LLADOC VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City,
donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor
of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in
the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift
tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift
tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner
was the parish priest.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the
fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of
donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have
juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for
religious purpose is valid.
Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section
22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption
only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as
Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The
imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious
purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not
a property by way of gift inter vivos.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real
party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the
property donated to the church for religious purpose.
LLADOC V CIR & CTA
GR 19201 June 16, 1965 14 SCRA 293
Paredes, J.:
FACTS:
MB Estate of Bacolod City donated Php 10,000 in cash to Fr.
Ruiz, then the Parish Priest of Victorias, who was the
predecessor of petitioner. MB Estate filed their donor’s gift tax
but petitioner is on protest regarding donee’s tax claiming
that assessment of gift tax against the Catholic Church is
against the law; that when the donation was made. He was
not yet the parish priest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be liable for assessed
donee’s gift tax dontated.
RULING:
A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on
the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious
purposes, does not constitute an impairment of Constitution…
“exempt from taxation” as employed in the Constitution
should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of
such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption
herein must be deniedRUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No.
25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will
be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further,
Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site
of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall
refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were
claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have
not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines.
“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by
due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue.
chongvHernandez,101Phil.115
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and
all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among
others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process of law; it violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and its
provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of
the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an
exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses
are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom
in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the
retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the
nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the
retail business who die, to continue such business for a period
of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the
exercise of the police power. It has been said that police
power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from
the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is
the most positive and active of all governmental processes,
the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so
under a modern democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all- embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot
foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare
in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power
by which and through which the State seeks to attain or
achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions
do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the
State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the
equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power, Is there
public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is
the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims
conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely
an unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it,
for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute
liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be classified
into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must
exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law
does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes
the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and
efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature,
with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of
the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of
China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the
law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as
the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China
are not discriminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , and the
same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police
power of the State.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law
provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as
corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail
trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in
this case. According to him, the said law violates the
international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the
Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise
of police power.
Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of
police power. It was also then provided that police power can
not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted
to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the
same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police
power of the state.
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
6
11
2010
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor
unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is
dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a
new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they
were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not
able to present it before in the CIR.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69
PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the
National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the
supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the
members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau
of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The
CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court,
but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang
Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious
to be granted.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the
functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords
and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the
occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present
one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at
the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and
the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen
the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth. So ordered.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders.
Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question.
Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the
law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUES:
Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?
RULING:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of
general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect.
Tañada vs Tuvera
5 President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
11
2010
136 scra 27
Publication – Presidential Proclamations
 
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concerns as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
Tañada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish and/or to
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees
(PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive
Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs).
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they
shall take effect.
 
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date
of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as
they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case
where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this
provision is to give the public general adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia legis non excusat”. Publication is indispensable.
People of the Philippines vs Francisco Larrañaga
27
11
2010
January 31, 2006
Minority as a Defense
Larrañaga et al were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape on February 3, 2004; and for serious illegal detention.
The first crime is punishable by death and the second is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. One of the co-accused, James Andrew Uy, alleged that on
July 16, 1997, the date of the commission of the crime, he was only 17 years
old and 262 days old. To prove his claim, Uy presented his birth certificate
duly certified by the City Civil Registrar and the National Statistics Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Uy is entitled a mitigating circumstance due to
minority?
HELD: Yes. Uy was able to prove his claim hence he is entitled to a
mitigating circumstance in both crimes charged against him. This is pursuant
to Article 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that persons
below 18 years of age are entitled to a penalty one degree lower than that
imposed by law.
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39;
21 MAR 1988]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed
what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019
against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the
PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in
the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which
was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation
was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to
the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and
report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to
the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft
and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition
by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985
that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on
June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section
3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for
receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to
said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation
of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years
1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was
made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due
process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as

an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy

disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came
to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out
with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-
affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and
report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary
investigation by him from its termination. While we agree
with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is
merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A
delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar.