assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993. *
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO,
MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their
parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE
MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MABILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE,
NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES,
all surnamed QUIPIT,
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
793
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 793
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by
their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines; All the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.—Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since
the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.—This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
794
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
94
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generation to come.—Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right; The right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.—The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.
Same;  Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.—The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
Same;  Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.—Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance
the said right.
Same;  Political Question; The political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.—The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government
is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right  vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine
is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
795
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 795
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
Same;  Contracts;  Non-impairment Clause; A timber license is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.—Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.—A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation’
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be
invoked.—Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state.—In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; The protection of the environment including the forest cover of our territory is of
extreme importance for the country.—I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the dismissal order of the RTC of Makati, Br. 66.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petition-
796
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
ers dramatically associate with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-
generational justice.” Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a
cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment” of Philippine rainforests and
“arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth.”
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia,engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition
by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper
motion by the petitioners.  The complaint  was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit  and alleges that
1 2 3
the plaintiffs “are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical
rainforests.” The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are “so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the Court.” The minors further asseverate that they “represent their generation as well as
generation yet unborn.” Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
4
“x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to—
_______________
 Rollo, 164; 186.
1
 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
2 1. 7.Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
3
 Rollo, 67.
4
797
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 797
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
1. (1)Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2. (2)Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.”
and granting the plaintiffs “x x x such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000.00) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country’s land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for
forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from the drying
up of the water table, otherwise known as the “aquifer,” as well as of rivers, brooks and streams,
(b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum—
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of
the country’s unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino’s indigenous cultures, (f) the
siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life
leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire
_______________
 Id., 74.
5
798
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which had led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect.”
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
“CAUSE OF ACTION
2. 8.Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country’s land mass.
3. 9.Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country’s land area.
4. 10.More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares
of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
5. 11.Public records reveal that defendant’s predecessors have granted timber license agreements
(‘TLA’s’) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’.
1. 12.At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour—nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included—the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
 799
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 799
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
1. 13.The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestration to the plaintiff minors’ generation and to generations yet unborn
are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
2. 14.The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs—especially plaintiff minors and
their successors—who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
1. 15.Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
2. 16.Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs’ letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’.
1. 17.Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s, to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
2. 18.The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA’s is an act violative to the
rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.
3. 19.Defendant’s refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA’s is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State—
1. ‘(a)to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
2. ‘(b)to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
3. ‘(c)to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well being’. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant’s continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA’s is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of
800
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
the State to—
1. a.effect ‘a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth’ and ‘make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)’. (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
2. b.‘protect the nation’s marine wealth.’ (Section 2, ibid);
3. c.‘conserve and promote the nation’s cultural heritage and resources (sic).’ (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
4. d.‘protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.’ (Section 16, Article II. id.)
1. 21.Finally, defendant’s act is contrary to the highest law of humankind—the natural law—and
violative of plaintiffs’ right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
2. 22.There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth.” 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2)
the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant’s abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.  In the said order, not only was the defendant’s claim—that the complaint states no cause
7
of action against him and that it raises a political question—sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this
_______________
 Rollo, 70-73.
6
 Annex “B” of Petition; Id., 43-44.
7
801
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 801
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent’s correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary’s alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution’s non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
_______________
  Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
8
802
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
allegations concerning an “environmental right” which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
“protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae.” Such allegations, according to them, do
not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether
logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners’ recourse is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage
of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time—usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners’ proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of
the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents
did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and
in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue
803
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 803
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety.  Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
9
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
10
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for
the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge’s challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said
order read as follows:
xxx
“After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) feel short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific
legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
_______________
9
 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.
10
 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
804
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of ‘Separation of Powers’ of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to ‘impairment of contracts’ abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.” 11
We do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
“SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
“SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.”
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and
_______________
 Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
11
805
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 805
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation—aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come—generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
“MR. VILLACORTA:
  Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution—air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
  Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be prov ided for
impairment of environmental balance.” 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country’s forests.
_______________
 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
12
806
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country’s natural resources,  then President Corazon C. Aquino
13
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,  Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
14
Department of Environment and Natural Resources “shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos.” Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
“SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and use of the country’s natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state
to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.”
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987, specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
15
_______________
 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.
13
 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
14
 E.O. No. 292.
15
807
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 807
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
“SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.—(1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.”
The above provision stresses “the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment.” Section 2 of the same Title, on the other
hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to
the fact of the agency’s being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
“SEC. 2. Mandate.—(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible
for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country’s
natural resources.”
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the “environmental right” of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former “declared a continuing policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
808
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure
the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being.”  As its goal, it speaks of the “responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of
16
the environment for succeeding generations.”  The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
17
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
“x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.” 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action,  the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
19
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of
_______________
16
 Section 1.
17
 Section 2.
  Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88
18
Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462[1967]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
19
809
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante 20
vs. Edrosolano,  this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should “exercise the utmost care
21
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute.”
After a careful examination of the petitioners’ complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vispolicies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
_______________
20
 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.
21
 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
810
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.”
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,  Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, 22
a distinguished member of this Court, says:
“The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of grave abuse of discretion,’ which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to
the disposition of the judiciary.”
In Daza vs. Singson,  Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
23
“In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: x x x.”
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
_______________
 1991 ed., 226-227.
22
 180 SCRA, 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191
23
SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
809 767 [1991].
811
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 811
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
“The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to ‘impairment of contracts’ abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.”
24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out
by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides:
“x x x Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x x.”
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,  this Court held:
25
“x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
_______________
 Rollo, 44.
24
 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].
25
812
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
‘A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x”
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
“x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-
24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].”
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
“SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” 27
cannot be invoked.
 In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case      Vitug, J., No part; I was not yet with the Court when the case was deliberated upon.
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. FELICIANO, J.: Concurring in the result
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr.,  J., in this case
_______________
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction
 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].
26

 Article III, 1987 Constitution.

27 and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
813 utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 813
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standiis not a function of
non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only petitioners’ claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standito
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right refer to the legal interest which
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the 815
general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.,  this Court stated:
28

VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 815

“The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.”
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,  quoted in Philippine 29
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept
of “class” here involved—membership in this “class” appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the future—it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to

benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,  to wit: 30

with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing

“ ‘Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
a beneficiaries’ right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally or sector of activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries’ right of action may be found under
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.’ ” any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31 governmental agency concerned must be shown (“prior exhaustion of administrative remedies”), is
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate ca
apply with respect to the prayer to se.
_______________ The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon “one specific
fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology” (Decision, p. 14). There is
 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.
28
no question that “the right to a balanced and healthful ecology” is “fundamental” and that,
 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
accordingly, it has been “constitutionalized.” But although it is fundamental in character, I
29

 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

30

 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs.
31
Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA
54 1[974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].
814
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Q
uiason, JJ., concur.
     Narvasa (C.J.), No part; related to one of the parties.
     Feliciano, J., Please see separate opinion concurring in the result.
     Puno, J., No part in the deliberations.
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as “specific,” without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive
in scope and generalized in character than a right to “a balanced and healthful ecology.” The list of
particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended:
prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters
by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic
wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after stripmining or
open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other
living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out
816
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977—all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Sections 16 (“the right—to a balanced and healthful ecology”) and 15 (“the right to
health”).
 P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled “The Philippine Environment Code,” is, upon It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
the other hand, a compendious collection of more “specific environment management policies” action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least
and “environment quality standards” (fourth “Whereas” clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is
wide range of topics: given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
1. (a)air quality management; The second is a broader-gauge consideration—where a specific violation of law or applicable
2. (b)water quality management: regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
3. (c)land use management; conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
4. (d)natural resources management and conservation embracing: Constitution which reads:
“Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
1. (i)fisheries and aquatic resources; which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
2. (ii)wild life; of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
3. (iii)forestry and soil conservation; Government.” (Emphases supplied)
818
4. (iv)flood control and natural calamities;
5. (v)energy development; 818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6. (vi)conservation and utilization of surface and ground water Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
7. (vii)mineral resources
When substantive standards as general as “the right to a balanced and healthy ecology” and “the
right to health” are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as “a grave abuse of
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,” the result will be, it is respectfully
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments—
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, the legislative and executive departments—must be given a real and effective opportunity to
appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
implementation of that Code. should intervene.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause of action as anchored on a legal right My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
comprised in the constitutional state- agreements or TLA’s petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
817 the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners’ entitlement to the relief demanded
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 817 is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific
terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
ments above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed
the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The factual nexus between petitioners’ specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here. the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
legal right—a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in
of the Constitution—that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the the Court’s decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or Petition granted. Challenged order set aside.
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
——o0o——
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
819
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes,
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in
any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily im-
G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000. *
________________
ORTIGAS & CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY
III, respondents.  SECOND DIVISION.
*

749
Contracts; Contract Clause; Police Power;  Statutes; A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be VOL. 346, -DECEMBER 4, 2000 749
given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.—We

Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
pairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain
activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts—police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence.—The foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given
retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable
not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested
rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes
in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Restrictions in a contract of sale limiting all constructions on the subject
lot to single-family residential buildings deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of a zoning
ordinance reclassifying the area as a commercial zone.—Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati
Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which
Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to
Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981,
the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed
lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning
ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a
contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot
contravene “law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” Otherwise such stipulations would be
deemed null and void.
Courts; Judges; Judgments; In resolving matters in litigation, judges are not only duty-bound to
ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also bound by their oath of office to apply the applicable
law.—Respondent court correctly found that the trial court committed in this
750
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
50
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to treat
Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are not
only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also bound by their oath of office to
apply the applicable law.
Actions; Parties; Words and Phrases;  A real party in interest is defined as “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit,” and “interest” within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest .—A real party in
interest is defined as “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.” “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Same; Same; Lease; The lessee which has built a building on leased land, and as possessor in the
concept of a “holder of the thing” under Article 525 of the Civil Code, is clearly a real party in interest in an
action filed by the vendor to enforce the stipulations in a deed of sale limiting constructions to residential
buildings.—Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent in this case is clearly a real party in interest.
It is not disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant to a valid lease. He is a possessor in the concept of
a “holder of the thing” under Article 525 of the Civil Code. He was impleaded as a defendant in the amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what petitioner seeks to enjoin is the building by respondent of a
commercial structure on the lot. Clearly, it is private respondent’s acts which are in issue, and his interest in
said issue cannot be a mere incidental interest. In its amended complaint, petitioner prayed for, among others,
judgment “ordering the demolition of all improvements illegally built on the lot in question.” These show that
it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business as “Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.,” and not only the Hermosos, who will
be adversely affected by the court’s decree.
Same;  Same; Same;  Estoppel; Where a plaintiff has impleaded a party as a defendant, he cannot
subsequently question the latter’s standing in court.—Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger to a contract
has no rights or obligations under it, and thus has no standing to challenge its validity. But in seeking to
enforce the stipulations in the deed of sale,
751
VOL. 346, DECEMBER 4, 2000 751
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
petitioner impleaded private respondent as a defendant. Thus petitioner must recognize that where a
plaintiff has impleaded a party as a defendant, he cannot subsequently question the latter’s standing in court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Eulogio R. Rodriguez for petitioner.
     Puhawan, Aldon & Associates for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 39193, which nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 261, in Civil Case No. 64931. It also assails the resolution of the
appellate court, dated August 13, 1996, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land
known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills
Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737.
The contract of sale provided that the lot:
1. . . . (1) be used exclusively . . . for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential
building will be constructed thereon, . . .
xxx
6. The BUYER shall not erect. . . any sign or billboard on the roof . . . for advertising purposes . . .
xxx
11. No single-family residential building shall be erected . . . until the building plans, specification . . .
have been approved by the SELLER . . .
xxx
752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
14. . . . restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025
when they shall cease and terminate . . .1
These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area
for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of
Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is
located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso
and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills
Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil Case No. 64931, the complaint sought the
demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the
Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the commercial building and/or
engaging in commercial activity on the lot. The complaint was later amended to implead Ismael G.
Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp., which has a ten percent (10%) interest in the lot.
In his answer, Mathay III denied any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and
filed a cross-claim against the Hermosos.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995,
Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion.
________________
 Rollo, p. 92.
1
753
VOL. 346, DECEMBER 4, 2000 753
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where
the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976
Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly
annotated on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must prevail over the
ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before the passage of MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01.
On March 25, 1996, the appellate court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders are hereby
nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED. 2 jurisdiction.
In finding for Mathay III, the Court of Appeals held that the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01
effectively nullified the restrictions allowing only residential use of the property in question.
Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it on August 13,
1996.
Hence, the instant petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioner now submits that the “principal issue in this case is whether
respondent Court of Appeals correctly set aside the Order dated June 16, 1995 of the trial court
which issued the writ of preliminary injunction on the sole ground that MMC Ordinance No. 81-
01 nullified the building restriction imposing exclusive residential use on the property in
question.”  It also asserts that “Mathay III lacks legal capacity to question the validity of conditions
3 parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself  and cannot be given retroactive effect
of the deed of sale; and he is barred by estop-pel or waiver to raise the same question like his
principals, the
________________
 Rollo, p. 52.
2
 Id., at 227.
3
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
owners.”  Lastly, it avers that the appellate court “unaccountably failed to address” several
4
questions of fact.
Principally, we must resolve the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to apply MMC Ordinance No.
81-01 to Civil Case No. 64931.
But first, we must address petitioner’s allegation that the Court of Appeals “unaccountably
failed to address” questions of fact. For basic is the rule that factual issues may not be raised
before this Court in a petition for review and this Court is not duty-bound to consider said
questions.  CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 was a special civil action for certiorari, and the appellate court
5
only had to determine if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, unless vital to our
determination of the issue at band, we shall refrain from further consideration of factual questions.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in limiting its decision to the cited zoning
ordinance. It avers that a contractual right is not automatically discarded once a claim is made that
it conflicts with police power. Petitioner submits that the restrictive clauses in the questioned
contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance. For one, according to petitioner, the MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of residential buildings. Petitioner argues
that even with the zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can voluntarily
agree to an exclusive residential use thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the condition imposing exclusive residential use was effectively nullified by
the zoning ordinance.
In its turn, private respondent argues that the appellate court correctly ruled that the trial court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to subject the contract to the MMC Ordi-
________________
4
 Ibid.
5
 First Nationwide Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 128797, November 18, 1999, p. 1, 318 SCRA
589.
755
VOL. 346, DECEMBER 4, 2000 755
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
nance No. 81-01. He avers that the appellate court properly held the police power superior to the
non-impairment of contract clause in the Constitution. He concludes that the appellate court did
not err in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in excess of its
We note that in issuing the disputed writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court observed
that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted
only in March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since private respondent had failed to show that
MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said ordinance should be given prospective
application only, citing Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 390(1988).
6
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation.  Lex
prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract
are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect.  A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the
7
8
without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. 9
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A
law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions
could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police
power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior
10
and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
________________
 CA Rollo, p. 26.
6
 Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172, 185 (1979).
7
 US vs. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 769 (1922).
8
 CONST., Art. III, Sec 10.
9
 Melchor, Jr. vs. Moya, 121 SCRA 1, 6 (1983); Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 (1949); Santos vs. Alvarez, 78
10
Phil. 503 (1947).
756
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
people.  Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every
11
mere interest in the question in-
contract.  Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,  we already upheld MMC
12 13 ________________
Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.
The trial court’s reliance on the Co vs. IAC,  is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was
14
 Supra, Art. 1306.
18

 Parada vs. Veneration, 269 SCRA 371, 378 (1997).

agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not specifically provide that “it shall have retroactive
19

 Caram Resources Corp. vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 724, 734 (1994).

20

effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the zone which 758
are neither residential nor light industrial in nature,”  and stated with respect to agricultural areas
15

758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

covered that “the zoning ordinance should be given prospective operation only.”  The area in this
16

case involves not agricultural but urban residential land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations volved, or a mere incidental interest.  By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
21

therein as commercial. distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), interest. 22

the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent in this case is clearly a real party in
the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was interest. It is not disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant to a valid lease. He is a
reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the possessor in the concept of a “holder of the thing” under Article 525 of the Civil Code.  He was 23

restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the
disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive
operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system
upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting
parties,  nonetheless, stipula-
17
impleaded as a defendant in the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what
petitioner seeks to enjoin is the building by respondent of a commercial structure on the lot.
Clearly, it is private respondent’s acts which are in issue, and his interest in said issue cannot be a
mere incidental interest. In its amended complaint, petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment
“ordering the demolition of all improvements illegally built on the lot in question.”  These show 24

________________ that it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business as “Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.,” and not only the
Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the court’s decree.
 Presley vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 201 SCRA 13, 18-19 (1991).
11

Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger to a contract has no rights or obligations under
 Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 136-137 (1968).
12

 168 SCRA 634, 669 (1988).

13
it,  and thus has no standing to chal-
25

 162 SCRA 390 (1988).

14
________________
 Id. at 396.
15

 Ibid.
16
 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 3, Sec. 2; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 203 SCRA 310, 324 (1991)
21

 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1159.

17
citing Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 598 (1988).
757  De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 478, 486-487 (1997); Barfel Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 223
22

SCRA 268 (1993).
VOL. 346, DECEMBER 4, 2000 757  CIVIL CODE, Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts; either in the concept of
23

owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person.
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals  Rollo, p. 61.
24

tions in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public  CIVIL CODE, Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where
25

policy.”  Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly
18 the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation, or by provision of
law. . .
found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
759
or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No.
64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are not only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and VOL. 346, DECEMBER 4, 2000 759
the applicable laws,  they are also bound by their oath of office to apply the applicable law.
19 20

Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals

As a secondary issue, petitioner contends that respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lenge its validity.  But in seeking to enforce the stipulations in the deed of sale, petitioner
26

lot in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred from questioning the impleaded private respondent as a defendant. Thus petitioner must recognize that where a plaintiff
conditions of said deed. Petitioner points out that the owners of the lot voluntarily agreed to the has impleaded a party as a defendant, he cannot subsequently question the latter’s standing in
restrictions on the use of the lot and do not question the validity of these restrictions. Petitioner court. 27

argues that Mathay III as a lessee is merely an agent of the owners, and could not override and rise
above the status of his principals. Petitioner submits that he could not have a higher interest than
those of the owners, the Hermosos, and thus had no locus standi to file CA-G.R. SP No. 39193to
dissolve the injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City.
For his part, private respondent argues that as the lessee who built the commercial structure, it
is he and he alone who stands to be either benefited or injured by the results of the judgment
in Civil Case No. 64931. He avers be is the party with real interest in the subject matter of the
action, as it would be his business, not the Hermosos’, which would suffer had not the respondent
court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
A real party in interest is defined as “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” “Interest” within the meaning of the rule
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 25, 1996, as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. (Siska
Development Corporation vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, 231 SCRA 674[19941)
The powers granted to the conservator of a bank, enormous and extensive as they are, cannot
extend to the post-facto repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise they would infringe
against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. (First Philippine International Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 [1996])
 The right to amend the by-laws by the employer, extensive as it may be, cannot impair the
obligation of existing contract or rights. (Salafranca vs. Philamlife [Pamplona] Village
Homeowners Association, Inc., 300 SCRA 469 [1998])
——o0o——
________________
VOL. 19, MARCH 18, 1967 625
Acar, et al. vs. Rosal
No. L-21707. March 18, 1967.
FELIPE ACAR, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. INOCENCIO RoSAL, in his capacity as Executive
Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, respondent.
Constitutional law; Interpretation of the Constitution.—The Constitution should be interpreted with a
view to realizing its fundamental objective of protecting and enhancing the people’s interest, as a nation
collectively and as persons individually.
Same; Free access to the courts; Actions; Suits in forma pauperis; Meaning of pauper.—The right to
sue in forma pauperisshould be broadly interpreted. An applicant for leave to litigate in forma pauperis need
not be literally a pauper. The fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his
statement that he has no sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs. It suffices that the
plaintiff is indigent, though not a public charge.
Same; Meaning of indigent.—Indigent persons are those who have no property or source of income
sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in
employment. The term “pauper” refers to this sense of being indigent, when it refers to suits in  forma
pauperis. A pauper is a person so poor that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on
account of poverty, is allowed to or defend without being chargeable with costs.
Same; Class suits.—The rule, that free access to the courts should not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty, applies to a class suit f iled by ten laborers in their own behalf and in behalf of 9,000 other
laborers because, although each laborer would share only P1.60 out of the total filing fee of P14,500, still such
amount would diminish the subsistence income of seasonal
626
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
26
Acar, et al. vs. Rosal
workers. Moreover, there are other litigation expenses to be shouldered. A contrary holding would
defeat the salutary purpose of the constitutional provision.
Same; Sufficiency of certificates of indigence.—The certificates of indigence for the ten laborers suing
in a class suit for more than 9,000 persons are sufficient for purpose of section 22, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court since it is not practicable to bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the court.
Same; Mandamus; When mandamus lies to compel allowance of suit in forma pauperis.—Where the
ten laborers were erroneously not allowed to sue in forma pauperis, mandamus lies to compel the trial court to
docket their case since they are excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Appeal was unavailing since they were not even accorded the status of litigants for nonpayment of the docket
fee. Perfecting an appeal would have presented the same question of exemption from legal fees and other
requirements.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     F.S. Villarin for petitioners.
     Jose B. Navarro for respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
 Ibañez vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 22 Phil. 572, 584 (1912); Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil.
26
340, 344 (1911).
 Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 237, 256 (1997).
27
760
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
All over the world, Constitutions share one purpose: to protect and enhance the people’s interest,
as a nation collectively and as persons individually. The Philippine Constitution is no exception.
Interpretation of its provisions, therefore, should be done with a view to realizing this fundamental
objective. Among the provisions in our Constitution is one both timely and far-reaching, as it
affects the people at large and relates to social justice problems of the day. It is Subsec. 21, Sec. 1
of Art. III: “Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” It is
the one involved in this case.
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten
persons for their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar
cane plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compañia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compa-
627
VOL. 19, MARCH 18, 1967 627
Acar, et al. vs. Rosal
ñia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs
sought to recover their alleged participations or shares amounting to the aggregate sum of
P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the provisions of
Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952), particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof:
“SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of
sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the
milling by any sugar central of the sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-
products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between them as follows:
“Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum
actual production of which is not more than four hundred thousand piculs: Provided,That the provisions of this
section shall not apply to sugar centrals with an actual production of less than one hundred fifty thousand
piculs;
“Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per centum for the
central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds four hundred thousand piculs
but does not exceed six hundred thousand piculs;
“Sixty-five per centum for the planter. and thirty-five per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds six hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed nine hundred
thousand piculs;
“Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per centum for the
central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds nine hundred thousand piculs
but does not exceed one million two hundred thousand piculs;
“Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds one million two hundred thousand piculs.
“By actual production is meant the total production of the mill for the crop year immediately preceding.”
x      x      x      x      x      x
“SEC. 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in
the participation granted the planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the
planter and his laborers in the plantation in the following proportion:
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acar, et al. vs. Rosal
“Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the laborers and forty per centum for the planters. The 630
distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under the supervision of the Department
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of Labor.
“The benefits granted to laborers in sugar plantations under this Act and in the Minimum Wage Law shall Acar, et al. vs. Rosal
not in any way be diminished by such labor contracts known as ‘by the piece,’ ‘by the volume/ ‘by the area,’ or It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500 would very well be shouldered by petitioners
by any other system of ‘pakyaw,’ the Secretary of Labor being hereby authorized to issue the necessary orders
since there are around 9,000 of them. It must be remembered, however that the action in question
for the enforcement of this provision.”
was filed by way of a class suit. And the Rules of Court allowing such procedure state under Sec.
Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate motion, that the aforementioned
12, Rule 3:
court authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court: “SEC. 12. Class suit.—When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
“SEC. 22. Pauper litigant.—Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper
many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect ect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case the court shall make sure that the parties
provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority once given shall include an exemption
actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interests concerned are fully
from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall
protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest.”
be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides/'
So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten named petitioners herein are the ones suing,
invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the Constitution of the Philippines. They alleged that
albeit for the benefit of all the others. It follows that the payment of docket fee would be directly
they had no means, to pay the docket fee of P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely on their
charged upon them, not upon the unnamed “9,000 other laborers.” And even if the 9,000 other
daily wages for livelihood and possessed of no properties, And in support of the foregoing, the ten
laborers should later bear the payment of said docket fee of P14,500, the same would be spread
named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the municipal treasurers of their places of residence
among them at about P1.60 each. Said cost of pressing their respective average demand of P1.60
stating that they have no real property declared in their names in said municipalities.
each is, to Our mind, a substantial imposition on a seasonal farm laborer earning barely subsistent
Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis, the Court of First Instance issued an order
wages. And as pointed out, this is only the initial fee; subsequent fees and charges would have to
on May 27, 1963 denying the same upon the ground that the plaintiffs have regular employment
be paid. The philosophy underlying the constitutional mandate of free access to the courts
and sources of income and, thus, can not be classified as poor or paupers.
notwithstanding poverty, therefore, calls for exemption of herein petititioners from payment of the
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but reconsideration was denied in an order
aforesaid legal fees in their assertion and claim of substantial rights under the Sugar Act of 1952.
dated June 11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI orders and asserting their alleged right not to be
Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as mentioned earlier, We find this course the
denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs in said case filed herein, on August
629 most sensible, logical and practical construction demanded by the free access clause of the
Constitution. For a contrary interpretation could not make said provision the living reality that it is
VOL. 19, MARCH 18, 1967 629 designed to be.
Acar, et al. vs. Rosal As regards the fact that the supporting certifications of indigence refer only to the ten named
1, 1963, the present special civil action or certiorari and mandamus. Petition to litigate as pauper plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this involves a class suit, where it
631
in the instant case before Us was also filed. And on August 16, 1963, We allowed petitioners
herein to litigate in this Court as paupers and required respondent to answer, Respondent’s answer VOL. 19, MARCH 18, 1967 631
was filed on November 2, 1963. After hearing on February 10, 1964 this case was submitted for
Ang vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc.
decision.
is not practicable to bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the court. This Court finds the
The sole issue herein is whether petitioners were deprived, by the orders in question, of free
supporting evidence of indigence adequate, showing in petitioners’ favor, as plaintiffs in the suit
access to the courts by reason of poverty. In denying petitioners’ motion to litigate as paupers,
bef ore respondent Judge, the right not to be denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty.
respondent Judge adopted the definition of “pauper” in Black’s Law Dictionary (at p. 1284) as “a
Since they were excluded from the use and enjoyment of said right, mandamus lies to enforce it.
person so poor that he must be supported at public expense”. And, as afore-stated, he ruled that
Appeal was unavailing, since they were not even accorded the status of litigants, for non-payment
petitioners are not that poor.
of docket fee; ‘and perfecting an appeal would have presented the same question of exemption
Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with the purpose of the rules on suits in forma
from legal fees, appeal bond and similar requisites.
pauperis and the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, that: “Free access to the courts
Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate as paupers in their class suit before
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” As applied to statutes or provisions on the
respondent Judge and the latter is hereby ordered to grant their petition to litigate  in forma
right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus been recognized that:
pauperis. No costs. So ordered.
“An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement that he has not sufficient
J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs ’ (14 Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff
?

