Guide On Transformer Intelligent Condition Monitoring (Ticm) Systems

630
GUIDE ON TRANSFORMER INTELLIGENT

CONDITION MONITORING (TICM) SYSTEMS
Working Group
A2.44
September 2015
GUIDE ON TRANSFORMER
INTELLIGENT CONDITION
MONITORING (TICM) SYSTEMS
WG A2.44
Members
C. Dupont (BR) - (Convener), TF Leaders: C. Beauchemin (CA), L. Cheim (US), N. Fantana (DE), C. Kane
(US), R. Skrzypek (DE), J. Wetzer (NL), Editors: V. Catterson (UK), B. Sparling (CA).
J. Borghetto (IT), P. Boss (CH), G. Buchgraber (AT), G. Buckley (AU), M. Bukvic (MK), T. Chiulan (RO),
G. Csépes (HU), P. da Costa Silva (BR), R. da Fonte (BR), H. da Silva (BR), R. da Silva (BR), P. de Oliveira
Turchiari (BR), A. de Pablo (ES), M. Foata (CA), W. Gil (PL), A. Gomes (BR), T. Gradnik (SI), E. Iraburu (ES),
P. Jarman (UK), M. Jensen (DK), F. Johnsen (NO), M. Kadowaki (JP), S. Keitoue (HR), M. Koch (AT),
A. Mcgrail (US), E. Mackenzie (UK), C. Moldoveanu (RO), K. Najdenkoski (MK), T. Noonan (IE),
M. Paulino (BR), L. Peh (NZ), P. Picher (CA), G. Russell (AU), M. Ryadi (FR), T. Saha (AU), F. Scatiggio (IT),
J. Silveira (BR), M. Soares (PT), I. Solteiro (BR), K. Takano (JP), J. Velek (CZ), K. Viereck (DE), A. Vita (BR).
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ISBN :978-2-85873-333-0
Guide on Transformer Intelligent Condition Monitoring (TICM) Systems
ISBN : 978-2-85873-333-0
Page 1
Guide on Transformer Intelligent Condition

Monitoring (TICM) Systems
Table of Contents
List of acronyms 4
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 5
1.1 WG Scope.....................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Chapters Organization ..............................................................................................................5
2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................... 6
2.1 TICM Definition ...........................................................................................................................6
2.2 TICM in the Future Power System .........................................................................................7
2.3 User’s Needs Identification .....................................................................................................8
2.4 TICM Stakeholders Identification.........................................................................................10
3. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF A TICM SYSTEM ............................................. 11
3.1 Main Functions and Requirement........................................................................................11
3.1.1 TICM Stages .......................................................................................................................11
3.1.2 Required Features of a TICM System ..........................................................................12
3.2 Relevant Attributes ..................................................................................................................13
3.2.1 Overall Data & Information Requirements .................................................................13
3.2.2 Information Hierarchy ......................................................................................................14
3.2.3 Processing Complexity ...................................................................................................14
3.2.4 Data & Information Classification ................................................................................15
3.2.5 Static and Dynamic Parameters....................................................................................15
3.2.6 Database Requirements ..................................................................................................16
3.3 TICM Modelling .........................................................................................................................16
3.3.1 The Concept of a TICM Generic Model .......................................................................16
3.3.2 The Concept of a Functional Transformer Model ....................................................17
3.3.3 The Concept of a Transformer Information Model ..................................................20
3.3.4 Structure of a TICM Intelligent Node ...........................................................................24
3.4 Health and Risk Indexing .......................................................................................................25
4. INTELLIGENT INTERPRETATION METHODS ....................................................... 26
4.1 Background ...............................................................................................................................26
4.2 Definition of Algorithms for Transformer ..........................................................................26
4.3 Examples of Basic Algorithms Used for Transformer Monitoring .............................26
4.3.1 Data Preparation and Pre-processing .........................................................................26
4.3.2 Derived Value (Causal Model) .......................................................................................28
4.3.3 Statistical Deviation .........................................................................................................29
4.3.4 Trending ..............................................................................................................................30
4.4 Examples of Advanced Algorithms Used for Transformer Monitoring .....................31
4.4.1 Fuzzy Logic ........................................................................................................................31
4.4.2 Multivariate Analysis........................................................................................................32
4.4.3 Health Index........................................................................................................................33
4.4.4 Neural Networks ................................................................................................................33
4.4.5 Expert Systems .................................................................................................................35
4.4.6 Pattern Recognition/Classifiers ....................................................................................35
4.4.7 Bayesian Inference ...........................................................................................................36
4.5 Action and Decision Making .................................................................................................36
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4.5.1 Alarm Management ..........................................................................................................36

4.5.2 Fleet Management and Planning ..................................................................................37
5. ARCHITECTURE ........................................................................................................... 38
5.1 TICM System Architecture Description ..............................................................................38
5.2 Degree of Centralization .........................................................................................................39
5.2.1 Intelligent Sensor ..............................................................................................................39
5.2.2 Monitoring of Individual Power Transformer Components ...................................39
5.2.3 Comprehensive System ..................................................................................................40
5.2.4 Integrated Corporate Solution .......................................................................................40
5.3 Data Management and Communication .............................................................................42
5.3.1 Further Standardization of Data Management and Communication ..................43
5.4 Protection, Control and Monitoring ....................................................................................45
6. DATA SPECIFIC ASPECTS ........................................................................................ 46
6.1 Generic TICM Data Model Focused on Outputs ..............................................................46
6.2 TICM Data Output .....................................................................................................................48
6.3 TCIM Data Input ........................................................................................................................50
6.3.1 On-Line Transformer Data From Sensors or IEDs ...................................................50
6.3.2 Data From Utility Information Systems .......................................................................52
6.3.3 Other Usable Data.............................................................................................................53
6.4 Data for TICM and Standardization .....................................................................................53
6.4.1 Standardization Related to TICM ..................................................................................53
6.4.2 Using IEC 61850 for Condition Monitoring Diagnosis and Analysis ..................56
6.4.3 Interoperability and Interchangeability .......................................................................59
6.5 Monitoring Data and Transformer Lifetime Aspects ......................................................60
6.6 Transformer Data and Security ............................................................................................62
6.7 TICM Output Data Use in Utility Systems ..........................................................................63
7. STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS .............................................................. 64
7.1 Fundamental Questions .........................................................................................................64
7.2 Questions Discussion .............................................................................................................64
7.2.1 Scope of Transformer Monitoring ................................................................................64
7.2.2 Company Strategic Plan .................................................................................................64
7.2.3 Determination of the Stakeholders ..............................................................................65
7.2.4 Access to Information .....................................................................................................65
7.2.5 Integration into IT Infrastructure ..................................................................................65
7.2.6 Asset Selection – Monitoring Allocation ....................................................................65
7.2.7 Substations Infrastructure .............................................................................................66
7.2.8 Ownership of Transformer Monitoring .......................................................................66
7.2.9 Transformer Monitoring Specification ........................................................................67
7.2.10 Application of Transformer Monitoring...................................................................67
7.3 Cost Benefit Analysis..............................................................................................................67
7.4 Suggested Scoring Methodology ........................................................................................68
8. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATION .............................................................. 71
9. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES .............................................................................. 72
ANNEX A – TRANSFORMER MAIN SUBSYSTEMS FMEA EXAMPLE

ANNEX B - IEC 61850 LOGICAL NODES FOR MONITORING
ANNEX C – WG WORLDWIDE SURVEY
ANNEX D – TRANSFORMER MONITORING CASES EXAMPLES
ANNEX E – INTELLIGENT INTERPRETATION METHODS
Page 3
List of acronyms
ANN - Artificial Neural Network
ATCC - Automatic Tap Change Control
AVC - Automatic Voltage Control
BCD - Binary-Coded Decimal
CBM – Condition Based Maintenance
CDC - Common Data Class;
CEN - European Committee for Standardization
CENELEC - European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
CI - Computational Intelligence
CIM - Common Information Model
CM – Condition Monitoring
DAO - Data Objects
DAU - Data Acquisition Unit
DGA - Dissolved Gas Analysis
DNP3 - Distributed Network Protocol
DP - Degree of polymerization
EPSs - Electrical Power Systems
ERP – Enterprise Resources Planning
FDS - Frequency Domain Spectroscopy
FFT - Fast Fourier Transform
FMEA - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
FMECA - Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis
HI - Health Index
HMI - Human-Machine-Interface
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission
IED – Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISO - International Organization for Standardization
IT - Information Technology
LAN - Local Area Network
LDs - Logical Devices
LNs - Logical Nodes
MMS - Manufacturing Message Specification
NSM - Network and System Management
OLTC - On-Load Tap changer
OFAF - Oil Forced Air Forced
ONAN - Oil Natural Air Natural
ONAF - Oil Natural Air Forced.
P&C - Protection and Control
PCA - Principal Component Analysis
PD - Partial Discharge
PDC - Polarization and Depolarization Current
PHD - Physical Device
PFM - Pulse-Frequency Modulation Mode
PLC - Programmable Logic Controller
PLS - Primary Least Squares
PWM - Voltage Regulator in Pulse-Width Modulation
RCM - Reliability Centered Maintenance
RTD - Resistance Temperature Detector
RTU – Remote Terminal Unit
RVM - Return Voltage Measurement
SAIDI/SAIFI - Duration and Interruption Frequency Outages indicators
SAS - Substation Automation System
SC - Study Committee
SCADA - Substation (or Supervisory) Control and Data Acquisition
SCL - System Configuration Language
SEC - Security
SFRA - Sweep Frequency Analysis
SMV - Sampled Measured Values
SOM - Self-organising Map
(SVMs) - Support Vector Machines
TB – Technical Brochure
TBM – Time Based Maintenance
TCP-IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TCDG - Total Combustible Dissolved Gas
TFO – Power Transformer
TICM – Transformer Intelligent Condition Monitoring
WAN - Wide Area Network
WG – Working Group
WHS - Winding Hot Spot
Page 4
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 WG Scope
The market now offers plenty of sensors, IEDs, on-line continuous monitoring systems, analysis algorithms and
software systems for condition evaluation. However there is no common practice on how to manage the whole
process and convert the large amount of data into useful and relevant information. Common ideas and designs
would enable the construction of a Transformer Intelligent Condition Monitoring (TICM) System, flexible and
extensible enough to meet utility needs now and in the future.
The WG A2.44 objective through this Technical Brochure (TB) is to provide guidance to manufactures and utilities
interested in understanding the main aspects involved with TICM. This understanding may help them to:
- define projects, processes and specifications to utilize best practices, and maximize the use of Condition
Monitoring (CM) and diagnostic information;
- improve asset management techniques with the large scale use of integrated information systems;
- recommend actions for the use of existing on-line continuous monitoring systems and TICM systems.
Several aspects of the TICM process are addressed in the text throughout the discussion of modelling ideas,
architecture possibilities, example algorithms, results from a WG survey and some examples of monitoring cases.
A review of alternatives based on what currently exists is presented, in order to construct a suitable transition
process towards future CM solutions and scenarios. For a better investment return this transition should ideally
occur with a minimum of technical and economic impact on legacy systems.
1.2 Chapters Organization
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the theme, presents the main definition of what is considered to be TICM,
locates TICM in relation to the future smart-grids, identifies the user’s needs for new solutions from CIGRE
literature evaluation [1] - complemented with the results of a specific WG worldwide survey (see Chapter 6 and
Annex C), and, the TICM main stakeholders with their required outcomes.
Chapter 3 deals with the Functional Description of TICM systems. Focus is kept on describing the whole process
characteristics, identifying the main features foreseen by the WG to be required of a valuable TICM system and
describing how to get a common and modular TICM solution for diagnostics according to the scenario identified in
Chapter 2. Annex A complements the chapter by showing an example of how a transformer functional analysis can
be performed to identify relevant condition analysis to be computationally implemented from continuous on-line
input data.
Chapter 4 covers aspects related to the application of Intelligent Interpretation Methods to TICM. Several
algorithms and concepts that can help utilities to understand the basics of diagnostic module development and help
providers to deal with the generic model identified in Chapter 3 are briefly discussed.
Chapter 5 refers to the Systems Aspects that should be considered to implement a suitable TICM system
architecture in a utility. Suggested generic possible topologies and additional orientations are based in the current
practices and most recent existing standardization.
Chapter 6 discusses some of the Specific Data characteristics that will help define a TICM system in a more
standardized way, with respect to the modelling ideas developed in Chapter 3 and topology options from Chapter
5. Some IEC standardized data input details are presented in Annex C, and Monitoring Use Case examples with
focus on data utilization are presented in Annex D to complement the chapter discussion.
Chapter 7 considers the main Strategic and Economical aspects that are related to transformer monitoring and
considered by the WG as fundamental for a successful TICM implementation and use in a utility. A scoring
methodology to evaluate the company’s “Readiness to Incorporate TICM” is proposed.
Chapter 8 shows conclusions and recommendations for further work.
Chapter 9 presents the bibliographic references.
Annexes A, B, C, D and E have complementary material to the chapters.
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2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 TICM Definition
Utilities have a strong desire to ensure that their high value assets operate efficiently while having low operating
and maintenance costs. To reach this goal, it is good practice to implement a condition monitoring process
throughout the company infrastructure. By implementing such a strategy, optimal preventive maintenance planning,
reduced equipment unavailability and increases in reliability and safety can be achieved.
In choosing condition monitoring as a solution, basically the following criteria need to be fulfilled:
 There is a measurable parameter by which the failure mode may be identified;
 There is a monitoring technique available;
 Monitoring allows sufficient time to take action after detection of incipient failure;
 The knowledge for interpreting monitoring data is available.
A properly implemented condition based process will not only gather and present data, but will also intelligently
analyze the collected data, using Computational Intelligence (CI) algorithms and other more traditional and simple
techniques, to proactively identify and diagnose pending deficiencies in the monitored equipment, giving to the
users a list of possible appropriate actions.
A statement of Transformer Intelligent Condition Monitoring (TICM) that respects the above requirements is:
TICM: is the process of using transformer fundamental knowledge, sensing, data acquisition and
processing systems to collect raw or pre-processed data, store it, and translate it to a common actionable
output, that describes the unit’s and/or component’s condition, with the use of analytical techniques.
TICM is, in this way, a major process that considers several other associated sub-processes like in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: TICM Process and main sub-processes
Some important definitions for understanding the context of TICM are:
Intelligence: is the ability for abstract thought, understanding, seeing, tasting, smelling, hearing and touching, as
well as thinking, self-learning, deductive reasoning and anticipation. In this application, this equates to using
Computational Techniques such as, but not limited to: Artificial Neural Networks, Fuzzy Logic Systems, Genetic
Algorithms, Expert Systems, etc.
Condition: is the state of something with regard to quality and/or working order. Condition can be good or bad or
anywhere between.
Monitoring: is the process of observing and checking the progress or quality of something over a period of time.
This usually entails obtaining raw data from sensor and data acquisition networks and/or pre-analyzed data from
other Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), but also includes the observation of results from periodic tests, visual
inspections, performed maintenance, etc.
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Diagnostics: is the process to interpret evidence of condition abnormalities and their evolution through time in
order to find possible causes, infer risks, and point out to the users the most worth actions to be taken.
Prognostics: is the process to extrapolate the evolution of the equipment state, in order to indicate the best
moment for intervention.
Health Index: is one overall indicator describing the condition status of the transformer that the decision maker can
use to define and prioritize the required action.
IED: An Intelligent Electronic Device is a term used in the electric power industry to describe microprocessor-based
equipment. IEDs receive data from sensors and power equipment, and can issue control commands. Common
types of IEDs include protective relaying devices, on load tap changer controllers, circuit breaker controllers,
capacitor bank switches, recloser controllers, voltage regulators, power transformer monitoring devices, etc.
Other used definitions are introduced through the TB sections and annexes.
2.2 TICM in the Future Power System
It can be said that the long-range plan for electrical networks is the “smart grid”, which is a fully automated power
system that can be achieved by integrating information technology, communication, control and intelligent
equipment monitoring, to gain increased security of supply and better utilization of the power industry’s resources.
The technologies employed - both on-line and off-line - for the purpose of CM for any equipment species, are
moving in the smart-grid direction. They have been evolving over the last 20 or more years to the point where they
are now commonly accepted and have been demonstrated to provide critical data and information for technical and
economic decision making, based on the key parameters and components of the evaluated equipment.
More specifically the technologies utilized for transformer on-line continuous CM have reached the point today
where, with powerful microprocessors and digital signal processing devices, it is possible to access and store the
most important condition and operation parameters at any necessary acquisition rate.
Further use of the transformer’s continuously stored data, integrated with other historical and contextual data about
the substation’s topology, transformer typology (based on the design and manufacturer), factory tests, periodic off-
line and periodic on-line diagnostics and inspections, relevant information from protection systems, etc., will derive
the totality of the needed “data inputs”. These inputs once converted into useful intelligent outputs (information),
should allow network and asset owners to make better technical, and hence, business decisions.
It can be recognized that there is a lot of “potential information”, considering the data which could be collected from
classical systems available today. However, a more intelligent CM system is needed to automatically convert data
into information. This tremendous volume of information could be valuable yet, with time and resources in short
supply to do a proper analysis of this data, there needs to be a new set of technologies and techniques
implemented.
An intelligent monitoring system should feature intelligent analysis as well as intelligent data storage. It should
serve as a “frame” program with high value evaluation functionalities and allow easy improvement as technology
evolves. It can be an information or data source not only to maintenance and operations staff but also for a
dispatch system and asset managers. It should be fully integrated within the standard processes of the company.
Both network owner/operators/maintainers and major energy users have a very real need to move from “just
monitoring” to the point of being able to have the full and continuous knowledge of the operating condition and
state of the transformer fleet. When things begin to go wrong, diagnosis of the problem should be promptly made
available and provide a recommended proactive course of action to reduce the risk of unexpected outages and
damage to transformers and other associated equipment. Diagnosis can improve on operational reliability and
safety of maintenance personnel and, no less importantly, help to protect the environment. If, inspite of all efforts,
an unexpected failure occurs then the timestamp-organized stored information should help to find the ultimate
reasons and direct the redesign process to avoid similar events.
Users want more and more intelligence and usability in the programs which support human decision-making. The
advent of new methods of data modelling, with interpretation using statistical analysis, expert rule systems and
artificial intelligence systems is now moving from the research stage to practical field implementation. Transformers
in critical condition should, in the very near future, benefit from best practices in this domain.
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Once this is achieved, the next logical step in the development of data screening systems would be for the
programs to be given the ability to recommend logical decisions for basic scenarios and possibly to provide
courses of action. Intermediate technology systems designed for each type of substation equipment will be needed
along the evolution process. These should be able to integrate into the network with other existing systems and
also be designed for compatibility with the smart grids of the future.
In the future intelligent networks, CM will occupy an important position as in Figure 2.2 [1].
RELIABILITY AND MANAGED OPERATIONAL

