662
[No. 14078. March 7, 1919.]
RUBI ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,
defendant.
1. 1.STATUTES; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF
1917; VALIDITY; CONSTRUCTION ; HISTORY.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917 reads as follows: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board." Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, having reference to the Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145,
1268, 1306 were enacted for the province of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur,
Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan),
Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. Act No. 547 referred especially to the Manguianes.
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. All of these special laws with the exception of Act No. 1306 were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and
1397. ,The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn,
Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The last Administrative Code
retains the provision which originated in Act No. 387, enacted in 1902, in section 2145 herein
quoted.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT POLICY.—These different laws denote an anxious regard for
the welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice
with reference to the method to be followed for their advancement.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Every really new question that comes before the courts is in the last
analysis determined by the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. In balancing
conflicting solutions,. that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "NON-CHRISTIAN ;" HISTORY.—A skeleton history of the attitude assumed
towards the backward inhabitants of the Islands both before and after the acquisition of the
Philippines by the United States is set forth in the opinion. The most important of the laws of the
Indies having reference to the subject are compiled in Book 6, Title 3. A clear exposition of the
purposes of the Spanish government in its efforts to improve the conditions of such inhabitants by
concentrating them in "reducciones" is f ound in the Decree of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881. Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the
United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has
been a perplexing one. Organic and statutory law has given the subject consideration.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED.—"Non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory expression.
Legislative, judicial, and executive authority has held that the term "non-Christian" should not be
given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degree of
civilization. This has been the uniform construction of executive officials who have been called
upon to interpret and enforce the law. The term "non-Christian" refers not to religious belief, but
in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization.
1. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE "MANGUlANES."—The name "Manguian" signifies savage,
mountaineer, pagan, negro. The Manguianes are very low in culture.
66 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY.— From the beginning of the United States, and
even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation
between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be
terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—With reference to the laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not
within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the
subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial
department of the Government.
1. 9.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The
maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected.
1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—"The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comrs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.)
1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate
officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity," of the case.
1. 12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice,
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
1. 13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a
department head.
1. 14.ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.—Since the term "nonChristian" is here
construed to refer to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not discriminate between individuals on account of
religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
1. 15.ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIBERTY.—Various conceptions of civil liberty are quoted in the opinion.
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a, civilized
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. Liberty includes the
right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to
 enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion.
1. 16.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—"Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license; it is "liberty
regulated by law." Whenever and whereever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercised
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed
rights must yield to the regulation of law.
1. 17.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The authority conferred upon executive officials by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
1. 18.ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.—"Due
process of law" is defined and analyzed in the opinion. The pledge that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class.
Per CARSON, J., concurring:
1. 19.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are not
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 since there exists a law; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and it applies to
all of a class.
1. 20.ID.; ID.; ID.; SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.—Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another."
1. 21.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Confinement in reservations in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
1. 22.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICE POWER.—The police power of the State is a power coextensive
with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity."
1. 23.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority
the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the
public interest.
1. 24.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual,
as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown
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66 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
4 control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life,
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity.
1. 25.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly
say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917.
1. 26.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION.—The
fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization.
1. 27.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of
the Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the
health and morals—is in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
1. 28.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned,
the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it,
are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of that great Island.
1. 29.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PRESUMPTION.—Most cautiously should the power of this court to
overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole
tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of the courts
whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.
1. 30.ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
1. 31.STATUTES; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" DEFINED.—The words "non-Christian" have a clear,
definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive
adjective, applied to "tribes," "peoples" or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts
and-provinces throughout the Islands.
1. 32.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TESTS.—The tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribe is,
or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-Christian" are, and
throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of
advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community."
1. 33.ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION OF INHABITANTS NOT NON
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. CHRISTIAN.—The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses
that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to
justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that
term" is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode
of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which
furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize
or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss
or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of the
tribe.
1. 34.ID.; ID.; ID.—So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants
of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be found
to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the
statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and
normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a
"non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe;
and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-
Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that
maintained by such tribe, but such a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property
 or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in
contact.
1. 35.ID.; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; BASIS; WHEN
PROPERLY APPLICABLE.—The power to provide for the issuance of the reconcentration
orders contemplated in section 2145 of the Administrative Code rests upon analogous principles
to those upon which the liberty and freedom of action of children and persons of unsound minds
is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare. The
power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly exercised only where
certain individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of such a low grade of civilization,
that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.
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666 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
D. R. Williams and Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Solicitor-General Paredes for def endant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a
slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion—This cause, in every
point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of a state,
the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights, if they have any, the political
existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first,
to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the socalled "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to
resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in f avor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
" The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr., presented the following resolution:
" 'Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a f ailure,
" 'Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan
work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
" 'Whereas it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
" 'Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board,
" 'Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place
most convenient f or the Mangyanes to live on, Now, theref ore be it
" 'Resolved, That under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
" 'Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
"2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
"3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
" 'Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25,
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro.
" 'Whereas said resolution has been duly approved by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
" 'Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later
than December 31, 1917.
" 'Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceeding sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.'
"4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order
of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them.
"5. That Rubi and those living in his ranchería have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
"6. That the undersigned has no information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act
No. 2711."
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called
upon to decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor.—With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public' lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board."
In connection with the above-quoted provision, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation.—Any non-Christian who shall refuse
to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon
conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days."
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read:
Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special
provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act
No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as
will later be dis-
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
closed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the
phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with ref erence to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to
set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-
Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE  "Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560.
UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI,
Title III, in the following language:
"LAW I.
"The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on
February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568.
Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578.
"THAT THE 'INDIOS' BE REDUCED INTO 'POBLACIONES' (COM
MUNITIES) .
"In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the.evangelical law, and in
order that they may forget the.blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in
harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use
all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our
Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of New Spain assembled by
order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six—all of
which meetings were actuated with a desire
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board ,of Mindoro.
to serve God and our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are
deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they Can not profit f rom the aid of our ministers
and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having
realized the convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and
ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such f orbearance and gentleness, without
causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment
and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is
ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has.been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, wehereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomenderos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title."
"LAW VIII.
"Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
"THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
"The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed, should have the facilities of waters,
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and a passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards;
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672 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"LAW IX.
"THAT THE 'INDIOS' IN 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT DEPRIVED OF 
THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
"With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they
shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby
order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them
previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom."
*      *      *      *      *      *      *
"LAW XIII.
"THE SAME AS ABOVE.
"THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER 
OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
"No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, ,president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indiosrequest such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that end. And, because
these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law
be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomenderowho should violate this law."
"LAW XV.
"Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
 "THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE 'REDUC
CIONES,' WHO SHALL BE 'INDIOS.'
"We order that in each town and reducción there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reducción;
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the
town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen. If there be less
than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who
should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests, as is the practice in town inhabited by
Spaniards and indios."
"LAW XXI.
"Philip II, in Madrid, on May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid,
on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Tordesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, See Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
"THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE 'INDIOS,' THERE SHALL LIVE  following:
NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, 'MESTIZOS,' AND MULATTOES.
"We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattoes, or mestizos to live in the reducciones and
towns of the indios,because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with
the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless
men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with
their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal
which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquility. We hereby order the
imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated
in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law
within their powers and avail themselves of the
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-
breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas, they shall not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents." (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the
condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is
found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881,
reading as follows:
"It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral
part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in f orce therein; while, on the other 'hand, it is the duty to
conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation,
and which, living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack all the notions which enable them to grasp the moral and
material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by
the same laws.
"It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of
the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the
commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative
of the Government of the metropolis.
"It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with, this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the
missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought
to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been
insufficient to complete the work under-
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taken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been
guarded against, thus giving way for the majority of these races to persist in their mode of living and customs
of isolation.
"As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account
the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing
respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I
have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves
important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After
hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of
Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity 'of the meeting held with the Archbishop of
Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the Orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for
the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only
f orm of accomplishing such la task.
"For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
"DECREE.
"1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Island of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are based upon the differences of
instruction, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its
territory.
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"2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races—which may be divided into
three classes: one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without f orming a town nor a
home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and
the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans—shall be published in their respective dialects, and the
officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of
next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
"3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or
settlements already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities,
if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that
this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the
same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that
in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
"4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located in fertile lands appropriate for cultivation,
the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute
necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them
and which prejudices the least their interests; and, in either of these cases, an
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effort must be made to establish their homes within the reach of the sound of the bell.
 "5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christians, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulation based
upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policía (division of the Guardia Civil).
"6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties
affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and how they shall till their lands and sell the
products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the  Hacienda at the same
price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the
others from engaging in commerce or any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which
shall be punished with deportation.
"7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
"8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church,
all who have settled and who profess our sacred religion shall by this fact alone be exempt for eight years from
rendering personal labor.
"9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountain
igorrots) the following advantages in return for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their
families; concession of good' lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way they
deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon affecting submission; respect for their habits
and customs in
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so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they
want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach,
direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the
exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the
direct charge of the authority of the province or district.
"10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in
return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and
country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, that the
location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions
of location and cultivation, and provided further that the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.
"11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the
peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April,
committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for this purpose, the
Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in
conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the. territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their
products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the
military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such
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operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
"12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missionaries, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said
forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
"13. With respect to the reducción of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part
of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
"14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the
foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultation by the chiefs of provinces and priests and
missionaries.
"15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in bringing
about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their
respective jurisdictions." (Gaceta de Manila,No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administración, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED 
STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing ,one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines, was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of
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July 1,1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation.
One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment,
surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and
active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic
Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a
legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the
Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The
Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This law transferred the
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine
Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve
senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva
Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was authorized
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to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.
16). The law established a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall
have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the
Legislature by appointed senators and representatives (sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognize a dividing line between the
territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province
of Benguet and the Igorots; Act No. 82, the Municipal Code; Act No. 83, the Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 183, the Charter of the city of Manila; Act No. 787, providing f or the
organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio Charter; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act
of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 and 1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United
States Philippine Commission,having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411,
422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753. 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the
provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela,
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Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac,
Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we
insert Act No. 547:
"No. 547.—AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS
FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
"SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro have. not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess
of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled 'An Act
providing for the establishment of local civil governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya.'
"SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems. such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
'provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisoned
for a period not exceeding sixty days.
"SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control
over them shall be exercised to this end, and to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be
maintained.
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"SEC. 4. When in the .opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections
one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the
geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
"SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of' An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in
the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, December 4, 1902."
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396
and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In
turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative
Codes retained the provisions in question.
These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the
non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to
the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
""Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instructions to the
Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These
words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in' section 22 of the Jones Law . They
are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippine Commission, establishing a Bureau of
nonChristian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into
sections 701-705 of the Ad-
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ministrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the
phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and
2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been
the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394,
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917;
and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, as well as in Act No. 1667
of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec, 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in
giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christians would be those who profess the
Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In
partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative
Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor
Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of
Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300,
note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I, p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate- further to ascertain
what is its true meaning.
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In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other
nonChristian tribes. Again, .the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the
twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippine Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to
that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The
first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable
only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain
Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the
Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do
not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
 It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of
whom are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes
this. (Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so again the geographical conception is likewise
inadequate. The reason is that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of
their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated on the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatis-
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factory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a
favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under
his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the
"backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'nonChristian tribes.'" (See Hearings
before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session
on H. R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future
political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the
Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the
Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections
701 et seq., and sections 2422 et seq., of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No.
253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with
reference to non-Christian tribes * * * with special view to determining the most practicable
means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29 Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a
tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal Code concerning the husband who
surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:
"* * * we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of  so-called non-
Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the
requisites prescribed by General Orders No. 68. * * * We hold
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also that the f act that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized. tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating
circumstance."
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of executive officials who have been called
upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine
Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called non-Christians and who had
these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governors of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and
was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
"SIR: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-
Christians but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are,
for the purposes of Acts 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
"It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are. not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so -great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of
the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those
lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial
Government Act and the Municipal Code.
"The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you
will give
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the member of so-called 'wild tribes' of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently
have embraced Christianity.
"The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of
regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree
of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
"I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces
organized under the Provincial Government Act." (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
"As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification
has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand. * * * I believe the term carries the
same meaning as that expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted).
It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for to hold that it is indicative
of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom."
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relative to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and
the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by
return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This
construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the
Bureau of Internal
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Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
"The internal revenue law exempts 'members of nonChristian tribes' from the payment of
cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not
that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and
that all other persons are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal
relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt f rom the cedula tax, and that all
others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long
as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so
much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is
subject to the cedula tax; it is moredependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is
associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question
has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot
and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one
occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula
tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes
from all of the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and others are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a
condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns.
Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad
ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and, non-civilized people preserving their
tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) "JNO. S. HORD,       "In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it
"Collector of Internal Revenue."
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On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:
"In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from
members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purpose of settling down and
becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws
governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all
concerned:
"Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do
not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three
classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned. * * *
"Whenever any member of a non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself to some civilized community, becoming a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other
members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the
same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the
expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign
countries or reaching, the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D,
F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay
the tax for former years.
"In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factor in determining whether or not a man is
subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does
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or does not profess Christianity; nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some
of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or
lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason go called 'Remontados' and 'Montescos'
will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal
Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of lif e,
degree of advancement and so f orth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other
recognized non-Christian tribes.
"Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) "ELLIS CROMWELL,       belief, but, in a way, to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands
"Collector of Internal Revenue,
"Approved:  E. THE MANGUIANES.
(Sgd.) "GREGORIO ARANETA, 
     "Secretary of Finance and Justice."
The two circulars above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of of Internal
Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance
and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of
Constabulary requested the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a nonChristian who
has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain
non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,
does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under
the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the
same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
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692 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
is probable that the person in question remains a nonChristian, so that in purchasing intoxicating liquors both
he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No.
1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions placed upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise."
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
"With respect to the meaning which the phrase nonChristian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative Code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning
which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipinos or strangers, civilized or
uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who,
living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order. * * *
"The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines
which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a
social and civilized life, did not intend to establish a distinction based on the religious belief s of the individual,
but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression
which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines.
"The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657
(articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its literal meaning
would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions based on the religion of the individual,"
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than Dr. David P.
Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the popu-
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lation into Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the
Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq.) The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio
Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is:
"Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of
the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a subdivision
under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian
Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the term refers to culture and not to religion.
In resumé, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" ref ers, not to religious
of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart f rom settled communities.
The so-called non-Christians are in various stages approaching civilization. The Philippine Census
of 1903 divided ,them into f our classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimología, de los
nombres de Razas de. Filipinas, says:
"In Tagalog, Bícol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies 'savage,' 'mountainer,' 'pagan,' 'negro.' It may be that the
use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who
bear it to-day, but its employment in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these
languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies 'ancient/ from which we
can deduce
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that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the 'ancients.'"
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The Manguianes 'have shown no desire for
community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently
in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See
Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE—THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be
practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-
Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in
a state of, pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States. .
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs.Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells
how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the
neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on—"This act avowedly contem-
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro,
plates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes
to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists,"
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U. S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United
States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indite a brief
history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can
be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs.Georgia, supra), as follows:
"The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the
Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
"Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of America towards the Indians who
were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have
recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established
occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were
forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority.
When a tribe wished to dispose of its land, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to
purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise.
With the Indians themselves these relations are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been,
regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people,
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696 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs.. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the State within whose limits they resided."
The opinion then continues:
"It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily
food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by
this court, whenever the question has arisen. * * * The power of the General Government over these remnants
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to
the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because
it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes."
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U. S., 28) the question to be considered
was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit
the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New
Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendents charged with
guarding their interests and found that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and
protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that
during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special
protection, were
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subjected to restraints and official supervision in the alienation of their property." And finally, we
note the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes, but longcontinued legislative and executive usage and an
unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and
civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of
the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always
been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U. S., 488; U. S. vs.Celestine [1909], 215 U. S., 278; U.
S. vs. Sandoval, supra;Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U. S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; The
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall., 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U. S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay
[1898], 169 U. S., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock [1903], 187 U. S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U. S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U. S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co.
[1911], 221 U. S., 286; U. S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U. S., 598; Cyr vs. Walker [1911], 29 Okla.,
281; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as
an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may
be necessary to give. to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.
S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U. S., 577.)
All this is borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line
of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in
the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891).
This was a hearing upon return to a writ of
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698 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and
other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance
that the relators are Indians who have f ormerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of lndians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the
whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid
or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being
guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their
liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that
the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they
had fled or escaped from a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory
—had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the
respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant
to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by
habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the
Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the
Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealings with the friendly tribe of
Poncas. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws, passed for the government of the Indian country,
and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the
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Indian tribes, conf er upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the
persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority. * * * Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not, need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise
of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
"The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. "1.That an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge,
in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States
or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. "2.That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the
Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws thereof.
3. "3.That no rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory,
as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. "4.That the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness/ so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And.
5. "5.Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered."
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is
a "person" within the meaning of
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700 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
