. Since by Lemma 3.2,
Bl(y*) ~ W*, it follows that P and P ' e W*. Thus e(P',y*) = e(P,y*) - fl* =
e(P,y*) = bl(y*), and P ' e BI(y*). But e(P',x*) = e(P,x*) - ~t* = bl(x*) - ~* <
bt(x*) so that P ' r Bl(x*) and P'~ Bt(y*) - contradicting the fact that
BI(y*) ~ Bl(x*), proved in Proposition 4.2.
Similarly, by repeated use of Proposition 4.2 and by Lemma 4.3, we obtain a
contradiction if we assume ~ = 0 and fl > 0. This completes the proof of Pro-
position 4.4.

Proposition 4.5:
Bl(X) = BI(y) and Bl(x*) = Bl(y*).

Proof:
By Proposition 4.2, Bl(x) c_ BI(y) and BI(y*) c_ Bi(x*), so that in both cases
we have to prove the inverse inclusion only.
Now, S t Bx(y) =~ S* E BI(y*) =~ S* ~ Bi(x*) =~ S t Bl(x), where the first arid
the third implications follow from (3.5) and Proposition 4.1, and the second impli-
cation follows from Proposition 4.2. Hence Bi(y) c_ Bl(x) and Bl(x) = BI(y).
To prove the second part of the proposition let P e Bt (x*). There are two cases:
(1) P = S*, and (2) P = Ts,p. Suppose P = S*. Then, proceeding as in the proof
of the first part, S* e B1 (x*) ~ S e B1 (x) =r, S ~ B1 (y) =~ S* ~ BI(y*). Next suppose
P = Ts,p. Then, by (3.5) and (3.6), b l ( x * ) = e(Ts,p,x*)= e ( S * , x * ) - p ~ * <
e(S*,x*) <_ bl(x*). It follows that equality must hold, ~* must vanish, and
S*e Bl(x*). By Proposition 4.4 fl* vanishes as well, and according to case (1)
S ~ B I ( y * ) . Again, by using (3.5), (3.6), e(Ts,p,y*)= e ( S * , y * ) - p f l * = bl(y*).
Hence Ts,peBl(y*) and we obtain BI(x*)s Thus B I ( x * ) = B I ( y * ) ,
completing the proof.
 136 z. GALIL

Lemma 4.6:
Suppose that x ~ ./if(G), p > 1 and (a) B~ (x) = B~(y) for i < p, (b) b~(x) = bi(y)
for i < p, and (c) Inp(x)[ = IBp(y)I. Then Bp(x) = Bp(y).

Proof:
x+
Let z = - Y. Obviously z r For i < p and SeB~(x)= Bi(y), e(S,z)=
2
e(S,x) + e(S,y)
2 = bi(x)= bi(y) (by (a) and (b)). It follows from (a) that
A - I~ U B~(x) = / ~ U Bi(y). I f S e A, then e(S,x) <_ bp(x) and e(S,y) _ bp(y) =
i<p i<p
b~(x) (by(b)) so that e(S,z) <_ bp(x). Equality will hold only if S t Bp(x)c~ Bp(y).
Therefore, b~(z)= b~(y) for i < p. Just as in the proof of Proposition 4.2, if
Bp(x) n Bp(y) = ~b we obtain b~(z) < bp(x) and O(z) < L O(x) which contradicts
the fact that x~Jff(G). Hence Bp(x)n Bp(y)=# t~, bp(z)= br(x), and B~(z)=
Bp(x) c~ Bp(y). But if we assume that Bp(x) -~ Bp(y), then ]Bp(z)] < ]Bp(x)[ and
O(z) <L 0(x), which is again a contradiction to the fact that x~ X(G). Thus
Lemma 4.6 is proved.

Corollary 4.7:
Under the assumptions of Lemma 4.6, except (c') IBm(x)1 < IBp(y)] instead
of (c), we obtain Bp(x) C Bp(y). (A strict inclusion).
The proof proceeds like the proof of Lemma 4.6. The same contradiction is
obtained if we assume Bp(x) (_ Bp(y), i.e., Bp(x)\Bp(y) --/=d~.

Proposition 4.8:
If~ = fl, then x = y.

Proof:
We shall proceed indirectly and assume that x 4 y (x* 4 y* as well), and,
therefore, since the nucleolus contains a unique point (see Section 2), O(x) < L O(y)
and 0(y*) <L O(X*). O(X) < r. 0(y) implies that there exists an index t such that
(a) for i < t , ]B~(x)] = IBi(y)l and bi(x)= hi(y); (b) b,(x)< bt(y) (ease 1), or
bt(x) = bt(y) and ]Bt(x)l < ]Bt(y)[ (case 2). We shall call t the special index, and
bt(x) and bt(y) the special components of O(x) and 0(y), respectively.
By Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.1 t > 1. By repeated use of Lemma 4.6
with p = 1,2,...,t - 1, we obtain B~(x) = B~(y) for i < t. According to Corollary
4.7, Bt(x) C Bt(Y) (a strict inclusion, i.e., Bt(y)\Bt(x) 4=~), if case 2 occurs.
Now, for each z ~ ~, z = (L y, n), the vector b(z*) is composed of the components
of the vector b(z) and, in addition, perhaps of new components e(Ts.p,z*) satis-
fying a formula analogous to (3.6). (When ? = 0, b(z) = b(z*)).
 The Nucleolus in Games with Major and Minor Players 137

We assumed that a* = fl* and we showed above that for i < t, bi(x) = bi(y)
and Bi(x) = Bi(y). Thus, in both vectors O(x*) and 0(y*) we get the same number
of new components of the same magnitude due to S* and Ts,p for S ~ B~(x) = B~(y),
i<t.
On comparing two ordered sets of real numbers according to lexicographical
order, one may omit from both sets any common subsets. Hence, on comparing
O(x*) and 0(y*), we may omit the components which are excesses of S* and
Ts,p for S ~ B~(x) = B~(y), i < t. Moreover, if case 2 occurs, we may also omit the
components due to S* and Ts,~ for S ~ Bt(x) = Bt(x) c~ Bt(y).
Let us denote these two new vectors (obtained by deletion of components as
outlined above) by O'(x*) and 0'(y*).
If case 1 occurs, then O'l(x*) = bt(x) and 0~(~V*) = bt(y), i.e., O'l(x*) < O'l(y*).
If case 2 occurs, then O's(y*) = bt(y), since there exists S e Bt(y)\Bt(x) =~ (k, and
this S satisfies e ( S * , y ) = bt(y). But O'l(x*)< b t ( x ) = bt(y), since in O'(x*) there
remain only excesses due to S* and Ts,~ which originated from S ~ Bp(x), p > t.
Therefore, here, too, O's(x*) < 0'1 (y*).
Thus in both cases we obtain O'(x*) < L 0' (y*), which implies that O(x*) < L 0(y*)
- a contradiction, since y* ~ X (G*). This completes the proof.

Proposition 4.9:
~>0, /~ > 0 ~ =/~.

Proof."

If the conclusion of the proposition were false, then ~ :~ fl, x ~ y, and, as

before, O(x) < r~O(y) and O(y*) <L O(x*). We denote again the special index by t
and distinguish between the two cases of Proposition 4.8.
It is impossible that in O(x*) and O(y*) no excesses of Ts,p will precede the
special components bt(x) and bt(y) of O(x) and O(y) respectively. (We regard
excesses of Ts,p as being located before those of Q*, S and Q E F, when they are
equal). Because if it were so then by constructing the vectors if(x*) and O'(y*)
(just as we did in Proposition 4.8), we obtain immediately O(x*) < L O(y*), which
is impossible.
Hence, new components must enter (at least in O(x*)), before the special com-
ponent. New components in O(x*) are e(Ts,~,x*) = e(S,x) - p~*, and those in
O(y*) are e(Ts,p,y* ) = e ( S , y ) - pfl* (by 3.6). The greatest new component in
O(x*) is e(P,x) - ~* for some P ~ Bi(x), i < t. The greatest new component in
0(y*) is e(P,y) - fl* for the same P. Hence, ~* ~ fl* and O(y*) < L O(x*) imply
that fl* > a* and fl > ~.
Let z = y + ~/(y - x) for some t / > O. Since fl > O, it follows from property
(a) of the kernel, as outlined in Section 2, that the components of y are all positive.
138 Z. GALIL

Thus, and by the fact that z is continuous in r/, we obtain for sufficiently small r/
(a) z = (~,v,n)~ ~', and (b) e(S,y) > e ( Q , y ) ~ . e ( S , z ) > e ( Q , z ) V S , Q t Y .
Now, for S e B i ( x ) = Bi(y), i < t, we have e ( S , z ) = e ( S , x ) = e(S,y). (Again,
because e(S,x) is linear in x). Hence, by p r o p e r t y (b) a b o v e Bi(z) = Bi(x) = Bi(y),
and bi(z) = b~(x) = bi(y) for i < t.
The same arguments used above to prove that O(y*)<L0(x*)=~ fl > a,
establish that 0(y*) < t . 0(z*)=- fl > ?. But ~ = fl + r/(fl - 0t) > fl - a contra-
diction which completes the proof.

5. Nucleolus Computations

We c o m p u t e the nucleoli of the games of the form Im; n l , n 2 , ~ . ~ l ] where

n

nl, n2, m, n are positive integers m > nl > n2 > 1 and nl + n2 + n > m9).
The following results follow from simple algebraic manipulations using the
definitions of the kernel and the nucleolus. Obviously x ~ X ( G ) = ~ x = ~,a.n)
and ~ = (xl,x2).

Remark:
The n o t a t i o n (p 1, P2, P) used in Table 5.1 refers to the values p 1, P2 and p appearing

in ~ =. Pi for i = 1,2 and 9 - P

Pl + P2 + pn Pl + P2 + pn

Table 5.1 :

Nucleolus Conditions
(1) (1,0,0) rt I + n > m and n2 + n < m.

n<m<_nl+n2,
(2) (1,1, o) a
f ni.+n-->m i=
nl + n 2 + n > 2 m ;
1 , 2 , and

b( ni + n < m i=1,2, and

or
nl+n2+n>m.

n<re<n1 q-n2, n~+ n>_ m i = 1,2

(3) (m - n2, m - nl, 1)
I and nl + n 2 + n _ < 2 m

9) We aon't allow winning coalitions of size 1 and there is at least one winning coalition.
 The Nucleolus in Games with Major and Minor Players 139

nl + n 2 < m , n < m , and

(4) (hi, n2, 1) a
n~+n>m i = 1,2;

or b 1"/1 -t- n 2 < m < n .

or c n I 4- n2 ~ m and n > m

(5) (1,1,1) n + n~ + n 2 = m (a unanimity game).

The reader can easily verify that the table is complete: If case (1) fails, then
either ni + n < m for i = 1,2 or ni + n/> m for i = 1,2. The former is covered
by cases (2)b and (5). The latter is covered by cases (4)b, (4)c (when n > m), (4)a
(when n < m and nl + n2 < m), and (2)a and (3) (when n < m and nl + n2 > m).
Note, that if (except in case (5)) we replace m, nl, n2 and n by mk, n~k, n2k
and nk respectively, the major players' share (i.e., ~ and x2) is the same - a
special case of the theorem.