EFFICIENCY PLANNING RELIABILITY RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION
Smart Smart
Generation Smart Grid Consumption
Transmission Grid Distribution Grid

PLANNING & MODELING
BACKOFFICE / FRONT OFFICE
Industrial &
Offshore
Commercial
Wind Power Decision Support Advanced Distribution Meter Data
Asset Loads
System Integrity Energy Mgmt Management Management
Management
Protection System (EMS) Systems (DMS) (MDM)
Distant
Solar Power
Substation Distribution Smart
Power Condition Residential
Automation & Automation & Meters / Demand
Electronics Monitoring Loads
Distributed Protection Protection Response
Energy
Resources
E-Cars E-Cars
Common Information Models and Communications Protocols
Figure 2.2: Equipment CM Positioning in The Future Smart Grids [1]
Figure 2.2 depicts CM as a foundational part of the smart grids process, having a direct relationship with asset
management and giving information to both transmission and distribution grids on the main processes they
embrace, like substation automation, protection, operation, etc. The base for CM is related to the use of
computational systems, founded on common information models and communications protocols that ensure
improved communication ability.
In thisTB, this desired intelligent networked CM when applied to power transformers is referred to as “Transformer
Intelligent Condition Monitoring” (TICM). Any computational system that follows the TICM process definition and
characteristics may be consequently called a “TICM system”.
2.3 User’s Needs Identification
Today, more and more transformer continuous monitoring systems are being installed worldwide, with varying
results. Some prove a significant value to the utility, while others show no or very little value. Some reasons for this
may be:
 The systems are too complicated for the specific circumstances of the majority of transformers;
 Lack of overall commitment from the company for the required infrastructure and real pay back calculation;
 Lack of a true champion to drive the new concepts throughout the traditionally conservative companies;
 Lack of education of the operators/maintainers regarding the meaning and interpretation of the signals;
 No time to look separately at individual units;
 Unreliability of available sensors;
 Lack of common standards, interoperability and open solutions;
 Lack of modular solutions;
 The computational network in the company is not able to receive “plug and play modules”;
 Poor or conflicting cyber security requirements.
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The solutions include technical and organizational aspects and are certainly interdependent. But, what do the users
really need and want from TICM systems?
A possible answer was defined by F.A. Nash [2] in 1954, who described the use of intelligent information systems
in the medical area:
“What is needed is a device which will answer the question: “What are
the possible causes of the group of symptoms and signs I have
elicited from my patient?”
Technically, this is not easy to achieve. Along with the identification of causes, a full diagnostic functionality with the
identification of the most important and urgent actions associated with the condition and operational context of
power transformers should certainly be included as a desired TICM output, since this is of prime importance to the
user decisions, control and planning activities (besides the economic and value reasons).
What is clear is that no single approach seems to be enough to ensure the future success of TICM systems. The
benefits will only fully appear if the company reaches an adequate infrastructure and maturity level for its use and if
economics, specification, hardware, software and information technology, are put together appropriately.
CIGRE Brochure 462 [1] edited in June 2011 by WG B3.12 –“Obtaining Value from On-Line Substation Condition
Monitoring”, presents the results of a survey performed with utilities around the world and has three interesting
chapters called respectively:
 “Present Practice” (chapter 9);
 “Future Development” (chapter 10);
 “Summary, Recommendations and Conclusions (chapter 11).
All three chapters provide significant commentary in clarifying users’ concerns with equipment CM. Those
comments are totally applicable to the power transformers universe.
According to [1], many advances have been achieved with substation CM but there is still a lot of potential for new
developments. Utilities will need modern tools and continuous on-line CM is expected to “become one of the most
essential of these tools”. A key factor for the future development of CM will be the efforts in standardization for the
development of a common language and understanding of function terminology - with naming and clarity of scope,
technical specification for parameters of the transformers to be monitored, rules for comparable interpretation as
well as common presentation of the outcomes. A condition monitoring system in the future should have its
functionalities described by a list of standard functions. Each function should have an unique identification and
should deliver comparable results independendly of whoever is the manufacturer, allowing easy interoperability.
Efforts are necessary to “establish the base for an information exchange platform beyond the present exchange of
information and unusual events between small numbers of users or manufacturers”. The major issue comes from
the software area where, according to [1], “consistently standardized designation of data collected from all different
network places and the data linking to the company asset inventory data base is a need”.
Although modern CM hardware and sensors feature better quality and performance compared to former devices, it
is obligatory that hardware-diagnostic and self-diagnostic functionality has to be implemented in TICM systems.
Examination of believability and validity of data should be included. This means that it is also necessary to monitor
the monitoring devices and software, and they should ideally be maintenance free. In the ideal system, if a software
or/and hardware module is wrong or fails to pass an examination of believability, the monitoring system should
operate without the faulty module and function, but must communicate the malfunction to the user.
Section 10.4 of Brochure 462 summarizes the WG B3.12 discussion, and a final look at Chapter 11 of brochure
462 (pgs. 153 to 159) is highly recommended for the reader of this brochure. All the main points that govern how to
“obtain and add value” from CM in a substation are presented there.
During the WG A2.44 process of information gathering and discussion for understanding the user’s needs, specific
details of actual transformer CM and transformer data were collected in a survey. The results are shown in
Annexes C and D. The goals of the survey were to identify current practices used for monitoring, and experience
related to operation, cases, events, data, reliability, learned lessons and benefits. Thus, Annexes C and D detail
some aspects related to transformers and add some new information that complements the literature [1].
The contents of Brochure 462 and the information in Annexes C and D are considered by the WG to be the
documented expression of the TICM system’s future requirements from the user’s point of view. This TB work was
developed having these identified user’s needs and former experience in mind.
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2.4 TICM Stakeholders Identification
Within the context of TICM, intelligence is the process of giving informative meaning to data; the data is
transformed into information useful to the user. This concept needs to be further specified as it is not yet clearly
defined who the user is and what their required outcomes are. It is crucial that the output delivered by the TICM
system matches the decision maker’s needs. Table 2.1 illustrates the different types of users, the different
timeframes for decision taking, and the TICM outcome.
All of these users will predominantly work on condition data, albeit that the time period over which one intends to
look back is different.
Time Frame Primary User Required Outcome

SYSTEM OPERATOR STATUS WITH REGARD TO
Immediate  Emergency operation  Safety
1
Short term  Emergency maintenance  Continuity
 System operation  Reliability
MAINTENANCE & PLANNING STATUS WITH REGARD TO
 Planned maintenance  Maintenance need
2 Medium term
 Replacement planning  Short term replacement
 "Intensive care" and "early warning"
STRATEGIC ASSET MANAGEMENT STATUS WITH REGARD TO
 Long term evolution  Degradation evolution
3 Long term
 Grid extension  Maintenance optimization
 Replacement strategy  Long term replacement need
Table 2.1: Users of a TICM system
The system operator user needs condition monitoring information to take decisions immediately or on a short
term basis. They will act on current and recent condition data (dating back in the order of hours to days, or a few
weeks). Sometimes even raw or enriched data may be directly used for triggering emergency operation or
maintenance. This user’s main goals are to ensure safety and continuity of supply. As opposed to protection (which
takes automatic action upon predefined warning signals), the system operator needs to take a fast decision by
himself, and therefore needs information that is real-time and easy to interpret. It is crucial that the information
reaching the system operator is limited (filtered) to contain only need-to-know information. The operational impact
may be twofold:
1. If a transformer is known to have an actual condition with reduced load capability, the operator can for example
adjust (reduce) the load until replacement or repair has taken place;
2. If the actual load capability is known from a thermal model with the load and the winding-, oil- and ambient
temperatures as monitoring inputs, the operator may optimize the loading beyond the rated loading, without
putting the transformer at risk.
The maintenance & planning department as a user needs monitoring information in the midterm for a correct
evaluation of the condition and lifetime of equipment. Their main goals are to adequately plan maintenance and
replacement activities. Next to this they may need condition information on the short term to identify timely critical
processes that may need "intensive care" or emergency repair. The kind of information needed by the maintenance
& planning department is not limited to condition information (such as oil humidity, electric arc presence, partial
discharge activity, bushing capacitance evolution) but may involve state information such as load and temperature
evolution, as these provide information about the future development of health condition, and thereby on
maintenance and replacement need. The typical timescale may vary from days to weeks or months; it may be on a
regular time basis or be scheduled according to, for example, the presence of assessment equipment and crew.
Monitoring as such may be permanent or during a prescribed time period based on a certain (critical) condition
("intensive care"). Monitoring may be used for diagnosis, or for recognizing suspect situations that need further
analysis once identified.
The strategic asset management department as a user primarily needs information on the evolution in time of
the health of equipment and the stress it is subjected to, and on the performance of maintenance processes and
field crews. The main goal of the asset manager is to assure the quality of maintenance, and to set up and optimize
maintenance and replacement strategies, in order to make optimum use of the transformer fleet, as well as human
and financial resources. The information is used to analyze the health and life expectancy, and the capability of
meeting grid demands.
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3. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF A TICM SYSTEM
3.1 Main Functions and Requirement
3.1.1 TICM Stages
The ultimate goal of a TICM system is to produce intelligent transformer condition information from monitoring data.
Therefore the TICM system combines the functions of a Transformer Monitoring System with intelligence, aiming at
producing relevant condition information to allow easier decision making.
TICM acts on monitoring data, which is regarded to be available “continuously” and on-line. However for any
system to be intelligent, it is obvious that existing off-line data is used in the interpretation of monitoring data.
Earlier results, measurements and transformer characteristics, for example, provide the context for interpreting
present data. As a result TICM relies on both actual on-line data, and on previous data available in databases, with
the aim of interpreting on-line data.
The TICM process goes through a number of stages that may be characterized, according to Figure 3.1, as Data
capture, Data pre-processing, Data processing, Data storage and Data presentation. The exchange of data
between the different stages is called data communication.
Data capture COM
Data pre- Presen-

COM Storage
processing tation
Data
COM
processing
Figure 3.1: Different stages in TICM
Data capture is the process of collecting data from systems and sensors by which some physical quantity (e.g.
temperature, pressure, or moisture concentration) is transformed to a representative quantity or signal (e.g. current,
voltage, number) that is fit for further processing and/or storage. In data capture the data is transformed into a
permanent format that can be stored for later use. It often includes some primary data processing such as
conversion (from current to voltage), digitization (from analog to digital), or scaling. The output of “data capture” is
the raw data which serves as input for further processing.
Data pre-processing is the process by which the quality of the raw data is improved or made fit for later analysis.
Distortions, for example due to electromagnetic interference, may be identified and removed. Data may be checked
for consistency, to correct for measurement errors (e.g. negative absolute moisture values), and to exclude false
information. Missing information may be recognized and if possible added. It is important that the criteria for quality
management are clearly defined, and that the raw data are available for later comparison if so required. The output
of “data pre-processing” is the enriched raw data which serves as input for further (advanced) processing.
Data processing is the process by which the raw or pre-processed data is analyzed and processed to produce
condition information, triggers and alarms. “Data processing” includes models and algorithms, and is based on
physical, empirical or statistical relationships between the condition parameters to be determined on the one hand,
and the measured data on the other hand.
Data storage is the process of storing and securing data for later processing and analysis. It is evident that data
should not only be stored but also made available and accessible for later use. "Data" in this respect may include
raw data, pre-processed (enriched) raw data, and condition data.
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Data presentation is the process by which data (be it raw data, pre-processed data, or results of advanced
processing) is being presented, and made available for reporting.
Data communication is the process of moving data from one entity to another. Such entities may include sensors,
data buffers, databases and other data storage facilities, servers and software.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below characterize the basic TICM stages by their input and output, and illustrate the
process flow.
Stage Input Output

Data capture Sensor output Raw data
Data pre-processing Raw data Enriched data
Data processing Enriched data Condition data
- Condition information
- Triggers, alarms
Data storage Any kind of data / information Secured and accessible data /
information
Data presentation Any kind of data / information Structured data / information
- Information reports
- Actions required
Table 3.1: Basic TICM process stages
Figure3.2: Basic data flowchart, defining the various processes, data types, storage types,
presentation and reporting types
3.1.2 Required Features of a TICM System
In order to produce intelligent transformer condition information from monitoring data, it is essential that the TICM
system exhibits most of the features mentioned below:
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Functional requirements: the TICM system allows the user to preserve all defined relevant primary transformer
functions:
 It should identify an anomaly and its possible causes;

 It should provide reliable and continuous information on individual transformers and/or the entire transformer
population / fleet;
 It should produce recommendations for basic actions and other outputs which are easily interpreted by the user
(both in bottom-up and top-down approaches).
System requirements: A TICM system is not an isolated system but part of an overall enterprise system:
 It integrates all available periodic, off-line and on-line continuous data/information in a common and
standardized computational architecture;
 It is compatible, interoperable, and interchangeable with hardware/firmware and software; it can be integrated
or interfaced with other company / station systems;
 It can be expanded and updated with minimal rework in order to evolve with time when so instigated by
company requirements or technological (hardware and software) developments;
 It should have at least the same reliability as alternative station systems;
 It should have a modular structure to allow either full or partial implementation according to the users’ needs
and available economic resources (modular expert system characteristics);
 A TICM system should be able to perform system self-diagnosis, and require only a minimum of maintenance.
Information requirements: Data / information quality (correctness, completeness, accessibility, etc.) is the lifeline
of a TICM system:
 The data / information captured and produced by a TICM should be of high quality;
 The data / information from other data sources that the TICM system relies on should be of high quality;
 The relevant information captured and produced should be retained for at least the life of the transformer.
Integration of condition monitoring with control and protection: Although control and protection systems may
provide useful information for condition monitoring, and vice versa, they are commonly separated in order to not
compromise essential control and protection functions. In future a coupling or integration may prove to be beneficial
for both condition monitoring and control and protection functions, without compromising either one.
3.2 Relevant Attributes
3.2.1 Overall Data & Information Requirements
The required output of a TICM system may come in many different forms, depending on who is the user and what
kind of decision needs to be supported. It may have the form of a "GO/NOGO" stop sign, or
"RED/ORANGE/YELLOW/GREEN" light for urgent operational decisions. It may also require a calculation of the
failure probability versus time for a long term replacement decision.
When applying any one TICM system, the following characteristics are crucial for obtaining high quality results:
 The quality of the data: It is imperative that the measured and stored data is representative of the measured
signals and is free of distortions, measuring errors, and data lapses as far as possible. Adequate correctional
techniques like filtering, deglitching and averaging should be applied if needed.
 The selection of data: The proper selection of data that is archived, which quantities, with which frequencies,
and the time period during which it is stored must be defined. It would not be efficient to store (and be able to
retrieve) all data measured forever. In defining the selection and time duration, it should be defined beforehand
what evaluation will take place, for what purpose, at what time, and therefore what data is needed for the
evaluation and what is the required acquisition rate.
 The accessibility and availability of information: The stored raw or analyzed data should be available to the
user to act on it. What information, at what time, and at what aggregation level very much depends on the kind
of user and their needs.
 The quality of the evaluation: The kind of evaluation is determined by a purpose that is defined beforehand.
The quality is determined by the knowledge rules and algorithms used, and the validation options that are
available to assure the quality of the evaluation methods.
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 The competence of the user: The user needs to understand the meaning of the information, the way it is
generated, and the possible pitfalls they should be able to avoid (e.g. by recognizing incorrect data). The user
should be able to access the original data to verify the output information, and should be competent to
adequately support a decision with the right information.
 The presentation of information: It should be possible to combine, aggregate and visualize data and
information, and make it suitable to support the intentions of the user.
3.2.2 Information Hierarchy
It is important to distinguish between different levels of data by regarding the level of meaningful information added.
From a bottom up perspective the hierarchy starts with raw data as delivered by the sensor(s). This data gains
more and more information by each step of analysis and interpretation. Raw data may first be enriched, and then
consecutively be used to arrive at physical properties, defects, failure modes, transformer status, associated risks,
maintenance and replacement need.
From a top down perspective the hierarchy starts with the needs of the decision maker, which may be
technology-, budget- or risk-driven. The need defines the information required, and thereby the data and evaluation
steps required. The decision making process is not a TICM activity; however it specifies the information need and
is thereby an important TICM boundary condition. For transformer monitoring purposes the suggested hierarchy is
shown in Figure 3.3. The upper box describes the needs of the user of TICM at which the TICM activities should be
aimed; the lower box describes the scope of TICM activities.
Decision information
Maintenance need
Replacement need User specification of TICM TICM "user"
Cost implications
Transformer status
Failure probability
Remaining life Core activity of TICM TICM "actor"
Condition data
Physical properties
Failure modes
Raw data
As delivered by a sensor
Enriched by quality management
Figure 3.3: Example of the Hierarchy of TICM data
3.2.3 Processing Complexity
Figure 3.4 illustrates that the process of transforming data into decision information may be very straightforward, or
more complex. In the case, for instance, of an oil level indicator or a critical temperature sensor, the data may be
directly turned into an alarm, or trigger an action.
Other processing may be more complex because it requires an intelligent combination of various input data. When
using partial discharge techniques, for example, one uses a combination of related data entries or quantities
(amplitudes, frequencies, phase angles, and location) to come to a conclusion on the source and severity of the
activity.
Figure 3.4 shows that there is a large variety of possibilities to turn monitoring data into decision information. In
general sensor and gathered data is combined to determine a physical property, various physical properties may
be combined to describe a failure mode, and the failure mode(s) need to be translated to required action. In some
cases sensor data may however directly indicate a failure mode or even required action.
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Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
DECISION
INPUT
Sensor Physical Failure Required

