MKTG/374

IBS Center for Management Research

McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

This case was written by Alok Kavthankar and Indu Perepu, IBS Hyderabad. It was compiled from published sources, and is
intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management
situation.

 2018, IBS Center for Management Research. All rights reserved.

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Sem III, Class of 2019-2021.
 MKTG/374

McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

On August 21, 2017, US global burger chain, McDonald’s released a notice announcing severance
of all ties with its Indian master franchisee (for the North and East Indian regions), Connaught
Plaza Restaurants Limited (CPRL), thereby ending a 22-year-old relationship. Termination of the
relationship would result in the shutdown of 169 McDonald’s outlets and a loss of around 6,500
jobs along with the abrupt termination of the long-term supply contracts with vendors and property
lessors. CPRL was a 50/50 joint venture between McDonald’s India Pvt. Ltd (MIPL), a subsidiary
of McDonald’s, and Vikram Bakshi (Bakshi). The CPRL board comprised four members; two
McDonald’s representatives, Bakshi, and his wife.
McDonald’s cited that default in the payment of royalties by CPRL was the primary reason for
termination of the partnership. The termination notice stated, “CPRL has to cease using the
McDonald’s system (which includes proprietary rights in McDonald’s names, trademarks, designs,
branding, operational and marketing practice and policies, and food recipes and specifications) and
its associated intellectual property in relation to these restaurants within 15 days of the termination
notice.”1
Bakshi alleged that McDonald’s was aware of the fact that royalties were not being paid and that
the money was being used to settle the debt overhang and interest expenses instead and that the
two McDonald’s representatives on the CPRL board had approved the transactions. Observers
opined that non-payment of royalties was used as a silver bullet to sever ties with the master
franchisee which McDonald’s had been trying to do for almost a decade. It was not that severing
ties with franchisees was unprecedented for McDonald’s, which had thousands of franchisees
across the world. But CPRL was a master franchisee and that too a 50:50 JV, one which had access
to millions of Indians and their rising disposable incomes; the aftermath of the break-up would
immediately erase McDonald’s from the map of North and East India.
Responding to the situation, the global head of corporate relations for foundational markets of
McDonald’s, Ron Christianson (Christianson), said, “We are committed to finding a new partner,
it is a lengthy process but we are committed to the market. We want to rebuild a stronger
McDonald’s.”2
However, the 231 McDonald’s outlets in West and South India weren’t affected as they were
owned by a different master franchisee, Hardcastle Restaurants Pvt. Ltd (HRPL). HRPL was run
by Amit Jatia (Jatia) and owned by Westlife Development (WD), a public listed company
promoted by Jatia. There was widespread speculation that Jatia would be the obvious choice to run
the McDonald’s outlets in the North and East too. Experts said that giving HRPL pan India rights
would be a win-win as it would have scale benefits while McDonald’s would swiftly regain lost
ground.

1
“McDonald’s Terminates Franchise Agreement for 169 Outlets in North, East India,”
www.hindustantimes.com, August 22, 2017
2
Harveen Ahluwalia, “McDonald’s Terminates Franchise Pact for 169 Restaurants in North, East India,”
www.livemint.com, August 21, 2017

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

At the same time, CPRL was looking at a legal recourse. Bakshi said, “We are going to challenge
them in the court to say these existing licenses were given for 25 years and you are terminating it
on the basis of some payments not made.”3
In the meanwhile, the competition wasn’t complaining. There was a sharp spike in the foot-falls
for Burger King in North India. “I am lovin it,”4 said chief marketing officer of a rival burger
chain, adding, “McDonald’s actually doesn’t need a rival. It’s on a self-destruction mode in India.”