6. Discussion Examples and Conclusion

It is often very difficult to find an explicit formula for the nucleolus. Only in
homogeneous, constant-sum games we know the nucleolus immediately (see
Section 2). But in most cases G is constant-sum and G* is not. (e. g., G: [-3;2,1,1,1]
and G*: r~.~ 1 2,
L J , z,, ~, I ~,
1 ~,2,
1 ~ 2~n~
j ).
The lack of an explicit expression for the nucleolus prevents the possibility
of using limit processes and probability models as were applied in SHAPLE'Z
and SrIAVmO [1960] and SrIAPLEY and Mn.NOR [,-1961] to SnAPLEY'S value.
We have proved that if G is precise and is not a unanimity game, then the
partition of the small, equally weighted players to an equal number of new minor
equal players does not change the share of the major players in the nucleolus.
The case when G is a unanimity game is trivial and uninteresting, as we know
the nucleolus immediately. (All players are veto players).
The condition that G is precise may perhaps be weakened but we may not
omit it; for example, if we have G: [-5;3,2,2,2] and G*: [,5;3,1,1,1,1,1,1], so
that G is not precise, then G has an equivalent homogeneous representation
[,3;2,1,1,1], and hence its nucleolus is ~5,~t2-!5,15,!~5jj,while the nucleolus of G* is
{~11 i 9,
t3, 9, ~, 1 9-,
1 9-,
1 9-J.~.
z~ (In both cases we use the form of nucleoli of homogeneous,
constant-sum games as stated in Section 2).
Usually games are not precise, but when there are several major players and
many minor players (like in SnAPLEYand M~LNOR [1961] this condition is almost
fulfilled: If max wr < e, S e M'Wand S c~ R :~ q~, then c < w(S) < c+ e. However,
r~R
this does not really help much, since the nucleolus does not depend continuously
on the weights.
140 Z. GALIL

We assumed that minor players have equal weights. If we have G: [3 ;2,1,1],

then JV(G) = (1,0,0) (the first player is a veto player). If we allow partition of all
players (considering them all as minor players), we get G*: [3 .4 , 1 , "l , -t~ ,1~ j1, ~a
so that JV'(G*) = ~n 1 1 1 1 lx~ (Table 5.1 case (4)b). In this case the share of a
mini-minor player in G* is not a half of the share of the corresponding minor
player in G.
The theorem will probably also be false when we allow partition of minor
players to different numbers, or to differently weighted new minor players.
These examples give rise to two problems: (a) Suppose that in G there are
several major players, and many minor players, whose weight does not exceed
a given e. If we divide the minor players to different numbers, and to differently
weighted new minor players, we obtain G'. What is the relation between ~V'(G)
and X ( G ' ) ? Can we evaluate the deviation of the new nucleolus in terms of e?
A more general problem would be the following: (b) Suppose there are several
major players and a continuum of small ones. Making partition of the interval
representing the small players to measurable disjoint sets with measure less
than given e we obtain a game. What is the relation of the nucleoli of two such
games induced by two such partitions?

Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Professor J. R. AUMANN for many discussions leading
to these results, to JEFF GROTTE and the referee for their careful reading of the
manuscript and their many suggestions which helped to bring it to a readable
form and to Professor W. LOCAS for allowing me to use the typing facilities of
the Center of Applied Mathematics at CorneU University.

References
DAVIS, M., and M. MASCHLER: The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Res. Logistics Quar. 12,
223-259, 1965.
MASCHLER, M., and B. PELEG: A characterization, existence proof and dimensions bounds for the
kernel of a game. Pacific J. Math. 18, 289-328, 1966.
PELEG, B . : O n weights of constant-sum majority games. SIAM J. Appl. Math. 16, 527-532, 1968.
SCHMEIDLER,D. : The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17,1163 - 1170,
1969.
SHAPLEY,L. S. : Simple games; an outline of the descriptive theory. Behavioral Science 7, 59 - 66, 1962.
SHAPLEY, L, S., and J. W. MILNOR: Values of large games, II: Oceanic games. The Rand Corporation,
R M 2649, February 1961.
- - : The structure of the kernel of a cooperative game. SIAM J. Appl. Math. 15, 569-604, 1967.
SHAPLEY, L. S., and N. Z. SHAPIRO"Values of large games, I: A limit theorem. The Rand Corporation,
R M 2648, November 1960.
Received, August 1973