Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
Centre-State legislative relations
The extent of laws made by Parliament and by the legislatures of states
Residuary powers of legislation
Parliament’s power to legislate on State List
o a) In the National Interest (Art.249)
o b) Under Proclamation of National Emergency (Art. 250)
o c) By Agreement between States (Art. 252)
o d) To Implement Treaties (Art. 253)
o e) Under Proclamation of President’s Rule (Art. 356)
Conclusion
Reference
Introduction
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar once said that the basic principle of the federations is that the legislative and executive
authority is divided between the centre and the states not by any law to be established by the centre, but by the
constitution itself. In no way does the member states rely on the centre for their legislative or executive authority.
The states and the centre are the same in this matter. The above statement makes it very clear that
the Constitution of India establishes a federal framework as the basic structure of the government of the country.
It is from the Constitution, which separates all competences-legislative, executive and financial-that union and
states derive their power. As a result, the states do not delegate to the Union but are autonomous within their
spheres as provided for in the Constitution.
But under this article, we will cover the relationship between legislature and centre-state.
The legislative ties between the centre and state are governed by Articles 245 to 255 of Part XI of the Constitution.
It sets out a double division between the Union and the states with legislative powers i.e, in territorial recognition
and relation to the subject.
Territory jurisdiction:
Concerning the territory, Article 245(1) requires a State Legislature to make law for the entire or any part of the
State to which it belongs, subject to the dispositions of this constitution. Unless the boundaries of the state itself
are broadened by an act of the Parliament, a State legislature can not broaden territorial jurisdiction in any
circumstance. On the other hand, Parliament has the right to legislate “on all or part of India’s territory, which does
not only include the States but also Indian Union territory.” It also has the strength of extra-territorial laws that no
state legislature has. This means that the laws made by Parliament would apply not only to individuals and
territory but also to Indian subjects living anywhere in the world. However, there are other limitations on
Parliament’s territorial competence. However, certain unique clauses of the constitution are subject to the plenary
territorial competence of Parliament. These are the following:
1. The President can make regulations that are equivalent to the laws of Parliament, some territories of
the Union, such as the Andaman and Lakshadweep Region, and these regulations may revoke or amend
a law adopted by Parliament on the said territories (Article 240).
2. Notifications can be issued by the governor (Para 5 of Schedule 5(3) of the Indian Constitution) that
prevent or change the application of the Acts of Parliament to any programmed area of government.
3. Para 12(1)(6) of schedule VI says that, by public notification, the Governor of Assam may, subject to
such exceptions or adjustments as may be stated in the notification, direct that any other act of
Parliament shall not apply to the autonomous region or district of the state of Assam or apply to that
region or section.
In the case of A.H. Wadia v. CIT, the court held that if there is an appropriate relation or link between the State
and the object, i.e. subject matter of legislation, the State legislature cannot make extraterritorial law (objects can
not be located physically within territorial limits of the State). In the case of Wallace Bros, v. CIT, a licensed
business in England was a partner in an Indian venture. Indian revenue tax authorities were aiming to tax the
company’s entire income. The Court affirmed that the derivation for a year of the substantial part of its revenue
from British India has given a corporation sufficiently territorial relation to justify that it is regarded domestically in
India for all purposes of income taxation.
Hence, the above particular requirements have been adopted since the areas mentioned in the question are
outdated and may cause difficulties or other injurious effects if they are implemented indiscriminately.
Subject matter:
A federal structure demands that the centre and States share their forces. The nature of the distribution is different
in every region, depending on the local and political context. For instance, in America, sovereign states did not like
the absolute central government subordination. Therefore, although maintaining the remainder, they believed in
confiding subjects of popular interest to the central government. Australia was pursuing just one set of forces in
the United States. There are double listings in Canada, leaving the residue in the centre by the federal and
provincial governments. The Canadians were mindful of the tragic circumstances that resulted in the Civil War of
1891 in the United States of America. We knew the vulnerabilities of the centre. And it was a good core that they
wanted. The Canadian regime chose a strong centre as a result of the Indian Constitution-Makers. However, they
have added one more list-a a concurrent list.
There are 98 subjects on the Union List, over which the Union has exclusive authority. The topics on the Union list,
for example, security and foreign relations, are of national significance, etc. There are 59 topics in the State List
over which countries have exclusive jurisdiction. The concerns listed on a State list, such as public order, police and
public safety, are of local or national importance. The Concurrent List contains 52 subjects like criminal and civil
cases, marriage and divorce, economic and special planning unions, money, media, magazines, employment,
management of the population and preparation of the families, etc. and both the Union and States can enact laws
on this list but the federal rule prevails over state law in the case of a dispute between the law of the Central and
the State law. The purpose of the constitutional inclusion of the list was to ensure continuity in key legal principles
across the country. Legislatures both in the parliament and in the State may make laws on matters mentioned
above, but a preliminary and ultimate right of the centre is to legislate on established matters. In the event of a
conflict between the law of the State and the law of the Union on a subject in the Concurrent List, the law of the
Parliament shall prevail.
Entry 97 of List I also provides for the exclusive powers of Parliament to make laws on all subjects not mentioned
in List II or III. The remaining powers of legislation shall be solely delegated to the Union Parliament under Article
248 and Entry 97 List I. The spectrum of residual powers, however, is limited as all the topics included in all three
lists and residual powers come under, or not, the Court’s view of a case. The reasoning for this power is that it
allows the House to legislate on any issue that has avoided the House’s oversight and on the subject that currently
can not be recognized. It requires Parliament, therefore, to enact legislation on topics that have taken society
forward. The constitutional framers intended, however, that the use of residual powers should be the final and not
the first step.
In the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab and UOI v. H.S. Dhillon’s case, the court held that parliament may
combine its power with the residual power under Article 248 under entry into the Union List or Competition List.
Also in the case of UOI v. H.S. Dhillon, it was held that Gift Tax Act, Inquiry Act Commissions, etc. are valid under
the parliamentary residuary power. In the case of State of A. P. v. National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. the
Supreme court held that unless an entry does not state an exclusion from the area of legislation that is evident at
the time of obvious reading, the absence of exclusion can not be read, if a particular clause in the Constitution that
forbids such legislation is valid, as allowing the legislative power not expressly excluded from it.
Conclusion
The Constitution authorizes the centre in the following ways to have control over the state legislature:
1. The Governor can withhold for President’s consideration those forms of bills approved by the State
legislature. The President has an absolute veto on them.
2. In the State legislature, even with the prior approval of the President as imposing limitations on free
trade and commerce can bill are made on such matters enumerated in the State list.
3. It is necessary for the President for the States to withhold the bills of funds and other budgetary
measures approved during national crises by the State legislature.
As a result, it is very clear from the scheme of allocation of legislative powers between the Union and the States
that framers have bestowed more authority on the Parliament than against the States. The States do not have sole
authority over the topics given to the States by the Constitution and therefore rendering the States, to that degree,
subordinate to the Centre. The centralization pattern is contradictory with the fundamental values but, rather than
adopting conventional provisions of a federal constitution, the legislative system is more concerned with country
unity. All these provisions of the constitution are therefore justified as they offer clarification and eradicate the
confusion between the powers of the centre and state. Unless this theory of legislative supremacy were to be
removed, there would be a risk of two similarly dominant pieces of government giving rise to a dispute, agitation,
confrontation, and confusion as a result of competing legislation. These provisions guarantee that there is an
overarching regulatory framework and that there is continuity in the basic laws.
Reference