Petition granted.
is indigent(Ibid.), the not a public charge. And the difference between “paupers” and “indigent”
persons is that the latter are “persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their
support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in employment” _____________
(Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 913, “Indigent”, citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24
NE 830). It is therefore in this sense of being indigent that “pauper” is taken when referring to © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
suits in forma pauperis. Black’s Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: “A person so poor
that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed
to sue or defend without being chargeable with costs” (p. 1284, italics supplied).
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 455 People vs. Mahinay
 G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO,
accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Those who lust and kill ought not to last.—A violation of the dignity, purity and
privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing
experience that destroys not only her future but of the youth population as well, who in the teachings of our
national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic
desecration of human dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12
years, has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the
“intrinsically evil act” of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is
an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
Same; Same; Rape with Homicide; Life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be
restored.—This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review
thereof since “there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the termination of a human
life.” For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In order therefore, that
appellant’s guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the records are not shy, for him to
verify.
Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence;  Requisites.—The proven circumstances of this case when
juxtaposed with appellant’s proffered excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the
Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur: 1. there is more than one circumstance; 2. the facts from which
the inferences are
__________________
 EN BANC.
* 458
456
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
56
People vs. Mahinay
derived are proven; and 3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon
the court.—Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
Same; Same; Same; Rape; Evidence; Guiding Principles in Review of Rape Cases.—Guided by the
three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; 2) In view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3) The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The foregoing
circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined and penalized under
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659.
Same; Rape; Statutes; Republic Act No. 8353; Under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8353), rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus,
may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.—At the time of the commission of
this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against chastity, although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997
(R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B,
and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Republic Act No. 8353, rape may be committed even by a woman
and the victim may even be a man.—The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is
457
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 457
People vs. Mahinay
sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. (Under the new law, rape may be
committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a man). If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof
of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the
absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie,
provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated,
as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other element that
the perpetrator’s evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat
needs to be established. Both elements are present in this case.
Same;  Same; The mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum
of the woman’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.—In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or
deep penetration of the victim’s vagina; rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex
organ is enough to consummate the sexual intercourse. The mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument
of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
Same;  Same; Where the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be
concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the
sexual act.—From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed employed
upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant’s own account, he pushed the victim causing the latter
to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his
salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious,
it could safely be concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether
before or during the sexual act.
Same;  Same; Witnesses; We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience—whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is
outside of judicial cognizance.—Appellant’s defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of
the victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet
of New Jersey, “Evidence to be believed must
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
58
People vs. Mahinay
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself—such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.”
Same;  Same; Same;  The findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left
to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.
—Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule that the
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its
unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on
the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. In this case, the trial court’s
findings, conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest
respect, the same being supported by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a
quo had overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have
affected the outcome of this case or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court below.
The absence of any improper or illmotive on the part of the principal witnesses for the prosecution all the more
strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists. Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police
officers who testified against appellant.
Same;  Rape with Homicide; Penalties; The special complex crime of rape with homicide is treated by
law in the same degree as qualified rape—that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) “attendant circumstances”
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, the penalty is death, but in cases where any of those
circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can
be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect
the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC.—Coming now to the penalty,
the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by R.A. 7659 “when by reason or on occasion of the rape,
459
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 459

People vs. Mahinay
a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.” This special complex crime is treated by law in
the same degree as qualified rape—that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) “attendant circumstances” enumerated
in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is death. In cases where any of those
circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can
be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect
the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC. However, if any of those
circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14
and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning
aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10
circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it
is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death
—subject to the usual proof of such circumstance in either case.
Same; Same; Same; Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law
for the crime of “rape with homicide,” the court has no option but to apply the same “regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime.”—Death being a
single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of “rape with homicide,” the
court has no option but to apply the same “regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may
have attended the commission of the crime” in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended. This case
of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import
of Article 47 of the RPC as amended.
Same; Same; Damages;  If the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil indemnity for the
victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).—Pursuant to current case law, a victim
of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by
present amended law, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00). In addition to
460
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
60
People vs. Mahinay
such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code in such
amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. Civil
indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary damages. The requirement of proof of mental
and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is “recognized
that the victim’s injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape
to warrant per se the award of moral damages.” Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the
award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
Same; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Miranda Rights;  Procedure, Guidelines and
duties to be done and observed by the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions
at the time of making an arrest, at and during custodial interrogation.—Considering the heavy penalty of
death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the
Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the
arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of
making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become
insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments: 1. The person arrested,
detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; 2. He must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against
him; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4. He must be informed that if he has no
lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
one acting in his behalf; 5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial inves-
461
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 461
People vs. Mahinay
tigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has
been made; 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means—telephone, radio, letter or messenger—with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished; 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; 8. In addition, if the person
arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence
of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to
speak; 9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of
the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police
may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already
begun; 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of
whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements; 11. He must also be informed
that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Br. 171.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the
ways of worldly pleas-
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
ures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the youth population as
well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once
again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed no less
upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock on the portals of
womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the “intrinsically evil act” of non-
consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an ignominious
crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational justification
other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People’s Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant,
as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record: 1**
“Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1993. His task was
to take care of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a
compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an
apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995,
pp. 5-10).
“The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip’s neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by
Isip’s house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard, catching mayabirds together with other
children. While they were playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound
yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-22).
__________________
 Rollo, pp. 146-154; Appellees Brief filed by the Solicitor General, pp. 2-10.
1
 Sic is no longer indicated so as not to clutter the narration and other quotations from the records and the Transcript of
**
Stenographic Notes (TSN).
463
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 463
People vs. Mahinay
“On June 25, 1995, at 8 o’clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 o’clock
in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go
out with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).
“Meantime, Isip’s sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the compound, saw Ma.
Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip’s unfinished house around 4 o’clock in
the afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera’s store (TSN, September 18, 1995,
pp. 9-11).
“On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law’s house between
6 to 7 o’clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of
his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law’s house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian
Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o’clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the
unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
“Later, at 9 o’clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera’s store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in
deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he
looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the compound (TSN, September 18,
1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
“Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her daughter
wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white
lady sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
“Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, June 26, 1995,
at 2 o’clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at
the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter
disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-17).
“That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic
tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim’s parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN,
September 6, 1995, p. 13).
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
“With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic tank.
She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed
the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0
cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left,
posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0
cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm. forearms, left,
posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd,
12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect,
1.5 x 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH—Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o’clock position corresponding to the face of
a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4, Record, p. 126)
“Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that her
houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just
disappear from the apartment since whenever he would
465
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 465
People vs. Mahinay
go out, he would normally return on the same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6,
1995, pp. 6-11-27).
“SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant was working in
a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of the factory
confirmed to them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his present whereabouts.
Appellant’s townmate, on the other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street,
Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
“The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house under construction,
they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon
which was identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another
room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength
away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings. These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14,
1995, pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
“A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the office of the
Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim’s underwear from the septic
tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
“After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan,
Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty.
Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped
and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim’s mother and aunt, he confided to
them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-
conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 13-21).”
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information which
reads: 2
________________
 Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 4974-V-95 filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela,
2
Metro Manila.
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
“That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of
MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO
against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused,
choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
“Contrary to law.” 3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting appellant
of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00
to the victim’s heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision states:
“WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P23,000.00 for
the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
“Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for the
automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
“SO ORDERED.” 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, 5
_______________
 Rollo, p. 8; RTC Records, p. 2.
3
 Decision dated October 25, 1995 penned by Judge Adriano R. Osorio of Branch 171 of the RTC of Valenzuela; Rollo,
4
p. 130.
 Article 47, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22, R.A. 7659 provides: In what cases the death penalty shall
5
not be imposed; automatic review of death penalty cases.—x x x In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial
court, the records
467
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999
People vs. Mahinay
appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against him is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony summarized by the trial
court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as follows:
“(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he
joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip,
appellant’s employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to clean the
jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 o’clock noon. Then he had lunch and took a bath. Later, he
asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash advance of
P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5).
“At 2 o’clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to rejoin Gregorio
Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one case of red horse beer. Around 6 o’clock
p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at Gregorio Rivera’s house. They went to Zaldy’s house and bought a
bottle of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 o’clock p.m. After consuming the bottle of gin, they went
out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was already 9 o’clock in the evening. While they
were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant
left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
“On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera’s store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed
him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to Isip’s apartment. But because it was
already closed, he decided to sleep at the second floor of Isip’s unfinished house. Around 10 o’clock p.m.,
Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room where appellant was
sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead
body of the child or they would kill him. He, however, refused to follow.
_______________
shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the Court en banc , within twenty (20) days but not earlier
than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also
be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (Emphasis supplied).
468
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead body downstairs. He obliged and
helped dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see
him again, they would kill him. At 4 o’clock the following morning, he left the compound and proceeded first
to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
“Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police officers
allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer’s plan to
salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an
extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced
to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).” 6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review
thereof since “there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the termination
of a human life.”  For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In
7
order therefore, that appellant’s guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the
records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant’s proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence  and pursuant to settled jurisprudence,  conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
8 9
provided that the following requisites concur:
________________
 Rollo, pp. 152-154.
6
 People v. Galera, 280 SCRA 492.
7
 Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence.
8
 People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 117471, September 3, 1998; People v. Quitorio, et al., G.R. No. 116765, January 28,
9
1998; People v. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111; People v. Abrera, 283 SCRA 1; People v.
467 469
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 469
People vs. Mahinay
1. 1.there is more than one circumstance;
2. 2.the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. 3.the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.  Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
10
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court. 11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which
upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the
shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
“FIRST—Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house
where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the
morning of June 26, 1995 is located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25, 1995,
accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound of her sister-in-law Maria
Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accused’s hair
was disarranged, drunk and walking in sigsaging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be
thinking deeply. That the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went inside the
compound.
________________
Doro, 282 SCRA 1; People v. Dabbay, 277 SCRA 432; People v. Bonola, 274 SCRA 238; People v. Grefaldia, 273
SCRA 591.
 People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141.
10
 People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335.
11
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
“SECOND—Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically testified that on June 25, 1995 between
6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-law’s house, he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the
road leading to his in-law’s residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
“THIRD—Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where victim’s body was
found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since November 20, 1993.
That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That after
finishing some work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part of Larry
Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the next morning. That accused Larry
Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.
“FOURTH—Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying the route
Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June
26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
“FIFTH—Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of Maria Isip where
accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a clear indication that the victim was raped
and killed in the said premises. “There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic)
fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of any evidence
as to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the
testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado, L-58585,
January 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali, L-18512, October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
“SIXTH—Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of
his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney’s Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commis-
471
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999
People vs. Mahinay
sion of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper
authorities of any maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos Santos, L-3398, May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA
311). He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8,
1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with
details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto
Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional
rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the
accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any
irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post
mortem findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and the
latter’s head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
“Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon
na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.”
“There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There were no medical
certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct
the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given.
(People v. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson, 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran, 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol, 35
SCRA 73).
“SEVENTH—Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to enter the apartment
where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished
house and slept. He said while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and
dumped it
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex with the dead body but he
refused. That the two asked him to assist them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the septic tank
downstairs. (Tsn, pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is
staying in the apartment and not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that
night of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was already closed. The Court is at a loss
how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished house.
“Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the second
floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still
brought the cadaver upstairs only to be dis-posed/dump later in the septic tank located in the ground floor.
Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by themselves.
“It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where accused Larry Mahinay
was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead body of the child.
“We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver knowledge observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous. (People vs. Santos, L-385, Nov. 16, 1979).”
“EIGHT—If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the body of
the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady
reporter who interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An innocent person
will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of preservation and self-
defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person’s silence therefore, particularly when it is
persistent will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978).
“NINTH—The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness of guilt. He left
the crime scene on the early morning after the incident and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on
July 7, 1995.” 12
_______________
 Rollo, pp. 126-129; RTC Decision, pp. 15-18.
12
473
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 473
People vs. Mahinay
471
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 13
1. 1).An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2. 2).In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and
3. 3).The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined
and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A.
7659, which provides:
“When and how rape is committed—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances.
1. 1.)By using force or intimidation;
2. 2.)When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. 3.)When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
_______________
 People v. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 (1998).
13
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mahinay
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
 1. 1.)When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. 2.)When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. 3.)When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. 4.)When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. 5.)When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6. 6.)When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. 7.)When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation. 14
7. 7.)When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine National Police or any
law enforcement agency;
8. 8.)When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation;
9. 9.)When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime; and
10. 10.)When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party at the time of the commission of the crime.
“Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding Article shall be punished by prision mayor.
“Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
“When the rape is attempted and the homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal or reclusion perpetua.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.

“Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article.”
 This case occurred after the passing of the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) which took effect on December 31,
15

_______________
1993.
476
 Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and further amended by R.A. No. 8353,
14

was renumbered to Articles 266-A and 266-B of the RPC which reads: 476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and how committed.—Rape is committed—
People vs. Mahinay
1. 1.)By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-classified as a crime against
persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint
1. a.)Through force, threat, or intimidation;
filed by the offended party.
2. b.)When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by
3. c.)By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. d.)When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
force and without consent.  (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and the
16

present. victim may even be a man).  If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent
17

becomes immaterial  not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,  but the absence of
18 19

1. 2.)By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie,
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she
was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but
Art. 266-B. Penalties.—Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
also the other element that the perpetrator’s evil acts with the offended party was done through
“Whenever the rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this
475 case.
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 475 Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately proven.
This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortemexamination
People vs. Mahinay on the child’s body:
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity,  although under the
15
Q: And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine?
_______________ A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
______________
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be  reclusion perpetua to
death.  People v. Philip Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425.
16

“When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall  Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.
17

be reclusion perpetua to death.  People v. Lagrosa, Jr., 230 SCRA 298; The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
18

“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. (People v. Andres, 253 SCRA 751).
“The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following  People v. Abordo, 328 Phil. 80; People v. Oarga, 328 Phil. 395; People v. Ligotan, 331 Phil. 98.
19

aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
477

VOL. 302, 477

1. 1.)When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the FEBRUARY 1, 1999
parent of the victim;
2. 2.)When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or penal People vs. Mahinay
institution;
3. 3.)When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
third degree of consanguinity.
4. 4.)When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 o’clock and 8:00
such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;
5. 5.)When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old; o’clock position and that the edges were congested.
6. 6.)When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human ImmunoDeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted
to the victim;
 A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration   S: Oho.
of an organ. “24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?   S: Naka-isa po.
A: Adult male organ, sir. “25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng ‘NAKARAOS,’ maaari bang
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness? ipaliwanag mo ito?
A: I am very sure of that. 20
  S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that he “26. T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?
had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
  S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
“15. T Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
“27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
:
  S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
  S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa,
“28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?
tapos dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa
  S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog
“29. T: Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?
na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
  S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
“16. T Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
“30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
:
  S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
  S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigator’s table.
“31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
Subject evidence were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
  S: Natatakot po ako.
“17. T Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae? 479
: VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 479
  S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko. 1, 1999
“18. T Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing? People vs. Mahinay
: “32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
  S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.   S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
_______________
“33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?
 TSN, September 1, 1995, Dr. Antonio Vertido, pp. 18-19.
20

  S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa

478
poso-negra.
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
People vs. Mahinay
  S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
“19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?
“35. T: Noong mga oras or sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN,
  S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
buhay pa ba siya o patay na?
“20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
  S: Buhay pa po.
  S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa,
“36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
basta araw ng Linggo.
  S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.” 21

“21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim’s vagina; rather the
  S: Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M. slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the
“22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo? sexual intercourse.  The mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the
22

pudendum of the woman’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.

  S: Hindi ko po alam. From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
“23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant’s own account, he pushed the
victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance
pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?
that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at
the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not “ — But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
_______________ Q
“ — Yes, sir.
 Sinumpaang Salaysay of appellant Larry Mahinay, dated July 8, 1995; RTC Records, p. 20.
21

 People v. Ligotan, 331 Phil. 98; People v. Lazaro, 249 SCRA 234.

22
A
480
“ — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start?
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Q
People vs. Mahinay 481
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra-judicial confession, which he, however, VOL. 302, 481
claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied
by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him FEBRUARY 1,
his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the 1999
assisting lawyer:
People vs. Mahinay
“ — Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
“A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
Q
“Q — And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that
“ — We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we
you did as assisting lawyer to the accused?
A were told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the
“A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
crime of, I think, rape with homicide.
“Q — What are those right?
“ — And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person
“A — That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his
Q present?
own choice and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and
“ — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the
that he has the right to refuse to answer any question that would inc riminate
A investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
him.
“ — And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already
“Q — Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay,
Q there?
do you recall whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced
“ — The accused was already there.
in writing?
A
“A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer
“ — Was he alone?
Alabastro.
Q
“Q — I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing,
“ — He was alone, sir.
will you be able to recognize the same?
A
“A — Yes, sir.
“ — So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers,
“Q — Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same
Q what did they tell you, if any?
document you mentioned?
“ — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of
“A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
A the crime charged, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
“ — By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
    May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A
Q
proper.
“ — Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney’s Office.
“Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused
A
whether you asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
“ — Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?
“A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
Q
“Q — But you were present?
“ — No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
“A — I was then present when he signed.
A
 “Q — There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and “Q — And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry
after there are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize
signatures? this signature?
482
“A — This is my signature, sir.
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“Q — And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have
People vs. Mahinay
personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary
“A — These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.
executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize the signature?
“Q — The signature of whom?
“A — This is also my signature, sir.”  (emphasis supplied).
23

“A — The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir. Appellant’s defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and forced
“ATTY. PRINCIPE: him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New
Jersey, 24

    May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compañero be “Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a the common experience and observation
encircled and marked as Exhibits A-1 and A-2. of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
“Q — After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.”
Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused? Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule
that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial
“A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement. court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence
“Q — What was the reply? of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.  In this case, the trial court’s findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
25

“A — He said “Opo.”
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, the same being supported by
26

“Q — Did you ask him of his educational attainment? substantial

_______________
“A — It was the Police Officer who asked him.
“Q — In your presence?  TSN, August 11, 1995, morning session, Atty. Restituto Viernes, pp. 6-11.
23

 Cited in Daggers v. Van Dyck, 37 N.J. Eq., 130, 132; See also People v. Cara, 283 SCRA 96.
24

“A — In my presence, sir.  People v. Philip Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425.

25

 People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296; People v. Tenorio, 284 SCRA 420.

“Q — And when he said or when he replied “Opo” so the question started?
26

484
“A — Yes, sir.
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when
People vs. Mahinay
he signed this waiver? evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded
“A — Yes, sir, I was also present. relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the outcome of this
case  or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court below. The absence of
27

“Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?

any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses for the prosecution all the more
“A — I had also explained to him, sir. strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists.  Neither was any wrong motive attributed to
28

“Q — In Filipino? the police officers who testified against appellant.

Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article
“A — In Tagalog, sir. 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 “when by reason or on occasion
“Q — And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.” This special complex crime is
treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape—that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) “attendant
Mahinay, “Nagsasalaysay,” whose signature is that?
circumstances” enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is
“A — This is also signed in my presence. death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot
“Q — Why are you sure that this is his signature? be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper
“A — He signed in my presence, sir. penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC. However, if any of those circumstances proven
483
but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the
VOL. 302, 483 same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning
FEBRUARY 1, aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if
any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a
1999 qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating
People vs. Mahinay
circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death—subject to the usual proof of such x x x      x x x      x x x
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article, may also recover moral damages.”
circumstance in either case.  People v. De los Santos, G.R. No. 121906, September 17, 1998; People v. Victor y Penis, supra.
34

_________________  People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998 cited in People v. Mostrales, G.R. No. 125937, August 28, 1998.
35

 People v. Perez, supra.
36

 People v. Dio, 44 SCAD 559; People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613.

27
 People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 129054, September 29, 1998 citing People v. Prades, People v. Alfeche, G.R. No.
37

 People v. Ravanes, 284 SCRA 634.

28
124213, August 17, 1998; See also Article 2219(3), New Civil Code.
485 487

VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 485 VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 487

People vs. Mahinay People vs. Mahinay

Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of stances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code  after proof that the offended party is entitled to
38

“rape with homicide,” the court has no option but to apply the same “regardless of any mitigating moral, temperate and compensatory damages.  Under the circumstances of this case, appellant is
39

or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime”  in accordance
with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended.  This case of rape with homicide carries with it the
30
penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC,
as amended, which provides:
“The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when
the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than
seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
29
liable to the victim’s heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against
an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people
lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation  in accordance with the Constitution,
40

majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438.  It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement
41

be reclusion perpetua.” (emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried to
alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime.  Again, the record
rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of
age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
______________
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
31
1. 1.The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warnings, information
or communica-
________________

 People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 129439, September 25, 1998.

29
 People v. Bernaldez, supra.
38

 “Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty.
30
 People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 129439, September 25, 1998; People v. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312.
39

It shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the  People v. Dicierdo, 149 SCRA 496.
40

commission of the deed. x x x”  Under R.A. No. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
41

 Article 47, RPC, as amended.

31
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING, AND
486 INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) which took effect only on
July 7, 1992, “custodial investigation” includes the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person who is investigated in
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed.
488
People vs. Mahinay
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the 488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).  In 32

People vs. Mahinay

addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code  in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of
33

the basis thereof.  Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
34
damages.  The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of
35
the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is “recognized that the victim’s injury is inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages.”  Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of
36
moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by one
or more aggravating circum-
______________
 People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998; People v. Bernaldez, G.R. No. 109780, August 17, 1998
32
citing People v. Victor y Penis, G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998.
 “Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
33
1. tion must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. 2.He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes
may be used as evidence against him;
3. 3.He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
37
4. 4.He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer,
one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;
5. 5.That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. 6.The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to

x x x      x x x      x x x
“(3) seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; communicate or confer by the most expedient means—telephone, radio, letter or
 messenger—with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. 7.He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. 8.In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed
that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he
489
VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999 489
People vs. Mahinay
1. must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to
speak;
2. 9.That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any
time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already begun;
3. 10.The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any
time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements;
4. 11.He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court—although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray  that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
42
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 131036. June 20, 2001. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.DONATO DEL ROSARIO, defendant-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide;  Evidence; Elements of the Offense of Robbery with Homicide.
—In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not against
persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
Same; Same; Same; Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established
through the overt acts of the offender; The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.—
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking
of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of
the perpetrator, “x x x (T)he intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.”
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
167
unconstitutional—nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of
civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00
moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
________________
 267 SCRA 682 (1997).
42
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
     Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing
, Martinez, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Conviction affirmed.
Notes.—Where there is no direct relation between the commission of rape with homicide and
the petitioner’s office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the
crime charged, the case does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Sanchez vs.
Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993])
The Supreme Court usually lends credence to the testimony of young girls, especially where
the facts point to their having been victims of sexual assault. (People vs. Sulte, 232 SCRA
421 [1994])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 167
People vs. Del Rosario
Same;  Same; Same;  It is a rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen
property is found in the possession of one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his possession,
he will be presumed to be the thief.—It is a rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen
property is found in the possession of one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his possession,
he will be presumed to be the thief. This rule is in accordance with the disputable presumption “that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole
act.”
Same;  Same; Same;  In the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may
occur after robbery.—It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before or after the robbery. In the crime of
robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is essential is that
there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
Same;  Same; Same;  Alibi;  Already a weak defense, alibi becomes even weaker by reason of the failure
of the defense to present any corroboration.—Accused-appellant relied on alibi as a defense to belie the
accusation against him. However, nobody was presented to corroborate his statements as to his whereabouts on
the day when the robbery, homicide, and arson took place, not even Rancen Anonat who was his companion
on that day and who was with him when the crimes occurred. Already a weak defense, alibi becomes even
weaker by reason of the failure of the defense to present any corroboration.
Constitutional Law; Confession; Requisites for a confession to be admissible.—A confession to be
admissible must be: (1) express and categorical; (2) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused
realizes the legal significance of his act; (3) with assistance of competent and independent counsel; (4) in
writing, and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; and (5) signed, or if the confessant
does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked by him.
Same; Same; Same; As an officer of the court, a lawyer has in his favor the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his sworn duties and responsibilities.—As officers of the court, lawyers have a
responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. As an officer of the court, he has in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance
168
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
68
People vs. Del Rosario
of his sworn duties and responsibilities. Absent any showing that Atty. dela Cruz was remiss in his
duty, the confession of the accused-appellant is valid and binding upon him and is thus admissible in evidence.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Br. 72.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
      Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Olongapo City, Branch 72 in
Criminal Case No. 838-92, entitled “People of the Philippines versus Donato del Rosario,”
convicting the accused of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua.
On November 20, 1992, an information was filed against Donato del Rosario charging him of
robbery with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the twenty-sixth (26th) of September, 1992, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) pc. of 22K grams of gold bracelet worth
P3,500.00, one (1) pc. of diamond ring with letter ‘E’ worth P3,200.00 one (1) pc. of wedding ring worth
P800.00, two (2) pairs of gold earring worth P1,600.00 and cash money in the amount of P1,600.00, all in the
total amount of Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P10,700.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Emelita
Paragua, and on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and carry away
the above-mentioned items, the herein accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and taking
advantage of superior strength and with intent to kill treacherously attack, assault,” hit her with a hard object
on the head and then strangle and tie the Deck of Raquel Lopez (niece of Emelita Paragua) with a Cat-V wire
to prevent her from breathing and
169
VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 169
People vs. Del Rosario
making an outcry, thereby inflicting upon said Raquel Lopez asphyxia injuries which directly caused her death
shortly thereafter.”
1
Upon arraignment on February 3, 1993, accused Donato del Rosario, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. The Regional Trial Court thereafter proceeded with the trial.
Culled from the records are the following:
On September 26, 1992, at about 8:10 in the morning, Emelita Paragua and a companion, a
Delia Aquino, left their house at 1657 Balic-Balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City to go to the former’s
stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old niece of Paragua, was left behind as she
had no classes that day, a Saturday.
Notified of the news that their house was on fire, they went home.
Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise (stuffed toys that they sell at the public
market), and the cassette were burned. When she entered the kitchen, she saw her niece lying on
her stomach with a raincoat covering her head and her neck and arms led with CATV wire. Parts
of her hand and her thigh were burned. Raquel Lopez was already dead when her aunt discovered
her. The total value of the burned properties was around Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Emelita Paragua likewise discovered that six pieces of her jewelries were missing.
SPO1 Ramon Fernandez received a report regarding the fire in Balic-Balic wherein a minor,
who was identified as Raquel Lopez, was found dead. Together with his chief investigator,
Leonardo Esteban and other personnel, he went to the scene of the incident to conduct an
investigation.
He found the single-storey house in complete disarray. The sala was set on fire and he found
the items therein burned. Likewise the two bedrooms.
He located the body of Raquel Lopez in the kitchen. Her head was covered with a pink
raincoat and around her neck was a CATV wire. She was lying face down, her hands behind her
back.
_______________
 Orig. Records, p. 2.
1
170
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Del Rosario
Inquiries made revealed that a certain Ramon Ilagan was seen in the vicinity of the house before
the incident. Ramon Ilagan was interrogated but denied the accusation against him. Since no
evidence could be produced linking him to the crime, he was released.
Three days after the incident, the police received information from the live-in partner of
Ilagan, that a certain Donato del Rosario was seen standing at the back of the house of Paragua
before the crime was committed and had disappeared since then. Del Rosario’s mother and
common-law wife were questioned about the whereabouts of the accused. SPO1 Fernandez told
the mother of del Rosario that her son was suspected of committing the crimes in Balic-Balic.
On October 2, 1992, the Olongapo City police received a call from the Subic police that
Donato del Rosario surrendered to police officer Fernando Morales, the brother-in-law of his
common-law wife, Ruby Tan. Thereafter, SPO1 Fernandez, together with Inspector Leonardo
Esteban and PO3 Laurea, proceeded to Subic to fetch Donato del Rosario.
Del Rosario, even without being asked, told them that he really surrendered to Morales
because he was being bothered by his conscience and that he was very willing to accompany them
to recover the stolen items. He also volunteered the information as to where he sold the jewelries
that he took from the house of Emelita Paragua.
Thereafter the policemen from Olongapo and Donate del Rosario proceeded to the places
mentioned by the latter—Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City, where the “Lovely Kahael Pawnshop”
was located, and Barangay Magsaysay, Iba, Zambales. Del Rosario was not even handcuffed at the
time.
At the Lovely Kahael pawnshop Del Rosario pointed out the jewelry that he had pawned. He
also signed the pawnshop ticket in order that a wedding band and a diamond ring with the letter
“E” could be redeemed. At the pawnshop he was identified by Florencio Gamboa, the
OIC/appraiser therein.
Afterwards they proceeded to Magsaysay, Iba, Zambales to the shop of Rogelio Adriano.
They were not able to immediately recover a bracelet and a 7-day ring that were sold to Adriano, a
watch re-
171
VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 171
People vs. Del Rosario
pairer and a buyer/seller of second hand jewelry, as he had given them to his son for safekeeping.
However, Adriano assured the police that he is going to voluntarily surrender the jewelry because
he learned of the girl who was found dead and of the robbery. His son, Rogelio Adriano, Jr.,
returned the jewelry to the police some days later. Both Adrianos identified del Rosario as the
person who sold them the jewelry. After the jewelry was recovered, the police called Emelita 173
Paragua who positively identified the jewels as hers. VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 173
Del Rosario was then brought to the Olongapo police station. A lawyer, Atty. Norberto dela
Cruz, was called in to assist del Rosario. During the custodial investigation, Atty. dela Cruz was People vs. Del Rosario
present the whole time. He informed del Rosario what was stated in the waiver/confession. It was the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to pay the costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
only when del Rosario said that he fully understood its contents that Atty. dela Cruz signed it as
3

counsel. SPO1 Fernandez brought the accused and Atty. dela Cruz to Assistant City Prosecutor
Martinez for subscription.
As to be expected, Donato del Rosario’s account of the day in question, September 26, 1992,
was different.
He alleged that on the morning of September 26, 1992, at around 7:00 A.M., he went to Subic,
Zambales to buy containers for his vinegar and Clorox business. He was with a certain Rancen
Anonat, the son of his would-be employer. They returned to Balic-balic at around 9:00 A.M. and
spent the night at the house of Anonat. The following day, he went to the house of his common-
law wife. On the 28th of September, he went to Navotas and returned to Subic the next day. On
the 30th he stayed with the brother-in-law of his common-law wife, Fernando Morales, a police
officer in Subic.
It was Morales who informed del Rosario that he was a suspect in the arson case. He was
persuaded by Morales to place himself in the custody of the police pending the investigation of the
case, as there was a threat to kill him by a certain Zapanta, a member of a salvage team in
Olongapo. He spent the night in the detention cell in Subic.
On October 1, four policemen from Olongapo arrived. He was led out of the detention cell to
talk with the policemen. In the investigation room, he was told that he would be taken to Olongapo
for further investigation. Morales told him to trust the police as they
172
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Del Rosario
are in the same corps. He was not handcuffed when he was taken out to the vehicle which would
take him to Olongapo.
When they arrived in the police station (Station A), he found his aunt and some people in a
room. When he sat down he was boxed by an unknown man.
Thereafter, he was brought to Station B. He was forced to sign a document, but not before
being mauled with a rattan stick and a chair. While he was being mauled he was forced to admit
that he committed the arson.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
“I
“IT IS ERRONEOUS AND ILLOGICAL FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO CONVICT APPELLANT WHEN
THE ELEMENTAL REQUISITES OF THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE ARE NOT PRESENT.
“II
“THE COURT A QUO IS LIKEWISE IN ERROR IN HANDING DOWN A CONVICTION ON A
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ABSENT ITS REQUISITE ELEMENTS.
“III
“THE LOWER COURTS QUESTIONED DECISION OVERLOOKED MATERIAL FACTS OF
IMPORTANCE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD TILT THE SCALE OF ‘LADY
JUSTICE’ TO ACQUIT THE APPELLANT.”
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Accused-appellant Donato del Rosario contends that it is essential to prove the intent to rob
and that the intent to rob must come first before the killing transpired. He is of the impression that
not all the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide were proven.
We hold otherwise.
In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property
and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the
taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the
property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the tak-
_______________
 Rollo, p. 36.
3

