G.R. No. 161434.
 March 3, 2004.* Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX E. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.*
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004.*
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
Election Law;  Disqualification Cases;  Jurisdiction;  Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s decision on a disqualification
case involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to, and could well be taken
cognizance of by, the Supreme Court.—Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
—“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself.
_______________
*
 EN BANC.
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Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the
same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law which power “includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the
land.
Same; Same;  Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal;  The omission in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not (being) justiciable”
controversies and disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice President; The statutory set-up under Republic Act No. 1793 would now be
deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution.—Petitioners
Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision
cited reads: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.” The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution.
The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare,
in Lopez vs. Roxas, as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes involving contests on
the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The constitutional
lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, “An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although
the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of govern-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
ment under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto;  Words and
Phrases;  Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election
scenario; Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office.—Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a
postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court defined
by Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly brought before it
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. —The rules
categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of
“candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held.
 Citizenship; Words and Phrases;  Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a
man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.—Perhaps, the
earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in
the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
significance if only to determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence. The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations,
on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to
submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
Same; Same;  The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries, from
simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political citizenship, social
citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.—The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to  civil citizenship, which
established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal
liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. The
20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village,
might well be the internationalization of citizenship.
Same; Same;  There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime
but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”—There was no such term as “Philippine citizens”
during the Spanish regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” In church records, the
natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago.
Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of
Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.
Same; Same;  Treaty of Paris;  Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
—The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her
sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle
of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress—
x x x Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress
on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
Same;  Same; Philippine Bill of 1902;  The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States in the Philippines.—The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first
time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
Philippines—“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight.” Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant
who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.
Same;  Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines
from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise
known as the principle of territoriality, governed.—Controversy arose on to the status of
children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no
citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time,
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282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.
Same;  Philippine Bill of 1902;  Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act);  Words and
Phrases;  With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens”
had for the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The
Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines
was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, (3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.—With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of
“Philippine citizens” had for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General inthe Philippines when he initially made mention of it in
his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known
as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended
by the Act of Congress in 1912—x x x Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
date, not a citizen of some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution;  The 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.—While there was, at one
brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the
1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and
for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Same; Same;  1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women
automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign husbands,
resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiring such children to
still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, as well as fully cognizant of the
newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution
crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns. —
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provi-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
sions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns—x x x The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death
Certificates;  Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of Fernando Poe, Jr.,
constitute prima facie proof of their contents.—Being public documents, the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate
of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides: “Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The trustworthiness of
public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the
sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually
affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such
errors as might have occurred.
Same;  Parent and Child; Paternity;  Filiation;  Acknowledgment; Under the Civil Code of
Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30 August 1950 when the
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity.—Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment
was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary to the new
code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—“In case
of an illegiti-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
mate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible
to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the
child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.” In order that
the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of
such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;  The 1950 Civil
Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary,
legal or compulsory; Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of
the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.—The 1950
Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation.
Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might
pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child; There is
little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would
also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State; Civil law has been
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance,
authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of
society for the protection of private interests.—It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships
within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil
Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly—Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization
of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of
private interests.”
Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.—The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that—“Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad”—that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights and
family relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his
adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law and not his political status.
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy;  The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should remain only in
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law—the
proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining a child’s citizenship should be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.—Civil
law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and
successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate
and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance
of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount. These distinctions between
legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own
Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law
and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law. The proof of filiation or
paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions
on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Same;  Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree;  Requisites.—Section 39,
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word ‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.” For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must
be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before
the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same;  Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to.—In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.
In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
—“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
or a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage.
Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the ap-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
propriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.”
Same;  Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded an
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the
child; Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”—Where
jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did
so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an
alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant
consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day,
month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing
neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
Same; Same;  Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.—
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the “en masseFilipinization” that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
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Same; Election Law;  Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy;  While the totality of the
evidence may not establish conclusively that Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.—
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Election Contests; Presidential Electoral Tribunal;  The actions
contemplated in Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular
election contests and quo warranto.—Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground
that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said
provision of the Constitution are postelection remedies, namely, regular election contests
and quo warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election remedies, such
as those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69
(Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, which are implemented in
Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-election remedies or
actions do not, however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
Citizenship;  For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a
Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to
follow the citizenship of his putative father.—Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe
was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively
conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate
child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is
enough for the child to
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follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of
the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen,
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads: Section
1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Election Contests;  Presidential Electoral Tribunal;Words and Phrases; The
word “contest” in Art. VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution means that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice
President—there can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed.—The Court is unanimous
on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners
cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides: The Supreme
Court, sitting en bancshall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The word “contest” in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be
invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no
“contest” before a winner is proclaimed.
Same;  Certiorari; The Supreme Court can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision
on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.—We start with the
elementary proposition that the certiorari power of this Court to review decisions of the
COMELEC is a limited one. This Court can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on the
ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion has a
well defined meaning in our jurisprudence. It means despotic, arbitrary or capricious. A
decision supported by substantial evidence is not despotic, arbitrary or capricious. Neither is a
decision interpreting a novel or difficult question of law with logical reasons. A mere
disagreement with COMELEC on the weight it gave to certain evidence or on its interpretation
of some difficult provisions of law is no basis to strike down the COMELEC decision as despotic,
arbitrary or whimsical. More so when the case involves election law where the expertise of
COMELEC ought to be conceded.
Same;  Disqualification Cases;  Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; In order that a
certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled on the ground of material
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and
willful.—To stress
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again, the petition of Fornier was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due
course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Poe on the ground of material
misrepresentation under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Allegedly, respondent Poe misrepresented
himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC we held that the
misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and willfull. Petitioner,
therefore, has the burden to prove by substantial evidence the following facts: (1) that
respondent Poe made a misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy; (2) that the
misrepresentation is material to the position of which he is a candidate; and (3) that the
material misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully.
Same; Same;  Same; Administrative Law;  Evidence;  The COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body
and hence is not bound by the technical rules of evidence—it can accept evidence which cannot
be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules of court on evidence are strictly observed.
—These sworn statements were submitted to the COMELEC en banc by the respondent Poe.
Instead of traversing them, petitioner merely contended that they should not be considered on
the technical grounds that they were not formally offered in evidence before the COMELEC and
that they cannot be the subject of judicial notice. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the
COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and hence is not bound by the technical rules of evidence. It
can accept evidence which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules of court
on evidence are strictly observed. It can accord weight to such evidence depending on its
trustworthiness. In any event, petitioner cannot complain they are hearsay for he was given an
opportunity to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who executed the foregoing sworn
statements.
Same; Same;  Same; Burden of Proof; For failure of petitioner Fornier to discharge the
burden of proof, respondent Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the petition—Poe need
not present any contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to him. —These are all
the evidence presented by the petitioner. Even a sweep eye contact both with these evidence
will show that petitioner failed todischarge the burden of provingthat respondent Poe is not a
natural-born citizen. Petitioner was more dismal in trying to prove that respondent
Poe willfullyand deliberatelymisrepresented himself as a natural-born citizen. For one, the
Manapat evidence appears to have been manufactured evidence. For another, these and the
other evidence are irrelevant evidence and there is no proof that they ever crossed the
attention of respondent Poe. On the other hand, the evidence unerringly show that respondent
Poe, from the time of his involuntary birth here, has always conducted himself as a Filipino. He
is a registered voter, he owns land, he is married to a Filipina, he carries a Filipino passport—he
has always lived the life of a Filipino (Exhibits “16,” “17” to “19”). Thus, there is no iota of doubt
that petitioner miserably
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failed to discharge his burden of proving that respondent Poe deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen. For failure of petitioner to discharge the
burden of proof, respondent Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition.
Respondent Poe need not present any contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted
to him. Prescinding from these premises, this Court cannot hold that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that no substantial evidence was offered by petitioner
to disqualify respondent Poe.
Same;  Same; Same;  The Court must be above politics for in the temples of justice, we do
not follow any political god.—In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curiae, it is daylight
clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wrong with his facts but also wrong with his
law.Considering that petitioner is wrong both with his facts and the law, the Court has no
option but to dismiss the petition at bar which espouses nothing but errors. This Court will be
compounding the wrongs committed by petitioner Fornier with another wrong if it remands
the petition at bar to the COMELEC. A remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC
when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated. Remand means the petitioner will
be gifted with another chance to prove facts which he have failed to prove before.
Remand means the petitioner will be given the extra-ordinary privilege of correcting his
erroneous understanding of the law on who are natural-born Filipino citizens. These are favors
which cannot be extended to a litigant without shattering the Court’s stance of political
neutrality. The Court must be above politics for in the temples of justice, we do not follow any
political god.
Same;  Same; Same;  Election Contests;  Quo Warranto; Citizenship;The complex issue of
natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised in an appropriate
proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after election—the citizenship issue in a quo
warranto proceeding will be determined in full length proceedings.—The Fornier petition was
treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. The principal issue on a Section 78 petition is whether the
respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. In
the particular petition at bar, the issue is whether respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue of whether respondent Poe is in truth a
natural-born citizen is considered only because it is necessary to determine the deliberateness
and the willfulness of the material misrepresentation. The proceedings are summary in
character for the central issue to be resolved is the deliberateness of the material
misrepresentation, as the issue of natural-born citizenship is a mere incident. In fine, the
complex issue of natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised in
an appropriate proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after election. The
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citizenship issue in a quo warranto proceeding will be determined in full-length
proceedings.
Same;  Same; Same;  Separation of Powers; The Supreme Court cannot change the nature
of a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power.—The remand of the case to the
COMELEC will change the character of a Section 78 proceeding. The citizenship ofrespondent
Poe will no longer be inquired into as a mere incident necessary to determine whether
he deliberately made a material misrepresentation that he is a natural-born citizen. It will now
be determined as if it is the main issue in a Section 78 proceeding. This Court cannot change
the nature of a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power. It is Congress by law
that defined the nature of a Section 78 proceeding and it is only Congress that can change it by
another law. We cannot engage in judicial legislation.
Same;  Same; Same;  Remand of Cases;  Due Process;  The COMELEC is composed of seven
commissioners all of whom must be independent, and unbiased—the right to due process is the
right to be heard by seven unbiased COMELEC commissioners.—There is a more compelling
reason why the petition, at bar should not be remanded to the COMELEC for relitigation. The
COMELEC that will resolve the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino has
ceased to be an impartial tribunal. Three of its members, Commissioners Tuazon, Barcelona
and Garcellano, submitted separate Comments to this Court expressing the firm view that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born Filipino. Their views are contrary to the decision of the
COMELEC under review by this Court. It is improper enough for individual commissioners to
assail the decision of the COMELEC of which they are members. It is worse in the case of
Commissioners Barcelona and Garcellano, who are not even sitting commissioners when the
COMELEC promulgated its decision under review. This is plain and simple prejudgment and it is
not even disguised prejudgment that needs to be unmasked. The COMELEC is composed
of seven commissioners all of whom must be independent, and unbiased. The right to due
process of respondent Poe is the right to be heard by sevenunbiased COMELEC commissioners
—not 1, not 2, not 3, not 4, but by 7unbiased members. We do not have such a COMELEC.
Same; Equal Protection Clause;  The right to run for public office includes the right to
equal chance to compete—any failure to equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure the
defeat of the disfavored.—It cannot be gainsaid that any doubt on the qualification of
respondent Poe to run as President is prejudicial to his presidential bid and favorable to his
political opponents. The right to run for a public office includes the right to equal chance to
compete. The right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished or denied a candidate. This
chance to win may amount to a
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mere chimera if the disqualification of respondent Poe will be left hanging in the air for a
long time. It is the solemn duty of this Court to equalize the chances of winning of all
candidates to a public office. Any failure to equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure
the defeat of the disfavored.
Citizenship; Parent and Child; Paternity;  Filiation;  Jus Sanguinis Principle; Proof that
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is the father of Fernando Poe, Jr. is proof that the blood of Allan
F. Poe flows in the veins of FPJ—no other proof is required for the principle of jus sanguinis to
apply, no need for other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are only
used in civil law for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children.—We
follow the principle of jus sanguinis, the rule of blood relationship. Proof that Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino citizen, is the father of respondent Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in
the veins of respondent Poe. No other proof is required for the principle of  jus sanguinisto
apply. There is no need for other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are
only used in civil law for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children.
Our Constitutions from 1935 merely state—“those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.” The ineluctable conclusion is that the only proof required for the principle of jus
sanguinis to operate is filiation, i.e.,that one’s father is a citizen of the Philippines. No other
kind of proof is required. In fine, the quantity and quality of proof or the standard of proof is
provided by the Constitution itself. We cannot alter this standard by suggesting either a strict or
liberal approach.
Same; Same;  Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;  Convention on the Rights of
the Child; A milestone treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child abolished all
discriminations against children including discriminations on account of “birth or other
status.”—The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on November 20, 1989. The Philippines was the 31st state to ratify the
Convention in July 1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution 109. The Convention entered into force
on September 2, 1990. A milestone treaty, it abolished all discriminations against children
including discriminations on account of “birth or other status.” x x x The Convention protects in
the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political rights, civil rights, social rights,
economic rights and cultural rights. It adopted the principle of interdependence and
indivisibility of children’s rights. A violation of one right is considered a violation of the other
rights. It also embraced the rule that all actions of a State concerning the child should consider
the “best interests” of the child.
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Same;  Same; Same;  Same; International Law; Pacta Sunct Servanda; We shall be
violating the Convention on the Rights of the Child if we disqualify FPJ just because he happened
to be an illegitimate child—it is our bounden duty to comply with our treaty obligation pursuant
to the principle of pacta sunct servanda.—Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, this Convention on the Rights of the child became valid and effective on us in July
1990 upon concurrence by the Senate. We shall be violating the Convention if we disqualify
respondent Poe just because he happened to be an illegitimate child. It is our bounden duty to
comply with our treaty obligation pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; To disqualify FPJ due to his illegitimacy is against the trend in
civil law towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that of a legitimate child.
—Moreover to disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy is against the trend in civil law
towards equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that of a legitimate child. Called
originally as nullius filius or no one’s child, an illegitimate child started without any birthright of
significance. The passage of time, however, brought about the enlightenment that an
illegitimate should not be punished for the illicit liaison of his parents of which he played no
part. No less than our Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a Commissioner of the
Constitutional Commission, proposed the adoption of the following radical provision in the
1987 Constitution, viz.: “All children regardless of filiations shall enjoy thesame social
protection.”
Election Law; Political Questions; On political questions, the Supreme Court may err but
the sovereign people will not—to be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected
members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people.—Whether respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves a constitutional issue but its political
tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent
Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national and
international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the
better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the next President. For on
political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the
Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of
the people.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law;  Suffrage; Judicial Review; Political Questions;  While the campaign for the
Presidency is on, the Supreme Court may not exercise its “judicial power” to disqualify a
candidate.—I submit that while the
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 campaign for the Presidency is on, this Court may not exercise its “judicial power” to
disqualify a candidate. That would definitely wreck the constitutional right of the people to
choose their candidate. Only after the election is over and a winner is proclaimed and the result
of the election is contested, may this Court participate and decide the contest. How is the
President elected? Only by “direct vote of the people.” He shall not be chosen by the
incumbent President. He shall not be elected by Congress nor by the Commission on Elections.
And neither by this Court. Only by “direct vote of the people.”
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The Constitution does not allow the intervention of the
Supreme Court to intrude into the right of the voters to elect by “direct vote” the President by
removing Fernando Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote for President, thereby
constricting or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently, the right of the people to vote (or
not to vote) for FPJ.—Petitioner Fornier would have this Court, in the exercise of its “judicial
power,” intrude into the right of the voters to elect by “direct vote” the President by removing
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. from among those whom they may vote for President, thereby
constricting or limiting the “candidates,” and consequently, the right of the people to vote (or
not to vote) for respondent Poe. The Constitution does not allow such intervention. Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC,said, “In my view, the issue in this case is whether the Commission on
Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the
office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of
candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for  quo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum.” The assailed ruling of the COMELEC
dismissing Fornier’s petition is consistent with the above view.
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse, in the
right of the people to choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested right to elect by
“direct vote” the President.—What is at stake is not just the candidacy of respondent Poe or the
right of the “masses” to vote for him. Equally at stake is the credibility of this Court. It should
not enter the “political thicket.” Intrusion into a campaign for President, and worse, in the right
of the people to choose their candidate, is an intrusion into their vested right to elect by “direct
vote” the President.
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The right to choose is the single factor that controls the
ambitions of those who would impose—through force or stealth—their will on the majority of
citizens.—Let it not be forgotten that the historic core of our democratic system is political
liberty, which is the right and opportunity to choose those who will lead the governed with their
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
consent. This right to choose cannot be subtly interfered with through the elimination of
the electoral choice. The present bid to disqualify respondent Poe from the presidential race is
a clear attempt to eliminate him as one of the choices. This Court should resist such
attempt. The right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those who would
impose—through force or stealth—their will on the majority of citizens. We should not only
welcome electoral competition, we should cherish it. Disqualifying a candidate, particularly the
popular one, on the basis of doubtful claims does not result to a genuine, free and fair
election. It results to violence. In some countries, incumbents have manipulated every resource
at their disposal to eliminate electoral choice. The result is a frustrated and angry public; a
public that has no place to express this anger because the electoral system is rigged to
guarantee the re-election of the incumbents in office. We have seen Edsa I and Edsa II, thus, we
know that when democracy operates as intended, an aroused public can replace those who
govern in a manner beyond the parameters established by public consent.
Same;  The Supreme Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the
right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election.—This Court, as the last guardian of
democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election.
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that “ every
citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . .to vote and be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”There can be no genuine, free and
fair election when the people’s right to choose, is manipulated or eliminated. Political liberty
cannot be subverted to the personal ambitions of some politicians. This Court should take an
active stance in crushing the devious ploy, for in the last analysis, its handling of the electoral
issues is the fundamental measure of the present government’s credibility.
Same;  Disqualification Cases;  Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; Burden of
Proof; He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove—petitioner has the burden of
establishing his allegations of respondent’s material misrepresentation in his Certificate of
Candidacy.—It bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of establishing his allegations of
respondent’s material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. Ei incumbit probation
qui dicit, non que negat, otherwise stated, “he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove.”What I observe from his allegations is a misconception as to whom the burden of proof
lies.
Same;  Statutory Construction; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;The ascertainment of
the meaning of the provision of the Constitution begins with the language of the document
itself, the words to be understood, as much as possible, in the sense they have in common use
and given their
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ordinary meaning—the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially
that of the people; As Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between a
legitimate child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction.—
The ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of the Constitution begins with the language
of the document itself. The words of the Constitution should as much as possible be
understood in the sense they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning. The
reason for this is because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially
that of the people, in whose consciousness is should even be present as an important condition
for the rule of law to prevail. Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution is very clear. As the
provision does not distinguish between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father, we should not make a distinction.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; The conduct of an election necessarily
includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for public
office in an election.—The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all
candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and
function to “[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.” The initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with
the Comelec clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec.
The conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified
under existing laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list
of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections
unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of
candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.
Same; Same;  Same; The power to decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily
includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law
for election to public office.—Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the
Comelec to “[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x
x x.” The power to decide “all questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the power to
decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public
office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely
to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal, remedy. If
one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for
President, the Comelec is
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certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is
no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Same; Same;  The Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the
coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine
citizen.—However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual
bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue presented
—whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed the First
Division ruling that “[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally declare whether or not the
respondent is a natural-born citizen.” In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for
President to run in the coming elections without being convinced that the candidate is a
natural-born Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Under Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65.
Same; Same;  Presidential Electoral Tribunal;  To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction
to determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after the elections would lead to
an absurd situation—the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine
citizen must be decided before the election.—To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to
determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after the elections would lead to
an absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day
before he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately after
the election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as President before he is
finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says when it provides that “[N]o
person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines .” The clear
and specific language of the Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born
citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born Philippine citizen
must be decided before the election.
Citizenship; Natural-Born Citizens;  A person’s citizenship at the time of his birth depends
on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth—any subsequent legislation
cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would
violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen
from birth.—Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his
birth depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth. FPJ’s citizenship
at the time of his birth in 1939,
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applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine
citizen. Natural-born Philippine citizens are “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.”  If a person
has to perform an act, such as proving in an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event
subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such person is
not a natural born citizen. The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in
1939, are the governing laws that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine
citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship
at birth of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional
definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one
who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent legislation a
natural-born citizen.
Same;  Parent and Child; Legitimate and Illegitimate
Children;  Acknowledgment; Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be
given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural-born
citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.—If the Filipino father acknowledges the child
after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time of the acknowledgment. In this case,
the child does not possess all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act
—the acknowledgement of the Filipino father—is required for the child to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of acknowledgment cannot be
given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural-born
citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Same;  Same; Same;  If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption
that the child has the blood of any man who is supposed to be the father—there is only a
conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the mother.—If the illegitimacy of a child
is established, there is no presumption that the child has the blood of any man who is supposed
to be the father. There is only a conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the
mother. If an illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be the
child’s father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as
required by law.
Same;  Same; Same;  Burden of Proof;  Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother
claims to follow the citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to
establish a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an
illegitimate child
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has the blood of the putative father; Citizenship, being a matter of public and State
interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere say so of
the putative Filipino father.—Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow
the citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood
relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an illegitimate child
has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity after the birth
of the illegitimate child, there must be an administrative or judicial approval that such blood
relation exists upon proof of paternity as required by law. Citizenship, being a matter of public
and State interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere
say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim
of paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien
mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For example, a Philippine
citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has several illegitimate children in China.
The State cannot be required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate
children born in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father
acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative
or judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
Same; Same;  Same; Natural-Born Citizens;  The rationale behind requiring that only
natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices is to ensure that the holders of these
high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines; The
constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy
if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later a natural-
born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his
paternity.—The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high
public offices is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up knowing they
were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they knew they owed from
birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other country claims their allegiance, they
would be faithful and. loyal to the Philippines of which they were citizens from birth. This is
particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The
President of the Philippines must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have
grown up knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition
of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth
recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later a natural-born Philippine citizen
just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity.
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Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Acknowledgment; An acknowledgment executed after birth
does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since
the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.—To
establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in a
record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of
his birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a
citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after
birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.
Same; Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person
because citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest. —
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because
citizenship is not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest. Even if
petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such
admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status of a natural-
born Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a
person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just because the private party litigants have
admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as
representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born
Philippine citizen.
Same;  Parent and Child;  Legitimation; Under Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code,
legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage—there was no retroactivity of the effects of
legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child.—Under Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code,
legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage. There was no retroactivity of the effects of
legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights
of a legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one year
earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects of
legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939. Besides, legitimation vests
only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child.
Same;  Same; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the
Convention on the Rights of the Child since he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he
was born half a century before the Convention came into existence.—The Philippines signed the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the same on 21 August
1990. The Convention defines a child to mean “every human being below the age of eighteen
years unless, under the law applicable to
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the child, majority is attained earlier.” Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention since
he is not a child as defined in the Convention, and he was born half a century before the
Convention came into existence. FPJ’s citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be
affected by the Convention which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
Same;  Same; Same;  Natural-Born Citizens; The Convention cannot amend the definition
in the Constitution of who are natural-born citizens.—The Convention has the status of a
municipal law and its ratification by the Philippines could not have amended the express
requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be
President. While the Constitution apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are
not, that is the explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the Executive
Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention
cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are “those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship.”
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at
birth, but merely “the right to acquire a nationality” in accordance with municipal law. —In any
event, the Convention guarantees a child “the right to acquire a nationality,” and requires
States Parties to “ensure the implementation” of this right, “in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.” Thus, as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the
Conventionguarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be
stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely “the
right to acquire a nationality” in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he
was apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth FPJ also had
the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in
accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly,
FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
 Same; Same;  Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;  The inexorable direction of the law,
both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination
between legitimate and illegitimate children.—Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to
abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable direction of the law, both international and
domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate
and illegitimate children. Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate children, we should not also distinguish, especially when private rights are not
involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng doc-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
trine upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning theChing
Leng doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights
of Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the
status of children, save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself like the
reservation of certain high public offices to natural-born citizens.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,Separate Opinion:
Election Law;  Disqualification Cases;  Prior to the proclamation of winners, questions on
the eligibility and qualifications of a candidate may be addressed to the COMELEC only if they
fall under Section 78 of the B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).—The Supreme Court, as a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and
exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” of the President and Vice-
President, Senators, and, Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized
that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate
has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest
or quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner. Prior to the proclamation of
winners, questions on the eligibility and qualifications of a candidate may be addressed to the
COMELEC only if they fall under Section 78 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code).
Same; Same;  Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy;  Burden of Proof; One who
alleges malice has the burden of proving the same.—The Certificate of Candidacy was executed
by respondent FPJ under oath. The law always presumes good faith. One who alleges malice
has the burden of proving the same. It is elementary that contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be based on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. To lay the burden of proof upon FPJ to
prove his citizenship simply because petitioner assails the Fame is anathema to the well-
recognized rule on the burden of proof. The burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is given on either side. In other words, petitioner should have
established by competent evidence before the COMELEC that the subject material
representation is false and that it must have been made by respondent FPJ deliberately to
deceive the electorate as to his eligibility for the position of President of the Philippines.
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Citizenship;  Parent and Child;  Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;Statutory
Construction;  The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision
itself; Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution does not provide for a qualification that the child
be a product of a legitimate union for the child to acquire the nationality of the Filipino father.
—The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The
presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. Otherwise stated, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids
of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission
or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed. Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not provide for a
qualification that the child be a product of a legitimate union for the child to acquire the
nationality of the Filipino father.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the
law does not distinguish, neither should we. There should be no distinction in the application of
the fundamental law where none is indicated. The drafters of the Constitution, in making no
qualification in the use of the general word “father” must have intended no distinction at law.
The Courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give
effect to the lawgiver’s intent.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Clearly, the framers of the 1935 Constitution simply provided
that when paternity is known or established, the child follows the father’s citizenship,
otherwise, the citizenship of the mother is followed.—Clearly, the framers of the 1935
Constitution simply provided that when paternity is known or established, the child follows the
father’s citizenship; otherwise, the citizenship of the mother is followed. If we concede that the
framers of the Constitution intended a qualification that the child be the product of a legitimate
union, such would lead to clear injustice, and a restricted interpretation, by creating a
distinction when the language of the law is clear and unambiguous.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.,Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law;  Election Contests;  Words and Phrases;  The subject matter of an electoral
contest is “the title or claim of title” to an office itself and not merely the qualifications or
absence of qualifications of a candidate for such office.—An “electoral contest” has been
defined as an adversarial proceeding “by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after the proclamation of the winner, is
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.” Thus, the subject
matter of such a contest is “the title or claim of title” to an elective office itself and not merely
the qualifications or absence of qualifications of a candidate for such office.
Same;  Same; Same;  Quo Warranto; Quo warranto literally means “by what authority”
and the object of a quo warranto proceeding is to determine the right of a person to the use or
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege; Actions falling under par. 7,
Sec. 4 of Art. VII of the Constitution may only be directed against the persons occupying or
having title to the position of President (or Vice President) and not against the candidates for
said electoral offices.—Quo warranto literally means “by what authority.” It has been defined
as an extraordinary legal remedy whereby a person or entity is challenged to show by what
authority he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. The object of a quo
warranto proceeding is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise
or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Hence, actions falling under paragraph 7, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution may only be directed against the persons occupying or having
title to the position of President (and Vice President)—i.e. the incumbent President (and Vice
President) or the President-elect (and Vice-President-elect)—and not against the candidates for
said electoral offices who do not, as such, hold or have any title thereto.
Same; Same;  Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; The
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is
clearly separate and distinct from the election contests contemplated in par. (2) of Sec. 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution.—The cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code is clearly separate and distinct from the election contests
contemplated in paragraph (2) of Section 2, Article IX-C. The former involves a measure to
enforce compliance with the statutory requirements for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
while the latter is an adversarial proceeding involving the title or claim of title to an elective
office. That there are grounds common to both does not detract from the fact that each has a
separate subject matter and purpose.
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned resolutions, first, by resolving to dismiss the petition for disqualification without
stating the factual bases therefor, and second, by resolving to dismiss the petition without
ruling categorically on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.—A careful review of the questioned
COMELEC Resolutions of January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 shows that the COMELEC did
indeed act with grave abuse of discre-
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tion in issuing them: first, by resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for
Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefor: and second, by resolving to dismiss
the Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  It was the duty of the COMELEC to determine, on the basis of
the evidence adduced, whether FPJ is in fact a “natural-born Filipino citizen.”—It is apparent
then that the COMELEC avoided ruling squarely, one way or the other, on the issue of FPJ’s
citizenship. Considering that Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a candidate
must state under oath that he is eligible for the office for which he is announcing his candidacy
and that Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution clearly provides that “[n]o person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,” it was the duty of the
COMELEC in the Petition for Disqualification to determine, on the basis of the evidence
adduced, whether FPJ is in fact a “natural-born Filipino citizen.” In resolving to dismiss the
Petition without performing this duty, the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  A false statement as to a qualification for elective office—in
this case, natural-born citizenship—is always material, and if the truth remains undisclosed, it
would definitely deceive the electorate as to a candidate’s qualifications for office.—The import
of this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II is clearly that Ermelita Cacao’s use of the surname “Salcedo,”
assuming it to be a misrepresentation, was not a “false material representation” in the context
of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code since it did not deceive the electorate as to either
her identity or her qualifications for the position of mayor. In contrast, a false statement as to a
qualification for elective office—in this case, natural-born citizenship—is always
material and, if the truth remains undisclosed, it would definitely deceive the electorate as to
a candidate’s qualifications for office. xxx xxx As applied to the present petitions, it is
the status of FPJ’s being a natural-born Filipino citizen, not the statement to that effect, which
is material since it is the status of being a natural-born Filipino which is decisivein determining
whether the Constitutional and statutory requirements have been fulfilled.
Citizenship;  Words and Phrases;  Derived from the Latin word “cives”, the term “citizen”
conveys the idea of connection or identification with the state or government and participation
in its function.—Citizenship is a political status denoting membership, more or less permanent
in character, in a political society and implying the duty of allegiance on the part of the member
and a duty of protection on the part of society. Thus, a citizen is one who, by birth,
naturalization, or otherwise, is a nember of a political community, and as such is subject to its
laws and entitled to its protection in all his rights incident to that relation. Derived from the
Latin word
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“cives”the term “citizen” conveys the idea of connection or identification with the state
or government and participation in its function. It denotes possession within that particular
political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications such as
minority.
Same;  In the Philippines, citizenship is essential not only for the exercise of political rights
and the right to hold public office, but for the exercise of a number of important economic
privileges which the Constitution reserves exclusively to Philippine citizens as well.—In the
Philippines, citizenship is essential not only for the exercise of political rights and the right to
hold public office, but for the exercise of a number of important economic privileges which the
Constitution reserves exclusively to Philippine citizens as well. A comparison of the 1935, 1973
and present 1987 Constitution shows that a number of economic privileges reserved
exclusively to Philippine citizens has increased over time. These “nationalist provisions” make
the question of citizenship of even greater importance and “deserving of the most serious
consideration.” Thus, it has been said that “[to] those who are citizens by birth it is a precious
heritage, while to those who acquire it thru naturalization it is a priceless acquisition.”
Same;  Treaty of Paris; Article IX of the Treaty of Paris contemplated two distinct classes
of persons—(a) the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and (b) Spanish subjects who
were natives of the Peninsula; The native inhabitants immediately became citizens of the
Philippine Islands with no option whatsoever to retain Spanish citizenship while natives of Spain
had to satisfy certain conditions to become citizens of the Philippine Islands.—From the
foregoing, it can be gathered that Article IX of the Treaty of Paris contemplated two distinct
classes of persons: (a) the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and (b) Spanish subjects
who were natives of the Peninsula. The native inhabitants immediately became citizens of the
Philippine Islands with no option whatsoever to retain Spanish citizenship. However, for the
natives of Spain to become citizens of the Philippine Islands, the following conditions had to be
met: (1) they had to be residents of the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899: (2) they had
to maintain actual residence therein for a period of 18 months or until October 11,
1900: (3) without their making an express declaration of intention to retain Spanish citizenship .
The absence of any of these requisites prevented them from becoming citizens of the
Philippine Islands.
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;  A textual examination of the relevant
provisions of the Constitution shows the same do not distinguish between legitimate or
illegitimate children—the civil law status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of Philippine citizenship.—After due consideration of the arguments, presented
by the parties and amici curiae, I agree with the view of FPJ and the amici curiaethat indeed a
textual examination of the relevant provisions of the Consti-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
tution shows the same do not distinguish between legitimate or illegitimate children. As
priorly observed, the Philippines has adopted the principle of jus sanguinis, orblood
relationship, as the rule in determining citizenship. Consequently, the civil law status of
legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of Philippine citizenship.
Same; Same;  Paternity; Presumptions; The practical fact of the matter is that, at the
point of conception and perhaps even until and beyond the point of birth, the identity of the
father remains a secret known only to God and hidden from men—the child’s father included;
Human biology is such that, as a scientific fact, the identity of the mother is immediately known
at birth, but that of the father is not, and to manage this uncertainty as well as preserve,
protect and promote the family as a social institution, the law steps in and creates certain
strong presumptions as to paternity.—The rationale for the rule that the citizenship of an
illegitimate child follows that of his or her mother appears to be two-fold: first, as an
illegitimate child, he or she does not have an identifiable father and, unless he is identified,
considered nullus filius or the child of no one; second, because the father is unknown, an
unacknowledged illegitimate child acquires no rights with respect to his father. Both reasons
appear to possess some practical value. Undoubtedly, citizenship is a political right which flows
not from legitimacy but from paternity. But, while it is impossible to argue with the statement
of Fr. Bernas that “paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized nine months before birth and
not upon marriage or legitimation,” the practical fact of the matter is that, at the point of
conception and perhaps even until and beyond the point of birth, the identity of the father
remains a secret known only to God and hidden from men—the child’s father included. Put
differently, the recognition that an illegitimate child may derive citizenship from his Filipino
father does not resolve all issues as to his citizenship. All the amici curiae agree that an
essential prerequisite is that the identity of the illegitimate child’s father should be firmly
established—he should be legally known. Human biology is such that, as a scientific fact, the
identity of the mother is immediately known at birth, but that of the father is not. To manage
this uncertainty as well as preserve, protect and promote the family as a social institution, the
law steps in and creates certain strong presumptions as to paternity.
Same; Natural Born Citizenship; The expansion of the requirement of natural-born
citizenship to other high public offices may prove prophetic in the context of the increasing
importance of global trade and the intensity of global economic competition.—That more high
ranking public officials are required to be natural-born Philippine citizens under the present
1987 Constitution than in previous Constitutions may be interpreted to be further measures
taken by the Constitutional Commissioners to ensure that the nationalist provisions of the
Constitution, political, social and economic, are carried out by men and women who are of
unquestionable
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
loyalty to the Philippines, whether in war or in peace. It may be further remarked that
this expansion of the requirement of natural-born citizenship to other high public offices may
prove prophetic in the context of the increasing importance of global trade and the intensity of
global economic competition.
Same;  Same; Treaty of Paris;  The claim that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands when on 10 December 1898, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the
Philippine Islands to the United States must be supported by a record of birth evidencing his
birth in the Philippine Islands, testimonial evidence to that effect, or some other competent
evidence of that fact.—Following the cases of In re Mallari andValles v. Commission on
Elections,the claim that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands when on
December 10, 1898, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States must be supported by a record of birth evidencing his birth in the Philippine
Islands, testimonial evidence to that effect, or some other competent evidence of that fact.
Moreover, the admission that Lorenzo Pou was a subject of Spain and not merely a native of
the Philippine Islands opens the possibility that he was a native of the Spanish Peninsula. If such
were the case, then he would have had to comply with the requirements prescribed in In Re:
Bosque, to become a citizen of the Philippine Islands. To reiterate, these requirements are: (1)
he should have been a resident of the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899; (2) he should have
maintained actual residence therein for a period of 18 months or until October 11, 1900; (3)
without their making an express declaration of intention to retain his Spanish citizenship.
Same;  Same; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Greater weight may be given to the
date and fact of FPJ’s birth as recorded in the Birth Certificate, but less weighty with respect to
the entries regarding his legitimacy or paternity.—In appreciating the evidentiary weight of
each document, it is observed that the Birth Certificate was prepared by the attending
physician who would have had personal knowledge of the fact and date of birth, but would
have had to rely on hearsay information given to him as regards the other entries including
legitimacy of FPJ. Hence, greater weight may be given to the date and fact of FPJ’s birth as
recorded in the Birth Certificate, but less weighty with respect to the entries regarding his
legitimacy or paternity. As for the marriage contract, since the two contracting parties, Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry, therein with respect to the date
of their marriage should be given greater weight.
Same;  Same; An illegitimate child of an alien mother who claims to be an offspring of a
Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the
latter at birth, thus leaving the
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illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship.—Following
the suggestion of Justice Mendoza, I am adopting the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-
mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born
citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with
nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship. Assuming arguendo, therefore, that
Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ, was indeed a Filipino citizen at the time of his birth, no
evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own
son at birth. In fact, as emphasized by petitioner Fornier, in the course of the proceedings
before the COMELEC, both parties verified that there was no such acknowledgment by Allan F.
Poe on the dorsal portion of FPJ’s Birth Certificate. Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and
was not acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth,
the inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
CALLEJO, SR., J.,Separate Opinion:
Election Law; Administrative Law;  Certiorari; The well-entrenched principle is that in the
absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion
rendered by the COMELEC on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to utmost
respect.—At the outset, it bears stressing that resort to a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as in the present recourse, is limited to the resolution of
jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal rendering the assailed decision,
order or resolution. Thus—There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ
of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Simply
stated then, the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the COMELEC committed a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
petition before it, for failure of the petitioner to prove the essential requisites for the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Poe under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The well-entrenched principle is that in the absence of any jurisdictional
infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion rendered by the COMELEC on
a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to utmost respect. Not every abuse of
discretion justifies the original action of certiorari; it must be grave. The test therefore is
whether the petitioner has demonstrated convincingly that the tribunal has committed grave
abuse of discretion.
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Same; Disqualification Cases; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; Elements; The
entries in a certificate of candidacy are prima facie correct. —A petition for the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code must aver three
essential elements: (a) the candidate makes a representation in his, certificate of candidacy; (b)
the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of
the candidate—the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate of candidacy;
(c) the candidate makes the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as
to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempts to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. If the petition fails to state the three
essential elements, the petitioner would have no cause of action for the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of the respondent candidate; hence, the petition must be dismissed.
The entries in a certificate of candidacy are prima facie correct. In making the said entries, the
candidate is presumed to have acted in good faith.
Same; Same;  Same; Respondent FPJ’s statement in his Certificate of Candidacy that he
was a natural-born Filipino citizen does not ipso facto amount to an erroneous and deliberate
statement of a material fact which would constitute “material misrepresentation.”—The
respondent Poe’s statement, in his CoC that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen does not ipso
facto amount to an erroneous and deliberate statement of a material fact which would
constitute “material misrepresentation.” Indeed, the determination of whether one is “a
natural-born citizen” as defined by our Constitution is, ultimately, a conclusion of law.
Corollarily, granting arguendo that respondent Poe’s statement in his CoC later turned out to
be erroneous or inexact, the same is not entirely groundless, having been honestly based on
admitted and authentic public records. Such error could not be considered a falsity within the
meaning of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because expressing an erroneous
conclusion of law cannot be considered a deliberate untruthful statement of a fact.
Same;  Same; Same;  Burden of Proof; In the final analysis, the party upon whom the
ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the
defendant.—Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the party who initiated
the action. But in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be
determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The test for
determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if
he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks
to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party would be successful if he offers no
evidence.
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Same;  Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;  Vested Rights;  Words and Phrases;  There is
no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity provided in Art.
256 of the Family Code to the effect that, “[T]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws”; Vested right is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy, a concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason
and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action.—The provisions of the
Old Civil Code adverted to by the petitioner should not be made to apply in the present case.
There is no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity provided
in Article 256 of the Family Code to the effect that, “[T]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.” “Vested right” is a right in property which has become fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of present
fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action.” In the present case, there appears to be no substantial evidence on record to
prove that vested rights will be prejudiced or impaired by a confirmation, that is, of respondent
Poe’s legitimate status since he has, since birth, been regarded a legitimate child by his parents,
siblings and other relatives. Consequently, the provisions of Articles 177, 178, 179 and 180 of
the Family Code may be applied retroactively to respondent Poe’s case. As a corollary,
respondent Poe’s legitimation, became the necessary legal consequence of the subsequent
marriage of his parents, the effects of which would retroact to the time of respondent Poe’s
birth in 1939.
Same;  Same; “Legitimacy” or the lack of it cannot by itself be made determinative of a
child’s citizenship—the legitimate status of a child emanates from civil law which regulates the
private relations of the members of civil society, while citizenship is political in character and
the ways in which it should be conferred lies outside the ambit of the Civil Code.—As correctly
maintained by the COMELEC, the issue of legitimacy bears no direct relevance to the
determination of respondent Poe’s citizenship in the petition at bar. Contrary to the
petitioner’s protestations, “legitimacy” or the lack of it cannot by itself be made determinative
of a child’s citizenship. The fact of legitimacy cannot, even if successfully concluded, be used as
a spring board to secure a declaration of a child’s citizenship. The legitimate status of a child
emanates from civil law which regulates the private relations of the members of civil society,
while citizenship is political in character and the ways in which it should be conferred lie
outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine
how or when citizenship is to be acquired. This is precisely evinced by the fact that the right to
acquire the parents’ citizenship is not among the enumerated rights of a legitimate child under
our civil laws.
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Same; Same;  There appears to be no substantial distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children to justify their disparate treatment vis-à-vis the possession of the status of
and the exercise of a political privilege, including the right to run for and be elected to public
office—the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, bears no relation to the individual’s
ability to participate in and contribute to society.—To circumscribe the application of the
endowed political privilege under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution only to the
legitimate children of Filipino fathers would be clearly violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. There appears to be no substantial distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children to justify their disparate treatment vis-à-visthe possession of the status of
and the exercise of a political privilege, including the right to run for and be elected to public
office. The legal states of illegitimacy, however defined, bears no relation to the individual’s
ability to participate in and contribute to society. The only purported purpose of the “natural-
born citizen” requirement is to ensure the elected public officer’s allegiance to the Republic.
The petitioners have failed to demonstrate how legitimate or illegitimate birth affects loyalty to
the Republic. Not to be overlooked is the fact that a natural child’s conception may take place
under circumstances that render it practically indistinguishable from that of a legitimate child,
except for the absence of a marriage ceremony between the parents. To hold that a child’s
illegitimacy can bear significance on his right to acquire citizenship is to step from the bounds
of law, into the realm of inequitable and bigoted rationalism.
Same; Quo Warranto; The resolution of the issue in the present petition will be without
prejudice to the filing by the proper party of the appropriate quo warranto petition before the
Court En Banc to assail FPJ’s eligibility in case he wins the elections and there to litigate all the
issues raised in as much detail as may be deemed necessary or apropos.—Accordingly, the
petition in G.R. 161824 must be dismissed for failure to show that respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition a quo as the petitioner failed to
establish that respondent Poe committed a material misrepresentation, within the meaning of
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, when he stated that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen in his Certificate of Candidacy. One caveat. The resolution of the issue in the present
petition will be without prejudice to the filing by the proper party of the appropriate  quo
warranto petition before the Court En Banc to assail respondent Poe’s eligibility in case he wins
the elections and there to litigate all the issues raised in as much detail as may be deemed
necessary or apropos.
AZCUNA, J., Separate Opinion:
Parent and Child;  Legitimation; While it is true that under the Old Civil Code, the effects
of legitimation retroact only to the time of the mar-
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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
riage, and not to the time of birth, the New Civil Code made the effects retroact to the
time of birth of the child.—It is true that under the Old Civil Code, prevailing when Poe, Jr. was
born, the effects of legitimation retroact only to the time of the marriage, and not to the time
of birth. However, the New Civil Code, effective on August 30, 1950, made the effects retroact
to the time of the birth of the child. It is also true that the Old Civil Code required, in addition to
the marriage, an acknowledgment by the parent(s) in the birth certificate, a will or any public
instrument. Under the New Civil Code, however, this was liberalized so that acknowledgment
can be done also in a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
Furthermore, these new provisions of the law are made expressly applicable to persons born
under the old regime if these are beneficial to them. And, finally, under the Family Code of
1988, even the need for acknowledgment has been dropped, and retroactivity is also provided
for, without prejudice to vested rights.
Same;  Same; I hold the view that the new legislations retroact to benefit FPJ so that he
must be deemed legitimated as of his birth.—Now, what we are concerned with here are not
the civil rights of the person—whether to support or to succession in the estate. And, as
admitted by Fornier’s counsel during the oral arguments, violation of vested rights are not
presumed but must be proved, which has not been done here. Accordingly, at issue here is
simply political status as a citizen, as ably pointed out by amicus curiae Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza. Therefore, I hold the view that the new legislations retroact to benefit Poe, Jr., so
that he must be deemed legitimated as of his birth. Since a legitimated child has all the rights of
a legitimate child (and here, as stated, we refer only to citizenship), it is clear that, pursuant to
the law, not being illegitimate at birth, Poe, Jr. does not follow the citizenship of his mother.
Citizenship;  Natural Born Citizens;  The definition in the Constitution refers to those who
are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship
—it speaks of an act having to be done by the child, to acquire or perfect his citizenship, and
does not cover acts of his parents.—As to the point that such legitimation needed an act after
birth, namely, the marriage of the parents, the same would not detract from the concept of a
natural-born citizen. For the definition in the Constitution refers to those who are citizens from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship  (Art. IV, Sec. 2,
Constitution). Thus, it speaks of an act having to be done by the child, to acquire or perfect his
citizenship, and does not cover acts of his parents.
TINGA, J.,Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Certiorari;  The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure introduced the mode of review
under Rule 64 as separate and distinct from the
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Rule 65 special civil action, and is consonant with the constitutional provision which
allows the institution of a new review modality for rulings of the constitutional commissions.—
The petition invokes as its basis Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which is captioned “Review of
Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit.” The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure introduced this mode of review as separate and
distinct from the Rule 65 special civil action. The innovation is consonant with the
constitutional provision which allows the institution of a new review modality for rulings of
constitutional commissions. It ordains that “(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution  or
by law,” the mode of review is certiorari. The Supreme Court introduced the new mode in the
exercise of its power under the Constitution to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts.
Same; Same;  Rule 64 appears to be a fusion of sorts of at least three other Rules, i.e.,
Rule 65, Rule 46 and Rule 43; As a new and independent mode of review a Rule 64 petition may
as well be treated as a petition for review, under which errors of fact or law may also be
rectified.—Rule 64 appears to be a fusion of sorts of at least three other Rules,  i.e.,Rule 65, Rule
46 and Rule 43. Notably, as in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Commission
concerned is joined as party respondent unlike in an ordinary appeal or petition for review; the
contents of the petition are similar to those required under Section 3 of Rule 46; the order to
comment is similar to Section 6 of Rule 65; the effect of filing a petition is similar to Section 12
of Rule 43; and the provision on when the case is deemed submitted for decision is similar to
Section 13 of Rule 43. A Rule 64 petition must be filed within thirty days from notice of the
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,whereas a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari calls for a sixty day period. The distinction gains greater significance in the context
that great public interest inheres in the goal to secure expeditious resolution of election cases
before the COMELEC. In form, a petition under Rule 64 takes on the characteristics of a Rule 43
petition, which may allege errors of fact or law. Similar to Rule 43, Rule 64 also provides that
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are binding. As a new and
independent mode of review a Rule 64 petition may as well be treated as a petition for review,
under which errors of fact or law may also be rectified.
Same; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy;  The pronouncements in Romualdez-
Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), and Salcedo II v. Commission on
Elections, 312 SCRA 447 (1999), are clearly not supported by a plain reading of the law—
nowhere in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is it stated or implied that there be an
intention to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. —The
pronouncements in Romualdez-Marcos andSalcedo II,however, are clearly not supported by a
plain reading of the law. Nowhere
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate
of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. All the law requires is that the “material
representation contained [in the certificate of candidacy] as required under Section 74 . . . . is
false.” Be it noted that a hearing under Section 78 and Rule 23 is a quasi-judicial proceeding
where the intent of the respondent is irrelevant. Also drawing on the principles of criminal law
for analogy, the “offense” of material representation is malum prohibitum not malum in
se. Intent is irrelevant. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.
Same; Same;  Judicial Legislation;  The Kapunan pronouncement in Romualdez-Marcos
did not establish a doctrine—it is not supported by law, and it smacks of judicial legislation; The
reiteration of the Kapunan pronouncement in Salcedo is a mere obiter dictum.—The Kapunan
pronouncement in the Romualdez-Marcos case did not establish a doctrine. It is not supported
by law, and it smacks of judicial legislation. Moreover, such judicial legislation becomes even
more egregious considering that it arises out of the pronouncement of only one Justice, or 6%
of a Supreme Court. While several other Justices joined Justice Kapunan in upholding the
residence qualification of Rep. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they did not share his dictum. It was
his by his lonesome. Justice Puno had a separate opinion, concurred in by Justices Bellosillo and
Melo. Justice Mendoza filed a separate opinion too, in which Chief Justice Narvasa concurred.
Justices Romero and Francisco each had separate opinions. Except for Chief Justice Narvasa and
Justice Mendoza, the Justices in the majority voted to grant Rep. Marcos’ petition on the
ground that she reestablished her domicile in Leyte upon being widowed by the death of
former President Marcos. On the other hand, the reiteration of the Kapunan pronouncement
in Salcedo is a mere obiter dictum. The Court dismissed the disqualification case on the ground
that the respondent’s use of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy is not a
material representation since the entry does not refer to her qualification for elective office.
Being what it is, the Salcedo obiter cannot elevate the Kapunan pronouncement to the level of
a doctrine regardless of how many Justices voted for Salcedo. Significantly, Justice Puno
concurred in the result only.
Same;  Same; Citizenship;  A candidate’s citizenship eligibility in particular is determined
by law, not by his good faith.—Thus, in this case, it does not matter that respondent knows that
he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen and, knowing such fact, proceeded to state otherwise
in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate. A candidate’s citizenship
eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his good faith. It was, therefore, improper
for the COMELEC to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove intent to
mislead on the part of respondent.
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Same;  Same; Same;  The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in failing to
make a determination of the findings of fact, as well as rule on the evidence before it.—I
submit, therefore, that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in failing to make a
determination of the findings of fact, as well as rule on the evidence before it. This failure is
even violative of the Constitution, as well as relevant statutes and rules of procedure.Especially
blatant to my mind was the conclusion of the COMELEC that Lorenzo Pou “had ceased to be a
Spanish subject and had become a Filipino citizen” by operation of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, despite the absence of substantial evidence to support this claim. The
relevant provisions of these laws are explicit. Those who were considered citizens of the
Philippines under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law were those who, on 11 April
1899, were inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects, and then resided in the
Philippines, and did not elect to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain.
Citizenship;  No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State; There
may be several matters under the law that may be liberally construed, but I believe citizenship is
not one of them; To cheapen citizenship by according it through haphazard presumptions is
tantamount to cheapening out nation’s worth and soul.—I am very mindful of the Court’s
pronouncement that no presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. This
doctrine provides the Court guidance on how to resolve the several doubtful factual issues in
the case. There may be several matters under the law that may be liberally construed, but I
believe citizenship is not one of them. Filipino citizenship is conferred by law and nothing else,
not even good faith or colorable possession thereof. Citizenship is a privilege, and not a right.
To cheapen citizenship by according it through haphazard presumptions is tantamount to
cheapening our nation’s worth and soul. Thus, any unresolved doubt cannot be adjudged in
favor of Poe. His claim to natural-born citizenship must be established by law, and evidence in
accord with the law.
 Same; Admissions; Estoppel; The rule on judicial admissions is but an application of the
law on estoppel.—The paternity of Ronald Allan Poe has not been conclusively established.
Some may take stock in the purported admission of petitioner Fornier in his pleadings before
both the COMELEC and this Court that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe. I am not as
hasty to conclude that such an admission dispenses with proof. The rule on judicial admissions
is but an application of the law on estoppel. The State is not put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials, much less by those who, not being an agent thereof, is in no position to
bind it. To hold otherwise would be to compel the State to recognize as a
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318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
citizen one who is not by its most fundamental of laws, and in effect “sanction a
monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel.”
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;  Illegitimate birth does not carry any
presumption on paternity.—In the end, there is nothing left but the Birth Certificate of 1939
and the Marriage Contract of 1940 that could be taken as proper evidence to establish filiation.
Not only do they fail to prove filiation, they actually caution us against any hasty presumptions
of paternity. These documents establish the illegitimacy of Poe, and illegitimate birth does not
carry any presumption on paternity. Indeed, paternity has to be established by independent
evidence. No such independent evidence is before this Court.
Same; International Law;  It is municipal law, not international law, that determines
citizenship and the qualifications of a candidate for public office.—It has been urged that
disqualifying Poe as a consequence of ruling that he follows the citizenship of his mother would
constitute a violation of international law, particularly the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. The Convention proscribes the commission of discriminatory acts against any person by
reason of birth. The submission proceeds from the conviction that the paternity of Poe and,
therefore, his Filipino citizenship, have been duly established. Truly, the Convention would find
full application if it were so, but, sadly, it has not. Surely, it is not suggested that, regardless of
his not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, respondent is eligible to be President by virtue of
such Convention. Obviously, it is municipal law, not international law, that determines the
qualifications of a candidate for public office. It is also municipal law, not international law, that
determines citizenship.
Same; It is the fact of presence on 11 April 1899 that renders operative the grant of mass
naturalization.—There is no evidence adduced that Lorenzo Pou was born in the Philippines, or
was even present in the Philippines up until the first few decades of the 20th century. However,
it is insisted that Lorenzo Pou obtained his citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the
Philippine Bill of 1902. I earlier concluded that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in adopting this theory without any substantial evidence. Again, there is no proof
that exists that Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject, was already present in the Philippines on 11
April 1899. It is the fact of presence on that date that renders operative the grant of mass
naturalization. It is a fact that must be established, and sadly, the evidence fails to do so.
Same; Presumptions; The presumption of inference of the continued existence of a
condition or state of facts is generally considered to be prospective, not retrospective—the
presumption never runs backward.—Even conceding that the presence of Lorenzo Pou in the
Philippines was estab-
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
lished as of 1916, when Allan F. Poe was born, the rule is that proof of the existence at a
particular time of a fact of a continuous nature gives rise to an inference, that it exists at
a subsequent time. No similar inference can be drawn that such fact existed prior to the time it
had been established. The presumption of inference of the continued existence of a condition
or state of facts is generally considered to be prospective, not retrospective. Indeed, the
presumption never runs backward. The presence of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines in 1916 or
1954 does not establish his presence in the Philippines in 1899. In 1916, he was already 46
years old, the average lifespan of the average male during that period, and yet it remains
unanswered where he was prior to that time and more so in 1899.
Same;  Respondent FPJ may indeed be at heart, and in mind, a natural-born Filipino and
may speak the vernacular, partake of the native ale, and portray the Filipino hero, and may
have even exercised rights and enjoyed privileges reserved to Filipino citizens but all these,
however, do not constitute conclusive proof that he is one.—Respondent may indeed be at
heart, and in mind, a natural-born Filipino. He may speak the vernacular, partake of the native
ale, and portray the Filipino hero. He may have even exercised rights and enjoy privileges
reserved to Filipino citizens. All these, however do not constitute conclusive proof that he is
one. For it may be that a person, otherwise disqualified by reason of citizenship, may exercise
and enjoy such rights and privileges by representing—or mistaking—himself to be a Filipino: It
was incumbent upon the respondent, who claims natural-born status, to prove to the
satisfaction of the Court that he really is such. Failing thus, and, as no presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, the doubt must be resolved in favor
of the State.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Andresito X. Fornier and Themistocles A. Sano, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 161824.
     Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Gertrude A. De Leon, Maricar T. Martinez & Alberto A.
Sales for petitioners in G.R. No. 161434.
     Romulo V. Borja for Zoilo Antonio G. Velez in G.R. No. 161634.
     Ireneo E. Guardino for petitioner-in-intervention.
     Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the
privilege. It is a “precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,” 1 that cannot be taken
lightly by anyone—either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver
screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he
not?
 The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter “FPJ”), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be “Fernando, Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, his date
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., Respondents,” initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
_______________
1
 Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor, 45 O.G. No. 31, 1269.
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VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 321
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions—first,Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelley only a year after the birth ofrespondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits—1) a copy of the certificate of
birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives Division cf the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding thebirth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being—a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth
of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by
the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War
II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003for lack of merit. Three days
later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed
the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824, likewise prayed
for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G.R. No. 161824, would include G.R. No.
161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. vs. The Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poo, Jr.’), and Victorino X. Fornier,” and the
other, docketed G.R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo Antonio G. Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,” both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G.R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material
fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code—
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false”—
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code—
“Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.—In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections”—
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize “any
interested party” to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any
nuisance candidate.
 Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
per Rule 642 in an action for certiorariunder Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads—
_______________
2 Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
 Sec. 2. Mode of review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. (Rule 64)
3
 Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46. (Rule 65)
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324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to,
and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to
our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on
who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G.R. No. 161434 and G.R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.”
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribu-
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VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 325
nal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this
Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes
involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act
No. 1793, “An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and
Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
the statutory setup, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-
election scenario.Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise—
“Rule 12. Jurisdiction.—The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
“Rule 13. How Initiated.—An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall
not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
“Rule 14. Election Protest.—Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after
the proclamation of the winner.”
_______________
4
 17 SCRA 761 (1966).
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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines,
and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warrantoproceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. 5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario.In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.,” and G.R. No. 161634, entitled “Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.” would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue, it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. 6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to
determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. 7 The concept
grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights
and entitlements,
_______________
5
See Rule 66, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
6
 The Politics of Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, Oxford University Press,
London, 1946, at p. 93.
7
Id., at p. 95.
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VOL. 424, MARCH 3, 2004 327
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 8 In its ideal setting, a citizen
was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general
interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, tocivil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. 9 Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right
to participate in the exercise of political power. 10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development,
in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.12
The Local Setting—from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects of
Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”13 In
_______________
8
 Introduction, “The Conditions of Citizenship,” edited by Bart Van Steenbergen, Sage
Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi (1994).
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
 Under the codified Novisima Recopilacion promulgated in Spain in 1805, the following
were considered denizens (vecinos) all foreigners who obtained the privilege of naturalization,
those who were born in these kingdoms, those who residing therein may be converted to the
holy Catholic faith; those, being self-supporting, established their domicile therein; and in the
case of a foreign woman who married a native man, she thereby becomes subject to the same
laws and acquires the same domicile as her husband; those who establish themselves in the
country by acquiring real property; those who have trade or profession and go there to practice
the same; also those who practice some mechanical trade therein or keep a retail
store;....those who reside for a period of ten years in a home of his
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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
church records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but
their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for
those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in
Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to
be the subject of differing views among experts; 15 however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines—the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands, 17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18
_______________
own; and also those foreigners who, in accordance with the common law, royal orders and
other laws of the kingdoms, may have become naturalized or acquired residence therein. (Leon
T. Garcia, The Problems of Citizenship in the Philippines,” Rex Bookstore, 1949, at p. 4)
14
 Garcia, supra, at p. 3.
15
 Justices Malcolm, Recto and Florentino Torres believed that the law was effective in the
Philippines. Those who entertained the contrary view were Justices Imperial and Villareal.
(Garcia, supra, at 4.).
16
 Garcia, supra, pp. 5-6.
17
 Under the Royal Decree of August 23, 1868; the following were considered foreigners—
(1) The legitimate and recognized natural children of a father who belongs to another
independent state, and the unrecognized and natural and other illegitimate children of a
mother belonging to another State born outside of the Spanish dominions, (2) The children
specified in the preceding paragraph, born in the Spanish dominions or on board Spanish
vessels on the high seas if they do not, on attaining the age of majority fixed in the laws of the
Kingdom, elect Spanish nationality, (3) Those being Spaniards, acquire another nationality, as
well by renouncing the first as by accepting employment, from another government without
the authority of the sovereign and (4) The woman who contracts marriage with a subject of
another State. (Garcia, supra, pp. 6-7)
 18
 Under the law, the following were foreigners (a) All persons born of foreign parents
outside of the Spanish territory; (b) Those born outside of the Spanish territory of foreign
fathers and Spanish mothers while they do
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the
express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramaramong
which this country was included, would be governed by special laws. 19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889,
which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.—
1. “(a)Persons born in Spanish territory,
2. “(b)Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
3. “(c)Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
4. “(d)Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy.”20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as
a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no
effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress—
“Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dis-
_______________
not claim Spanish nationality, (3) Those born in Spanish territory of foreign parents or
foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not make that claim, (4) Spaniards who may
have lost their nationality, (5) Those born outside of the Spanish territory of parents who may
have lost their Spanish nationality; and (6), the Spanish woman married to a foreigner.
(Garcia, supra, p. 7)
19
 Velayo, infra, p. 11.
20
 Article 17, The Civil Code of Spain.
21
 Garcia, supra, pp. 6-7.
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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
pose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus—
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress.” 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on
the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although
they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens” under
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill
of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines—
“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight.”23
_______________
22
 Ramon M. Velayo, “Philippine Citizenship And Naturalization,” Central Book Supply,
Manila (1965), pp. 22-23.
23
Ibid., p. 30.
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Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. 24
Controversy arose on the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was
given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902—
“Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.” 26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for the
first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General inthe Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for
the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in
1912—
“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
_______________
24
 Garcia, supra, at pp. 31-32.
25
 Garcia, supra, pp. 23-26.
26
 Velayo, supra, p. 31.
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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.”
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of
the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in
the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode
of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common
law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship—
“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines—
1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
2. “(2)Those born in the Philippines Islands offoreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
3. “(3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. “(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
5. “(5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate
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children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of
the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns—
“Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution—The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
2. “(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. “(3)Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
4. “(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that—
“A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship.”
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section 1, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. “(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
2. “(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. “(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;and
4. “(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.”
The term “natural-born citizens,” is defined to include “those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.”27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime
of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship—
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28—had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29(1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor 30(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta
Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident
of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The
certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915
to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate,
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
that—
1. 1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. 2.FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. 3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. 4.The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. 5.At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born
Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit “A” for petitioner and Exhibit “3” for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit
“21” for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit “5”. While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e.,the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1964 in
San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that—
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
“x x x      x x x      x x x
“(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office.”
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
“Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.”
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could
be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin
of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was
born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo
Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation 
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the
child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took
effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was
either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible
only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only
be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. 32 Complementary to the new code was
Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—
“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified.”
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The
failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled— “Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after
the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate
(Exhibit “1”), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment,
may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that
they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753.
For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in
the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be
made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own.”
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document
was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least
shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be “some other public document.” In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court
defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
“Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one
of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class.”
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, “authentic writing,” so
as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine
or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
“Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. “(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. “(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. “(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. “(2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
“Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
“x x x      x x x      x x x.
“Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
“Art. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
“We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under
Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that ‘the
voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws’ or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
273 may be given retroactive effect.”
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition
of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well
apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and
personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate
civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship
to the State. While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly
—
“Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family
and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members
of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests.”37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
“In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although
they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, ‘all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband
and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their
property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the
spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and
wife.”
The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, stating that—
“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”—
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions
on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of
the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations. 40 In adoption, for instance,
an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same
rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under
civil law41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights
of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to
keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil
law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—
“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may
be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.”
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a
relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley
Poe submitted as Exhibit “20” before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of
Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e.,living together with Bessie
Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family—
“I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
“1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
“2.Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
“3.Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or ‘FPJ’.
“4.Ronald Allan Poe ‘FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.
x x x      x x x      x x x
“7.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando
Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
“8.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
“9.Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald Allan
and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s house on
Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for
some months between 1943-1944.
“10.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children
after Ronald Allan Poe. “x x x      x x x      x x x .
“18.I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe
is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
“Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas 
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing—
“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage.
Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.”
Petitioner’s Argument For  “x x x     x x x     x x x
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court
in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon 44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiaeJoaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states—
“We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would
be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement
was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictumwhich did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
“First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It
was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a
Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
“Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public
office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution.
No one was illegitimate here.
“Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra
was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one
who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is
nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
“Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship
of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father,
Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his
son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
“The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin’s father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to
fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
“Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
“The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People
vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate
children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
“x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a
public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the
child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents.
There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in
the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.”
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views.
The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to
help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent
FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum—
(1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over
the petition in G.R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No.
04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ
has committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2)The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.R.
No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the
latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
 election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court
can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

(3)In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the “en masseFilipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4)But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS—

1. 1.G.R. No. 161434, entitled “Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus  Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
“Fernando Poe, Jr.”) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents,” and G.R. No. 161634,
entitled “Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent,” for want of jurisdiction.
2. 2.G.R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versusHon. Commission
on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,” for
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on
Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
 VOL. 419, JANUARY 13, 2004 123
Republic vs. Lim
G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
Remedial Law;  Civil Registry;  Change of Name; Correction of Entry;Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry; Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding; Nature of an appropriate adversary suit or proceeding.—To
clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule
108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
Same; Same;  Same; Same;  While judicial authority is required for a change of name or
surname, there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.—While judicial authority is required for a change of name
or surname, there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person
has already been using since childhood. The doctrine that disallows such change of name as
would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that
the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to
the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the
object of future mischief. In respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she has been
using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship;  The constitutional and statutory requirements of
electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children.—Plainly, the above constitutional
and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children.
These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was
not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically
became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to
elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
Same; Same;  The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.—This notwithstanding,
the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise
of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a
petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule
Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an,
Iligan City. Her birth was registered in
125
VOL. 419, JANUARY 13, 2004 125
Republic vs. Lim
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her
record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of
birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order,1 which reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of this
case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod,
Iligan City at 8:30 O’clock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any interested person
may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.
“Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and
the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
the petitioner.
“Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi
Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o,
Iligan City.
“SO ORDERED.”
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo.” She has been using “Yu” in
all her school records and in her marriage certificate. 2 She presented a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 3 to further show the consistency in her use of the
surname “Yu.”
Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co
Tian)” when it should have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).”
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering
that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her
mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a
Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child
when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never
married.
Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents
were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter’s father were never
married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
 In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local
civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage
between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence
although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining
respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and rendered judgment
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner straight
and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is
directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
1. 1.Her family name from “YO” to “YU”;
2. 2.Her father’s name from “YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)” to “YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)”;
3. 3.Her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” by changing “YES” to “NO” in answer
to the question “LEGITIMATE?”; and,
4. 4.Her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino.”
“SO ORDERED.”4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial court’s decision.5
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF
RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM “CHINESE” TO “FILIPINO” DESPITE THE FACT THAT
RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER
FATHER’S SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD. 6
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondent’s recourse to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in
entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under
said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in
the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia 7where we held
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 8
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republic’s failure to cite
this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply
with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.” 10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
InChing, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio Mallare,12 we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could
any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.13
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18
years old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 15
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals’ decision in
allowing respondent to use her father’s surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republic’s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to
use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled
surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent
does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her father’s
surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody,
would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing one’s name or
surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases,
a person is allowed to use a name “by which he has been known since childhood.”
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. InPabellar v. Rep. of the
Phils.,16 we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to
use a name “by which he has been known since childhood” (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104
Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Tañada,infra). Even legitimate children
cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v.
Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).17
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, 18 there is no such
requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since
childhood.19
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of
family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name
would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. 20 In this case, the Republic has not shown that
the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In
respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even
avoid confusion to her community in general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in
the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:

1. 1.Her family name from “YO” to “YU”;

2. 2.Her father’s name from “YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)” to “YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)”;
3. 3.Her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” by changing “YES” to “NO” in answer
to the question “LEGITIMATE?”; and,
4. 4.Her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino.”

SO ORDERED.
     
 G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.*
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.*
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
Political Law; Citizenship;  Having been declared as a non-citizen, it is incumbent upon
Frivaldo to show that he has reacquired citizenship.—Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared
by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has
reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said
statute (R.A. 7160).
__________________
*
 EN BANC.
728
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same;  Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization
or by repatriation.—Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and
during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives” due, according to him, to
the “maneuvers of his political rivals.” In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Same; Same;  Statutory Construction; Memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by
any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of
P.D. No. 725.—This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious
that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum—based
on the copy furnished us by Lee—did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect.
Same; Same;  Same; It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication
are not favored.—On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed “unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.”
Same; Same;  The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age.—From the above, it will be noted
that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year’s residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Same; Same;  Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of Qualifications of
Elective Officials not of candidates.—So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should
729
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 729
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of “Qualifications” of
“ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the
time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications—unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and
residence—should thus be possessed when the “elective [or elected] official” begins to govern,
i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term—in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court’s ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of
the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
Same;  Same; Same;  The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a
registered voter, it does not require him to vote actually.—If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement
of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification.
The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP
to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen
first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from “citizenship”), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the
official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: “a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected.” It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration—not the actual voting—is the core of this “qualification.” In other words, the law’s
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern—and not anywhere else.
Same;  Same; The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994.—But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also
hold that the repatriation of
730
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
Same;  Same; Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever
defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.—Being
a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Same;  Same; In case of doubt on the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be
presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail.—Another argument
for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725
were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to
delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos
who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his American citizenship—was,
may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.
 Same; Same;  Decision declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person’s future status with finality.—Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The power to annul a proclamation must be
done within ten (10) days following the proclamation.—The Court however cautioned that such
power to annul a proclamation must “be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation.” Inasmuch as Frivaldo’s petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee’s
proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.
Same; Same;  It is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the
elections.—This
731
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 731
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded
by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.
Same; Same;  A decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but
Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time.—In dismissing the
petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because “Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even
after the elections.” In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 “is
merely directory,” we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to “DISMISS
G.R. No. 120295.” One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to
deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-dayperiod prescribed therein.
The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such
petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in
Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections
is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no
inconsistency nor conflict.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Political Law;  Election Law;  Local Government Code;  Section 39 actually prescribes the
qualification of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official.—In the first
place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of
an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the
electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The
section unquestionably refers to elective—not elected—local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and
paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase “An elective local official,” while paragraphs (b) to
(f) thereof speak of candidates.
732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
Same;  Same; Same;  Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates
for elective local offices and their election.—It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other
than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no
way may the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be
reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
Constitutional Law;  Citizenship; Steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725.—Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation
under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of
the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If
the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application,
then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
PUNO, J.: Concurring Opinion:
Political Law;  Election Law; In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the
legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their
ballots.—Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In
election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with
the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect
the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, “x x x an enfranchised
citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority.” The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest
consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making
the people succeed.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Juanito G. Arcilla and Teodoro M. Jumamil for Juan G. Frivaldo.
733
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 733
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
     Felix Carao, Jr., Ferdinand Laguna,  Gavino Barlin and Bernardo P. Fernandez for Raul Lee.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared
the rightful governor of Sorsogon—
1. (i)Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be
disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to
have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

2. (ii)Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the
votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should
be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he
secured the most number of valid votes; or
3. (iii)The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly
to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should
take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a “permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred”? In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays
down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of
substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on
________________
1
 Composed of Pres. Comm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R.
Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F.
734
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
2      Isagani P. Ocampo
December 19, 1995  and another Resolution of the Comelec en bancpromulgated February 23,
19963 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo “be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines,” and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition: 6
__________________
Desamito, dissenting.
2
 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; rollo,
pp. 110-129.
3
 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified
that “Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of the deliberation and
resolution of this case. However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to
submit a dissenting opinion.” Rollo, pp. 159-171.
4
 Rollo, pp. 46-49.
5
 Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita DyLiaco Flores, concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe
(“on official business”).
6
 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No.
87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 1989), the Supreme Court,
by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo “not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.” On February
28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo.
However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the
735
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 735
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
“WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent’s certificate of candidacy is cancelled.”
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
     Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
     Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
     Raul R. Lee 53,304
1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the dulyelected Governor of Sorsogon.
________________
Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned this grant, and
Frivaldo was “declared not a citizen of the Philippines” and ordered to vacate his office. On the
basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028.
7
 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners, namely,
Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A.
Reyes-Claravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; rollo, pp. 56-57.
8
 Rollo, p. 60.
9
 Rollo, pp. 61-67.
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition “only on June 29,
1995,” the Comelec en banc directed “the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 x x x.” Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11docketed as SPC No. 95-
317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after “his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which
he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted.”
As such, when “the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o’clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x.” In the alternative, he averred
that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor—not Lee—should
occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, “not having garnered the highest number of votes,” was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, “having garnered
the highest number of votes, and x x x having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 x x x (is) qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon”; thus:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the
Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass,
proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered
the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to
hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of
the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof.”
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution14promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties “to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition.”
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee’s “position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions:”15
__________________
14
 Rollo, pp. 159-170.
15
 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
“First—The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant
the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second—The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition
and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third—The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and  Fourth
—Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner’s
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.”
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. 1.Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections “on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines”;
2. 2.Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. 3.Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995
suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.” (Italics
supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
“within the period allowed by law,” i.e., “not later than fifteen days before the election.”
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition
for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
740
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
1. 1.Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack
of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
 2. 2.Is Frivaldo’s “judicially declared” disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
3. 3.Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No.
95-317 considering that said petition is not “a pre-proclamation case, an election
protest or a quo warranto case”?
4. 4.Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of
existing jurisprudence?
5. 5.Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating
the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the
governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the
period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., “not later than
fifteen days before the elections”?
The First Issue: Frivaldo’s Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo’s repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
“Sec. 39. Qualifications.—(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
________________
19
 Republic Act No. 7160.
741
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 741
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
x x x     x x x     x x x
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
several members of the House of Representatives” due, according to him, to the “maneuvers of
his political rivals.” In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by
the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992,
and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-
Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable deci-
_________________
20
 See footnote no. 6, supra.
21
 In debunking Frivaldo’s claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p. 254,
observed that “(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of
our country. Under C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.”
22
 Supra, p. 794.
742
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
sion from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having
successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime
opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent
Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00
p.m. on June 30, 1995, is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he—not Lee—should have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers
met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo’s repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which
we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had “been effectively repealed,” asserting that “then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution,” adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them “to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as
defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended.” 23
__________________
23
 Petition, p. 27; rollo, p. 29.
743
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 743
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum—based on the copy
furnished us by Lee—did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
that repeals by implicationare not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed “unless it is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June
patently 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
__________________ circumstances, it could not be
__________________
24
 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:
26
“MEMORANDUM  Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al., G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).
TO :       The Solicitor General  745
     The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs  VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 745
     The Director-General 
     National Intelligence Coordinating Agency Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
The previous administration’s practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any said that there was “indecent haste” in the processing of his application.
other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative authority thereof, poses a serious Anent Lee’s charge that the “sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,” 27 the Solicitor
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
Constitution. baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Mani-festation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all On the basis of the parties’ submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation
270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
regulations. comply with, nor are
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino __________________
Manila, March 27, 1987.”
27
25
 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.  Petition, p. 28; rollo, p. 30.
28
744  The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“M A N I F E S T A T I O N
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.”26 The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative manifests that the following persons have been repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory 725, since June 8, 1995:
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending 2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901
whatever “judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution” might make. In other 3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress—once
4. Terry Herrera and Antonio Ching 903
created—to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully 5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of “the present 6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion” to leave the matter of repeal to
7. Samuel M. Buyco 906
the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is
now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon 8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907
statutory construction but on common sense as well. 9. Samuel Villanueva 908
Second. Lee also argues that “serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation 10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909
proceedings,” asserting that Frivaldo’s application therefor was “filed on June 29, 1995 x x x
(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x,” which “prevented a judicious 11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910”
review and evaluation of the merits thereof.” Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for 746
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and
even the rules and
________________
29
 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
“PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to
have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply
to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino
women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of
their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1) Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation
by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of
this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-five.”
747
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 747
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate.
This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is
merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his
province prior to his naturalization in the United States—a naturalization he insists was made
necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace—and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of
democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his
talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo’s
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code “must exist on the date of his election,
if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed,” citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held
that “both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine
citizens can run and be elected to public office.” Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as
the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo’s naturalization was valid or not—and NOT the
effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue
of when an aspirant for public office should be
_________________
30
 See footnote No. 6, supra.
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, “(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends
to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.”
* In addition, “candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.”
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation andon the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day 32 the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such
_________________
31
 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).
32
 “The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided
for by law, x x x.” Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
 749
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 749
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at
that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent
with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of “Qualifications” of “ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications—unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence—should thus be possessed when the “elective
[or elected] official” begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed  and at the start of his
term—in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court’s ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li
Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at
the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to
the effect that the citizenship
____________________
33
 96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955).
34
 The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral
argument held on March 19, 1996:
“JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be a
citizen at the time of proclamation?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the time of
proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes the office he must have the
continuing qualification as a citizen.
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected
official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a
citizen,
_________________
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of
certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be
reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of qualification for
Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53—it says that for purposes of residence it must be
reckoned x x x from the time of the filing of the certificate, for purposes of age, from the
time of the date of the election. But when we go over all the provisions of law under
current laws, Your Honor, there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is
concern(ed) as to when, as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say
that if there is no provision under any existing law which requires that you have to be a
citizen of the Philippines on the date of the filing or on the date of election then it has to be
equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified at the time that the office is
supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume the office.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the
candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a registered voter one must be a
citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered
voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact,
his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter
and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on
May 8, 1995.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The fact
is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice declared
not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is correct but the fact is, Your
Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered
751
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 751
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a “registered voter.” And, under the
law35 a “voter” must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a
voter—much less a validly registered one—if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the
law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason
__________________
voter was likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was aruling by the Municipal Court,
there was a ruling by theRegional Trial Court and he was sustained as a valid voter, sohe voted.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your contention that
citizenship should be determined as of the time of proclamation and not as of the time of
the election or at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the
Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when citizenship should be possessed by
the candidate, is that not correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the
candidate for governor or for other local positions should be a voter and to be a voter one
must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue here
because he was allowed to vote and he did in fact vote and in fact, he was a registered
voter.” (TSN, March 19, 1996.)
35
 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as “The Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines,” as amended, provides for the various qualifications of voters, one of which
is Filipino citizenship.
 752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if
being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement
was included as another qualification (aside from “citizenship”), not to reiterate the need for
nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY
he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: “a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected.” It should be emphasized that the Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him
to vote actually. Hence, registration—not the actual voting—is the core of this “qualification.”
In other words, the law’s purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern—and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized—and Lee has not disputed—that he
“was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration x x x. In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995.” 36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that “Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted
again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995.”37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the provincewhere he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenshipshould be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38
__________________
36
 Comment, p. 11; rollo, p. 259.
37
 See footnote no. 33.
38
 Section 253 reads as follows:
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VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 753
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the
ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that
authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent’s ineligibility arising
from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government
Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of “within ten days after proclamation” of
the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee’s proclamation (8:30
p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the
candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous “judicially-
declared” alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
____________________
“Section 253. Petition for quo warranto.—Any voter contesting the election of any member of
the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, B.P. 697;
Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively,
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2,
1978 EC).”
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.” But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences
by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement .
They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation.
Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are “healing acts x x x curing defects
and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. x x x By their very nature,
curative statutes are retroactive x x x (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.”
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retro-
_________________
39
 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25, 1988),
and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2, 1984).
40
 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I,
1990 ed., p. 23 states:
“Exceptions to Rule.—Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1)
when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes, (3) in case of curative
statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of laws creating new rights.”
41
 Id., p. 25.
42
 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271.
755
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 755
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
spective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43
 A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of “many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens” and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail
of repatriation until “after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status” and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution’s new provision allowing
“a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship x x x” because “such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens
before said constitution took effect.” Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women—the
right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not
exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new
right in favor of other “natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now
desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship,” because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such
former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
“By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041).
____________________
43
 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953).
44
 Memorandum, p. 9.
756
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the
death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization
and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations
and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.”
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable
that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. “(A)
retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so
operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof.”45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to “reach back” to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence.
And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as
important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative
intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. “(I)t
has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some
constitutional guaranty.”46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
_________________
45
 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.
46
 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; italics supplied.
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VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 757
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events—i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being—in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression,
then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner
to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no
showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from
giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay
the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his American citizenship—was, may
be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and
grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person’s
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo’s repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on
August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification—whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May
8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
__________________
47
 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.
48
 Based on the “Corrected Compliance” dated May 16, 1996 filed by the Solicitor General,
it appears that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval between date of filing of an
application for repatriation and its approval was three months and ten days; the swiftest action
was a same-day approval.
759
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 759
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo’s status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated—i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored—as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him “from running for any elective local
position?”49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he “had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenship—long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo
was stateless in the interim—when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before
he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.”50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
“By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.”
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
__________________
49
 “SEC. 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position: x x x
(d) Those with dual citizenship”;
50
 P. 11; rollo, p. 259.
51
 Resolution, p. 12; rollo, p. 121.
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. 52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-
028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 “became final and
executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by
this Honorable Court.”54 Hence, before Lee “was proclaimed as the elected governor on June
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying” Frivaldo. Lee adds
that this Court’s two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally “correct”) declaring
Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and
these “judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for
all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines.”
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for
________________
52
 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs.
Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).
53
 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is
not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent’s certificate of candidacy is cancelled.”
54
 Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 21.
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VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 761
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent
Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55
“The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However,
there is no record of any ‘final judgment’ of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for
the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen ‘having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March
25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.’ This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was
in connection with the 1992 elections.”
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence,
in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
“Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands.”
The Third Issue: Comelec’s Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No.
95-317 because the only “possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
________________
55
 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; rollo, p. 116.
56
 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971.
762
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case.” Again, Lee
reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee’s) proclamation only on July 6, 1995—“beyond the 5-day reglementary
period.” Hence, according to him, Frivaldo’s “recourse was to file either an election protest or
a quo warranto action.”
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to
“exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials.” Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission’s authority to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations—of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
“The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate’s
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)”
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must “be done within
ten (10) days following the proclamation.” Inasmuch as Frivaldo’s petition was filed only six (6)
days after Lee’s proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired
jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee’s Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 “the fact remains that he (Lee) was
not the choice of the sovereign will,” and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is “a second placer, x x x
just that, a second placer.”
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
“The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.”
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
“But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less
the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed
by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office
of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo’s
certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.”
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec’s
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in
the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate
of Sorsogon was “fully aware in fact and in law” of Frivaldo’s alleged disqualification as to
“bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety”; in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was
ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor—and not Lee—should be
proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, “obviously not the
choice of the people” of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
“The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.”
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
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VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 765
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
he—not Lee—should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee’s proclamation was patently erroneous and
should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads as follows:
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.” (italics
supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by
the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995,
affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
“SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the win-
_________________
63
 See footnotes 2 and 3.
766
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
ning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.” (italics supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide’s Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino’s memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal,
as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo
case;64 viz, “(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by x x x repatriation.” He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo
to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a
“mockery” of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such
abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995
elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were
the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec’s authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement
with our holding that Section 78 is merely
_______________
64
 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23, 1959).
767
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 767
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R.
No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were
invalid because they were issued “not later than fifteen days before the election” as prescribed
by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not
commit grave abuse of discretion because “Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try
and decide disqualifications even after the elections.” In spite of his disagreement with us on
this point, i.e., that Section 78 “is merely directory,” we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to “DISMISS G.R. No. 120295.” One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within
the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by
the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-
day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court’s holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity “dilutes” our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining
his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status—not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995
elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that “informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship.” Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who
are Philippine nationals, we
768
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in
international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens—not who are
the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical.
Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because “Frivaldo’s ineligibility for being
an American was publicly known.” First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such
“public” knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the
last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there
be such “public” knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of “elective local official” while par. (b) to (f)
refer to “candidates.” If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to “candidates”
and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a)
from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically
stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates
for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo’s repatriation
on the ground, among others,
________________
65
 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239.
 769
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 769
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that
applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what
the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus:  that after
taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship,
which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted
to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our “so too” argument regarding the literal meaning of the word “elective” in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Autonomy Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide’s
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up
rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: “This Court must be the first to uphold
the Rule of Law.” We agree—we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here.
The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so
it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how
to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the
naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in
the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters’ obvious choice.
In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate
upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court’s conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the
770
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in
full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo’s repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of
the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind
it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he
was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he
possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course,
are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec’s authority and jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political
laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way
of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
“x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections
(citations omitted).”67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who
are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo’s case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The
Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him
still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter
before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that
he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification “from running for any elective local position.” But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit’s gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of
the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical
and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger
social context consistent with Frivaldo’s unique situation approximating venerability in
Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches
of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to
serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his
demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reassume his nationality of birth despite
several legal setbacks speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines
even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility
of purpose cannot be lost on this
773
VOL. 257, JUNE 28, 1996 773
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But
he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling
but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which
can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon must certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

1. (1)The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
2. (2)The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In
any event, it has no merit.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 545
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001. *
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship;  There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth
and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.—There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen.
_____________
*
 EN BANC.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof.
Same; Same;  Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.—On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same;  Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a Former
Citizen.—Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Same; Same;  Same; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.—
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Same; Same;  Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-
born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino .—
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons
who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear:
as
547
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 547
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino . As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
Remedial Law; Certiorari;  The Court’s jurisdiction over the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is merely to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter; There is no
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.—The HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House. The Court’s jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court’s judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. There is no such showing
of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
PANGANIBAN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law;  Citizenship; Repatriation is simply the recovery of original
citizenship; It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one’s former or original
citizenship.—Repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1, of RA
2630, a person “who ha[s] lost his citizenship” may “reacquire” it by “taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.” Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a
noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private
International Law. He defines repatriation as “the recovery of the original nationality upon
fulfillment of certain conditions.” Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary
or common usage of repatriate, as “to restore or return to one’s country of origin, allegiance,
or citizenship; x x x.” In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of
citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one’s former or original
citizenship.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law;  Citizenship; Respondent did not reacquire his natural-born
citizenship; Provision on “natural-born citizen of the Philippines” is precise, clear and definite;
Neither HRET nor the Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys.—Clearly,
he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and
construction of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people
who adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are used according to their plain, natural,
and usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the
common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption. The provision on “natural-
born citizens of the Philippines” is precise, clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this
Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general
language which may call for construction of what the words imply.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Brillantes,  Nachura,  Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla,  Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for
petitioner.
     Romulo B. Macalintal for private respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen.”1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable
was the 1935 Constitution.2
___________
1
 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.
2
 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
549
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 549
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, “rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” Said provision of
law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost.—A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident hereto,
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
1. (a)The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
2. (b)The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces
of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of
the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRETs decision on the
following grounds:
1. 1.The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss
and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. 2.The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. 3.Assuming that private respondent’s acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born
Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in
1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications 12 and none of the
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. disqualifications13 provided by law to become a Filipino
_____________ _______________

5 12
 Rollo, p. 36.  Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:
6
 Id., at 69.
7
 Id., at 13. 1. (a)He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
552 2. (b)He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ten years;
3. (c)He must be of good moral character and believes in the principle underlying the
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
when he was repatriated since the phrase “from birth” in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the
his relation with the constituted government and as well as with the community in
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
which he is living;
The petition is without merit.
4. (d)He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
1. (1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this 5. (e)He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal
Constitution; languages; and
2. (2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 6. (f)He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools
3. (3)Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of
4. (4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8 the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways citizen.
of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and
13
the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country,  Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:
is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the 1. (a)He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
citizenship.”10 organized governments;
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens 2. (b)He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and 3. (c)He must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;
by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an 4. (d)He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
_______________ 5. (e)He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
8
 Article IV, Section 1. 554
9
 I TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed. 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
10
 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2. Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
11
 During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years
thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicants was undertaken by special committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
April 11, 1975, as amended. profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
553 rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 553 Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As
a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law, a
former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications17 and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of CA. 473. 18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; 19 (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time;21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political and economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
x x x. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would noteven be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.] 25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under RA. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.
____________
25
 Id., at 450.
26
 JOVITO R. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, P. 165 (1995).
27
 See Art. IV, Sec 1, 1935 Constitution.
557
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 557
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term “natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III, Section 4, of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,28 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those “naturalized citizens” were not considered natural-born obviously
because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of
Article IV adds a sentence: “Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.” Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes
of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy
is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the
loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings
in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House.29The Court’s jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check “whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the
latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court’s judgment for that of the
latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
cor-
______________
29
 Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
30
 Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353, 364 (1999).
559
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 559
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
rectness of the assailed decision. 31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.),  Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., concur.
     Melo, J., No part. Chairman of the HRET which rendered the decision under review.
     Vitug, J., No part—A member of the HRET which rendered the appealed judgment.
     Mendoza, J., No part, being ponente of decision under review.
     Panganiban, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
     Quisumbing,  Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., On leave.
     Pardo, J., Concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
     Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I also join concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
     Ynares-Santiago, J., I hereby certify that J. Santiago favors with the majority opinion of
J. Kapunan.
     Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I dissent. Please see my Dissenting Opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral
Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress.
Let me just add a few points.
______________
31
 Id.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribuna
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to
Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1 Article IV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine
citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with
Section 2 2 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United
States Marine Corps from November 1985 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was
naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently,
under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the
Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing
himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled “An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or
Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,” 4 Cruz took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro
C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that
the answer is “No.” In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1, of RA 2630, a
person “who ha[s] lost his citizenship” may “reacquire” it by “taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.” Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on
the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law.5 He
defines repatriation as “the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain
conditions.”6 Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage
of repatriate, as “to restore or return to one’s country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x
x.”7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is
not a grant of a newcitizenship, but a recovery of one’s former or original citizenship.
To “reacquire” simply means “to get back as one’s own again.” 8Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his
becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he “reacquired” the same status
upon repatriation. To rule, otherwise—that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen—would
not be consistent with the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. “New,” because it is not the same
as that with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, “the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its]
claimant x x x.”9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who
claims to be a natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural-Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born,
because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There a generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized
citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the
Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would
properly fall under the second category (naturalized).” 11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure,
in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino
citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born
citizen is a citizen “who has become such at the moment of his birth.”
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly
who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in
Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
“Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.”
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be
considered “natural-born”: (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one
does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one’s Philippine citizenship. 13 Thus, under
the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of “natural-born citizens” were (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. 14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to
include “[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof,” meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino
citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent—being
clearly and concededly not naturalized—is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they
naturally reacquire their originalclassification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In
the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in 1994, he
_____________
12
 Supra.
13
 Assailed Decision, p. 8.
14
 Ibid.
15
 Ibid., p. 9.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress.
I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether
the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET’s rulings, simply
because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of
HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the two
chambers of Congress “shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective, members.” 16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that
the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they
remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgments are beyond
judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:19
“The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of
due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.”
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier
explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of
the formercitizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At
best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But
an interpretation made in good faith and grounded on reason one way or the other cannot be
the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate
the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its
exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be
the sole judge of the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which
is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or
any judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the
latter’s actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our
fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusions of public respondent,
we cannot ipso facto attribute to it “grave abuse of discretion.” Verily, there is a line between
perceived error and grave abuse.21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. “It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.”22
____________
20
 Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.
21
 Ibid.
22
 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision
upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as
gravely abusive. Neither can I find any “patent or gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason
of passion or hostility” in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the Court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the
people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with
fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and
unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives.
The votes that Cruz garnered (80,119) in the last elections were much more than those
of all his opponents combined (66,182). 23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be
resolved in favor of the winning candidate’s eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the
will of the people.24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws
must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through
the ballot.25
Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations
in election controversies.26 For it would
_____________
23
 ”The following were the results of the election:
       Teodoro C. Cruz 80,119
       Antonio E. Bengson III 53,448 of the law. They are actually Filipinos by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire
their former citizenship.
       Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941 It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign
       Manuel R. Castro 622 countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should
       Mariano A. Padlan 171” welcome former Filipino citizen desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining
Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable
(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)
24 Filipinos is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for
 Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.
25 about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And
 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.
26 after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their
 Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.
representative in Congress.
567
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 567 law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET’s
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal prerogatives.
be better to err in favor of the people’s choice than to be right in complex but little understood WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
legalisms.27 DISSENTING OPINION
“Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will
in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the
issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore, must be
To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly disqualified as a member of Congress.
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal Who are natural-born citizens?
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the The laws on citizenship—its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic citizens—have given rise to some of the most disputatious and visceral issues resolved by this
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.” 28 Court. The problem is compounded in this petition because citizenship is taken up in
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards 569
globalization.29 Protectionist barriers are being dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 569
frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants
for citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court to deny respondent
themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills, know- Teodoro Cruz the right to hold the Office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
how and capital. because he does not possess the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of
_____________ this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be elected to
Congress considering that by repatriation, he reacquired his status as a natural-born Filipino
27 citizen.
 Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.
28 Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino
 Ibid.
29 parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United
 See Pacifico A. Agabin, “Globalization and the Judicial Function,” Odyssey and Legacy:
States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service for
The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by Atty.
almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of
Antonio M. Elicano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998 ed. See
California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen.
also Artemio V. Panganiban, Old Doctrines and New Paradigms,” a lecture delivered during the
On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided
Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series on February 13, 2001.
to return to the Philippines.
568
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil
want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not “aliens” in the true sense Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR No. B-
04628111) and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an
Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January
18, 1995, the United States Embassy Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States.
In the local elections of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and
served as mayor for one term.
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring
himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate
Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the
Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelamwith the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on September 14, 1998, claiming that Cruz, not being
a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is
not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-
born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which
provides: “No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.”
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and
supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his
natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected
representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
‘WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is
hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
11, 1998 elections.
“As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be
sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker,
and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio.”
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the
same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on
grounds that:
1. “1.The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss
and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. “2.The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his; Philippine citizenship.
3. “3.Assuming that private respondent’s acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed that, petition despite the fact
that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-
born status.”
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the
House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution 1 provides:
“Sec 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship, x x x.”
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase “from birth”
contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase “from birth” indicates that citizenship must start at a
definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution
does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at
one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the
benefits, privileges and attributes of “natural-born” citizenship. When he reacquired his
citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with the requirements for repatriation, thus effectively
taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase “from birth” refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a “natural-born.” Since he was born to Filipino
parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic
of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense,
but more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as
Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traced the grant of
natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March
23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
“Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.”
It was further held therein that under the said provision, “every person born after the 11th of
April, 1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in
this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizen of the Philippine Islands.”
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to line Second
Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial charter or fundamental law, we were
referred to as “people of the Islands,” or “inhabitants of the Philippine Islands,” or “natives of
the Islands” and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of “citizens
of the Philippine Islands” in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-
existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it
became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.
 Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired
under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law or the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited “citizens of the Philippine Islands” to
resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born
subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature.
Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by
law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Islands.
Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was
conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having
been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status
when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent’s position when it pronounced that the
definition of a natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the
classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
“Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. (1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
2. (2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. (3)Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. (4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration-there are only two classes of
citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen,
then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born
citizens as “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.”
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
“Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING
COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.”
575
VOL. 357, MAY 7, 2001 575
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen.
He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath
with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American
citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation and construction of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers
and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are used according to
their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on “natural-born citizens of the Philippines” is precise, clear and
definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning
conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for construction of what the
words imply.
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,6 this Court held:
“Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning,
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its
language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say.”
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition
according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the “reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through
any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, CA. No. 63)
results in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen” is
a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen
concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to
become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug 7 in the instant case, concurred in by
Justice Jose A.R. Melo:8
“Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of original nationality upon the fulfillment of
certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time
consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, as amended), he,
nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his
adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be considered a natural-born citizen under the first
part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at
all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his
citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship
without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the
term ‘natural born’ citizens could also cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens
by reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been
accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien
parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)”
The two dissenting Justices correctly stated that the “stringent requirement of the Constitution
is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of
allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the
government directly involved and given the delicate task of legislation.”
The dissenting opinion further states:
“The term ‘natural-born’ Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later
adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer
to those ‘who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship,’ and to those ‘who elect Philippine citizenship.’ Time and
again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation—there is only room
for application. The phrase ‘from birth’ indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship
and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and without interruption.”
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a
member of the House of Representatives must be a “natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman.
Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such position can
be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and
ratified by the Filipinos (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt of the United States) guides and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship
and the more narrow and bounded concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 Constitution, 9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable
only to the President and Vice President. 10A person who had been a citizen for only five (5)
years could be elected to the National Assembly. 11 Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution
was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives. 13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be
appointed Justice of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a lower court. 14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement
of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime
Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members
of the Constitutional Commissions and the majority of members of the cabinet, must be
natural-born citizens.16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the
members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. 17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear
intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the
meaning and import of natural-born citizen and citizenship in general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less than the
Constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a “natural-born
Filipino citizen” is a matter which can only be accomplished through a constitutional
amendment. Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been
restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he
cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born
Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Petition dismissed.
 G.R. No. 176947. February 19, 2009.*
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, petitioner, vs.  COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, respondents.
Election Law; Election Offense; Probable Cause; Determining probable cause is an
intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary
or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint.
—There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that there is no
sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting
for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining
probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or
submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the
allegations in the complaint.
Same; Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; The fact that a candidate has dual citizenship prior to
his filing his certificate of candidacy does not disqualify him from running for public office. —We
agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS
Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at
birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification
showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001
elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for
public office.
_______________
* EN BANC.
13
VOL. 580, FEBRUARY 19, 2009 13
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225);
The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to a natural-born Filipino who did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country.—In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall “meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath”
aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, 572 SCRA
295 (2008); Velasco v. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 590 (2008) and Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331
(2009), all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of
another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Same; Same; Residence; Residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin
elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,
and is not dependent upon citizenship.—Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the
residency requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an American. Cordora’s
reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and
the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.14
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Sibayan and Associates Law Office for petitioner.
  Francisco I. Chavez for respondent G.S. Tambunting.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting
(Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordora’s
complaint in a Resolution 1 dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18
August 2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution 2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En
Banc which denied Cordora’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that
Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
“That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B
[Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows,
particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.” 3(Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented
a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon
departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
“That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re:
CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state,
among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9 – residence requirement which
he lost when[he was] naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic]
Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the
above basic requirements under No. 12 – that he is indeed eligible for the office to which he
seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his
own statements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.”4 (Emphases in the original)
_______________
3 Id., at p. 29.
4 Id., at p. 30.
16
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in
his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of
a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized
as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took
an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225),
or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting
has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the
Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambunting’s
certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is
not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against
Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s
reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an
American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.17
VOL. 580, FEBRUARY 19, 2009 17
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.”5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion
which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed
out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively
renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004
and ran for public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the
COMELEC En Bancdismissed Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support
probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.
_______________
5 Id., at p. 40.
18
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
Cordora’s petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambunting’s
failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an
action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks to
prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of
candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an
Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that there is no
sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting
for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining
probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or
submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the
allegations in the complaint.6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
 “Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election pur-
_______________
6 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 345 Phil. 1141, 1173; 280 SCRA 892, 921
(1997).
19
VOL. 580, FEBRUARY 19, 2009 19
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
poses; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport
size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.”
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of
Section 74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’
differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand,
insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process
involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tam-20
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
bunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the
filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had
dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. 7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth
who desire to run for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we
ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position.
“To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto  and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another
_______________
7 See Valles v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 327; 337 SCRA 543 (2000).
21
VOL. 580, FEBRUARY 19, 2009 21
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
x x x
[I]n including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission
was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in
R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
“[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.”
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
“Any person with dual citizenship” is disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born
citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to
the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country
of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No
one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require
an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman’s example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening
himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to
say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: “I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship.”
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon
him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowl-23
VOL. 580, FEBRUARY 19, 2009 23
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
edges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.
Manzano,9  Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS v. Datumanong. 11 Mercado and Valles involve
similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed
dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in
the United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother
and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Vallesstated that dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by
effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individual’s active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS  states that,  under R.A. No.
9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The
act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted
years after the promulgation of
_______________
8  367 Phil. 132, 144-145, 147-149; 307 SCRA 630, 640-645 (1999). Citations omitted.
9  367 Phil. 132; 307 SCRA 630 (1999).
10 392 Phil. 327; 337 SCRA 543 (2000).
11 G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cordora vs. Commission on Elections
Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
“I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.”
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states
that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public
office in the Philippines shall “meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath” aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot  v. Dal
and COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14  and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-
born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for
elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did
not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambunting’s residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of
Tambunting’s naturalization as an American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is
not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the
twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there
permanently,16 and is not dependent upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed
willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting
sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the
office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements
prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.
 

G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015.*
 
RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003;
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA)on August 29,
2003.—R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections
2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of
Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the fol-
_______________
*  THIRD DIVISION.
527
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 527
David vs. Agbay
lowing oath of allegiance to the Republic: “I ___________, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Same; Same; Same; In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. —In fine, for
those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign
country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A.
9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for reacquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Criminal Law; Falsification of Documents; Falsification of documents under paragraph 1,
Article 172  in relation to Article 171  of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a
private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position, of public, private, or commercial documents.—Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private
individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of
public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private indi-
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Agbay
vidual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Danilo A. Soriano  for petitioner.
  Bienvenido C. Castillo for respondent.
 
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
 
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the
petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order 2 dated
March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his
motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square-meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria,
Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they
came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the
salvage zone.
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 26-29. Penned by Presiding Judge Recto A. Calabocal.
2  Id., at pp. 67-71. Penned by Acting MTC Judge Benuardo B. Manalo.
529
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 529
David vs. Agbay
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner,
a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-
6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07 5 issued by
the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he
could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the
Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the
right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and
criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution 7 finding
probable cause to indict peti-
_______________
3  Id., at p. 32.
4  An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes.
5  Rollo, p. 33.
6  Should be January 8, 2009, id., at pp. 13 & 50; Records, pp. 6 & 30.
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Agbay
tioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for
review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
petitioner’s subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by
the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public
document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any
proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the act of
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed
before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause 10 in the MTC. Interpreting the
provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that
R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity,
and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing law
was Commonwealth Act No. 63 11 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had reacquired his
_______________
7   Id., at pp. 36-38.
8   Id., at pp. 34-35.
9   Id., at pp. 50-53.
10  Id., at pp. 54-58.
11  An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired, approved on October 21, 1936.
 
531
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 531
David vs. Agbay
Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian
citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit,
the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration, 13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him
relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He
argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR
Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner)
who had reacquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public land.
The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration. 14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that  first, jurisdiction
over the person of an accused cannot be a precondition for the redetermination of probable
cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order
disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized
in another country reacquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification
was already consummated as petitioner has not yet reacquired his Philippine citizenship,
_______________
12  Rollo, p. 71.
13  Id., at pp. 72-75.
14  Id., at p. 76.
15  Records, pp. 1-16.
16  Id., at pp. 65-67.
532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Agbay
and his subsequent oath to reacquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship
status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any
remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a
Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full-blown trial, and in case of conviction, to
appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
 
Petitioner is now before us arguing that —
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has
disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by
reacquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction “deemed not to have
lost” it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to
have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to
surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has preempted the right of petitioner through his wife
and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is
implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process. 18
_______________
17  Rollo, p. 29.
18  Id., at p. 16.
533
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 533
David vs. Agbay
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the
retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections 20 on the retroactivity of
one’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot
be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such
doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the
simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public document,
it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised
and proved in a full-blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General
opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for
Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the
said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that
the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion
after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their
respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification
for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of
_______________
19  327 Phil. 521; 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
20  484 Phil. 609; 441 SCRA 655 (2004).
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Agbay
R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for redetermination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,”
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3
of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath. (Emphasis supplied)
535
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 535
David vs. Agbay
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified
by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the
first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country who shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for
both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but
the terminology used is different, “reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second
group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
“Retention of Philippine Citizenship,” the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
“reacquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both reacquisition
and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old
law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Agbay
 other countries and allowing dual citizenship, 21 and also provides for the procedure for
reacquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between reacquisition and retention in R.A.
9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused
is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in
this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to
have been understood by the accused, who is a nonlawyer, at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 2011 22 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed
by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where
Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate
version, “Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth,  ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.”
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by
reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens
who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained
their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you
mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after the
effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before
the effectivity of this act are no longer natural-born citizens because they have just reacquired
their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and
reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity — assuming that we can agree on this,
upon the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who
lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances.
So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions
between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain government positions,
no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the
provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our
conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law
allows dual citizenship, he was able to reacquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it
is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to
Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
539
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 539
David vs. Agbay
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise
misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-
honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 24 in relation to Article 17125 of
the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The
elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
 
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;
and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. 26
 
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a naturalborn
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not
err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph
1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground
for denying petitioner’s motion for redetermination of probable cause, as the motion was filed
prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for redetermination
warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that
deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of
he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. merit.
Thus: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez: With costs against the petitioner.
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his SO ORDERED.
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand,
one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody
of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will
and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is
literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
x x x x
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
543
VOL. 753, MARCH 18, 2015 543
David vs. Agbay
x x x x
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29(Emphasis supplied)
 
  
G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.*
 
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
 
G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.*
 
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs.  COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS and AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof
of the candidate.—The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the CoC of petitioner
should be denied due course or cancelled
_______________
*  EN BANC.
2 noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
“on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position,
if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of
the candidate.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; As presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought
to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”—Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is
an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election  the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; If a candidate cannot
be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
“provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy (CoC) be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
—Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of
one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction,
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or
by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a
prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification “provided by law or the
Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can
be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.—At the outset, it must be
 
 
3
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 3
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should
have shown that both of petitioner’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling
did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her
parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
Same; Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%)
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.—Other
circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance
that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
Same; Same; As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.—As a
matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this Court held that: The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.
 
 
4 of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to
discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path
to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization.—The Solicitor General makes
the further point that the framers “worked to create a just and humane society,” that “they
were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory
intent against foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions “for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The
burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show
that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the
board marginalization.” We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are
several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article
XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x” and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the
“right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Same; Same; Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is
Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction
only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
Same; Same; Adoption; Republic Act (RA) No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes”
(otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), RA No. 8552, entitled “An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes”
(otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include found-
 
5
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 5
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
lings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.—Recent legislation is more direct.
R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all
expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted. It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a
naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In the first place, “having to perform an act”
means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination
of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the
child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. In this instance, such
issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly
refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her “foundling parents,” hence effectively
affirming petitioner’s status as a foundling.
Same; Same; Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates  (opinion as
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
 
 
6
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
“General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a
process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems
generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e.,  the general principles of fairness and
justice,” and the “general principle against discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are the same core principles
which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  (UNCRC) and  International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.—The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and
ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished
by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended,
and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If
the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable
in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.
Same; Same; Foreign Judgments; Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
“basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judg-
 
 
7 a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 7
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
ments, were correctly considered as “generally accepted principles of international law”
under the incorporation clause.—Our approach in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598
(2009),  and Mijares v. Ranada, 455 SCRA 397 (2005),  effectively takes into account the fact
that “generally accepted principles of international law” are based not only on international
custom, but also on “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the
policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
“generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.
Same; Same; It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.—
Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis  regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the
1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also,
the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis  countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle
of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Same; Same; Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that
even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine
citizens.—Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules
on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided
by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
 
 
8
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
Same; Same; Repatriation; Natural-born Citizens; Parreño v. Commission on Audit,  523
SCRA 390 (2007), is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
Republic Act [RA] No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born  citizenship.”—R.A. No. 9225 is
Condon v. COMELEC,  678 SCRA 267 (2012), where we described it as an
“abbreviated repatriation process that restores  one’s Filipino citizenship x x x.” Also included
is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390 (2007), which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,  500 SCRA 9 (2006), where we said that “[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will
allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit is categorical
that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . . recover
his natural-born  citizenship.”
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’ determination.—The COMELEC construed the phrase
“from birth” in the definition of natural citizens as implying “that natural-born citizenship must
begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was
obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired
even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’
determination. More importantly, COMELEC’s position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
357 SCRA 545 (2001),where the phrase “from birth” was clarified to mean at the time of birth:
“A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural born
citizen thereof.” Neither is “repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s citizenship.
In Bengson III  v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court pointed out that there
are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized,
and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens: It is apparent from the enumeration
of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy
is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the
loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings
in order to reacquire his citizen-
 
 
9 Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 9
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
ship, he is perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot
reverse a judicial precedent.—The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is
reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Carpio-Morales  v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin  S. Binay, Jr.,  774 SCRA 431 (2015), where we decreed reversed the condonation
doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines.” This Court also said that “while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected.”
Civil Law; Adoption; One (1) of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter.”—It was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed
a falsehood when she put in the spaces for “born to” in her application for repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she
was a naturalborn Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown. This position disregards one important fact —
petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter.” Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate
“attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)” and which certificate “shall
not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.” That law also requires that “[a]ll records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of
Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.” The law therefore allows petitioner to
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her
birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records,
petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee. Clearly, to avoid a direct
ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation
of CoC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
Election Law; Presidential Candidates; Residence; The Constitution requires presidential
candidates to have ten (10) years residence in the Philippines
 
 
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before the day of the elections.—The Constitution requires presidential candidates to
have ten (10) years’ residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
“Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016,” she put in “10
years 11 months” which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning
date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S. When petitioner immigrated to
the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; Same; Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.—It is obvious that because of
the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no
choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent
resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of
petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her
husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing
a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
Same; Residence; Balikbayan Program; A closer look at Republic Act (RA) No. 6768 as
amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that there
is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans  as tempo-
 
 
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rary visitors who must leave after one (1) year.—The COMELEC also took it against
petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A.
No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,”
shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans  as temporary visitors who must
leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad
and “comes or returns to the Philippines.” The law institutes a balikbayan  program “providing
the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country” in line with the
government’s “reintegration program.” Obviously, balikbayans  are not ordinary transients.
Given the law’s express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan  must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to
allow him to reestablish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends
to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did — she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while
awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy (CoC)
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It was grave abuse of discretion for the
COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It
could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as to period of residence made in a CoC  was
overcome by evidence.  In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,  248 SCRA 300 (1995), the candidate
mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a
minimum of one year. We said that “[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.” The COMELEC ought to have
looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the
2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC both  correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
Same; Misrepresentation; Disqualification of Candidates; The candidate’s
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a material fact
(eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.—The facts now, if
not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it
 
 
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covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court’s
pronouncement that: Concededly, a candidate’s disqualification to run for public office does
not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due
course to, and for the cancellation of, a CoC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate’s
misrepresentation in his CoC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications
for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications to run for public office.
 