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the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In
re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do
exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and
for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches
of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a
carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the
segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian
tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this
power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has
abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should
be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has
not been violated in this instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney,
and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law,
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of
section 2145 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U. S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require
the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by
the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of
Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations
as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters
arising out of the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal,
especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of
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the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised.
In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department."
(See also as corroborative authority, if any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U. S. [1907], 204 U.
S., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court; U. S. vs. Lane
[1914], 232 U. S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order ?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of
its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that—"The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English,
and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of
'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, then, is that the law "constitutes an attempt
by the Legisla-
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
ture to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his argument is unanswerable—the Legislature must
be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded;
religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional
guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants
according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative
action.
We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not
discriminate between individuals on account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions to
the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted
in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation
is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution—and these
provisions, it has been said, "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for
the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty
by every other." (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
"Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on
right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and
never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep
off from us, the more liberty we have. * * * That man is free who is protected from injury." (II Webster's
Works, p. 393.)
"Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not being forced to do what one
ought not to desire." (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws.)
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will.
It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others."
(Field, J., in Crowley vs.Christensen [1890], 137 U. S., 86.)
"Liberty does not import 'an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with saf ety to its members. Society based
on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real
liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual
person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be
done to others. * * * There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his
own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government—especially of any free government
existing under a written Constitution—to interf ere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally
705
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights
of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such
restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.'" (Harlan, J.,
in Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U. S., 11.)
"Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual." (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed  in a civilized
community,consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-
making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes. to a successful
conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's
employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall.,
277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U. S., 274; Allgeyer
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
vs. Louisiana [1896], 165 U. S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R. C. L.,
258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent.
It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "liberty. regulated by law."
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every
man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural
rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are
also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or'
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.
S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Ala., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel
Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States
Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law"
is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often
held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law,
p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanc-
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
tioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice,
must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs, California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due
process of law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall. be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to
all of a class." (U. S. vs.Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. ) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-
1
matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs.Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statements, leaving the logical deductions to be made later
on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law
providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible
that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the
United States, has force in the Philippines. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has,
by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States
Criminal
____________
 218 U. S., 302; 64 L. ed., 1049.
1
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708 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
Code, prescribed the punishment f or these crimes. 'Slavery and involuntary servitude, together
with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another." (Hodges vs. U. S. [1906], 203 U. S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly
involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under
what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U. S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their
freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if
section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment
is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep, and
that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly
[1884], 113 U. S., 27.) What we are most interested in is the right of the government to restrain
liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, * * * "is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 111.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the
onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the
great principles that mean security f or the public wel-
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 709
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
fare or' do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to
exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
"There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs
to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamental principles which lie at the f oundation of all republican f orms of government."
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U. S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
 F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons for the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2)
the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following: (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
"To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to that place. There he found that the site selected is a good
one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there
appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they
appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period
for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that
the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely
justify its continuance and development.
"Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was, naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the
press:
" 'lt is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and
evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To
permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them.'"
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-
Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration—"The advancement of the non-
Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian
inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
1. "(a)Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
2. "(b)The extension of the public school system and the
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
2. "(c)The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate
their development and the extension of government control.
3. " (d)Construction of roads and trails between one place and another among non-
Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable
relations among them and with the Christian people.
4. "(e)Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
5. "(f)The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in,
the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu."
The Secretary adds:
"To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people.
These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully
appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded
to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is
the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities, thus
bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from
involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized
life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly
civilized inhabitants of the country." (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-
called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in
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712 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
civilization; (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the nonChristian people in the
following unequivocal terms:
"It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in
favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a
systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of
those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and
complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago."
(Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance
in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing them into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals—was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. This method
was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class,
because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few
reservations there live under restraint in .some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 713
Rubi vs.. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the Manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know
that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, f or instance, are not free, as civilized
men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed,, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are
Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and
Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so f ar as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain.
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will
leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code,
because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants
are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Island of Mindoro, and its, as yet,
unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State.
Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from
destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is
all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
"Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the Manguianes) are
engaged in the works of destruction—burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately
become of these
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will
ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and
make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse
them.
"There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practise
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will—going from one place
to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caingins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?
*      *      *      *      *      *      *
"But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process
of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty
in a rightful way?
"To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty is. It will mean, in the- case at bar, that the Government should. not adopt any measures looking to the
welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in
the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand
liberty in its true and noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was
adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience."
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 715
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under
the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not f ar
distant when they will become usef ul citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has
been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a
certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward
and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the path of civilization ? Shall we, after
expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and
superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to
pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent
state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the
nation to deal with our backward brothers.
"The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught
and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that the object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live
and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is
being done for them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured.
Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condi-
716
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
tion compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.
"But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other place under penalty of
imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and
wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the
conditions of living warrant, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the
greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can
not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of
permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the
public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes
and objectives. of the Government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return
to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provided for, you can not make them live
together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught."
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could he not, however, be kept away from certain localities? To furnish an example from
the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U. S. Stat. at L., p. 141) punished
those intruders who should cross the line into an Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did
not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of
marauding Indians. Without
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 717
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
any doubt, this law and other similar laws were accepted and followed time and again without
question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless
people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous officials. What, it is asked, would be
the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into
whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or no motive to oppress these
people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the
purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts
are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is
generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it
would seem that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the
accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the rights
and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government?
It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government f rom the beginning of time.
Not now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been
transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must
realize that the very existence of government renders imperative a power to restrain the individual
to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As
to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the
rights of the citizen, this is, and for a long time to come will be, impossible for the courts to
determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted free-
718
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
dom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental
activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of
the Government in this progressive march. ,
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say
that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that
power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and
the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods
of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would
lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume
towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full
accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question
that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior
cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will
best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule
719
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 719
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all
possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice
may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-
Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been
effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea is to unify the people of the
Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich
and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed, The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is
toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving
consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson
[1911], 222 U. S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the court must take "a chance," it should be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty
in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section
720
720 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws,
and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against petitioners. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set forth in the prevailing
opinion.
The words "non-Christian" have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in
the Philippine statutebook as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants,"
dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in our
statute-book, denote the "low grade of civilization" of the individuals included in the class to
which they are applied. To this I would add that the tests for the determination of the fact that an
individual or tribe is, or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-
Christian" are, and throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of
lif e, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some
civilized community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17, 1910, and
set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philip
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 721
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
pine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be
found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term
"non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization
which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to,
and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and
judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of
life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose
to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of
the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a
particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be found to
have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the
statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and
normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-
Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and
which Would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian"
tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that maintained by such
tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the
civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact.
 The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute,
the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as the rest of the
fifteen thousand Manguianes affected
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce
it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law
for the issuance of such an order.
If the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that
degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to serve notice upon, and give an
opportunity for a real hearing, to all the members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be
doubted whether the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in
its enforcement. By what proceeding known to the law, or to be specially adopted in a particular
case, could the officers of any province provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a
reconcentration order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one of
the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and whose individual
members have no fixed or known place of residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes
roaming in the wilds of Mindoro?
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted, after the
practice in the United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have been placed upon
reservations; but since non-Christian headmen and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful
authority to bind their peoples by their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a
hearing, would have the same force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not
preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the matter is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests upon
analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom of action of children and persons
of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the
general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly
exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of such a low
grade of civilization,
723
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 723
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and necessarily
paternal attitude assumed toward them by the Insular Government is well illustrated by the
following provisions found in the Administrative Code of 1917:
"SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes).—It shall be the duty of the
Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions
inhabited by nonChristian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid, and
complete manner the moral, material, economic, social and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete f usion of all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago."
"SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund.—There shall be maintained in the provincial treasuries of the
respective specially organized provinces a special fund to be known as the-township and settlement fund,
which shall be available, exclusively, for expenditures for the benefit of the townships and settlements of the
province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior."
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the jurisdiction of the
courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the action of the administrative
authorities in the enforcement of reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is a "non-
Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at
this time.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I
cannot
724
724 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a
hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are
entitled to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.
MOIR, J., with whom ARAULLO, and STREET, JJ., concur, 
          dissenting:
I dissent.
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of justice will not permit
me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong dissent from the opinion of
Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion
or to go into the questions in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human
side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears
from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is
approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of the
Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation' and was taken in hand by the provincial
sheriff -and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The
Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their
liberty in violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied in the majority
opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the prior approval of his act by
the Department Secretary or-
725
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 725
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
dered the placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.
The Manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in culture.
They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization.
They are peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?).
The Manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to
Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government."
It may be Well to add that the last P. I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro (not
including the smaller islands which together make the Province of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851
square miles and, a population of 28,361 of which 7,369 are wild or uncivilized tribes
(Manguianes). This appears to be the total Mangyan population of the province. The total
population was less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P. L Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.
It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the coast and
by Manguianes.
 The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will long before
Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the waters of Cebu. They have made little or no
progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people,"
whom the Government of the Philippine Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of
civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who like
Dabalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides the
punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the
fundamental one will
726
726 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
be considered by me. It is that the sections of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in
the majority opinion, are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that
accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered
necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indian. nations in the United
States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of
separate treatiesmade by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and, in
compliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart f or them on which they lived and were
protected from intrusion and molestation by white men. Some of these reservations were larger
than the Island of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the
Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are
accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos.
They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their
native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them
727
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 727
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
of their rights and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied the equal
protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they
want it or not. They are backward and 'deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes,
however humble they may be and "brought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the
Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these
"peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied
in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their offense which is that—
"Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the Manguianes) are
engaged in the works of destruction—burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caingins thereon.
Not bringing any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately
become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and f or which they are now fighting in
court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who
may want to abuse them.
'There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will—going from one place
to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caingins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising
728
728 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
the same rightf ully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
*      *      *      *      *      *      *
"But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process
of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty
in a rightful way ?
"To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the
welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in
the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even .the remotest hope of coming to understand
liberty in its true and noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was
adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
*      *      *      *      *      *      *
"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens."
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that the Manguianes
destroy the forests by making a caingin, What is a "caingin?" Simply this.- These people move
their camp or place of abode frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to
clear the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller
trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The
fires never spread in the tropical undergrowth of an island' like Mindoro, but the trees within
the caingin are killed and crops are planted
729
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 729
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on—due to superstition, to a lack of game in the
neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caingins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them
f or the more f ertile lands, which every man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that
they are committing such a great abuse as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land—
for incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them." They have never been a
burden to the state and never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the
law punish them. The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit
crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to
involutary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have
been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow
reservation from which they may not escape without facing a term in jail? Is it not more likely that
they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding
themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed them and
clothe them in return for their services?
I think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will all be subjected to involuntary
personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How will they live? There may be
persons who are willing to lend them money with which to buy food on the promise that they
730
730 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
will work for them. And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another
law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their necks, and they may be
fined not more than two hundred pesos or imprisoned for not exceeding six months or both, and
when the sentence expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will
again go to jail, and this may be repeated till they are too old to work and are cast adrift.
The Manguianes have committed no offense and are charged with none. It does not appear
that they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any
hearing or were allowed to make any def ense. It seems they were gathered here and there
whenever found by the authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because
they are "non-Christians," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there is
no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a Christian
Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These
non-Christian tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others,
about one million souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have
made great progress in civilization. They have beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor—they have
herds of cattle and horses and some few of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians,
like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but they are one and all
"non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from their
homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with the prior
approval of the department head. To state such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness
and illegality of the section of the law under which these people are restrained of their-liberty. But
it is argued that there
731
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 731
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
is no probability of the department head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the f act that
he can do it and has done it in the present case is what makes the law unconstitutional. The
arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's legality is
tested and not the probability of doing harm.
"It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary
body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its
institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power,
but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people have, through
the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised over them. In
particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids
that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was
intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary
spoliation of property.
"As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or
which singles out any particular individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating
legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and
especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case , and requires no further
discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
"When we consider the nature and the theory -of our institutions of government, the principles
upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are
constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and-action of purely
personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author
and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains
732
732 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the
definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged
somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of
mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate
tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as
individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the
monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth 'may be a government of law
and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems
to. be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine
Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determina-tion of its
constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law tends to
deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it is void.
In my opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of
law, but will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History
teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the
narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death.
733
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 733
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less
magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness
and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied,
malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields—than it would be to order
their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in
exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their
native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation—in effect an open air jail—then so may the
Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the
Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-
nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department, have the power under this
law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes and put
them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the courts
will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their
liberty, and their lives, may be, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
 .And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some
political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what
his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court
might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority opinion,
should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
"During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged
734
734 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
in administering the laws of my country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case
that appealed so strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consideration. On the one side, we
have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant,
únlettered, and generally despised race; and the other, we have the representative of one of the
most powerf ul, most enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times. On the one
side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of ours,
asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the
arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side, we have this
magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this application with the determination of
sending these people back to the country which is to them, less desirable than perpetual
imprisonment in their own native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the
brave and distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no sort of
sympathy in the business in which he is f orced by his position to bear a part so conspicuous; and,
so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper to say that, if the strongest possible
sympathy could give the relators title to freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the
moment the arguments in their behalf were closed. No examination or further thought would then
have been necessary or expedient. -But in a country where liberty is regulated by law, something
more satisfactory and enduring than mere sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis
of judicial action. It follows that this case must be examined and decided on principles of law, and
that unless the relators are entitled to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the United
States, or some treaty made pursuant thereto, they must be remanded to the custody of the officer
who caused their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left without the consent
of the government.
735
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 735
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during the session of the court
held at that time at Lincoln, presented their petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a writ
of habeas corpus and their final discharge from custody thereunder.
"The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca
tribe .of Indians now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the
tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites,
and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance f rom
the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the
laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George
Crook.
"The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the distance between the
place where the writ was made returnable and the place where the relators were confined being more than
twenty miles, ten days were allotted in which to make return.
"On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and detention is therein
shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the additional statement since filed, is that the relators are
individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a
reservation situated in some place within the limits of the Indian Territory—had departed therefrom without
permission from the government; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had
issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory,. and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian
reservation, and that they were in his custody for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory.
736
736 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators had withdrawn and severed,
for all time, their connection with the 'tribe to which they belonged; and upon this point alone was there any
testimony produced by either party hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and the! return to the writ are
conceded to be true; so that the questions to be determined are purely questions of law.
"On the 8th of March, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca tribe of Indians, by
which a certain tract of country, north of the Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the
permanent home of the said Indians, in which the government agreed to protect them during their good
behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in
Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does not appear.
*      *      *      *           *      *       *
"A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, when determined, will be
decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to the right of the government to arrest and hold the relators for
a time, for the purpose of being returned to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians
escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can do full justice to a question like the one under consideration.
But, as the matter furnishes so much valuable material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall
try to present it as viewed from my own standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms, which,
though not specially invited, will be sure to follow.
*      *      *      *           *      *      *
"On the 15th day of August, 1876, Congress passed the general Indian appropriation bill, and in it we find
a provision authorizing the secretary of the interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian
Ter-
737
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 737
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
ritory, and providing them a home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
*      *      *      *      *      *      *
"The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a portion of the same,- until
two or three years ago, when they removed therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At
all events, we find a portion of them, including the relators, located at some point in the Indian Territory.
There, the testimony seems to show, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness,
states that out of five hundred and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian
Territory, one hundred and fiftyeight died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were sick
and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the
survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of followers, he determined to leave
the Indian Territory and return to his old home, where, to use his own language, 'he might live and die in
peace, and be buried with his fathers/ He also stated that he informed the agent of their final purpose to leave,
never to return, and that he and his followers had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection
with the Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to cut loose f
rom the government, go.to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs of a higher
civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and laudable purpose, all who were able to do
so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same language, and with whom many of
the Poncas have long continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make
them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus employed, that they were
arrested by order of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They
738
738 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Ramirez.
claim to be unable to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from their
own native plains and blood relations to a far-off country, in which they can see little but new-made graves
opening for their reception. The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of
home and native land was strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to
return and live and die where they : had been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to
repose in the land they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and protected and formed a
part of what was to them a melancholy procession homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such
love of home and native land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to me that they are not unlike Christian in
principle."
And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in
violation of their right to life, liberty, and the  pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from
;
custody.
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 659
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-74457. March 20,1987. * achieved and for being confiscatory.—But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction;  Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality
of legislative measures.—This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,"
final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
Same; Due Process;  Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.—The closed mind has
no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion
is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto
the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other
perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.—In the light of
the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The
method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by
banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years
old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for
farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one
661
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 661
This case is very similar to the case of Standing Bear and others.
'I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of
1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their
liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the respondents
immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.
Writ denied.
____________
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is
violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose to be
subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.
Same;  Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed,
we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The
penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
Same;  Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
662
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
62
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and
in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Same;  Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
conf iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs
immediate and urgent correction.—It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and
hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of
due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacyof the problem sought to
be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS 
President      
Republic of the Philippines"     
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
1

executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
663
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 663
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Ap-

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court _______________
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
Same; Same; Damages;  A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation of  Rollo, pp. 7, 28, 29, 34.
1

E.O. 626-A is not liable for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.—  Ibid., pp. 6-7; Annex B.
2

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the 665
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate.
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 665
The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce
it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, pellate Court,  which upheld the trial court,  and he has now come bef ore us in this petition for
**3 ***

and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question review on certiorari.
the order we now annul.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
     Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that
the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
CRUZ, J.. challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No, 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles  is not 5

—but hear me first!' " It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as f ollows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with
respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the
measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the
requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as
contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.  We have jurisdiction under the
6

prohibition against interprovincial Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
664 rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7

_______________
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of ** Justices Coquia, Bartolome and Ejercito.
the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;  Rollo, pp. 6, 27, 33.
3

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the *** Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon.
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:  Ibid., pp. 10; 11,14-16, 76.
4

 129 SCRA 174.

5

"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of  Espiritu vs. Fugoso, 81 Phil. 637.
6

age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The  Sec. 5[2(a)], Art. X, 1973 Constitution; Sec. 5[2(a)], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution.
7

carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation 666
and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily,"  to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow
8
the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist,   and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
9
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar
inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by
President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters
of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency
to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds
was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment," a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really
_______________
 J. Laurel, concurring opinion, Zandueta v. dela Costa, 66 Phil. 615, 627.
8 may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
 US v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731.
9
667
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 667
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For
the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise
and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
That is the ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more
clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate
Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it.
He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due
process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow
room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained
by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise."  Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
11
farther than to define due process—and in so doing sums it all up—as nothing more and nothing
less than "the
_______________
 I Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution (1936), pp. 153-159.
10
 Twinning vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.
11
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that
that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life, liberty or property of any of its subjects
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves
and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society.
The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by
the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues
in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the
arrow, in leading to the correct ruling af ter examination of the problem not f rom one or the other
perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext
that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance,
or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum .requirements of due process are notice and hearing  which, generally speaking,
13
It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with ap-
_______________
 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33.
12
 David vs. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707; Montemayor vs. Araneta Univ. Foundation, 77 SCRA 321; Lentelera vs.
13
Amores, 70 SCRA 37; Flores vs. Buencamino, 74 SCRA 332; DBP vs. Bautista, 26 SCRA 366; Ong Su Han vs. Gutierrez
David, 76 Phil. 546; Banco-Español-Filipino vs. Palanca. 37 Phil 921.
669
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 669
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
plications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in
the famous Dartmouth College Case,  as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
14
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are
to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would
degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are
a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.   There are 15
instances when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on
sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.  Filthy restaurants may be summarily
16
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals.  In
such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view
of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the
_______________
 Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518.
14
 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1; 1 Cooley 639.
15
 Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833.
16
 12 C.J. 1224.
17
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare.  By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the
18
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the
State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead—from the womb to beyond the tomb—in practically everything he does or owns.
Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as
the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police
power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buff aloes be conserved f or
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence
of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss,
indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio,  where a law regulating the
19
registration, branding
_______________
 People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Ass. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA
18
849; Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75; U.S. v. Ling Su Tan, 10 Phil. 114; Collins v. Wolfe, 5 Phil. 297; U.S. v. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil. 225; Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 603.
 15 Phil. 85.
19
671
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of
law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without
the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law
was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which
were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had
caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent
increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures
for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a
valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as f ollows:
17 "To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. x x x      x x x.
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by 'the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are
fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a 'reasonably necessary' limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the
poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably
necessary for the pur-
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
pose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except
where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding
and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
flippant, dead meat.
E ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would
still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The
penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
671
the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine
673
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 673
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P1 2,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only.  In the exceptional cases
20
accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to
wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all
the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in  Pesigan v.
Angeles,  Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
21
_______________
 New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. Rivera, 33 SCRA 602; Gas Corp. of the Phil. vs. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653.
20
 supra.
21
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction
of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of
their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are
675
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in
accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a
mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals
itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we
now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw
them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit.
Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed
without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people
to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of
protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society,
if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as
affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
     Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
     Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
Decision reversed.
Note.—Judicial review exists precisely to test the validity of executive or legislative acts in an
appropriate legal proceedings; there is always the possibility of their being declared inoperative
and void. Realism compels the acceptance of the though that there would be a time-lag between
the initiation of such presidential or congressional exercise of power and the final declaration of
nullity. In the meanwhile, it would be productive of confusion, perhaps at times even of chaos, if
the parties affected were left free to speculate as to its fate being one of doom, this leading them
free to disobey in the meanwhile. Since, however, the orderly processes of government, not to
mention common sense, requires that the presumption of validity be accorded an act of Congress
or an order of the President. It would be less than fair, and it may productive of injustice, if no
notice of its assistance as a fact be paid to it, even if thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary, in
the case of Presidential act, either to the Constitution or a controlling statute. ( Municipality of
Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533.)
——o0o——
677
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
675