data property mode action
Figure 3.4: Diversity of processing possibilities in transforming raw data
into decision information
Some outputs will only require a simple threshold, where others require complex intelligent data manipulation.
Because of these differences in complexity, a TICM system needs to define a specific procedure for each individual
output.
3.2.4 Data & Information Classification
The key functionality of a database is to store data for later use, such as presenting, reporting, or processing the
data. Before defining the database requirements and setting up a database for a TICM system, it is crucial to
decide what the data will be used for, and what data attributes are required for that purpose. Data attributes may
involve the data format, storage time, accessibility and so on.
The data stored for TICM in a database may be classified as fixed transformer data, condition data, and operational
data.
 Fixed transformer data in this context refers to the fixed data describing the transformer type and make,
ratings etc., later referred to as static data.
 Condition data / information may be raw data, enriched data or processed data.
a. Raw data comes directly from any sensor or measuring instrument and is often temporarily stored until it is
enriched. After enrichment, the raw data is usually removed, unless there is any anticipated use for it in
future.
b. Enriched data usually forms the basis for (intelligent) processing producing condition information. It may
be stored, in a more or less compressed form, for later analysis by possible new processing techniques, or
for presenting to users in its simplest form, without processing.
c. Processed data is usually permanently stored, but one may choose to remove it or compress it after a
given period of time.
 Operational data does not refer to the transformer condition but to the installation location and circumstances
of operation, and involves current, ambient temperature, tap changer position and so on. It forms the context
within which condition data needs to be analyzed.
3.2.5 Static and Dynamic Parameters
For the data stored in a database one may distinguish between static data and dynamic data.
 Static data involves fixed data on the transformer (type, make, year of installation, ratings and so on).
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 Dynamic data is data on all properties that may vary in time. One can further distinguish between historic
dynamic data, stored earlier, and actual dynamic data, stored recently. Although monitoring deals with actual
dynamic data, it should be kept in mind that also static and historic dynamic data may be required in the
analysis of monitoring data. As an example, the interpretation of actual DGA measurements often requires a
trending analysis, for which historic data is needed. As another example, the interpretation of oil temperature at
a specific load requires static data on the transformer thermal properties, and dynamic data on the ambient
temperature.
For static data it is recommended to store as much information as is available: it will consume much less storage
capacity than dynamic data. For dynamic data it is crucial to decide before hand what data is, or might be,
relevant for processing or for any form of analysis. This may involve both recent and historic dynamic data.
Important data attributes involving the data format, data compression, data security, and compatibility with other
systems are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.
3.2.6 Database Requirements
What data needs to be stored, and how it should be stored, depends on what data operations are to be carried out,
and what data sources are available and usable.
Therefore the data requirements first of all require a description of the analysis and presentation/reporting
processes for which the data is being used. From this process description one may then define an information
model, describing what data is needed as input when and for what purpose, and what data will be produced. In the
context of TICM the transformer information model described in section 3.3.3 will therefore form the basis of the
database requirements.
Apart from the design of the data storage, additional features are important. As the transformer information model
develops over time with increasing knowledge and understanding, so must the dataset. New indicators may have
to be added, and the database may have to be interfaced with new types of equipment, requiring updated data
formats and communication protocols. This calls for a flexible, adjustable data storage facility and interaction
modes.
For the exchange of information between the data sources on the one hand, and monitoring systems and analysis
algorithms on the other hand, it is highly recommendable to use standardization of information model formats, and
coding of defect types. This will further be of benefit for the exchange of information between manufacturers of
monitoring equipment and companies using the information, and for the exchange of technical and scientific
information and results.
3.3 TICM Modelling
3.3.1 The Concept of a TICM Generic Model
One of the most common reasons for failing IT related projects is that users start putting together the pieces
without first agreeing a functional description with a robust and well documented model.
This section presents a systematic and structured way to select the proper data (sources) and evaluation methods
to produce the required relevant information, based on a goal oriented approach.
The exploration starts with the definition of the user needs related to intelligent condition monitoring systems and
their attributes, and the information needs that can be derived from the user needs. The information need in turn is
decisive for both the data sources and the evaluation methods.
The TICM model allows users and providers to define monitoring needs and solutions that can be easily integrated
into both existing and future monitoring systems regardless of the hardware and software used.
The model considered here consists of two parts: a functional transformer model and an information model. When
combined, they form a generic TICM model. This model and its context are shown in the Figure 3.5.
It is the ambition of this report to introduce the generic TICM approach including the concept of “intelligent nodes”,
and illustrate what intelligent nodes may be needed and how the nodes can be designed for the dominant
transformer failure mechanisms. In Annex A, Chapter 4 and Annex E a number of examples are provided.
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By building this generic model the user is enabled to specify a modular TICM system consisting of interoperable
(plug-and-play) analytical models.
Figure 3.5: TICM generic model concept and its context
3.3.2 The Concept of a Functional Transformer Model
The functional transformer model describes how the transformer is broken down into subsystems, and defines the
functionalities and failure modes of each subsystem. Based on the functional model a list of defect types and
required analysis types is defined. It is based on a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) or Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) [3] [4] approach, and is developed to provide guidance in defining the condition monitoring and
analysis requirements. This allows the specification of a TICM system, based on an understanding of functions and
failure modes. The concept of a functional transformer model is shown in Figure 3.6 (please note that the
breakdown of the transformer into the subcomponents, functions, and failure modes as presented here is an
arbitrary example).
Figure 3.6: Concept of a functional transformer model

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3.3.2.1 Methodology
In this section the functional transformer model will be developed in more detail. It should be noted that there is no
one perfect way of setting up such a transformer model. It depends, for example, on the purpose for which the
model is used in the first place (system operation, maintenance planning, asset management analysis), and on the
level of detail required for that purpose. For this reason the models presented here should be considered as
examples that may need fine-tuning when put into practice.
The methodology for designing the functional transformer model is based on failure mode analysis. It involves a
description of how the transformer may be broken down into subcomponents and how defect types may be
defined. In the framework of this brochure, the model will be primarily focused on continuous monitoring
applications, but it may be applied also to evaluate other desired functions.
The functional transformer model is based on Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). An FMEA is a systematic
stepwise procedure for evaluating failure modes. It starts with a definition of the system under investigation (here
the transformer) and its main functionality.
By the introduction of the concept of functionality, it becomes possible to uniquely define a failure mode [3] [4], as
the inability to fulfill this functionality to user defined performance standards.
The main functionalities of a transformer are:

 Converting electric power from one voltage level to another;
 Insulating (high) voltages;
 Conducting (high) currents.
Failure modes may then be defined as: improper or no voltage conversion, improper or no insulation, improper or
no conduction. The next steps in the FMEA methodology are that for each failure mode the failure causes are
identified, indicators are attributed to the failure mode or cause, and mitigation measures are defined.
As a transformer is too complex a system to define useful failure modes for the system as a whole, it is broken
down in subsystems. For each subsystem the functionality is defined, after which failure modes, failure causes,
indicators, and mitigation measures are obtained.
The choice of subsystems and their functionalities is not unique. Different breakdowns are possible, depending on
the amount of detail required, and on the relevance for a specific user. As a result there is a degree of freedom for
the user in applying this process.
One may use a hierarchy of transformer functionalities and distinguish between different functionality levels:
 Primary functionalities have a critical impact on the complete loss of functionality of the transformer as a
whole, or the network it is part of. These functionalities need to be evaluated and monitored with high accuracy,
and are mandatory to each functional TICM model;
 Secondary functionalities are not critical to the survival of the transformer or the network delivery but have a
significant impact on the company business values. They may have an impact on quality of power delivery,
costs, safety, environmental issues, and so on. Although many companies use comparable business values,
the priorities and choices may differ, and the functional model should be able to accommodate that;
 Tertiary functionalities are not directly related to complete loss of functionality or significant harm to one or
more business values. They may be incorporated according to the desires of the users and may be considered
optional to TICM systems functionalities.
The functionalities described in this report (see Annex A) include as a minimum what was judged by the WG as
having priority 1 (primary functionalities), but do not necessarily involve all possible options for priorities 2 and 3.
In this report the FMEA is adapted to TICM, and involves the following consecutive steps:
1. Breakdown of the transformer into functional subsystems
2. Defining the function of the primary subsystem
3. Define the possible functional failures of the primary subsystem
4. Define the (sub)components related to the functional failure
5. Define the failure modes and causes of the functional failure
6. Define the defect analysis name for the abnormal symptoms of the failure modes
7. Define the on-line measurable indicator values or data inputs for each failure mode
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Sometimes, this analysis is also referred to as a Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) analysis. In fact, RCM is
a maintenance design methodology that uses an FMEA analysis as a basis, but takes it further to design
maintenance programs. References to both FMEA and RCM analysis are incorporated in Annex A.
It is noted that the FMEA analysis may be performed at any level of detail required. In order to arrive at a practical
approach the analysis in this brochure is limited by taking into account the criterion that it needs to be relevant to
TICM. This means, it should contribute to the identification, evaluation, and prevention of failures by means of
(intelligent interpretation of) on-line monitoring. This criterion is not unique for each and every user, and depends
on the application foreseen. It is meant to provide guidance, but the details may be adjusted or fine-tuned to the
applications at hand.
In comparison to a “standard” FMEA the WG added in Annex A the “failure symptoms”. These symptoms represent
a transformer condition abnormality (being a defect, or the symptom of a defect) and are associated with an
evaluation process with which the defect may be identified and characterized. For this the WG has defined
standardized Defect Analysis Names, each of which refers to a TICM Intelligent Node.
It is noted that a catalog of defects and faults was also published in CIGRÉ brochure 227 [5] –“Life Management
Techniques for Power Transformers”, CIGRE A2.18, 20 January 2003, however this list is independent of the
context of monitoring applications.
3.3.2.2 Transformer Subsystems
In order to perform a failure mode analysis, the transformer is broken down in subsystems. The purpose is to
create a set of subsystems that each has, at least, one significant functionality that can be analyzed in terms of
failure modes. The number of subsystems to be used depends on the user interests, in the utility’s experience,
internal policies of the company, or the way the transformer is operated.
As an example:
 The failure mode of a bushing is mostly dielectric in nature, and the degradation process is enhanced by
field non-uniformities and surface degradation caused by the deposition of dirt, surface degradation by UV
irradiation, chemical corrosion, and so on.
 The winding insulation system is subject to both thermal and dielectric stress, sometimes even chemical
attack, and the predominant degradation mechanism is thermal degradation, which may be enhanced by
overloading or cooling system deficiencies.
The question of to what level the transformer should be broken down into subsystems can be answered by
balancing effectiveness and efficiency.
When breaking down the transformer in too few subsystems, the analysis will be ineffective: it will be hard to assign
a specific functionality to a subsystem, which makes it difficult to analyze failure modes and root causes. Breaking
down the transformer in more subsystems will at first make the analysis more refined, but at some point it becomes
inefficient because of the number of functionalities. As a result, the analysis of failure modes and root causes
increases so dramatically that the insight gained may not weigh up to the effort required. In conclusion, too few
subsystems may make the approach ineffective; too many make it complex and perhaps inefficient.
A second aspect that comes into the equation is the distinction between primary and secondary subsystems.
Primary subsystems are those that support the main transformer functionalities (converting voltage; withstanding
high dielectric, thermal and mechanical stress; carrying high currents).
Secondary subsystems are those that are required for the operation, protection and monitoring of the transformer
primary functions. In this brochure the focus is on monitoring of primary functions, and the WG has chosen a
division of subsystems that is both practical and useful for TICM applications. This has resulted in the following
proposed breakdown of the transformer into subsystems:
Transformer primary systems:

 Active Part
 Oil Containment and Preservation system
 Cooling system
 Bushings
 OLTC
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For the sake of completeness, an example is presented below of a breakdown related to the secondary transformer
subsystems.
Transformer secondary systems:

 Protection
 Control system
 Sensing devices (IEDs, monitoring hardware)
 CT
 Monitoring system (software)
 Accessories
Please note that other choices are possible, and may even be better for specific applications.
3.3.2.3 Transformer Failure Modes and Defect Types
As presented earlier, and in line with the methodology of the FMEA, a failure mode is defined as the inability to
fulfill functionality. In the previous section it was shown how the transformer is broken down into subsystems, each
having their own functionality, in order to be sufficiently specific for identifying defects by means of monitoring.
Failure modes may then be defined as not performing, or not properly or completely performing, the required
functionality.
For each of the primary subsystems, Annex A gives:

- The function(s) of the primary subsystem
- The possible functional failure modes of the primary subsystem
Then, for each failure mode Annex A gives:

- The subcomponent that is involved in the functional failure
- The failure modes and causes of the functional failure
- The defect analysis name and/or abnormal symptoms of the failure modes
- The on-line measurable indicator values or data inputs for each failure mode.
In the framework of TICM, Annex A provides a suggested list of standardized Defect Analysis Names and Codes,
as well as a list of monitoring parameters by which the defects may be identified. Each Defect Analysis Name also
refers to a TICM Intelligent Node as mentioned in 3.3.2.1.
3.3.3 The Concept of a Transformer Information Model
The transformer information model is based on the functional model and specifies the condition monitoring and
analysis process. It serves as a framework to describe what data and information is required when and where, and
it specifies the data processing needed to arrive at the required information in terms of computational units, or
algorithms. The building blocks of an information model are called here the “TICM intelligent nodes”. A TICM node
describes how information is processed to obtain the defect status and, if possible, the required action related to a
specific failure mode. The concept of a TICM intelligent node, together with an example structure, is shown in the
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Concept of a TICM intelligent node, and an example structure
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Each transformer subcomponent may be susceptible to several failure modes and defect types. For each defect
type, an algorithm may describe how the monitoring data is processed to arrive at the defect status. This algorithm
is called the TICM node.
3.3.3.1 Transformer Condition
The transformer information model is based on the functional model and specifies the condition monitoring and
analysis process. It serves as a framework to describe what data and information is required when and where, and
it specifies the data processing needed to arrive at the required information in terms of computational units, or
algorithms.
The building blocks of an information model are here called the TICM intelligent nodes. A TICM node describes
how information is processed to obtain the transformer condition and, based on that, the required action related to
a specific failure mode. First it is relevant to more precisely discuss and define “transformer condition”.
There is no unique way in the literature to define the concept of transformer condition. Some definitions relate
transformer condition to the measure by which the transformer is able to deliver its specified performance
(functional condition), whereas other definitions relate transformer condition to the probability of failure. What is
common in all approaches is that a transformer is assumed to have a 100% sound condition at the start of life, and
that it degrades over the course of time, thereby going through stages, until in the end it has lost its functionality
and has failed.
Figure 3.8 shows schematically that the condition degrades until deviations become detectable, and then degrades
further until, eventually, a critical threshold is exceeded and the faulty region is entered. In this region the
transformer is no longer able to perform according to its specifications and to meet its functional requirements. It
does not have to fail necessarily, until the functional requirements are really called upon.
As an example: for insulation winding paper it is known that it loses its mechanical strength as soon as the DP
value drops below a critical value of 200 – 250. This does not imply that the transformer fails as soon as this value
is reached, but it will fail as soon as the mechanical requirements are called upon, for instance by the mechanical
forces during a short circuit current or during transformer transport. So, a transformer failure requires that the
transformer is in a faulty condition and that a trigger is present to provoke the failure.
Figure 3.8: Schematic representation of condition development in time (top),