SERENO, CJ., Concurring Opinion:
 
Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; View that Section 78 of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Bilang  118, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), does not allow the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to rule on the qualifications of candidates.—Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang  118, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), does not allow the COMELEC to rule on the
qualifications of candidates. Its power to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is
circumscribed within the confines of Section 78 of the OEC that provides for a summary
proceeding to determine the existence of the exclusive ground that any representation made
by the candidate regarding a Section 74 matter was false. Section 74 requires, among others a
statement by the candidate on his eligibility for office. To authorize the COMELEC to go beyond
its mandate and rule on the intrinsic qualification of petitioner, and henceforth, of every
candidate, is an outcome clearly prohibited by the Constitution and by the OEC.
Same; Foundlings; View that it is absolutely offensive to Our concept of due process for
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to insist on its own interpretation of an area of the
Constitution that the Supreme Court (SC) has yet to squarely rule upon, such as the citizenship
of a foundling.—It is absolutely offensive to Our concept of due process for the COMELEC to
insist on its own interpretation of an area of the Constitution that this Court has yet to squarely
rule upon, such as the citizenship of a foundling. It was also most unfair of COMELEC to
suddenly impose a previously non-existing formal requirement on candidates — such as a
permanent resident visa or citizenship itself — to begin the tolling of the required duration of
residency. Neither statutes nor jurisprudence require those matters. COMELEC grossly acted
beyond its jurisdiction by usurping the powers of the legislature and the judiciary.
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; View that the remedy to remove from the
electoral ballot, the names of candidates who are not actually eligible, but who still state under
oath in their Certificate of Candidacies (CoCs) that they are eligible to run for public office, is for
any person to file a petition
 
 
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 under Section 78.—As used in Section 74, the word “eligible” means having the right to
run for elective public office; that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities.
The remedy to remove from the electoral ballot, the names of candidates who are not actually
eligible, but who still state under oath in their CoCs that they are eligible to run for public
office, is for any person to file a petition under Section 78, which provides: Sec. 78. Petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Same; Same; Misrepresentation; View that Jalover v. Osmeña, 736 SCRA 267 (2014),
reiterated that a petition under Section 78 cannot prosper in a situation where the intent to
deceive or defraud is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results.
Furthermore, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, but must
pertain to a material fact.—At any rate, after Tagolino v. HRET, 693 SCRA 574 (2013), We
reiterated the requirement of deceit for a Section 78 petition to prosper in four more cases.
Our most recent pronouncements in Jalover v. Osmeña, 736 SCRA 267 (2014), reiterated that a
petition under Section 78 cannot prosper in a situation where the intent to deceive or
defraud is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. Furthermore, the
misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, but must pertain to a
material fact.
Same; Same; Same; View that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy (CoC) according to the prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court (SC) still requires the
following essential allegations: (1) the candidate made a representation in the certificate; (2)
the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of
the candidate (the right to run for the election); and (3) the candidate made the false
representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public
office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible.—A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
according to the prevailing decisions of this Court still requires the following essential
allegations: (1) the candidate made a representation in the certificate; (2) the representation
pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the
right to run for the election); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or delib-
 
 
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erately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
him ineligible.
Same; Same; Same; View that under Section 78, it is not enough that a person lacks the
relevant qualification; he must have also made a false representation of the lack of qualification
in the certificate of candidacy (CoC).—It must be emphasized that under Section 78, it is not
enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he must have also made a false
representation of the lack of qualification in the certificate of candidacy. The denial of due
course to, or the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy, is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false,
which relates to the qualifications required of the public office the candidate is running for.
Considering that intent to deceive is a material element for a successful petition under Section
78, a claim of good faith is a valid defense. Misrepresentation means the act of making a false
or misleading assertion about something, usually with the intent to deceive. It is not just
written or spoken words, but also any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion. A
material misrepresentation is a false statement to which a reasonable person would attach
importance in deciding how to act in the transaction in question or to which the maker knows
or has reason to know that the recipient attaches some importance. In the sphere of election
laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate’s act with the intention to gain an
advantage by deceitfully claiming possession of all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications when the contrary is true. A material misrepresentation is incompatible with a
claim of good faith. Good faith encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. It implies honesty of intention and honest belief in the validity of one’s right,
ignorance of a contrary claim, and absence of intention to deceive another.
Same; Same; Same; Substantial Evidence; View that since the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is a quasi-judicial body, the petitioner must establish his case of material
misrepresentation by substantial evidence.—Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence defines burden of proof as “the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim” “by the amount of evidence required by law.” When it
comes to a Section 78 proceeding, it is the petitioner who has the burden of establishing
material misrepresentation in a CoC. Since the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body, the petitioner
must establish his case of material misrepresentation by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. Burden of proof never shifts. It is the burden of evidence that
shifts. Hence, in a Section 78 proceeding, if the petitioner comes up with a  prima facie case of
material misrepresentation, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent. In this case,
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
respondents had the burden to establish the following: (1) falsity of the representations
made by petitioner with regard to her citizenship and residence; and (2) intent to deceive or
mislead the electorate.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Admission Against Interest; View that to be admissible, an
admission must (1) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (2) be categorical and definite; (3) be
knowingly and voluntarily made; and (4) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it
would be self-serving and inadmissible.—It is well to emphasize that admissions against interest
fall under the rules of admissibility. Admissions against interest pass the test of relevance and
competence. They, however, do not guarantee their own probative value and conclusiveness.
Like all evidence, they must be weighed and calibrated by the court against all other pieces at
hand. Also, a party against whom an admission against interest is offered may properly refute
such declaration by adducing contrary evidence. To be admissible, an admission must (1)
involve matters of fact, and not of law; (2) be categorical and definite; (3) be knowingly and
voluntarily made; and (4) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-
serving and inadmissible. An admission against interest must consist of a categorical statement
or document pertaining to a matter of fact. If the statement or document pertains to a
conclusion of law or necessitates prior settlement of questions of law, it cannot be regarded
as an admission against interest. Even a judicial admission, which does not require proof, for
judicial admissions under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. But even then, contrary
evidence may be admitted to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake.
In Bitong v. CA, 292 SCRA 503(1998), the Court ruled that although acts or facts admitted in a
pleading do not require proof and can no longer be contradicted, evidence aliunde  can be
presented to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake.
Same; Same; Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence; Certificate of Candidacy; View that
while petitioner’s 2013 certificate of candidacy (CoC) may be presented as proof of its regularity
and due execution, it is not prima facie  evidence of the facts stated therein, i.e., the declaration
that she essentially became a resident of the Philippines only in November 2006.—The
statement that she would be a resident of the Philippines for six years and six months as of
May 2013 (reckoned from November 2006) in her 2013 certificate of candidacy was admittedly
made under oath. However, while notarized documents fall under the category of public
documents, they are not deemed prima facie  evidence of the facts therein stated. Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter. Clearly, notarized documents are merely proof of
 
 
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the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date stated therein. They require
no further proof to be admissible, because the certificate of acknowledgment serves as
the prima facie  evidence of its execution. Thus while petitioner’s 2013 certificate of candidacy
may be presented as proof of its regularity and due execution, it is not prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein, i.e., the declaration that she essentially became a resident of the
Philippines only in November 2006. Furthermore, while a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution and regularity, even such
presumption is not absolute as it may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
Honest Mistake; View that the surrounding circumstances in this case do not exclude the
possibility that petitioner made an honest mistake, both in reckoning her period of residence in
the Philippines as well as determining the proper end period of such residence at the time. —The
fact that it was the first time that petitioner ran for public office; that only a two-year period of
residence in the country is required for those running as senator; and that the item in the
certificate of candidacy providing “Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013”
could be open to an interpretation different from that required, should have been taken into
consideration in appreciating whether petitioner made the subject entry honestly, in good
faith, and without fault or negligence. The surrounding circumstances in this case do not
exclude the possibility that petitioner made an honest mistake, both in reckoning her period of
residence in the Philippines as well as determining the proper end period of such residence at
the time. That petitioner is running for the highest public office in the country should not be
the only standard by which we weigh her actions and ultimately her mistakes. Not all mistakes
are made with evil motives, in much the same way that not all good deeds are done with pure
intentions. Good faith is always presumed, and in the face of tangible evidence presented to
prove the truth of the matter, which is independent of the circumstances that caused
petitioner to make that fateful statement of “6 years and 6 months,” it would be difficult to
dismiss her contention that such is the result of an honest mistake.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; View that the term residence, as it is used in the 1987
Constitution and previous Constitutions, has been understood to be synonymous with domicile.
—Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution requires that a candidate for president be “a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.” The term
residence, as it is used in the 1987 Constitution and previous Constitutions, has been
understood to be synonymous with domicile. Domicile means not only the intention to reside
in one place, but also personal presence therein coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. It is the permanent home and the place to which one intends to return whenever
absent for business or pleasure as shown by facts and circumstances that disclose such intent.
 
 
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Same; Same; View that a person can have but one (1) domicile at a time. Once
established, the domicile remains until a new one is acquired.—A person’s domicile of origin is
the domicile of his parents. It is not easily lost and continues even if one has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Absence from the domicile to pursue a profession or
business, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature, and even
travels abroad, does not constitute loss of residence. In contrast, immigration to a foreign
country with the intention to live there permanently constitutes an abandonment of domicile
in the Philippines. In order to qualify to run for public office in the Philippines, an immigrant to
a foreign country must waive such status as manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. A person can have but one domicile at a
time. Once established, the domicile remains until a new one is acquired. In order to acquire a
domicile by choice, there must concur: (a) physical presence in the new place, (b) an intention
to remain there (animus manendi), and (c) an intention to abandon the former domicile
(animus non revertendi). Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these
requirements, the domicile of origin continues.
Balikbayan Program; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 6768 enacted on 3 November 1989,
instituted a Balikbayan Program under the administration of the Department of Tourism (DOT)
to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland.—R.A. 6768,
enacted on 3 November 1989, instituted a Balikbayan  Program under the administration of the
Department of Tourism to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their
motherland. Under R.A. 6768, the term balikbayan  covers Filipino citizens who have been
continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one year; Filipino overseas workers;
and former Filipino citizens and their family who had been naturalized in a foreign country and
comes or returns to the Philippines. The law provided various privileges to the balikbayan: 1.
Tax-free maximum purchase in the amount of US$1,000 or its equivalent in other acceptable
foreign currencies at Philippine duty-free shops; 2. Access to a special promotional/ incentive
program provided by the national flag air carrier; 3. Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a
period of one year for foreign passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals; 4.
Travel tax exemption; and 5. Access to especially designated reception areas at the authorized
ports of entry for the expeditious processing of documents. It is emphasized in the law that the
privileges granted thereunder shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by
the balikbayan  under existing laws, rules and regulations. R.A. 9174 dated 7 November 2002
amended R.A. 6768 by extending further the privileges of a balikbayan to include:
1. Kabuhayan shopping privilege through an additional tax-exempt purchase in the maximum
amount of US$2,000 or its equivalent in Philippine peso and other acceptable foreign
currencies, exclusively for the purchase of livelihood tools at all government-owned and
-controlled/operated duty-free
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
shops; 2. Access to necessary entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programs
and marketing assistance, including the balikbayan’s immediate family members, under the
government’s reintegration program; and 3. Access to accredited transportation facilities that
will ensure their safe and convenient trips upon arrival. It was again emphasized that the
privileges granted shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayan under existing
laws, rules and regulations.
Same; View that as far as our immigration laws are concerned with regard
to  balikbayans,  they and their families may reside in the Philippines either on temporary or
permanent bases even though they remain nationals of their host, adopted or native countries.
—As far as our immigration laws are concerned with regard to balikbayans, they and their
families may reside in the Philippines either on temporary or permanent bases even though
they remain nationals of their host, adopted or native countries. The special treatment
accorded to balikbayans finds its roots in recognition of their status as former Filipinos and not
as mere aliens.
Same; View that notwithstanding our immigration laws,  balikbayans may continue to
stay in the Philippines for the long-term even under a visa-free entry, which is extendible upon
request.—R.A. 9174 is the government’s latest thrust in its consistent efforts in
attracting balikbayans to come home to the Philippines and build a new life here.
Notwithstanding our immigration laws, balikbayans  may continue to stay in the Philippines
for the long-term even under a visa-free entry, which is extendible upon request.  It must be
emphasized that none of the Court’s previous decisions has ever looked at the very extensive
privileges granted to Balikbayan entrants.
Same; Residence; View that  considering that the law allows a  balikbayan to stay in the
Philippines for a certain period even without a visa and to settle in the country during that
period, there is no reason to reject petitioner’s intent to reestablish a residence from the date
she entered the country.—In the case of balikbayans, the true intent of Congress to treat these
overseas Filipinos not as mere visitors but as prospective permanent residents is evident from
the letter of the law. While they are authorized to remain in the country for a period of only
one year from their date of arrival, the laws, rules and regulations under
the Balikbayan Program do not foreclose their options should they decide to actually settle
down in the country. In fact, the Balikbayan Program envisions a situation where former
Filipinos would have been legally staying in the Philippines visa-free for more than 36 months.
In the case of petitioner Poe, she entered the Philippines visa-free under
the Balikbayan program, left for a short while and legally reentered under the same program.
This is not a case where she abused any Balikbayan  privilege because shortly after reentering
the country on 11 March 2006, she applied for dual citizenship under R.A. 9225. Based
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
on the foregoing, it was most unfair for COMELEC to declare that petitioner could not
have acquired domicile in the Philippines in 2005 merely because of her status as a balikbayan.
Her visa (or lack thereof) should not be the sole determinant of her intention to reacquire her
domicile in the Philippines. Congress itself welcomes the return of overseas Filipinos without
requiring any type of visa. Although visa-free entry is for a limited time, the period is extendible
and is not conditioned upon the acquisition of a permanent resident visa. Considering that the
law allows a balikbayan  to stay in the Philippines for a certain period even without a visa and
to settle in the country during that period, there is no reason to reject petitioner’s intent to
reestablish a residence from the date she entered the country. In fact, petitioner’s permanent
resettlement, as one millions of Filipino who had gone abroad, is an end-goal of
the Balikbayan  Program.
Domicile; View that  whether children are enrolled in local schools is a factor considered
by courts when it comes to establishing a new domicile.—Whether children are enrolled in local
schools is a factor considered by courts when it comes to establishing a new domicile.
In Fernandez v. HRET, 608 SCRA 733 (2009), we used this indicium: In the case at bar, there are
real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and
abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner
and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have
attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005.
Same; View that our very own jurisdiction treats acquisition of residential property as a
factor indicating establishment of a new domicile.—Our very own jurisdiction treats acquisition
of residential property as a factor indicating establishment of a new domicile. Take the 2012
case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 670 SCRA 572 (2012), in which we held that Rommel Jalosjos
acquired a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay: Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door
neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors
are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance of noting his presence or absence
than his other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo presented, who just sporadically passed by
the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the
same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay . He
showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from
where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Residence; View that a Taxpayer’s Identification Number (TIN) Card does not conclusively
evince the notion that petitioner is a resident of the Philip-
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 pines.—Indeed, the 1997 Tax Code mandates all persons required under our tax laws to
render or file a return to secure a TIN. This would include a nonresident so long as he or she is
mandated by our tax laws to file a return, statement or some other document. It is thus correct
to say that a TIN Card does not conclusively evince the notion that petitioner is a resident of
the Philippines. Nevertheless, the significance of the TIN Card lies in the fact that it lists down
the address of petitioner as No. 23 Lincoln St. West Greenhills, the very same address of her
mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe, as reflected in the latter’s affidavit. Therefore, the TIN Card, which
was issued on 22 July 2005, corroborates the assertion that petitioner, upon her arrival in 2005,
was then staying at her mother’s home.
Domicile; View that petitioner registered as a voter on 31 August 2006. This speaks
loudly of the intent to establish a domicile in the country.—Petitioner registered as a voter on
31 August 2006. This speaks loudly of the intent to establish a domicile in the country. In Hale
v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC, the Supreme Court of Mississippi considered registering
to vote as a factor indicative of the intent to acquire a new domicile. More
importantly, Oglesby v. Williams, treats voter registration as one of the two most
significant indicia of acquisition of a new domicile.
Residence; View that the implication of petitioner having registered on 31 August 2006 is
that she had already been a resident in the country for at least one (1) year as of the day of her
registration.—We must not lose sight of the fact that petitioner registered as a voter in this
country on 31 August 2006. Thus, the implication of petitioner having registered on 31 August
2006 is that she had already been a resident in the country for at least one year as of the day of
her registration. The reason is that the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 requires among other
things that the citizen must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year. That being
said, the registration of petitioner as voter bolsters petitioner’s claim that she concretized her
intent to establish a domicile in the country on 24 May 2005. Take note that if we use 24 May
2005 as the reckoning date for her establishment of domicile in the Philippines, she would have
indeed been a resident for roughly one year and three months as of 31 August 2006, the date
she registered as a voter in the Philippines.
Election Law; Residence; View that in Maquiling v. COMELEC,  696 SCRA 420  (2013),
while the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the use of a foreign passport negates the earlier
renunciation of such foreign citizenship,  did not say,  however, that the use of a foreign
passport after reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and before the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship adversely affects the residency of a candidate for purposes of running in the
elections.—In Maquiling v. COMELEC, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), which I penned for the Court,
while we ruled that the use of a foreign passport negates the earlier renunciation of such
foreign
 
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citizenship, did not say, however, that the use of a foreign passport after reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship and before the renunciation of the foreign citizenship adversely
affects the residency of a candidate for purposes of running in the elections. This case cannot,
therefore, be used as basis to negate petitioner’s residency. This Maquiling decision involved
Rommel Arnado who was elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 elections.
He ran also for the 2013 elections for the same post and won again. The Court affirmed
the Maquiling doctrine in the case of Arnado v. COMELEC, 767 SCRA 168 (2015). The doctrine
was not expanded in any manner as to affect petitioner’s citizenship claim.
The Maquiling doctrine solely has to do with the effect of the continued use of a US
passport after the renunciation of US citizenship. In the case of petitioner, there is absolutely
no evidence, which even COMELEC admits, that she used a US passport after she renounced
her US citizenship on 20 October 2010. Clearly, Maquiling and Arnado are not relevant to the
petitioner’s case until new proof can be adduced contradicting the present state of the
evidence on record that petitioner never used her US passport after she renounced her US
citizenship.
Adoption; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 8552, provides that the “adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such
is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided  by law to legitimate sons/daughter born to
them without discrimination of any kind.”—In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 189
(1992), We held that upon entry of an adoption decree, the law creates a relationship in which
adopted children were declared “born of” their adoptive parents. Congress confirmed this
interpretation when it enacted R.A. 8552, which provides that the “adoptee shall be considered
the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled
to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughter born to them
without discrimination of any kind.” Apart from obtaining the status of legitimate children,
adoptees are likewise entitled to maintain the strict confidentiality of their adoption
proceedings. The provisions of P.D. 603, R.A. 8515 and the Rule on Adoption stipulate that all
records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. The records are
permanently sealed and may be opened only upon the court’s determination that the
disclosure of information to third parties if “necessary” and “for the best interest of the
adoptee.” This grant of confidentiality would mean very little if an adoptee is required to go
beyond this decree to prove her parentage.
Same; View that the issuance of an amended certificate without any notation that it is
new or amended or issued pursuant to an adoption decree, should
 
 
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22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
not be taken against petitioner, because it merely complies with the confidentiality
provisions found in adoption laws.—Article 410 of the Civil Code states that the books making
up the civil register and all documents relating thereto are considered public documents and
shall be prima facie  evidence of the facts therein contained. As a public document, a registered
certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of validity. Petitioner’s birth certificate also has
the imprimatur of no less than the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal Province. In the absence
of a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is
void, the birth certificate and the facts stated therein are deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
Petitioner thus cannot be faulted for relying on the contents of a public document which enjoys
strong presumptions of validity under the law. She is actually obliged to do so because the law
does not  provide her with any other reference for information regarding her parentage. It must
be noted that records evidencing her former foundling status have been sealed after the
issuance of the decree of adoption. In Baldos v. Court of Appeals and Pillazar, 624 SCRA 615
(2010), We held that it is not for a person to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth,
but for those who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity. The issuance of an
amended certificate without any notation that it is new or amended or issued pursuant to an
adoption decree, should not be taken against petitioner, because it merely complies with the
confidentiality provisions found in adoption laws. Under Section 16 of the Rule on Adoption
(A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, 31 July 2002), it shall be the responsibility of the civil registrar where the
foundling was registered to annotate the adoption decree on the foundling certificate, and to
prepare a new birth certificate without any notation that it is a new or amended certificate.
Citizenship; Foundlings; Passports; View that if the State considers foundlings to be
anything else but its citizens (stateless persons, for example), it would not have given them
passports.—When the claim to Philippine citizenship is doubtful, only a “travel document” is
issued. A travel document, in lieu of a passport, is issued to stateless persons who are likewise
permanent residents, or refugees granted such status or asylum in the Philippines. If the State
considers foundlings to be anything else but its citizens (stateless persons, for example), it
would not have given them passports. However, since the 1950s, the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) has been issuing passports to foundlings. A quick look at the official website of the
DFA would show an enumeration of supporting documents required of foundlings for the
issuance of a Philippine passport; to wit, certificate of foundling authenticated by the Philippine
Statistics Authority, clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), passport of the person who found the applicant, and letter of authority or
endorsement from DSWD for the issuance of passport. The only conclusion that can be made is
that foundlings are considered by the State, or at least by the executive, to be Philippine
citizens.
 
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Same; Natural-born Citizens; Certificate of Candidacy; View that while findings made by
Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the citizenship of petitioner is not conclusive on the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), such negate any notion of bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner
when she made the representation in her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) that she was a natural-
born citizen.—While findings made by Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the citizenship of
petitioner is not conclusive on the COMELEC, such negate any notion of bad faith or malice on
the part of petitioner when she made the representation in her CoC that she was a natural-
born citizen. At the time, the presumption created by the Order was in operation. In effect,
petitioner had color of authority to state that she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
It has been argued that petitioner had obtained the BI order only because she misrepresented
herself to have been “born...to Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe.” However, as
previously discussed, the potent policy interests embedded in the confidentiality of adoption
records fully justifies her decision to write the names of her adoptive parents as indicated in
her birth certificate.
Same; Foundlings; View that petitioner’s honest belief that she was a natural-born citizen
is further shown by her constant assertion of her status and is corroborated by official
documents and acts of government issued in her favor.—At any rate, it would be absurd for
petitioner to answer “foundling” in every document where her filiation and citizenship is
required when her birth certificate and other official documents provide otherwise. Not only
would this defeat the purpose of the degree of confidentiality prescribed by the law, she would
even run the risk of causing offense to her parents whom she would deprive of actual
recognition. Petitioner’s honest belief that she was a natural-born citizen is further shown by
her constant assertion of her status and is corroborated by official documents and acts of
government issued in her favor. I believe that these documents, at the very least, negate any
deliberate intent on her part to mislead the electorate as to her citizenship qualification.
Same; Same; View that the standard proposed by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) — physical proof of blood relation to a parent who is a citizen of the Philippines — is
an impossible, oppressive and discriminatory condition.—The standard proposed by the
COMELEC — physical proof of blood relation to a parent who is a citizen of the Philippines — is
an impossible, oppressive and discriminatory condition. To allow the imposition of this unjust
and unreasonable requirement is to sanction a violation of the Constitution and our obligations
under existing international law. In Philippine law, a foundling refers to a deserted or
abandoned infant; or a child whose parents, guardian, or relatives are unknown; or a child
committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and
parentage, and registered as such in the Civil Register. The ruling of the COMELEC is premised
solely on the admitted fact that petitioner is a foundling. As explained in the assailed
Resolutions,
 
 
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24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
petitioner was found abandoned in the parish church of Jaro, Iloilo, on 3 September
1968 by a certain Edgardo Militar. She was later on legally adopted by Ronald Allan Poe and
Jesusa Sonora Poe. To date, however, her biological parents are unknown.
Same; Same; Filiation; View that physical or scientific proof of a blood relationship to a
putative parent is not required by law to establish filiation or any status arising therefrom such
as citizenship.—Evidently, there is no legal basis for the standard proposed by the COMELEC
and private respondents. Physical or scientific proof of a blood relationship to a putative parent
is not required by w to establish filiation or any status arising therefrom such as citizenship. In
fact, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that DNA evidence is not absolutely essential so
long as paternity or filiation may be established by other proof. There is, therefore, no reason
to impose this undue burden on petitioner, particularly in light of her situation as a foundling.
Instead of requiring foundlings to produce evidence of their filiation — a nearly impossible
condition — administrative agencies, the courts and even congress have instead proceeded on
the assumption that these children are citizens of the Philippines.
Adoption; Foundlings; View that under Republic Act (RA) No. 9523, foundlings were
included in the definition of abandoned children and expressly allowed to be adopted, provided
they were first declared by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as
available for adoption.—In 2009, Congress passed R.A. 9523, which allowed the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to declare a child “legally available for adoption” as a
prerequisite for adoption proceedings. Under this statute, foundlings were included in the
definition of abandoned children and expressly allowed to be adopted, provided they were first
declared by the DSWD as available for adoption. Administrative Order No. 011-09 was adopted
by that department in 2009 to implement the statute.
Citizenship; Foundlings; Natural-born Citizens; View that petitioner has typical Filipino
features, with her brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair, oval-shaped face and height. This
by itself, does not evince belief that as to her definite citizenship, but coupled with other
circumstantial evidence — that she was abandoned as an infant, that the population of Iloilo in
1968 was Filipino and there were not international airports in Iloilo at that time — establishes
the probability the she was born of Filipino parents.—First and foremost, it is admitted that
petitioner has typical Filipino features, with her brown eyes, low nasal bridge, black hair, oval-
shaped face and height. This by itself, does not evince belief that as to her definite citizenship,
but coupled with other circumstantial evidence — that she was abandoned as an infant, that
the population of Iloilo in 1968 was Filipino, and there were not international airports in Iloilo a
that time — establishes the probability the she was born of Filipino parents.
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
Such probability is further enhanced by the statistics obtained from the Philippine
Statistics Authority, showing that 10,558,278 children (99.03%) were born to Filipino parents
while 15,986 (0.07%) were born to foreigners in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975. Considering
that the election cases require a mere preponderance of evidence, then it can be reasonably
concluded that petitioner has fulfilled the requirements of citizenship under the law. In the
words of Justice Tuazon in Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953), this conclusion is not airtight
but rational; never certain but plain enough to justify a fact.
Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of natural-born citizenship, originally meant
to distinguish those who are “natural-born” from those who are “foreign-born” in  jus
soli  jurisdictions, cannot be used to justify the denial of citizenship status to foundlings because
of their inability to prove a certain blood relationship.—The requirement of natural-born
citizenship should serve only to deny certain privileges to those who have gone through the
process of naturalization in order to acquire and perfect their citizenship. The concept,
originally meant to distinguish those who are “natural-born” from those who are “foreign-
born” in jus soli  jurisdictions, cannot be used to justify the denial of citizenship status to
foundlings because of their inability to prove a certain blood relationship.
Same; Same; Same; View that it appears that the original opposite of the term “natural-
born” is not “naturalized,” but “foreign-born.”—It appears that the original opposite of the
term “natural-born” is not “naturalized,” but “foreign-born.” The term was meant to
distinguish between those born within a certain territory and those born outside it. Blood or
descent was irrelevant. However, because of the mixture of common law and civil law in our
jurisdiction, the original concept of natural-born citizenship seems to have been diluted.
Same; Same; Same; View that a Filipino citizen who did not undergo the naturalization
process is natural-born.—Since the term was defined in the negative, it is evident that the term
“natural-born citizens” refers to those who do not have to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. The definition excludes only those who are naturalized.
From this interpretation, it may be inferred that a Filipino citizen who did not undergo the
naturalization process is natural-born. As We explained in Bengson III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001): A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on
 
 
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26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof.
Same; Same; Same; View that as stated in the early case  Roa v. Collector of Customs,  23
Phil. 315 (1912), a natural-born citizen is one who has become such at the moment of birth. —
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in
which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizens as provided by law. In contrast, as
stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912), a natural-born citizen is
one who has become such at the moment of birth.
Adoption; View that upon the entry of an adoption decree, the law creates a relationship
in which adopted children are deemed “born of” their adoptive parents.—It must be
emphasized that adoption severs all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee
and vests those rights in the adopter. Section 17 of R.A. 8552, in particular, provides that the
“adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughter born to them without discrimination of any kind.” Hence, upon the entry of an
adoption decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted children are deemed “born
of” their adoptive parents.
Same; Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that as to whether petitioner also
reacquired her natural-born status, the Court must apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET,  357
SCRA 545 (2001),  which allowed the applicant to reacquire not only his citizenship, but also his
original natural-born status.—As to whether petitioner also reacquired her natural-born status,
the Court must apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), which allowed the
applicant to reacquire not only his citizenship, but also his original natural-born status. In that
case, the Court noted that those who reacquire Philippine citizenship must be considered
natural-born or naturalized citizens, since the Constitution does not provide a separate
category for them. Between the two categories, the Court found it more appropriate to
consider them natural-born citizens, since they were not required to go through the tedious
naturalization procedure provided under the law.
Same; Same; Same; View that there are only two (2) classes of citizens under the
Constitution — those who are natural-born and those who are naturalized.—It has been argued
that the taking of an oath under R.A. 9225, as petitioner has done, should be considered as an
“act to acquire or perfect citizenship” under Section 2, Article IV of the present Constitution. As
previously discussed, however, there are only two classes of citizens under the Constitution —
those who are natural-born and those who are naturalized. The “act” ad-
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
 verted to in the Constitution must therefore be understood as pertaining only to the act
of naturalization.
Same; Same; Same; View that the reacquisition and retention of citizenship under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 or RA No. 2630  and repatriation under RA No. 8171 are different
from naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.—The reacquisition and retention
of citizenship under R.A. 9225 or R.A. 2630 and repatriation under R.A. 817 are different from
naturalization under C.A. 473. Reacquisition, retention, and repatriation are effected by merely
taking the necessary oath of allegiance and registering in the proper civil registry (and in the
Bureau of Immigration in accordance with R.A. 8171). On the other hand, naturalization is a
tedious process that begins with the filing of a declaration of intention one year prior to filing a
petition for admission to Philippine citizenship and ends with the issuance of a certificate of
naturalization.
Same; Same; Same; View that although matters of citizenship were traditionally
considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, contemporary developments indicate
that their powers in this area are now “circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full
protection of human rights.”—It must be remembered that norms of customary international
law become binding on the Philippines as part of the law of the land by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause in the Constitution. For incorporation to occur, however, two elements
must be established: (a) widespread and consistent practice on the part of states; and (b) a
psychological element known as the opinio juris sive necessitatis  or a belief on the part of
states that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. For evident reasons, a statement made by one of the framers of the 1935
Constitution and the Hague Convention cannot, by themselves, prove widespread state
practice or opinio juris. Without more, We cannot declare the existence of a binding norm of
customary international law granting citizenship to foundlings in 1935. I believe, however,
that this customary norm exists in international law at present. Although matters of
citizenship were traditionally considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of states,
contemporary developments indicate that their powers in this area are now “circumscribed
by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.” In particular, the right of
children to acquire a nationality is enshrined in a number of international and regional
conventions. The presumption of citizenship accorded to foundlings in a state’s territory is
specifically mentioned in three conventions: the 1930 Hague Convention, the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness and the European Convention on Nationality. These treaties,
concurred in by various state parties, show that on the part of the members of the
international community, there is widespread recognition of the right to nationality of children
in general and foundlings in particular.
 
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CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
 
Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the
Constitution vests in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the power, among others, to
“[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
x x  x.”—Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power, among
others, to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, x x x.” Screening initially the qualifications of all candidates lies within this specific
power. In my dissent in Tecson v. COMELEC,  424 SCRA 277 (2004), involving the issue of
Fernando Poe, Jr.’s citizenship, I discussed the COMELEC’s jurisdiction, to wit: x x x. Under
Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power and function to
“[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” “The
initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with the Comelec
clearly falls within this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct
of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing
laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list of candidates
will be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable.
For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of candidates for
president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec. Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the
Constitution also empowers the Comelec to “[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote,
all questions affecting elections x x  x.” The power to decide “all questions affecting elections”
necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications
required by law for election to public office. This broad constitutional power and function
vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting
elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born
Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly
not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to
wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified. (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied) Clearly, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can
initially determine the qualifications of all candidates and disqualify those found lacking any of
such qualifications before the conduct of the elections. In fact, the COMELEC is empowered
to motu proprio cancel CoCs of nuisance candidates.
Election Law; Nuisance Candidates; View that it cannot be disputed that a person, not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy (CoC) for President, “put[s] the
election process in mockery” and is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such person’s CoC
can  motu proprio be cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) under Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Code (OEC), which empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio  the CoC if it “has
been filed to put the election process in mockery.”—It cannot be disputed that a person, not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for President, “put[s] the
election process in mockery” and is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such person’s certificate of
candidacy can motu proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the CoC if it “has been
filed to put the election process in mockery.”
Same; Same; View that allowing a nuisance candidate to run for President renders
meaningless the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) constitutional power to “[e]nforce and
administer all laws x  x x relative to the conduct of an election, x x  x.”—To allow a person, who
is found by the COMELEC not to be a naturalborn Filipino citizen, to run for President of the
Philippines constitutes a mockery of the election process. Any person, who is not a natural-
born Filipino citizen, running for President is obviously a nuisance candidate under Section 69
of the Omnibus Election Code. Allowing a nuisance candidate to run for President renders
meaningless the COMELEC’s constitutional power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws x x x
relative to the conduct of an election, x x x.” The election process becomes a complete mockery
since the electorate is mercilessly offered choices which include patently ineligible candidates.
The electorate is also needlessly misled to cast their votes, and thus waste their votes, for an
ineligible candidate. The COMELEC cannot be a party to such mockery of the election process;
otherwise, the COMELEC will be committing a grave abuse of discretion.
Citizenship; View that based on Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, petitioner’s
citizenship may be determined only under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5).—Based on Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, petitioner’s citizenship may be determined only under
paragraphs (3), (4) and (5). Paragraph (1) of Section 1 is not applicable since petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution as petitioner was born after
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution. Paragraph (2) of Section 1 is likewise inapplicable since
petitioner was not born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of the
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines. Of the Filipino citizens falling
under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5), only those in paragraph (3) of Section 1, whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines, can be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since they are
Filipino citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. In short, they are Filipino citizens by the mere fact of
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
birth. Under paragraph (4) of Section 1, those Filipino citizens whose mothers are
Filipinos and whose fathers are aliens cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since
they are still required to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority — they
are not Filipino citizens by the mere fact of birth. However, under paragraph (2), Section 1 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, those whose fathers are Filipino citizens and those whose
mothers are Filipino citizens are treated equally. They are considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. Moreover, under Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to paragraph
(3), Section 1 of the same Article, those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are also deemed natural-
born Filipino citizens.
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that none of the framers of the 1935
Constitution mentioned the term “natural-born” in relation to the citizenship of foundlings .—
None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term “natural-born” in relation to
the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers
were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were born of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing
them from being natural-born Filipino citizens. If, as petitioner would like us to believe, the
framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would have
created an absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a better
position than a child whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the
1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such an absurdity.
Same; Same; Same; View that clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935
Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as only those who were Filipino citizens by the
mere fact of being born to fathers who were Filipino citizens — nothing more and nothing less;
As a matter of course, those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are both unknown,
such as in the case of foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.—Clearly, it
was the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as only
those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born to fathers who were Filipino
citizens — nothing more and nothing less. To repeat, under the 1935 Constitution, only children
whose fathers were Filipino citizens were natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were born
of alien fathers and Filipino mothers were not considered natural-born Filipino citizens, despite
the fact that they had a blood relation to a Filipino parent. Since a natural-born citizen is a
citizen by birth who need not perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship, then
those born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers and who had to elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, an overt act to perfect citizenship, were not considered natural-born
Filipino citizens. As a matter of course, those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are
both unknown, such as in the case of foundlings, cannot be considered naturalborn Filipino
citizens.
 
 
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International Law; View that generally accepted principles of international law are those
legal principles which are so basic and fundamental that they are found universally in the legal
systems of the world.—Generally accepted principles of international law are those legal
principles which are so basic and fundamental that they are found universally in the legal
systems of the world. These principles apply all over the world, not only to a specific country,
region or group of states. Legal principles such as laches, estoppel, good faith, equity and  res
judicata  are examples of generally accepted principles of international law.
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Convention on the Rights of the Child; View that the
Convention on the Rights of the Child does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth, much
less a natural-born citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine Constitution, but
merely the right to acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal law.—The Philippines
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the same on
21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean every human being below the age of
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, the age of majority is attained
earlier. Since petitioner was born in 1968 or more than 20 years before the Convention came
into existence, the Convention could not have applied to the status of her citizenship at the
time of her birth in 1968. Petitioner’s citizenship at birth could not be affected in any way by
the Convention. The Convention guarantees a child the right to acquire a nationality, and
requires the contracting states to ensure the implementation of this right, in particular where
the child would otherwise be stateless. Thus, as far as nationality is concerned, the Convention
guarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that the child will not be
stateless. The Convention does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth, much less a
naturalborn citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine Constitution, but merely
the right to acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal law.
Same; Citizenship; Jus Soli; Jus Sanguinis; View that under the jus soli principle, the place
of birth determines citizenship at birth, not blood relation to the parents; Under the   jus
sanguinis principle, citizenship at birth is determined by blood relation to the parents.—
Nationality at birth may result because the law applicable is either jus soli  or jus sanguinis.  A
child born in the United States to foreign parents is a citizen of the United States at birth
because the United States adopts the jus soli  principle. Under the jus soli  principle, the place of
birth determines citizenship at birth, not blood relation to the parents. In contrast, a child born
in the Philippines to foreign parents is not a Philippine citizen at birth but a foreigner because
the Philippines follows the jus sanguinis  principle. Under the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship
at birth is determined by blood relation to the parents.
 
 
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Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that there is no international treaty
to which the Philippines is a contracting party, which provides expressly or impliedly that a
foundling is deemed a  natural-borncitizen of the country in which the foundling is found.—
Nationality at birth does not necessarily mean natural-born citizenship as prescribed under the
Philippine Constitution. The Constitution recognizes natural-born citizens at birth only under
the principle of jus sanguinis  — there must be a blood relation by the child to a Filipino father
or mother. Even assuming, and there is none, that there is an international law granting a
foundling citizenship, at birth, of the country where the foundling is found, it does not
necessarily follow that the foundling qualifies as a natural-born citizen under the Philippine
Constitution. In the Philippines, any citizenship granted at birth to a child with no known blood
relation to a Filipino parent can only be allowed by way of naturalization as mandated by the
Constitution, under paragraph 5, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, paragraph 4,
Section 1 of Article III of the 1973 Constitution, and paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution. Such a child is a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino
citizen. In sum, there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a contracting party,
which provides expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a natural-born citizen of the
country in which the foundling is found. There is also obviously no international treaty, to
which the Philippines is not a party, obligating the Philippines to confer automatically Philippine
citizenship to a foundling at birth.
Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; View that Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affirms that “everyone has the right to a nationality.” —
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that “everyone has the right to
a nationality.” With these words, the international community recognizes that every individual,
everywhere in the world, should hold a legal bond of nationality with a state. The right to a
nationality is a fundamental human right from which springs the realization of other cardinal
human rights. Possession of a nationality carries with it the diplomatic protection of the
country of nationality and is also often a legal or practical requirement for the exercise of
political and civil rights. Consequently, the right to a nationality has been described as the
“right to have rights.”
Same; Foundlings; View that in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is
deemed born in the country where the foundling is found.—Considering that there is no
conventional or customary international law automatically conferring nationality to foundlings
at birth, there are only two general principles of international law applicable to
foundlings. First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is
found. A foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at
 
 
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birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of origin which is the
country in which the foundling is found. Second,  in the absence of proof to the contrary, a
foundling is deemed born in the country where the foundling is found. These two general
principles of international law have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.
Same; View that international law can become part of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation.—Under Section 3, Article II of the 1935 Constitution, Section
3, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, and Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. International law can become part of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as domestic legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. The Philippine Constitution adheres to the
incorporation method.
Same; View that if a treaty, customary international law or generally accepted
international law principle does not contravene the Constitution and statutory laws, then it
becomes part of the law of the land.—Any treaty, customary international law, or generally
accepted international law principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must
conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines. If a treaty, customary
international law or generally accepted international law principle does not contravene the
Constitution and statutory laws, then it becomes part of the law of the land. If a treaty,
customary international law or generally accepted international law principle conforms to the
Constitution but conflicts with statutory law, what prevails is the later law in point of time as
international law has the same standing as municipal statutory law. However, if a treaty,
customary international law or generally accepted international law principle conflicts with the
Constitution, it is the Constitution that prevails. The Constitution remains supreme and prevails
over any international legal instrument or principle in case of conflict.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that only those citizens at birth because of  jus
sanguinis,  which requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.—There is a difference between citizenship at birth because
of jus soli,  and citizenship at birth because of jus sanguinis.  The former may be granted to
foundlings under Philippine statutory law pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution but the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a natural-born
citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at
 
 
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birth because of jus sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-
born Filipino citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that if a child’s parents are unknown, as in the case of a
foundling, there is no basis to consider the child as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is
no proof that either the child’s father or mother is a Filipino citizen.—If a child’s parents are
neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be considered a Filipino citizen is
through the process of naturalization in accordance with statutory law under paragraph (5),
Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. If a child’s parents are unknown, as in the case
of a foundling, there is no basis to consider the child as a naturalborn Filipino citizen since there
is no proof that either the child’s father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a
foundling can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.
International Law; Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that customary
international law cannot validly amend the Constitution by adding another category of natural-
born Filipino citizens, specifically by considering foundlings with no known parents as natural-
born citizens.—Customary international law has the same status as a statute enacted by
Congress. Thus, it must not run afoul with the Constitution. Customary international law cannot
validly amend the Constitution by adding another category of natural-born Filipino citizens,
specifically by considering foundlings with no known parents as natural-born citizens. Again,
under paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, in relation to
Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, only those born of Filipino fathers or
Filipino mothers are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Applying customary international
law to the present case, specifically the right of every human being to a nationality and the
Philippines’ obligation to grant citizenship to persons who would otherwise be stateless, a
foundling may be naturalized as a Filipino citizen upon proper application for citizenship. This
application should not be interpreted in the strictest sense of the word. On the contrary, the
term “application” for purposes of acquiring citizenship must be construed liberally in order to
facilitate the naturalization of foundlings. The application for citizenship may be any overt act
which involves recognition by the Philippines that the foundling is indeed its citizen. Thus, the
application for citizenship may be as simple as applying for a Philippine passport, which serves
as evidence of citizenship. An application for a passport is an application for recognition that
the holder is a citizen of the state issuing such passport. In the case of petitioner, she applied
for, and was issued a Philippine passport on the following dates: (1) 4 April 1988; (2) 5 April
1993; (3) 19 May 1998; (4) 13 October 2009; (5) 19 December 2013; and (6) 18 March 2014. In
any event, for a foundling to be granted citizen-
 
 
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ship, it is necessary that the child’s status as a foundling be first established. It must be
proven that the child has no known parentage before the state can grant citizenship on account
of the child being a foundling. In the Philippines, a child is determined to be a foundling after an
administrative investigation verifying that the child is of unknown parentage. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration provide that
the barangay captain or police authority shall certify that no one has claimed the child or no
one has reported a missing child with the description of the foundling.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that there is no constitutional provision or statute that
confers natural-born citizenship based on statistical probability.—There is no law or
jurisprudence which supports the Solicitor General’s contention that natural-born citizenship
can be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical probability. Absent any legal
foundation for such argument, the Solicitor General cannot validly conclude that a 99.93% (or
99.83%) statistical probability that a foundling born in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino
citizen legally confers on such foundling natural-born citizenship. There is no constitutional
provision or statute that confers natural-born citizenship based on statistical probability.
Adoption; View that either Filipino or alien children found in the Philippines, over which
the Philippine government exercises jurisdiction as they are presumed domiciled in the
Philippines, may be subject to adoption under Republic Act (RA) No. 8552 or RA No. 8043 .—
Clearly, there is no specific provision in these adoption laws requiring that adoptees must be
Filipinos, much less natural-born Filipinos. These adoption laws do not distinguish between a
Filipino child and an alien child found in the Philippines, and thus these adoption laws apply to
both Filipino and alien children found in the Philippines. In other words, either Filipino or alien
children found in the Philippines, over which the Philippine government exercises jurisdiction
as they are presumed domiciled in the Philippines, may be subject to adoption under RA 8552
or RA 8043. However, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8552, issued by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, provide that they shall “apply to the adoption
in the Philippines of a Filipino child by a Filipino or alien qualified to adopt under Article III,
Section 7 of RA 8552.” The IRR, in effect, restricted the scope of RA 8552 when the IRR
expressly limited its applicability to the adoption of a Filipino child when the law itself, RA 8552,
does not distinguish between a Filipino and an alien child. In such a case, the IRR must yield to
the clear terms of RA 8552. Basic is the rule that the letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by an administrative rule.
Election Law; Natural-born Citizens; Burden of Proof; View that any person who claims to
be qualified to run for the position of President of the Philip-
 
 
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pines because he or she is, among others, a natural-born Filipino citizen, has the burden
of proving he or she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.—Any person who claims to be a citizen of
the Philippines has the burden of proving his or her Philippine citizenship. Any person who
claims to be qualified to run for the position of President of the Philippines because he or she
is, among others, a natural-born Filipino citizen, has the burden of proving he or she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Any doubt whether or not he or she is natural-born Filipino citizen
is resolved against him or her. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being
an express qualification for election as President, must be complied with strictly. As the Court
ruled in Paa v. Chan,  21 SCRA 753 (1967): It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims
Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship , and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
Natural-born Citizens; Evidence; Deoxyribonucleic Acid; View that the issue of parentage
may be resolved by conventional methods or by using available modern and scientific
means. One (1) of the evidence  that she could have presented is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
evidence which could conclusively show that she is biologically (maternally or paternally)
related to a Filipino citizen, which in turn would determine whether she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.—As the burden of evidence has shifted to petitioner, it is her duty to present
evidence to support her claim that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and thus eligible to run
for President. The issue of parentage may be resolved by conventional methods or by using
available modern and scientific means. One of the evidence that she could have presented is
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence which could conclusively show that she is biologically
(maternally or paternally) related to a Filipino citizen, which in turn would determine whether
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The probative value of such DNA evidence, however,
would still have to be examined by the Court. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
the Court would consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
Same; Foundlings; View that there is no Philippine law automatically conferring
Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.—The 1987 Philippine Constitution is clear: “No
person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, x x x,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.” Is
petitioner, being a foundling, a natural-born Filipino citizen? The answer is clearly
no. First,  there
 
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is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.
Even if there were, such a law would only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino
citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of
Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a
matter of fact and any doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine
citizenship. Third,  the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings
from being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus
sanguinis  principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either her father or mother is a
Filipino citizen. Fourth,  there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of
international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Petitioner
failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best, there exists a
presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the country where the foundling is
found. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a
foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to parents
possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail over our
Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of municipal statutory
law. This means that customary international law is inferior to the Constitution, and must yield
to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis  principle,
and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino
citizens, then petitioner must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her
to be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes
the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of course be rejected. Sixth, petitioner
failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being a
foundling, she admitted that she does not know her biological parents, and therefore she
cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother. Without credible and convincing
evidence that petitioner’s biological father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is,
prove his or her status as a foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a
foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to
perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically
governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary
international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the State’s
obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of foundlings.
Election Law; Natural-born Citizens; Nuisance Candidates; View that not being a natural-
born Filipino citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy (CoC) for
President can  motu proprio  be cancelled by the
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).—Not being a natural-born Filipino citizen,
petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy for President can motu
proprio  be cancelled by the COMELEC. In fact, the COMELEC is duty-bound to cancel
petitioner’s CoC because to allow a person who, as found by the COMELEC is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to run for President makes a mockery of the election process. Since petitioner is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, I deem it irrelevant to discuss the issue of whether petitioner
complied with the ten-year residency requirement to run for President. At any rate, assuming
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, which she is not, I concur with Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo’s Dissenting Opinion on the residency issue.
Same; Same; View that natural-born Filipino citizens who have renounced Philippine
citizenship and pledged allegiance to a foreign country have become aliens, and can reacquire
Philippine citizenship, just like other aliens, only if “naturalized in accordance with law.”—
Natural-born Filipino citizens who have renounced Philippine citizenship and pledged allegiance
to a foreign country have become aliens, and can reacquire Philippine citizenship, just like
other aliens, only if “naturalized in accordance with law.” Otherwise, a natural-born Filipino
citizen who has absolutely renounced and abjured allegiance to the Philippines and pledged
sole allegiance to the United States, undertaking to bear arms against any foreign country,
including the Philippines, when required by U.S. law, could still become the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines by performing a simple act — taking an oath of
allegiance before a Philippine public official — to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship.
The framers of the Constitution, and the Filipino people who ratified the Constitution, could not
have intended such an anomalous situation. For this reason, this Court should one day revisit
the doctrine laid down in Bengson III v. HRET,  357 SCRA 545 (2001).
 
VELASCO, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Domicile; View that the facts of the case suggest that Sen. Poe’s change of domicile and
repatriation from the United States (U.S.) to the Philippines was, to borrow from Mitra v.
COMELEC, 622 SCRA 744 and 633 SCRA 580 (2010),  “accomplished, not in a single key move
but, through an incremental process” that started in early 2005.—The facts of the case suggest
that Sen. Poe’s change of domicile and repatriation from the US to the Philippines was, to
borrow from Mitra v. COMELEC, 622 SCRA 744 and 633 SCRA 580 (2010), “accomplished, not in
a single key move but, through an incremental process” that started in early 2005. Specifically,
Sen. Poe took definite albeit incremental moves to reacquire her domicile of origin as shown by
the repatriation of her children and their pet, if I may add, from the US to the Philippines; the
enrollment of her children in Philippine schools; the sale of their family home in the US; the
repa-
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
triation of her husband and his employment in the Philippines; the transfer of their
household goods, furniture, cars and personal belongings from the US to the Philippines; the
purchase of a residential condominium in the Philippines; the purchase of a residential lot; the
construction of her family home in the country; her oath of allegiance under RA 9225; her
children’s acquisition of derivative Philippine citizenship; the renunciation of her US citizenship;
her service as chairperson of the MTRCB; and her candidacy and service as a senator of the
Philippines. All these acts are indicative of the intent to stay and serve in the country
permanently, and not simply to make a “temporary” sojourn.
Same; View that Sen. Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her permanent relocation
to the Philippines, her actual residence, and intent to stay in the Philippines since May 2005,
i.e., even before she took her oath of allegiance under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 in July 2006.
—As previously discussed, Sen. Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her permanent
relocation to the Philippines, her actual residence, and intent to stay in the Philippines since
May 2005, i.e., even before she took her oath of allegiance under RA 9225 in July 2006.
Hence, Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 670 SCRA 572 (2012), is the better precedent.
In Jalosjos,  the Court reckoned the candidate’s domicile in the Philippines even before he
reacquired his citizenship under RA 9225, without mentioning the need for a residence visa,
because he was able to satisfactorily prove that he had lived with his brother prior to taking his
oath of allegiance.
Same; View that the element of intent to abandon an old domicile does not require a
complete and absolute severance of all physical links to that country, or any other country for
that matter.—The alleged fact that Sen. Poe acquired a house in the US in 2008, cannot be
taken as an argument against her animus non revertendi vis-à-vis the evidence of her manifest
intent to stay, and actual stay, in the Philippines. Certainly, the element of intent to abandon an
old domicile does not require a complete and absolute severance of all physical links to that
country, or any other country for that matter. It is simply too archaic to state, at a time where
air travel is the norm, that ownership of a secondary abode for a temporary visit or holiday
negates an intent to abandon a foreign country as a legal domicile.
Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that her status as a foundling does not foreclose
the likelihood that either or both of her biological parents were Filipinos rendering her a
natural-born Filipino under items 3 and/or 4 of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.—
The term “natural-born” Filipino does not even appear in the above quoted provision. This
Court, however, has construed the term to refer to those falling under items one to four of the
section, as opposed to those who underwent naturalization under item number 5. But Sen. Poe
was not born before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution so that the first item is inapplicable.
That being said, her status as a foundling does not foreclose
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40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
the likelihood that either or both of her biological parents were Filipinos rendering her a
natural-born Filipino under items 3 and/or 4 of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
Indeed, while it is not denied that Sen. Poe was abandoned by her biological parents, her
abandonment on the date and specific place above indicated does not obliterate the fact that
she had biological parents and the private respondents had not shown any proof that they
were not Filipino citizens.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; View that the jurisdiction of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) over election contests attaches only after the President or
the Vice President concerned had been elected and proclaimed.—As to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC vis-à-vis that of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal’s (PET’s), I strongly disagree in the
conclusion that the COMELEC, in ruling on the four Section 78 petitions, usurped the
jurisdiction of the PET. Petitioner Poe espouses that due to the absence of a false material
misrepresentation in her CoC, the COMELEC should have dismissed the petitions outright for
being premature as they are in the nature of petitions for quo warranto, which is within the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the PET. This is plain error. The jurisdiction of the PET over
election contests attaches only after the President or the Vice President concerned had been
elected and proclaimed.
Same; COMELEC Rules; View that Section 8, Rule 23 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Rules is a valid exercise of the rule-making powers of the COMELEC notwithstanding
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.—Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules is a
valid exercise of the rulemaking powers of the COMELEC notwithstanding Section 7, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution. The condition “[u]nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law” that is mentioned in the latter provision gives the COMELEC the flexibility to fix a shorter
period for the finality of its decision and its immediate execution in consonance with the
necessity to speedily dispose of election cases, but without prejudice to the continuation of the
review proceedings before this Court. Certainly, this is not inconsistent with Commission’s
constitutional mandate to promulgate its own rules of procedure to expedite the dispositions
of election cases.
Citizenship; Jus Sanguinis; View that contrary to the insistence of petitioner Poe that
there is nothing in our Constitutions that enjoin our adherence to the principle of “jus
sanguinis” or “by right of blood,” said principle is, in reality, well-entrenched in our
constitutional system.—Contrary to the insistence of petitioner Poe that there is nothing in our
Constitutions that enjoin our adherence to the principle of “jus sanguinis” or “by right of
blood,” said principle is, in
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
reality, wellentrenched in our constitutional system. One needs only to read the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions and the jurisprudence detailing the history of the well-deliberated
adoption of the jus sanguinis  principle as the basis for natural-born Filipino citizenship, to
understand that its significance cannot be lightly ignored, misconstrued, and trivialized.
 Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; View that basic in statutory construction is the
principle that when words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.—Basic in statutory construction is the principle that when words and
phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. This plain
meaning or verba legis rule,  expressed in the Latin maxim “verba legis non est
recedendum,”  dictates that “from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that paragraphs 3 and 4, Section 1, Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, the organic law in effect during the birth of petitioner Poe, were clear
and unambiguous, it did not provide for any exception to the application of the principle of   “jus
sanguinis”  or blood relationship between parents and child, such that natural-born citizenship
cannot be presumed by law nor even be legislated by Congress where no blood ties exist.—
Undeniably, petitioner Poe does not come within the scope of Filipino citizens covered by
paragraphs (3) and (4). From a literal meaning of the said provisions, she cannot be considered
a natural-born citizen. Paragraphs 3 and 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, the
organic law in effect during the birth of petitioner Poe, were clear and unambiguous, it did not
provide for any exception to the application of the principle of ‘‘jus sanguinis”  or blood
relationship between parents and child, such that natural-born citizenship cannot be presumed
by law nor even be legislated by Congress where no blood ties exist.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that considering the silence of the Constitution on
foundlings, the people who approved the Constitution in the plebiscite had absolutely no idea
about the debate on the citizenship of foundlings and therefore, they could not be bound by it.
—In the present case, given that the language of the third and fourth paragraphs of the article
on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine Constitution clearly follow only the doctrine of jus
sanguinis, it is, therefore, neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention. A foundling, whose parentage and/or place of birth is
obviously unknown, does not come within the letter or scope of the said paragraphs of the
Constitution. Considering the silence of the Constitution on foundlings, the people who
approved the Constitution in the plebiscite had absolutely no idea about the debate on the
citizenship of foundlings and therefore, they could not be bound by it.
 