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 31
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997. *
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine
Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance—procedural due process “refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely
the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”— Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the Constitution, viz.: SECTION 1. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.” In order to fall within the aegis
of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
32
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2 Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of
law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due
process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just.” PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Same; Same; As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
due process.—Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the pilots
themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment.
Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case
of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend
his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be
heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person
is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.”
Same; Same; Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.—Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not
consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.
Same; Same; Ships and Shipping;  Pilotage; Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right.—There is no
33
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 3 The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
3 to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona
recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of one’s profession falls
within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights
without due process.” He merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-
92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of
those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor
pilots of their profession.” As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends
to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Same;  Same; Same;  Words and Phrases; Pilotage, Defined.—Pilotage is the act of conducting a vessel
from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a two-mile area offshore to an assigned
berthing area and vice versa.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; “License” and “Licensure,” Defined.—Pilotage, just like other
professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is “the granting of license
especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in
accordance with established standards.” A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority
to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.
Same;  Same; Same;  The license granted to harbor pilots in the form of an appointment which allows
them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of 70 years is a vested right.—Their license is granted in
the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This
is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, “(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been
previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only,” and
“(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one
(1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.”
34
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
Same;  Same; Same;  An administrative order that provides for pre-evaluation cancellation of a license
is unreasonable and constitutionally infirm—in a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.—It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security
knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical
unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can
be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and
neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance” which is conducted only
after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real
sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel E. Valenzuela and Jesus P. Amparo for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment
of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law?
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter. Pursuant
35
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 35
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
pilots and the pilotage profession,  the PPA promulgated PPA-AO 03-85  on March 21, 1985,
1 2
which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots
and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be
holders of pilot licenses  and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in
3
the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory
performance  that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself  to
4 5
exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental
or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.  Harbor pilots in every harbor district are
6 arguments before the DOTC.
further required to organize themselves into pilot associations which would make available such
equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate,
pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new
pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required
to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as
reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92  on 7 On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
July 15, 1992, whose
_______________
1
 Pilotage is the act of conducting a vessel from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a two-mile
area offshore to an assigned berthing area and vice versa.
2
 Rollo, p. 87.
3
 The pilot licensing function itself which used to be exercised by the Philippine Coast Guard pursuant to the Revised
Coast Guard Law of 1974 (P.D. No. 601) has been transferred to the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) by virtue of
Executive Order No. 125, which took effect on January 30, 1987.
4
 Determined by an Evaluation Committee.
5
 Upon the recommendation of the PPA General Manager.
6
 Article IV, Section 20.
7
 Rollo, p. 41.
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
avowed policy was to “instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port
users through the improvement of pilotage services.” This was implemented by providing therein
that “all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and that “all appointments
to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1)
year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after
conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s
administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.”
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued a Memorandum Order No. 08-92  which laid 8
down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1)
Qualifying Factors:  safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for
9
Evaluation:  promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number
10
of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as
harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No.
04-92, but Secretary Gar-
_______________
8
 Ibid., p. 42.
9
 Qualifying factors are requirements which must be met before a pilot’s application for reappointment is even evaluated
by the PPA.
10
 These criteria are used for evaluation by the PPA after a pilot has complied with all the requirements to qualify for
evaluation. Each criterion is assigned a certain number of points.
37
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 37
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
cia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of
the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his
On December 23, 1992 the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative
order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots
under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its
implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of
port services.
Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.  He 11
concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes,
was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No.
857, mandating it “to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port
district.”
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
“The exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does
not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of those
affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the
appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of
the appointee’s performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in
PPA’s jurisdictional area.” (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
 Rollo, pp. 36-40.
11
38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
Finally, as regards the alleged “absence of ample prior consultation” before the issuance of the
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires
the PPA to consult with “relevant Government agencies.” Since the PPA Board of Directors is
composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the
Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the
Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his
knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law
has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September
6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: 12
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
1. 1.Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. 2.PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and
void;
 3. 3.The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92
and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.”
_______________
 Ibid., pp. 29-35.
12
39
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 39
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized
pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines,
Inc.  Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an
13
interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any “withdrawal or
alteration” of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not
conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned
about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their
case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the
Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must
be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.”
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is
a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When
one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of
procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself,
not merely the procedures by which the law would be
_______________
 145 SCRA 268 (1986).
13
40
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”  PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this
14
distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect
of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it
has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that “(a)s long as a
15
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.”
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times  before 16
the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to
persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, “which issues the
licenses of pilots after administering the pilots’ examinations,” was not consulted,  the facts show
17
that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly
represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there
being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the
Philippine Coast Guard need to be consulted. 18
_______________
 De Leon, Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, 1991, p. 81.
14
 G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997, citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, October 16, 1997,
15
and Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, 322 Phil. 573.
 Questioned twice before the DOTC, appealed to the OP, before finding affirmative relief with the RTC of Manila.
16
 Rollo, p. 55.
17
 Ibid., p. 163.
18
41
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 41
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of
the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. 19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of
harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and
can only be “withdrawn or shortened” by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of
law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where
PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.
Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he
exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation
of, or interference with, property rights without due process.”  He merely expressed the opinion
20
that “(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby,
and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of
their profession.” As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and
tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals.
Licensure is “the granting of
_______________
 Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989), citing 73 C.J.S. 452-453.
19
 Rollo, p. 38.
20
42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
license especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for
professional practice) in accordance with established standards.”  A license is a right or permission
21
granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such
license, would be illegal. 22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass
through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but fiveexaminations, each followed by
actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
“Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that here (sic)
in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional
examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel
for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3)
For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner
and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to
be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots.”
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage
until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92,
“(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs
or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only,” and
_______________
 Webster’s Third World International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 1304.
21
 53 C.J.S. 445, citing 37 C.J. 168. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 210 Phil. 244 (1983), the Court defined a license as
22
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. It is not a contract between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted. Neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation.
43
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 43
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
“(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority
after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training,
they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by
the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an
annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly
confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their
license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance” which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm.
In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-AO No. 08-92 are already covered by
PPA-MO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-
AO No. 04-92 is a “surplusage”  and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO No. 03-85 is
23
a comprehensive order setting forth the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” It provides, inter alia, for the
qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots—
matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order.
_______________
 Rollo, p. 65.
23
44
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
No. L-63915. December 29, 1986. *
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers
to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication.—After a careful study of this provision and
of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents’ insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for
the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power
and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial court’s finding of
animosity between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the
number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which have
reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-
AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in
accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly
always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the
court a quodated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
     Martinez, J., No part.
Petition dismissed; Assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due
process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially
concerned with fair procedure. (Azul vs. Castro, 133 SCRA 271 [1984])
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare
45
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 45
National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds
to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA
236 [1996])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Same;  Same; The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with.—lt
is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of
________________
 EN BANC.
*
447
 VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986 447
Tañada vs. Tuvera
it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but
simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
Same; Same; For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer
not only to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws; administrative
rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act;
but not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only.
—The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
Same; Same; Same.—We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Same; Same; Same.—Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
448
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
48
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Same; Same; Same.—Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Same; Same; Same.—Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Same; Same; Local Governments;  Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not
covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by
the Local Government Code.—However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the
Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
Same; Same; Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.—We agree that the
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents
of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is
not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act
for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the
Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
449
VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986 449
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Same;  Same; Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere.—At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a
law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice
but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or
after a different period provided by the legislature.
Same;  Same; Laws must be published as soon as possible.—We also hold that the publication must be
made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is
that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by
a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
FERNAN, J., concurring:
Statutes;  The requirement of prior publication seeks to prevent abuses by the lawmakers and ensure
the people's right to information.—The categorical statement by this Court on the need f or publication bef ore
any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time,
ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; To interpret Art 2, NCC literally so as to authorize a statute to be
effective upon its promulgation without publication is to make it collide with the due process clause.—A
statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly
interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
450
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
50
Tañada vs. Tuvera
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The
enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has
been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government
and its people.
Same;  Same; Specification by law that the Official Gazette shall be the organ where statutes must be
published before they take effect may be amended to authorize publication in other newspapers.—At the same
time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from
any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A
specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article
2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted. Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed
and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
451
VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986 451
Tañada vs. Tuvera
dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ha ve no binding f
orce and eff ect.''
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. Specifically, they ask the f ollowing questions:
1
1. 1.What is meant by '' law of public nature'' or  general applicability"?
"
2. 2.Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. 3.What is meant by "publication"?
4. 4.Where is the publication to be made?
5. 5.When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment  required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
3
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply  refuting these arguments. Came
4
next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder
in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Sec-
________________
 Rollo, pp. 242-250.
1
 Ibid, pp. 244-248.
2
 Id., pp. 271-280.
3 law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
 Id., pp. 288-299.
4
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
tion 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency or f or particular persons did not have to be
published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight
members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,  is the Civil Code which
6
did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
________________
 Id., pp. 320-322.
5
 136 SCRA 27, 46.
6
453
VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986 453
Tañada vs. Tuvera
to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as
a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they
did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may af fect bef ore they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly
applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements, The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enf orce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head
of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inf orm the public of the contents of the laws, As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a
455
VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.  The evident purpose was to withhold
7
rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette  and that six others felt that publication could be made
8 Tañada vs. Tuvera
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.  One reserved his vote  and another
9 10
merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made.  It
is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on
this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it
does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
_______________
 Rollo, p. 24,6.
7 A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang
 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo Relova.
8
 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren I. Plana, Serafin P.
9
Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.
 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
10
 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.
11
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That
function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to
give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although
not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time. Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the
instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no
further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
455 concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
457
VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986 457
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
11
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,
Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., I concur. I add a few observations in a separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., I concur. Please see separate opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
FERNAN, J.:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani
Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation
had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions,
etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President's nephew and the other imposing a
tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the
issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball
players Jeff rey Moore and Dennis George Still.
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
publication before any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the
lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and
to information on matters of public concern.
CONCURRING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the
Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not
be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment
and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which
are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout
history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 433
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
Nos. L-50581-50617. January 30, 1982. * Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
RUFINO V. NUÑEZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Courts;  Graft and Corrupt Practice Act;Martial Law; The President by virtue of
the 1976 amendments was conferred continuous law-making powers until Martial Law shall have been lifted.
—It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create
the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding.While such competence under the 1973
Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments
made clear that he as incumbent President “shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall
have been lifted” Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on
Elections decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated “all doubts as to the
legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, * * *.” As the opinion
went on to state: “It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing
in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.”
Same; Same; Same; The Bill of Rights must give way to specific provisions of the Constitution. The
creation of the Sandiganbayan was provided for in the Constitution in response to a problem. Petitioner
should therefore, have anticipated that a different procedure that would be prescribed for that tribunal will not
be violative of equal protection clause.—The premise underlying petitioner’s contention on this point is set
forth in his memorandum thus: “1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal
protection, because—appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion;—appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;
and—there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both
law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme
Court”
_______________
 EN BANC.
* regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penal-
434
bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government
and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is
embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in
Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official
Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil
Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
459
VOL. 146, DECEMBER 29, 1986 459
Averia, Jr. vs. Caguioa
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil
Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.
All laws shall immediately upon their approval, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from publication.
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
34
That is hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court
through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” To repeat, the Constitution specifically
makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as
petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, a 1949 decision,
that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal
protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific provision,” in that decision, one reserving to “Filipino
citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.” The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It
is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.
Same;  Same; Same;  The Presidential Decree (P.D. 1486, as amended by P.D. 1606) creating the
Sandiganbayan and prescribing its own unique rules of procedure and appeal is not an ex post facto
legislation.—The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision
of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is being diluted or
eroded efficacy wise * * *.” A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of
persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by
petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of
Justice Makasiar: “An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to
435

VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 435
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
ty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above
definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The “lawful protection” to which an accused “has become
entitled” is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for
in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter.
Same; Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan Decree does not dilute the right to appeal even if no
intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeals is prescribed therein.—Even from the standpoint then of the
American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal.
Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review
coining from this Court. x x x Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive
petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place,
his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among
the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence
of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.” Then if convicted, this Court has the
duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of
the facts. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due
course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been
overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the
quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of
such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Due process in criminal proceedings defined.—But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to
a filament. We are to keep the balance true. What is re-
436
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
36
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
quired for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson this
Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly identified it with “a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of defense.” In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the
accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction
being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the
sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered
the decision is one of competent jurisdiction.
Same; Same; A review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of
the presumption of innocence. The law creating the Sandiganbayan could stand improvement.—It is true that
other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now,
however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed
in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution .That is
a proposition too plain to be contested It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either
that a review by certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Teehankee, J.:
I concur with the grounds of Justice Makasiar’s dissent and reserve the right to file a separate
opinion.
Barredo, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Courts; The Supreme Court must be given its deserved superior status over the
Sandiganbayan.—Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the provision in
question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I am just
adding my little voice of protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus
give the Supreme Court its deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
437
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 437
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
Same;  Same; It should not be surprising that the structure and procedure of the Sandiganbayan should
be different from other courts.—It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure
in the Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts. Constitutionally
speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971
Constitution. To be particularly noted must be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution that the National
Assembly “shall create”, it is not under the Article on the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on
Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it to be “a special court.” To my mind, such
“special” character endowed to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it
should be treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial power, and so
under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court.
Same;  Same; The Sandiganbayan being a collegiate court it is improper to make its decisions
appealable to another collegiate court.—Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously
improper to make appeals therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of judges
composing it. We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan’s primary and primordial reason for being is to
insure the people’s faith and confidence in our public officers more than it used to be .We have only to recall
that the activism and restlessness in the later ‘60’s and the early ‘70’s particularly of the youth who are always
concerned with the future of the country were caused by their conviction that graft and corruption was already
intolerably pervasive in the government and naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and
more expeditious remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary
counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.
Same;  Same; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court is not supposed to re-weigh evidence, but only to
determine its substantiality.—Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court’s power of review
over decisions of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to legal
questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but only to determine
its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard to say the contrary, why should
We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of the Sandigan-
438
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
38
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
bayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the
accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination of the
facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses.
Makasiar, J., concurring and dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Courts; Anti-Graft Act; Section 7, Paragraph 3 of P.D. 1606 denies petitioner
due process and equal protection of the law.—It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the
law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and
corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and
government-owned and controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the
right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights
remains as restrictions on the law-maker in creating the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same.—It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon
the due process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to
the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise
known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the
petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against him.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same.—Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that
the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise
limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion,
and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving
offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the Court
of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Same; Limitation of the review powers of the Supreme Court over the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan to only the issues proper for certiorari violates the constitutional presumption of
439
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 439
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
innocence.—Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court
gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by
substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt
cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded
from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is
thereby deprived of the constitutional power to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt—by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability—and therefore
subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in
other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and
corruption.
Same; Same; Same; Present number of Sandiganbayan magistrates denies an accused equal
protection of the law as it diminishes chances of an acquittal.—The fact that there are only 6 members now
composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members
from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the
division dissents. This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an
acquittal. Applied to the petitioner. Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as
against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to
complete its membership of nine.
Same; Same; Same; The law arbitrarily placed the Sandigan-bayan on same level as the Court of
Appeals which should not be the case.—The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising appellate
jurisdiction over all cases—criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions, special proceedings, and
administrative cases—appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has been effectively downgraded and discriminated against
by the Sandiganbayan Decree.—P.D. No. 1606, effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme
Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that “the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be
440
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
40
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan” (italics
supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme
Court.
Same; Same; Same; P. D. 1606 violates the guarantee against ex post pacto law.—As heretofore
stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all persons accused of malversation of
public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court’s judgment of
conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also
on both questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate
tribunals on both factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by
the petitioner in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No.
1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly committed prior to
1978.
Same; Same; Same; Section 9 of P.D. 1606 clashes with the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court in that it authorizes the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules without requiring approval thereof
by the Supreme Court.—Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own
rules of procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the
constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of court for all courts of the
land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
Same; Same; Same; P.D. 1606 subverts the Supreme Courts power of supervision over inferior courts
in that it allows the Sandiganbayan to administer its own affairs.—Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing
the Sandiganbayan to “administer its own internal affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its
divisions, the allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its business,” without requiring the
approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of supervision over the
Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
Same;  Same; Same;  Certain provisions of P.D. 1606 are unconstitutional.—All the challenged
provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are separable from the
441
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 441
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared
unconstitutional without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply determine
what is to be done, who is to do it. and how to do it—the test for a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda
vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta. Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15
acknowledges such separability although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but
not necessarily binding on, the Supreme Court, which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the
challenged portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Fernandez, J.:
I concur in the separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar.
De Castro, J.:
I concur. I also agree with Justice Makasiar’s observations on matters not covered by the majority
opinion.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special
Court, the Sandiganbayan, with “jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law.”  It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential
1
Decree.  Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an
2
________________
 Article XIII, Section 5 of the Constitution.
1
 Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606, both issued in 1978.
2
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
anti-graft statute was passed,  to be supplemented five years later by another act,  the validity of
3 4
which was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc,  a 1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court:
5
“Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality
in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its
objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called
for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.”  It should occasion no6
surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the continuity until martial law shall have been lifted.”  Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in
17

need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision. Aquino Jr. v.Commission on Elections  decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice
18

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Makasiar, it dissipated “all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President
Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa during the period of Martial Law, * * *.”  As the opinion went on to state: “It is not a grant of
19

through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent
co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.  The informations were filed respectively on
7
President during the period of Martial Law.” 20

February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he 2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to
filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds.  A week later, respondent
8
nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v.
Court denied such motion.  There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the
9
Land Tenure Administration:  “The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all,
21

same fate.  Hence this petition for certiorari and pro-

10
that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be
________________ excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the
very essence of the idea of law.”  There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact
22

 Republic Act No. 1379.

3
exists “cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
 Republic Act No. 3019 (1960).
take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given
4

 L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424

5

 Ibid, 435.
6 a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be
 Petition, par. 2, enumerating such criminal cases as 027, 029, 054, 055, 059, 062-067, 111, 119, 120, 124-126, 130, 131,
7
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
139, 141, 142, 145, 153, 154, 157, 160, 161, 163-165, 167, 168, 171, 175, 179 and 186. Cf. Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
1605.
property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
 Ibid, par. 3.
8 clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
 Ibid, par. 4.
9
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
 Ibid, par. 5.
10
discrimination that finds no support in reason.”  Classification is thus not ruled out, it being suffi-
23

443 _______________
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 443
 1976 Amendments, par. 5.
17

Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan  L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.

18

hibition. It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the  Ibid, 298.
19

 Ibid, 298-299.
respondent Court is violative of the due process,  equal protection, and ex post facto  clauses of the
20

11
12 13

 L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

21

Constitution. 14
 Ibid, 434-435.
22

The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more effectively  Ibid, 435.
23

with dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether committed by government
officials or not, with the essential cooperation of the private citizens with whom they deal, cannot
of itself justify any departure from or disregard of constitutional rights. That is beyond question.
With due recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner  in his
pleadings butressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the
issues raised by the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General,  is of the view that the 16
invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been
demonstrated.
The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionally of such Decree cannot be
adjudged.
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
445
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 445
15
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
cient to quote from the Tuason decision anew “that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous.
If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated
in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.” 24

Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such
competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the
National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President “shall
continue to exercise legislative powers
_______________
 Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
11
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
3. The premise underlying petitioner’s contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum
thus: “1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal protection, because—
appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion;—appeal likewise
was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;
and—there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of
the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of
right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter to the Supreme Court.”  That is hardly convincing, considering that the classification
25

 Ibid.
satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera  requiring that it
12
26

 Ibid, Sec. 12.

13

 Memorandum of Petitioner, 1.
14 “must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
 Attorney Raymundo A. Armovit.
15
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
 Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato Puno and Trial Attorney Patria
16
each member of the class.”  To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation
27