MCDONALD’S: A BRIEF HISTORY

McDonald’s Corporation (McDonald’s), headquartered at Oak Brook, Illinois, United States,
was started in 1940 by two brothers, Richard and Maurice McDonald, as a typical drive-thru
restaurant with a large menu and a car hop service. In 1948, to speed up the service, the menu
was reduced to 9 items, the staple being the 15 cent hamburger. In 1954, Raymond Kroc, then a
kitchen apparatus salesman, visited a McDonald’s drive-thru in San Bernardino, California.
Kroc observed that the outlet was like no other restaurant he had witnessed in his 30 years of
working as salesman; it was like a factory with production lines and a standardized limited menu
which ensured super-fast service.
Amazed by the service and its uniqueness, Kroc proposed to the brothers that they start a
franchisee mode of operations to scale across the nation. The brothers agreed and an agreement
was signed which gave Kroc a fee of 1.9% on the gross sales each franchisee made. The brothers
would get 0.5% from Ray’s share. Right to a franchise would be given to individual operators
who would deploy capital and resources to run the outlet. There was also a onetime franchisee fee
of $950 Kroc would charge to find a suitable location and a landlord who would invest to build the
outlet and then rent it out to an operator. Each license was to run for 20 years.
Kroc’s unique philosophy was to form a system comprising three elements or three legs of a stool
as he called it. The first leg was the franchisee, the second was the supplier, and the third was the
employee. The stool was only as strong as the three legs which formed its base. Kroc developed a
small supplier base whose produce was supplied to the franchisees at rock bottom prices. The
efficiencies gained through common sourcing and mass production were then passed on to the
franchisees.

REVENUE MODEL
In 1976, during Kroc’s visit to the Tuck Business School, he asked the students what business they
thought he was involved in and there was a unanimous answer; “Hamburger business”. Kroc said
“No, I am in the real estate business.”
Kroc’s surprising answer had its roots in the 1950s when Harry Sonneborn (Sonneborn), then CFO
of McDonald’s, came up with a convincing idea. Sonneborn proposed that McDonald’s should
venture into the real estate business and charge rentals for the franchisees. Sonneborn’s proposition
had led to one more revenue stream for McDonald’s apart from royalties. Over the decades which
followed, McDonald’s went on to own lands and develop properties with its real estate arm called
Franchise Realty Corporation (FRC).
In the beginning, FRC leased land and developed it to sublease it to its franchisees. Later on, FRC
stared adding the assets on McDonald’s balance sheet. By 2017, the real estate assets on
McDonald’s balance sheet amounted to around $34 billion – 99% of the company’s total assets.
Around 50% of the assets were rented to the franchisees. Clearly, the return on the company’s total
assets was lopsided toward rentals (Refer to Exhibit I for a glimpse of the break-up of revenue
streams from the Franchisee business).

3
“Will Challenge Termination of Licence by McDonald’s: Vikram Bakshi,” http://economictimes.
indiatimes.com, August 24, 2017
4
McDonald’s slogan for its worldwide marketing campaign launched in 2003

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

Obviously the own stores of McDonald’s contributed the highest to the topline but only 15% to the
bottom line owing to higher operating expenses. Royalties and rents were thus the most desirable
streams for McDonald’s. Observers of the Industry believed that rents insulated McDonald’s from
the ups and downs of the fast food industry vulnerable to the vagaries of competition and the state
of the economy.

MCDONALD’S: FRANCHISING ROUTE TO INTERNATIONALIZATION

For an individual entrepreneur, franchising meant significant liberty to have control over all
employment-related matters and marketing and pricing decisions, while also benefiting from the
financial strength and global experience of McDonald’s. For McDonald’s, it meant a steady inflow
of two predictable revenue streams – royalties and rent.
In 2017, McDonald’s had over 37000 outlets spread over 119 countries across the world.
Approximately 85% of the restaurants in 2017 were franchised and contributed more than 80% to
the bottom line through rentals and royalty fees. An average franchisee had rights to around five
outlets. As a long-term goal, McDonald’s intended to be more asset-light. It therefore wanted to
operate 95% of its business as franchisees by 2018. A big move to achieve that target was exiting
China (3rd largest market in terms of outlets) and converting 80% of its ownership into franchisees.
Typically, McDonald’s followed two types of structures under its franchisee model; conventional
franchisee (CF) and developmental license (DL). The optimal ownership model depended on
various factors like the availability of experienced entrepreneurs and financial availability in the
market along with legal and political regulations.
CFs were essentially small entrepreneurs and were responsible for handling their day-to-day
operations. They were expected to reinvest capital in their business. In the CF mode, the operator
initially invested in equipment, décor, seating, and other signs. McDonald’s generally owned the
land and building and leased it to the operator, charged a one-time licensing fee, and then the
royalties. There were also co-investment initiatives led by McDonald’s to improvise on the
franchisee operations to accelerate growth.
DLs were large businesses with substantial financial power which had access to capital from their
core established businesses. Under the developmental licensing arrangement, McDonald’s did not
invest any money and only charged the initial licensing fee along with a percentage of gross sales
as a royalty fee. McDonald’s had 6300 restaurants under such an arrangement with the largest DL
operating around 2200 restaurants in 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

MCDONALD’S IN INDIA: THE STORY OF TWO FRANCHISEES

Typically, McDonald’s did not own and run restaurants in its overseas forays. Its preferred model
was a low-risk, low-hassle Franchise model. In India, however, McDonald’s deviated from its
usual practice and adopted an ownership model. In the 80s, McDonald’s had followed a similar
route in Latin America which eventually proved successful and evolved into its largest DL
operation. In the mid-nineties, India was a newly liberalized economy and most foreign companies
preferred to form JVs to enter India.
In 1996, McDonald’s made an early entry into India by launching its first store in New Delhi in
North India by partnering with Bakshi, who was then a young and ambitious businessman on his
way to becoming a real estate tycoon. In 1994, a lead from his neighbor made Bakshi approach
McDonald’s. His roots in real estate and a big appetite for investment made him keen to step into
the then Indian virgin F&B waters.5 McDonald’s wanted partners with fire in their belly, who
could negotiate in the complex real estate market in India. In Bakshi, McDonald’s had found the
right partner and it went on to form a 50/50 venture with him.

5
Surajeet Das Gupta , “Out of the Menu,” www.business-standard.com , February 21 , 2014

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

Meanwhile, in Mumbai, the commercial hub of India, Jatia had learned about the franchising
opportunity McDonald’s had to offer in 1994. Amit Jatia came from a business family in Mumbai
which had its interests in textiles as well as real estate. Being a staunch vegetarian, he at first
refused to proceed on the offer. Later, however, he was convinced by McDonald’s that the stores
would have two different production lines for vegetarian and non-vegetarian offerings.
McDonald’s also assured him that beef and pork would not be served at the outlets.
McDonald’s signed a 25-year joint venture agreement with both its master franchisees, which
would run till 2020. However, it was not an exclusive agreement; McDonald’s could appoint
another franchisee whenever needed. McDonald’s held a 50% stake in each master franchisee
through MIPL. From the time McDonald’s had been in India, Bakshi had been the face of the
company. While Jatia kept a relatively low profile, Bakshi was both vocal and visible. He was
proactive in taking decisions and initiatives right from the pure vegetarian outlets to McDelivery
on cycles.
On the other hand, Jatia seemed to be more interested in understanding the intricacies of
McDonald’s operations. Jatia also spent a few days working at a McDonald’s restaurant in
Singapore to learn the ropes of the business. He successfully led the company’s ventures in West
and South India and was instrumental in setting up a sourcing and cold chain infrastructure which
was pivotal in scaling up McDonald’s operations in India.6
Over the years, McDonald’s India had given its affiliates the leeway to customize the menu as per
the preferences of Indian customers. It had given them the operational freedom to tap the
burgeoning Indian F&B market. But the way the two affiliates evolved under the umbrella of
MIPL was as different as chalk and cheese.
In May 2010, in the 15th year of its 25-year pact, McDonald’s entered into a new arrangement
with Jatia. In a friendly buyout, it sold its 50% stake back to Jatia, and the JV moved to the
American company’s preferred low risk mode of franchise fee and royalty. Under McDonald’s
ownership structure, HRPL was termed as a developmental licensee (DL); a more independent unit
than a conventional franchisee and one which functioned with minimal intervention from
McDonald’s and had strong financial back-up to fund its expansion.
According to Jatia, “When [McDonald’s] found business was getting better in 2009, they felt the
correct ownership structure was to make us a licensee. And they’ve done that around the world
[going from JV to full licensee].” 4 However, McDonald’s sold its stake in HRPL at a loss of 99%.
Moreover, it was charging a 2% royalty for the Jatia-led franchisee against 5% for CPRL.
Up in the north, Bakshi and McDonald’s were not on the same page. In 2008, McDonald’s had
offered to buy out Bakshi’s stake for $ 5 million. But, Bakshi did not agree to sell his stake as he
found the valuation too low. A report on valuations by Grant Thornton revealed that CPRL was
worth $338 million in 2008 and that Bakshi’s stake amounted to more than $150 million – 30
times the low ball offer by McDonald’s.
In the years to follow, the relations only deteriorated. There were severe issues with the quality of
service which the Bakshi led restaurant offered. There were complaints about rodents in the stores,
poor air-conditioning, and unhygienic conditions. The growth of outlets in the North and East
began to stall. Bakshi maintained that McDonald’s was not giving him proper signals to lead and
the incentive to excel was missing. Neither was McDonald’s infusing the required funds.
McDonald’s accused Bakshi of being too involved in his personal real estate pursuits and
demanded that he focus more on the outlets as he had pledged his shares in CPRL to raise debt for
his personal real estate arm. Meanwhile, Bakshi had rented the property he had developed to a
rival food chain which was a conflicting move and against the contract terms with McDonald’s.
All these allegations led to the ouster of Bakshi as MD of CPRL in 2013. From then on, CPRL’s
growth had plateaued (Refer to Exhibit II for the growth of outlets in India).

6
Shravan Bhat, Samar Srivastava , “Amit Jatia and McDonald’s 15-year Wait for Success,”
forbesindia.com, March 13, 2014

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

In the interim, Bakshi made a counter offer to buy McDonald’s stake at a fair market value of $300
million followed by a low ball counter offer by McDonald’s. A long legal battle followed but much
to the dismay of McDonald’s, Bakshi was reinstated as the managing director of CPRL in 2016.
Bakshi said, “I was not the usual subservient partner that most franchisers look at.”7

BUSINESS OUTLOOK FOR THE TWO FRANCHISEES

In 2016, CPRL made around $100 million in revenue (Refer to Exhibit III for the Revenues of
CPRL and HRPL). But CPRL’s profitability remained anemic, resulting in delinquencies in its
paying the royalties. CPRL’s average per store sale of $0.8 million was way below McDonald’s
global average of $2.5 million.
HRPL’s growth had got a boost post 2010 when it was made a DL. Though HRPL was ahead of
CPRL in terms of outlets, it was way below CPRL in terms of revenue per outlet – $0.5 million
and clocking around $128 million in revenue. HRPL was hardly breaking even at the operating
level. HRPL had same store sales (SSS)8 growth rate of 1.8% in 2016 and only 4% in 2017; in the
foundational markets of McDonald’s of which India was a part, the average same store growth rate
in 2017 was11.1%.
Such subdued figures depicted that; overall, McDonald’s was not the part of Indian growth story.
McDonald’s had somehow failed to win the market which it had created in the 90s.

VALUATION OF TWO FRANCHISEES

HRPL had access to public funds raised by its holding company Westlife Development (WD),
which was also promoted by Jatia. Of WD’s revenue, 99% came through HRPL. In 2017, the
market value of WD was $560 million, which actually reflected the true value of HRPL’s 231
outlets. On a similar basis, using relative valuation, analysts believed that the market value of
CPRL was about $400 million, Bakshi’s 50% stake being $200 million.

MCDONALD’S IN 2017
Overall, the global sales of McDonald’s had hit a wall since 2013 (Refer to Exhibit IV). For the
year ended December 31, 2016, its four reporting segments, namely the US, International Lead
Markets, High Growth Markets, and Foundational Markets, accounted for 34%, 29%, 25%, and
12% of total revenues, respectively.
McDonald’s had followed in the footsteps of its competition to increase the spread of its menu but
this had made the fast service chain choke on delivery times. McDonald’s was slowly losing its
identity. It was also being criticized for maintaining profitability by raising rents even as revenues
dropped. Franchisees passed on the rise in rents to the customer through increased prices – which
made the chain even less competitive.

THE INDIAN MARKET

Foundational markets were critical for the future growth of McDonald’s as the US and
International lead markets had shown sluggish growth in the past few years. India was categorized
under the foundational market segment. The foundational segment was the largest and most
diverse segment and spanned over 80 countries which were home to 60% of the world’s
population and represented one-third of global GDP growth.

7
Amy Kazmin, “McDonald’s Hit by Beef with India Partner” , FT.com ,February 12, 2015
8
Same-store sales is a business term which refers to the difference in revenue generated by a retail chain’s
existing outlets over a certain period compared to an identical period in the past, usually in the previous
year.

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

In 2017, for its population of 1.3 billion and around 2700 fast food restaurants belonging to chains,
India was largely underpenetrated in terms of chain fast food restaurants. Only 4 percent of the fast
food industry was organized and most of the growth and presence was concentrated in the
metropolitan cities. India had the world’s highest youth population – around 356 million people
aged between 10 and 24, a major demographic segment for fast food consumers. It was estimated
that by 2020, the fast food market in India would generate revenue of $26 billion, growing at 18%
CAGR from 2015-2020.
In 2017, more than 22 years after McDonald’s had set foot in India, the Indian fast food market
went through a tectonic shift in terms of preference as well as purchasing power. McDonald’s had
enjoyed the pole position in India till 2010. Within a span of five years – by 2015 – it had slipped
to third position.
The preference of consumers was shifting toward pizzas. Domino’s Pizza was at the pole position
with 850 outlets and a 16% market share. KFC at second position had 11% market share and
operated 318 stores .In contrast, McDonald’s through its two master franchisees had 400
restaurants and around 7.5% market share. Meanwhile, the competition in the Indian burger market
was also intensifying with major American burger companies such as Burger King (3% market
share), Wendy’s, and Fat Burger entering the market. The preferred model for entry for most of the
QSR chains was mostly tying-up with a master franchisee (Refer to Exhibit V for the new entrants
in the Indian QSR market) which had financial muscle and the managerial expertise to thrive in the
cut-throat market.

THE ISSUE WITH REAL ESTATE IN INDIA

Apart from the ownership model, there was yet another deviation in McDonald’s approach to
India; it had no real estate assets in India. Having outlets at prime locations was a key to the
success for any QSR outlet. Locations created a moat for newcomers. For instance, in places like
airports, there was no space for a new entrant. Over two decades, CPRL was able to lease and
develop a chain of restaurants at prime locations like airports and city centers as well as highways.
Most of the lease agreements were signed for a period of 15 to 40 years, and that was of immense
value for the chain. Real estate experts said the McDonald’s outlet rentals were way below the
existing market price. Hence, developing and owning real estate made little sense when
McDonald’s set foot in India. The country was in a developing mode and there was abundant
supply of cheap real estate.
In the last 20 years, the Indian real estate landscape had changed dramatically. There was a steep
demand and supply gap for prime properties. "We are looking at opportunities to occupy the
vacuum created by McDonald’s,” said a franchisee partner for U.S burger chain called Carl’s Jr.
The property owners, meanwhile, expected a 25% rise in rentals, a very lucrative rise when
compared to the long-term contracts which CPRL had signed in the 90s.
Scouting for new localities and cutting through the bureaucracy to get them approved was a
different challenge altogether. Commencing operations at the new sites would take McDonald’s
anywhere between one and two years with a long break even period. Continuing on the existing
outlets through a new franchisee was impossible as the existing rentals were executed through
CPRL. Bakshi’s real estate arm owned nine properties which were leased out to CPRL.

TOUGH TIMES

For McDonald’s it was time to reap what it had sown in the previous 20 years. The cold chain was
established and vendors had become stable and evolved to offer a high scale of economies. In fact,
McDonald’s had developed the QSR market in India.
But on the ownership front, it was a deadlock. According to the joint venture agreement,
McDonald’s and Bakshi had the right to offer to sell or to buy the other’s stake. Both partners
were tiring out each other, waiting to see who was going to blink first. CPRL would soon become

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

a shell company which would eventually erase the presence of McDonald’s in North and East
India. Experts opined that 50:50 ownership models in India had been perilous in the past for the
simple reason that both partners had equal rights; someone had to compromise.
The ownership battle between McDonald’s and Bakshi had taken its toll on the business and even
more on the McDonald’s brand. The revenue growth for CPRL had fallen to 4%, which was
almost one-fifth of the Industry growth, leaving enough vacuum for the competition to fill in.
As per the legal notice, on September 7, 2017, CPRL was supposed to close down its 169 stores.
The next legal hearing was scheduled for September 21. “There is expected to be a lot of confusion
among consumers. This is definitely a gain for Dominos, KFC and Burger King. Having said that,
this seems to be the way forward for McDonald’s. The legal battle has been going on for years,
due to which the quality was suffering,”9 said Abneesh Roy, senior vice-president and research
analyst (institutional equities) at Edelweiss Securities Ltd.
Ron Christianson, McDonald’s global head of corporate relations and foundational markets, said,
“We are committed to finding a new partner; it is very early stages and we will start the process
soon,” he said, adding: “There are no concrete conversations as yet. It could take several months at
the least and we cannot speculate at this stage.”10 It was reported that MIPL was considering
writing off its investments in CPRL and starting afresh with new partners.
Bakshi, on his part, was looking at appropriate legal remedies. He termed the move by
McDonald’s contemptuous, and continued to pay employees their salaries and the landlords of
McDonald’s in North and East their rents. He said he would keep the outlets open till the board of
CPRL made a decision.
A board meeting was scheduled for September 21, 2017, to decide whether the stores should
remain open till the matter was settled.
There was also an elephant in the room – the question why McDonald’s would take such an
extreme step which was tantamount to suicide. Also, HRPL, the partner which was perceived by
McDonald’s as reliable had questionable capabilities to have a pan India presence given that
HRPL was driving a profitless growth.
The clock was ticking. McDonald’s had to act quickly. The Burger chain which sold around 100
hamburgers per second across the globe was really on a self-destructive mode in India.

9
Harveen Ahluwalia, “McDonald’s Terminates Franchise Pact for 169 Restaurants in North, East India,”
www.livemint.com, August 21, 2017
10
Ratna Bhushan, “All 169 McDonald’s Stores face Closure in North & East, Thousands of Jobs at Risk,”
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/, August 24, 2017

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

Exhibit I:
Break-up of Revenue Streams from Franchise Business
Revenue Streams FY 2016 FY 2015 FY 2014
Rents 25% 23% 23%
Royalties 13% 12% 8%
Initial Fees 1% 1% 0.5%
McDonald’s own stores 62% 65% 69%
Total revenue $ 24.6 B $25.41 B $27.44 B
Compiled from www.mcdonalds.com

Exhibit II:
Growth of Outlets in India

Compiled from various sources

Exhibit III:
Revenues
(in Rs. Billion)

Compiled from various sources

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

Exhibit IV:
McDonald’s Global Sales
In Billion Dollars 2014 2015 2016
Total Revenue 27 25 24
Cost of Revenue 16 15.6 14.4
Gross Profit 10.2 9.7 10.4
Net Profit 4.6 4.5 4.7
Source: Annual Reports, McDonald’s

Exhibit V:
Indian QSR Market – New Entrants
Brand Year of Entry Mode of Entry Indian Partner
Wendy’s (US) 2015 Master franchise Sierra Nevada Restaurants
Barcelos (South Africa) 2015 Company-owned N/A
Burger King (US) 2014 Master franchise Everstone Group
Fatburger (US) 2014 Master franchise VAZZ Foods Private Limited
Johnny Rockets (US) 2014 Master franchise Prime Gourmet Private Limited
Dunkin’ Donuts (US) 2012 Master franchise Jubilant Foodworks
Starbucks (US) 2012 Joint venture Tata Global Beverages
Krispy Kreme (US) 2013 Master franchise Citymax Hotels India Pvt. Ltd.
Pizza Express (UK) 2012 Joint Venture Bharti Group
Compiled from various sources

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 McDonald’s in India: Troubled Times, Troubled Ties

References and Suggested Readings:

1. Corinne Abrams, Eric Bellman, “McDonald’s Has a McSpicy Problem: An Indian Partner
has Gone Rogue,” https://www.wsj.com, October 09, 2017.
2. “How Will McDonald’s Fare in India’s Burger Battle?” http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu, October 06, 2017
3. Kiran Stacey, “McDonald’s Battles to Regain Control of Brand in India,” www.ft.com,
October 1, 2017
4. “McDonald’s is Flirting with Disaster in India – has it Already Given Up?”
www.verdict.co. uk, September 12, 2017
5. Ratna Bhushan, “All 169 McDonald’s Stores face Closure in North & East, Thousands of
Jobs at Risk,” http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/, August 24, 2017
6. “Will Challenge Termination of Licence by McDonald’s: Vikram Bakshi,”
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com, August 24, 2017
7. “How McDonald’s Closing Nearly Half Of Its Restaurants In India Will Impact
Operations,” www.forbes.com, August 23, 2017
8. “McDonald’s cut ties with India Franchisee,” www.fcsi.org, August 22, 2017
9. “McDonald’s Terminates Franchise Agreement for 169 Outlets in North, East India,”
www.hindustantimes.com, August 22, 2017
10. “McDonald’s to close 169 outlets in India in Franchise Battle,” www.usatoday.com,
August 22, 2017
11. Harveen Ahluwalia, “McDonald’s Terminates Franchise Pact for 169 Restaurants in North,
East India,” www.livemint.com, August 21, 2017
12. Surajeet Das Gupta, “McDonald’s India Dilemma: Growing in South but Facing Closure in
North,” www.business-standard.com, August 21, 2017
13. Have put in effort to build McDonald’s brand in India, says Vikram Bakshi,”
www.moneycontrol.com, July 14, 2017
14. “McDonald’s India Woes: Is The Franchisee Model Breaking In The Region?”
www.nasdaq.com, July 05, 2017
15. Molly Montgomery, Rishi Iyengar, “Closed Until Further Notice: Most McDonald’s
Restaurants in India’s Capital,” http://money.cnn.com, August 22, 2017
16. Shravan Bhat, Samar Srivastava , “Amit Jatia and McDonald’s 15-year Wait for Success,”
forbesindia.com, March 13, 2014
17. Surajeet Das Gupta , “Out of the Menu,” www.business-standard.com, February 21, 2014
18. Amy Kazmin, “McDonald’s Hit by Beef with India Partner,” FT.com ,February 12, 2015
19. www.mcdonaldsindia.com
20. www.westlife.co.in
21. Global Franchising, McDonald’s, http://corporate.mcdonalds.com

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Sem III, Class of 2019-2021.