 
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Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner Poe would like to apply to her situation several
international law conventions that supposedly point to her entitlement to a natural-born
Filipino citizenship, notwithstanding her lack of biological ties to a Filipino father or mother.—
Generally accepted principles of international law “may refer to rules of customary law, to
general principles of law x x x, or to logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning on the
basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.” And it has been observed that,
certainly, it is this judicial reasoning that has been the anchor of Philippine jurisprudence on
the determination of generally accepted principles of international law and consequent
application of the incorporation clause. Petitioner Poe would like to apply to her situation
several international law conventions that supposedly point to her entitlement to a natural-
born Filipino citizenship, notwithstanding her lack of biological ties to a Filipino father or
mother. In effect, she wants to carve an exception to the ‘‘jus sanguinis”  principle through that
generally accepted principles of international law which, under the theory of incorporation, is
considered by the Constitution as part of the law of the land. Basic is the principle in statutory
construction that specific provisions must prevail over general ones, to wit: A special and
specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of their relative positions in the
statute. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what
is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general
enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within
the provisions of the particular enactment.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the provisions of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,  in claiming natural-born
Filipino citizenship.—Petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the provisions of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in claiming natural-born Filipino citizenship
primarily for the following reasons: firstly, the Philippines has not ratified said International
Conventions; secondly, they espouse a presumption by fiction of law which is disputable and
not based on the physical fact of biological ties to a Filipino parent;  thirdly, said conventions are
not self-executing as the Contracting State is granted the discretion to determine by enacting a
domestic or national law the conditions and manner by which citizenship is to be granted;
and fourthly, the citizenship, if acquired by virtue of such conventions will be akin to a
citizenship falling under Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, recognizing citizenship
by naturalization in accordance with law or by a special act of Congress.
 
 
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Same; Same; Same; View that notice must be made of the fact that the treaties,
conventions, covenants, or declarations invoked by petitioner Poe are not self-
executing,  i.e.,  the international instruments invoked must comply with the “transformation
method” whereby “an international law [must first] be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.”—Notice must be made of the
fact that the treaties, conventions, covenants, or declarations invoked by petitioner Poe are not
self-executing, i.e., the international instruments invoked must comply with the
“transformation method”  whereby “an international law [must first] be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.” Each of the
aforementioned recognizes the need for its respective provisions to be transformed or
embodied through an enactment of Congress before it forms part of the domestic or municipal
law.
Same; Same; Same; View that the child of unknown parentage may acquire the status of
a mere “national.” Nowhere in the identified international rules or principles is there an
obligation to accord the stateless child a citizenship that is of a “natural-born” character.—The
foregoing international conventions or instruments, requiring implementing national laws to
comply with their terms, adhere to the concept of statehood and sovereignty of the State,
which are inviolable principles observed in the community of independent States. The primary
objective of said conventions or instruments is to avoid statelessness without impairing State
sovereignty. Hence, the Contracting State has the discretion to determine the conditions and
manner by which the nationality or citizenship of a stateless person, like a foundling, may be
acquired. Neither do they impose a particular type of citizenship or nationality. The child of
unknown parentage may acquire the status of a mere “national.” Nowhere in the identified
international rules or principles is there an obligation to accord the stateless child a citizenship
that is of a “natural-born” character. Moreover, even if it so provided, it cannot be enforced in
our jurisdiction because it would go against the provisions of the Constitution.
Constitutional Law; View that in case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute,
the former always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws,
whether domestic or international, must conform to.—In case of conflict between the
Constitution and a statute, the former always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law
to which all other laws, whether domestic or international, must conform to. The duty of the
Court under Section 4(2), Article VIII is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws,
and by express provisions of said Section treaties or international agreements that do not
conform to it.
Citizenship; Foundlings; View that there must be a law by which citizenship can be
acquired by a foundling.—Citizenship is not automatically conferred
 
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44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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under the international conventions cited but will entail an affirmative action of the
State, by a national law or legislative enactment, so that the nature of citizenship, if ever
acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. There must be a law by which
citizenship can be acquired by a foundling. By no means will this citizenship can be considered
that of a natural-born under the principle of jus sanguinis, which is based on the physical
existence of blood ties to a Filipino father or Filipino mother. It will be akin to citizenship by
naturalization if conferred by fiction created by an international convention, which is of legal
status equal to a statute or law enacted by Congress.
Same; Same; Paternity; Filiation; View that statistics have never been used to prove
paternity or filiation.—The Solicitor General argues for Petitioner Poe citing the ratio of children
born in the Philippines of Filipino parents to children born in the Philippines of foreign parents
during specific periods. He claims that based on statistics, the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural-born Filipino is either 99.93% or 99.83%,
respectively, during the period between 2010 to 2014 and 1965 to 1975. This argument, to say
the least, is fallacious. We are determining blood ties between a child and her/his
parents. Statistics have never been used to prove paternity or filiation. With more reason, it
should not be used to determine natural-born citizenship, as a qualification to hold public
office, which is of paramount importance to national interest. The issue here is the biological
ties between a specific or named foundling and her parents, which must be supported by
credible and competent evidence. We are not dealing with the entire population of our country
that will justify a generalized approach that fails to take into account that the circumstances
under which a foundling is found may vary in each case.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; View that natural-born citizenship, as a qualification
for public office, must be an established fact in view of the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in
the Constitution, which should not be subjected to uncertainty nor be based in statistical
probabilities.—Natural-born citizenship, as a qualification for public office, must be an
established fact in view of the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the Constitution, which
should not be subjected to uncertainty nor be based in statistical probabilities. A disputable
presumption can be overcome anytime by evidence to the contrary during the tenure of an
elective official. Resort to this interpretation has a great potential to prejudice the electorate
who may vote a candidate in danger of being disqualified in the future and to cause instability
in public service.
Same; Same; View that a foundling is one who must first go through a legal process to
obtain an official or formal declaration proclaiming him/her to be a foundling in order to be
granted certain rights reserved to Filipino citizens.—A foundling is one who must first go
through a legal process to obtain an official or formal declaration proclaiming him/her to be a
foundling in order to be granted
 
 
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certain rights reserved to Filipino citizens. This will somehow prevent opening the
floodgates to the danger foreseen by Justice Del Castillo that non-Filipinos may misuse a
favorable ruling on foundlings to the detriment of national interest and security. Stated
otherwise, the fact of being a foundling must first be officially established before a foundling
can claim the rights of a Filipino citizen. This being the case, a foundling does not meet the
above quoted definition of a natural-born citizen who is such “from birth.”
Same; Same; View that a foundling first undergoes a legal process to be considered as
one before he/she is accorded rights to be adopted available only to Filipino citizens.—
A foundling  first undergoes a legal process to be considered as one before he/she is accorded
rights to be adopted available only to Filipino citizens. When the foundling is a minor, it is the
State under the concept of ‘‘parens patriae” which acts for or on behalf of the minor, but when
the latter reaches majority age, she/he must, by herself/himself, take the necessary step to be
officially recognized as a foundling. Prior to this, the error of outrightly invoking the “disputable
presumption” of alleged “natural-born citizenship” is evident as there can be no presumption
of citizenship before there is an official determination of the fact that a child or person is a
foundling. It is only after this factual premise is established that the interference or
presumption can arise. That being so, a foundling will not come within the definition of a
natural-born citizen who by birth right, being the biological child of a Filipino father or mother,
does not need to perform any act to acquire or perfect his/her citizenship.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; View that our adoption laws do not confer “natural-
born citizenship” to foundlings who are allowed to be adopted.—It should also be emphasized
that our adoption laws do not confer “natural-born citizenship” to foundlings who are allowed
to be adopted. To read that qualification into the adoption laws would amount to  judicial
legislation. The said laws of limited application which allows the adoption of a foundling,
cannot also be used as a basis to justify the natural-born citizenship of a foundling who has
reached majority age like petitioner Poe who applied to reacquire her citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225. The opinion of the seven (7) Justices if pursued, there will be no need for a foundling
to misrepresent himself or herself as a biological child of her adoptive parents like what
petitioner Poe did, and instead, a foundling can be truthful and just submit a Foundling
Certificate to be entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Since from their point of view a
foundling need not perform any act to be considered a natural-born citizen, said foundling
need not prove the veracity of the Foundling Certificate. This will include a Foundling Certificate
in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) prepared list of evidence of natural-born citizenship. This is
pure and simple judicial legislation. Foundlings are not even mentioned at all in R.A. No. 9225.
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46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
Same; Same; Same; Dual Citizenship; View that petitioner Poe’s claim to a dual
citizenship by virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 is invalid for the simple reason that the said
law limits its application to natural-born Filipino citizens only.—Petitioner Poe’s claim to a dual
citizenship by virtue of R.A. No. 9225 is invalid for the simple reason that the said law limits its
application to natural-born Filipino citizens only. In other words, the right to avail of dual
citizenship is only available to natural-born citizens who have earlier lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of acquisition of foreign citizenship. Second, petitioner Poe obtained dual
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by misrepresenting to the BI that she is the biological
child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that the Bureau was misled in to believing
that “[petitioner Poe] was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to
Filipino parents.” Third, the said order was not signed by the Commissioner of the BI as
required by implementing regulations. And her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship being
clearly invalid, petitioner Poe’s acceptance and assumption to public office requiring natural-
born citizenship as condition sine qua non  is likewise invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Misrepresentation; View that in her Petition for Retention and/or
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship filed before the Bureau of Investigation (BI) on July 10,
2006, petitioner Poe knowingly committed a false representation when she declared under oath
that she was “a former natural-born Philippine citizen, born on Sept. 3, 1968 at Iloilo City to
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a Filipino citizen and Jesusa Sonora Poe, a Filipino citizen.”—Given my
preceding discussion on the citizenship of petitioner Poe, I submit that she could not have
validly repatriated herself under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225 for purposes of
“reacquiring” naturalborn Filipino citizenship. Another point that I wish to emphasize is the fact
that in her Petition for Retention and/or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship filed before the
BI on July 10, 2006, petitioner Poe knowingly committed a false representation when she
declared under oath that she was “a former natural-born Philippine citizen, born on Sept. 3,
1968 at Iloilo City to Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a Filipino citizen and Jesusa Sonora Poe, a Filipino
citizen[.]” [Emphasis supplied] In so answering the blank form of the petition, petitioner Poe
plainly represented that she is the biological child of the spouses Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and
Jesusa Sonora Poe; thereby effectively concealing the fact that she was a foundling who was
subsequently adopted by the said spouses. This false representation paved the way for the
issuance by the BI of the Order dated July 18, 2006 that granted Poe’s petition, which declared
that she “was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, being born to Filipino parents
and is presumed to be a natural-born Philippine citizen[.]”
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of
Investigation (BI) granting petitioner Poe’s application for the reacquisition of her supposedly
lost natural-born citizenship was not only improvidently issued,
 
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but more importantly, it was null and void. The nullity stemmed from her concealment or
misrepresentation of a material fact, not an error of law, regarding the identity of her biological
parents.—I submit that the July 18, 2006 Order of the BI granting petitioner Poe’s application
for the reacquisition of her supposedly lost natural-born citizenship was not only improvidently
issued, but more importantly, it was null and void. The nullity stemmed from her concealment
or misrepresentation of a material fact, not an error of law, regarding the identity of her
biological parents. The unlawful product of this concealment was carried over in her pursuit
of high government positions requiring natural-born citizenship as a qualification. Therefore,
the same could not be the source of her reacquisition of all the attendant civil and political
rights, including the rights and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines, granted to
natural-born Filipino citizens.
Balikbayan Program; Domicile; View that under Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6768,
petitioner Poe was merely entitled to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1)
year. Thus, her stay then in the Philippines was certainly not for an indefinite period of
time.  This only proves that petitioner Poe’s stay was not impressed with animus manendi,
i.e., the intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of time.—It is
beyond question that petitioner Poe lost her domicile in the Philippines when she became a
naturalized American citizen on October 18, 2001. From then on, she established her new
domicile of choice in the U.S. Thereafter, on July 7, 2006, petitioner Poe took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act No. 9225. Again, on
the assumption  that petitioner Poe can validly avail herself of the provisions of said law, she
was deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship under the latter date. Subsequently,
on October 20, 2010, petitioner Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation).
Following Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), petitioner Poe’s
reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship did not automatically make her regain her residence
in the Philippines. She merely had the option to again establish her domicile here. The length of
petitioner Poe’s residence herein shall be determined from the time she made the Philippines
her domicile of choice. Whether petitioner Poe complied with the ten-year residency
requirement for running for the position of the President of the Philippines is essentially a
question of fact that indeed requires the review and evaluation of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC. On this note, I concur with the ruling
in Justice Del Castillo’s Dissenting Opinion that the evidence submitted by petitioner Poe was
insufficient to establish her claim that when she arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, her
physical presence was imbued with animus manendi. At that point in time, petitioner Poe’s
status was merely that of a nonresident alien. Notably, when petitioner arrived in the
Philippines on May 24, 2005, the same was through a
 
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48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
visa-free entry under the Balikbayan Program. Under Republic Act No. 6768 (An Act
Instituting a Balikbayan  Program), as amended by Republic Act No. 9174, the said program was
instituted “to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their motherland.”
Under Section 3 of the above mentioned law, petitioner Poe was merely entitled to a visa-free
entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year. Thus, her stay then in the Philippines was
certainly not for an indefinite period of time. This only proves that petitioner Poe’s stay was not
impressed with animus manendi,i.e., the intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an
indefinite period of time.
Election Law; Residence; View that it is the taking of the oath of allegiance to the
Republic on July 7, 2006 presumably conferred upon petitioner Poe not only Philippine
citizenship but also the right to stay in the Philippines for an unlimited period of time; Any
temporary stay in the Philippines prior to the aforesaid date cannot fall under the concept of
residence for purposes of elections.—Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225, the entitlement
to the full civil and political rights concomitant with the reacquired citizenship shall commence
only when the requirements in the said law have been completed and the Philippine citizenship
has been acquired. It is only then that that Filipinos who have reacquired their citizenship can
be said to gain the right to exercise their right of suffrage or to seek elective public office,
subject to the compliance with the requirements laid down in the Constitution and existing
laws. Thus, it is the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic on July 7, 2006 presumably
conferred upon petitioner Poe not only Philippine citizenship but also the right to stay in the
Philippines for an unlimited period of time. It was only then that she can claim subject to proof,
that her physical presence in the Philippines was coupled with animus manendi. Any temporary
stay in the Philippines prior to the aforesaid date cannot fall under the concept of residence for
purposes of elections. The animus manendi  must be proven by clear and unmistakable
evidence since a dual citizen can still freely enjoy permanent resident status in her/his domicile
of choice if said status is not given up or officially waived.
Same; Same; Misrepresentation; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; View that by
stating in her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) that she had complied with the required ten (10)-
year residency when she actually did not, petitioner made a false material representation that
justified the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) cancellation of her CoC.—The petitioner’s
evidence fails to substantiate her claim that she had established her domicile of choice in the
Philippines starting on May 24, 2005. By stating in her CoC that she had complied with the
required tenyear residency when she actually did not, petitioner made a false material
representation that justified the COMELEC’s cancellation of her CoC.
 
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Same; Same; Same; View that if she indeed wanted to reestablish her life here, petitioner
Poe should have applied for a Returning Former Filipino Visa, instead availing herself of a visa-
free  balikbayan entry.—Indeed, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is a
government agency that is primarily tasked to protect the interest and promote the welfare of
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). Among the benefits and services it renders is a Reintegration
Program, which defines reintegration as “a way of preparing for the return of OFWs into the
Philippine society.” Not being an OFW, petitioner Poe is not the balikbayan that is envisioned
to be the recipient of the above reintegration program. If she indeed wanted to reestablish her
life here, petitioner Poe should have applied for a Returning Former Filipino Visa, instead
availing herself of a visa-free balikbayan  entry. This visa may be applied for by a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the
Philippines for permanent residence, including his/her spouse and minor children. By this visa,
she would be allowed, inter alia, to stay in the Philippines indefinitely, establish a business, and
allowed to work without securing an alien employment permit. This would have definitely
established her intent to remain in the Philippines permanently. Unfortunately for petitioner
Poe, she did not apply for this visa.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is no need to go into the matter of questioning
petitioner Poe’s intent in making a material representation that is false; It is enough that she
signified that she is eligible to run for the Presidency notwithstanding the fact that she
appeared to know the legal impediment to her claim of natural-born Filipino citizenship, as
borne out by her concealment of her true personal circumstances, and that she is likewise
aware of the fact that she has not fulfilled the ten (10)-year residency requirement as shown by
her inconsistent and ambivalent stand as to the start of her domicile in the Philippines.—A
deeper analysis and research on the import and meaning of the language of Section 78, led to
the conclusion that as opposed to the use of the term “misrepresentation”which, colloquially is
understood to mean a statement made to deceive or mislead, the qualifying term
“false”  referring to the phrase “material representation” is said to have “two distinct and
well-recognized meanings. It signifies (1) intentionally or knowingly, or negligently untrue, and
(2) untrue by mistake, accident, or honestly after the exercise of reasonable care.” Thus, the
word ‘‘false”  does not necessarily imply an intention to deceive. What is important is that an
untrue material representation is made. Relating to the disqualification under Section 78 of the
OEC, the requirement of the said law (that a cancellation of a candidate’s CoC be exclusively
grounded on the presence of any material representation contained therein that is required
under Section 74 of the same is false) should only pivot on the candidate’s declaration of a
material qualification that is false, and not on the deliberate intent to defraud. With this, good
faith on the part of the candidate would be inconsequential. In these present cases, there is no
need to go into the matter of ques-
 
 
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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
tioning petitioner Poe’s intent  in making a material representation that is false. It is
enough that she signified that she is eligible to run for the Presidency notwithstanding the fact
that she appeared to know the legal impediment to her claim of natural-born Filipino
citizenship, as borne out by her concealment of her true personal circumstances, and that she
is likewise aware of the fact that she has not fulfilled the ten-year residency requirement as
shown by her inconsistent and ambivalent stand as to the start of her domicile in the
Philippines. Apparently, she is cognizant of the fact that she is actually ineligible for the
position.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner Poe’s ambivalent or varying accounts do not
inspire beliefs of the truthfulness of her latest allegation of the period of her residence in the
Philippines.—On the matter of her residency requirement, petitioner Poe concedes that she
indicated in her 2013 CoC that her “period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013”
was “6 years and 6 months.” Consequently, her residence in the Philippines could have only
begun on November 2006, such that by May 9, 2016, her aggregate period of residence in the
Philippines was approximately only 9 years and 6 months, which is short of the period of
residence required for presidential candidates. Petitioner Poe explains, however, that she
made the above statement as an “honest misunderstanding” of what was being asked of her.
She contends that she did not fully comprehend that the phrase “Period of Residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013” in her 2013 CoC actually referred to the period of residence
on the day right before the May 13, 2013 elections. She allegedly construed it to mean her
“period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of CoCs in October 2012 (which is
technically also a period ‘before May 13, 2013’).” Thus, she counted backwards from October
2012, instead from May 13, 2013 and in so doing she brought herself back to “March-April
2006,” which was the period when her house in the U.S. was sold and when her husband
resigned from his job in the U.S. She argues that that was the period she indicated, albeit it was
a mistake again on her part as it should have been May 24, 2005. Petitioner Poe’s ambivalent
or varying accounts do not inspire beliefs of the truthfulness of her latest allegation of the
period of her residence in the Philippines.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Commission on Elections; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; View that if we were
to follow the  ponencia’s  limitation on the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) function to
determine Poe’s eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result
would be that even the Supreme Court (SC) itself cannot rule on Poe’s citizenship and residence
eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78  COMELECruling; any declaration regarding
these issues would be obiter dictum.—If we were to follow the ponencia’s limitation on the
COMELEC’s function to determine Poe’s eligibility to become President in a
 
 
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 Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule
on Poe’s citizenship and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78
COMELEC ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum. In practical
terms, the Court’s ruling only assured Poe the chance to run; conceivably, if she wins, the
Court, through the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, will then rule that the people have spoken
and that they cannot be denied their voice after the elections. Based on the present
circumstances, this is a scenario that cannot be entirely ruled out. To reiterate,
the ponencia declared that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine, even preliminarily,
the eligibility of candidates prior to an election under a Section 78 proceeding, except for
disqualifications already or previously acted upon by the proper authorities or where the facts
are self-evident or of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity from which the falsity of
representation could readily be determined.
Citizenship; Foundlings; View that  ironically, the  ponencia’s  citation of Jose M. Aruego’s
recounting of the deliberations even reinforces my position that the framers never intended to
include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution’s parentage provisions.—Ironically,
the ponencia’s citation of Jose M. Aruego’s recounting of the deliberations even reinforces my
position that the framers never intended to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935
Constitution’s parentage provisions. Aruego allegedly said: During the debates on this
provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines,
and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention
believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality
of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
Constitution of the proposed amendment.
Judgments; View that the present case and ruling may very well be considered another
instance of judicial tinkering with the express terms of the Constitution.—But the worst impact
yet on the Constitution is the discovery that this Court can play around  even with the express
wordings of the Constitution. While this may already be known to those in the legal profession,
the reality becomes glaring and may be a new discovery for the general public because of the
recent EDCA case; the present case and ruling may very well be considered another instance of
judicial tinkering with the express terms of the Constitution.
 
 
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Citizenship; Burden of Proof; View that  citizenship cannot be presumed; the person who
claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a Filipino.  It is only upon proper
proof that a claimant can be entitled to the rights granted by the State.—Separately from the
strictly procedural aspects of the cancellation of CoC proceedings, it must be considered that
the petitioner, by filing a CoC, actively represents that she possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for the office she is running for. When this representation is
questioned, particularly through proof of being a foundling as in the present case, the burden
should rest on the present petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born Philippine citizen, a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately prior to the election, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a registered voter. This is
the opportunity that the COMELEC gave Poe to the fullest, and I see no question of grave abuse
of discretion on this basis. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the
right to determine who its citizens are. By conferring citizenship on a person, the State
obligates itself to grant and protect the person’s rights. In this light and as discussed more fully
below, the list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read
as exclusive and exhaustive. Thus, this Court has held that any doubt regarding citizenship must
be resolved in favor of the State. In other words, citizenship cannot be presumed; the person
who claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a Filipino. It is only upon
proper proof that a claimant can be entitled to the rights granted by the State.
Political Law; Judicial Review; View that in the seminal case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the Supreme Court (SC) mandated in no uncertain terms that
judicial review is  “limited to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented,”
and without passing upon “questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.”—In the
seminal case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the Court mandated in no
uncertain terms that judicial review is “limited to the constitutional question raised or the
very  lis mota  presented,” and without passing upon “questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.” With the scope of the justiciable issue so delimited, the Court in
resolving the constitutional issues likewise cannot add to, detract from, or negate what the
Constitution commands; it cannot simply follow its sense of justice based on how things out to
be, nor lay down its own policy, nor slant its ruling towards the individual Justices’ pet
advocacies. The individual Justices themselves cannot simply raise issues that the parties did
not raise at the COMELEC level, nor explore constitutional issues for the first time at this stage
of the case.
 Citizenship; Foundlings; View that foundlings are simply not included in the wordings of
the Constitution and cannot be read into its clear and express terms.—Separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of gov-
 
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ernment that divides the powers of government into the legislative, the executive, and
judicial. The power to enact laws lies with the legislature; the power to execute is with the
executive; and the power to interpret laws rests with the judiciary. Each branch is supreme
within its own sphere. Thus, the judiciary can only interpret and apply the Constitution and the
laws as they are written; it cannot, under the guise of interpretation in the course of
adjudication, add to, detract from or negate what these laws provide except to the extent
that they run counter to the Constitution. With respect to the Constitution and as already
mentioned above, the judiciary cannot interpret the Constitution to read into it what is not
written there.  The separation of powers can be very material in resolving the present case as
petitioner Poe essentially relies on two positions in claiming natural-born Philippine citizenship
as a foundling. The first of these positions is the claim that foundling’s fall within the listing of
“citizens of the Philippines” under the 1935 Constitution, under the view that this was the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. As I reason out below, foundlings are simply not
included in the wordings of the Constitution and cannot be read into its clear and express
terms. Nor can any intent to include foundlings be discerned. Thus, foundlings are not within
the 1935 constitutional listing, except to the extent that the application of its general terms
would allow their coverage.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that the well-settled principle is
that the equal protection of the laws guaranty is not violated by a legislation based
on  reasonable classification.—The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guaranty
of the equal application of the laws to all persons. The equality guaranteed does not deny the
State the power to recognize and act upon factual differences between individuals and classes.
It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify. The well-settled
principle is that the equal protection of the laws guaranty is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonableclassification. Thus, the problem in equal protection cases is primarily in the
determination of the validity of the classification made by law, if resort to classification is
justified. For this reason, three (3) different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality
of classifications have been developed over time — the rational basis test; the intermediate
scrutiny test; and strict scrutiny test.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that foundlings are not being
treated differently on the basis of their race, national origin, alienage, or religion.—Foundlings
are not being treated differently on the basis of their race, national origin, alienage, or religion.
It is the lack of information on the circumstances of their birth because of their unknown
parentage and the jus sanguinis standard of the Constitution itself , that exclude them from
being considered as natural-born citizens. They are not purposely treated unequally nor are
they purposely rendered politically powerless; they are in fact
 
 
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recognized under binding treaties to have the right to be naturalized as Philippine
citizens. All these take place because of distinctions that the Constitution itself made.
Same; Same; View that it is a well-settled principle that the equal protection guaranty of
the laws is not violated by a legislation (or governmental action) based on reasonable
classification.—It is a well-settled principle that the equal protection guaranty of the laws is not
violated by a legislation (or governmental action) based on reasonable classification. A
classification, to be reasonable must: 1) rely on substantial distinctions; 2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; 3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; View that the decision to cancel a
candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), based on grounds provided in Section 78, involves an
exercise of judgment or discretion that qualifies as a quasi-judicial function by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC).—In Cipriano v. COMELEC,  436 SCRA 45 (2004), this Court recognized
that this authority is quasi-judicial in nature. The decision to cancel a candidate’s CoC, based
on grounds provided in Section 78, involves an exercise of judgment or discretion that qualifies
as a quasi-judicial function by the COMELEC. Quasi-judicial power has been defined as: x x x the
power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for
their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. In Section 78 proceedings, the
COMELEC determines whether the allegations in a petition to cancel a CoC are supported by
sufficient evidence. In the process, the COMELEC allows both the petitioner and the
respondent-candidate the opportunity to present their evidence and arguments before it.
Based on these submissions, the COMELEC then determines whether the candidate’s CoC
should be cancelled. To arrive at its decision in a cancellation case, the COMELEC must
determine whether the candidate committed a material representationthat is false — the
statutory basis for the cancellation — in his or her CoC statements. While Section 78 itself does
not expressly define what representation is “material,” jurisprudence has defined “materiality”
to be a false representation related to the candidate’s eligibility to run for office. The
 
 
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representation is “false” if it is shown that the candidate manifested that he or she is
eligible for an elective office that he or she filed a CoC for, when in fact he or she is not.
Same; Same; Misrepresentation; View that Poe’s Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) deliberately misrepresented
her status as a former natural-born Philippine citizen, as it lists her adoptive parents to be her
parents without qualifications. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) also noted that Poe
had been falsely representing her status as a Philippine citizen in various public documents. All
these involve a succession of falsities.—The COMELEC thus found it unconvincing that Poe
would not have known how to fill up a pro forma CoC, much less commit an “honest mistake”
in filling it up. (Interestingly, Poe never introduced any evidence explaining her “mistake” on
the residency issue, thus rendering it highly suspect.) A plain reading of Article IV, Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution could have sufficiently appraised Poe regarding her citizenship. Article
IV, Section 1 does not provide for the situation where the identities of both an individual’s
parents from whom citizenship may be traced are unknown. The ordinary meaning of this
noninclusion necessarily means that she cannot be a Philippine citizen under the 1935
Constitution’s terms. The COMELEC also found that Poe’s Petition for Reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship before the BID deliberately misrepresented her status as a former
natural-born Philippine citizen, as it lists her adoptive parents to be her parents without
qualifications. The COMELEC also noted that Poe had been falsely representing her status as a
Philippine citizen in various public documents . All these involve a succession of falsities.
Same; Same; Same; View that with respect to the required period of residency, Poe
deliberately falsely represented that she had been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years prior to the May 9, 2016 elections.—With respect to the required period of
residency, Poe deliberately falsely represented that she had been a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years prior to the May 9, 2016 elections. Poe’s CoC when she ran for the Senate
in the May 2013 national elections, however, shows that she then admitted that she had been
residing in the Philippines for only six years and six months. Had she continued counting the
period of her residence based on the information she provided in her 2012 CoC, she would
have been three months short of the required Philippine residence of ten years. Instead of
adopting the same representation, her 2015 CoC shows that she has been residing in the
Philippines from May 24, 2005, and has thus been residing in the Philippines for more than
ten years. To the COMELEC, Poe’s subsequent change in counting the period of her residence,
along with the circumstances behind this
 
 
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change, strongly indicates her intent to mislead the electorate regarding her eligibility.
Same; Same; Same; View that Poe’s false representation regarding her Philippine
citizenship did  not merely involve a single and isolated statement, but a series of acts —  a
series of falsities — that started from her Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 application, as can be
seen from the presented public documents recognizing her citizenship.—These COMELEC
considerations, to my mind, do not indicate grave abuse of discretion. I note particularly that
Poe’s false representation regarding her Philippine citizenship did not merely involve a single
and isolated statement, but a series of acts — a series of falsities  — that started from her RA
No. 9225 application, as can be seen from the presented public documents recognizing her
citizenship. I note in this regard that Poe’s original certificate of live birth (foundling certificate)
does not indicate her Philippine citizenship, as she had no known parents from whom her
citizenship could be traced. Despite this, she had been issued various government documents,
such as a Voter’s Identification Card and Philippine passport recognizing her Philippine
citizenship. The issuance of these subsequent documents alone should be grounds for
heightened suspicions given that Poe’s original birth certificate provided no information
regarding her Philippine citizenship, and could not have been used as reference for this
citizenship.
Same; Same; Same; View that government documents that touched on Poe’s birth origins
had been tainted with irregularities and were issued  before Poe ran for elective office strongly
indicate that at the time she executed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), she knew that her
claimed Philippine citizenship is tainted with discrepancies, and that she is not a Philippine
citizen under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.—The timing of the application for
this amended birth certificate strongly suggest that it was used purposely as a reserve
document in case questions are raised about Poe’s birth; they became unnecessary and were
not used when the BID accepted Poe’s statement under oath that she was a former natural-
born citizen of the Philippine as required by RA No. 9225. That government documents that
touched on Poe’s birth origins had been tainted with irregularities and were issued  before Poe
ran for elective office strongly indicate that at the time she executed her CoC, she knew that
her claimed Philippine citizenship is tainted with discrepancies, and that she is not a
Philippine citizen under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; View that based on Poe’s 2012  Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), her
legal domicile in the Philippines began in November 2006, shortly after the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued the Order granting her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship on July 18, 2006; It also indicates
 
 
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her present deliberate intent to deceive the electorate by changing the starting point of
her claimed residency in the Philippines to May 24, 2005. This, she did despite being in the
Philippines at that time as an alien under a  balikbayan visa.—On Poe’s residence, I find it
worthy to add that the information in her 2012 CoC (for the Senate) complies with the
requirement that a person must first be a Philippine citizen to establish legal domicile in the
Philippines. Based on Poe’s 2012 COC, her legal domicile in the Philippines began in November
2006, shortly after the BID issued the Order granting her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
on July 18, 2006. That her 2012 CoC complies with the ruling in Japzon v. Comelec,  576 SCRA
331, a 2009 case requiring Philippine citizenship prior to establishing legal domicile in the
Philippines, indicates Poe’s knowledge of this requirement. It also indicates her present
deliberate intent to deceive the electorate by changing the starting point of her claimed
residency in the Philippines to May 24, 2005. This, she did despite being in the Philippines at
that time as an alien under a balikbayan visa.
Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
can conduct its own inquiry regarding the petitioner’s citizenship, separate from and
independently of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).—The COMELEC can conduct its own
inquiry regarding the petitioner’s citizenship, separate from and independently of the SET. The
COMELEC, in order to determine the petitioner’s eligibility and decide on whether her CoC
should be cancelled, can inquire into her citizenship. Courts, including quasi-judicial agencies
such as the COMELEC, may make pronouncements on the status of Philippine citizenship as an
incident in the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy. In making this
determination (and separately from the reasons discussed above), the COMELEC is not bound
by the SET’s decision since these constitutional bodies are separate and independent from
one another, each with its own specific jurisdiction and different issues to resolve. The
COMELEC, as the independent constitutional body tasked to implement election laws, has the
authority to determine citizenship to determine whether the candidate committed false
material representation in her CoC. The SET, on the other hand, is a constitutional body tasked
to resolve all contests involving the eligibility of Senators to hold office. That these two bodies
have separate, distinct, and different jurisdictions mean that neither has the authority nor the
ascendancy over the other, with each body supreme in its own sphere of
authority. Conversely, these bodies have no ascendancy to rule upon issues outside their
respective specific authority, much less bind other bodies with matters outside their respective
jurisdictions. The decision of the SET, with its specific jurisdiction to resolve contests involving
the qualifications of Senators, does not have the authority to bind the COMELEC, another
constitutional body with a specific jurisdiction of its own.
 
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Bureau of Immigration and Deportation; Jurisdiction; View that the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) handles  the approval process  and the restoration of the
applicant’s civil and political rights, but  how and  whether the applicant can enjoy or exercise
these political rights are matters that are covered by other laws; the full enjoyment of these
rights also depends on other institutions and agencies, not on the BID itself whose task under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 at that point is finished.—An RA No. 9225 proceeding simply makes
a finding on the applicant’s compliance with the requirements of this law. Upon approval of the
application, the applicant’s political and civil rights as a Philippine citizen are restored, with
the subsequent enjoyment of the restored civil and political rights “subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities  under existing laws of the Philippines x x x.” In other words,
the BID handles the approval process and the restoration of the applicant’s civil and political
rights, but how and whether the applicant can enjoy or exercise these political rights  are
matters that are covered by other laws; the full enjoyment of these rights also depends on
other institutions and agencies, not on the BID itself whose task under RA No. 9225 at that
point is finished. Thus, the BID Order approving petitioner Poe’s reacquisition of her Philippine
citizenship allowed her the political right to file a CoC, but like other candidates, she may be the
subject of processes contesting her right to run for elective office based on the qualifications
she represented in her CoC.
Election Law; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; View that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal’s (PET’s) jurisdiction was restored under the 1987 Constitution with the
Justices of the Supreme Court (SC) as the only members. Presently, this Court, sitting  En Banc,  is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice President.—The PET’s jurisdiction was restored under the 1987 Constitution with the
Justices of the Supreme Court as the only members. Presently, this Court, sitting En Banc, is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice President. The grant of jurisdiction to the PET is exclusive but at the same time, limited.
The constitutional phraseology limits the PET’s jurisdiction to election contests which can only
contemplate a post-election and post-proclamation controversy since no “contest” can exist
before a winner is proclaimed. Understood in this sense, the jurisdiction of the members of the
Court, sitting as PET, does not pertain to Presidential or Vice Presidential candidates but to the
President (elect) and Vice President (elect).
Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Pre-proclamation Controversies; View that
the Administrative Code of 1987 further explicitly granted the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) exclusive jurisdiction over  all  pre-proclamation controversies.—The 1987
Constitution deleted the adjective “administrative” in the description of the COMELEC’s powers
and expanded its jurisdiction to decide all  questions affecting elections, except those involv-
 
 
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ing the right to vote. Thus, unlike the very limited jurisdiction of election contests
granted to the Supreme Court/PET, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction, with its catchall provision, is all
encompassing; it covers all questions/issues not specifically reserved for other tribunals. The
Administrative Code of 1987 further explicitly granted the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction
over all pre-proclamation controversies. Section 78 of the OEC still further refines the
COMELEC’s power by expressly granting it the power to deny due course or to cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of false material representation . Ex necessitate
legis. Express grants of power are deemed to include those of necessary or fair implication, or
incident to the powers expressly conferred, or essential thereto. This power under Section 78,
therefore, necessarily includes the power to make a determination of the truth or falsity of the
representation made in the CoC.
Citizenship; Foundlings; View that the 1935 Constitution does not expressly list foundlings
among Filipino citizens.—Jurisprudence has established three principles of constitutional
construction: first, verba legis non est recedendum — from the words of the statute there
should be no departure; second, when there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima  — the words of
the Constitution should be interpreted based on the intent of the framers; and third, ut magis
valeat quam pereat — the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. I hold the view that
none of these modes support the inclusion of foundlings among the Filipino citizens listed in
the 1935 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution does not expressly list foundlings among Filipino
citizens. Using verba legis, the Constitution limits citizens of the Philippines to the listing
expressly in its text. Absent any ambiguity, the second level of constitutional construction
should not also apply.
Same; Same; View that as the list of Philippine citizens under Article IV, Section 1 does
not include foundlings, then they are not included among those constitutionally-granted or
recognized to be Philippine citizens except to the extent that they fall under the coverage of
paragraph 5, i.e., if they choose to avail of the opportunity to be naturalized.—As the list of
Philippine citizens under Article IV, Section 1 does not include foundlings, then they are not
included among those constitutionally granted or recognized to be Philippine citizens  except to
the extent that they fall under the coverage of paragraph 5, i.e., if they choose to avail of the
opportunity to be naturalized. Established rules of legal interpretation tell us that nothing is to
be added to what the text states or reasonably implies; a matter that is not covered is to be
treated as not covered. The silence of Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution, in
particular of paragraphs (3) and (4) parentage provisions, on the citizenship of foundlings in the
Philippines, in fact speaks loudly and directly about their legal situation. Such silence can only
mean that  the 1935 Constitution did not
  
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address the situation of foundlings  via paragraphs (3) and (4), but left the matter to
other provisions that may he applicable as discussed below.
International Law; Treaties; Doctrine of Transformation; View that treaties are entered
into by the President and must be ratified by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Philippine Senate in
order to have legal effect in the country. Upon ratification, a treaty is transformed into a
domestic law and becomes effective in the Philippines; This process takes place pursuant to
the  doctrine of transformation.—Treaties are entered into by the President and must be
ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Philippine Senate in order to have legal effect in the country.
Upon ratification, a treaty is transformed into a domestic law and becomes effective in the
Philippines. Depending on the terms and character of the treaty obligation, some treaties need
additional legislation in order to be implemented in the Philippines. This process takes place
pursuant to the doctrine of transformation.
Same; Same; View that treaties are — in the same manner as the determination of a
State’s determination of who its citizens are — an act made in the exercise of sovereign rights.
—Treaties are — in the same manner as the determination of a State’s determination of who
its citizens are — an act made in the exercise of sovereign rights. The Philippines now has every
right to enter into treaties as it is independent and sovereign. Such sovereignty only came with
the full grant of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946. Thus, the Philippines could not have
entered into any binding treaty before this date, except with the consent of the U.S. which
exercised foreign affairs powers for itself and all colonies and territories under its jurisdiction.
No such consent was ever granted by the U.S. so that any claim of the Philippines being bound
by any treaty regarding its citizens and of foundlings cannot but be empty claims that do not
even deserve to be read, much less seriously considered.
Citizenship; Jus Sanguinis; View that Article IV of the 1935 Constitution generally follows
the  jus sanguinis rule: Philippine citizenship is determined by blood,  i.e.,  by the citizenship of
one’s parents.—In the Philippines, the Constitution defines the overall configuration of how
Filipino citizenship should be granted and acquired. Treaties such as the ICCPR and UNCRC
should be complied with, insofar as they touch on citizenship, within the terms of the
Constitution’s Article on Citizenship. In the context of the present case, compliance with our
treaty obligations to recognize the right of foundlings to acquire a nationality must be
undertaken under the terms of, and must not contradict, the citizenship provisions of our
Constitution. The 1935 Constitution defined who the citizens of the Philippines then were and
the means of acquiring Philippine citizenship at the time the respondent was found (and
born). This constitutional definition must necessarily govern the petitioner’s case.  As
repeatedly mentioned above, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution generally follows the
 
 
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jus sanguinis rule: Philippine citizenship is determined by blood, i.e., by the citizenship
of one’s parents. The Constitution itself provides the instances when jus sanguinis is not
followed: for inhabitants who had been granted Philippine citizenship at the time the
Constitution was adopted; those who were holding public office at the time of its adoption; and
those who are naturalized as Filipinos in accordance with law.
International Law; Generally Accepted Principles of International Law; Doctrine of
Incorporation; View that generally accepted principles of international law usually gain
recognition in the Philippines through decisions rendered by the Supreme Court (SC), pursuant
to the doctrine of incorporation.—Generally accepted principles of international law are legal
norms that are recognized as customary in the international plane. States follow them on the
belief that these norms embody obligations that these States, on their own, are bound to
perform. Also referred to as customary international law, generally accepted principles of
international law pertain to the collection of international behavioral regularities that nations,
over time, come to view as binding on them as a matter of law. In the same manner that treaty
obligations partake of the character of domestic laws in the domestic plane, so do  generally
accepted principles of international law. Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that these legal norms “form part of the law of the land.” This constitutional declaration
situates in clear and definite terms the role of generally accepted principles of international law
in the hierarchy of Philippine laws and in the Philippine legal system. Generally accepted
principles of international law usually gain recognition in the Philippines through decisions
rendered by the Supreme Court, pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation. The Supreme Court,
in its decisions, applies these principles as rules or as canons of statutory construction, or
recognizes them as meritorious positions of the parties in the cases the Court decides.
Same; Same; Same; View that until the Court declares a legal norm to be a generally
accepted principle of international law, no other means exists in the Philippine legal system to
determine with certainty  that a legal norm is indeed a generally accepted principle of
international law that forms part of the law of the land.—But until the Court declares a legal
norm to be a generally accepted principle of international law, no other means exists in the
Philippine legal system to determine with certainty that a legal norm is indeed a generally
accepted principle of international law that forms part of the law of the land. The main reason
for the need for a judicial recognition lies in the nature of international legal principles. Unlike
treaty obligations that involve the express promises of States to other States, generally
accepted principles of international law do not require any categorical expression from
States for these principles to be binding on them.
 
 
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Citizenship; Foundlings; Jus Sanguinis; View that without the identity of either or both
parents being known in the case of foundlings, no determination of the foundling’s citizenship
can be made under  jus sanguinis.—Other than through naturalization or through outright
constitutional grant, the 1935 Constitution requires that the father or the mother be known to
be Filipino for a person to acquire Filipino citizenship. This is a consequence of the clear and
categorical jus sanguinis  rule that the 1935 Constitution established for the country. Under its
terms, should a child’s father be Filipino, then he or she acquires Philippine citizenship. On the
other hand, should his or her father be a foreigner but the mother is a Filipina, the 1935
constitutional Rule is to give the child the right to elect Philippine citizenship when he or she
reaches 18 years of age. Without the identity of either or both parents being known in the case
of foundlings, no determination of the foundling’s citizenship can be made under jus sanguinis.
Specifically, whose citizenship shall the foundling follow: the citizenship of the father, or the
option to elect the citizenship of the mother?
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; View that the petitioner’s argument based on a
foundling’s presumed Filipino parentage under a claimed generally accepted principle of
international law is legally objectionable under the 1935 Constitution and cannot be used to
recognize or grant natural-born Philippine citizenship.—A presumption of Filipino parentage
cannot similarly apply or extend to the character of being natural-born, as this character of
citizenship can only be based on reality; when the Constitution speaks of “natural-born,” it
cannot but refer to actual or natural, not presumed, birth. A presumption of being natural-
born is effectively a legal fiction that the definition of the term “natural-born” under the
Constitution and the  purposes this definition serves cannot accommodate. To sum up, the
petitioner’s argument based on a foundling’s presumed Filipino parentage under a claimed
generally accepted principle of international law is legally objectionable under the 1935
Constitution and cannot be used to recognize or grant natural-born Philippine citizenship.
Election Law; Residence; View that aliens who reacquire Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may only begin establishing legal residence in the Philippines from
the time they reacquire Philippine citizenship.—The COMELEC correctly applied prevailing
jurisprudence in holding that Poe has not established her legal residence in the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately prior to the May 9, 2016 elections. In addition, I offer my own
views regarding the political character of the right to establish domicile, which necessarily
requires Philippine citizenship before domicile may be established in the Philippines. In my
view, aliens who reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 may only begin
establishing legal residence in the Philippines from the time they reacquire Philippine
citizenship. This is the clear import from the Court’s rulings in   Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA
331 (2009) and Cabal-
 
 
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lero v. COMELEC, 771 SCRA 213 (2015), cases involving candidates who reacquired
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225; their legal residence in the Philippines only began
after their reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Same; Same; Domicile; View that the Supreme Court (SC) generally reserves the use of
the term residence as domicile for purposes of exercising political rights. Jurisprudence has long
established that the term “residence” in election laws is synonymous with domicile.—We
generally reserve the use of the term residence as domicile for purposes of exercising political
rights. Jurisprudence has long established that the term “residence” in election laws
is synonymous with domicile. When the Constitution or the election laws speak of residence, it
refers to the  legal or juridical relation between a person and a place — the individual’s
permanent home irrespective of physical presence.  To be sure, physical presence is a major
indicator when determining the person’s legal or juridical relation with the place he or she
intends to be voted for. But, as residence and domicile is synonymous under our election
laws, residence is a legal concept that has to be determined by and in connection with our laws,
independent of or in conjunction with physical presence.
Same; Domicile; View that domicile is necessary to be able to participate in
governance, i.e., to vote and/or be voted for, one must consider a locality in the Philippines as
his or her permanent home, a place in which he intends to remain in for an indefinite period of
time (animus manendi) and to return to should he leave  (animus revertendi).—Domicile is
necessary to be able to participate in governance, i.e., to vote and/or be voted for, one must
consider a locality in the Philippines as his or her permanent home, a place in which he intends
to remain in for an indefinite period of time (animus manendi) and to return to should he leave
(animus revertendi). In this sense, the establishment of a domicile not only assumes the color
of, but becomes one with a political right because it allows a person, not otherwise able, to
participate in the electoral process of that place. To logically carry this line of thought a step
further, a person seeking to establish domicile in a country must first possess the necessary
citizenship to exercise this political right.
Same; Same; View that  a Philippine citizen who has chosen to reside permanently
abroad may be allowed the limited opportunity to vote (under the conditions laid down under
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act) but he or she cannot be voted for; he or she is disqualified
from running for elective office under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).—It is
the sovereign Filipino people (i.e., the citizens through whom the State exercises sovereignty,
and who can vote and participate in governance) who shall establish the Government of the
country (i.e., one of the purposes why citizens get together and collectively act), and
they themselves ordain and promulgate the Constitution (i.e., the
 
 
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64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
citizens themselves directly act, not anybody else). Corollarily, a person who does not
possess Philippine citizenship, i.e., an alien, cannot participate in the country’s political
processes. An alien does not have the right to vote and be voted for, the right to donate to
campaign funds, the right to campaign for or aid any candidate or political party, and to
directly, or indirectly, take part in or influence in any manner any election. The character of the
right to establish domicile as a political right becomes even more evident under our election
laws that require that a person’s domicile and citizenship coincide to enable him to vote and be
voted for elective office. In more concrete terms (subject only to a few specific exceptions), a
Philippine citizen must have his domicile in the Philippines in order to participate in our
electoral processes. Thus, a Philippine citizen who has chosen to reside permanently abroad
may be allowed the limited opportunity to vote (under the conditions laid down under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act) but he or she cannot be voted for; he or she is disqualified from
running for elective office under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
Same; Same; View that if a former Filipino reacquires his or her Philippine citizenship, he
reacquires as well the political right to reside in the Philippines, but he does not become a
Philippine  domiciliary unless he validly effects a change of domicile; otherwise, he remains a
Filipino physically in the Philippines but is domiciled elsewhere. The reason is simple: an
individual can have only one (1) domicile which remains until it is validly changed.—Once a
Philippine citizen permanently resides in another country, or becomes a naturalized citizen
thereof, he loses his domicile of birth (the Philippines) and establishes a new domicile of choice
in that country. If a former Filipino reacquires his or her Philippine citizenship, he reacquires as
well the political right to reside in the Philippines, but he does not become a Philippine
domiciliary unless he validly effects a change of domicile; otherwise, he remains a
Filipino physically in the Philippines but is domiciled elsewhere. The reason is simple: an
individual can have only one domicile which remains until it is validly changed.
 Same; Naturalization; View that whether termed as naturalization, reacquisition, or
repatriation, all these modes fall under the constitutional term “naturalized in accordance with
law” as provided under the 1935, the 1973, and the 1987 Constitutions.—Whether termed as
naturalization, reacquisition, or repatriation, all these modes fall under the constitutional
term “naturalized in accordance with law” as provided under the 1935, the 1973, and the
1987 Constitutions.
Same; Domicile; View that a person who has reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 does not automatically become domiciled in the Philippines, but is
given the option to establish domicile in the Philippines to participate in the country’s electoral
process.—RA No. 9225 restores Philippine
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
citizenship upon the applicant’s submission of the oath of allegiance to the Philippines
and other pertinent documents to the BID (or the Philippine consul should the applicant avail of
RA No. 9225 while they remain in their country of foreign naturalization). The BID (or the
Philippine consul) then reviews these documents, and issues the corresponding order
recognizing the applicant’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Upon reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225, a person becomes entitled to full political and civil
rights, subject to its attendant liabilities and responsibilities. These include the right to
reestablish domicile in the Philippines for purposes of participating in the country’s electoral
processes. Thus, a person who has reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does
not automatically become domiciled in the Philippines, but is given the option to establish
domicile in the Philippines to participate in the country’s electoral process.
Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) correctly applied the
doctrine laid out in Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA
331 (2009),  and Caballero v. COMELEC, 771 SCRA 213 (2015) in Poe’s case, i.e., that her
physical presence allegedly coupled with intent should be counted, for election purposes, only
from her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or surrender of her immigrant status.—In these
lights, the COMELEC correctly applied the doctrine laid out in  Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA
607 (2002), Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331 (2009),   and  Caballero v. COMELEC, 771 SCRA
213 (2015)  in Poe’s case, i.e., that her physical presence allegedly coupled with intent should
be counted, for election purposes, only from her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or
surrender of her immigrant status. Any period of residence prior to such reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship or surrender of immigrant status cannot simply be counted as Poe, at
such time, was an alien nonresident who had no right to permanently reside anywhere in the
Philippines.
Balikbayan Program; Words and Phrases; View that  the term  “balikbayan” refers to a
Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one (1)
year, a Filipino overseas worker, or  former Filipino citizen and his or her family  who had been
naturalized in a foreign country and  comes or returns to the Philippines.—When Poe returned
to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, she was a nonresident alien — a naturalized American
citizen. She used her U.S. passport in her travel to and arrival in the Philippines under a
“Balikbayan” visa, as the parties’ evidence show and as even Poe admits. These dates stamped
in her U.S. passport, in particular, bear the mark “BB” (which stands for Balikbayan) or “1 YR”
(which stands for 1-Year stay in the Philippines): September 14, 2005, January 7, 2006 (arrival),
March 11, 2006 (arrival), July 5, 2006 (arrival), and November 4, 2006 (arrival). The
term “balikbayan” refers to a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines
for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas worker, or
 
 
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66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
former Filipino citizen and his or her family  who had been naturalized in a foreign
country and comes or returns to the Philippines. In other words, a balikbayan may be a Filipino
citizen or a former Filipino who has been naturalized in a foreign country. Notably, the law
itself provides that a former Filipino citizen may “come or return” to the Philippines — this
means that he/she may be returning to permanently reside in the country or may just visit for a
temporary stay.
Same; View that a Filipino  balikbayan,  by virtue of his Philippine citizenship, has the right
to permanently reside in any part of the Philippines. Conversely, a foreigner-balikbayan, though
a former Philippine citizen, may only acquire this right by applying for an immigrant visa and an
immigrant certificate of residence (ICR) or by reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.  Evidently,
the nature of the stay of a foreigner-balikbayan  who avails of the visa-free entry privilege is
only temporary, unless he acquires an immigrant visa or until he reacquires Philippine
citizenship.—RA No. 6768, as amended, further provides for the privilege of a visa-free entry to
the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign passport holders, with the exception of
restricted nationals. I stress in this regard that not all balikbayans  enter the Philippines via a
visa-free entry, as the privilege applies only to foreign passport holders and not to Filipino
citizens bearing Philippine passports upon entry. The distinction is significant because a
Filipino balikbayan, by virtue of his Philippine citizenship, has the right to permanently reside in
any part of the Philippines. Conversely, a foreigner-balikbayan, though a former Philippine
citizen, may only acquire this right by applying for an immigrant visa and an immigrant
certificate of residence or by reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Evidently, the nature of
the stay of a foreigner-balikbayan who avails of the visa-free entry privilege is only temporary,
unless he acquires an immigrant visa or until he reacquires Philippine citizenship.
Citizenship; Domicile; View that Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18,
2006 when the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) granted her Republic Act (RA) No.
9225 application; Under RA No. 9225, a person acquires the right to establish domicile in the
Philippines upon reacquiring Philippine citizenship. Prior to this, a former Philippine citizen has
no right to reside in the Philippines save only temporarily as our Immigration laws allow. —Poe
reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18, 2006 when the BID granted her RA No. 9225
application. Under Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225, the right to enjoy full civil and political rights
that attach to Philippine citizenship begins only upon its reacquisition. Thus, under RA No.
9225, a person acquires the right to establish domicile in the Philippines upon reacquiring
Philippine citizenship. Prior to this, a former Philippine citizen has no right to reside in the
Philippines save only temporarily as our Immigration laws allow. In this light, the COMELEC
correctly ruled that July 18, 2006 is the earliest possible date for
 
 
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 Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections enroll and study in the Philippines without having to acquire Philippine citizenship or without
securing immigrant visas (and ICRs). Foreigners or aliens at least 18 years of age may apply for
 
nonimmigrant student visa, while those below 18 years of age elementary and high school
Poe to establish her domicile in the Philippines, as it is only then that Poe acquired the
students may apply for Special Study Permits.
right to establish domicile in the Philippines. Counting the period of her residence in the
Same; One-Domicile Rule; View that for a person to demonstrate his or her animus non
Philippines to begin on July 18, 2006, however, renders Poe still ineligible to run for President,
revertendi  to the old domicile, he or she must have  abandoned it completely, such that he or
as the period between July 18, 2006 to May 9, 2016 is 9 years, 9 months, and 20 days, or 2
she can no longer entertain any  animus revertendi with respect to such old domicile. This
months and 10 days short of the Constitution’s ten-year requirement.
complete abandonment is necessary in light of the one-domicile  rule.—As a requirement to
Same; View that entitlement to the enjoyment of the civil and political rights that come
establish domicile, a person must show that he or she has animus non revertendi, or intent to
with the reacquired citizenship that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 grants attaches when the
abandon his or her old domicile. This requirement reflects two key characteristics of a
requirements have been completed and Philippine citizenship has been reacquired. —As earlier
domicile: first, that a person can have only one residence at any time, and second, that a
explained, entitlement to the enjoyment of the civil and political rights that come with the
person is considered to have an animus revertendi (intent to return) to his current domicile.
reacquired citizenship that RA No. 9225 grants attaches when the requirements have been
Thus, for a person to demonstrate his or her animus non revertendi to the old domicile, he or
completed and Philippine citizenship has been reacquired. Only then can reacquiring Filipino
she must have abandoned it completely, such that he or she can no longer entertain
citizens secure the right to reside in the country as Filipinos with the right to vote and be
any animus revertendi with respect to such old domicile. This complete abandonment is
voted for public office under the requirements of the Constitution and applicable existing
necessary in light of the one-domicile rule. In more concrete terms, a person seeking to
laws. Prior to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, they are entitled only to such rights as the
demonstrate his or her animus non revertendi must not only leave the old domicile and is no
Constitution and the laws recognize as inherent in any person.
longer physically present there, he or she must have also shown  acts cancelling his or her
Domicile; View that the sale of their United States (U.S.) home on April 27, 2006
animus revertendi to that place. Note, at this point, that a person who has left his or her
establishes only the fact of its sale. At most, it may indicate intent to transfer residence (within
domicile is considered not to have abandoned it so long as he or she has animus revertendi or
or without the U.S.) but it does not automatically result in the change of domicile from the U.S.
intent to return to it. We have allowed the defense of animus revertendi for challenges to a
to the Philippines.—The sale of their U.S. home on April 27, 2006 establishes only the fact of its
person’s domicile on the ground that he or she has left it for a period of time, and held that a
sale. At most, it may indicate intent to transfer residence (within or without the U.S.) but it
person’s domicile, once established, does not automatically change simply because he or she
does not automatically result in the change of domicile from the U.S. to the Philippines. The
has not stayed in that place for a period of time.
notice to the U.S. Postal Service in late March of 2006, on the other hand, merely shows that
Same; View that in between Poe’s arrival on May 24, 2005 and her acquisition of
they may have complied with the U.S. laws when transferring residence, for convenience and
Philippine citizenship, Poe made four (4) trips to and from the United States (U.S.) in a span of
for mail forwarding purposes while on extended but temporary absence. This act, however,
one (1) year and two (2) months; this frequency over a short period of time indicates and
does not conclusively signify abandonment of U.S. residence, more so reestablishment of
supports the conclusion that she has not fully abandoned her domicile in the U.S. during this
Philippine domicile. Note that at both these times, Poe did not have the established legal
period.—Poe’s acts of leaving the Philippines for the U.S. as an American citizen who had
capacity or the right to establish residence in the Philippines. Besides, the winding up of a
previously stayed in the Philippines under a temporary visa is an indication of her  animus
would-be candidate’s property affairs in another country is not a qualification requirement
revertendi  to the U.S., her old domicile. Worthy of note, too, is that in between Poe’s arrival on
under the law for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship nor is it a condition to the residency
May 24, 2005 and her acquisition of Philippine citizenship, Poe made four trips to and from the
requirement for holding public office.
U.S. in a span of one year and two months; this frequency
Same; View that the enrollment of Poe’s children in Philippine schools in June 2005
 
establishes their physical presence in the Philippines during this time, but not her intent to
 
abandon United States (U.S.) domicile. Note that her children entered the Philippines for a
69
temporary period under their  balikbayan visas. Enrollment, too, in schools is only for a period
of one (1) school year, or about ten (10) months.—The enrollment of Poe’s children in VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 69
Philippine schools in June Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
   
  over a short period of time indicates and supports the conclusion that she has not fully
68 abandoned her domicile in the U.S. during this period. Additionally, too, during this time, Poe
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED continued to own two houses in the U.S., one purchased in 1992 and another in 2008 (or after
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections her reacquisition of the Philippine citizenship. The ownership of these houses, when taken
together with her temporary visa in travelling to the Philippines from May 24, 2005 to July 18,
 
2006, manifest the existence of an animus revertendi to the U.S., which means that as of May
2005 establishes their physical presence in the Philippines during this time, but not her
24, 2005, she had not yet completely abandoned the U.S. as her domicile.
intent to abandon U.S. domicile. Note that her children entered the Philippines for a temporary
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that
period under their balikbayan visas. Enrollment, too, in schools is only for a period of one
Poe’s public declarations under oath considered as a whole reveal  a pattern that confirms her
school year, or about ten months. Moreover, aliens or foreign national students can, in fact,
deliberate attempt to mislead and to falsely represent to the electorate that she was eligible for
the Presidency. This evidence fully justified the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) decision to
cancel her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC).—As with her 2012 CoC, this was a personal
declaration which she made under oath and which she announced to the public to prove that
she was eligible, this time for the Presidency. This declaration, however, is contrary to the
declaration she made in her 2012 CoC as well as to the declarations she made to the public in
2015 when she tried to explain away her potential disqualifying circumstance. I clarify that
these declarations, particularly the declaration Poe made in the 2012 CoC, are not — and the
COMELEC did not consider them to be — evidence of the actual number of years she had been
legally residing in the Philippines from which I draw the conclusion that she has not been a
Philippine resident for ten years and thus committed false material representation. As the
COMELEC did, I do not conclude that Poe has only been a Philippine resident for 9 years and 6
months following her 2012 CoC declaration. Rather, I consider these declarations to
be evidence of falsehoods and inconsistent representations with respect to her residency
claim: she made a representation in her 2015 CoC that is completely different from her
representation in her 2012 CoC as well as from her public declarations. Poe’s public
declarations under oathconsidered as a whole reveal a pattern that confirms her deliberate
attempt to mislead and to falsely represent to the electorate that she was eligible for the
Presidency. This evidence fully justified the COMELEC decision to cancel her CoC.
DEL CASTILLO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; View that anent the contention that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) lacks jurisdiction over candidates for national positions,
suffice it to state that Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) does not distinguish
between Certificate of Candidacies (CoCs) of candidates running for local and those running for
national positions. It simply mentions “certificate of candidacy.”—Anent the contention that
the COMELEC
 
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70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
lacks jurisdiction over candidates for national positions, suffice it to state that Section 78
of the OEC does not distinguish between CoCs of candidates running for local and those
running for national positions. It simply mentions “certificate of candidacy.” Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus — when the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish. This is a basic rule in statutory construction that is applicable in these cases. Hence,
the Comelec has the power to determine if the CoC of candidates, whether running for a local
or for a national position, contains false material representation. In other words, any person
may avail himself/herself of Section 78 of the OEC to assail the CoC of candidates regardless of
the position for which they are aspiring.
Same; Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Quo Warranto; View that while it
is admitted that there is a similarity between a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) and a quo warranto proceeding in that they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, what sets them apart is the time when the action is filed, that
is, before  or after  an election and proclamation.—While it is admitted that there is a similarity
between a petition under Section 78 of the OEC and a quo warranto proceeding in that they
both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, what sets them apart is the time
when the action is filed, that is, before or after an election and proclamation. As the election
subject of these petitions is yet to be held, there can be no doubt that the issues raised by
respondents were properly set forth in their respective petitions for cancellation and/or denial
of due course to petitioner’s CoC. Therefore, the Comelec was not so grossly unreasonable that
it exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction when it duly characterized the petitions as ones for
cancellation and/or denial of due course to petitioner’s 2015 CoC. Indeed, in these cases the
Comelec did not exercise its judgment in a whimsical, capricious, arbitrary, or despotic manner.
Otherwise stated, petitioner failed to show that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the petitions before it are
for cancellation and/or denial of due course to petitioner’s 2015 CoC.
Same; Election Protests; Quo Warranto; View that under the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) Rules an election protest may be filed only within thirty (30) days after
proclamation of the winner,  while a quo warranto petition may be initiated within ten (10) days
after the proclamation of the winner.—The PET is “the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President of the Philippines.”
Particularly, the PET has jurisdiction over an election contest initiated through an election
protest or a petition for  quo warranto  against the President or Vice President. The PET’s
adjudicative powers come into play after the President or the Vice President concerned had
been elected and proclaimed. Under the PET Rules an election protest may be filed only within
30 days after proclamation of the winner, while a quo warranto petition may be initiated within
10 days after the proclamation
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
of the winner. In other words, it is the date of proclamation of the candidate concerned
that is determinative of the time when the PET’s jurisdiction attaches.
Commission on Elections; Rule-making Power; View that the Constitution itself recognizes
the rule-making power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and, as a necessary
corollary, invests it with authority to determine the reasonable period within which its decision
or resolution shall be considered final and executory.—At the risk of belaboring a point, the
1987 Constitution explicitly grants the Comelec rule-making powers in deciding election cases.
Thus, in fulfilment of its Constitutional mandate of deciding election cases with reasonable
dispatch, the Comelec promulgated rules of procedure to provide for an orderly means, ways
or process of deciding election cases. The insertion in the above quoted Section 7, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution of the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or law,” makes it abundantly clear that the Constitution itself recognizes the rule-making power
of the Comelec and, as a necessary corollary, invests it with authority to determine the
reasonable period within which its decision or resolution shall be considered final and
executory.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), has
the power to determine whether a candidate committed any material misrepresentation in his
or her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). In view thereof, the Comelec can also properly determine
the candidate’s citizenship or residency as an adjunct to or as a necessary consequence of its
assessment on whether the CoC contains material misrepresentation.—As earlier explained, the
Comelec, under Section 78 of the OEC, has the power to determine whether a candidate
committed any material misrepresentation in his or her CoC. In view thereof, the Comelec can
also properly determine the candidate’s citizenship or residency as an adjunct to or as a
necessary consequence of its assessment on whether the CoC contains material
misrepresentation. To my mind, this does not amount to a usurpation of the SET’s power to
determine the qualifications or eligibility of a candidate; neither does it amount to a usurpation
of this Court’s prerogative to resolve constitutional issues. Rather, I view it as part of the
Comelec’s duty to examine a candidate’s representations in his/her CoC pursuant to the
aforementioned Section 78. Clearly, for the Comelec to shirk or evade from, or to refuse to
perform, or abandon this positive duty would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Citizenship; View that it is settled that whenever the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, the decision of the court or tribunal on the
issue of citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata.  This is so because the issue on
citizenship may be “threshed out again
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
and again as the occasion may demand.”—It is settled that whenever the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, the decision of the court
or tribunal on the issue of citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata. This is so
because the issue on citizenship may be “threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand.” To accept petitioner’s contention that it is the DOJ that has jurisdiction to revoke the
grant of her petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship would be to veer away from the
said settled rule because this implies that no subsequent contrary findings may be arrived at by
other bodies or tribunals.
Election Law; Residence; View that a person aspiring to become a President must be
a  resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years immediately preceding the election. This
requirement is mandatory and must be complied with strictly.—A person aspiring to become a
President must be a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the
election. This requirement is mandatory and must be complied with strictly. For one, no less
than our Constitution itself imposes it. For another, Section 2 was couched in a negative form
— an indication of the intention of the framers of our Constitution to make it mandatory. “A
statute or provision which contains words of positive prohibition, such as ‘shall not,’ ‘cannot,’
or ‘ought not,’ or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done
otherwise than designated, is mandatory.” Moreover, Section 63 of Article IX of the OEC
imposes the same 10-year residency requirement.
Same; Domicile; View that to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a  bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.—To acquire a new domicile of choice, one must demonstrate: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in the new locality; 2. An intention to remain there ( animus
manendi); and 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi). “To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.” In the absence of
clear and positive proof of the above mentioned requisites, the current domicile should be
deemed to continue. Only with clear evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity of residence be rebutted, for a change of legal
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old domicile. Elsewise put, if
any of the above requisites is absent, no change of domicile will result.
Same; Same; View that since petitioner availed herself of Republic Act (RA) No. 6768, her
stay in the Philippines from the time she arrived here as a foreigner   balikbayan on May 24,
2005 was not permanent in character or for an indefinite
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
period of time. It was merely temporary. At most, her stay in the Philippines would only
be for one (1) year. This only proves that her stay was not impressed with  animus manendi,
i.e., the intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of time. —Since
petitioner availed herself of RA 6768, her stay in the Philippines from the time she arrived here
as a foreigner balikbayan on May 24, 2005 was not permanent in character or for an indefinite
period of time. It was merely temporary. At most, her stay in the Philippines would only be for
one year. This only proves that her stay was not impressed with animus manendi, i.e., the
intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of time. Thus in  Coquilla
v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), we did not include the period of the candidate’s physical
presence in the Philippines while he was still an alien. In that case, Teodulo M. Coquilla
(Coquilla) was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1965. He returned to the Philippines in 1998 and
was repatriated under RA 8171 on November 7, 2000. He took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines on November 10, 2000. Subsequently, he filed his CoC for Mayor of Oras, Eastern
Samar. A petition to cancel Coquilla’s CoC was filed on the ground of material
misrepresentation based on his representation that he met the one-year residency
requirement. This Court affirmed the Comelec finding that Coquilla lacked the required
residency. While Coquilla arrived in the Philippines as early as 1998, his presence here from
that point until his naturalization on November 10, 2000 was excluded in counting the length of
his residency in the Philippines because during that time he had no right to reside permanently
here.
Taxpayer’s Identification Number; Domicile; View that securing a Taxpayer’s
Identification Number (TIN) is not conclusive proof of intent to remain in the Philippines
considering that under the country’s tax laws, any person, whether a citizen, noncitizen,
resident or nonresident of the Philippines, is required to secure a TIN for purposes of tax
payment.—After a critical review, I am satisfied that the Comelec correctly found petitioner’s
evidence relative to her claim of animus manendi beginning May 24, 2005 both wanting and
insufficient. For instance, securing a TIN is not conclusive proof of intent to remain in the
Philippines considering that under the country’s tax laws, any person, whether a citizen,
noncitizen, resident or nonresident of the Philippines, is required to secure a TIN for purposes
of tax payment. If at all, procurement of a TIN merely suggests or indicates an intention to
comply with the obligation to pay taxes which may be imposed upon any person, whether a
citizen or an alien. In fact, by her own admission, petitioner secured a TIN precisely for the
purpose of “settling her late father’s estate.” At any rate, a TIN was issued to petitioner on July
22, 2005, or almost two months after her claimed starting point of residency in the Philippines.
Domicile; View that speaking for the Supreme Court (SC) in Svetlana Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, 691 SCRA 646 (2013), Chief Justice Maria
 
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Lourdes P.A. Sereno declared that “ownership of a house or some other property does
not establish domicile.”—Under the same parity of reasoning, petitioner’s acquisition of a
condominium unit and parking lot at One Wilson Place in San Juan City, as well as her
acquisition of a parcel of land in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and the subsequent construction
of a house thereon, do not evince an intent to remain in the Philippines for good. Speaking for
the Court in Svetlana Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,  691 SCRA 646 (2013), Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno declared that “ownership of a house or some other property does
not establish domicile.” After all, acquisition of properties may also very well be for investment
purposes only. Besides, it bears emphasis that by petitioner’s own allegation, the condominium
unit and parking lot were acquired in the second half of 2005, the lot in Corinthian Hills was
bought in 2006, and the house standing thereon was constructed that same year (2006) — all
after May 24, 2005.
Same; Animus Manendi; View that to follow petitioner’s proposition that acquisition of
residential properties is an indicia  of  animus manendi  is actually detrimental to her cause
considering that subsequent to her purchase of a condominium unit and a residential lot in the
Philippines in 2006, she later on acquired a residential property in the United States (U.S.) in
2008. In addition, she maintained  one other residential property in the U.S. which was bought
in 1992.—To follow petitioner’s proposition that acquisition of residential properties is
an indicia of animus manendi is actually detrimental to her cause considering that subsequent
to her purchase of a condominium unit and a residential lot in the Philippines in 2006, she later
on acquired a residential property in the U.S. in 2008. In addition, she maintained one other
residential property in the U.S. which was bought in 1992. I also agree with the observation of
respondent Contreras regarding the failure of petitioner to secure an ICR for herself as she did
with her children. For Contreras, this not only shows that petitioner was fully cognizant of the
nature of her residency status and the applicable laws/rules regarding the same; more
significantly, it was clear and positive evidence of her intention or ambivalence not to become a
permanent resident of the Philippines at that time.
Evidence; Admission Against Interest; View that to be admissible, an admission must: (a)
involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and
voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-
serving and inadmissible.—“To be admissible, an admission must: (a) involve matters of fact,
and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d)
be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.” All
these requisites are present in these cases. The entry in petitioner’s 2012 CoC, i.e., six years
and six months, refers to her period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013 — a
matter which without a doubt involves a
 
 
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question of fact. The same is categorical and definite, and was made under oath. The
entry is adverse to petitioner’s interest, specifically in respect to her present claim in her 2015
CoC that she has been a resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months up to the day
before the May 9, 2016 elections. Clearly, the questioned entry in petitioner’s 2012 CoC is
admissible as an admission against her interest. “Admissibility, however, is one thing, weight is
another.” Indeed, when the admission is contained in a document as in this case, the document
is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale
for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself/herself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration
corresponds with the truth, and it is his/her fault if it does not. It bears emphasizing, though,
that this does not preclude a declarant from refuting his/her admission. In this case, petitioner
must show clear, convincing, and more than preponderant evidence in order to refute the facts
stated in her 2012 CoC considering that it is a sworn document which the Rules of Court
presumes had been executed in the regular course of law.
Certificate of Candidacy; Honest Mistake; View that the defense of honest mistake is
available only if the mistake in the certificate of candidacy (CoC) would make a qualified
candidate ineligible for the position. It cannot be invoked when the mistake would make an
ineligible candidate qualified for the position.—I am not convinced with petitioner’s invocation
of honest mistake. Among other reasons, the defense of honest mistake interposed
in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), was found tenable
because therein petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Imelda) wrote in her CoC “seven”
months as her period of residence — an entry which was obviously short of the one-year
residency requirement for the position for which she filed her CoC. Hence, the Court stated
that it would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a CoC which would lead to her disqualification. It can be concluded, therefore,
that the defense of honest mistake is available only if the mistake in the CoC would make a
qualified candidate ineligible for the position. It cannot be invoked when the mistake would
make an ineligible candidate qualified for the position. For in the first case, no candidate in
his/her right mind would prevaricate or make the electorate believe that he/she is not qualified
for the position he/she is aspiring for. Hence, there could be no other conclusion than that the
mistake was committed honestly. Whereas in the second case, the intention to mislead can be
deduced from the fact that an aspirant, although not qualified, makes it appear in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible to run for public office when in truth he/she is not. Here, petitioner made
it appear that she did meet the 10-year residency requirement when in fact, she did not.
 
 
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Citizenship; View that as a United States (U.S.) citizen, petitioner failed to perform an act
necessary to show that as of May 24, 2005 she intended to permanently remain in the
Philippines.—I wish to make it abundantly clear that it is not my position that petitioner could
not reestablish her domicile in the country prior to taking the oath of allegiance to the country.
In retrospect, petitioner could have made her stay in the Philippines permanent in character
beginning May 24, 2005 or thereabouts had she applied for an immigrant status as provided in
Commonwealth Act No. 613 or The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by RA
4376, which allows a natural-born Filipino citizen (assuming that she is) who was naturalized
abroad to return as a non-quota immigrant entitled to permanent residence. As correctly
argued by respondent Contreras, “[t]he possession of a permanent resident visa is not an
added element, but is simply evidence that sufficiently proves the presence of an act that
would indicate the element of animus manendi that applies to foreign nationals who would like
to make the Philippines as their new domicile of choice.” But for some reason petitioner did
not apply for an immigrant status, and there is no indication that she was subsequently granted
an immigrant visa, or a permanent resident status. As a U.S. citizen, petitioner failed to perform
an act necessary to show that as of May 24, 2005 she intended to permanently remain in the
Philippines. Such intention may be inferred from her waiver of nonresident status by obtaining
a permanent resident visa or an ACR or by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines, which
petitioner neither availed of on or before May 24, 2005.
Same; Domicile; View that petitioner’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship neither
automatically resulted in the reestablishment of her Philippine domicile nor in the
abandonment of her United States (U.S.) domicile.—It must be emphasized that petitioner’s
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship neither automatically resulted in the reestablishment of
her Philippine domicile nor in the abandonment of her U.S. domicile. It is settled that RA 9225
treats citizenship independently of residence. It does not provide for a mode of reestablishing
domicile and has no effect on the legal residence of those availing of it. “This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino
may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he[/she] may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he[/she] is also a citizen.”
Same; Same; View that since petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance in July 2006 and
renounced her United States (U.S.) citizenship in October 2010, both events having occurred less
than ten (10) years prior to the May 9, 2016 elections, the conclusion becomes inexorable that
she could no longer possibly prove compliance with the ten (10)-year residency requirement.—I
find no sufficient evidence showing that petitioner intended to reestablish a new domicile in
the Philippines prior to taking her Oath of Allegiance on July 7, 2006; as such petitioner still has
to prove that after taking said oath she has reestablished the
 
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Philippines as her new domicile by demonstrating that her physical presence here is
coupled with animus manendi and an undeniable and definite intention to abandon her old
domicile. However, since petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance in July 2006 and renounced her
U.S. citizenship in October 2010, both events having occurred less than 10 years prior to the
May 9, 2016 elections, the conclusion becomes inexorable that she could no longer possibly
prove compliance with the 10-year residency requirement.
Same; Same; View that petitioner’s evidence cannot prove  animus non revertendi prior
to her renunciation of her United States (U.S.) citizenship on October 20, 2010. This is so
because prior thereto, petitioner could return anytime to the U.S., stay there as its citizen and
enjoy all the rights, privileges and protection the U.S. government extends to its nationals,
including the right to a legal residence.—Petitioner’s evidence cannot prove animus non
revertendi prior to her renunciation of her U.S. citizenship on October 20, 2010. This is so
because prior thereto, petitioner could return anytime to the U.S., stay there as its citizen and
enjoy all the rights, privileges and protection the U.S. government extends to its nationals,
including the right to a legal residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to October 20, 2010,
petitioner did go back to the U.S. no less than five times: February 14, 2006, April 20, 2009,
October 19, 2009, December 27, 2009 and March 27, 2010. And when she went to the U.S. on
those dates, she used her U.S. passport and stayed there not as an alien but as its citizen. It
should also be recalled that petitioner and her family still own and maintain two residential
houses in the U.S. which they purchased in 1992 and in 2008, or two years after petitioner had
taken her oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Hence the only clear and positive proof that
petitioner abandoned her U.S. domicile was when she executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship on
October 20, 2010 because that was the point when she concretized and exteriorized her
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile. It is this act that unequivocally and irremissibly sealed
off any intent of her retaining her U.S. domicile. Prior to that, it cannot be said that she has
complied with the third requirement.
Same; Same; View that petitioner’s case is nowhere nearly congruent to  Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010),  and Sabili v. Commission on Elections, 670
SCRA 664 (2012),  because in  those cases, the evidence of therein petitioners were plainly
viewed by the Supreme Court (SC) as positive acts that formed part of the incremental process
of changing domicile.—Petitioner’s case is nowhere nearly congruent to Mitra v. Commission
on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), and Sabili v. Commission on Elections, 670 SCRA 664 (2012),
because in those cases, the evidence of therein petitioners were plainly viewed by the Court as
positive acts that formed part of the incremental process of changing domicile. That same
perspective cannot, however, be applied to petitioner’s case because, unlike
in Mitra and Sabili, her change of domicile, as previously dis-
 
 
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cussed, was inevitably and inextricably intertwined with her citizenship. It bears
reiterating that as a naturalized U.S. citizen, petitioner is duty-bound to comply with our
immigration laws before her stay in this country could be considered for purposes of the
elections. Just because she thought of permanently staying in the Philippines does not mean
that upon setting foot on this country she has instantly reestablished domicile here. As an alien
wanting to reestablish a domicile here, petitioner must first reacquire Philippine citizenship (or
at least ought to have secured a permanent resident visa) before the totality of her acts or
actions tending to show animus manendi can be regarded part of an incremental process of
establishing domicile. The same is true with respect to animus non revertendi: she must have
first renounced her U.S. citizenship (or applied for a Philippine immigrant visa). The records also
show that petitioner has not only procrastinated in renouncing her U.S. citizenship; in fact she
also did it unwittingly. It should be recalled that the President appointed her Chairperson of the
MTRCB on October 6, 2010. At that time, petitioner was still a dual citizen owing allegiance
both to the Philippines and to the U.S. Hence she could not accept the said appointment
without renouncing her U.S. citizenship first, conformably with Section 5(3) of RA 9225.
Same; Same; View that when petitioner thus executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance on October 20, 2010, there could be no two (2) opinions about the fact that her
primary purpose was to meet the requirement for her appointment as  Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) Chairperson; petitioner did not renounce her United
States (U.S.) citizenship upon her own volition with the deliberate intent or intention of
reestablishing legal residence here. It only incidentally arose as an inevitable consequence of
her having to comply with the requirements of Section 5(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225.—
When petitioner thus executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance on October 20, 2010,
there could be no two opinions about the fact that her primary purpose was to meet the
requirement for her appointment as MTRCB Chairperson. This is buttressed by the fact that she
assumed office the following day and by the answers she wrote in the
Questionnaire/Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship that she submitted
with the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. There she explicitly stated
that she was relinquishing her U.S. citizenship because she was appointed Chairperson of the
MTRCB and she wanted to comply with both U.S. and Philippine laws. Even then, it bears notice
that in that document she made no categorical declaration at all that she was relinquishing her
U.S. citizenship to transfer domicile here. In other words, petitioner did not renounce her U.S.
citizenship upon her own volition with the deliberate intent or intention of reestablishing legal
residence here. It only incidentally arose as an inevitable consequence of her having to comply
with the requirements of Section 5(3) of RA 9225. Be that as it may, I consider her act of
renouncing her foreign allegiance on October 20, 2010 as amounting to sufficient compliance
with the third re-
 
 
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quirement in reestablishing domicile for it carried with it a waiver of her right to
permanently reside in the U.S. Regrettably, this date does not jibe with what petitioner
declared in her 2015 CoC for President.
Same; Same; View that the period of her physical presence here, as an alien, should not
be included in the computation of the length of her residency as the same was temporary in
character or not permitted by our immigration laws.—The present case, however, involves a
personality who formerly abandoned the Philippines as her domicile, and renounced her
Philippine citizenship by becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. Thus, what is involved here is a
transfer of domicile from one country to another by a naturalized U.S. citizen. Petitioner now
tries to convince this Court that she had abandoned her U.S. domicile and had successfully
reestablished her new domicile of choice in this country. To stress, this case involves relocation
by an alien of the national domicile from the U.S. to the Philippines, which requires much
stronger proof, both as to fact and intent, than in the case of a change of domicile from one
municipality, or subordinate subdivision of a country, to another, by a Filipino citizen who
never renounced such citizenship. “[I]t requires stronger and more conclusive evidence to
justify the court in deciding that a man has acquired a new domicile in a foreign country, than
would suffice to warrant the conclusion that he has acquired a new domicile in a country where
he is not a foreigner.” In Perez v. Commission on Elections, 317 SCRA 641 (1999), and Jalover v.
Osmeña, 736 SCRA 267 (2014), for instance, it was no longer necessary for this Court to
determine whether the candidates had the legal right to permanently reside in their chosen
domicile because, being Filipinos, they can reside anywhere in the Philippines. In the case of
the herein petitioner, however, it is not only the length of her stay in the Philippines that must
be determined, but also the legality and nature thereof for, as heretofore discussed, the period
of her physical presence here, as an alien, should not be included in the computation of the
length of her residency as the same was temporary in character or not permitted by our
immigration laws. Also, while citizenship and residency are different from and independent of
each other, one may invariably affect the other. For instance, petitioner had to abandon her
Philippine domicile when she applied for U.S. naturalization in 2001. Corollarily, she cannot
reestablish domicile here unless she first reacquires her Philippine citizenship (or enter the
Philippines as an immigrant). Thus, unlike in Perez and Jalover, the petitioner in this case has
the added burden of proving, among others, the character and legitimacy of her presence here
since she earlier abandoned her Filipino citizenship and Philippine domicile to become a U.S.
citizen and its domiciliary.
Same; Same; View that the import of the phrase “Period of Residence in the Philippines
before
 
 
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May 13, 2013” as found in petitioner’s 2012 Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is too plain to
be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.—The import of the phrase “Period of
Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013” as found in petitioner’s 2012 CoC is too plain
to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. As can be observed, a fixed date was
given as a reference point, i.e., May 13, 4013. Indeed, even an average person would be able to
tell that what comes before May 13, 2013 is May 12, 2013. From a plain reading of the said
phrase, therefore, it can readily be discerned or understood that what was being required by
Item No. 11 is a candidate’s period of residence in the Philippines until May 12, 2013. To argue
that any period which is not until May 12, 2013 but prior to May 13, 2013 is technically still a
period “before May 13, 2013” is like clutching at straws. To an astute political aspirant like
petitioner, filing a CoC necessarily presupposes knowledge on her part of the qualifications
required by the office where she seeks to be elected. After all, it is presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his or her concerns.
Same; Same; View that being the educated woman that she is, coupled by her brief but
memorable stint in politics and relevant government experience, I find it hard to believe that
she misinterpreted the clear and simple import of the phrase “Period of Residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013” as pertaining to her period of residence in the Philippines as
of the submission of her 2012 Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) on October 2, 2012. —Petitioner’s
personal circumstances and those surrounding the filing of her 2012 CoC provide little solace to
her claim of honest mistake. As petitioner alleges, she pursued a college degree in
Development Studies in one of the country’s premiere universities — the University of the
Philippines in Manila. In 1988, she went to Boston College in the U.S. where, as can reasonably
be expected, she learned concepts on politics after graduating with a degree of Bachelor of Arts
in Political Studies. When she filed her 2012 CoC, she was not technically a neophyte in the
Philippine political arena, she having been on her adoptive father’s side during the campaign
for his presidential bid in 2004. At that time, she was, for two years, at the helm of MTRCB
where her duties impacted not only media and entertainment culture but also society at large.
Being the educated woman that she is, coupled by her brief but memorable stint in politics and
relevant government experience, I find it hard to believe that she misinterpreted the clear and
simple import of the phrase “Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013” as
pertaining to her period of residence in the Philippines as of the submission of her 2012 CoC on
October 2, 2012. To repeat, the phrase is too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted, more especially by one of her educational and professional stature.
Same; Same; View that when one runs for an elective public office, it is imperative to first
know the qualifications required of the office and then to assess whether such qualifications
have been met; In petitioner’s case, precisely because her adoptive father’s qualifications were
then under question when he ran for President in 2004, then there is more reason for petitioner
to carefully evaluate and assess her eligibility and qualifications so that she would not be
trapped into
 
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the same quagmire her adoptive father fell into.—Notably, when one runs for an elective
public office, it is imperative to first know the qualifications required of the office and then to
assess whether such qualifications have been met. Hence, petitioner is reasonably expected to
know the requirements of the office she is running for, and to determine whether she
satisfactorily meets those requirements. One cannot just aspire to occupy a position without
making some self-examination whether he/she is qualified. In petitioner’s case, precisely
because her adoptive father’s qualifications were then under question when he ran for
President in 2004, then there is more reason for petitioner to carefully evaluate and assess her
eligibility and qualifications so that she would not be trapped into the same quagmire her
adoptive father fell into.
Same; Same; View that petitioner miserably fell short of portraying that the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) had whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously and despotically exercised its
judgment as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.—In sum, I find that the Comelec
committed no grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking
cognizance of the petitions and in denying due course to and cancelling petitioner’s 2015 CoC.
To my mind, it properly exercised its power to determine whether a candidate’s CoC contains
false material representation; its resolution was anchored on settled jurisprudence and fair
appreciation of facts; and it accorded the parties ample opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence. Conversely stated, it is my opinion that the Comelec did not usurp the jurisdiction of
the SET, or the PET, or the DOJ or any other tribunal; it did not disregard or contravene settled
jurisprudence; and it did not violate the parties’ right to due process. Thus, I find that petitioner
miserably failed to hurdle the bar set by this Court in Sabili, that is, to prove that the Comelec
was so grossly unreasonable in its appreciation and evaluation of evidence as to amount to an
error of jurisdiction. Petitioner miserably fell short of portraying that the Comelec had
whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously and despotically exercised its judgment as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Res Judicata; View that even if the Supreme Court (SC) rules on her citizenship
now, that ruling can be changed or altered any time when there is certainty or definiteness
about her biological lineage because there is generally no  res judicata in matters of citizenship.
—It is not improbable, of course, that petitioner was born to Filipino parents; yet the fact
remains that their identities are unknown. In short, petitioner’s citizenship is uncertain. Thus, I
feel that we should not overlook altogether her much publicized efforts to obtain
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence to prove her genealogy. She could use this breather to
gather such evidence. Petitioner surely has biological parents. It is indeed surprising that these
parents, or any close relatives, have not come forward to claim their ties to someone so highly
respected and so well recognized as one of the worthy leaders of the country. While it defies
human nature to resist the
 
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natural impulse to claim one’s own child, the sad reality is that there are still many
parents who abandon their child, depriving said child not only of parental love and care, but
also identity and pedigree. Every opportunity should thus be given to the innocent child to
trace his/her parentage and determine compliance with the Constitution. This opportunity and
this privilege should not be time-bound, and should be afforded to every foundling at any stage
of his/her life. Thus, even if the Court rules on her citizenship now, that ruling can be changed
or altered any time when there is certainty or definiteness about her biological lineage because
there is generally no res judicata  in matters of citizenship. As the Court has declared in Moy Ya
Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 (1971), whenever the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, the ruling therein as to
the person’s citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata. Thus, it may be threshed
out again and again as the occasion demands, stock being taken of the fact that the requisites
enumerated in In re Petition for  Naturalization of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, 51 SCRA 248
(1973), reiterated in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 598 SCRA 266 (2009), are all present.
 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., Dissenting Opinion:
 
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that the Commission on
Elections’ (COMELEC’s) power to deny due course to or cancel a candidate’s Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) stems from Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which grants it the
authority to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall” and to “[d]ecide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x  x.”—The COMELEC’s power to deny due
course to or cancel a candidate’s CoC stems from Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution which grants it the authority to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall” and to “[d]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections x x x.” In Loong v. COMELEC,  305 SCRA 832 (1999), it was elucidated that: Section
2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power “to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum[,] and recall.” Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to
give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this
Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct
of our elections. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Likewise, in Bedol v. COMELEC, 606
SCRA 554 (2009): The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
 proclamation controversies; x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Based on the
text of the Constitution, and bearing in mind the import of cases on the matter, there is no
perceivable restriction which qualifies the exercise of the COMELEC’s adjudicatory power to
declare a candidate ineligible and thus, cancel his/her CoC with the need of a prior
determination coming from a “proper authority.”
Same; Same; Same; View that contrary to the  ponencia’s  interpretation, the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), under Rule 25 of its Resolution No. 9523 dated September 25, 2012,
may disqualify any candidate found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.—Contrary to the ponencia’s interpretation, the COMELEC,
under Rule 25 of its Resolution No. 9523 dated September 25, 2012, may disqualify any
candidate found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution: Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates. Section 1. Grounds.—Any
candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) It is
confounding that the ponencia ignores the second prong of the provision and myopically
zeroes-in on the first which but procedurally reflects the COMELEC’s power to disqualify a
candidate already declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of any disqualification,
such as those accessory to a criminal conviction.
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that as
worded, a Section 78 petition is based exclusively on the ground that a Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) contains a material representation that is false.—As in this case, a “pre-proclamation
controversy” may arise from a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC. This remedy —
which is filed before and falls under the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the COMELEC — is
governed by Section 78, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the
“Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines” (OEC): Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74  hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As worded, a Section 78
petition is based exclusively on the ground that a CoC contains a material representation that
is false. “The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the [OEC] pertains to [a]
material
 
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fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate’s
qualification for elective office such as one’s citizenship and residence.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the plain text of Section 78 reads that the remedy is based
“on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false.”—The plain text of Section 78 reads that the remedy is based “on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false.” It pertains to a material representation that is false and not a
“material misrepresentation.” In my view, the latter is a semantic but impactful misnomer
which tends to obfuscate the sense of the provision as it suggests — by employing the word
“misrepresent,” ordinarily understood to mean as “to give a false or misleading representation
of usually with an intent to deceive or be unfair” — that intent is crucial in a Section 78
petition, when, in fact, it is not.
Same; Same; Same; View that truly, “[n]owhere in Section 78 is it stated or implied that
there be an intention to deceive for a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) to be denied due course or
be cancelled.”—Truly, “[n]owhere in Section 78 is it stated or implied that there be an intention
to deceive for a certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled.” At the risk of
belaboring the point, the candidate’s intent to mislead or misinform on a material fact stated in
his/her CoC is of no consequence in ruling on a Section 78 petition. To premise a Section 78
petition on a finding of intent or belief would create a legal vacuum wherein the COMELEC
becomes powerless under the OEC to enjoin the candidacy of ineligible presidential candidates
upon a mere showing that the material representations in his/her CoC were all made in good
faith. It should be emphasized that “[a] candidate’s citizenship eligibility in particular is
determined by law, not by his good faith.” With this, the Romualdez-Marcos  v. COMELEC, 248
SCRA 300 (1995), and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,  312 SCRA 447 (1999),  rulings which “judicially
legislated” this requirement should, therefore, be abandoned as legal aberrations. Neither is it
acceptable to think that the matter of eligibility particularly, that of a candidate for President —
can only be taken up before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) after a candidate has
already been voted for. The COMELEC’s constitutional mandate cannot be any clearer: it is
empowered to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall” and to “[d]ecide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x.” As observed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio in his own opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC,  424 SCRA 277 (2004): This broad
constitutional power and function vested in the COMELEC is designed precisely to avoid any
situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is
obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold [Schwarzenegger], runs for
President, the COMELEC is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such
candidate.
 
 
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There is no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be
disqualified.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot tolerate an absurd
situation wherein a presidential candidate, who has already been determined by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to have missed a particular eligibility requirement and,
thus, had made a false representation in his/her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) by declaring that
he/she is eligible, is still allowed to continue his/her candidacy, and eventually be voted for.—
Verily, we cannot tolerate an absurd situation wherein a presidential candidate, who has
already been determined by the COMELEC to have missed a particular eligibility requirement
and, thus, had made a false representation in his/her CoC by declaring that he/she is eligible, is
still allowed to continue his/her candidacy, and eventually be voted for. The proposition that
the matter of eligibility should be left to the PET to decide only after the elections is a
dangerous one for not only does it debase the COMELEC’s constitutional powers, it also
effectively results in a mockery of the electoral process, not to mention the disenfranchisement
of the voters. Clearly, the votes of the Filipino people would be put to waste if we imprudently
take away from the COMELEC its capability to avert the fielding of ineligible candidates whose
votes therefor shall be only considered stray. The Filipino people deserve to know prior to the
elections if the person they intend to vote for is ineligible. In all reasonable likelihood, they
would not have cast their votes for a particular candidate who would just be ousted from office
later on.
Domicile; Balikbayan Program; View that petitioner returned to the Philippines on May
24, 2005 under the  Balikbayan  Program,  and therefore, only obtained the status of a
temporary resident; As such, since she did not waive her status of being a nonresident alien, her
stay here upon her return on May 24, 2005 up until she reacquired Philippine citizenship in July
2006 should only be considered as temporary.—To my mind, the COMELEC’s reliance
on Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), is apt. As the records disclose, petitioner
returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2005 under the Balikbayan Program, and therefore,
only obtained the status of a temporary resident. Specifically, Section 3 of RA 6768, as
amended by RA 9174, merely accorded her the benefit of visa-free entry to the Philippines for a
period of one (1) year: Section 3. Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan.—
The balikbayan and his or her family shall be entitled to the following benefits and privileges:
x x x x (c) Visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign passport
holders, with the exception of restricted nationals[.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As,
since she did not waive her status of being a nonresident alien, her stay here upon her return
on May 24, 2005 up until she reacquired Philippine citizenship in July 2006 should only be
considered as temporary.
 
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Same; View that being still a citizen of the United States (U.S.) at the time of her return to
the Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner remained entitled to the rights, privileges, and the
protection the US government extends to its nationals, including the right to residence; Absent
compelling evidence to show that he/she had reestablished domicile in another country, it
should therefore be presumed that he/she continues to be domiciled in the country he/she is a
citizen of.—I further observe that the need for stronger proof becomes more apparent when
the person involved is one who has been domiciled in another country as part of his/her
naturalization as a citizen therein. As such, while citizenship and residency are different from
and independent of each other — this, being the key premise in the Court’s rulings in  Japzon v.
COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), and Caballero v. COMELEC, 771 SCRA 213  (2015) — I do
believe that “one may invariably affect the other.” Being still a citizen of the US at the time of
her return to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner remained entitled to the rights,
privileges, and the protection the US government extends to its nationals, including the right to
residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to October 20, 2010, petitioner availed of this privilege
when she returned to the US, on separate dates, significantly, for no less than five times. To my
mind, the ability to enjoy the privileges of foreign citizenship at any time, while remaining
under that status, conjures a reasonable presumption that the latter continues to avail of these
privileges, which, among others, include the privilege to reside in that foreign country. Hence,
absent compelling evidence to show that he/she had reestablished domicile in another
country, it should therefore be presumed that he/she continues to be domiciled in the country
he/she is a citizen of.
Election Law; Residence; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation;
Honest Mistake; View that while petitioner may later impugn an admission against interest, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) found that her residency declaration in her 2012
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) could not be borne out of an “honest mistake”; the falsity of the
material representation already justifies the cancellation of petitioner’s CoC.—It is certainly not
patent and grave error for the COMELEC to regard a CoC as a notarized document and accord it
the presumption of regularity. Also, while petitioner may later impugn an admission against
interest, the COMELEC found that her residency declaration in her 2012 CoC could not be borne
out of an “honest mistake,” in light of the following considerations: (a) the bulk, if not all, of the
evidence she presented were executed before she reacquired her Philippine citizenship, which
cannot be done in light of Coquilla,  among others; (b) while she made statements
acknowledging that there was a mistake in her 2015 CoC, they were nonetheless delivered at a
time when, at the very least, the possibility of her running for President was already a matter of
public knowledge; and (c) petitioner was a well-educated woman and a high-ranking official
with a competent staff and a band of legal advisers and is not entirely unacquainted with
Philippine politics, and thus, would know how to fill-up a pro forma CoC in 2012. As I
 
 
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see it, these reasons are not barren of any considerable merit. At the very least, they are
plausible enough to negate the finding that the conclusion amounted to grave abuse of
discretion. Besides, I believe that the falsity of the material representation already justifies the
cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. As above intimated, a candidate’s intent is immaterial to a
Section 78 analysis.
Remedial Law; Burden of Evidence; Foundlings; View that while petitioner did not bear
the initial burden of proving that she made a false material representation on her citizenship in
her 2015 Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), as that burden belonged to those who filed the
petitions to deny due course to or cancel her CoC before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), the burden of  evidence shifted  to her when she voluntarily admitted her status as
a foundling.—In this case, petitioner has shown no evidence of blood relation to a Filipino
parent to prove that she acquired Filipino citizenship by birth under the jus sanguinis  principle.
While petitioner did not bear the initial burden of proving that she made a false material
representation on her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, as that burden belonged to those who filed
the petitions to deny due course to or cancel her CoC before the COMELEC, the burden of
evidence shifted to her when she voluntarily admitted her status as a foundling. Under Section
1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which governs petitioner’s case, foundlings are not
included in the enumeration of who are considered as Filipino citizens.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that without any proof of blood
relation to a Filipino parent, and without any mention in the 1935 Constitution that foundlings
are considered or are even presumed to be Filipino citizens by birth, the Commission on
Elections’ (COMELEC’s) finding that petitioner was not a natural-born citizen cannot be taken as
patently unreasonable and grossly baseless so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. —
Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent, and without any mention in the 1935
Constitution that foundlings are considered or are even presumed to be Filipino citizens by
birth, the COMELEC’s finding that petitioner was not a natural-born citizen cannot be taken as
patently unreasonable and grossly baseless so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. As it
is apparent, the COMELEC, with good reason, relied on the plain text of the 1935 Constitution
based on the statutory construction  axioms of  expressio unius est exclusio alterius and verba
legis non est recedendum, as well as firmly abided by the jus sanguinis principle which, as
repeatedly stated, necessitates proof of blood relation, of which petitioner presented none.
Accordingly, its analysis was grounded on sound legal basis and therefore unreflective of grave
abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; View that while petitioner argues that foundlings should be
considered as natural-born Filipinos based on the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution,
it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in its final form, never
carried over any proposed provision on
 
 
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foundlings being considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens.—While petitioner argues
that foundlings should be considered as natural-born Filipinos based on the intent of the
framers of the 1935 Constitution, it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was
adopted in its final form, never carried over any proposed provision on foundlings being
considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is therefore indicative of the
framers’ prevailing intent. Besides, in  Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary,  194 SCRA
317 (1991), this Court remarked that: Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it [is] safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face.”
International Law; Treaties; View that in our legal hierarchy, treaties and international
principles belong to the same plane as domestic laws and, hence, cannot prevail over the
Constitution.—I also find no merit in petitioner’s invocation of international covenants which
purportedly evince a generally accepted principle in international law that foundlings are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Since the 1935 Constitution, and
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions thereafter, consistently subscribe to the jus
sanguinis  principle, it is axiomatic that no international agreement or generally accepted
principle of international law — even assuming that there is a binding one which supports
petitioner’s averred presumption — could contravene the same. “Under the 1987 Constitution,
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation.” Thus, in our legal hierarchy, treaties and international principles belong to the
same plane as domestic laws and, hence, cannot prevail over the Constitution.
Statistical Probability; View that the constitutional requirements for office, especially for
the highest office in the land, cannot be based on mere probability.—I oppose petitioner’s
resort to statistical probability as basis to presume natural-born citizenship in this case. Allow
me to point out that these statistics surfaced only in the proceedings before this Court and
hence, could not have been weighed and assessed by the COMELEC En Banc  at the time it
rendered its ruling. Be that as it may, the constitutional requirements for office, especially for
the highest office in the land, cannot be based on mere probability. “[M]atters dealing with
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with.” The proof to hurdle a
substantial challenge against a candidate’s qualifications must therefore be solid. We cannot
make a definitive pronouncement on a candidate’s citizenship when there is a looming
possibility that he/she is not Filipino. Also, the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
abandonment, as well as her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility.
 
 
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By parity of reasoning, they do not prove that she was born to a Filipino: her
abandonment in the Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling status, while her physical
features only tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it remains
uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Supreme Court; Judicial Review; View that judicial review grants the
Supreme Court (SC) authority to invalidate acts — of the legislative, the executive,
constitutional bodies, and administrative agencies — when these acts are contrary to the
Constitution.—Under Rule 64, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections may be brought to this court on certiorariunder Rule
65. For a writ of certiorari to be issued under Rule 65, the respondent tribunal must have acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution recognizes this
court’s jurisdiction to settle actual cases or controversies. It also underscores this court’s
jurisdiction to determine whether a government agency or instrumentality committed grave
abuse of discretion in the fulfillment of its actions. Judicial review grants this court authority to
invalidate acts — of the legislative, the executive, constitutional bodies, and administrative
agencies — when these acts are contrary to the Constitution.
Judicial Review; COMELEC Rules; View that that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
may deem a resolution final and executory under its rules of procedure does not automatically
render such resolution beyond the scope of judicial review under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution.—The Commission on Elections’ Rules of Procedure are evidently procedural rules;
they are remedial in nature. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice. They are the
means by which its power or authority to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action.
Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections’ Rules of Procedure refers only to the
pleadings and practice before the Commission on Elections itself, and does not affect the
jurisdiction of this court. Accordingly, that the Commission on Elections may deem a resolution
final and executory under its rules of procedure does not automatically render such resolution
beyond the scope of judicial review under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. Rule 23, Section 8
of the Commission on Elections’ Rules of Procedure merely guides the Commission as to the
status of a decision for its own operations; it does not prevent this court from acting on the
same decision via certiorariproceedings. In any event, while it is true that certiorari does not
immediately stay a decision of a constitutional commission, a temporary restraining order can
still be issued, as in this case.
 