Manalastas.
444
of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan

24
 Ibid
  Memorandum of Petitioner, 7-8.
25
 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
26
 Ibid 126.
27
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back
as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for
the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be
unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno,  a 1949 decision, that the general
28
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal
protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific provision,” in that decision, one reserving to
“Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.”  The scope of such a principle is
29
not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post
facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of
appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise * * *.”  A more searching scrutiny of its rationale
30
would demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas
Kami  decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding
31
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: “An ex post facto
law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
_______________
 83 Phil. 242.
28
 Ibid, 251.
29
 Memorandum of Petitioner, 7-9, 36.
30
 In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., L-32485, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429.
31
447
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 447
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done
was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty.”  Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of
32
petitioner. The “lawful protection” to which an accused “has become entitled” is qualified, not
given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has
spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo,  a 1949 decision, speaking through the then
33
Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine Justices then composing this
Court, excepting only the ponentehimself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death
sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes
committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.
5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition of what
is prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe,  decided in 1903. Thus: “An
34
ex post facto law has been defined as one—(a) Which makes an action done before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) Which alters the legal
_______________
 Ibid, 431.
32
 82 Phil. 524. It is worthy of mention that the then Justice Paras was the sole member of the Court relying on the 1908
33
decision, United States v. Gomez, 12 Phil. 279, cited by petitioner.
 2 Phil. 74.
34
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.”  There is relevance to the next
35
paragraph of the opinion of Justice Cooper: “The case clearly does not come within this definition,
nor can it be seen in what way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his
disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended as
furnishing the means for the correction of errors. The possibility that the judge of the Court of
First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only
foundation for the claim. A person can have no vested right in such a possibility.” 36
6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull,  a 1798 decision of the United States
37
Supreme Court. Even the very language as to what falls within the category of this provision is
well-nigh identical. Thus: “I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words
and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law; and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed 4th Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to
convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.”  The 38
opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: “The
expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution,
and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and
judicious Sir William Blackstone
_______________
 Ibid, 77-78.
35
 Ibid, 78.
36
 3 Dallas 386.
37
 Ibid, 390-391.
38
449
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 449
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His
opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who I
esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of
government.” 39
7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utah.  As it was decided by the American Supreme Court
40
in April of 1898—the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American
sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired—it is understandable why he did so. Certainly, the
exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an author, has a cutting edge,
but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional the
challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous
pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan made this realistic
appraisal: “The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that an accused has
no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by
their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him.”  An 1894 decision of the American Supreme
41
Court, Duncan v. Missouri  was also cited by petitioner. The opinion-of the then Chief Justice
42
Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically stated that “the
prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new
ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing laws surrounds the
person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition.”
_______________
 Ibid, 391.
39
 170 US 343 (1898).
40
 Ibid, 352.
41
 152 US 377.
42
 Ibid, 382.
43
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully
argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No.
1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. The test as
to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-
cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking “from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time
of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him.” The crucial words are
“vital for the protection of life and liberty” of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission
of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the
protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or
guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices
from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five
justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judg-
ment.”  Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of
44
law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps
excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What
cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due
course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of
innocence  has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no
45
way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been
satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight
________________
 Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1606.
44
 According to Article IV, Section 19 insofar as pertinent: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
45
innocent untill the contrary is proved, * * *.”
451
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo. Thus: “Accusation is not, according to the
46
fundamental law, as synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that
culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their
freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always
been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the
state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that
on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.”  This 47
43
Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this fundamental and basic right to be
presumed innocent has been disregarded.  It does seem farfetched and highly unrealistic to
48
conclude that the omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss
“vital protection” of liberty.
_______________
 L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.
46
 Ibid, 64.
47
 To speak of 1981 decisions alone, the judgment of acquittal was handed down in the following cases: People v.
48
Novales, L-47400, Jan. 19, 1981, 102 SCRA 86; People v. Mendoza, L 48275, Feb. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 122; People v.
Duero, L-52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379; People v. Tabayoyong, L-31084, May 29, 1981, 104 SCRA 724;. Perez v.
People, L-43548, June 29, 1981; People v. Anggot, L-38101-02, June 29, 1981; People v. Utrela, L-38172, July 15,
1981; People v. Francisco, L-43789, July 15, 1981; People v. Cuison, L-51363, July 25, 1981; People v. Pisalvo, L-32886,
Oct. 23, 1981; Peo-
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive
forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its
discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as
“the tenor and thrust” of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v.
Massachusetts.  Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words,
49
Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: “The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in
maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of
an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair
trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and
inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due
to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.”  What is required for compliance with
50
the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson,  this Court with Justice
51
Tuason as ponente, succinctly identified it with “a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of defense.”  In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied
52
if the accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with
his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity
for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a
_______________
pie v. Verges, L-36436, Oct. 23, 1981; People v. Tapao, L-41704, Oct. 23, 1981; People v. Delmendo, L-32146, Nov. 23,
1981; People v. Orpilla, L-30621, Dec. 14, 1981; People v. Marquez, L-31403, Dec. 14, 1981; People v. Rosales, L-31694,
Dec. 14, 1981; People v. Felipe, L-54335, Dec. 14, 1981. In People v. Corpus, L-36234, Feb. 10, 1981, 102 SCRA 674, of the
451 10 accused, three were acquitted.
 291 US 97 (1934).
49
 Ibid, 122.
50
 87 Phil 418 (1950).
51
 Ibid, 422.
52
453
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 453
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent
jurisdiction.” The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American
53
Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States   decided during
54
the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: “This court has had frequent occasion to
consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally
speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within
the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.”
55
10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.
The decision does not go as far as passing on any question not affecting the right of petitioner to a
trial with all the safeguards of the Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the Decree could
have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called
for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that
in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a
way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution.
That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval. Nor should there
be any doubt either that a review by certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan
calls for strict observance of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
     Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
_______________
 Cf. Vera v. People, L-31218, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711, 717.
53
 218 US 272.
54
 Ibid, 279-280.
55
454
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
54
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
     Teehankee, J., I concur with the grounds of Justice Makasiar’s dissent and reserve the
right to file a separate opinion.
     Barredo, J., concurs and adds a separate opinion.
     Makasiar, J., submits a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
     Fernandez, J., concurs in the separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar.
     De Castro, J., I concur. I also agree with Justice Makasiar’s observation on matters not
covered in the majority opinion.
     Concepcion, Jr. and Ericta, JJ., did not take part.
CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I concur.
I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned colleague, Mr.
Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has unduly and improperly placed
the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the Supreme Court insofar as the matter of automatic
releases of appropriations is concerned, which definitely should not be the case. I must say
emphatically that if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan’s independence, it
is certain-ly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court’s independence is unworthy of similar
protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the provision in
question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I
am just adding my little voice of protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud
and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
455
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 455
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional strictures expressed by Justice Makasiar. I
am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished Chief Justice, whose learning in
constitutional law is duly respected here and abroad, that the arguments against the
constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics lack sufficient persuavity.
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the
Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts.
Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the judicial structure
designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must be the fact that the
mandate of the Constitution that the National Assembly “shall create”, it is not under the Article
on the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers . More, the
Constitution ordains it to be “a special court.” To my mind, such “special” character endowed to
the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it should be treated
differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial power, and so under
Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court. And in this respect, I agree
with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional
necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect
unless approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section 5(5) of the
Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts, “special” as it may be.
I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the
Sandiganbayan and the special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe
the constitutional injunction against ex-post factolaws. The creation of a special court to take
cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a constitutional abnormality.
Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of offenses which in the public interest must
be dealt with more expeditiously in
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make appeals
therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of judges composing it. We
must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan’s primary and primordial reason for being is to insure
the people’s faith and confidence in our public officers more than it used to be. We have only to
recall that the activism and restlessness in the later ‘60’s and the early ‘70’s particularly of the
youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their conviction
that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and naturally they
demanded and expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies. Thus, the
Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.
It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the
Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure, and the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not insulated by the Charter against legislature’s
attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court that cannot modify or
amend, much less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the
Sandiganbayan cannot be unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be legitimately created to
try offenses already committed, like the People’s Court of Collaboration times, I cannot see how
the new procedure of appeal from such courts can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the
constitutional requirement is complied with. That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the
conviction of the accused from the factual
457
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 457
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long as the evidence relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court’s power of review over
decisions of the former even in criminal cases, has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to
legal questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but
only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard to
say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I
believe that the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and
the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the appellate courts
should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges, except in cases where pivotal
points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule apply to the
review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on
an appeal in a criminal cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no
power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers
and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan, whose three
justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-
clad guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever be finally convicted
without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees of due
process as well as equal protection of the law and against the enactment of  ex post facto laws, but
also the constitutional provisions on the power of
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post facto laws, have
been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority opinion; hence, there is no
need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on
the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of
supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of P.D. No.
1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and therefore can be given
effect minus the challenged portions, which are separable from the valid provisions.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis—resist from the very beginning
any attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two
appellate courts—first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and
malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by
public officers, who, under the Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal—
to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious
discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better
than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the in-
459
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 459
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
tellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate
tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to
create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption
committed by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and
government-owned and -controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the
lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the
Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the law-maker in creating the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive.
It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process
clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the
Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
otherwise known as R. A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural due
process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime
charged against him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548,
555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil.
Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion hereunder
concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of ex post facto laws.
2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits
the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal
cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are
reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court.
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court’s judgment is
subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with
greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices
that may be engendered during the trial.
3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan
only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court
gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is
supported by the substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof
beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court
under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted
before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to
determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the operation of
—by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability—and therefore subverts the the courts.
constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in
other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious II
than graft and corruption.
4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS -
Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5
thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the
1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22,-1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law is one
pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote,
which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony than the law
the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the Court to
required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a person accused of a crime of some
sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority
lawful protection to which he has become entitled. The indictment against herein petitioner
of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
461
accused him of graft and corruption committed “from July 20, 1977 up to and including January
12, 1978” (Annex A, p. 24, rec), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10,
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 461 1978 by P.D. No. 1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978.
At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating. As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all
Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated by persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to
the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to constitute a special division of five a review of a trial court’s judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact
members. The fact that there are only 6 members now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both questions of fact
463
choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, intead of 6 members from whom to select the two
other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents. This VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 463
situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an acquittal. Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as
and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both
against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be
factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the
appointed to complete its membership of nine.
petitioner in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by
P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other
P.D. No. 1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly
defendants indicted before other trial courts.
committed prior to 1978.
5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places
2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of
expressly the Sandiganbayan on “the same level as the Court of Appeals.” As heretofore stated,
innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to rebut the
the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely
presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality
limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruption as well as violation of the
and quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal conviction.
prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the government, its
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which was not
instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an
so prior to its promulgation.
appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases—criminal cases, civil cases,
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People’s Court exclusively trying cases against
special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases—appealable from the trial
national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to the Supreme Court (Sec. 13,
courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
CA 682); because at the time the People’s Court Act or CA. No. 682 was enacted on September
is too patent to require extended demonstration.
25, 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer existing then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945
6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being
by Executive Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmeña soon after the Liberation.
downgraded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior
Consequently, the People’s Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals which
to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that “the appropriation for the
was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13 of the People’s
Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with the schedule submit-
462
Court Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari. The Supreme
Court can review all judgments of the People’s Court both on questions of fact and of law.
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan III
ted by the Sandiganbayan” (italics supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the
annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING
funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT
upon request therefor by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is
hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court—the Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of
highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentary-presidential procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the con-
government—the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the 464
Batasang Pambansa—emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
can be jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the

Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
stitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of court for all courts
of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER
INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to “administer its own internal affairs,
to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them
and other matters relating to its business,” without requiring the approval of the Supreme Court
also contravenes the constitutional power of supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior
trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select
and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to remove
them for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or disapprove
such appointments and to review such removals, aggravates the violation of the constitutional
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts.
3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires the Sandiganbayan to submit an annual
report directly to the President without coursing the same to the Supreme Court for review and
approval.
That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General
Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that “all appropriations provided herein for the
Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding Justice, x x x” (par. 1, Sp. Provisions
XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This particular pro vision
impairs likewise the constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme
Court over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be
465
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 465
Nuñez vs. Sandiganhayan
emphasized that the same General Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides that the
disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit
Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian Relations is expressly subject to the approval of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the
Sandiganbayan does not include the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the
constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.
All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13
are separable from the rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can
therefore be declared unconstitutional without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The
valid provisions amply determine what is to be done, who is to do it, and now to do it—the test for
a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta, Oct. 20, 1970, 35
SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability although
under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily binding on, the
Supreme Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the challenged portions are
inseparable from the valid portions.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written therein
the phrase “of the same level as the Court of Appeals.”
[No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more
members of the Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without affecting
the completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606; because in the
absence of said Paragraph 3, Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, can
apply.
However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain valid
provided it is understood that
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
the powers delegated thereunder to the Sandiganbayan are deemed subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Petition dismissed
Notes.—A hearing to determine the validity of the information for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is indispensable before issuance of suspension order against an
employee charged for violation of said Act. Certiorari lies if no hearing was conducted. ( Bayos vs.
Villaluz, 89 SCRA 285.)
The equal protection clause of the Constitution allows reasonable classification. (Anucension
vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350.)
The prohibition against an ex post facto law is not applicable to an interest which is not penal
in character. (Central Azucarera de Don Pedro vs. Court of Tax Appeals,20 SCRA 344.)
A legislation which affects with equal force all persons of the same class and not those of
another is not class legislation and does not infringe the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of laws. (Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA
336.)
The Sandiganbayan, not the Court of First Instance, has exclusive jurisdiction over the
offenses of complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents allegedly committed by
a government employee. (Manuel vs. De Guzman, 96 SCRA 398.)
Police power is the authority of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with the
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burden in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the State. (Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195.)
Valid source of statute may be challenged by one who will sustain direct injury of its
enforcement. (Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333.)
The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of Martial Law is now a conceded
valid act. (Sanidad vs. Commis-
467
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 467
People vs. Mendoza
sion on Elections, 73 SCRA 333.)
The public right dogma as a means of keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism is no longer looked upon as an inhibition. (Burroughs, Limited vs. Morfe, 69
SCRA 401.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
1. 1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the Court of Industrial
Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—The Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.
R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of
636
63 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
6 2. "2.Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
1. this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While
the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only
must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or
any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a
conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation
which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the decision.
637
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 537
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
DECISION on motion for reconsideration on motion for new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-
entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his
motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. "1.Que un contrato de trabajo, así individual como colectivo, sin término fijo de
duración o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera
de las partes o cada vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios según
costumbre en la localidad o cuando se termine la obra;
colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus
trabajos por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fábrica en la cual trabajan, dejan de
ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. "3.Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
obreros sin tiempo fijo de duración y sin ser para una obra determinada y que se niega
a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es
culpable de práctica injusta ni incurre en la sanción penal del artículo 5 de la Ley No.
213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros
pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser
empleados suyos por terminación del contrato en virtud del paro."
638
638 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. "1.That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
2. "2.That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor
Union, Inc., from work.
3. "3.That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
 4. "4.That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U. S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. "5.That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and
5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. "6.That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source
of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made
applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor
legislation of American origin where industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. "7.That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
639
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 539
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
1. "8.That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. "9.That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be hereinaf ter stated With ref erence to the
motion f or a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it
is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall
proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make
several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before
it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of
the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken
contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and
conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own
views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part
of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
640
640 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or f arm-laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours
of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers
and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the
Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the
course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by
amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to
the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting f or such industry or locality a minimum
641
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 541
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation
for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory
arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not
be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing f urther industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however,
that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of
an administrative
642
642 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
1. (1)The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, -58 S. Ct.
773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."
2. (2)Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
3. (3)"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates
from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power.
4. (4)Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650,
81 Law. ed. 965.) "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
643
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 643
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater
Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) * * * The statute
provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57
Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565,
569, 68 Law. ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct.
220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroboratborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed.
No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence pre-sented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of
inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any
644
644 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any
matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as
the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
1. (6)The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial
Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board
or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
2. (7)The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as
to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual ,basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged
645
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 645
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
that "the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted
to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work" and
this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers' Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence
and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached
to the petition to prove his substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are
of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang
Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussion, we have
come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
Motion for new trial granted and cause remanded with instructions.
646
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93891. March 11, 1991. *
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR
TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
Judgment; Order; Pollution Adjudication Board; Instances when an ex-parte cease and desist order
may be issued by the Pollution Adjudication Board under Sec. 7(a) of P.D. No. 984.—We note that under the
above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the
Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an “immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed “the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC].” On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an “immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” exists before an ex parte cease and
desists order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed “the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC].” In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set
by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence
of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not
yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an  ex
parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life.” Since the applicable
standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable
kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life” remains necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law;  Police Power; Ex-parte cease and desist orders issued by
the Pollution Adjudication Board are permitted under the Police Power of the State; Reasons.—Ex parte cease
and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of
the Philippines cannot be made to
_______________
 THIRD DIVISION.
*
113
VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 113
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as
the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. The Board’s ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar
temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply
absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not
constitutionally entitled to reduce their capital costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by
imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding
the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
PETITION for review from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.
     Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.
646 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
El Pueblo de Filipinas vs. Orfida
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board (“Board”) asks us to review the Decision and Resolution
promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. No. SP 18821 entitled “Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication
Board.” In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287dismissing private respondent
Solar Textile Finishing Corporation’s (“Solar”) petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parteOrder directing Solar immediately to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were
discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros
River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as
follows:
“Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about
30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on
05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final outfall
outside of the plant’s compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on 06 September 1988
showed that respondent’s Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater
generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly
discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the
remaining 20% was channelled into the plant’s existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the
analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color
units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply
with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of
its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installations and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros
River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the
requirements and until further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED.” 1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several
_______________
 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
1
115
VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 115
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
inspections of Solar’s plant:
1. a.inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National
Pollution Control Commission (“NPCC”), the predecessor of the Board;  and 2
 2. b.the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (“DENR”).
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar’s wastewater treatment plant was non-
operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which
was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The
remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar’s non-operational
wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar’s effluents showed the presence
of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its
Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution
issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of
the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24
April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another
inspection and evaluation of Solar’s wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board
directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and
evaluation within thirty (30) days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar’s
_______________
 Section 19 of Executive Order No. 192, dated 10 June 1987, abolished the NPCC and transferred its powers and
2 order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the
functions relating to the adjudication of pollution cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984 to the Board.
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the
Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board’s subsequent
Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar’s petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here
assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for
further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and
void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:
“x x x. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board]
may take relative to the projected ‘inspection and evaluation’ of appellant’s [Solar’s] water
treatment facilities.” 3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders
of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case
might be moot and academic, “larger issues” demanded that the question of due process be settled.
Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
1. 1.its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
2. 2.the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition
for certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex
parte orders to suspend the
_______________
 Rollo, p. 33.
3
117
VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 117
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
operations of an establishment when there is prima facieevidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the
reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board’s own rules and regulations, an ex
parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life.” In the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar’s wastewater discharged posed
such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar’s contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized
petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
“P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. x x x Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte
establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The
said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person
prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent
court.” (Italics supplied)
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an  ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an
establishment pose an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life,” or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed “the allowable standards set by the
[NPCC].” On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an “immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
welfare, or to animal or plant life” exists before an ex partecease and desist order may be issued. It
is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed “the allowable standards set by
the [NPCC].” In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by
the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima
facieevidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the
effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the
Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof
that the wastewater or material involved presents an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety
or welfare or to animal or plant life.” Since the applicable standards set by the Commission
existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or
waste discharge, the general standard of an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life” remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set
by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an “immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.”
 Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982  sets out the maximum permissible levels of
4 120
physical and chemical substances which “effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
industrial plants” must not exceed “when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B,
C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations.” The waters of Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978
“Inland         November September
NPCC Rules and Regulations,  which in part provides that:
5

“Section 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe Waters         1986 1988
and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified
(Class C & D 7
        Report 8
Report 9

according to the following beneficial usages:

_______________           Station 1 Station 1
  mg./l.     mg.l.    
 78 Official Gazette No. 1, p. 52 (4 January 1982).
4

 74 Official Gazette No. 23, p. 4453 (5 June 1978).

5
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
119
  solids in     solids in    
VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 119
  mg./l.     mg./l. f)  
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
f) BOD in 80   BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
(a) Fresh Surface Water
  mg./l.     mg./l.    
Classification        Best usage
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease    
xxx xxx xxx
  in mg./l.     mg./l.    
Class D        For agriculture, irrigation, livestock
h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93  
         watering and industrial cooling and processing.
  in mg./l.”     mg./l. MBAS    
xxx xxx xxx
      i) Dissolved 0  
(Emphases supplied)    
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar’s wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12         Oxygen, mg./l.    
November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following identical finding:       j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
“a. For legal action in [view of] violation of Section 103 of the implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No.
984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982.” 6
        Matter, mg./l.    
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982       k) Total Dis 800 610
alongside the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the
        solved Solids    
following results:
        mg./l.    
“Inland         November September
      l) Total Solids 1,400 690
Waters         1986 1988
        mg./l.    
(Class C & D 7
        Report 8
Report 9