From the “mayores” in the jail, he found out that the document he had signed was a waiver. 174
Del Rosario did not recall going to the prosecutor’s office to file or submit his counter- 174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
affidavit. Neither did he go to the fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation.
Based on the findings of Dr. Richard Patilano, medico-legal officer, the cause of death of People vs. Del Rosario
Raquel Lopez was asphyxia by strangulation and multiple physical injuries. The victim was ing is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or
already dead when the burning took place because the body did not show any carbonization or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. 4

black color. Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the
On November 8, 1996, an order was issued stating, among other things, that since the overt acts of the offender.  Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the
5

prosecution and the defense agreed that if witness Raymund Tan (the father of the accused’s evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to
common-law wife) will be presented to testify that his son-in-law (Fernando Morales) be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special
accompanied del Rosario in surrendering to the police department of Subic, Zambales, the circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator, “x x x (T)he intent to gain
testimony of the said witness was dispensed with. 2 may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.” 6

On April 2, 1997, a decision was rendered by the trial court convicting the accused and Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
imposing the following penalty: charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Donate del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime things subject of the robbery. 7

of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences him to the maximum of Reclusion Perpetua or from In this case, it was apparent that the reason why accused-appellant stole the jewelry of Emelita
THIRTY-THREE (33) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FORTY YEARS, and to Paragua was because he intended to gain by them. He had already admitted that he needed money
indemnify the heirs of Raquel Lopez y Paragua to marry his common-law wife. 8

_______________
We take note of the places where the jewelry were recovered—a pawnshop in Olongapo City,
2
 Orig. Record, p. 321.
and a stall of a second hand jewelry buyer in Iba.
 Florencio Gamboa, the OIC/appraiser of the Lovely Kahael Pawnshop, remembered giving In fact, his surrender was to be the gist of the testimony of Raymund Tan, the father of his
the accused-appellant nine hundred pesos (P900.00) for the two pieces of jewelry the latter had common-law wife, had he testified: that his son-in-law, Fernando Morales, accompanied del
pawned, while Rogelio Adriano admitted paying the accused the amount of One Thousand Five Rosario in surrendering to the police department of Subic, Zambales.  (Emphasis supplied) We do
11

Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) for two jewelries. not see why Raymund Tan would not say that Morales accompanied Del Rosario in surrendering
If gaining through unlawful means was farthest from the mind of the accused, why then did he to the police if it was not the truth.
pawn and sell the jewelry he had taken from Emelita Paragua for a total amount of two thousand We, therefore, find that accused-appellant surrendered to the police authorities, confessed to
four hundred pesos (P2,400.00)? the crime, volunteered the information as to where he pawned and sold the jewelry, and went with
_______________ the Olongapo police willingly to the Lovely Kahael Pawnshop and to the stall of the Adrianos and
to the police station in Olongapo. He admitted that he was not even handcuffed.
 People vs. Gavina, 264 SCRA 450 (1996).
4
After his surrender and the recovery of the jewelry, accused-appellant executed a waiver and
 Ibid.
confession in the vernacular, in the presence of his aunt and some persons whom he cannot
5

 Avecilla vs. People, 209 SCRA 466 (1992).

6

 People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 (1993).

7 identify.  He was assisted by Atty. dela Cruz. The waiver reads:
12

 T.S.N. dated March 4, 1996, p. 11.

8
“WAIVER
175

VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 175 “SA SINUMANG KINAUUKULAN:

People vs. Del Rosario

“AKO, DONATO DEL ROSARIO Y LACORTE, NASA HUSTONG GULANG AT NAKATIRA SA NR.
The accused vehemently denies having robbed the house of Emelita Paragua. But the testimonies 1663 Balic-balic, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City ay nagsasaad ng mga sumusunod:
of Gamboa and the Adrianos that it was the accused who pawned and sold, respectively, the
jewelry to them shows that the accused had in his possession the stolen jewelry. His failure to
1. “1.Na ako ay kusang sumuko sa Pulisya noong ika-02 ng Oktubre 1992 dahil sa nakokonsensiya
refute this must be taken against him.
ako sa nagawa kong pagpatay kay Raquel Lopez at pagnanakaw at pagsunog ko sa bahay nila;
It is a rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in 2. “2.Na sa dahilang ito ay pinawawalang bisa ko ang aking mga karapatan na nakapaloob sa Art. 125
the possession of one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will ng RPC at ako ay pumapayag na pansamantalang magpakulong at pumailalim sa pan
be presumed to be the thief. This rule is in accordance with the disputable presumption “that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and _______________
doer of the whole act.” 9

We conclude that accused-appellant went to the house of Emelita Paragua because he intended 11
 Orig. Records, p. 321.
to rob her. Lamentably, Paragua’s niece, Raquel Lopez, was in the way and she had to be dealt 12
 T.S.N. dated March 4, 1996, pp. 36-37.
177
with in the direct manner possible. And the means resorted to by the accused-appellant was to
strangle her until her very last breath. Raquel Lopez was killed on the occasion of the robbery VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 177
because she was the only one in the house at that time and the only witness to the crime that People vs. Del Rosario
accused-appellant committed.
Her autopsy report revealed that she was already dead before the fire started, thus eliminating
any inference that arson was committed to finish her off. The arson was but a ruse to cover up the 1. gangalaga ng mga pulis at para na rin makaharap ko ang nagrereklamo sa akin.
theft. 2. “3.Na nilagdaan ko ang pawawalang bisa ko sa aking mga karapatan bilang patotoo sa nilalaman
nito.
It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before or after the robbery. In the crime of
robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is
essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether (Sgd.) Donato del Rosario 
the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes be committed at the same Nagsasaad     
time. 10

Accused-appellant claims that his arrest was violative of his constitutional rights and that all Assisted by: 
(Sgd.) ATTY. NORBERTO DELA CRUZ”  (Italics supplied)
the evidence obtained thereat were fruits of the poisonous tree and therefore inadmissible in any
13

A confession to be admissible must be: (1) express and categorical; (2) given voluntarily, and
pro-
_______________ intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act; (3) with assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (4) in writing, and in the language known to and understood
 Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, 267 (1996).
9 by the confessant; and (5) signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write,
 People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998).
10
thumbmarked by him. 14

176 As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED justice.  As an officer of the court, he has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the
15

performance of his sworn duties and responsibilities.  Absent any showing that Atty. dela Cruz
16

People vs. Del Rosario
ceeding of whatever nature and for any purpose. He alleged that he was mauled to force him to
sign a confession.
Contrary to accused-appellant’s allegation that he was arrested, we find that he was not, and
that he voluntarily surrendered to police officer Fernando Morales of the Subic police.
was remiss in his duty, the confession of the accused-appellant is valid and binding upon him and
is thus admissible in evidence.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the extrajudicial admission is not binding upon him,
let it be stressed that he was positively identified by Florencio Gamboa, the appraiser of Lovely
Kahael Pawnshop, and by Rogelio Adriano and his son, as the person who pawned and sold the 179
jewelry. VOL. 359, JUNE 20, 2000 179
Both SPO1 Ramon Fernandez and Lt. Leonardo Esteban told the court that the accused
voluntarily led them to the place where he pawned and sold the jewelry so that the jewelry could People vs. Del Rosario
be recovered. The court a quo did not hand down a conviction based on circumstantial evidence.
_______________ The accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police and admitted his guilt by way of
the waiver/confession he had signed. Circumstantial evidence had no place in this case.
 Exhibit “B”; Orig. Records, p. 248.
13
Accused-appellant relied on alibi as a defense to belie the accusation against him. However,
 People vs. Olivares, Jr., 299 SCRA 635 (1998).
14
nobody was presented to corroborate his statements as to his whereabouts on the day when the
 Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 518(1998).
robbery, homicide, and arson took place, not even Rancen Anonat who was his companion on that
15

 People vs. Sabban, 260 SCRA 630 (1996).

16

178 day and who was with him when the crimes occurred. Already a weak defense, alibi becomes even
weaker by reason of the failure of the defense to present any corroboration. 22

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the absence of showing that the factual findings of the trial judge were reached arbitrarily
People vs. Del Rosario or without sufficient basis, these findings are to be received with respect by, and indeed are
If he was not the culprit, how did he come to know where to lead the policemen in order to retrieve binding on, the Supreme Court. 23

the jewelry of Emelita Paragua? In every case, courts must specify the award for each item of damages and make a finding
Where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, his thereon in the body of the decision.  Prevailing jurisprudence awards only P50,000.00 to the heirs
24

positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath deserve full faith and of the victim without need of any evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. The
credence. 17 trial court therefore erred in awarding P100,000.00 as indemnity.
We find it incredible that he was mauled to force him to sign his confession, let alone mauled. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the conviction of appellant is
Accused-appellant admitted knowing Fernando Morales of the Subic police station. His AFFIRMED, with the modification that the P100,000.00 awarded as indemnity is reduced to
relationship with the said police officer would make other police officers be wary of him. They P50,000.00 pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence.
could not have dared maul him as Del Rosario would have sent word to Morales as to the fate he SO ORDERED.
had suffered in the hands of the Olongapo police.       Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ, concur.
The Olongapo police would have had a hands-off policy with regard to the accused-appellant, Judgment affirmed with modification.
as they would not have wanted any of their friends or relatives to be mauled by the Subic police if _______________
they ever get arrested there. Quid pro quo.
In addition, bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions  People vs. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602 (1998).
22

 People vs. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316 (1998).

23

from the accused are not sufficient in view of the standing rule enunciated in cases of  People vs.  People vs. Laceste, 293 SCRA 397 (1998).
24

Mada-I Santalani, People vs. Balane;  and People vs. Villanueva,  “that where the defendants did
18 19 20
180
not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to People vs. Galeno
be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a Note.—Confession extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court
reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these were considered by this Court as factors of law. (People vs. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 [1999])
indicating voluntariness.” 21

_______________ ——o0o——
17
 People vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353 (1998).
18
 93 SCRA 317 (1979). © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
19
 123 SCRA 614 (1983).
20
 128 SCRA 488 (1984).
21
 People vs. Damaso, 190 SCRA 595 (1990).
Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore,
VOL. 198, JUNE 3, 1991 129 a bailable offenseunder Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
People vs. Teodosio Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion; When a
matter of right and a matter of discretion.––Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable
People vs. Donato
by reclusion perpetuabail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
G.R. No. 79269. June 5, 1991. * The court’s discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended.––The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly
alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Rebellion; Bail; Rebellion is a bailable offense under Section 13
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.––We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the
bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right, such is required only where the grant of bail is
private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal
discretionary.––Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail
in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
_____________
 EN BANC.
*
131
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 131
People vs. Donato
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;  The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in
Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court;
Guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond.––We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent
court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines
for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters
left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
“Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other case. x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent has unequivocably waived his right to bail.––
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;  Definition of waiver.––Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No.
6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of
general circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty
for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads: “Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup
d’etat.––Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or
insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.”
133
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 133
People vs. Donato
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XII. Donato, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for petitioner.
     Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/ preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias “Commander
Bilog” in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion,  and the subsequent Order dated July 30,
1

surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;  What rights and privileges may be waived.––As to what rights and
privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: “x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges
of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a
person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the
owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
132
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner’s supplemental motion for reconsideration of
July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer
for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information  filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the
2

32 Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information  which was filed on 24 3

People vs. Donato October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias “Commander Bilog”, and his co-accused
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by were charged for the crime of
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not ______________
infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by
law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,  Entitled People of the Philippines versus Rodolfo C. Salas, alias Commander Bilog, Josefina Cruz, alias Mrs. Mercado,
1

and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual and Jose Concepcion, alias Eugene Zamora.
in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and  Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 25-27.
2

 Annex “C” of Petition; Id., 28-31.