 
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Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that generally, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of certificates of
candidacy (CoC). COMELEC has the competence to deny acceptance of a CoC when a
candidate’s lack of qualifications appears patent on the face of the CoC and is indubitable.—
Generally, the Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of certificates of candidacy. The Commission on Elections has the competence to deny
acceptance of a certificate of candidacy when a candidate’s lack of qualifications appears
patent on the face of the certificate of candidacy and is indubitable. This is in line with its
power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.” For instance, if the date of birth in the certificate of candidacy clearly and patently
shows that the candidate has not met the required age requirement for the office for which he
or she is running, the Commission on Elections may motu proprio deny acceptance. Specifically,
in such cases, the candidate has effectively made an admission by swearing to the certificate of
candidacy. Therefore, in the interest of an orderly election, the Commission on Elections may
simply implement the law.
Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has no jurisdiction over
the elections, returns, and qualifications of those who are candidates for the Office of the
President (OP). They also do not have jurisdiction to decide issues “involving the right to
vote.”—Except for item (2), all the powers enumerated in Article IX-C, Section 2 are
administrative in nature. These powers relate to the Commission’s general mandate to
“[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” The
Commission on Elections’ adjudicatory powers are limited to having “exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials” and “appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.” The Commission on
Elections has no jurisdiction over the elections, returns, and qualifications of those who are
candidates for the Office of the President. They also do not have jurisdiction to decide issues
“involving the right to vote[.]” The Commission on Elections was originally only an
administrative agency. Under Commonwealth Act No. 607, it took over the President’s function
to enforce election laws.
Same; Appeals; View that given Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, any “case or
matter” decided by a constitutional commission “may be brought to the Supreme Court (SC) on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof.”—
Clearly, the credibility — and perhaps even the legitimacy — of those who are elected to these
important public offices will be undermined with the slightest suspicion of bias on the part of
the Commission on Elections. This is why the pressure to determine the qualifications of
 
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candidates to these positions has been purposely removed from the Commission on
Elections. After all, given Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, any “case or matter”
decided by a constitutional commission “may be brought to the Supreme Court on  certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” The Commission on
Elections will find itself in a very difficult situation should it disqualify a candidate on reasons
other than clearly demonstrable or factual grounds only for this court to eventually overturn its
ruling. The Commission on Elections, wittingly or unwittingly, would provide justifiable basis for
suspicions of partiality.
Same; Jurisdiction; View that under Section 78, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
cannot resolve questions of law — as when it resolves the issue of whether a candidate is
qualified given a certain set of facts — for it would arrogate upon itself the powers duly
reserved to the electoral tribunals established by the Constitution.—As petitioner suggests, “the
sovereign people, in ratifying the Constitution, intended that questions of a candidate’s
qualification . . . be submitted directly to them.” In the words of Former Chief Justice Reynato
Puno in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727 (1996), the People, on certain legal
issues, choose to be the “final power of final legal adjustment.” Consistent with this legal order,
only questions of fact may be resolved in Section 78 proceedings. Section 78 uses the word
“false”; hence, these proceedings must proceed from doubts arising as to the truth or
falsehood of a representation in a certificate of candidacy. Only a fact is verifiable, and
conversely, falsifiable, as opposed to an opinion on a disputed point of law where one’s
position is only as good as another’s. Under Section 78, the Commission on Elections cannot
resolve questions of law — as when it resolves the issue of whether a candidate is qualified
given a certain set of facts — for it would arrogate upon itself the powers duly reserved to the
electoral tribunals established by the Constitution.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that that
intent to deceive is an inherent element of a Section 78 petition is reflected by the grave
consequences facing those who make false material representations in their certificates of
candidacy (CoC).—That intent to deceive is an inherent element of a Section 78 petition is
reflected by the grave consequences facing those who make false material representations in
their certificates of candidacy. They are deprived of a fundamental political right to run for
public office. Worse, they may be criminally charged with violating election laws, even with
perjury. For these reasons, the false material representation referred to in Section 78 cannot
“just [be] any innocuous mistake.” Petitioner correctly argued that Section 78 should be read in
relation to Section 74’s enumeration of what certificates of candidacy must state. Under
Section 74, a person filing a certificate of candidacy declares that the facts stated in the
certificate “are true to the best of his [or her] knowledge.” The law does not require “absolute
certainty” but allows for mistakes in the certificate of candidacy if made in good faith. This is
 
 
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consistent with the “summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy.”
Same; View that the law does not allow petitions directly questioning the qualifications
of a candidate before the elections.—The law does not allow petitions directly questioning the
qualifications of a candidate before the elections. Tatad could have availed himself of a petition
to deny due course to or cancel petitioner’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78 on the
ground that petitioner made a false material representation in her certificate of candidacy.
However, Tatad’s petition before the Commission on Elections did not even pray for the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion in either implicitly amending the petition or incorrectly interpreting its
procedural device so as to favor Tatad and allow his petition. The Commission should have
dismissed Tatad’s petition for want of jurisdiction. In failing to do so, it acted arbitrarily,
whimsically, and capriciously. The Commission on Elections on this point acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that there was
no material misrepresentation as to a matter of fact. There was no intent to deceive. Petitioner,
even as a foundling, presented enough facts to make a reasonable inference that either or both
of her parents were Filipino citizens when she was born.—The Commission on Elections had no
jurisdiction under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to rule on the nature of citizenship
of petitioner. Even assuming without granting that it had that competence, the Commission
gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy on this
ground. There was no material misrepresentation as to a matter of fact. There was no intent to
deceive. Petitioner, even as a foundling, presented enough facts to make a reasonable
inference that either or both of her parents were Filipino citizens when she was born.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; View that in an action for cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy (CoC) under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), the person
who filed the petition alleging material misrepresentation has the burden of proving such claim.
—In an action for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the person who filed the petition alleging material misrepresentation has the
burden of proving such claim. He or she must establish that there is material misrepresentation
under the required standard of evidence. In cases before quasi-judicial bodies, the standard of
evidence is “substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
 
 
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Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that being Filipina at birth, petitioner did not
have to do anything to perfect her Filipino citizenship. She is natural-born.—Even if we assume
that it was petitioner who had the burden of evidence, a complete and faithful reading of the
provisions of the entire Constitution, together with the evidence that petitioner presented,
leads to the inescapable conclusion that as a newborn abandoned by her parents in Jaro, Iloilo
in 1968, she was at birth Filipina. Thus, being Filipina at birth, petitioner did not have to do
anything to perfect her Filipino citizenship. She is natural-born. Furthermore, there is no shred
of evidence to rebut the circumstances of her birth. There is no shred of evidence that can lead
to the conclusion that both her parents were not Filipino citizens. The whole case of private
respondents, as well as the basis of the Commission on Elections’ Resolutions, is a presumption
that all newborns abandoned by their parents even in rural areas in the Philippines are
presumed not to be Filipinos. Private respondents’ approach requires that those who were
abandoned — even because of poverty or shame — must exert extraordinary effort to search
for the very same parents who abandoned them and might not have wanted to be identified in
order to have a chance to be of public service.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that the first approach is to assume as a matter of
constitutional interpretation that all foundlings found in the Philippines, being presumptively
born to either a Filipino biological father or a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof to the contrary; The second approach is to read the definition of
natural-born in Section 2 in relation to Article IV, Section 1(2). Section 1(2) requires that the
father  or the mother is a Filipino citizen.—The first approach is to assume as a matter of
constitutional interpretation that all foundlings found in the Philippines, being presumptively
born to either a Filipino biological father or a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born,
unless there is substantial proof to the contrary. There must be substantial evidence to show
that there is a reasonable probability that both, not just one, of the biological parents are not
Filipino citizens. This is the inevitable conclusion reached when the entirety of the provisions of
the Constitution is considered alongside the contemporary construction based on statutes and
international norms that form part of the law of the land. It is also the most viable conclusion
given the purpose of the requirement that candidates for President must be natural-born. The
second approach is to read the definition of natural-born in Section 2 in relation to Article IV,
Section 1(2). Section 1(2) requires that the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Same; View that physical features will not be determinative of natural-born
citizenship.—There is no requirement that the father or mother should be natural-born Filipino
citizens. It is possible that one or both of the parents are ethnically foreign. Thus, physical
features will not be determinative of natural-born citizenship. There is no requirement of
citizenship beyond the
 
 
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first degree of ascendant relationship. In other words, there is no necessity to prove
indigenous ethnicity. Contrary to the strident arguments of the Commission on Elections, there
is no requirement of Filipino bloodline. Significantly, there is also no requirement that the
father or mother should be definitively identified. There can be proof of a reasonable belief
that evidence presented in a relevant proceeding substantially shows that either the father or
the mother is a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; View that upon taking this Oath, those who became citizens of another
country prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 reacquire their Philippine
citizenship, while those who became citizens of another country after to the effectivity of RA No.
9225 retain their Philippine citizenship.—Upon taking this Oath, those who became citizens of
another country prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire their Philippine
citizenship, while those who became citizens of another country after to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9225 retain their Philippine citizenship. Taking the Oath enables the
enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws and the different solemnities under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225.
Different conditions must be complied with depending on whether one intends to exercise the
right to vote, seek elective public office, or assume an appointive public office, among others.
Same; Same; View that a natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one
who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship.”—A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one
who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship.” On the other hand, a naturalized citizen is one who is not
natural-born.
Same; Same; View that one’s status as a natural-born Filipino is immutable: “all
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship.”—While Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545
(2001), involved Commonwealth Act No. 63, its ruling is still consistent with the declared policy
under the current system of reacquiring Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225. One’s status as a natural-born Filipino is immutable: “all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.” Republic Act No. 9225
requires certain solemnities, but these requirements are only for the purpose of effecting the
incidents of the citizenship that a naturalized Filipino never lost. These requirements do not
operate to make new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the time they have been
complied with. To consider petitioner, a foundling, as not natural-born will have grave
consequences. Naturalization requires that petitioner is of legal age. While it is true
 
 
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that she could exert time and extraordinary expense to find the parents who might have
abandoned her, this will not apply to all foundlings. Thus, this approach will concede that we
will have a class of citizens who are stateless due to no fault of theirs.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that an interpretation that foundlings are not natural-
born Filipino citizens would mean that we should teach our foundling citizens to never aspire to
serve the country in any of the above capacities.—An interpretation that foundlings are not
natural-born Filipino citizens would mean that we should teach our foundling citizens to never
aspire to serve the country in any of the above capacities. This is not only inconsistent with the
text of our Constitution’s citizenship provisions, which required only evidence of citizenship and
not of the identities of the parents. It unnecessarily creates a classification of citizens with
limited rights based on the circumstances of their births. This is discriminatory. Our
Constitution provides that citizens shall have equal protection of the law and equal access to
opportunities for public service.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that apart from the anonymity of
their biological parents, there is no substantial distinction between foundlings and children with
known Filipino parents, all of whom are protected by the state from birth. —The equal
protection clause guarantees that “persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’ It is a
guarantee against ‘undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or oppression of inequality.’” Apart from the anonymity of their biological
parents, there is no substantial distinction between foundlings and children with known Filipino
parents, all of whom are protected by the state from birth. The foundlings’ fortuitous inability
to identify their biological parents who abandoned them cannot be the basis of a law or an
interpretation that has the effect of treating them as less entitled to the rights and protection
given by the state. To base a classification on this circumstance would be to sanction
statelessness and the marginalization of a particular class who, by force of chance, was already
made to start life under tragic circumstances.
International Law; Treaties; View that ratification of treaties by the Senate makes it
legally effective and binding by transformation.—Treaties are “international agreement[s]
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation.” They require concurrence by the Senate before they become binding
upon the state. Thus, Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution provides: SECTION 21. No treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Ratification of treaties by the Senate makes it legally
effective and binding by transformation.
 
 
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Civil Law; Adoption; Foundlings; View that the statutes providing for adoption only allow
the recognition of filiation for children who are Filipinos. They allow adoption of foundlings.
Therefore, foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino.—The statutes providing for adoption
only allow the recognition of filiation for children who are Filipinos. They allow adoption of
foundlings. Therefore, foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that the nonexistence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo can reasonably provide context that it is illogical for a foreign
father and a foreign mother to visit a rural area, give birth and leave their offspring there. —
These circumstances provide substantial evidence to infer the citizenship of her biological
parents. Her physical characteristics are consistent with that of many Filipinos. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is consistent with the expected behavior of a Filipino in
1968 who lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment. The nonexistence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo can reasonably provide context that it is illogical for a foreign
father and a foreign mother to visit a rural area, give birth and leave their offspring there.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; View that in this jurisdiction, it is settled doctrine that
for election purposes, the term “residence” contemplates “domicile.”—In this jurisdiction, it is
settled doctrine that for election purposes, the term “residence” contemplates “domicile.”
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) has emphasized that as a rule, “domicile
of origin is not easily lost and that it is lost only when there is an actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one,
and acts which correspond  with such purpose.”—This court has emphasized that as a rule,
“domicile of origin is not easily lost and that it is lost only when there is an actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing
a new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose.” Consistent with this, it has held that
there is a “presumption in favor of a continuance of an existing domicile.” Controversies
adverting to loss of domicile must overcome the presumption that domicile is retained. The
burden of proof is, thus, on the party averring its loss. This presumption is “particularly strong”
when what is involved is domicile of origin.
Same; Same; View that the election of a new domicile must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that: one, there is an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; two,
there is a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and three, there must be definite acts which correspond to the purpose of establishing
a new domicile.—Domicile may be lost and reacquired. Domicile of choice “is a domicile chosen
by a person
 
 
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to replace his or her former domicile.” It is the domicile acquired by a person through
the exercise of his or her own free will and shown by his or her specific acts and conduct. The
election of a new domicile must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that: one, there is
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; two, there is a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and three, there must
be definite acts which correspond to the purpose of establishing a new domicile. As mentioned,
domicile by operation of law is the “domicile that the law attributes to a person independent of
a person’s residence or intention.” This court has previously stated that “a minor follows the
domicile of his parents.” Thus, a minor’s domicile of origin is replaced (by operation of law)
when the minor’s parents take the minor along with them in reestablishing their own domicile.
Same; Residence; View that the residency requirement was included in order that the
People may “have a full opportunity to know [the candidate’s] character and merits, and that
he may have mingled in the duties, and felt the interests, and understood the principles and
nourished the attachments, belonging to every citizen in a republican government.”—The
residency requirement was included in order that the People may “have a full opportunity to
know [the candidate’s] character and merits, and that he may have mingled in the duties, and
felt the interests, and understood the principles and nourished the attachments, belonging to
every citizen in a republican government.” Under the framework of the United States
Constitution, residence was “to be understood as not an absolute inhabitancy within the
United States during the whole period; but such an inhabitancy, as includes a permanent
domicile in the United States.”
Same; Domicile; View that for domicile to be lost and replaced, there must be a manifest
intention to abandon one’s existing domicile.—There is no shortcut to determining one’s
domicile. Reference to formalities or indicators may be helpful — they may serve as guideposts
— but these are not conclusive. It remains that domicile is a matter of intention. For domicile to
be lost and replaced, there must be a manifest intention to abandon one’s existing domicile. If
one does not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of choice, his or her (old) domicile
of origin remains. The primacy of intention is settled. In Limbona v. Commission on
Elections,555 SCRA 391 (2008), this court stated in no uncertain terms that “for purposes of
election law, the question [of] residence is mainly one of intention.”
Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erroneously considered
a visa — a mere permission to enter — as a badge of residence, and equated an immigrant with
one who is domiciled in the Philippines.—The Commission on Elections ignored the basic
distinction between citizenship and residence. Likewise, it erroneously considered a visa — a
mere permission to
 
 
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enter — as a badge of residence, and equated an immigrant with one who is domiciled in
the Philippines. So too, the Commission on Elections’ indiscriminate reliance on Coquilla v.
COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), and Caballero v.
COMELEC, 771 SCRA 213 (2015), indicates a failure in properly appreciating the factual nuances
of those cases as against those of this case. Citizenship and residency are distinct, mutually
exclusive concepts. One is not a function of the other. Residence is not necessarily contingent
on citizenship. The loss or acquisition of one does not mean the automatic loss or acquisition of
the other. Change of domicile as a result of acquiring citizenship elsewhere is neither inevitable
nor inexorable.
Same; Same; View that as with citizenship, nonpossession of a permanent resident or
immigrant visa does not negate residency for election purposes.—As with citizenship,
nonpossession of a permanent resident or immigrant visa does not negate residency for
election purposes. A visa is but a travel document given by the issuing country to travelers for
purposes of border control. Holders of a visa are “conditionally authorized to enter or leave a
territory for which it was issued, subject to permission of an immigration official at the time of
actual entry.” Conditions of entry usually include date of validity, period of stay, number of
allowed entry, and territory covered. In this jurisdiction, visas are issued by a consular officer of
the Philippine Embassy or Consulate as a permit to go to the Philippines and seek permission to
enter the country at its port of entry. The decision to admit or disallow entry into the country
belongs to immigration authorities at the port of entry. Hence, the mere issuance of a visa does
not denote actual admission into, let alone prolonged stay, i.e., domicile, in the country.
Balikbayan Program; View that the Balikbayan Program is not only a scheme that
dispenses with the need for visas; it is a system that affirmatively works to enable balikbayans
to reintegrate themselves into the Philippines. Alternatively stated, it works to enable
balikbayans to reestablish domicile in the Philippines.—Petitioner falls within the definition of
a balikbayan, under Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 6768, as amended. She is a “Filipino citizen
. . . who had been naturalized in a foreign country [who came] or return[ed] to the Philippines.”
She was, thus, well-capacitated to benefit from the Balikbayan Program.
The BalikbayanProgram is not only a scheme that dispenses with the need for visas; it is a
system that affirmatively works to enable balikbayans to reintegrate themselves into the
Philippines. Alternatively stated, it works to enable balikbayans to reestablish domicile in the
Philippines.
Election Law; Domicile; View that the position that the residence of the wife follows that
of the husband is antiquated and no longer binding.—Relying on the residence of petitioner’s
husband is simply misplaced. He is not a party to this case. No incident relating to his residence
(or even citizenship) binds the conclu-
 
 
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sions that are to be arrived at in this case. Petitioner was free to establish her own
residence. The position that the residence of the wife follows that of the husband is antiquated
and no longer binding. Article 110 of the Civil Code used to provide that “[t]he husband shall fix
the residence of the family.” But it has long been replaced by Article 152 of the Family Code,
which places the wife on equal footing as the husband.
Same; Same; View that Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7192, otherwise known as the
Women in Development and Nation Building Act specifically states that “[w]omen of legal age,
regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act .  . . which shall in every respect be equal
to that of men under similar circumstances.”—Chief of these is Republic Act No. 7192,
otherwise known as the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Section 5 of this Act
specifically states that “[w]omen of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity
to act . . . which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances.” As
underscored by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in the February 9, 2016 oral arguments, a
wife may choose “to have her own domicile for purposes of conducting her own profession or
business.”
Same; Same; View that reestablishing her domicile in the Philippines cannot mean a
prohibition against travelling to the United States (U.S.).—The Commission on Elections’
begrudging attitude towards petitioner’s two trips demonstrates an inordinate stance towards
what animus non revertendior intent to abandon domicile in the United States entails.
Certainly, reestablishing her domicile in the Philippines cannot mean a prohibition against
travelling to the United States. As this court emphasized in Jalover v. Osmeña,  736 SCRA 267
(2014), the establishment of a new domicile does not require a person to be in his home 24
hours a day, seven (7) days a week. To hold otherwise is to sustain a glaring absurdity.
Notarized Documents; View that notarization does not sustain a presumption that the
facts stated in notarized documents are true and correct.—Untenable is the Commission on
Elections’ conclusion that a certificate of candidacy, being a notarized document, may only be
impugned by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant because it
has in its favor a presumption of regularity. Notarizing a document has nothing to do with the
veracity of the statements made in that document. All that notarization does is to convert a
private document into a public document, such that when it is presented as evidence, proof of
its genuineness and due execution need no longer be shown. Notarization does not sustain a
presumption that the facts stated in notarized documents are true and correct.
Evidence; Admissions Against Interest; View that admissions against interest may be
refuted by the declarant.—Even assuming that an “admission” is
 
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worth considering, the mere existence of any such admission does not imply its
conclusiveness. “No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant.” This
is true both of admissions made outside of the proceedings in a given case and of “[a]n
admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case.” As regards the latter, the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly provides that “[t]he
admission may be contradicted . . . by showing that it was made through palpable mistake.”
Thus, by mistakenly “admitting,” a party is not considered to have brought upon himself or
herself an inescapable contingency. On the contrary, that party is free to present evidence
proving not only his or her mistake but also of what the truth is.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that she
accomplished her certificate of candidacy (CoC) without the assistance of a lawyer. Thus, it
should not be taken against her (and taken as a badge of misrepresentation) that she merely
filled in information that was then apropos, though inaccurate.—Her Certificate of Candidacy
for Senator must be appreciated for what it is: a document filed in relation to her candidacy for
Senator, not for President. Under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, all that election
to the Senate requires is residence in the Philippines for “not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.” For purposes of her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator,
petitioner needed to show residence for only two (2) years and not more. As petitioner
explained, she accomplished this document without the assistance of a lawyer. Thus, it should
not be taken against her (and taken as a badge of misrepresentation) that she merely filled in
information that was then apropos, though inaccurate.
Same; Domicile; View that to say that petitioner owns “residential” property does not
mean that petitioner is actually residing in it.—Valdez’s characterization of the two properties
as “residential” does not mean that petitioner has actually been using them as her residence.
Classifying real properties on the basis of utility (e.g., as residential, agricultural,
commercial, etc.) is merely a descriptive exercise. It does not amount to an authoritative legal
specification of the relationship between the real property owner and the property. Thus, one
may own agricultural land but not till it; one may own a commercial property but merely lease
it out to other commercial enterprises. To say that petitioner owns “residential” property does
not mean that petitioner is actually residing in it. In the Answer she filed before the
Commission on Elections, petitioner has even explicitly denied Valdez’s assertion “insofar it is
made to appear that (she) ‘resides’ in the 2 houses mentioned.” As against Valdez’s allegation,
petitioner alleged and presented supporting evidence that her family’s residence has been
established in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City. As pointed out by petitioner, all that Valdez
managed to do was to make an allegation, considering that he did not present proof that any of
the two (2) properties in the United States has been and is still being used by petitioner’s family
for their residence.
 
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Same; Same; View that it does not matter that petitioner owns residential properties in
the United States (U.S.), or even that she actually uses them as temporary places of abode.
What matters is that petitioner has established and continues to maintain domicile in the
Philippines.—Even on the assumption that the remaining properties in the United States may
indeed be characterized as petitioner’s residence, Valdez’s assertion fails to appreciate the
basic distinction between residence and domicile. It is this distinction that permits a person to
maintain a separate residence simultaneously with his or her domicile. Ultimately, it does not
matter that petitioner owns residential properties in the United States, or even that she
actually uses them as temporary places of abode. What matters is that petitioner has
established and continues to maintain domicile in the Philippines.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; Presumptions; View that the principles of
constitutional construction favor an interpretation that foundlings like petitioner are natural-
born citizens of the Philippines absent proof resulting from evidence tpreso the contrary.—
Relying on the single fact of being an abandoned newborn is unreasonable, arbitrary, and
discriminatory. It fails to consider all other pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner for the
fair and unbiased consideration of the Commission on Elections. The principles of constitutional
construction favor an interpretation that foundlings like petitioner are natural-born citizens of
the Philippines absent proof resulting from evidence to the contrary. Such proof must show
that both — not only one — of petitioner’s parents were foreigners at the time of her birth.
Without conceding that foundlings are not — even presumptively — natural-born Filipinos,
petitioner has presented substantial evidence that her biological parents are Filipinos.
Same; Same; Same; View that our Constitution and our domestic laws, including the
treaties we have ratified, enjoin us from interpreting our citizenship provisions in a manner that
promotes exclusivity and an animus against those who were abandoned and neglected.—
Petitioner never had to go through our naturalization processes. Instead, she has been treated
as a Filipino citizen upon birth, subject to our laws. Administrative bodies, the Commission on
Elections, the President, and most importantly, the electorate have treated her as a Filipino
citizen and recognized her natural-born status. Not being a Filipino by naturalization, therefore,
petitioner could have acquired Filipino citizenship because her parent/s, from her birth,
has/have always been considered Filipino citizen/s who, in accordance with our jus
sanguinis principle, bestowed natural-born citizenship to her under Article IV, Section 1(1) to
(3) of the Constitution. Our Constitution and our domestic laws, including the treaties we have
ratified, enjoin us from interpreting our citizenship provisions in a manner that promotes
exclusivity and an animus against those who were abandoned and neglected.
 
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JARDALEZA, J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that it is beyond question that
the issues affecting the citizenship and residence of Poe are within the purview of Section 78.
There is also no dispute that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over
Section 78 petitions.—Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) allows a person to file a
verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a COC exclusively on the ground that
any of the material representations it contains, as required under Section 74, is false. The
representations contemplated by Section 78 generally refer to qualifications for elective
office, such as age, residence and citizenship, or possession of natural-born Filipino status. It is
beyond question that the issues affecting the citizenship and residence of Poe are within the
purview of Section 78. There is also no dispute that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Section
78 petitions. Where the parties disagree is on whether intent to deceive is a constitutive
element for the cancellation of a COC on the ground of false material representation.
Same; Honest Mistake; View that it could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office
upon just any innocuous mistake.—There are two classes of material representations
contemplated by Section 78: (1) those that concern eligibility for public office; and (2) those
erstwhile numerated in Section 74 which do not affect eligibility.  Tagolino v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 574 (2013), applies to the
former; Salcedo  ii  v. comelec, 312 SCRA 447 (1999) to the latter. This is a logical distinction
once we connect the factual settings of the two cases with the aforementioned state interests.
Ironically, Salcedo, oft-cited in Section 78 cases as authority for requiring intent in
cases involving eligibility-related representations, actually did not concern a representation in
the COC affecting the candidate’s eligibility. Salcedo involved a candidate who used the
surname of her husband of a void marriage. Her COC was challenged on the ground that she
had no right to use such surname because the person she married had a subsisting marriage
with another person. We held that petitioner therein failed to discharge the burden of proving
that the alleged misrepresentation regarding the candidate’s surname pertains to a material
matter, and that it must equally be proved that there was an intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office to justify the
cancellation of the COC. The rationale is that the penalty of removal from the list of candidates
is not commensurate to an honest mistake in respect of a matter not affecting one’s eligibility
to run for public office. “It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of
such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any
innocuous mistake.” Notably, a finding in Salcedo that the candidate had no intention to
deceive the electorate when she used her married name, notwithstanding the
 
 
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apparent invalidity of the marriage, would have been sufficient to arrive at the same
conclusion (that is, allowing her to run) without making a sweeping rule that only matters
pertaining to eligibility are material.
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; Intent to Deceive;
View that in cases involving eligibility-related representations, the Supreme Court (SC) has
never considered intent to deceive as the decisive element.—In fact, in cases involving eligibility-
related representations, the Court has never considered intent to deceive as the decisive
element, even in those that relied on Salcedo. In Tecson v. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277
(2004), which involved a question on the eligibility of Fernando Poe, Jr. for the 2004
presidential elections by way of a Section 78 petition, the Court determined whether he was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippine. Intent to deceive the electorate was never discussed.
In  Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231 (2008), which involved residency, the Court
determined that the candidate lost his residency when he became a US green card holder
despite his mistaken belief that he retained his domicile in the Philippines. The candidate,
invoking the legal definition of domicile, claimed that even if he was physically in the US, he
always intended to return the Philippines. The Court, placing emphasis on his permanent
resident status in the US, merely inferred his intent to deceive when he failed to declare that he
was a green card holder. Then in Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 699 SCRA 507 (2013), also involving
residency, the Court found that the claim of domicile was contradicted by the temporary
nature of the candidate’s stay. This time, the Court simply deemed that “[w]hen the candidate’s
claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to substantiate meeting the
required residency in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the COC  constitutes a
‘deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact’ of ineligibility.”
Same; View that the proceeding under Section 78 is not an election contest and therefore
does not encroach upon Presidential Electoral Tribunal’s (PET’s) jurisdiction over election
contests involving the President and Vice President.—Notably, the Constitution neither
allocates jurisdiction over preelection controversies involving the eligibility of candidates nor
forecloses legislative provision for such remedy. Absent such constitutional proscription, it is
well within the plenary powers of the legislature to enact a law providing for this type of
preelection remedy, as it did through Section 78. In this regard, Poe’s statement that the
COMELEC essentially arrogated unto itself the jurisdiction to decide upon the qualifications of
candidates is inaccurate. It is Congress that granted the COMELEC such jurisdiction; the
COMELEC only exercised the jurisdiction so conferred. When the COMELEC takes cognizance of
a Section 78 petition, its actions are not repugnant to, but are actually in accord with, its
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an
election. To be clear, the proceeding under Section 78 is not an election contest and
 
 
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 Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections that, unless the existence of customary international law is convincingly shown, courts of law
should not preempt the executive and legislative branches’ authority over the country’s foreign
 
relations policy, including the negotiation, ratification, and approval of treaties.
therefore does not encroach upon PET’s jurisdiction over election contests involving the
Citizenship; Jus Sanguinis; View that there is no question that since 1935, the Philippines
President and Vice President.
has adhered to the jus sanguinis  principle as the primary basis for determining citizenship.—In
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Quo Warranto; View that under Section
interpreting the silence of the Constitution, the best guide is none other than the Constitution
78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
itself. As Prof. Laurence Tribe suggests, giving meaning to constitutional silence involves the
and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo
twin tasks of articulating the relevant constitutional norms that determine how the silence
warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two (2) grounds — (1) ineligibility
ought to be interpreted and propounding principles of statutory construction consistent with
or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten (10) days
these norms. There is no question that since 1935, the Philippines has adhered to the  jus
after the proclamation of the election results.—We have already recognized that a Section 78
sanguinis principle as the primary basis for determining citizenship. Under the 1935
petition is one instance — the only instance — where the qualifications of a candidate for
Constitution, a child follows the citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of birth,
elective office can be challenged before an election. Although the denial of due course to or the
although there was a caveat that if only the mother is Filipino, the child has to elect Philippine
cancellation of the COC is ostensibly based on a finding that the candidate made a material
citizenship by age of majority. Determining a person’s parentage, of course, requires a
representation that is false, the determination of the factual correctness of the representation
determination of facts in an appropriate proceeding. Consequently, to arrive at a correct
necessarily affects eligibility. Essentially, the ground is lack of eligibility under the pertinent
judgment, the fundamental principles of due process and equal protection demand that the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office, similar to
parties be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions, and for the decision-
a petition for quo warranto which is a species of election contest. “The only difference between
maker to make a ruling based on the applicable quantum of evidence.
the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid; View that considering these unusual circumstances
misrepresented in the COC and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections,
common to all foundlings, Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) or other definitive evidence would,
whereas a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two
more often than not, not be available.—The COMELEC’s starting position is that foundlings are
grounds — (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be
not natural-born citizens unless they prove by DNA or some other definitive evidence that
initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results.” Put simply, the main
either of their biological parents are Filipino citizens. Thus, it limited its inquiry to the question
distinction is the time the action is filed. If a person fails to file a Section 78 petition within the
of whether the 1935 Constitution considered foundlings as natural-born citizens. In effect, the
25-day period prescribed in the OEC, the election laws afford him another chance to raise the
COMELEC has created a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption against foundlings, i.e., they are
ineligibility of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto.
not natural-born citizens. This is true notwithstanding the apparently benign but empty
Citizenship; View that as a sovereign nation, the Philippines has the inherent right to
opening allowed by the COMELEC. By definition, foundlings are either “deserted or
determine for itself, and according to its own Constitution and laws, who its citizens are.—The
abandoned . . . whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown,” or “committed to an
power of a state to confer its citizenship is derived from its sovereignty. It is an attribute of its
orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage.”
territorial supremacy. As a sovereign nation, the Philippines has the inherent right to determine
Considering these unusual circumstances common to all foundlings, DNA or other defini-
for itself, and according to its own Constitution and laws, who its citizens are. International law,
 
as a matter of principle, respects such sovereign determination and recognizes that the
 
acquisition and loss of citizenship fall within the domestic jurisdiction of each state. Domestic
106
rules on citizenship vary greatly from sovereign to sovereign, a necessary consequence of
divergent demography, geography, history, and culture among the many states. 106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Political Law; Separation of Powers; View that the doctrine of separation of powers Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
dictates that, unless the existence of customary international law is convincingly shown, courts  
of law should not preempt the executive and legislative tive evidence would, more often than not, not be available. A presumption disputable
  only by an impossible, even cruel, condition is, in reality, a conclusive presumption.
  Same; Foundlings; View that Poe’s parents are unknown does not automatically discount
105 Filipinos the possibility that either her father or mother is a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed,
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 105 the verba legis interpretation of the constitutional provision on citizenship as applied to
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections foundlings is that they  may  be born of a Filipino father or mother.—It appears that because of
its inordinate focus on trying to interpret the Constitution, the COMELEC disregarded the
 
incontrovertible fact that Poe, like any other human being, has biological parents. Logic tells us
branches’  authority over the country’s foreign relations policy, including the negotiation,
that there are four possibilities with respect to the biological parentage of Poe: (1) both her
ratification, and approval of treaties.—It may not be amiss to explain that another reason why
parents are Filipinos; (2) her father is a Filipino and her mother is a foreigner; (3) her mother is
we judiciously scrutinize an invocation of customary international law based on treaties the
a Filipino and her father is a foreigner; and (4) both her parents are foreigners. In three of the
Philippine has not acceded to is out of deference to the President’s treaty-ratification
four possibilities, Poe would be considered as a natural-born citizen. In fact, data from the
power and the Senate’s treaty-concurring power. The doctrine of separation of powers dictates
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) suggest that, in 1968, there was a 99.86% statistical
probability that her parents were Filipinos. That Poe’s parents are unknown does not
automatically discount the possibility that either her father or mother is a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, the verba legis interpretation of the constitutional provision on citizenship
as applied to foundlings is that they may be born of a Filipino father or mother. There is no
presumption for or against them. The COMELEC’s duty under a Section 78 petition questioning
a candidate’s citizenship qualification is to determine the probability that her father or mother
is a Filipino citizen using substantial evidence. And there lies the second fault of the COMELEC:
regardless of who had the burden of proof, by requiring DNA or other definitive evidence, it
imposed a quantum of evidence higher than substantial evidence.
Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid; View that the 1935 Constitution could not have intended
that citizenship must be proved by Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence for the simple reason
that DNA profiling was not introduced until 1985.—In proceedings before the COMELEC, the
evidentiary bar against which the evidence presented is measured is substantial evidence,
which is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. This is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, as compared to
the highest, proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable to criminal cases, and the intermediate,
preponderance of evidence applicable to civil cases. When the COMELEC insisted that Poe must
present DNA or other definitive evidence, it effectively subjected her to a higher standard of
proof, that of absolute certainty. This is even higher than proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which requires only moral certainty; in criminal cases, neither DNA evidence nor direct
evidence are always necessary to sustain a conviction. The COMELEC’s primary justification is
the literal meaning of jus sanguinis, i.e., right of blood.
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
This, however, is an erroneous understanding because jus sanguinis is a principle of
nationality law, not a rule of evidence. Neither is it to be understood in a scientific sense.
Certainly, the 1935 Constitution could not have intended that citizenship must be proved by
DNA evidence for the simple reason that DNA profiling was not introduced until 1985.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that the Commission on Elections’
(COMELEC’s) unwarranted presumption against Poe, and foundlings in general, likewise
violates the equal protection clause.—The COMELEC’s unwarranted presumption against Poe,
and foundlings in general, likewise violates the equal protection clause. In Dycaico v. SSS, 476
SCRA 538 (2005), the Court ruled that the proviso in the Social Security Law disqualifying
spouses who contracted marriage after the SSS members’ retirement were unduly
discriminated against, and found that the “nexus of the classification to the policy objective is
vague and flimsy.” In GSIS v. Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441 (2004), the Court considered as
“discriminatory and arbitrary” the questioned proviso of the GSIS Act that created a category
for spouses who contracted marriage to GSIS members within three years before they qualified
for the pension.
Citizenship; Foundlings; View that when the 1935 Constitution referred to “those whose
fathers [or mothers] are citizens of the Philippines,” it necessarily included foundlings whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens.—When the 1935 Constitution referred to “those whose
fathers [or mothers] are citizens of the Philippines,” it necessarily included foundlings whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. As previously discussed, the parentage of foundlings
may be proved by substantial evidence. Conversely, foundlings whose parents are both
foreigners are excluded from the constitutional provision. This would be the case if in an
appropriate proceeding there is deficient relevant evidence to adequately establish that either
of the parents is a Filipino citizen.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; View that it is well-settled in
election law that residence is synonymous with domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return.—It is well-settled in election law that residence is synonymous with domicile. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. To establish domicile, three elements must concur: (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there
(animus  manendi); and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).
Same; Same; View that the circumstance that Poe, after leaving the United States (U.S.)
and fixing her residence in the Philippines, may have had what is called a “floating intention” to
return to her former domicile upon some indefinite
 
 
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occasion, does not give her the right to claim such former domicile as her residence.—The
facts that Poe did not renounce her US citizenship until 2010 and used her US passport
between 2006 and 2010 do not affect her establishment of domicile in the Philippines. The
circumstance that Poe, after leaving the US and fixing her residence in the Philippines, may
have had what is called a “floating intention” to return to her former domicile upon some
indefinite occasion, does not give her the right to claim such former domicile as her residence.
It is her establishment of domicile in the Philippines with the intention of remaining here for an
indefinite time that severed the respondent’s domiciliary relation with her former home.  This is
consistent with the basic rule that she could have only one domicile at a time.
Same; Same; View that a foreign national can establish domicile here without
undergoing naturalization.—I now discuss the effect of the fact that Poe entered the country in
May 2005 as an American citizen under the balikbayan visa-free program. There is no dispute
among the parties that citizenship and residence are distinct concepts. A foreign national can
establish domicile here without undergoing naturalization. Where there is disagreement is
whether Poe could have established her domicile in the Philippines in May 2005 considering
that her entry was through the balikbayan program, which is valid for one year. Respondents,
on the one hand, believe it was not possible because of the temporary nature of her stay. For
them, Poe should have first secured an Immigrant Certificate of Residence or repatriated earlier
than July 2006. On the other hand, Poe contends that to require either would be to add a
fourth requisite to the establishment of domicile.
Balikbayan Program; View that with the amendments introducing the reintegration
provisions, a  balikbayan is no longer precluded from developing an intent to stay permanently
in the Philippines.—The amendments introduced by RA 9174 to RA 6768 differentiate the
present case from Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002). In that case, decided prior to the
enactment of RA 9174, the Court concluded that a visa-free balikbayan  visitor could not have
established domicile in the Philippines prior to a waiver of his nonresident status. This is
because under RA 6768, the only declared purpose was “to attract and encourage overseas
Filipinos to come and visit their motherland.” Coupled with the one-year visa-free limit, this
most likely led to the Court’s interpretation that a balikbayan’s entry was merely temporary.
However, with the amendments introducing the reintegration provisions, a balikbayan  is no
longer precluded from developing an intent to stay permanently in the Philippines. Therefore,
Poe, who entered the Philippines after the effectivity of RA 9174, had the ability to establish a
lawful domicile in the Philippines even prior to her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
 
 
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CAGUIOA, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
 
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that
under Section 78, a certificate  of candidacy (CoC) can be denied due course or cancelled in case
of false material representation therein.―Under Section 78, a certificate of candidacy can be
denied due course or cancelled in case of false material representation therein. The
jurisprudential requirements for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78
of the OEC are clear: (1) that a representation is made with respect to a material fact, (2) that
the representation is false, and (3) that there is intent to deceive or mislead the electorate.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that time and again, this Court has
held that the extent of its review is limited to the determination of whether the   Commission on
Elections (COMELEC)  acted without jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.―The limited scope of this Court’s review
on certiorari  of a judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC under Rule 64 is well-
defined. Time and again, this Court has held that the extent of its review is limited to the
determination of whether the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion,” under
Rule 65, has been described in a number of cases as the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power
due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. This
Court has also previously held that wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is
sufficient to taint COMELEC’s action with grave abuse of discretion, and that in exceptional
cases, when the COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps
the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, this Court is not only
obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; View that
there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.―In Mitra v. COMELEC,  622 SCRA 744 (2010), this Court
elucidated on the nature of the element of intent to deceive, thus: [T]he misrepresentation
that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist
in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception of the
electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material
fact cannot run; x x x. Proceeding from this
 
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110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
statement, this Court found in that case that Mitra did not commit any deliberate
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Moreover, this Court held that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence which led it to
conclude that Mitra was not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to
critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan. In Jalover
v. Osmeña,  736 SCRA 267 (2014), the requirement of intent to deceive was restated, thus:
Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive
the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. x x x These cases
show that there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Therefore, the requirement of intent cannot be
disposed of by a simple finding that there was false representation of a material fact; to be
sure, there must also be a showing of the candidate’s intent to deceive as animating the
making of the false material representation.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; View that contrary to the rules of evidence,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)  shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner, ascribing
to her the onus of showing that she had the qualifications to run for President, instead of
requiring the respondents to prove the three (3) elements that furnish the grounds for denial of
due course or cancellation of certificate of candidacy (CoC).―Contrary to the rules of evidence,
the COMELEC shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner, ascribing to her the onus of
showing that she had the qualifications to run for President, instead of requiring the
respondents to prove the three elements that furnish the grounds for denial of due course or
cancellation of certificate of candidacy. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law. This Court has consistently held, and it is an established rule, that the
burden of evidence may shift depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of trial;
however, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is originally imposed — he
who seeks the affirmative of an issue. In this case, as with other election cases, the burden of
proof is placed upon the parties seeking the denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that to
impute intent to mislead upon a person who represents what she knows to the best of her
knowledge and belief to be true, as supported by the evidence, is to commit grave abuse of
discretion.―The totality of evidence presented by the petitioner points to a decision and action
to establish a new domi-
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
cile of choice in the Philippines as early as 2005. Stated differently, my considered
appreciation of the totality of all these overt acts done by the petitioner is that she had
believed in good faith that when she filled up her certificate of candidacy she was correctly
reckoning the period of her residency from the time that she had taken concrete steps to
transfer her domicile. Using the standard of Section 74 of the OEC, petitioner filled in the
certificate of candidacy to “the best of her knowledge.” To impute intent to mislead upon a
person who represents what she knows to the best of her knowledge and belief to be true, as
supported by the evidence, is to commit grave abuse of discretion.
Domicile; View that similar to evidence showing physical presence, the petitioner
sufficiently showed that since 2005, she and her entire family had taken steps to permanently
relocate in the Philippines.―Similar to evidence showing physical presence, the petitioner
sufficiently showed that since 2005, she and her entire family had taken steps to permanently
relocate in the Philippines. Petitioner showed that as early as March 2005, her husband had
begun the process of transporting and disposing of their household belongings in the United
States. By the middle of 2005, the petitioner and her children had arrived in the Philippines; the
children, enrolled in Philippine schools by June 2005. The next year, they began the
construction of a home and acquired a condominium unit to stay in until the construction is
completed.
Same; View that there can be no clearer manifestation of the earlier concurrence of the
petitioner’s animus manendi and animus non revertendi with her physical presence in the
country than when she brought her children to the Philippines in the middle of 2005 and
enrolled them in the same year in Philippine schools.―To my mind, there can be no clearer
manifestation of the earlier concurrence of the petitioner’s animus manendi and animus non
revertendi with her physical presence in the country than when she brought her children to the
Philippines in the middle of 2005 and enrolled them in the same year in Philippine schools. To
any parent, this is a very big decision that is not lightly made. To uproot teens from the world
they know, and to displace them from the environment in which they grew up, is, to say the
least, a very significant decision for any parent to make. Indeed, as a parent, the petitioner is
presumed to be acting in the best interest of her children. And that petitioner did this
convinces me that petitioner’s decision to permanently reside in the Philippines was already
made at the time, or just before, the children were brought to the Philippines to stay with her
and to study, in the middle of 2005.
Residence; Honest Mistake; View that given the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner, the inaccuracies with respect to the period of her residency can be considered an
honest mistake.―Given the totality of evidence presented by petitioner, the inaccuracies with
respect to the period of her residency can be considered an honest mistake. The petitioner had
admitted to making a mistake
 
 
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in determining the precise date of the start of her residency when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator in 2012. The filing of the 2015 certificate of
candidacy is the earliest opportunity that the petitioner had to correct her previous
representation — the very fact that she changed her period of residence, on its own, cannot be
the basis of a finding that there was deliberate intent to mislead as to her residency.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) grossly misappreciated the evidence when it found that  the  petitioner deliberately
intended to mislead the electorate when she stated that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
knowing full well that she is a foundling.―On this point I deviate from the majority opinion
when it proceeded to rule on the question of the petitioner’s citizenship. Keeping in mind the
nature of this Court’s limited certiorari review, I believe that this Court need not have made a
definitive ruling on petitioner’s status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. I concur, however, that
the COMELEC grossly misappreciated the evidence when it found that the petitioner
deliberately intended to mislead the electorate when she stated that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, knowing full well that she is a foundling. The COMELEC would have us believe
that the petitioner knew that she was not a natural-born citizen at the time that she
accomplished and filed her certificate of candidacy, and knowing this, deliberately attempted
to deceive the electorate by claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Good Faith; Honest Mistake; View that the rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or
difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith; If indeed a mistake was made by
petitioner as to her real status, this could be considered a mistake on a difficult question of law
that could be the basis for good faith. In this regard, good faith is presumed. ―The rule is that
any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
In Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 Phil. 217 (1939), this Court, citing Manresa, recognized the
possibility of an excusable ignorance of or error of law being a basis for good faith: We do not
believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law.
When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already
been passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final
judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the
possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents
and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should
be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall
into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one
thing, to which undoubtedly refers Article 2, and another and different thing is possible and
excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting
doc-
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
trines. But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still,
ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of
certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an
error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines. If indeed a mistake was
made by petitioner as to her real status, this could be considered a mistake on a difficult
question of law that could be the basis for good faith. In this regard, good faith is presumed. In
the same vein, it is presumed that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong, and that the law
was obeyed. Without more, the legal conclusion alleged by the respondents in the petitions for
cancellation, and thereafter reached by the COMELEC, that the petitioner was not a natural-
born citizen simply because she is a foundling is not sufficient to overcome the presumption
that the petitioner made the representation as to her citizenship in good faith.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  George Erwin M. Garcia, Alexander J. Poblador, Dino Vivencio A.A. Tamayo, Justin
Christopher C. Mendoza and Sandra Mae T. Magalang for petitioner.
   Manuelito R. Luna for private respondent Francisco Tatad.
  Amado D. Valdez, Melquiades Marcus N. Valdez II, Donna S. Agoncillo, Mark Andrew M.
Santiago and Lorenze Angelo G. Dionisio for private respondent Amado D. Valdez.
 
PEREZ, J.:
 
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3)
11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and (4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc,  in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No.
15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 
 
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The Facts
 
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September
1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported
and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the
name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.”1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar” to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.” Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner’s foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed
adoption,2 the petitioner’s adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of
2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner’s adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a
new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner’s new name and the name of her adoptive
parents.3 Without delay, petitioner’s mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer’s
omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with
the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC
Voter’s Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
_______________
1  Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, pp. 15-16; COMELEC First Division
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and  SPA No.
15-139 (DC), p. 2.
2  Petition for Certiorari, id., at pp. 16-17.
3  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra at p. 4.
4  Petition for Certiorari, supra at p. 22.
5   Id.; Comment (on the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent
COMELEC dated 11 January 2016, p. 6.
 
 
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On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511
and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the
United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in
Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City.10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back
to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time
that she gave birth to her young-
_______________
6   Petition for Certiorari,  id.; id., at p. 7.
7   Id., at p. 18.
8   Id.; Comment (on the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent
COMELEC dated 11 January 2016, p. 6.
9   Id.
10  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 3.
11  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 17.
12  Id., at p. 18.
13  Id.
14  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra.
15  Id.
  
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116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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est daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
 
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped
into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005
to take care of her father’s funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his
estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first
quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of
their children’s schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; 21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as
to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22As early as
2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3)
children immediately followed 25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete
pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. 26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother’s place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a park-
_______________
16  Supra note 1 at pp. 17-18.
17  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.
18  Id.
19  Id.
20  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 20.
21  Id.
22  Supra note 3.
23  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 20.
24  Supra note 3.
25  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 20.
26  Supra note 3.
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
ing slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. 27 The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued
by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
200628 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal
of some of the family’s remaining household belongings 29 She travelled back to the Philippines
on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner’s husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family’s change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family home was eventually
sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner’s husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006,
arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in
July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square-meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home 34 and to this day, is where the couple and
their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple’s name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1 June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003.36Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can
_______________
27  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 4.
28  Id.
29  Id., at p. 23; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 3.
30  Id.; id.
31  Id.; id.
32  Id.; id.
33  Id., at pp. 23-24; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 5.
34  Id., at p. 24; id.
35  Id.
36  Id.
37  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 25; COMELEC First Division
Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 5.
 
 
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118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner’s petitions
and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner’s name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay  Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine
Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. 45 The following
day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI 46 and took her oath
_______________
38  Id., at pp. 25-26; id.
39  Id., at p. 26; id.
40  Id.; id.
41  Id.; id.
42  Id., at p. 32; id., at p. 6.
43  Id., at p. 26; id., at p. 5.
44  Id., at pp. 26-27; id.
45  Section 5, R.A. No. 9225 states:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions:
x x x x
3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption
of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath.
x x x x
46  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 27.
 
 
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VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 119
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her
American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.” 49 On that
day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated
that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among
others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner
stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September
1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a “Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States” effective 21 October 2010. 52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the
question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” 53Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530.55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her CoC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections.56 In her CoC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her CoC
_______________
47  Id., at p. 29.
48  Id., at p. 27; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 6.
49  Id., at p. 30; id.
50  Id.
51  Id., at p. 27; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 6.
52  Id., at p. 31; id.
53  Comment, supra note 5 at p. 9.
54  Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 31.
55  Id., at p. 32; Comment, supra note 5 at p. 10.
56  Id.; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 6.
57  Id.; id., at p. 7.
 
 
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120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.58
Petitioner’s filing of her CoC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
 
A day after petitioner filed her CoC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said CoC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. 59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo’s contention is that petitioner committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her CoC that she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen and that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the
day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62 Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer naturalborn status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo  that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she
is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
_______________
58  Id.; id.
 59  Comment (on the Petition in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent Elamparo, dated  
January 6, 2016, p. 7. 122
60  COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated December 1, 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), 122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
p. 7.
61  Id., at pp. 7-8. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
62  Id., at p. 7.  
63  Id. e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-
64  Id., at p. 8. born status;
65  Id. f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile
66  Petition for Certiorari  in G.R. No. 221697, p. 7. in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
  g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born
  citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
121 h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 CoC for Senator
was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her
VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 121
true date of reacquisition of domicile;
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections i. Elamparo’s petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of
  the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she
On the matter of petitioner’s residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound serve as the country’s next leader.68
by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 CoC for Senator wherein she indicated that she  
had resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of May 2013 Elections. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo  that petitioner is qualified to regain her submitted for resolution.
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from petitioner’s CoC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the
July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations
assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67  
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo’s petition as it was Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly,
actually a petition for quo warranto  which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
to revoke the BI’s July 18, 2006 Order; Poe-Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
CoC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there which the COMELEC En Banc  resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the
was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part; same.70
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the CoC regarding her _______________
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings 68  Petition for Certiorari,  supra note 66 at p. 8; COMELEC Second Division
were considered citizens; Resolution, supra note 60 at pp. 8-11.
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of 69  COMELEC Second Division Resolution, id., at p. 34.
citizens of the place where they are found; 70  Comment, supra note 59 at p. 10.
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the  
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;  
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to 123
the filing of her CoC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 123
same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
_______________ Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
67  COMELEC Second Division Resolution, supra note 60 at p. 8. Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
   
 This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the
COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,  persons
of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino
citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status. 73 Tatad invoked the
rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact
that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935
Constitution is indicative of the framers’ intent to exclude them. 74 Therefore, the burden lies on
petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality. 76 According to Tatad, international conventions
and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give
effect
_______________
71  Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, states:
Rule 25 – Disqualification of Candidates
Section 1. Grounds.—Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
72  Petition to Disqualify dated 19 October 2015 filed by Tatad in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), p. 9.
73  Id., at pp. 9 and 14.
74  Id., at p. 10.
75  Id., at p. 12.
76  Id., at p. 11.
 
 
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124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. 77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings. 78
Similar to Elamparo’s argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling. 79
Referring to petitioner’s CoC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the
ten (10)-year residency requirement.80Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in
Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime
in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner’s lack of intention to abandon her
U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to
the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the CoC of petitioner, docketed as
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow
upon her the status of a natural-born citizen. 83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and
will not revert to their original status as naturalborn citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner’s own admission in her CoC for Senator that she had only
been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13
May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner’s claim that she could have
validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)-year residency
requirement for President.
_______________
77  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 8.
78  Id.
79  Petition to Disqualify, supra note 72 at p. 11.
80  Id., at p. 21.
81  Id.
82  Id.
83  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 8.
84  Id.
 
 
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VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 125
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras’ petition, 85 docketed
as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner’s
2015 CoC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year
period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her CoC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016. 86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner’s residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that
petitioner’s physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad’s petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His
petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack
85  Contreras’ petition is a petition for cancellation of Grace Poe’s CoC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code which states that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. —A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
_______________
86  Petition for Cancellation of Grace Poe’s CoC dated 17 October 2015 filed by Contreras
in SPA No. 15-007 (DC), pp. 2-4.
87  Id., at p. 3; Petition for Certiorari,  supra note 1 at p. 13.
88  Id., at pp. 3-4.
89  Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications.—Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
 
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126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office. 90
Second,  the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto  as they
focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A petition for quo warranto falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Third,  the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born
citizen of this country.
Fourth,  customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality
and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. 94 Consequently, the
petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 95
_______________
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Sec. 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.
90  COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 12.
91  Id., at p. 10.
92  Id.
93  Id., at p. 9.
94  Id.
95  Id.
 
 
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VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 127
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
Fifth,  she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under
R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. 96 Moreover, the official acts of
the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18
July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB
Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. 97 She believed that all these
acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing
her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children’s resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction
of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh,  she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. 100 She reasoned out that there was
no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a
new domicile of choice.101
Eighth,  she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her CoC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled
that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10)-year
residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her CoC when
she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elec-
_______________
96   Id.
97   Id.
98   Id.
99   Id., at pp. 9-10.
100  Id., at p. 10.
101  Id.
102  Id.
103  The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was concurred in by
Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon. Presiding Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.
 
  
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128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
tions on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the
elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
 
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division’s Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte  temporary restraining
order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015,
temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from
the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its
Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. PoeLlamanzares and to ANNUL
and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares, respondent.
 
 
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3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the
1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the
11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
 
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the CoC of petitioner should be denied
due course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false
material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the
position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or
lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article
IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangayoffices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
 
 
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130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
 (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard
of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
 
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be des-
 
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ignated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
 
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
 
The Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was
made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc  decision in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin  reads:
 
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as
to provide in Rule 25 §1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification.—Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot
be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-
making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is
_______________
104  318 Phil. 329; 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
105  595 Phil. 449; 574 SCRA 782 (2008).
 
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noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications  based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only
in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for “disqualification”
different from those for a declaration of “ineligibility.” “Disqualification” proceedings,
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §12 and §68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of
barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race  either
from the start or during its progress. “Ineligibility,” on the other hand, refers to the lack
of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove
the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office
does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a
candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2
of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications
provided in §4.
 
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that “the lack of
provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule.” Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
 Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g.,  vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is
 
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provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will
not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted;
and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be
proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates’ eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending
beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the
companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino’s residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings
relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is
satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for
the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to
be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre proclamation cases in
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, §15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as “sole
judges” under the Constitution of the election,  returns  and qualifications of members
of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. 106
 
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez  pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September
2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February 1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
 
Grounds for disqualification.—Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
_______________
106  Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 104 at pp. 396-397.
107  Id., at pp. 397-398; Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 105 at pp. 471-472; p. 799.
 
 
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was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds.—Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission
to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
 
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.”
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of
one to the other. Both do not allow,  are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction,
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or
by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from
a disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy
be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior
decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false repre-
 
 
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sentations regarding the candidate’s citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
essentially that since foundlings 108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the
1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments,
when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly,
in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner
possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when “it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable,” proceeded to say that “she now has the burden to present evidence to prove
her natural filiation with a Filipino parent.”
The fact is that petitioner’s blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown
nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof
was on private respondents to show that peti-
_______________
108  In A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Resolution Approving The Proposed Rule on Adoption
(Domestic and Inter-Country), effective 22 August 2002, “foundling” is defined as “a deserted
or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child
committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and
parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a “foundling.”
109  Article IV – Citizenship.
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.
110  Articles 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The
Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on 4 August 1988.
 
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136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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tioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden
to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are
Filipinos.
 
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
 
Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters.—Evidence must have such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or noexistence. Evidence on collateral
matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
 
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos
and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-
49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or  99.68%.
In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970,
there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year,
there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did
not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
_______________
111  Statistics from the PSA or its predecessor agencies are admissible evidence.
See Herrera v.  Commission on Elections,  376 Phil. 443; 318 SCRA 336 (1999) and Bagabuyo
v.  Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 678; 573 SCRA 290 (2008). In the latter case, the Court
even took judicial notice of the figures.
 
 
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arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in
Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the fact that she
was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval
face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person
with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a
99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In
the words of the Solicitor General:
 
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do
 not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a
50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to
frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in
the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the
parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly
average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as
opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural-born Filipino children is 1:1357. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural-born Filipino is 99.93%.
_______________
112  Transcript of Stenographic Notes, 9 February 2016, p. 40.
113  Section 3(y), Rule 131.
 