and an example of condition coding (bottom)
Figure 3.8 shows how the condition develops over time in stages:
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- Normal condition: from the moment the transformer is put into operation, the condition starts to deteriorate
until observable evidence occurs that may be associated with a future potential failure. Until this moment in
time the transformer is assumed to be in a normal condition.
- Defective condition: from this point on the transformer is assumed to be in a defective condition, which
implies that a potential future failure is developing, and that this development can be evaluated from
observations by means of (intelligent) analysis methods or algorithms.
- Faulty condition: when degradation continues, at some point the condition will reach the limit of acceptability
defined by the user, and enter the regime of a faulty condition. The threshold is usually chosen to represent a
limit on the failure probability. In the faulty condition the transformer is no longer able to guarantee safe
operation specified by the user. The transformer does not necessarily fail when in the faulty condition. First,
the failure probability is below 100%, and secondly, a trigger may be needed to induce a failure. Such a trigger
may consist of an overload, an overvoltage, or a mechanical force exerted during short circuit or transport.
- Failed condition: when in the faulty region the failure probability reaches 100%, or when a trigger occurs
which exceeds the transformer withstand capability, the transformer will end up in failed condition.
From this timeline, it may be concluded that monitoring is particularly useful for transformers in the defective region.
The goal is to prevent the transformer condition from entering the faulty region, by acting proactively at an
appropriate moment.
When interpreting the condition with respect to a specific failure mode, often a scaling system or a classification
system is used.
- A scaling system is a continuum; one may use, for example, a linear scale from 0 to 1 or from 0% to 100%.
The condition value can take any number in between, and indicates how far the condition is from being perfect
or faulty.
- In a classification system one first defines classes (e.g. new, as good as new, degrading/defective, faulty,
and failed). The condition is discrete, falling into one of the prescribed classes. The classes may be given a
color for easy interpretation (e.g. green, yellow, orange, red).
The WG strongly suggests defining a universal classification scheme with standardized categories, for the
following reasons:
 It allows judgement of all failure modes with the same criteria;
 It allows creation of a consistent interoperable system for analyzing monitoring information;
 It enables creation of a platform for the exchange of information between different users (the diagnostics
expert, the analyst, the asset manager (decision taker), etc.).
 It enables creation of a platform for the exchange of information between different companies and
institutions, and provides grounds for sector wide information sharing.
This universal classification, as in Figure 3.9, may consist of colors, numbers, or other classifications. In principle it
may refer to the condition (failure probability) or to the required action. However, as the coupling of actions to
condition may be dependent on company policy (dependent on impact, risk, and risk appetite), the link between
class and condition (failure probability) is more universal than the link between class and action required.
UNIVERSAL COMPANY SPECIFIC
CLASS COLOR DEFINITION ACTION

4 bad (faulty) replacement on short term
3 poor (evolved defect) repair / replacement required
2 average (early defect) observe evolution; diagnostic / repair action if required
1 good (as good as new) business as usual
Figure 3.9: Proposed universal condition classification scheme (left), and an example of a
possible company specific action classification scheme (right)
Translation of observable parameters to a condition value or class is performed by a condition algorithm. Although
the term algorithm is often associated with software, in general it describes a sequence of activities, or a step by
step procedure, to generate an output from an input. An algorithm may take many forms. It may be a simple
comparison between a measured value and a threshold value, or an empirical knowledge rule, or a theoretical
Page 22
model linking a measured parameter to a degradation status, and so on. Chapter 4 on Intelligent Interpretation
Methods describes a number of different types of algorithms.
For the purpose of condition monitoring, an algorithm is useful when it meets the following requirements:
 It should be able to detect a condition change soon after the condition has entered the defective region,
and sufficiently long before it enters the faulty region;
 It should allow sufficient time to reveal a trend from consecutive evaluations, and to take mitigating action
to prevent it from entering the faulty region;
 It should give information on the developing defect, and possibly on the estimated time until the condition
will enter the faulty region.
3.3.3.2 Condition and Recommended Action
According to the data hierarchy described in section 3.2.2 the TICM should allow the following sequence of
evaluation steps:
- From the input data, an algorithm will usually first provide condition data (physical properties, active failure
modes);
- Secondly, an algorithm will preferably provide transformer status data (failure probability, remaining life or
time to failure);
- Eventually the transformer status data should allow the user to produce decision information on the required
action (maintenance need, replacement need, need for additional diagnosis, cost implications).
It is important to note that the TICM system does not take decisions, but provides decision support information.
Depending on how conclusive this information is, it may support decisions on different types of recommended
actions:
 Planning of replacement, maintenance, or additional diagnostic measurements or inspections (off-line or
on-line);
 Optimization of maintenance (activities, frequencies, assessment and inspection techniques, mix of
corrective, periodic, condition based and risk based techniques)
 Optimization of operation (procedures, loading, protection, quality assurance);
 Optimization of specifications;
 And so on.
It is crucial to realize that, in general, decision information requires more than an algorithm which provides
information on one single failure mode or defect type. Taking a decision on the transformer as a whole requires an
integrated evaluation of all analysis results. This integrated evaluation needs to be based on the transformer
information model, but requires an aggregation step to determine the condition or health of a transformer as a
whole. This aggregation is discussed in section 3.4.
3.3.3.3 Analysis Types
In the functional transformer model of section 3.3.2.1 it was described how the failure symptoms and the monitoring
parameters by which they may be identified can be derived from a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. An example is
presented in Annex A, Tables A1 to A5.
This evaluation supports the user in deciding which failure/defect modes need to be looked after, and which of
those need to be monitored. It should be noted that the FMEA provides information on possible failure modes, but
not on the likelihood or the impact of the failure modes. Even when using the extended version of FMEA, the
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), it should be noted that here criticality is related to how
critical a specific failure mode is to survival of the transformer. It does not reflect the impact of transformer failure
on the grid operation, on safety, on costs and the like. It can not therefore replace the impact analysis required for
prioritization and decision taking.
Likelihood and impact together determine the associated risk of the failure mode, and are therefore the basis for
prioritization. The prioritization then forms the foundation of the decision to use monitoring, or not.
In short, a monitoring system needs to be able to identify high priority failure modes in a timely fashion, predict the
future development of the failure mode, and allow timely action. This requires a suitable parameter to identify the
failure mode by, the availability of a monitoring technique to measure this parameter, and sufficient knowledge to
interpret the monitoring data.
Page 23
Analysis is required to interpret condition monitoring data and convert it into information on defect occurrence and
severity. To guide the user, the WG has defined a number of standardized analysis types that fulfill the criteria
mentioned above. These are incorporated in Annex A.6. The listing is not necessarily comprehensive but serves as
a guide. In terms of TICM each analysis corresponds to a TICM node.
The final aspect of the monitoring decision is the cost/benefit evaluation. For condition monitoring to be the
preferred solution it should be clear that the consequences that are being prevented by monitoring are sufficiently
1
relevant to justify the investment of applying and maintaining the monitoring solution.
3.3.4 Structure of a TICM Intelligent Node
A TICM node is, basically, an algorithm that determines the defect status from monitoring data, making use of
available supporting data to produce information on the defect status. This in turn supports the decision of the
required action. The concept was illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
It is assumed here that the required data is available in an enterprise database:

 Data from monitoring;
 Data from previous measurements, maintenance and failure/defect history;
 Transformer characteristics and parametric data;
 Operational context.
In some cases the TICM node may directly trigger maintenance actions; in other cases it needs to be evaluated in
combination with other TICM nodes.
The transformer information model contains at least one analysis module (or TICM node) for each defect type that
is considered relevant by the user. Annex A.6 lists a number of possible analysis types. This list is however not
necessarily comprehensive (other analysis types may be considered relevant), nor are all listed analysis types
required for each transformer type and each user. The list serves as guidance to the reader, but may be extended
or shortened at will.
Figure 3.10: An example of a TICM Intelligent Node
An example of a TICM node for Winding Paper Degradation induced failure causes is given in Figure 3.10. In this
algorithm case the monitoring inputs are coming from temperature-, current- and oil sensors; the analysis uses
historical profiles from a database, a loading guide for the calculation of the hotspot temperature and loss of life, a
model to derive DP values from the furfural content, and an analysis model to weight the results of loading guide
and furfural analysis outputs. Outputs are the calculated loss of life and indication of the degradation condition
through a color code.
1
In fact costs have been the driving force of the evolution of maintenance programs from corrective to preventive maintenance, and from
Periodic to Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) and to Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) [3].
Page 24
Chapter 4 will further discuss what kind of algorithms may be used, and what kind of methodologies are available,
to build effective analysis modules for the defect types selected.
3.4 Health and Risk Indexing
So far the TB has described the transformer information model at the level of individual failure modes and defect
types, and illustrated how TICM nodes can be used to provide uniform information with regard to one failure mode
or defect type.
The individual results on failure mode level can be translated to an overall statement on the transformer condition
with the aim of having a fleet condition perspective.
An often-used concept is the “Transformer Health Index” (HI). The HI may be defined as: “one overall indicator
describing the condition status of the transformer that the decision maker can use to define and prioritize the
required action”, such as prioritization of replacement units, spares strategy definition, etc.
Health indexing is focused on the condition of the transformer. It may be combined with an assessment of the
impact of transformer failure. The result then may be a risk index, which can inform prioritization and risk based
decision taking [6] [7]. This requires a methodology to determine the impact (e.g. in terms of reliability, cost, safety,
environmental impact, etc.).
The HI is within the scope of work for WG A2.49. Therefore, without going into further detail, Figure 3.11 presents
an example result of such a methodology where all transformers in a fleet are plotted on a risk plot. This combines
the health, presented here as the probability of a failure on the one axis, and the impact of the failure, presented on
the other axis. The colored areas in this plot refer to the risk level defined by the user (usually referred to as the
“risk appetite”). In the example, the areas are delimited by curves where the product of the probability and impact
index is a constant (iso-risk curve) that assume, according to the user’s definition, values of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.4.
Figure 3.11: Example of a risk plot showing the results of combined health (probability of
occurrence) and impact indexing for a population of transformers
Without claiming to be comprehensive, the following aspects are identified as being relevant when applying a
Health Indexing approach with in a TICM system:
 The Health Indexing methodology should preferably not only produce a numerical output, but be able to refer to
the transformer needs in terms of replacement, refurbishment and maintenance;
 Data quality is decisive for the quality of Health Indexing and decision support. This holds for both missing data
and incorrect data. Therefore it is recommended that the Health Indexing methodology is able to compensate
for the impact of missing or incorrect data;
 It is recommended that Health Indexing methodologies provide a confidence level that accounts for
uncertainties due to missing, incorrect or inaccurate input data.
Page 25
4. INTELLIGENT INTERPRETATION METHODS
4.1 Background
In order to take some action in response to monitoring, meaningful information must be extracted from
measurement data. "Interpretation" is short-hand for this process, and encompasses a wide range of techniques
and approaches to data analysis.
Interpretation techniques can be considered based on the type of output, or "answer", they give:
 Anomaly detection is the most basic type of analysis, where deviations away from the norm are identified
(but not explained).
 Diagnosis gives more information, identifying the behaviour or fault type represented by data.
 Prognosis takes this even further, giving not only a diagnosis of the current state, but also a prediction of
how things will evolve in the future.
These three approaches can be summarised as identifying there is a problem, recognising what the problem is,
and predicting how much time remains in order to correct it.
There is a distinction between knowledge-based and data-driven interpretation techniques, both in practical terms
of how to implement and build a system and in the theoretical aim of replicating intelligence:
 Knowledge-based techniques aim to encode the expert judgment of an engineer, and replicate the high-
level reasoning they would apply to a problem. Examples include causal models, expert systems, and
fuzzy logic.
 Data-driven techniques, on the other hand, aim to encode lower level pattern matching facets of
intelligence, and undergo training by repeated exposure to examples before any interpretation can be
performed. Examples of this type include neural networks, multivariate analysis, rule induction, and
Bayesian networks.
It should be noted that a large variety of techniques could be used to interpret data generated by transformer
monitoring. Therefore, this chapter should not be considered as an exhaustive review, as several available
techniques are not presented here. This chapter only aims to introduce the terminology most associated with
intelligent algorithms for transformer intelligent condition monitoring (TICM), and to give a general background to
common techniques. The following sections describe each technique at a high level, with more specific examples
in Annex E detailing how these techniques have been applied to TICM.
4.2 Definition of Algorithms for Transformer
There are a wealth of techniques for data processing that can be applied to transformers. Different techniques will
give different types of output and result, which means it is important to understand what a technique can do and
when it is appropriate for use.
Broadly, there are three stages of data processing: data preparation, interpretation, and recommendations/action.
The first is an umbrella term for approaches for improving interpretation through data pre-processing, such as data
validation, cleaning, transmission and storage. Interpretation refers to turning data into information, and extracting
some meaning from measurements. This is the activity we refer to as "Algorithms". The final stage is to turn this
information into action.
Each of these stages can use simple or complex techniques, and need not comprise a single technique per stage.
Some stages may be performed manually by an engineer, such as downloading a batch of data for interpretation
(data preparation), or could be automated as part of the on-line data acquisition system, such as multivariate
analysis for anomaly detection (interpretation) and somemay envolve planning appropriate maintenance in
response to alarms (action).
4.3 Examples of Basic Algorithms Used for Transformer Monitoring
4.3.1 Data Preparation and Pre-processing
In many situations, some pre-processing or preparation of the data will produce more effective results than using
raw data for interpretation [8]. Intelligent system techniques tend to perform most accurately when the interpretation
Page 26
task is as constrained as possible. It is more difficult to recognise patterns in noisy, highly-dimensional data than in
data which has been pre-processed specifically for the required task.
Pre-processing is a broad term, encompassing simple data cleaning through data transformation. Different types of
data preparation are data cleaning, dimensionality reduction, transformation and feature extraction and data
normalisation as described below.
 Data Cleaning:
The purpose of this operation is to remove erroneous measurements that are misleading for the characterisation of
transformer behaviour. This includes removing outliers due to sensor or logging faults, reducing the number of
variables analysed or de-noising of the signal.
Data cleaning is often an overlooked, but necessary, part of data processing. It often relies on user experience and
"common sense" in spotting unlikely data and it is not always possible to fully automate the process. Some types of
data error are easy to find and remove (for example, a reading of 0 mA out of a 4-20 mA loop). Some others can be
more subtle, such as an out of calibration sensor or a faulty sensor giving a constant value, but in "normal" range
(i.e. flat line). Data cleaning tends to be performed manually, using visual inspection to remove extraneous points
of bad data.
Examples of cleaning techniques:

- Remove data out of reasonable physical range
Any temperature below -50C or over 200C
Negative load
Load larger than 2 P.U.
Signal below 4 mA in a 4-20 mA loop
- Remove noise in the signal
Loss of communication
Flat line (a frozen reading)
Spikes
See Annex E1 for an example of data cleaning, and the theory behind it.
 Dimensionality Reduction:
Some monitoring installations record a single parameter at relatively low frequency, allowing interpretation to be
performed directly on the raw or cleaned data stream. However, most monitoring installations will capture multiple
parameters (e.g. top oil temperature, dissolved gas levels, load current) or high frequency data (e.g. partial
discharge). The number of parameters is referred to as the dimensionality of the data, and it can significantly
influence the accuracy and sensitivity of TICM models.
An example of data with one dimension is the per unit loading on a transformer. This is a single type of value
recorded periodically over time, making it one dimensional. The same information can be represented as two
parameters, e.g. measured current (amps) and rated load, giving a two dimensional dataset. The underlying
information about health and condition is the same, regardless of whether the data is stored as one or two
dimensions. But in general, patterns are easier to determine in data sets with fewer dimensions, and transformers
can more easily be compared against each other.
Therefore, one component of data preparation is to consider dimensionality reduction: the elimination or
combination of certain variables to simplify the interpretation task. This can result in models with improved
sensitivity to significant changes, and thus overcome the so called "curse of dimensionality" that makes such tasks
increasingly difficult as parameters are added [8] [9]. It also makes it easier to visualise data, as two or three
parameters can be graphed against each other. One technique for visualising data with higher dimensionality
(more than three parameters) is Sammon mapping [9].
An approach to dimensionality reduction can be, for example, to simply eliminate duplicate or related parameters
from the analysis process, such as ignoring Total Combustible Dissolved Gas (TCDG) and using individual gas
levels. Other approaches are to "transform" multiple parameters into fewer, such as calculating per unit loading,
converting three bushing voltage readings into a single phase vector measurement, or combining top oil and
ambient temperature into a single top oil temperature rise value. Particular techniques for "transformation" are
discussed further below.
Page 27
 Data Transformation and Feature Extraction:
The aim of data transformation is to extract key information or descriptors from the data, in order to reduce the
complexity of the interpretation task. One example is to perform a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on time series
data, in order to identify the dominant frequencies of periodic behaviour in the data. The interpretation task may be
to ensure that the highest amplitude is always at the same frequency, as a deviation may relate to a defect. In this
case, the FFT is used to reduce a time series dataset down to one value: the frequency at which the greatest
amplitude occurs.
There are many other transforms which can be applied to data. Some of the most common are Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), clustering, and feature extraction.
For a given dataset, PCA gives a ranked set of linear transformations which maximise the variance between data
points along each axis. Mathematically, this is performed by calculating the eigenvectors (also called characteristic
vector) of the covariance matrix of the dataset, ranked by eigenvalue (also called characteristic value) [8]. The first
axis, or principle component, is the eigenvector with highest eigenvalue (highest influence on the variation of the
data set), and represents the vector through data space which maximises the information given by each data point.
PCA can be used for dimensionality reduction, by simply removing the eigenvectors with lowest eigenvalues (less
influence on the variation of the data set). Care should be taken when interpreting the principal components, as it
can be difficult to draw inferences about the relative importance of original parameters.
PCA can be used for dimensionality reduction, but also for interpretation (see section 4.4.2).
See Annex E2 and [10] [11] [12] [13] for specific examples of data transformation. See Annex E7 and [14] for an
example of PCA analysis
 Data Normalisation:
For some interpretation, it can be preferable to normalise data prior to analysis. For example, multivariate analysis
and health indexing both require a normalisation of all values to the same unitless scale (typically 0 to 1 or 0% to
100%).
Care should be taken that an appropriate range of values can be represented within the normalised scale.
Consider scaling gas-in-oil levels to a range of 0 to 1, with warnings and alarms being triggered by values above
0.6 and 0.8 respectively. Normalisation would normally be calculated based on scaling the population values so
that the maximum corresponds to 1 and the minimum to 0.
4.3.2 Derived Value (Causal Model)
A causal model is an abstract representation of the causal mechanisms within a system. The model expresses
relationships known to be stronger than correlation, because correlation does not imply causation.
Formally, Judea Pearl defines a causal model as an ordered triple, where U is a set of exogenous variables whose
values are determined by factors outside the model; V is a set of endogenous variables whose values are
determined by factors within the model; and E is a set of structural equations that express the value of each
endogenous variable as a function of the values of the other variables in U and V [15] [16].
For example, Winding Hot Spot (WHS) is determined from the exogenous variables load and top oil temperature,
and the endogenous winding characteristics rated load, rated winding temperature rise, cooling type, and winding
structure. These variables are linked according to the widely used structural equations from the loading guide
(Equation 1), giving a causal model for calculating WHS temperature.
2m
I 
 HXu   HXR *  X 
 I XR 
Equation 1:Ultimate hot-spot temperature rise on winding X
There are a number of transformer parameters which can be difficult to measure directly. Causal models can be
implemented to derive values for these parameters. A partial list includes:
Page 28
- Winding Hot Spot (WHS) temperature

- Cooling efficiency - Bubbling Margin
- Contact wear - Absolute moisture in oil
- Load current - MVA
- P.U. - Cooling control
- Motor torque - Oil level
- OLTC operation count
- Aging rate and cumulative aging
- Water in oil condensation temperature
- Moisture content in winding paper and in barriers
- Dissipation factor and capacitance (bushing)
- Overload capability (Thermal Prediction; Dynamic loading)
- Pump and fans usage (run time)
- OLTC temperature differential
- Ratio and Boolean logic (Example: DGA interpretation)
Causal models can be relatively simple, using a few sensor inputs and rules (as in the WHS case described
above). Alternatively, they can be quite elaborate, using several sensors and multi-level modelling, such as
moisture evaluation in the insulating system or thermal evaluation like in Figure 4.1.
SENSORS RULES OUTPUT

Water content in
Moisture sensor insulating paper
• It is assumed that under
Moisture sensor significant load, the
Bubbling
temperature absolute water content in
temperature
oil is uniform in the
transformer
Water
• The relative water content condensation
Top-oil temperature in the winding can be temperature
temperature model
Winding hot-spot
derived from the moisture

H winding current sensor Water content in
X winding current • Paper-oil partition curves Barriers
(optional) can be applied taking into
Y winding current account the time constant Absolute water
(optional) of water exchange with oil content in oil
(ppm)
Figure 4.1: Example of a complex causal model: moisture in insulating system
Two examples of complex causal models, covering thermal modelling and bushing health evaluation, are given in
Annex E3.
4.3.3 Statistical Deviation
Deviation analysis in statistics refers to measuring the difference between one data point and the mean of the full
dataset. Deviation analysis can be applied when mining historical data, or with real time data from an on-line
monitor, to observe anomalous behaviour from large data sets.
As an example, an alarm set-point for a given variable (such as gas in oil) can be determined by calculating a
moving average of the variable, then using a multiple of its standard deviation as the alarm. Another example is to
monitor the statistical distribution of a measurement over time to extract small changes from a noisy signal, as in
Figure 4.2.
Annex E4 gives a detailed presentation of statistical analysis as applied to bushing capacitance monitoring.
Page 29
Figure 4.2: Statistical description of relative voltage variation of bushing phase A (left) and
change over time (from solid to dashed distributions)
4.3.4 Trending
Trending can be defined as an evaluation of the change over time of a signal rather than an evaluation of its
absolute value. Trending is a simple tool that allows the detection of small changes over a period of time that could
potentially be lost in the noise or too small to reach the absolute value of an alarm set-point. It can be applied to
any signal or measurement (such as gas-in-oil level, moisture in oil), or to the result of prior data processing (such
as Squared Prediction Error, multivariate analysis (section 4.4.2), etc).
Gas level
Dissolved Gas 24 Hours trend
30 Days trend
Trend 0 Reference
200 40
180 35
160 30
Gas trend (μl/l)/period
140 25
Gas level (μl/l)
120 20
100 15
80 10
60 5
40 0
20 -5
0 -10
2-Jul 16-Jul 30-Jul 13-Aug 27-Aug 10-Sep 24-Sep
Date
Figure 4.3: Example of trend analysis
Figure 4.3 is an example of trend analysis on data from a gas-in-oil monitor collected over a three month period.
The analysis is performed with the low pass/first order derivative method. The black line (left scale) is the gas level
value. The magenta line is the 24 hour trend while the orange line is the 30 day trend (right scale). It can be easily
observed that the 30 day trend is positive for the whole period, indicating that gas was being produced constantly,
although the absolute change (approximately 20 ppm) is below the short term noise level of the signal and is
therefore not so obvious to observe in the raw signal (gas level).
Page 30
Methods of trend calculation, plus their relative merits, are detailed in Annex E5.
4.4 Examples of Advanced Algorithms Used for Transformer Monitoring
The algorithms presented in this section may be considered to more directly mimic the intelligence, reasoning, and
learning capabilities of an engineer, than those in the previous sections. For this reason, they have been grouped
together and called advanced algorithms. As before, brief summaries of the techniques themselves are presented
here, with Annex E containing examples of their application to TICM.
4.4.1 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy Logic was introduced in 1965 by Lotfi A. Zadeh [17], as a mathematical framework capable of handling
imprecise human reasoning as in, for example, expressions like “the temperature is high”, “the humidity is normal”,
“the gauge is near the limit” and so forth. While statistics handle uncertainty, Fuzzy Logic handles imprecision.
In every day life humans coexist harmoniously in a very imprecise world. On responding to a request to assess the
top oil temperature of a given transformer, an operator may just say: “the temperature is okay”. There is no precise
indication of the actual temperature in that answer, but it conveys the appropriate level of detail regarding the
status of the transformer. That is the way humans tend to operate in day-to-day life, and for many situations there
is no need for a crisp number, such as 2.5 meters or 32.5˚C, and fuzzy concepts such as “okay” are sufficient for
communication. In order to incorporate human reasoning and the use of natural language Zadeh created a
completely new mathematical formulation, called Fuzzy Logic. This is based on conventional set theory, but
changes the fundamental definition of what constitutes a set [18][19][20].
x = 2°C
Low Not so Low
membership, µ(x)
membership, µ(x)
Low Not Low

1 1
µ low(x) = 0.8
µ not so low (x) = 0.2
0 Ambient 0 Ambient
0 temperature °C 0 10 temperature °C
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: Graphical comparison of a standard Boolean logic set to a fuzzy logic set
The problem Zadeh found examining Figure 4.4a was the misclassification of boundary elements. For example, a
temperature of 0.5 °C would have μ(x) = 0 and thus be classified as “not low”, as it does not meet the fundamental
requirement to belong to the “low ambient temperature” set. The rigor of the mathematical set definition does not
allow flexibility in the assessment of a given temperature.
This is where Fuzzy Logic plays an essential role, in providing the crisp set with some soft boundaries. This allows
for the incorporation of terms which may not be defined as precisely as before, but which still make logical sense,
as illustrated by the definition of a fuzzy “low ambient temperature” set in Figure 4.4b.
The generic structure of a Fuzzy Inference System can be seen in Figure 4.5.
Details of the fuzzy set theoretical operations are not in the scope of this brochure. however, set theory operations
like de Morgan’s Law, the Law of Contradiction, and the Excluded Middle Law all have their corresponding
definitions in Fuzzy Set Theory [21] [22].
The fuzzy rule base contains a collection of rules which represent the expert knowledge about the domain. The
rules are formulated by the imprecise variables defined by the fuzzy sets, such as: if the top oil temperature is high,
and the TCDG is high, then the operational risk is high. More details, including specific examples, are given in
Annex F6.
Page 31
Figure4.5: General structure of a Fuzzy Inference System
The IEEE Tutorial on Fuzzy Logic Applications in Power Systems [23] gives a comprehensive view of Fuzzy Logic,
its principles, and many applications, particularly in Power Systems Stability and Control. For Power Transformers,
there are a large number of technical papers on transformer diagnostics, gas analysis interpretation techniques,
general classification issues, and probabilistic Bayesian applications (see [24][25][26][27][28][29][30]). Some
examples can also be seen in Annex E6.
4.4.2 Multivariate Analysis
Multivariate analysis is a technique for detecting the correlations between related data sets, and learning the
patterns of interaction between each variable. Multivariate analysis has been found to be effective on data
generated by on-line monitors. It is not generally suitable for “sparse” data sets where there is a long time between
recorded data points, such as DGA data recorded once every 6 months.
Multivariate analysis techniques such as Principle Component Analysis (PCA, see section 4.3.1.3) and Primary
Least Squares (PLS) have been demonstrated to detect when the behaviour of a process begins to deviate from its
learned behaviour (from a reference data set). Once normal correlations between variables have been learned, the
method can analyse incoming data in real time to detect deviations from the expected norm.
It is important to note that multivariate analysis makes no assumptions about the reasons for correlation between
variables. Unlike derived value models (section 4.3.2), which require a defined causal relationship between model
parameters, the links within a multivariate model need not be any stronger than correlation. This makes it
significantly easier to apply multivariate analysis to large groups of parameters, where the underlying physical
reasons for related changes in certain parameters may not be well understood.
50 1.2
Top-oil Temp.
40 1.0
Temperature, RH%
30 0.8
Load p.u.
Sensor Temp.
20 0.6
Load p.u.
10 0.4
RH% at Sensor
0 0.2
16-Sep 30-Sep 14-Oct 28-Oct 11-Nov 25-Nov 9-Dec 23-Dec
Figure 4.6: Typical Correlated Transformer Variables Correlation Mapping
Page 32
Figure 4.7: Deviation from correlation
See Annex E7 for an example of multivariate analysis [14].
4.4.3 Health Index
A Health Index (HI) may be defined as: “one overall indicator describing the condition status of the transformer that
the decision taker can use to define and prioritise the required action”. The concept is introduced in Chapter 3.10,
but is not covered in detail in this brochure. Health Indexing is the scope of another CIGRÉ WG A2.49 on
“Transformer Condition Assessment (Health Index)”. Readers should refer to the forthcoming brochure from WG
A2.49 for further information. See also [7][31][32][33].
4.4.4 Neural Networks
An artificial neural network (ANN) is a set of simple computational units connected together in such a way as to
mimic the structure of neurons in the brain. There are many different ANN architectures which can be used for
different purposes, but all have the ability to learn relationships within data by adjusting the strength of signals
passed from one artificial neuron to another.
Each artificial neuron in the ANN performs a weighted sum of its inputs, and passes this sum through a function to
give an output, which feeds into other neurons [8]. The function is commonly chosen to be a sigmoid, logistic,
hyperbolic tangent, or radial basis function. Since these are non-linear, the ANN has the ability to approximate
complex non-linear functions. The learning of an ANN is achieved by updating the weights between neurons.
An ANN can be used for regression (learning a function) or classification. If the former, the ANN would generally
have a single output for the target value. An example would be to predict top oil temperature (the output) based on
load current and ambient temperature (the inputs). The output predicted top oil temperature is then compared
against the measured value, and discrepancies attributed to overheating in the transformer.
For classification, the ANN can have multiple outputs corresponding to different classes, and the value of an output
will increase with the likelihood of the class. An example would be to classify a fault based on dissolved gas levels,
where a high level of hydrogen should result in a high value for the PD diagnosis output, and a low value for the
overheating diagnosis output.
 OLTC Condition Monitoring using Kohonen Maps
Vibration monitoring and analysis of transformer on-load tap changers (OLTCs) has been shown to generate very
large amounts of data: up to about 40 operation signatures may be received each day from on-line monitoring of a
single transformer [34]. Each tap change operation generates a signal that contains information about the condition
of the tap changer contacts and the drive mechanism. Signals for every tap position are found to be different and
there is considerable variability amongst normal condition signals for the same tap position.
A typical vibration signature and its processed envelope are shown in Figure 4.8.
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10
-5
Amplitude
-10
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
10
8
6
0
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
Time, s
Figure 4.8: A vibration signal of a selector-type OLTC and the corresponding envelope
Features from the time aligned, normalised envelope can be used as input to a self-organising map (SOM) ANN,
which provides the basis for detection and classification of OLTC faults. A SOM-based OLTC condition feature map
is shown in Figure 4.9. The map indicates that different conditions of equipment produce well-defined clusters, as
circled in red.
A: area of normal operation. C: area of worn fixed and moving contacts.

B: area of weak springs. D: area of worn moving contacts.
The axes refer to the number of SOM map units, and not to specific parameters.
Figure4.9: OLTC condition feature map
Condition diagnosis is performed by projecting newly acquired signatures onto the labelled map. The
corresponding location of the signature on the map gives an indication of the actual condition of the equipment.
See Annex E8 and [35][36], for more detail and examples of Artificial Neural Networks.
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4.4.5 Expert Systems
Expert systems use logic and reasoning to solve problems in a similar way to human engineers. Sometimes called
knowledge-based systems, an expert system encodes the knowledge of an expert in transformer diagnostics about
the relationships between faults and changes in parameters. One of the most common types of expert system is a
rule based system, which contains a set of rules linking faults and indicator parameters.
A simple example of a knowledge based system is the set of rules for interpreting dissolved gas levels according to
a method such as Duval’s Triangle [37] or Rogers’ Ratio. These rules have been developed to capture expertise
about defects and the gases produced. Engineers commonly use automated software (the expert system) to
diagnose a fault and support their maintenance decision making.
Duval 1
100 0
PD
T1
T2
CH4 C2H4
D1
D2 DT T3
100
0
100 C2H2 0
Figure4.10: Duval triangle 1- a knowledge-based approach to diagnosis
One of the challenges of developing a knowledge-based system is capturing the expertise of an engineer. A
structured process of knowledge elicitation is used to draw out the expert’s understanding of relationships between
faults and data. An example of an expert system used for partial discharge classification is given in [14].
4.4.6 Pattern Recognition/Classifiers
Pattern recognition is a general term for any intelligence technique which can identify a signature within data. In the
context of transformer monitoring, pattern recognition is generally used for classifying types of fault. Applicable
techniques include neural networks, clustering algorithms including Support Vector Machines (SVMs), and Markov
models [8].
Pattern recognition is often associated with identifying particular faults, such as PD-causing defects, based on a
given signature seen within time-series data [9]. The technique may be trained to differentiate between the fault
and no-fault conditions, or between various fault states. The output is the type of fault present along with a
probability or likelihood of the presence of the fault.
There are two main disadvantages of pattern recognition. The first is that training may require large amounts of
data relating to all the conditions to be identified, while some faults are relatively rare and data is difficult to obtain.
The second disadvantage is that pattern recognition is most often a “black box” technique, giving a numerical
output with no explanation of the reasoning behind it. The latter can be alleviated by highlighting the particular
abnormal pattern which has been identified by the software.
Pattern recognition is good for automating the analysis of large sets of data, as it is relatively computationally
inexpensive once trained.
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System 1.3
System 1.3
Figure 4.11: Example of a typical partial discharge pattern - Delamination of the glue between
winding and pressboard
Annex E9 contains an example of Pattern Recognition as applied to partial discharge diagnosis [38].
4.4.7 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian methods are becoming increasingly recognised as a way of combining multiple variables or diagnoses
into a combined picture of transformer health (see, for example, [39][40][41]). Bayes' Theorem allows calculation of
the probability of a transformer being in a given condition, based on evidence from measurements or other analysis
techniques. More formally, the Theorem is:
where P() means “probability of”, C is a condition (health, unhealthy, PD, overheating, etc), and E is the evidence
(top oil temperature, gas levels, DGA diagnoses from different techniques, etc). It is generally much easier to
quantify the values on the right hand side of the equation than those on the left: the probability of a symptom
arising due to a given fault (P(E|C)), the prior probability of the fault arising (P(C)), and the prior probability of the
symptom arising (P(E)).
Whereas a Fuzzy Logic approach requires some expertise to select fuzzy membership functions and their
boundaries, the probabilities required for a Bayesian calculation can be derived either from data or from
engineering judgement. In this way, Bayesian Inference is a very flexible technique for representing the chances of
various faults from happening, given current measurements and data.
4.5 Action and Decision Making
Data interpretation is crucial for understanding the health of a transformer, but it is just as essential to convert this
information into an appropriate decision for action. The output of, say, a neural network can indicate whether or not
a fault is present. But the algorithm is only useful if the diagnosis of a fault can trigger the right maintenance, repair,
or replacement.
This section examines common methods of converting information to decisions.
4.5.1 Alarm Management
At first glance, the traditional alarms found in many SCADA systems look simple and should not merit the title of
"Intelligent Monitoring". However, a closer look reveals that an effective alarming system can be quite complex,
and needs to perform more than just thresholding to be effective.
Annex E10 deals with this topic in detail, and presents the key considerations.
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4.5.2 Fleet Management and Planning
In addition to management of a single asset, the result of algorithms could be used for fleet management and a
condition based maintenance process.
Health Index assessment (section 3.10) is a good example of this application when considering the overall
transformer life management process as shown on Figure 4.12. When a whole population of transformers is
considered, the preliminary health index assessment is made from test data and operating observations readily
available. This preliminary assessment is combined with an impact index reflecting the strategic importance of this
unit to the network (including safety, impact of a failure on the network operation, ease of replacement, corporate
image and any other parameter that could be affected by the unit failure). The resulting combined index allows
ranking of the units to identify those that need further action, such as field inspection.
Health Index Impact Index
Weighting and Ranking
Detailed Condition Assesment
Mitigation
Refurbishment
Replacement
Figure4.12: Role of health index in the transformer life management process
One element of fleet management and planning is the prioritisation of equipment replacement. Often this is based
on the age of the equipment. The use of a Health Index or other intelligent algorithm could be of great benefit for
this activity, as the age itself can be misleading if used as the sole element of evaluation. In this regard, interesting
data has been published by Jahromi et al [32] on the relation between age and health, as summarised in Figure
4.13 for a large population of power transformers.
Figure 4.13: Example of a population of power transformers’ Health Index versus age
On-line monitoring offers the advantage of taking into account historical data not easily available in off-line analysis,
such as actual service time (time under potential), load history, and thermal history, that will allow a more realistic
correlation with health and condition than the simple calendar year age.
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5. ARCHITECTURE
5.1 TICM System Architecture Description
With the rapid development of Information Technology (IT) together with the introduction of appropriate innovative
sensing technology for on-line acquisition of various electrical, mechanical, chemical and thermal properties of
power transformers, a wide range of various continuous on-line condition monitoring solutions have become
established on the market. As continuous supervision is essential to assess the performance and safe operating
conditions, this powerful tool becomes more and more frequently an integral part of the power transformer.
Today’s practice reveals that the selection of sensors and functionality as well as the corresponding architecture of
monitoring systems varies greatly between different users. From single sensors and Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) equipped with appropriate sensors, to fully integrated corporate solutions that can be applied across the
entire power transformer fleet.
Based on the common methodology for the description of a system that consists of hardware and software
elements the architecture of a TICM system may be viewed in terms of:
- Physical architecture that shows the components of the system such as sensors, transducers and
indicators, IEDs, database servers and data processing units, HMI, etc., their relationship as well as their
distribution in terms of physical location.
- Communication architecture that describes the required hardware and software to operate the data and
unidirectional or bidirectional information flow between the physical elements (components) of the entire system.
- Data and information architecture which is a reflection of required input/output data and information, and
their interrelation.
In light of the wide variety of technical solutions and possible architectures of a continuous on-line monitoring
solution, a function-based generic view of the TICM system that is independent of technical details of a specific
application and is representative for all or most of the used monitoring architectures is illustrated on Figure 5.1.
Analysis,diagnosis
Analysis, diagnosis and
andprognosis
prognosis
Figure 5.1: Function-based generic view of a TICM system
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The selection of technology, sensors, functionalities and a suitable system architecture as well as the method of
operation, are not only determined by the size, age, condition and importance of the power transformer [42], but
are also influenced, to the same extent, by the available information technology infrastructure at the substation and
network level.
Physical components of on-line continuous monitoring systems such as sensors, IEDs, servers for data processing
and storage, etc. should be able to communicate effectively and share measured and analyzed data by means of
standardized interfaces, common input and output data and communication protocols as much as possible to
achieve the compatibility and interoperability between devices and systems from different vendors.
The higher the degree of the possible standardization of interfaces (hardware and software) and data exchange,
the better compatibility, expandability and interoperability will be, also the wider deployment of the monitoring
system would be.
5.2 Degree of Centralization
Today, a variety of on-line sensors, IEDs and monitoring systems are used in electrical power systems with
different levels of complexity and degrees of centralization.
To suit a variety of needs for new power transformers, retrofitting of existing units with sensors, for use in various
monitoring topologies have already been successfully established on the market.
The following classification gives an overview on typical applications. However, it is only an example and does not
claim to be complete.
5.2.1 Intelligent Sensor
In the simplest case, the power transformer may be equipped with a microprocessor-based Intelligent Electronic
Device (IED) that monitors either a single parameter, for instance, dissolved gases, moisture-in-oil content, winding
temperature, etc., or, incorporates sensing devices for monitoring of few parameters, for instance, dissolved gases
and moisture-in-oil content.
Such devices (depending on the available models and technical characteristics) are normally equipped with an
internal memory with a limited storage capacity, display and keypad for local operation, dry contact relays as well
as DC analog outputs for connection to external devices (0-10 V or 4-20 mA, for example).
They might also be capable of making the data available to the network by means of standardized physical
interfaces to support proprietary protocols or standardized station communication protocols such as Modbus,
DNP3, IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104 or IEC 61850 as well as standard web protocols.
The IEDs are capable of notifying the user if a warning or alarm threshold is reached. The transformer owner is
responsible for analysis and interpretation of the acquired data, and the necessary steps to be taken.
5.2.2 Monitoring of Individual Power Transformer Components
This technique allows monitoring of individual components of the power transformer, for example, the On-Load Tap
Changer (OLTC) or bushings. Depending on the application, different combinations of sensors for various
measured quantities are used.
The monitoring IEDs can be either integrated into the control cabinet of the transformer or the tap changer, or
placed in a separate dedicated monitoring cabinet installed at the transformer tank or close to the transformer, or
can be physically located at the station control area.
Such monitoring systems typically incorporate data consolidation features, data storage, diverse analysis and
diagnosis tools, data download and configuration features and web-based visualization software. By connection to
the substation LAN and depending on the technology, either a dedicated Human-Machine-Interface (HMI)
workstation or any computer in the network is used to access the monitoring system interactively. Often remote
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access terminals are made available to access the monitoring system through the utility’s LAN/ WAN or modem, if
a network access is not available.
The acquisition of multiple parameters allows the analysis and assessment of the condition and health of the
transformer or component to enable effective decision making with regard to the next steps to take.
5.2.3 Comprehensive System
In this next level of complexity no corporate monitoring server and corporate database are considered. The power
transformer is equipped with a multitude of sensing devices installed on different components of the power
transformer such as Active Part, Bushings, Cooling System, Tap changer and Conservator.
A possible selection of sensing devices suitable for acquisition of various electrical, mechanical, chemical and
thermal properties of power transformers has been shown in the CIGRE TB 343 [42] and IEEE C57.143-2012 [43].
However, as the on-line sensor technology develops continuously, this list is not complete and is intended to
provide guidance only. The above mentioned brochure and guide also addresses the subject of possible
standardization of the interfaces between the power transformer and the sensing devices as well as the provisions
required at the power transformer for installation of a monitoring system on a new power transformer or retrofitting
of an existing unit in the field.
Although, mechanical interfaces at the power transformer, e.g. valves or thermometer pockets used for installation
of sensing devices have been standardized, the rapid development in electronics and software continuously offers
new sensing devices that might be useful for condition monitoring, and which might require specific, customized
interfaces and provisions at the power transformer.
The physical location of the monitoring IEDs that form a comprehensive system can also be either at the primary
equipment or at the station automation level or both together.
The entire functionality and intelligence of an continuous on-line monitoring system can either be implemented in
one IED per transformer (see Figure 5.2, example station 1) or can be designed on a modular base and be
allocated in various interconnected IEDs that cooperate, or the functionality of the IEDs is combined with a
monitoring server installed, e.g. at the station level (see Figure 5.2, example station 2).
Several power transformers at one site can also be connected to a single monitoring IED as shown in Figure 5.2,
example station n.
A station may also use, at the same time, a combination of the above alternatives with IEDs and Data Acquisition
Units (DAUs) used at the same time.
Due to the architecture of comprehensive systems various data acquired from all components of the power
transformer may be analyzed and evaluated, and a useful correlation of all relevant data of the transformer or even
between several transformers can be provided more easily.
This approach allows an effective interpretation of a larger scope of data and information and may deliver health
information of the transformer and all of its components.
5.2.4 Integrated Corporate Solution
Today’s Electrical Power Systems (EPSs) are becoming more interconnected with communication infrastructure,
remote data transfer and exchange between power generation station, transmission and distribution substations
and control centers by means of internationally standardized communication protocols. This leads to information
and data being readily available where connectivity can be achieved and is allowed by the regulatory authorities.
This continuously increasing data networking of different devices, various sites and control centers, enables a real-
time distribution and exchange of information and potential creation of remote monitoring centers. At such a
solution all raw and analyzed data or only selected portions are sent periodically or on demand to the remote
monitoring center for visualization, achieving and if required, further analysis and processing, meaning that at the
corporate level a corporate monitoring server and corporate database are needed.
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Figure 5.2: Example of system architecture with corporate monitoring server and database .
Various system architectures; Example Station 1: One IED per transformer. Example Station 2:
Multiple IEDs connected to a monitoring server. Example station n: Several transformers
monitored by one IED
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The central corporate server may also include an expert system to perform the data analysis, diagnosis and
prognosis from a correlation with other off-line data (periodic inspections and test results, maintenance records,
operation events, economic data, etc.) accessed from ERP systems or other existing software.
5.3 Data Management and Communication
Real-time data exchange, of both operational and non-operational data, is fundamental to new CM techniques.
Intelligent sensors and other IEDs, including those used for continuous on-line monitoring of not only power
transformers, but other major equipment in the substation, are key components of an emerging digital substation
approach.
The functions as shown in Figure 5.1 can either be physically located at one IED or can be distributed across
various IEDs. The entire monitoring data base and/or the “intelligence” or a part of both can be also incorporated in
enterprise individual or virtual application and database servers that serve the needs of various users and
departments, and run diverse software applications.
The current stage of technology permits the design of intelligent on-line condition monitoring systems to convert
raw data into useful and actionable information in following ways:
- Single IED installed at the primary equipment or substation control level;
- Set-up of multiple networked IEDs and/or DAUs located at the substation level;
- Configuration of various IEDs and/or DAUs connected to a monitoring server installed at the station level;
- Combination of a single IED or a network of IEDs physically located at the transformer or within the
substation with corporate server(s) data processing and storage server(s) providing complementary
functions, (data management, analysis, and diagnosis based on on-line and off-line data of a transformer
fleet);
It is also not unusual that the monitoring equipment also communicates data from SCS/DCS. This could be valid to
all types of shown topologies, e.g. an intelligent sensor may acquire from SCS/DCS the information about the load
current, a bushing monitoring system may acquire a reference voltage signal from voltage transformer via the
SCS/DCS or a comprehensive system may collect information about the OLTC position, top oil temperature, load
current, voltage, etc. from the SCS/DCS, too.
It should be noticed that sometimes, for technical reasons (requirement of time-stamped data with very high
resolution), some data models can only be run on IEDs installed nearby the monitored primary equipment. In such
cases to allow the implementation of the full range of available functions, higher level central analysis should be
performed using historical stored data or locally pre-processed information should be made available by the IEDs
to the central server.
Another aspect that may be more important for selection process of the most effective monitoring architecture is
the availability not only of a suitable LAN/WAN substation connectivity with a remote monitoring center, but
connectivity between the transformer and the substation control building as well as the communication capability
within the utility’s data network.
An integrated enterprise solution that is also based on corporate data processing and storage server(s) requires a
strong network and communication infrastructure, robust cyber security and high network reliability and availability,
which can be made available easier for new or refurbished than for existing transformer stations equipped with
older telecommunication technology.
The rapid development of wireless technologies may also play a role in future physical architecture of monitoring
systems. The application of wireless communication could simplify wiring and increase the flexibility in system
architectures. But at the same time, the introduction of wireless sensors for data collection and transfer into the
monitoring IED or even directly into the network will also bring new security challenges related to cyber security
and connectivity disruptions that should be properly addressed.
With the increasing data exchange between processes and devices, application of networked solutions by using
standard IT infrastructures, for both critical and non-critical communication, implementation of well-known shared
communication and interoperability standards should be implemented.
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With the digitization and automation of stations, cyber security threats are becoming an increasingly important
issue.There is a need for intelligent and high-performance security measures against cyber-attacks from outside as
well as against unauthorized accesses inside the system. There are different standards which describe security
procedures, firewalls, guidelines and recommendations for the construction of secure networks and safe data
utilization, e.g. ISO/IEC 27002 [44], IEC 62351 [45], IEEE 1686 [46].
Besides technical selection criteria, other aspects may play a role in determining the most effective monitoring
architecture. For instance, in case of bigger utilities operating a larger number of transformers, an investment in a
corporate solution suitable for an application across the entire power transformer fleet could be appropriate.
However, for smaller utilities, independent power producers or industrial applications, a less networked solution
installed at the primary equipment of station level with an access for remote information visualization and
interactive operation might be more reasonable. The system architecture definition and functionalities depends also
on the company strategic decisions and economic issues (see more on Chapter 7).
5.3.1 Further Standardization of Data Management and Communication
The users and suppliers recognized that a unified international data model and communication standard are one of
the key elements to ensure interoperability and compatibility between IEDs and devices from various
manufacturers. This can allow full digitization of the signals in a station, to manage the large amount of operational
and non-operational data and to exchange information in real-time.
For instance, the IEC 61850 standard proposes new generation communication architectures that make it possible
to develop devices and solutions that are instantly interoperable, regardless of the manufacturer and remain
compatible and interoperable with future generations of hardware and software, and might be one possible
approach towards a higher level of standardization of intelligent on-line condition monitoring solutions for power
transformers.
This higher level of standardization of data management and communication (see Figure 5.3) may provide
following significant benefits to users:
- Less costly project engineering;
- Lower installation and commissioning costs;
- Reduced number of sensors and wiring costs;
- Easier expandability;
- Greater interoperability and interchangeability;
- Improved maintainability;
- Improved security.
The object-oriented IEC 61850 data model enables the modelling of transformer monitoring functions that usually
consists of different sub-functions (free composition of data models algorithms as described in Chapter 3).
A Physical Device (PHD), is a virtual representation made up from grouping of compatible condition monitoring
Logical Nodes (LN's) that contain the required standardized Data Objects (DAO) that describe the Physical Device
(monitoring IED). This virtual representation allows the system to be built up with specific defined functions
(modelling of loss of life, bushing health, tracking of contact erosion of the OLTC diverter switch contacts etc.),
regardless of the brand or make of the IED.
An example of a system architecture based on IEC 61850 is shown in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Example of a system architecture based on IEC 61850
Although, the Edition 2 of the IEC 61850-7-4 [47] standard includes numerous new data objects for condition
monitoring and dedicated logical nodes for monitoring sub-functions, still relevant and important data objects for
condition monitoring purposes as per functions described in Chapter 3 are not available.
In order to be able to model all available functions of a TICM system, extensions, for new logical nodes and data
objects dedicated for monitoring functions should be addressed properly in further evolutions of the IEC 61850
standards, in Part 7-4: Basic communication structure - Compatible logical node classes and data object classes
[47].
Annex B, shows some existing Logical Nodes in IEC revisions.
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5.4 Protection, Control and Monitoring
It is common practice that the information derived from on-line condition monitoring systems is not used to
automatically generate commands for protection. Some on-line monitoring systems may, however, combine CM
and control functions such control of pumps and fans of the transformer cooling system to ensure that the power
transformer is operated within the permissible winding hot-spot temperature range or an Automatic Voltage Control
(AVC) that contains the algorithm that decides whether an OLTC should maintain its position, step down or step up.
A modern substation automation system architecture concept is based on the networking of multiple functions,
services and data from various sources and integration of multiple IEDs which are connected by communication
technology.
There are universal IEDs dedicated for power transformer protection and control applications that also incorporate
specific basic models for CM functions, such as thermal modelling for calculation of the transformer hot spot
temperature that may be used for the thermal overload protection as well as for cooling control or for simplified
aging and lifetime calculation. In the current practice only some selected status information derived from algorithms
implemented in such IEDs may be used for an automatic tripping of the transformer. However others, where a
precise interpretation of results is not universal and not always possible, and an assessment and interpretation of
results by human experts might be required, are not used to generate commands for protection.
It is important to consider that the systems architecture should, as far as possible, be generic. Nowadays IEDs
could implement functions for monitoring, control and also protection. They may not be used nowadays or widely
accepted, but are possible. To the moment, IEEE WG’s have recognized [43] that monitoring systems are just
monitoring, not protection. They have proven themselves to be capable of controlling functions as pointed out, but
not protection functions as in the classical sense.
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6. DATA SPECIFIC ASPECTS
6.1 Generic TICM Data Model Focused on Outputs
A new approach and generic input-output model for a transformer monitoring system was proposed and discussed
by the WG. It is based on processing input data and delivering output data/information in a more standardized and
modular way. This approach is starting from the output functionalities to be delivered by the condition monitoring
system rather than from sensors and input data. The main features of the modelling approach have been described
in an overall context in Chapter 3, Figures 3.5 to 3.10. From a pool of transformer data a set of TICM nodes which
are placed in an information model is proposed, and the outputs are supplied to the various stakeholders. The
corresponding data related parts from this generic model are shown in Figure 6.1 below.
Figure 6.1: The data related part of the Generic TICM data model
This chapter is presenting further details of this generic approach, such as details on output and input data, data
sources which can be used for TICM, including specific aspects related to data standardization and IEC 61850,
lifetime aspects and security for monitoring data.
The generic data model for a TICM system can be further detailed in terms of input and output data. In Figure 6.2
example, there are three “levels” of data inputs and outputs, as function of the informational content, the time frame
or criticality like this:
- Three levels of inputs based of the amount, the richness, the detail level and the accuracy of data
obtained about the transformer from any sensor, device or system. This have been denoted in Figure 6.2
as Input1, Input2, Input3, where Input1 contains basic, minimal input data for a TICM; Input2 some more
input data; and Input3 very detailed input data from different sources.
- Three level of outputs based on urgency and timeframe. The output levels have been denoted Output
L1, L2, and L3. Output L1 has the highest urgency in terms of information content and the shortest
response time requested from the user, while L3 the longest time response and priority. So, for example,
L3 is allowing also planned actions, while Output L2 corresponds to an intermediate medium term.
The central TICM box in Figure 6.2 represents the data information model and should contain all algorithms
necessary for monitoring of all transformer components and subsystems such as winding, core, bushing, OLTC,
cooling, etc.
Figure 6.3 is presenting an example on how this concept can be extended for the case where multiple transformer
subsystems are considered simultaneously.The individual blocks in Figure 6.3 are the same of the generic Figure
6.2 and referring to the active part (winding), bushing and OLTC. Each of the individual monitoring blocks
Page 46
(modules) can have his own or shared inputs 1, inputs 2, inputs 3, own algorithms and own priority outputs L1, L2,
L3 like in Figure 6.2.
Figure6.2: TICM data information model, a generic viewfor the basic