      m) Turbidity    
          Station 1 Station 1
        NTU/ppm. SiO3 70  
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:
  platinum     (Apparent     “Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation,
was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting
  cobalt     Color)     dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new
  units           owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March
1986 (sic).
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7 The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature     during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal
Division a re-inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted;
  ture in  C
o
    (oC)     hence, this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in    
_______________ Commission by undertaking dyeing
121
6
 Rollo, pp. 64 and 66. VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 121
7
 78 Official Gazette No. 1, p. 53 (4 January 1982).
8
 Rollo, p. 68. Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
9
 Id., p. 66.
operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples
taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is
recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm x x x.” 10
The September 1988 inspection report’s conclusions were:
1. “1.The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the
inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was
estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced
directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by
means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant’s existing
wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
2. 2.The WTP was noted not yet fully operational—some accessories were not yet
installed. Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared
seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the
collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such
collection tank].
3. 3.A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of
the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD
and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory result).” 11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence
before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar’s plant exceeded the maximum allowable
levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was
adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to
note that the previous owner of the plant facility—Fine Touch Finishing Corporation—had been
issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying
out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the
new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on
_______________
 Rollo, p. 67; emphases supplied.
10
 Id., p. 65; emphases supplied.
11
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the
results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained
from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988
re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other
words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the
applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its
continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinerejos River,
presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant (“WTP”) in
an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,  the
Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
1. “1.No mayor’s permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether
there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a
business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the
Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he
may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emission in the operation of the business.
2. 2.The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor “not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area,” so that petitioner was ordered to
stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: 
x x x      x x x      x x x
_______________
 G.R. No. 94759, promulgated 21 January 1991.
12
123
VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 123
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
1. (3)Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
(Annex A-2, petition)
1. 3.This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels (Annex A-B, petition). x x x.
2. 4.The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the
fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and
that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition) 
x x x      x x x      x x x
3. 6.While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good
only up to May 25, 1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort
to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution
and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.”
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government
official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with
the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with
or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that
here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of
course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
12
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise
of police power. The Board’s ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have
compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case
have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational
basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and
operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its
safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution
statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the  ex
parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board
itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where
such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That
such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause
of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board’s decision rendered after the
public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance
with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A
subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to
seek nullification of the Board’s Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the
Court of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to
continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then
another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned
Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded
that that Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board,
the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar’s petition for certiorari. It
125
VOL. 195, MARCH 11, 1991 125
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 523
Non vs. Dames II
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990. * Non vs. Dames II
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON,
LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO,
GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES,
petitioners, vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional
Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its
president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN,
respondents.
Schools and Universities; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Imposition of sanctions on students
requires observance of procedural due process.—There are withal minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
Same; Same; Contracts; Contracts between school and students not ordinary; It is impressed with
public interest.—The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract.
It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions.
Same; Same; Same; A school cannot refuse to enrol a student on the simple ground that his contract
expires every end of a semester.—Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
524
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar
did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No.
SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the
Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby
REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board’s Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
     Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision and resoluton set aside.
Notes.—Decisions of National Water Resources Council on water rates fixing disputes should
be appealed to Regional Trial Courts. (BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 543.)
There has to be a measure of finality to unappealed administrative decisions insofar as the
department or agency is concerned. (Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 150 SCRA 601.)
——o0o——
126
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
24
“[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester
for collegiate courses,” which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired. The
“termination of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that
a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected
and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the
balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was
enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole
semester before he is given his credentials for transfer.
Same;  Same; Same;  Exclusion of a student for academic deficiency where the real cause of action for
doing so is related to possible breach of discipline—staging of a mass action and rally—violates tenets of fair
play.—On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner
expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that
the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied
that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988
and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing
grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline
not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Same;  Same; Same;  Enrolment in another school no bar for readmission.—With regard to petitioner
Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not bar
him from seeking readmission in respondent school. Same; Same; Same; Penalty to be imposed on student for
breach of discipline must be commensurate to offense committed.—But the penalty that could have been
imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only
after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed upon
any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school’s rules and regulations duly
promulgated
525
 VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 525
Non vs. Dames II
and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.” But this matter of disciplinary proceedings
and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been
refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four
(4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the
disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and
would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent school
which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Concurring:
Schools and Universities; Contracts: The “termination of contract” doctrine should be overturned.—
In other words, I agree with Mme. Justice Cortes that the “termination of contract doctrine” should be
overturned for being a doctrinal error. It is now clear (it was quoted out of context before) that paragraph 137
of the Manual of Regulations for Public Schools falls under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees and is
intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It cannot be
construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
PADILLA, J., Concurring:
Schools and Universities; The school may still refuse re-enrollment on other grounds.—It would
indeed appear that, consistent with this constitutional priority given to education, par. 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools should be underscored. It provides that every student has the right to enroll in
any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations; x x x and
that “the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete the
course, without prejudice to his right to transfer.” It should be stressed, however, that this right of students to
enroll is not designed to leave schools completely helpless to deny enrollment or re-enrollment. For, par. 107
itself of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools still recognizes the right of the school to refuse
enrollment in case of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations of the school.
526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring:
Schools and Universities;  Mere fact that student rally disrupted classes is not a ground for imposition
of disciplinary action.—To be sure, the school may punish students for breach of discipline, as, say, for
breaking chairs or window panes or for disrupting classes in the course of a demonstration, but they may be
penalized for those actions alone and not because of the content of their speech or the vociferousness with
which it was said. Moreover, violations of school discipline must be judged on a case to case basis and
measured depending on gravity before school authorities may legitimately act. I do not think that the fact that a
demonstration has disrupted ongoing classes is a ground for penalizing students taking part therein because a
demonstration, from its very nature, is likely to disrupt classes. The school must convincingly show that the
demonstrators had deliberately turned to lawlessness, say, by barricading the schoolgate or the classroom
entrances or otherwise prevented non-demonstrating students or members of the faculty from attending a class
or finishing one by threats or intimidation. Only in that sense may school heads validly invoke “disruption of
classes.”
PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte, Br. 38. Dames II, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Antonio A. Ayo, Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr. for petitioners.
     Pedro A. Venida, Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echarofor private respondents.
CORTÉS, J.:
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v.
Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7,
to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one
semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract
between the student and the school is deemed terminated.
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte,
were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or par-
527
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 527
Non vs. Dames II
ticipating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the
protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point
at issue in this case but affirming the authority of the school regarding admission of students, save as a matter
of compassionate equity—when any of the petitioners would, at the least, qualify for re-enrolment, this petition
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1989
in this wise:
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., and that really there must be a
better way of treating students and teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme Court, the
Termination of Contract at the end of the semester, that is.
But applicable rule in this case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et
al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353,
May 2, 1988; that of the termination at the end of the semester, reason for the critical comments of Joaquin G.
Bernas, and Doods Santos, who both do not agree with the ruling.
Petitioners’ claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny
respondent’s affirmative defenses that “they were given all the chances to air their grievances on February 9,
10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L.
Lapak” and that on February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners
continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to
attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their
right to be present in their classes.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-
enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
for the first semester of school year 1988-89. Said form specifically states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and
to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere
with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code
of conduct and discipline.
In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which among others uniformly reads:
In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College and of my privileges as student of this institution, I hereby pledge/
promise under oath to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled. Specifically:
xxx
 3. I will respect my Alma Mater, the Mabini College, which I represent and see to it that I conduct myself in such a
manner that the college will not be put to a bad light;
xxx
9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement which tend to cause confusion or disrupt the normal appreciation
of the college.
Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3, Rule
65). It being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed
by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission
Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975) and Tangonon vs. Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 15-16.]
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction.
The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the
529
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 529
Non vs. Dames II
Court, which resolved on April 10, 1989 to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for proper
determination and disposition. The Court of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the
petition and set the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
hearing. After considering the comment and hearing the injunction application, the Court of
Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989 to certify the case back to the Supreme Court considering that
only pure questions of law were raised.
The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which then transferred it to the
Court en banc on August 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On
September 14, 1989, the Court en bancaccepted the case and required respondents to comment.
Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. Petitioners were required to reply.
As reply, they filed a pleading entitled “Counter-Comment,” to which respondents filed a rejoinder
entitled “Reply to Counter-Comment.” To this, petitioners filed a “Rejoinder to Reply.”
The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.
At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt
from Alcuaz:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is
provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in
a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual,
that the “written contracts” required for college teachers are for “one semester.”  It is thus evident that after the
close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with
the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-
honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated,
there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers. “The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court,
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
have no power to make contracts for the parties.” (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra).
[At 161 SCRA 17-18; Italics supplied.]
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students, who were
barred from re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it added that “in
the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic
deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should be
allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.” [At 161 SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento
dissented from the majority opinion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers in Alcuaz. The students did
not move for reconsideration. The Court en banc, to which the case had been transferred, denied
the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 29, 1989, but added as an  obiter
dictum:
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their education in the
school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and
demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as part of their freedom of speech and their right to
assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and without
resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of
discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license.
The majority’s failure to expressly repudiate the “termination of contract” doctrine enunciated in
the decision provoked several dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of the
Court  disagreed with the Second Division’s dismissal of the students’ petition, a definitive ruling
**
on the issue could not have been made because no timely motion for reconsideration was filed by
the students. (As stated above, the motion for
_______________
 Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, Mr. Justice Narvasa, Mme. Justice Herrera, Mr. Justice Cruz, Mr. Justice Feliciano, Mr.
**
Justice Sarmiento, and Mme. Justice Cortés.
531
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 531
Non vs. Dames II
reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers.)
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, insofar as it allowed
schools to bar the readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of
contract, shall be made in this case where the issue is squarely raised by petitioners [Petition, p. 4;
Rollo, p. 5].
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of a
school refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the
refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities
as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of
respondent school who, after leading and participating in student protests, were denied
readmission or re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to
speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline
them.
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated
August 8, 1988; Rollo, pp. 12-12-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students’
rights and the school’s power to discipline them, to wit:
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education, and there is such denial
when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech and
peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of due
process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic
language against school authorities during a student rally.
But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . . [Order of February 24, 1989; Rollo, p.
13.]
1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the
rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973
Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 8], the
Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15,
para. 13]. Thus, as early as 1907, the Court in People v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the right to
speech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition. It said:
Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal methods any of the following
objects are guilty of sedition:
xxx
2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any public official, from freely
exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or administrative order.
But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge “the freedom of speech” or “the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances” guaranteed by the express
provisions of section 5 of “the Philippine Bill.”
xxx
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest
against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule,
will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right
to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to
exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the pur-
533
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 533
Non vs. Dames II
poses which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor,
but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and
between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is
similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case of  Malabanan
v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Chief Justice Fernando in an en banc decision, declared:
xxx
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They
enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those
disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of
Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, “shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions
over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.]
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass actions:
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent [Gregorio Araneta] University.
They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and
vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute
of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science building and continued
their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving
utterance to lan-
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
guage severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a
result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should
not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through a
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents and
before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director
of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the
Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by
the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was
suspension for one academic year. . . . [At pp. 363-364.]
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a one-week
suspension.
The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc
decisions of the Court.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135
SCRA 706, the Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis
for barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its officials from acts of
surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the non-
enroll-ment of students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency, with the
following caveat:
xxx
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by “institutions of higher learning” includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it
has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does
so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause
535
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 535
Non vs. Dames II
being disregarded. [At p. 711].
In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA
94, a case arising from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court rejected “the
infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure
of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them.” [At p. 98].
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent
school was directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their
respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in
connection with their participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and
assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to
discipline students. This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School District, 393 US 503, 514: “But conduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course,
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”
Thus, in Malabanan, the Court said:
xxx
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that
specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University.
Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento,
the “concerted activity [referring to such assem-
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
bly] went on until 5:30 p.m.” Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [At pp. 370-371].
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. Thus:
. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process;
and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated in
Malabanan, “[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.” [At p. 371].
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated
not only because of political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging
controversy over increases in tuition fees. But the overeager hands of some school authorities were
not effectively tied down by the ruling in Malabanan. Instead of suspending or expelling student
leaders who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same stratagem was
adopted by the latter: refusing the students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to,
their alleged “misconduct” of “illegal assembly” in leading or participating in student mass actions
directed against the school. Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to “academic
deficiency.”
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.
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VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 537
Non vs. Dames II
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termina-tion of contract” theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that “[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate courses,” which the Court
in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his
contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.
The “termination of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools
wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of
the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student
does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two
weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his
credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on
Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides:
137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for
elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers
or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid
the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be
charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or
twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended
classes. The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week
of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the
pertinent fees only up to and
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
including the last month of attendance.
Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for
only one semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the
sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to
be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107
states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement
and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is
expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.
This “presumption” has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the “Education
Act of 1982.” Section 9 of this act provides:
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School.—In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by
law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxx
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
xxx
5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students’ Rights.
Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that “respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school” [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this conclusion, he cited the cases
of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, G.R. No. L-40779,
November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan v. Pano, G.R.
539
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 539
Non vs. Dames II
No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Court emphasized the institutions’
discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic
freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue was whether a female lay
student has a clear legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological
studies leading to a degree. In Tangonan, the issue was whether a nursing student, who was
admitted on probation and who has failed in her nursing subjects, may compel her school to
readmit her for enrollment.
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court’s unequivocal statement in Villar that the
right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711].
6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.
In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent cases
of Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989, and Licup
v. University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, both decided by the First Division
of the Court.
We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues in the
present case.
In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close
down the school because of problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its
faculty. The Court ruled that the students had no clear legal right to demand the reopening of the
school.
On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were afforded
procedural due process before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court stated:
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they were deprived of due process of
law and that the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the
 540
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
contrary, what appears from the record is that the charges against petitioners were adequately established in an
appropriate investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record. . . .
Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the “termination of contract” theory in Alcuaz, impliedly
rejected it, to wit:
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational
institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concommitant right to see
to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or
fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not
review the discretion of university authorities. (Italics supplied.)
7. The Instant Case.
To justify the school’s action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989,
quoting from their answer filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight
(8) have incurred failing grades, to wit:
1. a)Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause the
submission of Form 137 which is a pre-requisite to his reenrollment and to his
continuing as a student of Mabini;
2. b)Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has incomplete grades in
four (4) subjects as well as no grades in two (2) subjects;
3. c)Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete grades;
4. d)Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take CMT 11 to 22. He
is already enrolled at Ago Foundation;
5. e)Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;
6. f)Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;
7. g)George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the incomplete grade
in one (1) subject;
8. h)Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete grades in five
(5) more subjects, and has no grade in one (1) subject. [Rollo, p. 79.]
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VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 541
Non vs. Dames II
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:
xxx
(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:
1. a)Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the Answer.)
2. b)Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non-read-mission. (The Answer indicates only
8 of the 13 as with deficiencies.)
3. c)Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
4. d)The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a February 1988 student rally. (The crux of the
matter, as shown even in the Answer.)
5. e)There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (In effect,
admitted in the Answer; even Alcuaz required due process.)
6. f)Respondents admit students with worse deficiencies—a clear case of discrimination against
petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An equal protection question.)
7. g)Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence which they can afford
to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-half school-years—in
itself punishment enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano,
Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused
reenrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the
manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear
from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a
mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the
student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by
petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due
process but also
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have only one or two failures,
namely, Rex Magana, Elvin Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their failures
cannot be considered marked academic deficiency within the context of the Court’s decision
in Villar.
Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito
Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents’ enumeration
whether the failures were incurred in only one semester or through the course of several semesters
of study in the school. Neither are the academic standards of respondent school, from which we
can gauge whether or not these students are academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus,
while the prerogative of schools to set academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm
respondent school’s action as to petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of
insufficient information.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago
Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent
school.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken
against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court’s
ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in
connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed
must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed
only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit
from the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that “[n]o
penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in
the school’s rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have
been conducted.”
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions
have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or reenrollment
and who have been effectively excluded from re-
543
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 543
Non vs. Dames II
spondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any
breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions
that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to
disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the
strained relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent school which necessarily
resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8,
1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED
to readmit and to allow the re-enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without
prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George
(Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed
to satisfy the school’s prescribed academic standards.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Medialdea and Regalado JJ., concur.
     Melencio-Herrera, J., See concurring opinion.
     Padilla, J., See concurring opinion.
     Sarmiento, J., Please see concurring opinion.
     Griño-Aquino, J., On leave.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Concurring:
Like Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla, I had concurred in the majority opinion in Alcuaz, et al., vs.
Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7.
But, as I had expressed in my vote on the Motion for Reconsideration in the said Alcuaz case
“Except for the general statement that students’ enrollment is limited to per semester, I concur.”
In other words, I agree with Mme. Justice Cortes that the “termination of contract doctrine”
should be overturned for
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
being a doctrinal error. It is now clear (it was quoted out of context before) that paragraph 137 of
the Manual of Regulations for Public Schools falls under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees
and is intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment
basis. It cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
As to the power of discipline, my view still is that schools should retain that prerogative, with
the caveat that the penalty they impose be proportionate to the offense committed.
PADILLA, J., Concurring:
I concurred in the majority opinion in Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7 including therefore that portion
of the opinion which held that under par. 137, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, a
college student in a private school is enrolled only for one (1) semester and that after each
semester “the school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students x x x .”
However, after carefully considering the decision penned by Madame Justice Cortes in the
case at bar, I am inclined to agree with her that “the contract between the school and students is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by
the Constitution to education x x x” (p. 15, Decision).
It would indeed appear that, consistent with this constitutional priority given to education, par.
107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools should be underscored. It provides that
every student has the right to enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific
requirements and reasonable regulations; x x x and that “the student is presumed to be qualified
for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his
right to transfer.”
It should be stressed, however, that this right of students to enroll is not designed to leave
schools completely helpless to deny enrollment or re-enrollment. For, par. 107 itself of the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools still recognizes the
545
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 545
Non vs. Dames II
right of the school to refuse enrollment in case of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary
regulations of the school.
SARMIENTO, J.: Concurring:
I have always held that schools are not free to penalize, by administrative sanction or outright
expulsion, students on account alone of the fact that they had taken part in mass actions or
assemblies. 1
Students, as all persons, enjoy freedom of speech and assembly, right granted by the
Constitution, and one nobody may abridge. The opinion of the majority reaffirms this fundamental
principle.
This case also clarifies the true import of Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, i.e., that it is intended merely to enable schools to collect fees for the entire
semester although the student may not have completed the semester. But in no way may learning
institutions use the provision as an excuse to dismiss students after one semester on the ground of
termination of contract.
The “termination of contract” theory espoused by Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business
Administration  has indeed allowed schools to circumvent the guarantees of the Constitution by
2
denying “erring” students of their right to enroll, when the single “error” committed by the
students was to participate in political activities. As I said, our students have as much right to
disagree—whether against school policies or government programs, and whether in or out of the
school compound—and no prior or subsequent penalty may be inflicted on account of such acts
alone.
To be sure, the school may punish students for breach of discipline, as, say, for breaking
chairs or window panes or for disrupting classes in the course of a demonstration, but they may be
penalized for those actions alone and not because of the content of their speech or the
vociferousness with which it was
_______________
 See Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7, Sarmiento, J.,
1
Dissenting.
 Supra.
2
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
said.  Moreover, violations of school discipline must be judged on a case to case basis and
3
measured depending on gravity before school authorities may legitimately act. I do not think that
the fact that a demonstration has disrupted ongoing classes is a ground for penalizing students
taking part therein because a demonstration, from its very nature, is likely to disrupt classes.  The 4
school must convincingly show that the demonstrators had deliberately turned to lawlessness, say,
by barricading the schoolgate or the classroom entrances or otherwise prevented non-
demonstrating students or members of the faculty from attending a class or finishing one by threats
or intimidation. Only in that sense may school heads validly invoke “disruption of classes.”
As far as discipline is concerned, this Court has laid down guidelines for proper school action.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, as in the present case, we held that the punishment must fit the crime,
and in Guzman v. National University,  we ruled that before any penalty may be imposed, the
5
students concerned should be allowed to be heard by themselves or representatives. In all cases,
the courts should be wary—and the school authorities must themselves convince the judge—that
punishment meted out is due to a real injury done to the school and not for the fact that the
students had simply expressed their constitutional right to disagree.
 As to failing grades, I agree that, as we held in Villar v. Technological Institute of the
Philippines,  academic deficiency is a legal basis for, among other things, expulsion. However, as
6

Villar warned, educational institutions must set standards “to determine under what circumstances
failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students,”  and that such standards “should be followed
7

meticulously,”  and that they “cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who
8

exercise their consti-

_______________

 Malabanan v. Ramento, No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359 .

3

 See US v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422 (1907).

4

 No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699.

5

 No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706.

6

 Supra, 711.
7

 Supra.
8

547

VOL. 185, MAY 21, 1990 547

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Union Shipping Corp.
tutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech.” What this decision makes plain is that the
9

school must pre-set the ground rules for either suspension or expulsion of students by reason of
falling marks which must be observed with reasonable uniformity. The school can not use it to
spring surprises on students with failing grades, who also happen to be politically active in the
campus, after the authorities had long tolerated their poor performance. In this case, our courts
must also exercise caution that, as “disruption of classes”, resort to “failing grades” is not done to
evade the constitutional mandates.
I take note of the increasing practice by school heads to simply bar students from enrollment
for a host of excuses as a result of their exercise of constitutional rights. I am gratified that the
majority has put an end to this practice.
I concur fully with Mme. Justice Irene Cortes’ ponencia.
Petition granted. Orders annulled.

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