without detriment to the community at large. x x x Although the general rule is that any right or privilege
3

conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is
not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that all
personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that
constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional
rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;  Same; Rights to bail is another of the constitutional rights which
can be waived.––We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Same; Same; Same; Under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision
mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.––It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly
committed as follows:
“That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until the present time, in
the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm,
the New People’s Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other subordinate
organizations and fronts, have, under the direction and control of said organizations’ leaders, among whom are
the aforenamed accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the country against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the
seat of which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to that government and its laws, the
country’s territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the aforenamed
organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged
themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence,
and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as x x x.”
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave.,
Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his capture. 4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas
corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court which, as 5
_____________
 Petition, 7; Rollo, 7; p. 4 of Order of 6 March 1987 of respondent Judge, Annex “F” of Petition; Rollo, 47.
4
 G.R. No. 76009 entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
5
Concepcion, petitioners, versus Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., respondents.
135
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991
People vs. Donato
shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the
basis of the agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent “will remain in legal
custody and will face trial before the court having custody over his person” and the warrants for
the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986, private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished,  to which petitioner filed
6
an Opposition citing, among other grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion
7 economic, guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action.
dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx
“Par. 2(b)––Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.” In his Order of March 6, 1987,  respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
8
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a
petition for bail, which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987  on the
9 10
ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion, the accused is
no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
______________
 Annex “D” of Petition; Rollo, 32-36.
6
 Annex “E” of Petition; Id., 37-45.
7
 Annex “F” of Petition; Id., 44-50.
8
 Annex “G” of Petition; Id., 51-53.
9 imposable for the offense and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private
 Annex “H” of Petition; Rollo, 54-56.
10
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as
it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion,  prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol.
83, No. 24) which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987  respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No.
11
187, granted private respondent’s petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed
upon private respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two
(2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting the petition
respondent Judge stated:
“x x x There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the offense of rebellion,
for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a
matter of right in non-capital offenses before final judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3,
Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the present circumstances
in this case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of
rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.”
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private
respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal
is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his
release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the
goverment before whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge
135
replied:
___________
 Annex “J” of Petition; Id., 64-70.
11
137
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 137
People vs. Donato
“True, there now appears a clash between the accused’s constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense,
which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the prosecution, ‘the existence of the
government that bestows the right, the paramount interest of the state.’ Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights,
one of which is the right to bail, is a ‘declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and
Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of certain inherent
and inalienable rights of the individual, which the government is prohibited from violating’ (Quisumbing-
Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now
pictured by the prosecution, the same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law,
is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is
that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and the wherewithals to fight those ‘who oppose,
threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political institutions.’ The
prosecution’s fear may or may not be founded that the accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades
in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear
can not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an
accused is entitled as a matter of right to bail. Dura est lex sed lex.”
In a motion to reconsider  the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to
12
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice
Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the provisional release of an accused should be in
an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty
respondent “had in the past escaped from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for
which he is charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the
commission, the perpetrator has achieved his end” and that “the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organ-
_____________
 Annex “K” of Petition; Rollo, 71-74.
12
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Donato
ized plan to overthrow the government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system
based on a foreign ideology is attained.”
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration  indirectly asking
13
the court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the “inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main
condition of his bail to appear in court for trial,” a conclusion it claims to be buttressed “by the
___
following facts which are widely known by the People of the Philippines and which this
Honorable Court may have judicial notice of:
1. 1.The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested;
2. 2.He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. 3.He was using the false name “Manuel Mercado Castro” at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver’s License to substantiate his false identity;
4. 4.The address he gave “Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,” turned out to be also a false address;
5. 5.He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. 6.Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982, a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest,”
which “clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court
for trial, if released.” Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his
followers, are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens
the existence of this very Court from which he now seeks provisional release,” and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original
penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the
____________
 Annex “L” of Petition; Id., 75-79.
13
139
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 139
People vs. Donato
State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former prevails for “the right of the State of
self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution.” Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United States of America holding
“that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings,  and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he presents
14
a risk of flight;  and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious felonies
15
who are found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the
community which no condition of release can dispel.” 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order  adverted to in the introductory
17
portion of this decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the ‘supplemental’ motion for
reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first motion for reconsideration to be
meritorious only insofar as the amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987
only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and
with the additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every two (2) months
within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al.,  L-31665, August 6,
1975, 66 SCRA 58).”
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the
“sudden turn-about” on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of
______________
 Carlson vs. Landon, 342 U.S. 524; 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing vs. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1986).
14
 Bell vs. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 534.
15
 U.S. vs. Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro, No. 86-87, May 26, 1987, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
16
Second Circuit Court.
 Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 18-24.
17
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of
25 May 1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the cases involved
deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on
the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail;
and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of Nava, et al. vs.
Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11,
1951, 90 Phil. 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the
following issues:
“THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO
SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.”
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to
bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to “remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody of his person” in consideration of the recall of the
warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail,
even in non-capital offenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is
a serious threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to
present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its
prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so
since during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it
141
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 141
People vs. Donato
never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if release
on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally
P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of private respondents’ criminal
background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987  We required the respondents to comment on the petition
19
and issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,  private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of
20
the petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM  Id., 163.
28

ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM  Id., 196-206.
29

RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 143

VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 143

II
People vs. Donato
break; in determining bail, the primary consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL. the trial of the case against him, which would be frustrated by the “almost certainty that
respondent Salas will jump bail of whatever amount”; and application of the guidelines provided
III
for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates
denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right of the
petitioner to hearing on the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied by
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION
PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION. respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
IV I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for
EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETI- which the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency
_____________ of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which
the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was
 Petition, 11-15.
18

restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the
 Rollo, 84.
19

 Id., 89-119.
20
petition for bail.
142 We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he
is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.  It is, 30

People vs. Donato therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED. provides thus:
“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
V guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
___________
ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS’ RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.
 Article 135, Revised Penal Code.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent.  The reply was filed on
30

21

144
18 September 1987. 22

In Our resolution of 15 October 1987  We gave due course to the petition and required the
23
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
parties to file simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice. People vs. Donato
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November  and 23 November
24

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:

1987  petitioner and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that
25

the petition and reply be considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our resolutions of 19 November
1987  and 1 December 1987,  respectively.
26 27
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand
on the issues raised in this petition,  which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May
28
“Bail, a matter of right: exception.––All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as
a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong.”
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.  To that 31

1990  wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
29 extent the right is absolute. 32

Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the
respondent had waived the right to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting fact that the accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the
bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life
______________ imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal
from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny bail to the accused
21
 Resolution of 3 September 1987; Rollo, 122. because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed
22
 Id., 126-135. from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:
23
 Id., 136.
24
 Rollo, 137. “x x x Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like
25
 Id., 139-141. ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the
26
 Id., 138-A. preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
27
 Id., 142. guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our
Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21)
of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.”
_____________
 See Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210, 213; People vs. Alano, 81 Phil. 19, 21.
31
 Montano vs. Ocampo, L-6352, Resolution of 29 January 1953, 49 O.G. 1855, cited in the dissenting opinion of then
32
Justice Teehankee in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 472 (1953).
145
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 145
People vs. Donato
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the
Court’s ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
“The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the
right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective.
If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and
detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the
field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.”
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court’s discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.  But once it is determined that the
33
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, supra., We held:
“The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the Constitution of
the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
‘The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many states provide that all persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such
provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the exceptions.
Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great!”
34
_____________
 Herras-Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 770.
33
 Citing 6 C.J., sec. 168, pp. 953, 954; Italics supplied for emphasis.
34
146
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in
the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing
of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters
left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA,
489, 495:
“Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other case x x x.”
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial
thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved
on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of general
circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:
____________
 People vs. Sandiego, 26 SCRA 522.
35
147
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 147
People vs. Donato
“Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat.–– Any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
“Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.”
xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to
its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5
of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.” 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No.
76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal
Case No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent,
and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz,
Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig.
Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that
the petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to
produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-accused before the Court and explain
by what authority they arrested and detained them. The following proceedings took place
thereafter in said case:
1. 1.In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required
respondents to make a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13
October and set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o’clock in the
morning.
___________
 Article 22, Revised Penal Code.
36
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
1. 2.On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Return To The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and
Josefina Cruz alias “Mrs. Mercado”, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias “Eugene
Zamora” were apprehended by the military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at
the Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Manila, being leaders or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People’s Army and National
Democratic Front, organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Government
 through violent means, and having actually committed acts of rebellion under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest they were forthwith
charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their arrest were
issued and respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of arrest and
the pendency of the criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that,
contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was not a member
of the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the Government; neither is he
and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any safe conduct pass issued by
competent authorities.
2. 3.At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain
agreements reached between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:
“When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners
with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor
General Ordoñez arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in conformity with the
agreement reached with the government, the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn with detainee
Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody,
149
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 149
People vs. Donato
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing statement made by
petitioners’ counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus,declaring that no objection will
be interposed to the immediate release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond
will be required of them, but they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that
they will not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the trial court provided that they manifest in
open Court their willingness to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when
their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners’ counsel today relative to the
compromise agreement that they have previously undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as member of the
Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have agreed to subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and required both parties to
SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00 o’clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on
official leave.”
4. At 3:49 o’clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation
and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S.
Villanueva, counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
“COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel, and to this Honorable
Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners’ counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be
preserved and human considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the fol-
150
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
lowing terms of agreement:
1. a.The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926],
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them under their personal
recognizance.
2. b.Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
3. c.The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation before the Supreme Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the Government to the
foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on October 14 and the
present manifestation in compliance with the resolution announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.”
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
“G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.
Gen. Ramon Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno]––Considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986 filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states
that they have entered into an agreement whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
151
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 151
People vs. Donato
immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et
al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila],
filed against them, on their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for the person of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of the formal manifestation before
this Court that they will submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person and in view of the
said agreement, the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for
habeas corpus but subject to the condition that petitioners’ lead counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as
member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on official
leave.”
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, “in agreeing to remain in legal custody even
during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to
bail.”  Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual
37
and legal basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the
arrest and the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion,
which was not resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but left open
for further determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was
neither raised by either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by
private respondent after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7
November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his
statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not only provisional but final and permanent
liberty. Finally, private respondent maintains that the term “legal custody” as used in the Joint
Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent agreed to con-
___________
 Petition, 8.
37
152
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Donato
tinue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted
as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
“ ‘Custody’ has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of a
person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the ‘care and possession of a thing or person.’ (Bouviers Law
Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)”
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the “constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying
for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.” 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
“b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his
person.”
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of
the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning
his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against
them; they agreed, however, “to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
persons.” Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction
between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas
and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was
precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should
remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private
respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be
remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the
terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and
Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against private
___________
 Comment, 6-8; Rollo, 94-96.
38
153
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 153
People vs. Donato
respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed
the agreement that herein petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or
confinement.
In defining bail as:
“x x x the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, x x x”
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for
the term “in custody of the law” than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.  It 39
presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private
respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
“Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.”
Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever
deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.” 41
____________
 Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38.
39
 Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., 51 SCRA 369.
40
 67 C.J. 291.
41
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Donato
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
“x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’
covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his
property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he
is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. x x x
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the
public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property
may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of
waiver.” 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,  it was held:
43
“Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as
well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of
personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.”
It is “competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to
action which would be
_____________
 92 C.J.S., 1066-1068; Italics supplied for emphasis.
42
 16 A. 2d 50, 57, 340 Pa. 33, cited in note 71 C.J.S., 1068.
43
155
VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 155
People vs. Donato
invalid if taken against his will.” 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures;  the right to counsel and to remain silent;  and the right
45 46
to be heard. 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
“x x x These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly
suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver
will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
 The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the SO ORDERED.
private respondent.      Fernan (C.J.) Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
Case No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander JJ., concur.
Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora,      Sarmiento, J., No part, I was a consultant of the legal defense panel before I joined the
for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Court.
___________ Orders nullified and set aside.
Note.––The abolition of the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution does not mean persons
 TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., pp. 31-32, citing Waxman vs. United States, 12
44
accused of any crime now have an absolute right to bail. (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489.)
Fed. 2nd, 775
 People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221; de Garcia vs. Locsin, et al., 65 Phil. 689.
45