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From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986
while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural-
born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us,
but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines
would be a natural-born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are
known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even
be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps,
shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines
thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this
country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best
left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty — 99.9% — that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural-born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of
their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not
separate disciplines.
 
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
 
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent
_______________
114  236 Phil. 307; 152 SCRA 284 (1987).
 
 
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of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption
of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
 
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is
inserted: The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not
recognized by the father.
x x x x
President: [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola: For clarification. The gentleman said “of unknown parents.” Current codes
consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of
unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because
the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard.
This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born
in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need . . .
Sr. Rafols: There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to
be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more]
need for amendment.
_______________
115  Id., at pp. 314-315; pp. 291-292.
 
 
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Sr. Rafols: The amendment should read thus: “Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father
and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage.”
Sr. Briones: The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown
parentage.
Sr. Rafols: The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize
the child, is not unknown.
President: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the
children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their
parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father
[whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President: The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion: Mr. President, don’t you think it would be better to leave this matter in the
hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are  few and far in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them.  By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens
in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the
subject exhaustively.116
 
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of “unknown parentage” are not citizens but only because
their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
_______________
116  English translation of the Spanish original presented in the petitioner’s pleadings
before the COMELEC and this Court. The COMELEC and private respondents have not disputed
the accuracy and correctness of the translation.
117  1 Aruego, Jose M. The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 209 (1949).
 
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During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to
include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother
who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was
defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution
of the proposed amendment.
 
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February
2016 Oral Arguments:
 
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as
Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was
the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to
expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn’t matter whether Montinola’s or Roxas’ views were legally
correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions
that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic.
What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues
in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution.
This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is
appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice
Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
 
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers “worked to create a just and
humane society,” that “they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute
upon them a dis-
_______________
118  TSN, 16 February 2016, pp. 20-21.
 
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criminatory intent against foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the
argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions “for an express intention to deny foundlings the status
of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and
inflict this across the board marginalization.”
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x” and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee
must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of
the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions,
legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.”
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to
be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
 
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,  which no
court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the
case and over the parties, but also
_______________
119  117 Phil. 976; 7 SCRA 962 (1963).
 
 
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over the res,  which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners
herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of
a natural person is determined by the latter’s nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines,
but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. 120(Underlining supplied)
 
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise
known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes”
(otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship.” In the first place, “having to perform an act” means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is
done not by the child but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
_______________
120  Id., at pp. 978-979; pp. 963-964.
121  See Section 5 of the RA No. 8552: “Location of Unknown Parent(s).—It shall be the
duty of the Department or the child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all
efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be
registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she
shall be declared abandoned.” (Underlining supplied)
 
 
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144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree of
Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her
“foundling parents,” hence effectively affirming petitioner’s status as a foundling. 123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. 125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a
result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates  (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.126 “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a
process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems
generally,”127 such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice,” and the “general principle against discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal
_______________
122  See Exhibit “1” in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
123  See Exhibit “2” in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
124  Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600; 606 SCRA 598, 673 (2009),
citing Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386,
398; 535 SCRA 265, 289 (2007).
125  Article 38.1, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
126  Mijares v. Ranada, 495 Phil. 372, 395; 455 SCRA 397, 421 (2005).
 127  Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra at p.
400; p. 291.
 
 
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Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” 128 These are the same core
principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) has been interpreted by this Court as part
of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article 15
thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
 
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
 
Article 7
 
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right
to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
 
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child “to acquire a nationality”:
_______________
128  International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, 388 Phil. 661, 672-673; 333
SCRA 13, 20-21 (2000).
129  Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1.
130  Republic v. Sandiganbayan,  454 Phil. 504, 545; 407 SCRA 10, 57 (2003).
 
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146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Article 24
 
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at
the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which
require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a
foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” to wit:
Article 14
 
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country
of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by
the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
 
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
 
Article 2
 
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, be considered to have been
 
 
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born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not
binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which 131effectively affirms Article 14
of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 “United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness” merely “gives effect” to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. 132 In Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis,133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the “International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that
the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a “generally accepted principle of international law.” Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis is likewise
notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and
which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points
out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional
state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada,134 where only four countries had “either ratified or acceded to” 135 the 1966
“Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters” when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that
nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
_______________
131  “Everyone has the right to a nationality.”
132  See Introductory Note to the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness issued by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
133  Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,  supra note 124.
134  Supra note 126.
135  Id., at p. 392; p. 418; see footnote No. 55 of said case.
 
 
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Our approach in Razon, Jr.  and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
“generally accepted principles of international law” are based not only on international custom,
but also on “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the
policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are “basic to legal systems generally,” 136 support the notion that the right against
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered
as “generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner’s evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42)
of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are
parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the
Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in
166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis  countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals
of the country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules
on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention
on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The pre-
_______________
136  Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,supra note
124.
137  See Exhibits 38 and 39-series.
 
 
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sumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that
presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which
suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their
application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. The Solicitor General’s warning in his opening statement is relevant:
. . . . the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that
those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is
concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be
tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments
which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to
accord them second-class citizenship.138
 
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner’s repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions
of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not “natural-born”
citizenship but only plain “Philippine citizenship.”
The COMELEC’s rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,140 repatriation was explained as follows:
 
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen
_______________
138  Opening Statement of the Solicitor General, p. 6.
139  First Division resolution dated 11 December 2015, upheld in  toto  by the COMELEC En
Banc.
140  409 Phil. 633, 649; 357 SCRA 545, 556 (2001).
 
 
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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a naturalborn Filipino.
 
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an
“abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship x x x.” Also included
is Parreño v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said
that “[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his
Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born  citizenship.”
The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural citizens as
implying “that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to
decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not
for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’ determination.
More importantly, COMELEC’s position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III  v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 145 where the
phrase “from birth” was clarified to mean at the time of birth: “A person who at the time of his
birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalborn citizen thereof.” Neither is
“repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s citizenship. In Bengson III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no
third category for repatriated citizens:
 
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
_______________
141  692 Phil. 407, 420; 678 SCRA 267, 280 (2012).
142  551 Phil. 368, 381; 523 SCRA 390, 404 (2007).
143  531 Phil. 407, 417; 500 SCRA 9, 19 (2006).
144  Parreño v. Commission on Audit,  supra.
145  Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 140 at p. 646; p.
552.
 
 
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(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required
by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications
to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. 146
 
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while
we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” This
Court also said that “while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as
a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s
reliance thereupon should be respected.”148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for “born to” in her application for repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she
was a naturalborn Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact — petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee,
except when the biological par-
_______________
146  Id., at p. 651; pp. 557-558.
147  G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November 2015, 774 SCRA 431.
148  Id.
 
 
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152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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ent is the spouse of the adopter.” 149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an
amended birth certificate “attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)”
and which certificate “shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.” 150 That law also
requires that “[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the
court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.” 151 The law
therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that
was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an
adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in
the same case for cancellation of CoC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of
discretion.
 
On Residence
 
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her CoC that she has before and
until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner’s claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections,is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9
May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten
(10) years. In answer to the requested information of “Period of Residence in the Philippines up
to the day before May 09, 2016,” she put in “10 years 11 months” which according to her
pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned
for good from the U.S.
_______________
149  Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8552, Art. VI, Sec. 33.
150  Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 14.
151  Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 15.
 
 
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When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the
old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide  intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi  coupled with animus non
revertendi.The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include
petitioner’s former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the
Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to
September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children
showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot
issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items
from petitioner’s family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for
change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing
sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the
U.S. Embassy where petitioner
_______________
152  Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,  623 Phil. 628, 660; 608 SCRA
733, 765 (2009), citing Japzon v. COMELEC,  596 Phil. 354, 370-372; 576 SCRA 331, 349 (2009),
further citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 768-770; 381 SCRA 133, 147 (2002),
further citing Romualdez v. RTC, Br.  7, Tacloban City,  G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226
SCRA 408, 415.
153  Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819; 310 SCRA 546, 568-569 (1999).
 
 
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154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa
Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family
stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner’s
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and
that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner’s domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim
conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded
the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the
earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006
when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC
relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155  Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC.157 During
the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158  Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted
until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa free
entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American
(without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay
from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections.
_______________
154  TSN, 16 February 2016, p. 120.
155  434 Phil. 861; 385 SCRA 607 (2002).
156   Japzon v. COMELEC, supra note 152.
157  G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015, 771 SCRA 213.
158  G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699 SCRA 522.
159  Coquilla v. COMELEC, supra.
 
 
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Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct
from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate’s acts after reacquisition sufficed
to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC,161 the candidate admitted that his place of
work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-
month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that
“such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency.”
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house)
and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on
24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband
getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise
known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that there is no overriding
intent to
_______________
160  Japzon v. COMELEC,  supra note 152.
161  Caballero v. COMELEC, supra note 157.
162  Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 158.
 
 
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
treat balikbayans  as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law
is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and “comes or returns to the
Philippines.”163 The law institutes a balikbayan  program “providing the opportunity to avail of
the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members
of society upon their return to the country” 164 in line with the government’s “reintegration
program.”165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law’s express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to
allow him to reestablish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends
to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did — she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while
awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner’s, where the former Filipino’s evidence of change in domicile
is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner’s evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases
cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation
where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on
the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner’s claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by
9 May 2016 in her 2015 CoC was false because she put six (6) years and six (6) months as
“period of residence before May 13, 2013” in her 2012 CoC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically
_______________
163  Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 2(a).
164  Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 1.
165  Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 6.
166  Coquilla v. COMELEC, supra note 155.
 
 
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assumed as true the statement in the 2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 CoC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that CoC in 2012. She
said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S.
house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by
her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner’s explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the CoC, is
bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 CoC which is now
“period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016.” The COMELEC
would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S.
house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a
year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of
her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as to
period of residence made in a CoC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where
the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that “[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.” The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC both  correctly stated
the pertinent  period of residency.
_______________
167  Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 104 at p. 326. (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
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158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC
took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner’s repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner
had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she
claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in
good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As
already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as
August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner’s repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for
purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 CoC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner’s evidence on this
point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
of residence in the 2012 CoC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 CoC was also brought up in the SET petition
for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that
she made a mistake in the 2012 CoC when she put in six (6) years and six (6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in
the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her CoC
for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
erroneous statement in her 2012 CoC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her
Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to
hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover,
has on her side this Court’s pronouncement that:
 
 
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
Concededly, a candidate’s disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying
due course to, and for the cancellation of, a CoC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate’s misrepresentation in his CoC must not only refer to a material fact
(eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications
to run for public office.168
 
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi  to the Philippines
and animus non revertendi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of
coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been
fixed at the petitioner’s “sworn declaration in her CoC for Senator” which the COMELEC said
“amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only
commence sometime in November 2006’’; such that “based on this declaration, [petitioner]
fails to meet the residency requirement for President.” This conclusion, as already shown,
ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the
person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional
requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that
cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of
facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by
petitioner.169It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner
cannot be bound by her declaration in her CoC for Senator which declaration was not even
considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her CoC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and
six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally
_______________
168  Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253, 265-266; 552 SCRA 231, 242-243 (2008).
 169  In Mitra v. COMELEC, [636 Phil. 753; 622 SCRA 744 (2010)], it was ruled that the
residence requirement can be complied with through an incremental process including
acquisition of business interest in the pertinent place and lease of feedmill building as
residence.
 
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160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by
her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at
the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to
vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner,
by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a
length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence
other than that which was mentioned in the CoC for Senator. Such other facts of residence
have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
 
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. [Petitioner’s] husband
however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their
family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection
in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until
the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner’s] mother discovered that her
former lawyer who handled [petitioner’s] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner’s] new name and stating that her parents are “Ronald Allan K. Poe” and
“Jesusa L. Sonora.”
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the
disposal of some of the family’s remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned
to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner’s] husband informed the United States Postal
Service of the family’s abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sold on 27 April 2006.
 
 
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VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 161
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
In April 2006, [petitioner’s] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned
to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July
2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian
Hills, where they eventually built their family home. 170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case
fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that
mentioned by petitioner in her CoC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division
and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C.  Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
 
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and
_______________
170  COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), pp. 4-5.
 
 
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162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
 
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of
the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
  
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-

LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and
Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 221538. September 20, 2016.*
 
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, respondents.
Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; Exclusive,  original jurisdiction over
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within
the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals.—
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral
tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as
_______________
*  EN BANC.
 
 
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
of the President and the Vice President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal)
may be initiated. The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review.
Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being the “sole” judge must be read in
harmony with Article VIII, Section 1’s express statement that “[j]udicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is allowed in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an
independent civil action.—A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral
Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of
the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is
allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as an independent civil action. The viability of such a petition is premised on an
allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.” The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been
generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; There is grave abuse of discretion when a
constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) or the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of
evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which
were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.—There is grave abuse of
discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission
on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of
evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which
were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for. A glaring misinterpretation of
the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of
the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse
 
437
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 437
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
of discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
Same; Same; Same; Writs of certiorari have been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s
approach to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a
gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;  (b) where a tribunal’s assessment
of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective
assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used”;  “(c) where the
tribunal’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal invokes
erroneous or irrelevant  considerations in resolving an issue.—Writs of certiorari have,
therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an issue is premised on wrong
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of
the evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and] based
solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
standards that can be used”; “(c) where the tribunal’s action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in
resolving an issue.
Constitutional Law; Senators; Natural-born Citizens; Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”—Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells
out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.”
Same; Statutory Construction; Even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating
the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.—At the heart of this controversy is
a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of
whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times,
not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may
be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
 
 
438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
foundling, remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional
interpretation. Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign’s
purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more
contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are
situated within the whole document — context — govern. Secondarily, when discerning
meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle
what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating
the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
 Same; Same; Verba Legis Doctrine; Words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis.—To the extent possible, words must be given
their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. The Constitution
is truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People:
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent
consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People’s consciousness: that is,
popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: We look to the language of the
document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where
we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule
of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.
Same; Same; The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular, whole  unit
— ut magis valeat quam pereat.—Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its
relation with the
 
 
439
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 439
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater
whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components through
the dynamism of these components’ interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire
document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated
and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam pereat. Each provision must be
understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its
foundational principles to its finest fixings.
Same; Same; Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “[j]udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.”—
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously considered
that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
system.” Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial
interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was
originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent
that the text brings to effect. Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering
prior interpretation as immutable.
Same; Same; Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may
be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.—Contemporaneous
construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is capable
of multiple, viable meanings. It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the
document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of
the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning
yielded by such reading.
Same; Same; On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific
provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2,
of “natural-born citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration,
which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation
to the factual milieu of this case.—Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
 
 
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making
her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a
need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal
instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels. On an initial level, a plain textual
reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s
actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.” This definition must be
harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These
provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted
circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage.
Same; Citizenship; The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is,
the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold
public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.—Citizenship is
a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” It is one’s personal
and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievance. Citizenship also entails obligations to the political
community of which one is part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that
loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is
particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the
citizen’s birth.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section
2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one
who is not natural-born.—A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is
a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship.” By necessary implication, a natural-
 
 
441
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 441
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
ized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), articulates this definition by dichotomy: [O]nly
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes
of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of naturalized
citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are “former aliens
or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Although the Revised Rules on
Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, the
Supreme Court (SC)  has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other
proceedings.—Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use
of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. There is no rational basis for making the use of
circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings. In
criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result
in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our
legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence
suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of
proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Words and Phrases; Burden of proof is the duty of a party
to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.—“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
 
 
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the party
making the allegations; that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue” Burden of
proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift
happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party then bears
the “burden of going forward” with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
established against him or her.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Foundlings; The presumption that all foundlings found in
the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus
natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the
Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole purpose.”—The presumption that all
foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one
reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole purpose.” As much as we
have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional
provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the
constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of
the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights. They
must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution’s reasons for requiring natural-born
status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous
construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative
actions, and international instruments.
Same; Same; Same; Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is
tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens; Concluding that
foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.—Concluding that foundlings are not
natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling
citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is
also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These conse-
 
 
443
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 443
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
quences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present
politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an
inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee
that “persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in
terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’”—The equal protection clause serves as
a guarantee that “persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are
treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.’ It is a guarantee against
‘undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of
inequality.’” Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction
differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to
the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings’ misfortune
in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them — an inability arising from no fault of
their own — cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at best,
as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from
the state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable;
it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were
abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.
Same; Citizenship; Foundlings; Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case
of Poe-Llamanzares,  private respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and
reaffirmed through various official public acts.—Our statutes on adoption allow for the
recognition of foundlings’ Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this
without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens. Specifically regarding
private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her natural-born status.
This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it
appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the
proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent’s natural-born status
has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public acts. First, private respondent
was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second,
on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President
of the Philip-
 
 
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
pines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson — an office that requires natural-born
citizenship.
Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No.
9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and RA No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”—“Philippine citizenship may
be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.” Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in
effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001,
provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization
in a foreign country.” Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was
naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later,
July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for
Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. Republic Act
No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Republic Act No. 8171 specifically “to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic
Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,”  that is, keep, their
Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the
rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of
allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5).
On the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of RA
No. 9225  “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and
 
 
445
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 445
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain
solemnities.—Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the
effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this
status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became
citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 “reacquire” their
Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance
with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of a policy of
immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the
intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it
was never lost at all.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites which Natural-born Filipinos who Have Been Naturalized
Elsewhere and Wish to Run for Elective Public Office Must Comply.—Natural-born Filipinos who
have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must comply with all
of the following requirements: First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects
the retention or reacquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables the
enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are
satisfied. Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing
laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in
elections. Third, “mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” This, along with satisfying the other
qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to
comply with Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-
born, Filipino citizen.—It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having
 
 
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a
natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No.
9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. To do so is to completely
disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a
natural-born Filipino citizen’s naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or
her natural-born status.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may involve extended processes not
limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities,
but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.—Although Bengson was decided while
Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225’s
policy of permanence and immutability: “all Philippine citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.” In Bengson’s words, the once naturalized
citizen is “restored” or brought back to his or her natural-bornstatus. There may have been an
interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized
elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he
or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving
forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the
intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended
processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional
solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not
for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly
different from naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with which the former
natural-born citizen must comply.
 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., Dissenting Opinion:
 
 Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered
as committed with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—An act of a court or
 
 
447
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 447
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
tribunal can only be considered as committed with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. In this relation, “grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”
Citizenship; Jus Sanguinis Principle; View that in this case, respondent failed to present
competent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is
necessary to  determine natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle.—In this
case, respondent failed to present competent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood
relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to determine natural-born citizenship pursuant
to the jus  sanguinis principle. This notwithstanding, the ponencia concludes that the following
circumstances are substantial evidence justifying the inference that respondent’s biological
parents are Filipino.
Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot make a definitive pronouncement on a
candidate’s citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not Filipino.—Case law
holds that “[m]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly
complied with.” The proof to hurdle a substantial challenge against a candidate’s qualifications
must therefore be solid. This Court cannot make a definitive pronouncement on a candidate’s
citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not Filipino. The circumstances
surrounding respondent’s abandonment (both as to the milieu of time and place), as well as
her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility. By parity of reasoning, they do not
prove that she was born to a Filipino: her abandonment in the Philippines is just a restatement
of her foundling status, while her physical features only tend to prove that her parents likely
had Filipino features and yet it remains uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino. More so, the
statistics cited — assuming the same to be true — do not account for all births but only of
those recorded. To my mind, it is uncertain how “encompassing” was the Philippine’s civil
registration system at that time — in 1968 — to be able to conclude
 
 
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
that those statistics logically reflect a credible and representative sample size. And even
assuming it to be so, 1,595 were reflected as foreigners, rendering it factually possible that
respondent belonged to this class. Ultimately, the opposition against respondent’s natural-born
citizenship claim is simple but striking: the fact that her parents are unknown directly puts into
question her Filipino citizenship because she has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent from
which she could have traced her Filipino citizenship.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; View that while the predicament of foundlings of having
their parents unknown would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of proving their
Filipino parentage, the current state of the law which requires evidence of blood relation to a
Filipino parent to establish natural-born citizenship under the jus sanguinis  principle must be
respected at all costs.—While the predicament of foundlings of having their parents unknown
would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of proving their Filipino parentage, the
current state of the law which requires evidence of blood relation to a Filipino parent to
establish natural-born citizenship under the jus sanguinis principle must be respected at all
costs. This is not to say that the position of foundlings in relation to their endeavors for high
public offices has been overlooked in this discourse. Rather, the correction of this seeming
“misfortune” — as the ponencia would suppose — lies in legislative revision, not judicial
supplication. For surely, it is not for this Court to step in and supply additional meaning when
clarity is evoked in the citizenship provisions of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that the jus sanguinis principle of citizenship established
in the 1935 Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or generally accepted principle
of international law which purportedly evince that foundlings are accorded natural-born
citizenship in the State in which they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect
as it would contravene the Constitution.—It bears stressing that they jus sanguinis principle of
citizenship established in the 1935 Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted in
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or
generally accepted principle of international law which purportedly evince that foundlings are
accorded natural-born citizenship in the
 
 
449
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 449
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
State in which they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect as it
would contravene the Constitution. To recall, should international law be adopted in this
jurisdiction, it would only form part of the sphere of domestic law. Being relegated to the same
level as domestic laws, they could not modify or alter, much less prevail, over the express
mandate of the Constitution. In this relation, I deem it fitting to echo the point made by
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, likewise in her Separate Opinion before the
SET: Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international conventions cited but
will entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or legislative enactment, so that
the nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by naturalization.
There must be a law by which citizenship can be acquired. By no means can this citizenship be
considered that of a natural-born character under the principle of jus sanguinis in the
Philippine Constitution.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Manuelito R. Luna for petitioner.
   Poblador, Bautista & Reyes and George Erwin M. Garcia for respondent Mary Grace Poe-
Llamanzares.
 
LEONEN, J.:
 
 The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all
foundlings from public service.
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent
search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the
quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino,
then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. When these
inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there is no grave
abuse of discretion remediable by either
 
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single foundling as
natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof may exist to
show that a foundling is not natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its
place in the scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution, are likewise different
from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He
prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15. 2 The assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision3dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which
sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly
not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold
such office under Article VI, Section 3 4 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015
Resolution5 denied David’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents
are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. 6
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 3-76. The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2  Id., at p. 73.
3  Id., at pp. 227-258.
4  Const., Art. VI, Sec. 3 provides:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
5  Rollo, pp. 80-83.
6  Id., at p. 8.
 
 
451
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 451
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. 7 He
later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. 8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. 9 She was given the
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. 10 Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live
Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON
SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS
PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET,
JARO . . .11
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting
the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known
as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). 12 The
Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe’s name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A.
Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality. 14
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan
Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe’s foundling certificate that she was
_______________
7   Id. See also Id., at p. 227, SET Decision.
8   Id.
9   Id., at p. 227.
10  Id., at p. 681, Poe Comment.
11  Id., at p. 8.
12  Id., at p. 681.
13  Id.
14  Id.
 
 
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe. 15 This hand-written notation appears on
Senator Poe’s foundling certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court
Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974,
under Sp. Proc. No. 138.16
 
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she
turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter’s Identification Card for
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986. 18
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. 19 Her
passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013,
and March 18, 2014.20 Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic
passport on December 19, 2013.21
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but
eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. 22 In 1991, she
earned a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, 35  Id., at p. 683.
Massachusetts.23 36  Id., at p. 10.
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an  
American and Filipino na-  
_______________ 454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
15  Id.
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
16  Id.
17  Id., at p. 9. to the Philippines on December 13, 2004. 37 On December 14, 2004, her father died. 38 She
18  Id. stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father’s funeral and to attend to the
19  Id. settling of his estate.39
20  Id., at p. 228. In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for work
21  Id., at p. 682. again in the United States.40
22  Id., at pp. 9 and 682. Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. 41 After consulting her children, they all
23  Id., at p. 9. agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces. 42 In early 2005, they
  notified Brian and Hanna’s schools Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to
  the Philippines the following semester. 43 She came back on May 24, 2005. 44 Her children also
453 arrived in the first half of 2005. 45 However, her husband stayed in the United States to “finish
pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there.” 46
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 453 Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47
tional since birth.24 The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines: 48
Manila.25 On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband. 26 For I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United States. 27 Constitution of the
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna _______________
MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28Brian was born in the United States on April 16,
1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were 37  Id.
born in the Philippines.29 38  Id.
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. 30 She 39  Id.
was subsequently given a United States passport. 31 40  Id., at p. 684.
Senator Poe’s adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the 41  Id., at p. 228.
Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. 32To support her father’s candidacy, Senator Poe and 42  Id., at p. 684.
her daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004. 33 After the Elections, she 43  Id.
returned to the United States on July 8, 2004. 34 It was during her stay in the Philippines that she 44  Id., at p. 685.
gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35 45  Id.
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually “slipped into a 46  Id.
coma.”36 Senator Poe returned 47  Id., at p. 228.
_______________ 48  Id., at p. 10.
 
24  Id., at pp. 682-683.  
25  Id., at p. 228. 455
26  Id. VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 455
27  Id., at p. 9.
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
28  Id., at p. 683.
29  Id. Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
30  Id., at p. 9. constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
31  Id. supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
32  Id., at p. 683. that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
33  Id., at p. 9. evasion.49
34  Id.  
 On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and/or Re-acquisition of 59  Id., at p. 256.
Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225. 50 She also “filed applications for 60  Id.
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of  
age at that time.”51  
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006 457
through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 457
Fernandez, Jr.:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents  
and is presumed to be a naturalborn Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen Arrivals Flight No.
and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and  has taken her November 4, 2006 SQ076
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed July 23, 2007 PR731
to have reacquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original) November 5, 2007 PR337
  May 8, 2008 PR103
In the same Order, Senator Poe’s children were “deemed Citizens of the Philippines in October 5, 2008 PR359
accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225.”54 Until now, the Order “has not May 21, 2009 PR105
_______________ August 3, 2009 PR733
November 15, 2009                             PR10361
49  Id., at p. 685.  
50  Id., at p. 228.  
51  Id., at p. 686. On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as
52  Id., at p. 228. Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 62 On
53  Id., at p. 686. October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
54  Id. United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship, 63 stating:
  I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No. 107
  Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in
456 accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly
and voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or undue
been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other agency of Government.” 55 influence.64 (Emphasis in the original)
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the name  
of Senator Poe and her children. 56 It stated that Senator Poe is a “citizen of the Philippines The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010. 65 On
pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to October 21, 2010, she took her Oath
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 per _______________
Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18,
2006.”57 61  Id.
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 62  Id., at p. 10.
31, 2006.58 63  Id., at p. 687.
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 64  Id., at pp. 687-688.
using her United States Passport No. 170377935.59 She used her passport “after having taken 65  Id., at p. 688.
her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 7 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced  
her American citizenship on 20 October 2010.”60 The following are the flight records given by  
the Bureau of Immigration: 458
_______________ 458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
55  Id.
56  Id., at pp. 686-687. of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010. 66 Her oath of office
57  Id., at p. 687. stated:
58  Id.  
 PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN Pending the filing of Senator Poe’s answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of
  Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from the Bureau of
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Immigration on August 25, 2015.81 The documents requested in-
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin _______________
ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito’y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng 72  Id.
Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na 73  Id.
tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at 74  Id.
mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng 75  Id.
Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o 76  Id.
hangaring umiwas. 77  Id.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos. 78  Id., at p. 230.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng 79  Id.
Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original) 80  Id.
  81  Id.
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United  
States68 in the presence of Vice Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011. 69 On this  
occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. 460
Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of 460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The certificate was ap-
_______________ David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
cluded Senator Poe’s record of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate. 82 On August 26, 2015, the
68  Id., at p. 229. Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion. 83 The same
66  Id., at p. 229. Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials
67  Id., at p. 689, Poe Comment. of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office. 84 The subpoenas ordered the
69  Id. officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the
70  Id. Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents. 85 The subpoenas were complied
71  Id. with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1,
  2015.86
  On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for
459 Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4)
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 459
Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court. 87
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-05 requiring
proved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012. 72 the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before September 9, 2015. 88 The
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. 73 On September 27, 2012, she Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on September 11, 2015. 89During the Preliminary
executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on Conference, the parties “agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground of prescription.” 90
October 2, 2012.74 She won and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75 Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015. 91 The
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral parties were then “required to
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He contested the election of Senator _______________
Poe for failing to “comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the
1987 Constitution.”77 82  Id.
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David “to 83  Id.
correct the formal defects of his petition.” 78 David filed his amended Petition on August 17, 84  Id.
2015.79 85  Id.
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, 86  Id.
through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to 87  Id.
summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended Petition. 80 88  Id., at p. 231.
89  Id.
90  Id.
 91  Id. Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules
  Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the “final act” to reacquire
  natural-born Philippine citizenship.
461  
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 461 ....
 
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her
submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen
[Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date.” 92 from that time on until today.
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.
results.93 The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through No pronouncement as to costs.
Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
results of DNA Testing, 95 which stated that “none of the tests that [Senator Poe] took provided  
results that would shed light to the real identity of her biological parents.” 96 The Manifestation On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration. 101 The Senate Electoral Tribunal
also stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to
development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted “the issue of her comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. 102
natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on
in her submissions to the Tribunal.” 97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the December 1, 2015.103 David’s Motion for
Senate Electoral Tribunal “noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case submitted for _______________
resolution.”98
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision 100  Id., at pp. 253-257.
finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as 101  Id., at pp. 84-100.
Senator.99 The Decision stated: 102  Id., at p. 80, SET Resolution No. 15-12.
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and 103  Id., at p. 81.
continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution,  
_______________  
463
92  Id.
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 463
93  Id.
94  Id. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
95  Id. Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015: 104
96  Id. WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration (of the
97  Id. Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November
98  Id. 2015.
99  Id., at p. 257. The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November 2015
  issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by
  counsel for Respondent on 01 December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and
462 submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled “Amado D. Valdez, Petitioner, versus
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent.”
as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.  
  On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s Resolution was received by
.... David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the present Petition for Certiorari before this
  Court.107
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe
Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of to comment on the Petition “within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. notice.”108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on January 19, 2016. 109 The Senate Electoral
Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December
_______________  
....
104  Id., at pp. 80-83.  
105  Id., at p. 82. SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
106  Id., at p. 7. Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
107  Id., at pp. 7-8. qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
108  Id., at p. 647, SET Comment. Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
109  Id. Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
  as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
  political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
464 represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (Emphasis supplied)
 
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-
30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.111 judicial bodies (particularly,
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on Elections case _______________
on the issue of private respondent’s citizenship.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave 112  A counterpart electoral tribunal for the positions of President and Vice President was
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s Petition also created by the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
for Quo Warranto based on its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 4 provides:
qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. SECTION 4. . . .
  ....
I The Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
  the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a petition promulgate its rules for the purpose.
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed  
Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and  
conclusions on private respondent’s citizenship. 466
Ruling on petitioner’s plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of two (2)
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
factors: first, the breadth of this Court’s competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle — a petition for certiorari — through David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from courts and the Commission on Elections) 113 the power to rule on contests114 relating to the
this Court. election, returns, and qualifica-
_______________ _______________

110  Id., at p. 669. 113  Trial courts and the Commission on Elections still exercise jurisdiction over contests
111  Id., at pp. 677-828. relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of local elective offices.
  CONST., Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2) provides:
  SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
465 functions:
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 465 ....
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
I.A appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
  trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution: 112 Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
  elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
ARTICLE VI 114  The term “contest” refers to post-election disputes. In Tecson v. Commission on
The Legislative Department Elections, 468 Phil. 421; 424 SCRA 277 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], this Court
 referring to the counterpart electoral tribunal for the President and Vice President —
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal — explained: “Ordinary usage would characterize a
“contest” in reference to a post election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have
one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the whining candidate from office. A perusal of
the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
support this premise. . . .
“The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice President,” of the
Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
 
 
467
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 467
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
tions of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives). These powers are
granted to a separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s power. The power to resolve such contests is
exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no
other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal system an
“independent, impartial and nonpartisan body attached to the legislature and specially created
for that singular purpose.”115 The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission,
independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
members of the National Assembly.116 This
_______________
a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This
rule again presupposes a post election scenario.
“It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [sitting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal], defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice presidency before the elections
are held.”
115  Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 250 Phil. 390, 399; 168 SCRA 391, 401 (1988).
[Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
116  CONST. (1935), Art. VI, Sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elec
 
468
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
was a departure from the system introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American
colonial rule — namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 — which vested
the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was
amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was made for
there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress. 117 The 1973 Constitution
did away with these electoral tribunals, but they have since been restored by the 1987
Constitution.
All constitutional provisions — under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions — which provide for
the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been
unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal shall be the “sole” judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as “intended to be as
_______________
tion, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
117  CONST. (1935 amended), Art. VI, Sec. 11 provides:
SECTION 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by
each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes
and three of the party having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
118  Supra note 115.
 
 
469
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 469
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]” Earlier, this grant
of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as “full, clear and complete.” .
. . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. 119
 
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in
these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the
election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President
and the Vice President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI,
Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being the “sole” judge must be read in harmony
with Article VIII, Section 1’s express statement that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that “. . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final ac-
_______________
119  Id., at pp. 399-400; p. 401.
120  347 Phil. 797; 283 SCRA 520 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
 
 
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
tion taken by the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.”
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases.
In Robles v. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that while
the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however,
but only “in the exercise of this Court’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.”
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero v. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission “is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process.” The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co v. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process
or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself
calls for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
 
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the
exercise of its appellate juris-
_______________
121  Id., at pp. 804-805; pp. 529-530.
 
 
471
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 471
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
diction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in
jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
 
I.B
 
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal
from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil
action.122 The viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of
discretion.”123
_______________
122  See J. Leonen, Concurring Opinions in Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, April
5, 2016, 788 SCRA 442, 462-463 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 182, 237 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
123  RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
 
 
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave. 124
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences
such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a
party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted
for.125
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a
misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave
abuse of discretion.126 The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from settled
principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent
against a party.
_______________
124  Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 636 Phil. 753, 777; 622 SCRA 744, 765 (2010)
[Per J. Brion, En Banc].
125  Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (First
Division), 670 Phil. 136, 151; 654 SCRA 505, 519 (2011) [Per J.Brion, Second Division].
126  Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, October 14,
2015, 772 SCRA 638, 649 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an
issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if
not misrepresentation, of the evidence; 127 (b) where a tribunal’s assessment of a case is “far
from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards
when the law is replete with standards that can be used”; 128 “(c) where the tribunal’s action on
the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable”;129and (d)
_______________
127  Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra  note 124 at pp.  777-778, 782; pp. 771-772,
778.
128  Id., at p. 787; p. 777.
129  Id., at p. 778; p. 767. In Mitra, this Court faulted the Commission on Elections for
relying on very select facts that appeared to have been appreciated precisely in such a manner
as to make it appear that the candidate whose residence was in question was not qualified.
Viewing these facts in isolation indicated a practically deliberate, ill-intentioned intent at
sustaining a previously-conceived myopic conclusion:
“In considering the residency issue, the [Commission on Elections] practically focused solely on
its consideration of Mitra’s residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs
of the premises. In the [Commission on Elections’] view (expressly voiced out by the Division
and fully concurred in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been
Mitra’s residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra’s personality
and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence.
This was the main reason that the [Commission on Elections] relied upon for its conclusion.
“Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling as
shown by and examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the [Commission on
Elections] thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a person’s residence based solely on
very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that
can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence — i.e., the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain — his or her capac
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue. 130
I.C
 
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal’s conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive
reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations
of all its provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose
biological parents are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2)
explicitly makes reference to one’s father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its original
jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial
precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the established personal circum-
_______________
ity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.”
130  In Varias v. Commission on Elections, 626 Phil. 292, 314-315; 617 SCRA 214, 238-239
(2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc], this Court, citing Pecson v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil.
1214, 1226; 575 SCRA 634, 649 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] stated: “[A] court abuses its
discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant
to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or
improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions
of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.”
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
stances of private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private respondent,
sending her on a proverbial fool’s errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy
before it arose because private respondent’s parentage was unknown and has remained so
throughout her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on
burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short
months, the one thing that she has never been in a position to know throughout her lifetime.
Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known about her
finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof
required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but “substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.” 131
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune
of having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior,
second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution’s aims of
promoting and defending the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.
 
II
 
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person
shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not
qualified to sit as Senator of
_______________
131  RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5.
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are
unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed
to establish her Filipino “blood line,” which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution’s
determination of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first
assertion, petitioner insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she
could never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that
ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner’s case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2),
which identifies as citizens “[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.”
Petitioner similarly claims that, as private respondent’s foundling status is settled, the burden
to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With private respondent having supposedly failed to
discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a natural-born
Filipino.
 
III
 
 At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have
biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must
consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling,
remains unknown.132Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.
_______________
132  CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 1(2):
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
....
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign’s purpose so
as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same text is the more
contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are
situated within the whole document — context — govern. Secondarily, when discerning
meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle
what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating
the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
 
III.A
 
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily begin with
the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from
which this Court determines constitutional intent.133
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with
the basic precept of verba legis.134The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was
ratified and approved by a direct act of the People: exercising their right of suffrage, they
approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution,
therefore, is the People’s consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal,
understanding. Thus:
_______________
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines[.]
133  Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308, 338;
359 SCRA 698, 724 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
134  See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 709 Phil. 478,
501-523; 696 SCRA 496, 546 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the
framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of
these components’ interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not
simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a
singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and
effected in a way that gives life to all
_______________
135  Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., 460 Phil. 830, 885; 415 SCRA 44, 126 (2003) [Per J.Carpio-Morales, En
Banc], citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393; 31 SCRA 413
(1970) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]. This was also cited in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241 [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
136  Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., id., at p. 886; p. 127.
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings. 137
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each provision at
the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
 
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously
considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that
“judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our]
legal system.”140 Juris-
_______________
137  La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754, 773; 445 SCRA 1, 79
(2004) (Resolution) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc] states that “[t]he Constitution should be read
in broad, life-giving strokes.”
138  272 Phil. 147; 194 SCRA 317 (1991) [Per CJ. Fernan, En Banc].
139  Id., at p. 162; pp. 330-331, as cited in  Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650
Phil. 326, 341; 635 SCRA 783, 798-799 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
140  CIVIL CODE, Art. 8.
 
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480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
prudence is not an independent source of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed
part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because
judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to
effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation
as immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has evolved.
Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the readoption — often with
accompanying recalibration — of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel,
provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current iteration with
prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for
more conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers,
and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change
galvanizes meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but
even in organic laws142 and in similar mechanisms143 in-
_______________
141  Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
142  The adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine Organic
Act of 1902, crystallized the concept of “Philippine citizens.” SeeTecson v. Commission on
Elections, supra  note 114 at pp. 467-468; p. 331.
143  For example, the Civil Code of Spain became effective in the jurisdiction on December
18, 1889, making the first categorical
 
 
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
troduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal interpretation
must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In Social Weather
Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a holistic approach
in legal interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively) construe to
be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)’s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words
“paid for” evinces no distinction between direct purchasers and those who
purchase viasubscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)’s
desistance from actually using the word “subscriber” means that subscribers are beyond its
contemplation. The variance in the parties’ positions, considering that they are both banking on
what they claim to be the Fair Election Act’s plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant
ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity.
The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not
be belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in
everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on
technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to
bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In
reality, univer-
_______________
listing on who were Spanish citizens. See Tecson v. Commission on Elections, id., at p. 465; p.
329.
144  G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA 124 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
 
 
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
sality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is
static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than
parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even
the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social
ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock
of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word  in the vernacular that describes
the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we
consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of
which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a
cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the
ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the
Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III.B
 
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to
when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. 146 It is only then that one can go beyond
the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been
ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify
or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
_______________
145  Id., at pp. 166-167.
146  Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 692 Phil. 407, 421; 678 SCRA 267, 282
(2012) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc]: “Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of
being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same
time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible
meanings.”
 
 
483
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the
business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic
foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and
even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When competing viable
interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in
order to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its
democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or
deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle underlies the basic doctrine that
courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only
constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.147
When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial
decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns), 148 as well as thematically
similar statutes and international norms that form part of our legal system. This includes
discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts under consideration. It
is also only at this juncture — when external aids may be consulted — that the supposedly
underlying notions of the framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other
similar accounts, can be illuminating.
_______________
147  See, for example, In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and
Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of
Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 352 [Per J. Leonen, En
Banc], citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 278-279 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
148  Cf. what was previously discussed regarding previous judicial decisions on the very
same text.
 
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484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
III.C
 
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from the
supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who
adopted the basic document is the weakest approach.
 These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, they allow
for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or
exhaustively articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent
and have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or against a
proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that motivated them
were based on entirely erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can also
misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical
episodes through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always uniform with
the original understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper in-
 
 
485
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 485
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
terpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framer’s understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the
need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the
logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The
Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of
its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which
principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born
citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a
reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual
milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts,
and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s
Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its
mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law,
equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its
reasons for requiring natural-
_______________
149  Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., supra note 135 at p. 887; pp. 128-129, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, supra  note 138 at pp. 169-170; pp. 337-338.
 
 
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous
construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative
actions, and international instruments.
 
V
 
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status’ commencement from birth
means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-
born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is
qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
 
V.A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
 
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
 
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150
_______________
150  The 1935 Constitution was in effect when petitioner was born. However, the
provisions are now substantially similar to the present Constitution, except that the present
Constitution provides clarity for “natural-born” status. For comparison, the 1935 provisions
state: 
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines.
 
 
487
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David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
 Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens: alternative identification of native inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens  of the Philippines from birth without colonial master’s regard for native inhabitants as inferior. 157 Natives were, thus, reduced to
having to perform  any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine  citizenship. Those who elect subservience in their own land.
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not just
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the
  Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by
Section 2’s significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term “natural-born special laws.158 It
citizens.” This is distinct from Section 1’s enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section _______________
1’s generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-
born. 152  Go v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138, 149
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated when [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and natural-born Philippines, A Commentary (2009 ed.).
citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term “natural-born citizen” was a transplanted, 153  Id.
but tardily defined, foreign concept. 154  Supra note 114.
  155  Id., at pp. 464-470; p. 326.
V.B 156  Id., at p. 464; p. 330.
  157  Id.
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” 151 It 158  Id., at p. 465; p. 329.
is one’s personal and . . .  
_______________  
489
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 489
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. was only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. Spain, that there existed a categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens, 159 thus:
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.  
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
SECTION 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by  
law. (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
151  CJ. Warren, Dissenting Opinion in Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).  
  (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
  the Monarchy.160
488  
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on December
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically convert the native inhabitants to American
permanent membership in a political community. . . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to citizens.161 Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants’ status to the Congress of
enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right the United States:
to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
grievance.152 present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is remove therefrom . . . . In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance;
state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen’s birth. nationality of the territory in which they may reside.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections 154 reckoned with the historical development of our Thus —
concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule. 155 Under the Spanish, the native _______________
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as “Spanish
subjects.”156 Church records show that native inhabitants were referred to as “indios.” The 159  Id.
 160  Id., at pp. 465-466; p. 329, citing The Civil Code of Spain, Art. 17.
161  Id., at pp. 466-467; p. 329, citing Velayo, Ramon M., Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization, pp. 22-23 (1965).
 
 
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded
to the United States shall be determined by Congress. 162
 
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had ceased
to be Spanish subjects were “issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.”163
The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” first appeared in legislation in the Philippine
Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902: 164
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
 
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the Philippine
Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not
account for the status of children born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects.
A view was expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth),
which was operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands. 165
_______________
162  Id., at p. 466; p. 329, citing Velayo, Ramon M.,  id.
163  Id., at p. 467; p. 330.
164  Id., at pp. 467-468; p. 330.
165  Id.
 
 
491
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 491
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on
acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States if residing therein.166
 
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced
the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
amended:167
Section 2. Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization—
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as
have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the
_______________
166  Id., at p. 468; p. 331.
167  Id.
 
 
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein.
 
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was “(1) a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not
a citizen of some other country.” 168
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring citizenship. It
was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage vis-à-vis the determination of
citizenship.169Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
 
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
 
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
 
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
_______________
168  Id., at p. 469; p. 332.
169  Id.
 
493
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 493
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 
The term “natural-born citizen” first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution’s
provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice President of the Philippines.
Article VII, Section 3 read:
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice President, unless he
be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has
been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election.
 
While it used the term “natural-born citizen,” the 1935 Constitution did not define the
term.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution — read with the then civil law provisions
that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands
— was discriminatory towards women. 170 The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic
situation:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
 
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
 
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
 
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
 
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her
citizenship.171
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term “natural-born
citizen.” Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. 172
 
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on
citizenship, “except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.”173
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
 
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
 
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution’s previous definition of natural-
born citizens, as follows:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Ironically, the concept of “natural-born” citizenship is a “foreign” concept that was
transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution’s eligibility requirements for
President and Vice President of the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term “natural-
born citizen” appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the
presidency.175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale
for inclusion as a requirement for the presidency are not even found in the records of
constitutional deliberations. 176 However, it has been suggested that, as the United States was
under British colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of being natural-born was
introduced as a safeguard against foreign infiltration in the administration of national
government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a
letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25,
1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check
to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government;
and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American army shall not be
given to nor devolve on, any but a natural-born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served
valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay.
Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to
rumors that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch. 177
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.
 
V.C
 
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the
Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-
born. Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 178 articulates this definition by
dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes
of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino.179
 
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of
naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are
“former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.” 180
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally required to file
a verified petition.181 He or she must establish among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of
good moral character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and
principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant period of time. 182
_______________
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
filing of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in
which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any
public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not
limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of
school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if
he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are
unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of
their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects
of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Comm. Act No. 473, Sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Qualifications.—Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the
following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
 
 
Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public,
and to the Filipinos’ core beliefs.183
V.D
 
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. Section 2
categorically defines “natural-born citizens.” This constitutional definition is further clarified in
jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship.
Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written
into the interpreted text, thus establishing its contemporaneous intent.
Therefore, petitioner’s restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline
is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section 1’s mere enumeration
but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section’s unequivocal definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2
that is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must
look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of  Bengson, this
calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual
naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more effective way to terminate
this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of proof.
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as
well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies
are misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly
devised. The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the
relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is
contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be
discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It
privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-à-visnatural-born status is clear.
It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be
contrasted, not against other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be
thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.
 
V.E
 
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
Section 2 defines “natural-born citizens.” Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either
one’s father or one’s mother must be a Filipino citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are
not determinative of citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one’s parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not
even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically
Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship
of everyone else in one’s ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure
Filipino bloodline.
 Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial
sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less stringent
or both of one’s parents is a Filipino citizen. standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the
  Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190
V.F Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
  on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most — if not all — Philippine provinces, had a
Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings attests predominantly Filipino population. 192 Private respondent is described as having “brown
to how at least one — if not both — of her biological parents were Filipino citizens. almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face.” 193 She
Proving private respondent’s biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. 194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro,
with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. Iloilo.
By now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological
lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding. Even the identification parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with
of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would
economic cost, prohibitive. have behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of
  a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out
  of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is
505 unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 505 In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,195 the Solicitor
General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private respondent was born a
David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to statistical inference:196
establish her parentage. Number of Foreign and Filipino Children Born in the Philippines: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte- Year Foreign children born in the philippines Filipino children born in the philippines
Felipe v. People:185
1965 1,479 795,415
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken 1966 1,437 823,342
either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a 1967 1,440 840,302
necessary or probable consequence.186 1968 1,595 898,570
  1969 1,728 946,753
People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence: 1970 1,521 966,762
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, 1971 1,401 963,749
which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause
1972 1,784 968,385
and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion. 188 (Citation omitted)
  1973 1,212 1,045,290
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when 1974 1,496 1,081,873
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings: 1975 1,493 1,223,837
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for 2010 1,244 1,782,877
conviction if: 2011 1,140 1,746,685
(a) There is more than one circumstances; 2012 1,454 1,790,367
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
2013 1,315 1,751,523
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. 2014 1,351 1,748,782
  Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in [illegible]197
reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of  
circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. 189 There is no rational basis for making the use of Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18%
circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings. was born a Filipino citizen.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may
result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof
 Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half a
century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to
private respondent’s parentage.
 
VI
 
Before a discussion on how private respondent’s natural-born status is sustained by a
general assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and considering that we have just
discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent’s birth, it is
opportune to consider petitioner’s allegations that private respondent bore the burden of
proving — through proof of her bloodline — her natural-born status.
Petitioner’s claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a mere
showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all newborns
who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on
private respondent’s supposed burden to prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her
an impossible condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd when
there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy — the identity of her biological parents — is
simply not known.
“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof
lies on the party making the allegations; 198 that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the
issue.”199 Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of
evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The
other party then bears the “burden of going forward” 201with the evidence considering that
which has ostensibly been established against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings
the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
the requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence. 202 This burden was petitioner’s to
discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
respondent.
Private respondent’s admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in
favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent’s biological
parents are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother
is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no
means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence
to private respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent’s being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other
uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as substantive evidence of
private respondent’s parentage:
(1)  Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
(3)  She was found sometime in September 1968;
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a foundling;
(5)  There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
(6) Private respondent’s physical features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
 
Petitioner’s refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As
against petitioner’s suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is
that at least one of private respondent’s parents is a Filipino.
 
VII
 
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a
reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2’s definition of natural-born citizens and Section
1(2)’s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found
in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus
natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section
1(2), any such countervailing proof must show that both — not just one — of a foundling’s
biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
 
VII.A
 
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro’s Dissenting Opinion to
the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or
presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case. 203 He
insists that it is private respondent’s duty to present incontrovertible proof of her Filipino
parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates that actual
proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly
established in jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the allegations
that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe,
Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions
that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.’s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the
country was still under Spanish colonial rule; 204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou’s place of
residence, as indicated in his death certificate, must have also been his place of residence
before death, which subjected him to the “en masse Filipinization,” or sweeping investiture of
Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. 205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo
Pou’s citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe Jr.’s father, Allan F. Poe.
Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born
while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino
fathers, was in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. 206
It is true that there is jurisprudence — Paa v. Chan207 and Go, Sr. v. Ramos208 (which merely
cites Paa) — to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor
of the  claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved
in favor of the State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
 
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court’s more recent ruling
in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that “no presumption can be indulged in
favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship.” This reference to “the claimant” was preceded
by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of “the respondent.” The syntax of this Court’s
pronouncement —using the definitive article “the” — reveals that its conclusion was specific
only to Chan and to his circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic
language. Instead of the definite article “the,” it could have used the indefinite article “a” in
that same sentence: “no presumption can be indulged in favor of  a claimant of Philippine
citizenship.” In the alternative, it could have used other words that would show absolute or
sweeping application, for instance: “no presumption can be indulged in favor
of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship”; or, “no presumption can be indulged in favor
of all claimants of Philippine citizenship.”
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its statements,
therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced
showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already
indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast,
petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent’s or of
both of her parents’ foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear that the
same pronouncement was generally applicable:
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.210 (Emphasis supplied)
 
Thus, Paa’s essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In any case, Go
was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by
this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go’s factual and even procedural backdrops are different
from those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable
alien, not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the
Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.
VII.B
 
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a
Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole
purpose.”211
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section
1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read
in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal
protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect
human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution’s reasons for
requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to
enhance children’s well-being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may
undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory
conditions and, especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind the
veneer of the legal apparatus:
 
ARTICLE II
 
....
 
State Policies
 
....
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
 
....
 
ARTICLE XV
The Family
 
....
 
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
....
 
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
 
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:
(1) President;212
(2) Vice President;213
(3) Senator;214
(4)   Member of the House of Representatives;215
 (5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court; 216
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission; 217
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections; 218
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit; 219
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;221and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. 222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include, among
others, city fiscals,223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of
the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices.225 Certain professions are also limited to natural-
born citizens,226 as are other legally established benefits and incentives.227
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to
the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from
certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of
their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all
through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to
exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no
fault of their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities
for public service:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access  to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
....
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
 
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
 
....
 
  
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
 
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
 
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “persons under like circumstances
and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.’ It is a guarantee against ‘undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.’” 228
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial
distinction229 differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both
entitled to the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings’
misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them — an inability arising from
no fault of their own — cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness
or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and
protection from the state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not
only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their
lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the
Constitution’s dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and development of children.
It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth.
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are human persons
whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII.C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of
constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines
(unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling’s parents is
presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the
Constitution with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well
as acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the
President of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens
at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect children.
Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put this mandate into effect.
  Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy.—The following State policies shall be observed at all
times:
 
....
 
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will
ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, especially those
to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be
conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which allows the child to
participate and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the
program and policy formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and
welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the “best interest of the child” as the
“totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child’s physical,
psychological and emotional development.”
Consistent with this statute is our ratification 230 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties’ protection of: first, children’s
rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness;
and third, against discrimination on account of their birth status. 231 Pertinent portions of the
Convention read:
Preamble
The State Parties to the present Convention,
 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
 
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person , and
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
 
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status,
 
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed
that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
 
....
 
Have agreed as follows:
 
....
 
Article 2
 
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention
to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective
of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
birth or other status.
 
 
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2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected
against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family
members.
 
Article 3
 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or
her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and,
to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
 
....
 
Article 7
 
1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis
supplied)
 
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be
allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends
them against discrimination:
Article 24. . . .
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
 
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
 
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
 
....
 
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Treaties are “international agreement[s] concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” 233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of
the 1987 Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate before they became binding:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate’s ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress.
In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
 
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a processprescribed
by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.235 (Emphasis supplied)
 
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is
necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government — including the judiciary — is duty-bound to
abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of
discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon
birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to
unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of
promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from discrimination. Other legislative
enactments demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is
formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino
Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to “provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who is neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned.”236
Foundlings are explicitly among the “Filipino children” covered by Republic Act No. 8552: 237
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s).—It shall be the duty of the Department or the
child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate
his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a
foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption
of Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly
includes foundlings among “Filipino children” who may be adopted:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted.—Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following
documents must be submitted: to the Board:
a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
 
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
 
d) Medical evaluation/history;
 
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
 
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
 
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated
birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then
facilitate their adoption by foreigners:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true copy of the
Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended birth certificates as
issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In
case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall
be required:
 
a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death
Certificate of the child’s parents, or the Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed after
the birth of the child.
 
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
 
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.238 (Emphasis supplied)
  
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings’ Filipino citizenship on
account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their
citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they
are natural-born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized
her natural-born status. This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until
circumstances made it appear that she was a viable candidate for President of the Philippines.
Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private
respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the
domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition
of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on
October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson — an
office that requires natural-born citizenship.239
VIII
 
As it is settled that private respondent’s being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born
citizenship, petitioner’s proposition as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225
crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, reacquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied
with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
 
VIII.A
 
“Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.”240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was
naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country.” Thus, private
respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen.
However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine
citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted. 241
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 242and Republic Act No.
8171243 specifically “to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries.”244
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words,
to ensure “that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.”245 This Court shed light on this in Calilung
v. Commission on Elections:246 “[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.”247
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos’ status permanent and immutable
despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 provides:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
“I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath.
 
Section 3’s implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act
No. 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine
citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and
capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and
other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other
hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No.
9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities,
also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2’s declaration
of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in
the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as
though it was never lost at all.
 
 
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VIII.B
 
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, “subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities.” 248 However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of
other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
 
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as “the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws;
 
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
 renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
 
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an  oath of
allegiance to the Republic of  the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office;  Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
 
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
 
b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis
supplied)
 
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for
elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or
reacquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino. 249 This also enables the enjoyment of full
civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied. 250
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 251 Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws.
This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. 252
Third, “mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” 253 This, along with satisfying the other
qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this required sworn
renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that
“[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.” 255 It is also in view
of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or
who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from being appointed or elected to
public office in the Philippines.
 
VIII.C
 
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. 256 Second, on August 31, 2006,
she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.257This evidences her
compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the
country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship. 258 This was
complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States259 before Vice Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011, 260 which was, in
turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian’s issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on
December 9, 2011261 and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service,
Department of State, on February 3, 2012.262
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she
has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as
stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII.D
 
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with Republic Act
No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong
to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to
perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability
as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to
erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen’s naturalization elsewhere is an
irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix “re” signifies reference to the
preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that one returns. “Re”-acquiring can only
mean a reversion to “the way things were.” Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the
investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have used a word such as “reacquire.”
Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that repatriation
involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one’s original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
 
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is
in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225’s policy of permanence and immutability: “all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship.”264 In Bengson’s words, the once naturalized citizen is “restored” or brought back to
his or her natural-bornstatus. There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this
status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-
born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine
citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized,  de jure,
as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de
facto.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of
Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating
the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as there is no
singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must comply.
 
IX
 
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless265 is not only to set a
dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the
bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright
irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence
at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any
economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate an
interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their being
abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them by
mechanical judicial fiat.
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against other
reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but
always with justice in mind.
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must always
sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as
Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional
competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as
Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, there is no basis for annulling its
assailed Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision
and December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified
to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R No. 147066, March 26, 2001.*
AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II-Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR,
MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE,
RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN
TABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R No. 147179. March 26, 2001.*
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS MEHOL
SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTIQN, FLORENTINO TUASON
and RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), respondents.
Election Law;  Suffrage; In a representative democracy, the right of suffrage, although
accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be
exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield
to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature.—In a representative democracy such as
ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied
in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature,
which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished
right from ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so long,
guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse. To be sure, the right of
suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the
exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing
substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and
other repositories of law.
Same; Same;  Voter’s Registration; The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage; The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
_______________
*
 EN BANC.
319
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 319
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner, one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.—As to the procedural limitation, the right of
a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the “Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.” Stated differently, the
act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is
part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus,
contrary to petitioners’ argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the
lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration
as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to
the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed
by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner—one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
Same;  Same; Same;  Words and Phrases; “Registration,” Defined; Registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act.—The act of registration is concededly, by its
very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has
its own specific definition, precise meaning and coverage, thus: “a) Registration refers to the
act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before
the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the
book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board.”
Same;  Same; Same:  Statutory Construction; Rudimentary is the principle in legal
hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments to a statute
should be given effect, together with other parts of the amended act—It bears emphasis that
the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A.
8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both provisions, although at
first glance may seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in a more circumspect perusal,
necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled. Rudimentary is the principle in legal
hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments to a statute
should be given effect, together with other parts of the amended act. It is not to be presumed
that the legislature, in making such changes, was indulging in mere semantic exercise. There
must be some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The best method of interpretation is that which makes laws
consistent with other laws.—Every new statute should be construed in connection with those
already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize
and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of
justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile
them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should
harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) 8189, providing that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election, applies in the present case, while the provisions of Section 28 of R.A.
8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance
within the available period prior to election day; Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is anchored on the
sound premise that these certain “pre-election acts” are still capable of being reasonably
performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other
related pre-election activities required under the law.—In light of the foregoing doctrine, we
hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the
assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid
law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. Corollarily, it is specious for herein
petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a two-day
special registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end,
the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election
acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day. In
321
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 321
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the
sound premise that these certain “pre-election acts” are still capable of being reasonably
performed vis-à-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other
related pre-election activities required under the law.
Same; Same;  Administrative Law; It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that
the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and
application of a law would be accorded great weight.—It is an accepted doctrine in
administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation,
implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that
these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to
know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Same; Same;  Statutory Construction; The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility,
expressed in the maxim nemo tenetur ad impossible; It must be presumed that the legislature
did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the
realm of the possible.—Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that
the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the
maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible
thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require
compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally accomplished. To put it
differently, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or
application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the
interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance
with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view
that the “stand-by power” of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436,
presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Same; Same;  Well-entrenched is the rule that the law aids the vigilant and not those
who slumber on their rights.—Petitioners’ bare allegation that they were disenfranchised when
respondent COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of
January 13, 2001—the day before the prohibitive 120-day period before the May 14, 2001
regular elections commences—is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no
allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that
anyone of herein petitioners has
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor
filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the
Office of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000
to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from
filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the
registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm view that petitioners were
not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189.
Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame.
They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period
of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to
speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court
with unclean hands. In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law
aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura
in re subveniunt.
Same;  Same; Judicial Review;  Certiorari; In the absence of clear showing of grave abuse
of power or discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the Supreme
Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the
province of the COMELEC-—a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with
independence.—Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request
of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law on the matter—Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the
registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that
chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its
constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of
its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters’ registration, pertains to
the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of
grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not
validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of
respondent COMELEC—a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with
independence.
323
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 323
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
Same;  Same; Mandamus; As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.—As an extraordinary
writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not
a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.
Same;  Same; Same;  The determination of whether or not the conduct of a special
registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the
actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.—Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the
peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioner’s failed to establish, to
the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so
as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For
the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible,
possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the
exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
KAPUNAN, J., Concurring Opinion:
 Election Law;  The “standby power” of the COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods
for registration under Section 29 of RA. 8646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 must be understood in
the context of the inadequacy of the registration period under the law then prevailing, i.e., the
period provided in Section 126 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 881, under which provision the
registration of voters was held only on the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular
election; Obviously, when Congress prescribed the new system of registration under R.A. No.
8189, it intended to discard the system set forth in B.P. 881. —The “standby power” of the
COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods for registration under Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and
Section 28 of R.A. 8436 must be understood in the context of the inadequacy of the registration
period under the law then prevailing, Le., the period provided in Section 126 of B.P. 881. Under
this provision, registration of voters was held only on the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a
regular election. It was in recognition of the insufficiency of the two-day registration period
under Section 126 that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 granted the COMELEC a “standby power” to fix
additional dates and times for pre-election activities, including registration. Section 126 of B.P.
881 has,
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
however, been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 8189, which prescribes an entirely new
system of registration, and which in fact allows a prolonged period of registration for potential
voters. The implied repeal of Section 126 of B.P. 881 by Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. No. 8189
cannot be gainsaid inasmuch as these provisions speak of two systems of registration of voters
which are obviously inconsistent with each other. B.P. 881 merely provided for a two-day
registration period whereas R.A. 8189 now calls for a prolonged and continuous period of
registration (daily during regular office hours) except during the prohibited period. To uphold
the view that both systems of registration are presently co-existing would give rise to the
absurd situation where potential voters who failed to register daily during regular office hours
before the 120-day period would nonetheless be allowed to register on the seventh and sixth
Saturdays within the 120-day prohibited period. Obviously, when Congress prescribed the new
system of registration under R.A. No. 8189, it intended to discard the system set forth in B.P.
881.
Same; Statutory Construction;  The rule is that a law which treats a subject in general
terms and which does not contradict the provisions of a special statute is not to be considered
as intending to affect the provisions of the latter, unless it is absolutely necessary to construe it
in order to give its provisions any meaning at all.—Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of
R.A. 8436 cannot prevail over R.A. 8189 with respect to the pre-election activity of registration
since the latter deals specifically with registration of voters. The rule is that a law which treats a
subject in general terms and which does not contradict the provisions of a special statute is not
to be considered as intending to affect the provisions of the latter, unless it is absolutely
necessary to construe it in order to give its provisions any meaning at all. Where a conflict
between a general law and a special statute exists, the latter should prevail because it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than the general law. The special law is to be construed as an
exception to the general law in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.
Applying the foregoing rule to the cases at bar, since Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28
R.A. 8436 do not deal with registration of voters alone, as in fact the aforementioned
provisions speak of pre-election activities in general, and R.A. 8189 deals particularly with the
pre-election activity of registration, the provisions of the latter regarding registration are
controlling.
Same;  Suffrage; The right of suffrage is so important that every citizen knows or ought to
know that it is his right, duty and privilege to register and vote, if qualified. —It is an
overstatement to say, as petitioners and the Solicitor General do, that the reason for the
“disenfranchisement of
325
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 325
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
four million new Filipino voters”—a figure not duly established—was the alleged
absence of a massive and active information campaign by the COMELEC for new voters to
register. R.A. No. 8189 providing for continuing registration has been in existence since June 11,
1996 or for more than four (4) years. Everybody is presumed to know the law. The right of
suffrage is so important that every citizen knows or ought to know that it is his right, duty and
privilege to register and vote, if qualified. The failure to register lies, perhaps, on neglect,
apathy or nonchalance, rather than the COMELEC’s alleged lack of information campaign.
Same;  Administrative Law; It is elementary in administrative law that “courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.”—The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are
essentially executive (“enforcement”) and administrative (“administration”) in nature. It is
elementary in administrative law that “courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.” The reason
behind this salutary policy has been explained in this manner: The rationale for this rule relates
not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and
the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs;
it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar
Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs the Court stressed executive officials are presumed to
have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose
of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion
thereon. The courts give much weight to contemporaneous construction because of the
respect due the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law,
their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they are
frequently the drafters of the law they interpret. (Citations omitted)
Same:  Same; The determination of the feasibility of conducting a special registration less
than fifty (50) days prior to the regular election must be dealt with realistically and not from the
standpoint of pure theory; Since it is the COMELEC’s honest-to-goodness assessment that it
cannot undertake the conduct of special registration without compromising the integrity of the
entire election process, then the Court would do well to respect this administrative “finding of
fact.”—The determination of the feasibility of
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
conducting a special registration less than fifty (50) days prior to the regular election
“must be dealt with realistically and not from the standpoint of pure theory.” The COMELEC,
not this Court, is concededly in a better position to resolve this matter considering its actual
experience as well as its knowledge of its own operational and logistical capabilities. It should
be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created—free, orderly and honest campaign, and the casting and counting of votes.—In this jurisdiction, an election means “the
elections. Since it is the COMELEC’s honest-to-goodness assessment that it cannot undertake choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote” through the use of the ballot,
the conduct of special registration without compromising the integrity of the entire election and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. “An
process, then the Court would do well to respect this administrative “finding of fact.” election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
Same; Same;  The Supreme Court’s function is merely to check and not to supplant the people.” “Specifically, the term ‘election,’ in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the
COMELEC, or to ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond the limits prescribed by law, not conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and
to exercise the power vested in it or to determine the wisdom of its act. —This pronouncement the casting and counting of votes.”
was reiterated in Loong vs. COMELEC. Due regard for the independent character of the
COMELEC, as ordained by the Constitution, requires that the Court must not “by any excessive SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.
zeal” compel that body to perform an act that would imperil the holding of a “free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible” election on May 14, 2001. This Court’s function is merely to The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
check and not to supplant the COMELEC, or to ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond      Antonio B. Betito for petitioner in G.R. No. 147179.
the limits prescribed by law, not to exercise the power vested in it or to determine the wisdom 328
of its act. Clearly, certiorari would not lie.
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PARDO, J., Dissenting: Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
     Rube Carranza, Jr. for petitioners in G.R. No. 147066.
Election Law;  Statutory Construction; It is a basic rule in statutory construction that laws      Ceferino Padua Law Office for Intervenor.
are to be harmonized rather than consider one repealed in favor of the other—there is nothing      The Solicitor General for the COMELEC.
incongruous in R.A. No. 8189 with RA. No, 6646, Section 29, nor B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 52 [m], as to
repeal the latter.—It is a basic rule in statutory construction that laws are to be harmonized BUENA, J.:
rather than consider one repealed in favor of the other. Besides, there is nothing incongruous
in R.A. No. 8189 with R.A. No. 6646, Section 29, nor B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 52 [m], as to repeal the At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions 1before us is the exercise of a
latter. Neither is there an express repeal of the same. “It is a well-settled rule of statutory right so indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less than by
construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.” “The presumption is the fundamental law—the right of suffrage.
against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied repeal.” Invoking this right, herein petitioners—representing the youth sector—seek to direct the
327 Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 327 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million
youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.2
Same: Same;  Under the circumstances prevailing, the prohibition to conduct registration Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the
one hundred twenty (120) days before regular election as set forth in R.A. No. 8189, Section 8, is Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s Participation, through a Letter dated
not an absolute prohibition—it is directory, not mandatory, and COMELEC is vested with January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the
residual power to conduct pre-election activities, including the registration of voters beyond the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register
deadline prescribed by law,—Under the circumstances prevailing, the prohibition to conduct before the COMELEC deadline.3
registration one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election as set forth in R.A. No. Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant
8189, Section 8, is not an absolute prohibition. It is directory, not mandatory, and Comelec is Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate
vested with residual power to conduct pre-election activities, including registration of voters Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay
beyond the deadline prescribed by law. This is not to defeat the right of suffrage of the people City.
as guaranteed by the Constitution. Millions of qualified voters in the country were not able to _______________
register before the 120-day period provided by law because of the failure of Comelec to
conduct a nationwide public information campaign relative to the period provided by law. The 1
 G.R. No. 147066 and G.R. No. 147179.
Comelec erroneously perceived that the number of voters, who registered during the system of 2
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF
continuing registration is the barometer for the success or effectiveness of their information CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING PROCEDURE THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE
campaign which was actually non-existent. Comelec must bear the responsibility for this. Time APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR.
and again, it has been said that every Filipino’s right to vote shall be respected and upheld. 3
 Letter of Senator Raul Roco.
Preliminary as it is in the exercise of their right to vote, the deprivation of their right to register 329
is tantamount to the denial of their right to vote.
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 329
Same; Same;  Words and Phrases;  The term “election,” in the context of the Constitution,
may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No.
2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters
Only, excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
“Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People’s Participation presided over by the Hon.
Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters
Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the request by youth organizations to hold
additional two days of registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders along with
Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day
additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001
nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration under RA 8189 is December 27,
2000.
To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for ‘hakot system,’ certain
restrictive parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve as safeguards against
fraudulent applicants:
1. “1.The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less and will be
registering for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. “2.The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and
3. “3.The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like school records.
“Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
1. “1.Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately prior to the
actual registration of the applicants;
2. “2.The Comelec field officers will be given the opportunity to verify the voters
enumerator’s list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. “3.Availability of funds for the purpose; and
4. “4.Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest conduct of the
registration and drum up interest to register among the new voters.
“The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness
and interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in
the country among our youth.
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
Considering that they failed to register on December 27, 2000 deadline, they approved for
special registration days.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this
request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified available
funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for the
estimated costs of additional two days of registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the practical
side and logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at
1:30 p.m. at the office of ED.”4
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives, and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of
the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. 5
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of
which reads:
“Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17
and 18, 2001.”
Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while
Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students’
request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II
(YOUTH), et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
docketed as
_______________
4
 G.R. No. 147066, Rollo, p. 24.
5
 See Resolution No. 3584.
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VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 331
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent CQMELEC’s Resolution and/or
to declare Section 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes
the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray
for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated
young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the
Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying that
this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the
continuing registration provision under the Election Code.
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and farther
required respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring at
10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the consolidated cases for
oral arguments on March 16, 2001.6
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, recommended that an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted at
the soonest possible time “in order to accommodate the disenfranchised voters for purposes of
the May 14, 2001 elections.”
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to resolve
a two-pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELEC’s issuance of the assailed Resolution
dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have undermined
their constitutional right to vote on the May 14, 2001 general elections and caused the
disenfranchisement of around four (4) million Filipinos of voting age who failed to register
before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
_______________
 6
 Resolution dated March 13, 2001.
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
1. (a)Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001;
2. (b)Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters
during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline
and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a
prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised
within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to
pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes,
are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the
democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism,
debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other
rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect,
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
“SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO
SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE
WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUF-FRAGE.”
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the
minimum requirements set by the fundamental
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VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 333
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the “Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.”
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ argument, registration cannot and should
not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly,
in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could
be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner—one which
is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational considerations bear
great weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8 of R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing
registration, is explicit, to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.—The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election.” (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within
which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter’s list,
provides:
“SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List—Any registered voter, representative of
a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election x x
x.”
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
“x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety
mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants,
and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of securing the
voter’s substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
“In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter’s registration is conducted, then the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If
we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter’s list since we would already be well into the
100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process,
this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the
voter’s list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
“x x x It must be remembered that the period serve a vital role in protecting the integrity of
the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of
any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to simply take them
at face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter’s
list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and
ghosts x x x.
“x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of
registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom
might not even be qualified to vote. x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting
elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of
the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections
regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results, x x x”
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called “standby” powers or
“residual” powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29,
Republic Act
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 VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 335
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
No. 66467 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436,8 thus:
“SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts.—If it should no longer be
possible to. observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the
Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the
activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage.”
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under
Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise
meaning and coverage, thus:
“a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein
he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the
Election Registration Board;”
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein
petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both provisions,
although at first glance may seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in a more
circumspect perusal, necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in
the form of amendments to a statute should be given effect, together with other parts of the
amended act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was
indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be
_______________
7
 AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
8
 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMELEC TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE
MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect. 9
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing
in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. 10 Interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of
justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile
them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should
harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature.11
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may
validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter of
Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into
play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available
period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our
mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain “pre-election acts” are still capable of
being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the
conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
______________
9
 Agpalo,  Statutory Construction, pp. 265-266, Fourth Edition, 1998; Tan Kim Kee vs. Court
of Appeals, 7 SCRA 670 (1963); Collector of Internal Revenue, 7 SCRA 872 (1963).
10
 Agpalo, ibid., p. 271; City of Naga vs. Agna, 71 SCRA 176 (1976).
11
 Ibid., p. 271; Gordon vs. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 51 (1988).
337
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 337
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC—which is the constitutional body tasked by no less than
the fundamental charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including registration of voters—
painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the “operational impossibility” 12 of conducting a
special registration, which in its own language, “can no longer be accomplished within the time
left to (us) the Commission.”13
Hence:
“x x x      x x x      x x x.
1. “19)In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk in
the park for the Comelec. Allow us to outline what the Commission has yet to do,
and the time to do it in:
2. “20)First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The
Projects of Precincts indicate the total number of established precincts and the
number of registered voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the final
Project of Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper allocation of official
ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia. More succintly
said, without the Project of Precincts, we won’t know how many forms to print and
so we’re liable to come up short.
3. “21)More importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it will be impossible
to complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the elections.
4. “22)Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the
4th of March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI—including the precinct
where they are assigned and the barangay where that precinct is located—must be
furnished by the Election Officer to all the candidates and political candidates not
later than the 26th of March.
5. “23)Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration
Records of registered voters in particular precinct, must be inspected, verified, and
seated beginning March 30, until April 15.
_______________
 12
 Comment of respondent COMELEC, p. 14.
13
 Ibid., p. 9.
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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
1. “24)Fourth, the Computerized Voters’ List must be finalized and printed out of use on
election day; and finally
2. “25)Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the Voters
Information Sheet must be completed on or before April 15.
3. “26)With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the Comelec will have
roughly a month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen
occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom behind
setting the 120-day prohibitive period. After all, preparing for an election is no easy
task.
4. “27)To hold special registrations now would, aside from being illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
5. “28)When we say registration of voters, we do not—contrary to popular opinion—
refer only to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names down.
Registration is, in fact, a long process that takes about three weeks to complete, not
even counting how long it would take to prepare for the registration in the first
place.
6. “29)In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the Comelec, the other Commissioners,
prepared a time-table in order to see exactly how the super-imposition of special
registration would affect the on-going preparation for the May 14 elections.
7. “30)We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special
registration on April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes
in account the fact that we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration Forms
available, as against an estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it would take
about 14 days—if we were to declare special registrations today—to print up the
difference and to verify these accountable forms. After printing and verification, the
forms would have to be packed and shipped—roughly taking up a further two and a
half weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
8. “31)The first step in registration is, of course, filing the application for registration
with the Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is
then set for hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or
municipal bulletin board for at least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations
on the 16th and the 17th the posting requirement would be completed by the 24th.
Considering that time must be allowed for the filling of oppositions, the earliest that
the Election Registration Board can be convened for hearing would be the May 1st
and 2nd.
9. “32)Assuming—and this is a big assumption—that there are nit challenges to the
applicant’s right to register, the Election registration
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VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 339
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
1. Board can immediately rule on the Applicant’s registration, and post notices of its
action by the 2nd until the 7th of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of the
action taken by the Board will have already been furnished to the applicants and
the heads of registered political parties.
2. “33)Only at this point can our Election Officers once again focus on the business of
getting ready for the elections. Once the results of the special registration are
finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters’ List generated—at
the earliest, by May 11, after which the new CVL would be posted. Incidentally, if
we were to follow the letter of the law. Strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new
CVL would be improper since the RA. 8189 provides that the CVL be posted at least
90 days before the election.
3. “34)Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification, and
sealing of the Book of Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May 14,
election date, and still not have finished our election preparations.
4. “35)After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots,
Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the
new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded, the
various forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different
municipalities. All told, this process would take approximately 26 days from the
15th of May until June 10.
5. “36)Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections.
x x x      x x x.”14
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency
as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight
considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the
best position to know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be
done.15 The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo
tenetur ad
________________
14
 G.R. No. 147179, Rollo, pp. 98-102.
15
 Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958).
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
impossible.16 In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium
nulla obligatio est Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with
what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally accomplished. 17
To put it differently, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an
interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible.
Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in
accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the
considered view that the “stand-by power” of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
RA. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners’ bare allegation that they were disenfranchised when respondent
COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001

—the-day before the prohibitive 120-day period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections
commences—is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the two
consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein
petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the
COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she
proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from
December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by
respondent COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that
respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the
firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing
registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case
are not without fault or blame. They admit in their
________________
16
 Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447 (1987).
17
 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 157-158, Fourth Edition, 1998.
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VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 341
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
petition18 that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and
came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in
their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean
hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re
subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not
commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some
patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which, in respondent’s
own terms, resolved “to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.”
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of laws.19
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of
petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law on the matter—Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, 20 inter alia, questions relating to the
registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that
chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its
constitutionally-
_______________
18
 Paragraphs 4 and 5 in G.R. No. 147066 and Paragraph 9 in G.R. No. 147179.
19
 Cuison vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 (1998); Jardin vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 119268,
February 23, 2000, 326 SCRA 299 citing Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
20
 Article IX-C, Section 2.
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342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude
of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters’ registration, pertains to the wisdom
rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse
of power or discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct
an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC—
a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.
As to petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court
cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 21
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of
the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction
of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively
compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination
of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical
within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of
discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases, 22 we enunciated that the
Court’s function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is “merely (to) check whether or not
the governmental
_______________
21
 Sy Ha vs. Galang, 7 SCRA 797 (1963); Aprueba vs. Ganzon, 18 SCRA 8(1966).
22
 G.R. No. 138570, promulgated on October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449.
343
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 343
Akbayan-Youth vs. Commission on Elections
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . (of) grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error ,” 23
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued
Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 19, 2001, to allow the
conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No. 12930 has been filed before the
Lower House, which bill seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period
provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276 24 was filed before the Senate, with
the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections. This Court views the foregoing factual
circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative
departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission
on Elections of a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus are
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221318. December 16, 2015.*
 
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, represented by REPRESENTATIVE JAMES MARK TERRY L. RIDON and
MARJOHARA S. TUCAY; SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF
THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ANAKBAYAN;
CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS; ARLENE
CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN (AGHAM); and SINING MARIA ROSA L. MARFORI,
petitioners, vs.  COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such
persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.—As early as the 1936
case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945, it has been recognized that
“[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public
good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the
exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the
spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to
embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise.”
Same; Same; One must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and
third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the
_______________
*  EN BANC.
 
 
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Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections
place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
election.—Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for
the exercise of suffrage: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Dissecting the provision,
one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage: first, he
must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have
resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
Same; Same; Biometrics; Words and Phrases; Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis
that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint,
signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.—RA 8189 primarily governs the process
of registration. It defines “registration” as “the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the [ERB].” As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order “to
systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters.” To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in
modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February
2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics
validation as part of the registration process: Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is the policy of
the State to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology. “Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a
positive identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris,
and/or such other identifiable features.”
Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10367
respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves for biometrics validation.—
Sections 3
 
 
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576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections
and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves
for biometrics validation: Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation.—Registered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation. Section
10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration.—The Commission shall implement a mandatory
biometrics registration system for new voters. Under Section 2(d) of RA 10367, “validation” is
defined as “the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not
yet been captured.”
Same; Same; Same; Deactivation; Words and Phrases; The consequence of
noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the registration record of the
registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the
validation process as required by [Republic Act (RA) No. 10367].”—The consequence of
noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the registration record of the
registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the
validation process as required by [RA 10367].” Section 7 states: Section 7.  Deactivation.—
Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act.
(Emphases supplied) Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of
validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners’ argument that the law creates
artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an “obedient
group.” If anything, noncompliance by the “disobedient” only rightfully results into prescribed
consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws,
which only works “against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”
Judicial Review; In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers
to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought
to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.—In terms of judicial review of statutes or
ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender,
or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.
  
 
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As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate
travel. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Biometrics; Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the
procedure for biometrics validation.—Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for
biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear
before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c)
have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one’s
registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new
registrants. The re-registration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is
adopting a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that
has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be
inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to
heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied by bureaucratic
improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC as an administrative institution.
Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; The public has been sufficiently informed of the
implementation of Republic Act (RA) No.  10367 and its deactivation feature.—It deserves
emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and
its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February 22, 2013, and took
effect fifteen (15) days after. Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all are bound to
know the terms of its provisions, including the consequences of noncom pliance. As
implemented, the process of biometrics validation commenced on July 1, 2013, or
approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the
COMELEC conducted a massive public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-No-Boto, from May
2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen (18) months, whereby voters were
reminded to update and validate their registration records. On top of that, the COMELEC
exerted efforts to make the validation process more convenient for the public
 
 
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections
as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration
centers and declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices within the National Capital
Region and in highly urbanized cities. Considering these steps, the Court finds that the public
has been sufficiently apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of
deactivation in case of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural due
process.
Judicial Review; Statutes; It is significant to point out that questions relating to the
wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that should not be addressed
to the judiciary.—Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries — i.e.,
Guatemala, Britain, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Kenya — in implementing biometrics
registration should serve as warning in adhering to the system. They highlighted the inherent
difficulties in launching the same such as environmental and geographical challenges, lack of
training and skills, mechanical breakdown, and the need for re-registration. They even admitted
that while biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does not,
however, solve other election-related problems such as vote-buying and source-code
manipulation. Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly,
petitioners’ submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the
biometrics registration system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point
out that questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy
matters that should not be addressed to the judiciary.
Election Law; Biometrics; Indeed, the reason behind the legislature’s choice of adopting
biometrics registration notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its
implementation, or its concomitant failure to address equally pressing election problems, is
essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.—In the exercise of
its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of discretion to enact laws, such as RA 10367,
to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through the establishment of an updated
voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has necessarily
sifted through the policy’s wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the best means in curtailing electoral
fraud is a question that does not present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed,
the
 
 
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Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections
reason behind the legislature’s choice of adopting biometrics registration
notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its
concomitant failure to address equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy
question and, hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Elections; As the constitutional body tasked to
enforce and implement election laws, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the power to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfill its mandate.—Aside from committing
forum shopping by raising this issue despite already being subject of a prior petition filed
before this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918, petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-day
periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no
longer be conducted. As already resolved in this Court’s Resolution dated December 8, 2015 in
G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter
registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but
may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies. Verily, as
the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election laws, the COMELEC has the
power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfill its mandate. Perforce, this
power includes the determination of the periods to accomplish certain preelection acts, such as
voter registration.
Same; Same; As the constitutional body specifically charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should be given
sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections.—This Court
reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end with the filing of applications which, in
reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the approval of applications by the
ERB. Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps
are necessary for the generation of the final list of voters which, in turn, is a prerequisite for the
preparation and completion of the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual
elections. The POP contains the number of registered voters in each precinct and clustered
precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative districts, and
regions included in the precincts, and the names and locations of
 
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections
polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct are assigned. The POP is
necessary to determine the total number of boards of election inspectors to be constituted, the
allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the election day, the number of vote
counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed. More
importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the finalization of the Election Management
System (EMS) which generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the voting
jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces. The EMS determines the
configuration of the canvassing and consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction.
Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall, the COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in accounting
for the exigencies of the upcoming elections.
 
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
 
Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Biometrics; Biometrics Law; View that Republic Act (RA)
No. 10367 is a valid regulation that assists in the identification of a person for purposes of
ensuring that the right to vote is exercised only by that person.—Republic Act No. 10367 is a
valid regulation that assists in the identification of a person for purposes of ensuring that the
right to vote is exercised only by that person. It is also a measure to purge the voters list of
spurious names or ghost voters. Viewed this way, Republic Act No. 10367 is not a burden on
the right of suffrage; rather, it enhances this fundamental right. It provides mechanisms to
ensure the identity of the voter, prevent multiple votes for a single individual, and deter the
casting of ballots in the names of persons who do not actually exist or who, at the time of the
elections, are already deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the requirement of biometric registration is not an
additional qualification but rather a means to ensure and protect the identity of the voter.—The
requirement of biometric registration, therefore, is not an additional qualification but rather a
means to ensure and protect the identity of the voter. Names are deactivated because these do
not correspond to real persons. Thus, there is no disqualification inasmuch as fictitious names
or names of the deceased do not represent real persons. A ghost cannot be disqualified
because it does not exist.
 
 
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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Maria Kristina C. Conti for petitioners.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 filed by herein
petitioners Kabataan Party-list, represented by Representative James Mark Terry L. Ridon and
National President Marjohara S. Tucay; Sarah Jane I. Elago, President of the National Union of
Students of the Philippines; Vencer Mari E. Crisostomo and Einstein Z. Recedes, Chairperson
and Deputy Secretary-General of Anakbayan, respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila, National
President of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines; Charisse Bernadine I. Bañez,
Chairperson of the League of Filipino Students; Arlene Clarisse Y. Julve, member of Alyansa ng
mga Grupong Haligi ng Agham at Teknolohiya para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM); and Sining
Maria Rosa L. Marfori (petitioners) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA)
10367, entitled “An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration,” 2 as well as
respondent Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721, 39863,4 and 10013,5 all
related thereto.
 
The Facts
 
On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, which is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on December 11, 2012 and December 12, 2012, 6respectively.
Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters7 in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. 8RA 10367 was duly
published on February 22, 2013,9 and took effect fifteen (15) days after.10
RA 10367 likewise directs that “[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation.”11 “Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the
May 2016 [E]lections shall be deactivated x x x.”12 Nonetheless, voters may have their records
reactivated after the May 2016 Elections, provided that they comply with the procedure found
in Section 2813 of RA 8189,14 also known as “The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.”15
On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116which serves as the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for
validation,17deactivation,18 and reactivation of voters’ registration records (VRRs). 19 Among
others, the said Resolution provides that: (a) “[t]he registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated in  the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be conducted
prior to said elections”;20 (b) “[t]he following registered voters shall have their biometrics data
validated: [(1)] Those who do not have  BIOMETRICS data appearing  in the Voter[’s]
Registration System  (VRS);  and [(2)] Those who have incomplete BIOMETRICS  data appearing
in the VRS”;21 (c) “[d]eactivated voters shall not be allowed to vote”;22 and (d) “[d]eactivation
x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual
notices to the deactivated voters.”23Resolution No. 9721 further states that, as of the last day
of registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on October 31, 2012, a total of 9,018,256
registered voters were without biometrics data. 24 Accordingly, all Election Officers (EOs) were
directed to “conduct [an] information campaign on the conduct of validation.”25
On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, commenced the
mandatory biometric system of registration. To make biometric registration convenient and
accessible to the voting public, aside from the COMELEC offices in every local government unit,
it likewise established satellite registration offices in barangays and malls.26
On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327which amended certain
portions28 of Resolution No. 985329 dated February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall
deactivate the VRRs of those who “failed to submit for validation despite notice on or before
October 31, 2015,” and that the “[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be
made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing.”30
A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto  public
information campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration. 31
On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1001332 which provides for the
“procedures in the deactivation of [VRRs] who do not have biometrics data in the [VRS] after
the October 31, 2015 deadline of registration and validation. 33 Among others, the said
Resolution directed the EOs to: (a) “[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the
bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the  barangay hall
along with the notice of ERB hearing”; and (b) “[s]end individual notices to the affected
voters included in the generated list of voters without biometrics data.” 34 It also provides that
“[a]ny opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall be filed not later than
November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section 4, 35 [Chapter I],
Resolution No. 9853.”36 During the ERB hearing, which proceedings are summary in
nature,37 “the ERBs shall, based on the list of voters without biometrics data, order the
deactivation of registration records on the ground of ‘failure to validate.’” 38 Thereafter, EOs
were required to “[s]end individual notices to the deactivated voters within five (5) days from
the last day of ERB hearing.”39 Moreover, Resolution No. 10013 clarified that the “[r]egistration
records of voters with incomplete biometrics data and those corrupted data (biometrics) in
the database shall not be deactivated and be allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized
National, Local and [Autonomous Region on Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional Elections.” 40
On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI)
assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They
contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial
qualification where there is penalty of deactivation; 41 (b) biometrics deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution; 42 (c) biometrics validation
gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not
poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of
the right to suffrage;43 (d) voters to be deactivated are not afforded due process; 44 and (e) poor
experience with biometrics should serve as warning against exacting adherence to the
system.45 Albeit already subject of a prior petition 46filed before this Court, petitioners also raise
herein the argument that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature
termination of the registration period contrary to Section 8 47 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately,
petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721,
9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from
deactivating registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate voters who are
compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted, and to extend the
system of continuing registration and capture of biometric information of voters until January
8, 2016.49
On December 1, 2015, the Court required the COMELEC to file its comment to the petition.
Meanwhile, it issued a TRO requiring the COMELEC to desist from deactivating the registration
records of voters without biometric information, pending resolution of the case at hand. 50
On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista, through a
letter51 addressed to the Court En Banc, urgently appealed for the immediate lifting of the
above mentioned TRO, stating that the COMELEC is set to finalize the Project of Precincts (POP)
on December 15, 2015, and that the TRO issued in this case has the effect of including the 2.4
Million deactivated voters in the list of voters, which, in turn, would require revisions to the
POP and consequently, adversely affect the timelines of all other interrelated prepara-
47  Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.—The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election.
_______________
48  Rollo, p. 12.
49  Id., at p. 33.
50  See TRO and Notice of Resolution dated December 1, 2015; id., at pp. 70A to 70D.
51  Id., at pp. 71-75.
 
 
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tory activities to the prejudice of the successful implementation of the Automated Election
System (AES) for the 2016 Elections.52
On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
comment53 to the instant petition. On even date, petitioners filed a manifestation 54 asking the
Court to continue the TRO against the deactivation of voters without biometric information. 55
With no further pleadings required of the parties, the case was submitted for resolution.
 
The Issue Before the Court
 
The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional.  
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The petition is bereft of merit.  
 
I.
 
At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections raised in this case. In
particular, the COMELEC claims that petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office
of the President, and the ERB which it purports are indispensable parties to the case; 56 (b) did
not have the legal standing to institute the instant petition; 57 and (c) erroneously availed
of certiorari  and prohibition as a mode of questioning the constitutionality of RA 10367 and the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions.58
The submissions do not hold.
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining to
the right of suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of transcendental public importance
and of compelling significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing
procedural barriers and instead, resolve the case on its merits. As resonated in the case
of Pabillo v. COMELEC,59citing Capalla v. COMELEC60 and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC:61
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the May
2016] elections is a matter of great public concern. On election day, the
country’s registered voters will come out to exercise the sacred right of
suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our
democracy, the coming elections also embodies our people’s last ounce of
hope for a better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our
people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our
country. If there is anything capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary
Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it is the coming
elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of
the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondents should not be
allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid
adherence to the rules of procedure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on biometrics validation, as provided
under RA 10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, should be upheld is one
that demands immediate adjudication in view of the critical preparatory activities that are
currently being undertaken by the COMELEC with regard to the impending May 2016 Elections.
Thus, it would best subserve the ends of justice to settle this controversy not only in order to
enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to stymy the operations of a co-constitutional body.
As pronounced in Roque, Jr. v. COMELEC:62
 
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the
operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require. Put a bit differently,
rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in
the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules
of procedure.63
 
That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues in this case.
 
II.
 
Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721,
9863, and 10013. As noncompliance with the same results in the penalty of deactivation,
petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in
the exercise of the right of suffrage. 64 They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric
validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property
because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage
through deactivation.65 Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the
1987 Constitution.66
The contestation is untenable.  
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral,67 it has been
recognized that “[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage
is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it
for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of
government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the
inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the
modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from
the franchise.”68
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the
exercise of suffrage:
 
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
 
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise
the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by
law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage.
The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the
restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the
provision, a “literacy, property or other substantive requirement.” Based on its genesis, it may
be gleaned that the limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are
purely based on socio-economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good.
To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on
January 15, 1907, mandated that only men who were at least twenty-three (23) years old and
“comprised within one of the following three classes” were allowed to vote: (a) those who
prior to the 13th of August, 1898, held the office of municipal
captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of any ayunta-
miento; (b) those who own real property to the value of P500.00, or who annually pay P30.00
or more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak, read, and write English or Spanish.
When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was lowered to
twenty-one (21) and the foregoing class qualification and property requirements were
removed.69However, the literacy requirement was retained and only men who were able to
read and write were given the right to vote. 70 It also made women’s right to vote dependent on
a plebiscite held for such purpose. 71
 During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove the literacy
and property requirements to broaden the political base and discontinue the exclusion of
millions of citizens from the political systems: 72
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus   ignorance, which was the persistence of this requirement of literacy remained. And this
DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the draft proposal, the subject matter of
Report No. 11 contains amendments that are designed to improve Article V on suffrage
and to broaden the electoral base of our country. The three main points that are taken
up in this draft which will be developed in the sponsorship speeches that will follow
might need explanatory remarks. x x x.
x x x x
(2) The present requirement, reading and writing, is eliminated and
instead a provision is introduced which says, “No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage”;
x x x x
 
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend towards the broadening of the
electoral base already begun with the lowering of the voting age to 18, and it is in
keeping further with the Committee’s desire to discontinue the alienation and
exclusion of millions of citizens from the political system and from participation in
the political life of the country. The requirement of literacy for voting is eliminated for
it is noted that there are very few countries left in the world where literacy remains a
condition for voting. There is no Southeast Asian country that imposes this
requirement. The United States Supreme Court only a few months ago declared
unconstitutional any state law that would continue to impose this requirement for
voting.
x x x x
It is to be noted that all those who testified before the Committee favoured the
elimination of the literacy requirement. It must be stressed that those witnesses
represented all levels of society x x x.
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoñez
x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and more of our people were left to the
sidelines because they could no longer participate in the process of government simply
because their ability to read and write had become inadequate. This, however, did not
mean that they were no longer responsive to the demands of the times, that they were
unsensible to what was happening among them. And so in the process as years went
on, conscious efforts were made to liberate, to free these persons who were formerly
entitled in the course of election by means of whittling away the requirements for the
exercise of the right to vote. First of all, was the property requirement. There were
times in the English constitutional
 
 
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history that it was common to say as an answer to a question, “Who are entitled to
vote?” that the following cannot vote — criminals, paupers, members of the House of
Lords. They were landed together at the same figurative category.
Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement was eliminated
but the last remaining vestige which bound the members of the community to
is again preserved in our Constitution, in our Election Code, which provides that those
who cannot prepare their ballots themselves shall not be qualified to vote.
x x x x
Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural minorities, the underprivileged,
the urban guerrillas will forever be outcasts of our society, irresponsive of what is
happening. And if this condition were to continue, my friends, we cannot fully claim
that we have representative democracy. Let us reverse the cycle. Let us eliminate the
social imbalance by granting to these persons who are very responsible the right to
participate in the choice of the persons who are to make their laws for them.
(Emphases supplied)
 
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase “other substantive requirement” carries the same
tack as the other standards alienating particular classes based on socio-economic
considerations irrelevant to suffrage, such as the payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly
noted and as will be later elaborated on, the phrase did not contemplate any restriction on
procedural requirements, such as that of registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, line 3, the following appears:
“For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,] property, or other
substantive re-
 
 
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quirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.”
just what is contemplated in the phrase, “substantive requirement?”
DELEGATE OCCEÑA: I can answer that, but it belongs to the sphere of someone else in
the Committee. We use this term as distinguished from procedural requirements.  For
instance, the law cannot come in and say that those who should be allowed to vote
should have paid certain taxes. That would be a substantial requirement in addition to
what is provided for in the Constitution. But the law can step in as far as certain
procedural requirements are concerned like requiring registration, and also step in as
far as these classifications are concerned.73 (Emphases supplied)
 
As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement was proscribed and the following provision on suffrage was adopted 74 in the 1973
Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided
 in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The Batasang
Pambansa shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking down a proposal to exclude literacy
requirements from the limitation, 75 the exact provision prohibiting the imposition of “literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement[s]” in the 1973 Constitution was fully adopted in
the 1987 Constitution.
Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant to Section 118 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, among others, imposed the following
legal disqualifications:
 
Section 118. Disqualifications.—The following shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to
vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or
tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted
government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms
laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political
rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote
automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
 
A “qualification” is loosely defined as “the possession of qualities, properties (such as
fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office,
or to perform a public duty or function.”76
Properly speaking, the concept of a “qualification,” at least insofar as the discourse on
suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of “registration,” which is
jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person’s qualifications to vote is
determined. In Yra v. Abaño,77 citing Meffert v. Brown,78 it was stated that “[t]he act of
registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the
citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to
vote.”79 In said case, this Court definitively characterized registration as a form of regulation
and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for
such right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
 As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is dutifully enjoined.
Section 115 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
 
Section 115. Necessity of Registration.—In order that a qualified elector may
vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the
permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides. (Emphasis
supplied)
 
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply
with the registration procedure in order to vote.  
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere procedural
requirement which does not fall under the limitation that “[n]o literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.” This was echoed
in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-Youth), wherein the Court pronounced that the
process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the
right of a citizen to vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:
 
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all
other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied
in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the
substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
x x x x
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others,
the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his
right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements
_______________
81  407 Phil. 618; 355 SCRA 318 (2001).
 
 
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set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of
1996.82 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines “registration” as “the act
of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before
the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the
book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB].” 83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189
was passed in order “to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.”
To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the
assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February 2013. It built on the policy
considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the
registration process:
 
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is the policy of the State to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology.
 
“Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an
individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable
features.”84
 Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit
themselves for biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation.—Registered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation.
Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration.—The Commission shall
implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2(d) of RA 10367, “validation” is defined as “the process of taking the
biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured.”
The consequence of noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the
registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for
failure to comply with the validation process as required by [RA 10367].” 85Section 7 states:
 
Section 7. Deactivation.—Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before
the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act. (Emphases supplied)
 
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally
applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners’ argument that the law creates artificial class of
voters86 is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an “obedient group.” If
anything, noncompliance by the “disobedient” only rightfully results into prescribed
consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws,
which only works “against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”87
It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already
provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the
Constitution or the Omnibus Election are listed.
 
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration.—The board shall deactivate the
registration and remove the registration records of the following persons from the
corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same, properly marked and dated
in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or causes of deactivation:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this
paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the
Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts
the Sandiganbayan;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or
tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and
firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and
political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote
automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;
c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent
unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a
proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular
elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not
include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
 
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For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/
Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall
furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at the end of each
month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with
their addresses. The Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost
their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or incompetent with their addresses
from other government agencies.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of
those persons whose registration were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and
furnish copies thereof to the local heads of political parties, the national central file,
provincial file, and the voter concerned.
 
With these considerations in mind, petitioners’ claim that biometrics validation imposed
under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013,
must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the
right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.
Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court’s pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth,
wherein it was held that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ argument, registration cannot and
should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite
and to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
 
 
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Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even preelection activities
could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly
manner — one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of
 the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. 88(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution
— that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis
to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good — the same
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
 
III.
 
For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for
state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage. 89 They cite the
case of White  Light Corp. v. City of Manila 90 (White Light), wherein the Court stated that the
scope of the strict scrutiny test covers the protection of the right of suffrage. 91
Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test.   10013 violate the tenets of procedural due process because of the short periods of time
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 92 As pointed out by petitioners, the
United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental
rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel. 93
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest,94 and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same. 95
In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA
10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct
of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing — if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the
sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse
the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the
elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. 96 The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above
said interest. Section 697 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the
Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature,
and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one’s registration for those
already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The re-
registration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel
technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly
plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by
waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy volume of
work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to
be implemented by the COMELEC as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC
has not turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies by
holding continuous registration as early as May 6, 2014 until October 31, 2015, or for over a
period of 18 months. To make the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC
even went to the extent of setting up off-site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping
malls and conducted the same on Sundays. 98 Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367
and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation
every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation
process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he
remains an active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from
exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still
apply for reactivation99 following the procedure laid down in Section 28 100 of RA 8189.
That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as
it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive
means in promoting that interest.101
IV.
 
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
between hearings and notice, and the summary nature of the deactivation proceedings. 102
Petitioners are mistaken.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 10013,
had directed EOs to: (a) “[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards
of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with the
notice of ERB hearing”; and (b) “[s]end individual notices to the affected voters included in the
generated list of voters without biometrics data.” 103 The same Resolution also accords
concerned individuals the opportunity to file their opposition/objection to the deactivation of
VRRs not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,104 Chapter I,
Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively state that
“[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of
individual notices to the deactivated voters,” 105 and that the “[d]eactivation for cases falling
under this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing.” 106 While the
proceedings are summary in nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters’ list for the upcoming
May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters
who fail to comply with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the May
2016 National and Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the
proceedings does not depart from the fact that petitioners were given the opportunity to be
heard.
Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the
implementation of RA 10367 and its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early
as February 22, 2013,107 and took effect fifteen (15) days after. 108 Accordingly, dating to the day
of its publications, all are bound to know the terms of its provisions, including the
consequences of noncompliance. As implemented, the process of biometrics validation
commenced on July 1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the October
31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a massive public information
campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto, from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen
(18) months, whereby voters were reminded to update and validate their registration records.
On top of that, the COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation process more convenient
for the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro Manila to serve as satellite
registration centers and declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices within the
National Capital Region and in highly urbanized cities. 109Considering these steps, the Court finds
that the public has been sufficiently apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its
penalty of deactivation in case of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural
due process.
 
V.
 
Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries — i.e., Guatemala, Britain,
Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Kenya — in implementing biometrics registration should serve as
warning in adhering to the system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the
same such as environmental and geographical challenges, lack of training and skills, mechanical
breakdown, and the need for re-registration. They even admitted that while biometrics may
address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does not, however, solve other
election-related problems such as vote-buying and source-code manipulation. 110
Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly,
petitioners’ submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the
biometrics registration system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point
out that questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy
matters that should not be addressed to the judiciary. As elucidated in the case of  Fariñas v.
The Executive Secretary:111
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court
to look into the wisdom or propriety of  legislative determination . Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it
is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. 112 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of discretion to enact
laws, such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through the
establishment of an updated voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its desired result,
Congress has necessarily sifted through the policy’s wisdom, which this Court has no authority
to review, much less reverse.113 Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the best means
in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does not present a justiciable issue cognizable by
the courts. Indeed, the reason behind the legislature’s choice of adopting biometrics
registration notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its
implementation, or its concomitant failure to address equally pressing election problems, is
essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
VI.
Finally, petitioners’ proffer that Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation
on October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189 which states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.—The personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election
Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and ninety (90) days before a special election. (Emphasis added)
 
The position is, once more, wrong.  
Aside from committing forum shopping by raising this issue despite already being subject
of a prior petition filed before this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918, 114 petitioners fail to consider
that the 120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which
voter registration may no longer be conducted. As already resolved in this Court’s Resolution
dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not mandate COMELEC
to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not
be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other
exigencies.115 Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election laws,
the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfill its
mandate.116 Perforce, this power includes the determination of the periods to accomplish
certain preelection acts,117 such as voter registration.
At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and
end with the filing of applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be
followed by the approval of applications by the ERB. 118 Thereafter, the process of filing petitions
for inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are necessary for the generation of ther final
list of voters which, in turn, is a prerequisite for the preparation and completion of the Project
of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP contains the number of
registered voters in each precinct and clustered precinct, the names of the barangays,
municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts, and
the names and locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct are
assigned.119 The POP is necessary to determine the total number of boards of election
inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the
election day, the number of vote counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed,
and the budget needed. More importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the finalization
of the Election Management System (EMS) which generates the templates of the official ballots
and determines the voting jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and
provinces.120 The EMS determines the configuration of the canvassing and consolidation system
for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall,121 the COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in accounting for
the exigencies of the upcoming elections. In fine, its measures therefor should be respected,
unless it is clearly shown that the same are devoid of any reasonable justification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on December 1, 2015 is consequently DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
 KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE G.R. No. 189868 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585[2] on February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of voter
RAYMOND V. PALATINO, ALVIN A. PETERS, Present: registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF  
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP), MA. PUNO, C.J., of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514.
CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA, CHAIRPERSON OF CARPIO,
THE STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF CORONA,  
THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP), VENCER MARI E. CARPIO MORALES,
CRISOSTOMO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF VELASCO, JR., The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, VIJAE O. ALQUISOLA, NACHURA, notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that it
PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP), DIANNE KRISTEL M. BRION, needs ample time to prepare for the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari
ASUELO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PERALTA,
KABATAANG ARTISTA PARA SA TUNAY NA BERSAMIN, and Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009,[3] petitioners challenge the validity of COMELEC
KALAYAAN (KARATULA), KENNETH CARLISLE DEL CASTILLO,
EARL EUGENIO, ANA KATRINA V. TEJERO, ABAD, and Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its nullity.
VICTOR LOUIS E. CRISOSTOMO, JACQUELINE VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.  
ALEXIS S. MERCED, and JADE CHARMANE ROSE J.  
VALENZUELA,    
Petitioners, Promulgated:
    Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral representative under the Kabataan
- versus - December 15, 2009
Party-list, sues as a member of the House of Representatives and a concerned citizen, while the
 
  rest of petitioners sue as concerned citizens.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.  
 
  Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this case and potential
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first instance,
 
  claiming that based on National Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting population for

DECISION
 
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the threshold once again is the right of suffrage of the sovereign Filipino people the
foundation of Philippine democracy. As the country prepares to elect its next set of leaders
on May 10, 2010, the Court upholds this primordial right.
On November 12, 2008, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 8514[1] which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15,
2009 as the period of continuing voter registration using the biometrics process in all areas
nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Subsequently, the
the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the age group 18-19 and 8,756,981 for the age group
20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional
encroachment on the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing
voter registration under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as The
Voters Registration Act of 1996, reading:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The
personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted
daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election.

 
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the
COMELEC be accordingly required to extend the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which
is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on December 7, 2009 that, among
other things, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to
promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that
[4]
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA 6646)  and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA
8436)[5] authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voter registration; and
that its schedule of pre-election acts shows that the October 31, 2009 deadline of voter
registration was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v.
[6]
COMELEC  wherein the Court denied a similar prayer for an extension of the December 27,
2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of
every Filipino to choose the leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the fullest
extent possible, in every national and local election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental
law that it devoted an entire article solely therefor:
 
ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
 
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and
the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then,
they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
ballot.
 
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power
from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of
the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, [7] bolstered
by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.[8]
 
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter
registration in Section 8 of RA 8189 which provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The
personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted
daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular
offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days
before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC
to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections including: (1)
completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots,
election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of
Election Inspectors, including the determination of the precincts to which they shall be assigned;
(3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of the campaign period; and (5) Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18,

preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voters Information Sheet. Such determination 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.

of Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative power, which this Court is bound to  

respect. And the COMELECs rule-making power should be exercised in accordance with The Court in fact suggested in Akbayan-Youth that the therein petitioners could have, but had
[9]
the prevailing law. not, registered during the period between the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC

  and before the start of the 120-day prohibitive period prior to the election date or January 13,

Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other 2001, thus:

dates for pre-election acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter  
[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the
registration under RA 8189. This Courts primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed
an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the
one as repealed by the other. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and,
COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging
accordingly, against implied repeal. For Congress is presumed to know the existing laws on the that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register
between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001,
subject and not to enact inconsistent or conflicting statutes.[10] and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from
filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent
  COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this
Court is of the firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC
opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189.
[12]
the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the
 
purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage the common underlying policy of
The clear import of the Courts pronouncement in Akbayan-Youth is that had the
RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
therein petitioners filed their petition and sought an extension date that was before the 120-day
 
prohibitive period, their prayer would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing
the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009)
voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily
and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The
during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular
Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to the extension prayed for.
elections.There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or
 
deadlines therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is
 
declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10,
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.[11] In said
2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in
case, the Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the
reopening the registration of voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010. This Decision is
request of the therein petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with
SO ORDERED.
the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under