 People vs. Royo, 114 SCRA 304; Morales vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538; People vs. Colana, 126 SCRA 23; People vs.
46
––––o0o––––
Galit, 135 SCRA 465; People vs. Sanchez, 132 SCRA 103 and People vs. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362.
 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525; People vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957.
47

156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Servando's Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 741
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115407. August 28, 1995. *
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Words and Phrases; Bail, Defined; As bail is intended to obtain or secure
one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.—Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines
bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its
main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure
his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be
posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or
voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a case, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free.”
Same; Same; The rationale for the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor.—The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor. Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., where the petitioner who
______________
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
attended the filing of the bail application, namely, that he was then confined in the hospital, for purposes of
the hearing thereof, he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law
and, necessarily, the jurisdiction of the trial court.—In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he
had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He
may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be considered as being constructively and
legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which
thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee or
merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified
by the so-called “house arrest” or, in the case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or
restricted to the military camp area. It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel,
emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could
not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and
the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a
finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him.
743
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 743

 SECOND DIVISION.
*

742

7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

42
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and
shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial,
the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
Same; Same; Instances where a person is considered to be in custody of the law.—On the other hand, a
person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of
arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
Same; Same; In the instant case, even as petitioner filed his motion for admission to bail before he was
actually and physically placed under arrest, he may, however, under the peculiar circumstances which

Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence;  The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused.—Section 13, Article III
of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In
pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from
the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the
outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Same; Same; Where bail is a matter of right, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court
having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to
specifically determine the conditions of the bail.—Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the
regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the
present exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general
rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter
of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114.
Same; Same; Where the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion, a hearing, mandatory in
nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the
participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, to ascertain whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.—On the other hand, as the grant
of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a
hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is
required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this
time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
744
7 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
44
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum.
Same; Same; Due Process; Procedure to be followed when the grant of bail is a matter of judicial
discretion.—Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court
may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. If the prosecution is
denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the
court’s order in respect of the motion or petition is void. At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. When,
eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these
represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law
requires.
Same; Same; Same; There is no irregularity that could be attributed to the trial court in regard to the
grant of bail to petitioner where it exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of
evidence on the part of the prosecution and the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the
evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude
that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.—No irregularity, in the context of procedural due
process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A
review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety
of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite
summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the
court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that,
since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
745
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 745
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
Same;  Same; Actions; Certiorari;  The indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed, one
hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, before the prosecution questioned through the special civil action
of certiorari the resolution and the omnibus order militates against the cause of the prosecution .—What
finally militates against the cause of the prosecution is the indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed
before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through
a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6) months, or
one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was
initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below
with the active participation of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The definitive rule now is that the special civil action for certiorari should
not be instituted beyond a period of three months.—At any rate, the definitive rule now is that the special civil
action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of three months, the same to be reckoned by
taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to
the institution of the proceeding to annul the same.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Concordio C. Diel,Guerrero A. Adaza, Juanito Dela Riarte, Gael Paderanga and Alfredo
J. Lagamon for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by
certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner’s right to be
admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple
746
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of Cagayan de Oro
City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which
petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the
Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,  had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused
1
suspects, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John
Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the
spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused,
Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from
prison. The others have remained at large up to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo (“Ely”) Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As herein
petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former’s services
as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, said
accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990,
implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. 3
 Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his
resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated
a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new
prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said
criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his
inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No.
_______________
 Venue was later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-
1
244; Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5.
 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5-6.
2
 Ibid., id., 6.
3 application for bail contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.
747
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
96080, entitled “Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello
III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan.” In an en banc decision
promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information
against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner’s apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner, through
counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the
same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office, and the private
prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the
application for bail. Four of petitioner’s counsel appeared in court but only Assistant Prosecutor
Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office appeared for the prosecution.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
“acute costochondritis,” his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person
of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing on his bail application, he be considered as being in the custody of the
law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the
directive of the chief of their office, Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution
was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the
same to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the
trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November
6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed
_____________
 Ibid., id., 7.
4
 Ibid., id., 22.
5
 Ibid., id., 23.
6 practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus
fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and, in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and
attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon, who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order
dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor
Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action for
certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner
annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner’s application for bail,
he was not yet “in the custody of the law,” apparently because he filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from
the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the
evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the
prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the
prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner’s
Petitioner argues that in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc.,
747 et al.,  his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred on the
9
latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of
the law. In petitioner’s words, the “invocation by the accused of the court’s jurisdiction by filing a
pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with
_____________
 Ibid., id., 23-25; Rollo, 9-11.
7
 Ibid., id., 26-30; Rollo, 7-9, 56-58.
8
 G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633.
9
749
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 749
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law.”
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong
5
evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of
the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose the application
for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot
legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the
special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an unjustifiable delay over an
unreasonable length of time. On the undisputed facts, the legal principles applicable and the
equities involved in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing
before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is
to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same
10
cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by
his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.  As this Court has put it in a case, “it would be
11
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.” 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with
the requirements therefor. 13
____________
 Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 38.
10
 Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., supra, Fn. 9.
11
 Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, etc., et al., L-35612-14, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 369, citing Feliciano
12
vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., L-14657, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 888.
 Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778.
13
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,  where the petitioner who had been charged with
14
kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed
a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the
Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or
otherwise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail
need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available
to “all persons” where the offense is bailable. This rule is, of course, subject to the condition or
15
limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.
16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities.  In this light, the ruling vis-a-vis the facts
17
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,  should be explained.
18
In said case, the petitioner, who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an “Urgent Ex-
parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond.” Said peti-
_____________
14
 Supra, Fn. 12.
15
 De la Camara vs. Enage, etc., L-32951-2, September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
16
 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, et al., 75 Phil. 634(1945); Manigbas, et al. vs. Luna, etc. et
al., 98 Phil. 466(1956); Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., supra.
17
 Dinapol vs. Baldado, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, August 5, 1993, 225 SCRA 110.
18
 Supra, Fn. 9.
751
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 751
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
tioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she
sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave “that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of
the required trial and other proceedings.” On the basis of said ex parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtained in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash
bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her
physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she questioned the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that “she
has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not
validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.” In rejecting her
arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for bail, she had
earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail bond which was
accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her person.
Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the basic rule is that the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities
either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at
that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be considered as being constructively and legally
under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have
voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of
the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by an
actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person
752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
making the arrest.  The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called “house arrest” or, in the
19
case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally
appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute
costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution
and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of
petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would
have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities,
since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away,
by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted
to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and
legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court; secondly,
by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally
recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to
evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he
was charged in court, up to the submission of his application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account
of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a
manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the
______________
 Section 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court.
19
753
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 753
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
authority of the trial court, petitioner’s counsel readily informed the court that they were
surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter.  In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the
20
purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for being derogatory of
the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no
intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the
application therefor be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail
as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature  and 21
which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the
presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due
established beyond reasonable doubt. 22
process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal Prosecutor’s Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick F.
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the
thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense case and who received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing had been
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment  and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under
23
conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all
said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to
_____________ submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the
prosecution was not afforded “reasonable time” to oppose that application for bail.
 Rollo, 101-102.
20
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as
 People vs. Donato, etc., et al., G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991, 198 SCRA 130.
the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39
21

 De la Camara vs. Enage, etc., supra, Fn. 15.

22

 Sec. 7, Rule 114, as amended; see also Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226
23 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent
SCRA 206. through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional State
754 Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-Tan questioned
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo
the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a to enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case.  It was in 32

hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor
(now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as
discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature _______________
and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,  is required with the
24

participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to  People vs. Casingal, et al., G.R. No. 87173, March 29, 1995.
30

ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the  Baylon, etc. vs. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995.
31

applicant.  Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
25
 Rollo, 69, 106, 115-116; Annex “A,” Petitioners Reply.
32

756
required quantum. 26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be given an 756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due
collaborating prosecutors in the previous hearings in said case.  Hence, on the strength of said
33

process.  If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due
authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor’s
27

process, as a consequence of which the court’s order in respect of the motion or petition is
Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on
void.  At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
November 5, 1992.
28

prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.  When, eventually, the court issues an
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with
29

order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the
the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or
Prosecutor’s Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the
motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor
______________ Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously,
 Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106087, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397; Aurillo, Jr.
24
what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving the
vs. Francisco, etc., et al., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283. presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or
 Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., supra, Fn. 23.
25
not that was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in
 Section 8, Rule 114, as amended.
26
the affirmative.
 People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al., G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA
27
The following exchanges bear this out:
489; Lardizabal vs. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640.
“PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
 People vs. San Diego, etc., et al., L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 523; Carpio, etc.,
28

et al. vs. Maglalang, etc., et. al., G.R. No. 78162, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 41.       I was informed to appear in this case just now, Your Honor.
 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946); Beltran vs. Diaz, et al., 77 Phil. 484 (1946).
29
COURT:
755
  Where is your Chief of Office? Your Office received a copy of the motion as early as October
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 755
28. There is an element of urgency here.
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
not the evidence of guilt is strong.  The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of
30
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are   I am not aware of that, Your Honor. I was only informed just now. The one assigned here is
insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31

State Prosecutor Perseverando Arana, Jr. who unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his
  Ibid., 75-77.
34

sick son. I do not know about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief to  Supra, Fn. 16.
35

758
relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to admit bail. That office is
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
neither supporting nor opposing it and we are submitting to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court. Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the
COURT: interest of justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as to the nature of his evidence to
  Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter  Re: First
______________ Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department
of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison,  the 36

 Ibid., 105.
33
Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to
37

757
the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and
VOL. 247, 757 from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the
AUGUST 28, bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the
1995 trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of
March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in
      Abejo, would you like to formally enter your appearance in this matter? its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the
requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting
  Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office
through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.
represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever
COURT: committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence
  By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in effect, at least, within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional State
the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of evidence to show that the Prosecutor’s Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same day that it
was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the
guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .
hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: _____________

  I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

 Supra, Fn. 31.
36

COURT:  A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995.

37

759
  Final inquiry. Is the prosecution willing to submit the incident covered by this
VOL. 247, AUGUST 28, 1995 759
particular motion for resolution by this court?
Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
one (1) week to muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in
  Yes, Your Honor. opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than
COURT: reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on
November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State
  Without presenting any further evidence? Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: 4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecution is the indubitably unreasonable
period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the
  Yes, Your Honor.”
omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General
34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State
submits that the delay of more than six (6)months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be
Prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this should be so
exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the
notwithstanding the statement that they were “neither supporting nor opposing” the motion. What
criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the
is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was “submitting (the motion) to the
respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the
sound discretion of the Honorable Court.” By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution
active participation of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the
was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and
definitive rule now is that the special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a
stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had
period of three months,  the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that
fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the prosecution.
38

had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,  it was stressed that where the trial court has
35

to annul the same.

reasons to believe that the
39

_______________
 ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well
as said respondent court’s
______________

 Caramol vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102973, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 582,
38

citing Philec Worker’s Union vs. Young, G.R. No. 101734, January 22, 1992, Minute Resolution, First Division; Catalina
Bermejo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102713, January 20, 1992, Minute Resolution, First
Division.
 Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 106090, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 460.
39

760

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trial
Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside, resolution and omnibus order of the court a quo reinstated.
Notes.—Estoppel does not lie against the government more so if the previous acts are
erroneous, let alone irregular. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, 231
SCRA 202 [1994])
Due process demands that the identification procedure of criminal suspects must be free from
impermissible suggestions. (People vs. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 [1995])

——o0o——

761
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.