Input-output data structure
Figure 6.3: Approach for TICM combining data from modules related to subsystems
of the transformer. A bundling to output L1 is shown
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6.2 TICM Data Output
The generic output-focused TCIM model, as described in the section 6.1 and in functionalities Chapter 3, is
considering a group of output categories for the TICM system which are related to the stakeholder needs.
These needs may be further classified in some categories like below, for example, where the preceding “O_” is
standing for Output category:
1. O_SafetyStatus: The output of the TICM system related to safety related status, which should assess all
situations with a hazard or safety risk level.
2. O_OperationCapability: The output of TICM should assess the operational capability of the transformer,
especially loading capabilities and reserves.
3. O_MaintenanceGeneralWarning: This output of TICM points to a recommended maintenance action in

more general terms, i.e. where only approximate/general maintenance information is provided. This may
include also self-supervision alarms from IEDs.
4. O_MaintenanceSpecificWarning: This output of TICM may assess a specific identified maintenance need
knowing the exact part or subsystem to be maintained.
5. O_AssetManagement: This type of output of the TICM system can support asset management actions
and is intended to support rather long term decisions.
Each single output or output category may be characterized by a group of attributes such as described below and
in Table 6.1.
 User/beneficiary – the group or function which should first receive the information from this output
category;
 Main use/reason – why such an output should be used at all, what is the reason for using it;
 Content of the information for the user - what message or how is it represented to the peson;
 Possible impact category – what could be the impact or consequence if a failure occurs, for example,
very low, low, medium,high, extreme;
 Information on time needs - what is the reaction time or urgency to take actions following the TCIM
output information;
 Follow-up actions to be considered – what should be done in a utility or by the owner to properly react to
the output information of TICM.
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Information or Possible
Information Follow-up actions
Output category Name Typical Example User/Beneficiary Main use/reason signal to the impact Comment
urgency to be considered
user category
O_SafetyStatus
Maintenance Stop access to Judge unit turn off; Sparking; Possible,

Increased level of
dispatcher; Avoid hazards TFO; warn / Extreme Immediate Immediate flashover; Possible,
acetylene
Nearby personnel inform diagnostics catastrophic fault
O_OperationCapability
Top oil Operation of the Control load to

Operator; Operate up to Operation
temperature too TFO in the Medium Immediate limits;
Maintenance load value limitations
high network Check cooling
O_MaintenanceGeneral
Warning
Maintenance
Warning,
Moisture or gas in Maintenance team team receives a Near term; Diagnostics; Consider outage for
reminder, mail, Medium
oil (general info) general Medium term Oil treatment oil treatment
SMS
information
O_MaintenanceSpecifi
cWarning
Maintenance of a Warning,
Change in Maintenance team Immediate; Diagnostics; Information is
specific part or reminder, mail, High
bushing health (specific info) Near term Replacement specific to part.
system. SMS,
O_AssetManagement
DP investigation;
Asset
High loading over Decision on future;
Asset management management; Reminder Low Long term Aging of unit/paper
time in service Maintenance or
Planning
replacement
Table 6.1: Example of possible Output categories and attributes for TICM
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6.3 TCIM Data Input
The data usable for a CM system depends on the sensing and monitoring devices, existing systems, data and
communication infrastructure, and strategy of the utility. The key is to have that data input which can be used in
various algorithms or evaluation modules of a TICM system and should be closely related to detectable and
important functions and failure modes as described by the user performed Functional Transformer Model using
FMEA, as detailed in Chapter 3 and Annex A example.
An example of input data for a TICM system is presented in Figure 6.4 where inputs from sensors, IEDs, SCADA
and also utility systems are shown. More details can be found in [1] and [48]. The outputs of the TICM system can
well be used for an individual transformer and or as input for transformer fleet evaluations.
Items 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 show details on the usable input data.
Figure 6.4: Data input overview for a TICM - Example
6.3.1 On-Line Transformer Data From Sensors or IEDs
The most common case today is the use of existing sensors, dedicated sensors and IEDs. An analysis of such
sensor systems was presented by WG A2.27 in the CIGRE Technical brochure 343 - “Recommendations for
Condition Monitoring and Condition Assessment Facilities for Transformers” [42]. Also IEEE C57.143-2012 -
"Guide for the Application for Monitoring Liquid-Immersed Transformers and Components” [43] deals with such
aspects of input from sensors referring to liquid immersed transformers.
Typical sources of on-line data are:

 Measured values and binary signals coming from existing or new retro-fitted sensors or converters;
 On-line data from other relevant data acquisition systems (SCADA);
 Data coming from computation models used as input for other models.
Existing sensors are those that are usually available on the transformer, independently on monitoring systems:
current, taps position indication, alarms (Buchholz), tap-change operation counters, temperatures, vent or pump
start commands, etc.
Added sensors are those that have been added (retro-fitted) to the transformers in order to supply data to the
monitoring systems (dissolved gas-in-oil on-line sensor, moisture sensor, etc.).
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 Data acquired on the transformer continuously on-line (in service):

This group of data represents mainly direct measured analog or digital values or status related binary signals
provided by simple sensors (Pt100) or IED’s (gas-in-oil monitors, moisture sensors or status contacts, etc).
Their formats are usually very different starting with analog values (0-20 mA, 4-20 mA, 0-10 V), digitally
measured data supplied by means of various protocols used by respective manufacturers (Modbus, DNP-3,
IEC-101 (104), 61850) on various interfaces (RS485, RS232, TCP-IP, etc). Some data has special codes
(BCD for tap changer position). CIGRE WG A2-27 has prepared a standardized set of interfaces for
monitoring sensors on a transformer (see TB 343) [42].
On-line continuous data constitute a very important group once they allow, because of their relatively short
time acquisition rates, the proactive defect detection of failure modes usually associated with primary functions
of the transformers. They are the keys for transition in maintenance processes from time based maintenance
(TBM) to condition based maintenance (CBM) [48].
The major goal in selecting data sources (sensors) is to achieve the desired results from the fewest possible
sources requiring the least hardware and cabling in order to ensure the highest possible degree of reliability.
Sensor selection considerations include the following:
 Parameter to be measured: type, range and sampling rate;
 Sensor type: active or passive, reliability, calibration needs, intelligence level;
 Sensor output: voltage, current, digital, status (on/off), etc.
The sensor hardware used should have appropriate properties as far as its application in the extreme
environment of outdoor substation, including ambient temperatures, vibrations, electrical insulation, etc. Signal
transmission considerations will include the signal type and the transmission medium like in Table 6.2.
Transmission
Signal Type Input for TICM Comments
Medium
Current (4-20 mA) Can be converted
Analog RTD (resistance) Copper wire into digital at some
Voltage (0-10 V) point
Copper wire or Serial connection in
Digitally encoded
Digital optical fiber Wireless various protocols,
analog value
(RF technologies) PWM, PFM
Transformer (on/off) On or Off state
Copper wire or
Status pumps and fans converted to digital at
optical fiber
(on/off) some point
Table 6.2: TICM signal types
 Data acquired in SCADA systems continuously on-line:

Sometimes it may be advantageous to use data acquired by SCADA to complement the monitored image of a
transformer. A typical example is if the transformer is equipped with a single gas monitor only. Then it may be
good to store measured loads, currents, voltages, temperatures and other useful variables coming from
SCADA to the common monitoring historical database in order to ease the analysis of an event. The goal is to
depict load and temperatures together with increased gas level synchronously. Though there are usually tough
restrictions concerning use of SCADA data for other applications in most of the utilities, possibilities can be
found how to provide an isolated mirror image of SCADA data (read only) for such reasons.
 Data stored in protection relays and fault recorders during unexpected events on-line (if the utility
policy allows its use):
Modern protection systems are designed based on digital technology and are usually able to store data in a
high degree of resolution. This data can be used for monitoring, operation and interpretation of various events
and situations on a transformer. An example might be the use of this data for analyzing transformer trips
triggered by protection relays or in case of electronic fault recorders to analyze switching processes (mainly
large inductances such as shunt reactors). Continuous digital high resolution sinusoidal records might be used
for on-line phase angle (tan) measurement or monitoring (bushings). Another useful area is registering
cumulative inrush currents and short circuits in transformer’s proximity to assess mechanical condition of
windings. This data comes usually in a form of a file and should be interpreted in a separate regime.
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 Data acquired or computed by other devices or systems in the network:

To investigate an event (transformer trip), data from distant devices located in adjacent parts of the network
may be useful (short circuits, transformers overloads caused by failures occurring in other substations, etc.)
This data is usually not used for direct transformer monitoring, but may serve to clarify some unexpected
events influencing the monitored transformer.
6.3.2 Data From Utility Information Systems
Data from utility systems, sometimes referred as ‘non-operational data’, could include historical data from asset
management, maintenance, external inspections and tests, repairs, data from operation, data from calculations in
other enterprise supporting systems and expert systems.
Typical types of input data that may be available on the transformer, in the substation or in utility systems and
databases are listed below:
 Data registered in the asset inventory:

Nearly all calculation modules (models) of an advanced transformer monitoring system require a set of
transformer data (constants, variables, limits allowed, electrical, mechanical and others). A condition
monitoring system can be fed by this data manually. In this case, a question of data maintenance arises
immediately. The best way of avoiding incorrect data is to use data from the company asset management
information system database (i.e. ERP system) which is usually be permanently updated.
 Data coming from service history – events, relocations, changes in service conditions:
The asset management system registers all events the transformer has seen. It provides a good overview of
the service history of a transformer. This data is usually stored in a database. Again, systems enabling a
monitoring system to use this data without any intervention to the asset management database can be
developed. Knowledge of the in-service history is fundamental for any assessment of the technical condition of
a transformer. Interventions to the machine such as repairs, relocations, oil reclamation, component changes
and service conditions changes (average load, number of short circuits seen, past overloads, change of tap
changer contacts, etc.) may have impact on the transformer condition and its residual life. Together with the
transformer criticality it provides basis to assess a health index. An overall health index is then useful for any
kind of asset management decision-making regarding transformers in the utility fleet.
 Data collected during maintenance or diagnostic works on a transformer:

This data comes from regular maintenance activities, namely from their diagnostic parts. Preventative
maintenance provides data on overall technical condition of the transformer and its components (oil, electrical
insulation, bushings, tap changer, etc). Corrective maintenance offers data focused on findings made during
operational or maintenance checks. Maintenance data should also keep track of works and changes done on
a particular transformer as well as of repairs, relocations, etc. It is a good practice to store maintenance
activities performed over time such as: addition of oil, replacement of oil, filtering and/or degasification of oil,
addition of inhibitors to the oil, replacement or modifications of the transformer accessories, on-load tap
changer maintenance.
 Data coming from diagnosis and testing activities:

Any data collected during diagnostic or test/measurement works on the transformer and its components is
valuable for evaluating the transformer evolution. Such data could stem from tests before delivery, tests during
commissioning or after on site repair, or any off-line diagnostic testing method normally carried out such as:
winding ratio tests, insulation resistance test, insulation power factor and capacitance tests on the windings,
insulation power factor and capacitance tests on all condenser bushings, winding resistance tests, polarization
tests (RVM, FDS, PDC), impedance/leakage reactance tests, frequency response, excitation tests, oil tests,
acoustic analyses, dissolved gas analysis or particle analyses tests of the oil. For further details on such tests,
referer to Cigre TB 445 - Guide for Maintenance of Transformers [48] and IEEE C57.152-2013 -IEEE Guide
for Diagnostic Field Testing of Fluid-Filled PowerTransformers, Regulators, and Reactors [49].
 Data about transformer criticality or importance:

Every transformer installed in a network should be reviewed with respect to an unexpected failure. Aspects to
consider include, transformer importance (N-1), industry supplied with electricity on the demand side, possible
consequences of failure (i.e. losses caused by energy not supplied, cost of recovery). This is usually classified
by a score (1-10). Such a criticality score should be assigned to every transformer position in the network
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scheme and should be entered into the asset management information system (data in the database related to
the installation place of the equipment - transformer).
 Data coming from nameplate data of the transformer:

This data should be entered as attributes to every equipment record (transformer) in the asset management
information system database. This implies its on-going maintenance.
6.3.3 Other Usable Data
 Data acquired on the energized transformer not continuously:

This data comes usually from diagnostic (test) records stored in an electronic application (i.e. DGA / OTLC
diverter switch based on oil sampling). There should be no problem in using this data; its format can be easily
converted directly in the database system or at the output interface of the data storage system. This data is
usually used to provide complementary or control information to the continuous on-line data.
 Data acquired on the de-energized transformer not continuously:

This data comes in a similar way as on-line. The only difference is that a planned outage of the transformer
may be necessary to gather this data. Due to this fact it may be difficult to obtain this data (electrical insulation
measurement, tan main insulation, bushings, SFRA, special diagnostic data as e.g. acoustic analyses, etc) in
case of its urgent need. This data may help when analyzing unusual events or may help explain unclear
findings of the on-line part of TICM.
 Data from special models and expert systems:

Data from complex models, calculation models, results from expert systems existing at enterprise level can
also be included. Usually such computation models are able to generate additional information and in this
manner, additional calculated or “virtual sensor signals”. A monitoring system can handle this kind of signal
like data from a virtual sensor channel such as calculated hot-spot temperatures. Expert systems which are
supported by comprehensive data collection are providing a critical bridge between on-line monitoring and on-
line diagnostics.
Remark to data quality and input validation:

Performance of the TICM is only as good, as the used input data. Therefore it is very important to use only
verified and validated data.The verification and validation process may be specific for each type of data and
may differ according to where data is coming from (sensors, other substation systems, utility information
systems). Algorithms and aspects related to data cleaning are mentioned in Chapter 4 of this Technical
brochure.
6.4 Data for TICM and Standardization
This section presents a discussion on the main data-related standards to consider for a TICM system.
6.4.1 Standardization Related to TICM
There are efforts in IEC standardization, in IEEE PES groups and in CIGRE to issue standards, to define industrial
guidelines or recommended practices usable for monitoring systems. These sections of the technical brochure are
intended to give an overview only and refer to complete or on going work in IEC, CIGRE or IEEE committees.
The standardization or guideline activities which can be of interest for TICM can be grouped in a few main
categories:
1. Activities related to communication, protocols and data and message exchange;
2. Activities related to the transformer itself, e.g. on monitoring, or sensors;
3. Data related to network and network devices in general.
In the first group there are standards related to communication protocols to consider for TICM systems:
- IEC 61850
- DNP 3.0
- Modbus
- IEC 60870-5 -101,102,103,104
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- IEC 61850-90-3, Using IEC 61850 for condition monitoring and analysis)
The second group contains transformer specific standards of interest for condition monitoring such as:
- IEC 60076-7, Loading guide for oil immersed power transformers
- IEEE C57.143 2012, Guide for application of monitoring to liquid immersed TFO and components
- IEEE C57.91, IEEE guide for loading of mineral oil immersed transformers
The third group is more general and can include standards like:
- IEC 61970, CIM
- IEC 61499 open standard for distributed control and automation
- COMTRADE latest standard 2013 release.
The standardization or guideline activities which can be of interest for TICM are mentioned below with some
comments and references for more details:
 Activities related to communication, protocols and data and message exchange:
 IEC61850-4: Communication networks and systems for power utility automation.The abstract data models
defined in IEC 61850 can be mapped to a number of protocols. Current mappings in the standard are to
MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification), GOOSE Messages, SMV (Sampled Measured Values) and
also to Web Services. These protocols can run over TCP/IP networks or substation LANs.
 IEC61850-90-3: The major assignment consists of defining new logical nodes that contain the information
for condition monitoring. It is important that the existing standards are analyzed with regard to information
that is already available today. The information available in these logical nodes can as well be useful for
asset management systems. An example for data mapping is shown in Annex B.
 IEC60870-5 -101, -102, -103, -104: Is one of the IEC 60870 set of standards which define systems used
for telecontrol, supervisory control and data acquisition in electrical engineering and power system
automation. Part 5 provides a communication profile for sending basic telecontrol messages between two
systems, which uses permanent directly connected data circuits between the systems. The IEC Technical
Committee 57 have developed a protocol standard for telecontrol, teleprotection, and associated
telecommunications for electric power systems.
 DNP 3.0: DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol) is a set of communications protocols used between
components in process automation systems. Its main use is in utilities such as electric and water
companies. Its dominate role is, where it is used by SCADA Master Stations (Control Centers), Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs) and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs).
 MODBUS: Modbus is a serial communications protocol originally published for use with Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC). Simple and robust, it has since become a de facto standard communication
protocol, and it is now a commonly available means of connecting industrial electronic devices. Modbus is
often used to connect a supervisory computer with a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in generating stations, and large industrial electrical networks.
 Activities related to transformer itself, e.g. on monitoring, or sensors:
 IEC 60076-7: Loading guide for oil immersed power transformers

 IEEE C57.143: Guide for application of monitoring to liquid immersed TFO and components
 IEEE C57.91: IEEE Guide for loading of mineral oil immersed transformers
 Data related to network and network devices in general:
 IEC 61499: Open standard or distributed control and automation

 IEC 61970: Application program interface for energy management systems – Part 3: Common Information
Model (CIM)
 IEEE P2030: Draft Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information
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Figure 6.5 and 6.6 show an example of IEC 61850 models and the Common Information Model (CIM) according to
IEC 62357 ed.1.0, as presented in [50].
The focus is also on an increased observability and controllability of the power grid and the communication
channels, including all its participating elements. This will then demand a higher level of interoperability of the
various products, solutions and data, and communication systems that build up a power system. This framework
will be at the core of new developments and benefits reached through the implementation of Smart Grid and
condition monitoring.
Furthermore there are areas which are not traditionally standardization topics such as market and service systems.
These, however, also pose new requirements for standardization. A close cooperation with the relevant
organizations in these fields should be sought.
The development in Network and System Management (NSM), Security (SEC) and System Configuration
Language (SCL) requiring the permanent adjustment of the data mapping and profiles in web services and field
communication.
The introduction of the standard IEC 61850 has prepared the way to standardize digital communication for
monitoring data between devices in substation automation systems. This opens up new possibilities of information
networking within the substation or even to the Network Control Center.
Figure 6.5: IEC 61850 models and the Common Information Model (CIM)
according to IEC 62357 ed.1.0 [50]
The example depicted in Figure 6.7 shows a substation with a monitoring system using 61850. By this
communication standard it is possible to integrate the primary and monitoring substation equipment in a
standardized way in the substation automation system. The transformer monitoring system is connected to the
process bus which allows sample values to be collected/transmitted. Protections are connected to a completely
separate and redundant bus system.
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Figure 6.6: Substation with a transformer monitoring system and using IEC 61850 [50]
6.4.2 Using IEC 61850 for Condition Monitoring Diagnosis and Analysis
A modern system for communication within a substation – specifically for an integrated control and monitoring
system, is using LAN technology. A key objective has been to define a system that allows interoperability and peer
to peer communications between substation IEDs from different manufacturers. IEDs will be represented as device
oriented data objects.
A very comprehensive (but not complete) list of these data objects has been developed, and they are known as
Generic Object Models for input of IEC standard 61850. This protocol also permits the data exchange between
single IEDs or a common data base. The intent is to use Ethernet technology with either twisted pair copper wire or
fiber optic cable as the physical layer.
The IEC 61850 applies to Substation Automation Systems (SAS). It defines the communication between Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs) e.g. a transformer in the substation and its related system requirements for data
exchange.
A data interface to an IED will provide information for logical devices, logical nodes, data and related data
attributes.
The main task is the definition of logical nodes that contain the information for intelligent condition monitoring of
transformers. The information available in these logical nodes can as well be helpful for asset management
systems.
The communication syntax and semantics of IEC 61850 are based on the use of common data objects related to
the power system:
A simple overview with nodes for monitoring and the details thereof is addressed in the following Table 6.3. More
details are presented in the Annex B:
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Figure 6.7: Structure of an IEC 61850 Data Model
- Physical Device (PHD): Equivalent to an IED (Intelligent Electronic Device) as used in the context of this guide.
- Logical Device (Level 1): Part of a physical device with the same functional background.
- Logical Node (LN) (Level 2): Smallest part of a function that exchanges data. A Logical Node is an object,
defined by its data and methods.
- Data Object (DAO) (Level 3): Parts of a logical node object representing specific information, for example, status
or measurement. From an object-oriented point of view, a data object is an instance of a data object class.
- Common Data Class (CDC) (Level 3):The common data classes define the relation between their attributes and
the functional constraint.The selection is based on the purpose of the data object of this common data class and is
fixed for the data object within a LN class, e.g.:
BSC: Binary controlled step position information
MV: Measured value
- Data (Level 4): Value to be used.
Physical Device Logical Node Data object Common

PHD LN Data Class
Measurement Data Cdc
Bushing ZBSH
Voltage Vol MV
Leakage current LeakA MV
Tap changer
tap changer position ATCC TapChg BSC
tap changer position YLTC TapChg BSC
torque measured SLTC Torq MV
Accessories
oil level conservator SIML Lev MV
tank transformer
air moisture H2OAir MV
conservator tank
transformer
Cooling Equipment CCGR
inlet temperature OilTempin MV
cooling equipment
flow cooling agent FanFlw MV
Active Part SPTR
oil temperature TopTmp MV
aging rate AgeRte MV
Table 6.3: Excerpt from logical nodes for TFO monitoring according to 61850 -9-4 ED2
Figure 6.8 shows a data structure for a transformer based on 61850 considering the following groups:
 General information and transformer events
 Transformer sensor values and alarms
 Details on load
 Details on OLTC
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Such a data template for TICM use gives a time snapshot of the transformer information and valuable and
systematical input to the transformer evaluation models.
Such data collected over time will contain valuable information. The collection of the data for a fleet of transformers
over transformer lifetime is a challenge and has to be considered looking on data value and relevance, as
discussed in section 6.5.
Transformer Unit
General Logical Nodes:

LPHD
Location
Event green SPTR
Event yellow SIML
Event red SLTC
Transformer
MMUX
Hotspot Temperature
Aging rate Transformer
Topoil Temperature Tranformator
Ambient Temperature
Pressure Relief Device
Event Oil Level critical min.
Event Buchholz Alarm
Event Oil Level max.
Event Oil Level min.
Sensor Gas 1
Sensor Gas 2
Load
Load Current
Load Voltage Ph. to Ground
Load Voltage Ph. to Ph.
Power Factor (cos_phi)
Apparent Power
Active Power
Reactive Power
OLTC
Motor Drive
Motor Protective swithch tipped
Motor Drive Door Open
Motor Drive running
Contact Wear switching contact
Contact Wear transition contact
Oil exchange operation count interv.
Oil Exchange time intervall
Oil sample intervall
Maint. User intervall time OLTC
Maint. User intervall operations count OLTC
Maint. User intervall intervall time Transformer
Maintenance Diverter Switch
Maintenance Selector
Maintenance Oil filter Exchance
Maintenance OLTC
Oil Soothing
Maintenance OLTC Exchange
Protection Relay
Operations Counter
End Position Max.
End Position Min.
Tap Position
Figure6.8: Example for a Data Template with IEC61850 to describe a physical device for OLTC
monitoring
Note: all definitions and acronyms used in this sections can be found in IEC 61850-2.
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6.4.3 Interoperability and Interchangeability
From a utility point of view the standardization, interoperability of devices used, and interchangeability is very
important.
The main question in this point is how to ensure interoperability and operation in the face of multiple standards, and
data aspects?
In general one can distinguish two types of interoperability related to data:

 Same standard used and different manufacturer devices;
 Different standards are used by different devices.
In case where it is required to have various devices with different protocols interacting, e.g. in case of legacy
installations, protocol converters can be used to bridge the practical case. Typically these are many-to-one
protocol.
 Interoperability:
A TICM system must consider data coming from different sources.
Each piece of data coming from a data sender needs to be organized in a predefined form which can be easily
understood by a data receiver. There are many standards describing the data organization. Some of them are
widely spread across the world (SCADA protocols, for example, IEC 60870 –5- 101 – 104, 61850). Some of them
are more usual on the North American continent (DNP-3, Modbus and Canbus).
Some IED’s used specific vendor-developed protocols for communications inspite of standard protocols. Therefore
it is very important to review the legacy IED’s communication protocols, and upgrade them if necessary. This will
allow these components (sensors, data transmitters, IED’s, servers), working with data protocols that allow the data
to be easily shared.
Some of the sensors (i.e. Gas-in-oil) provide the data output in Modbus (DNP3.0) and the data processing units
have to be able to receive such data and to process it. Some of the sensors (IED’s) use supplier specific protocols.
The problem of interoperability between two or more different protocols can be in some cases solved by software
(SW), e.g. by programming an interface ensuring protocol translation or be solved by using adequate hardware
(HW) basis e.g. by use of commercially available protocol converters and merging units.
Generic data standards have been developed during the last 10 years. A good example is the IEC 61850 Standard.
The basic idea is to make the data addressing simple and to avoid the need of adapting the communication
channel according to the protocol used.
 Interchangeability:
A TICM should be designed with respect to the future, including long service life, operation and spares availability.
Parts of a monitoring solution will need to change over time, due to various reasons. For example, in case there is
a need to change a defective sensor.
The interface and data protocol are important to consider. Also how the communication occurs physically e.g.
wired, wireless, optical communication.
The replacement object should have at least the same functionality – improved or new required functions should be
also, additionally, available.
In many cases, but not always, the physical object itself has to fit in the same place and comply to space limitations
or requirements (form, fit and function).
Some of the devices are made for wire (metallic) interconnection (i.e. RS485, RS232, RJ45 (LAN/WAN). There are
cases, where metallic interconnections are not acceptable, due to magnetic interference or fiber optic connected
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sensors have to be used. Optical fiber connection will imply the use of optical infrastructure e.g. use of optical data
transmitters.
In practical cases, when additional communication is needed, in order to avoid placement of additional cables, the
use of Powerline carrier technology over existing low voltage power supply cables (AC or DC) can and has been
used.
 Open Issues and Questions:
Interoperability and interchangeability are an important issue in Protection and Control (P&C). For monitoring
systems there are, however, some questions which still have to be answered such as:
1) Are multi-standard compatible TICM systems really necessary, such as compatible to IEC 61850, DNP3,
non-IEC61850 and also interoperable to former SCADA installations?
2) Does the customer expect full interchangeability of monitoring systems like expected for protection and
control?
3) Does the customer expect standardization for monitoring data in terms of content and format?
In the view of the Working Group, below are few opinions on these questions:
Regarding question 1: In practical cases, e.g. in the case of North American and some South American utilities, if
IEDs are added to existing substations, the required protocol to be used in the IEDs is that which the standard with
that utility. Most often it is not desired and utilities do not like to mix protocols and typically require IEDs to match
the existing standards.
Regarding question 2: The typical answer from practical experience is no. The IEDs installed on the transformer
(DGA or bushing monitors) will use the same access point to measure the data (oil valves, or bushing test taps),
but in terms of how the data is measured (DGA for example), or how data is extracted from either leakage current
measurements etc, is where it ends. The fact is that different vendors have different technologies, and different
‘foot prints’ of where and how the IEDs are mounted, installed, and function. In the best case the data/information
coming out of the IED is a standard format, but in terms of how those devices are configured and what goes into
the configuration, all are different. Presently the monitoring systems do not provide interchangeability in the way we
have for protection relays for example.
Regarding question 3: Current practice is that every customer may have different data requirements in terms of
“Tag Names” used for monitored parameters. Some of this goes back to legacy systems. Changing anything in
backend systems has an enormous cost, and is not always justifiable. It is debatable if we will ever get to the point
of having everyone agree on terminology for variable names except for things that have a scientific basis, such as
gases (H2 or CO). This is, however, the path followed by the IEC 61850 in the long term.
6.5 Monitoring Data and Transformer Lifetime Aspects
A TICM system is expected to be operational for a long number of years, sometimes to accompany the transformer
during its entire lifetime.
However, it should be noted that computerized hardware lifetime is nowadays 3 or 4 times shorter than the
expected transformer lifetime.
The CIGRE WG A2.23 (Transformer Lifetime Data Management) has addressed the main aspects of transformer
lifetime data [51]. Both off-line data over lifetime and also some aspects on monitoring have been considered.
One of the major aspects to consider regarding data from a transformer monitoring system is that raw data grows
very much over its lifetime, so obviously the question is which data to keep, which is relevant, and which
information needs to be re-used at a later date.
A possible way to address the aspect of the ever increasing amount of data from monitoring systems in a utility is
described by the 3 level strategy below:
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Level 1 - Keep entire transformer monitoring data collected, the full raw data, for a certain amount
of time only: Current practices are to keep this data for typically 1-2 years. The data is immediately
available for visualization or any analysis with the full level of detail as stored.
Level 2 - Store compressed monitoring data: The monitoring data can be compressed and archived in a
proper utility storage. The information in the compressed data is typically near-time accessible, by un-
compressing and can be used for post-analysis or status evaluation at a later date.
Level 3 - Keep special information on events, alarms, values over thresholds, from the monitoring
system or other systems related to transformer condition only: This data is quite compact; the details
are available only from archived information, but still very important regarding the stresses to which the
transformer was exposed over its life.
Often monitoring data is processed to condense or to extract relevant information. For example, by using
algorithms to keep only derived information on an abnormal situation, such as overloads for a transformer. Such a
procedure could lead to data reduction and such processing can be combined with any of levels 2 and 3 above.
One of the ways to analyse data is using statistical analysis techniques.
A data storage solution must be implemented to store, access on demand the lifetime data. A number of aspects
have to be considered for the data solution such as:
 What data will be used and who are the users, groups or departments
It is important to clarify also for the users: for which activity, when or under which conditions, the criticality and
importance of the event for the data is used:
a. For immediate, direct action (e.g. following alarms, alerts)

b. For short term evaluation and consecutive remedy action (e.g. maintenance)
c. For later or delayed, un-critical time evaluation (failure investigation, replacement need)
 How are the access time requirements
With regard to storage and time access requests a distinction should be made between categories such as:
a. Static transformer data (nameplate, year of installation, and so on)

b. Transformer event data (trips, maintenance, alarms)
c. SCADA data related to transformer (load, voltage, current)
d. Dynamic transformer data (monitoring, temperatures, DGA concentrations,)
Transformer monitoring produces dynamic data but for the evaluation of monitoring data such as in a TICM system,
we may use static data, event data and SCADA data as well.
 When storing monitoring data it is important to decide the level of granularity the data is stored.
For example, what information of a certain quantity should be stored (e.g. temperature values at intervals of
“x”minutes, or only temperature values if the temperature has changed more than p% compared to the
previous value), etc. These decisions have to be made for each sensor used or value supervised.
 What data reduction or compression to use.
Data storage efficiency can be increased by "data-reduction" but part of information is lost forever. Brute force
data compression is not so effective in storage space reduction but all data can be restored without information
loss.
Lifetime data aspects of monitoring system data should be considered together with all lifetime data of the
transformer. Lifetime data aspects depend often on the characteristics of the data historian used by the utility.
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6.6 Transformer Data and Security
With increasing integration and possibilities of interaction of intelligent protective, control and monitoring systems in
a utility installation/network the problem of cyber-security, initially of interest only for protective and control devices,
which can trigger actions, is becoming of interest for monitoring installations too.
Access to transformer monitoring data should be such that:

- TICM Data should not be changed or deleted without authorization;
- TICM Data should be accessible based on access rights in the organization, for various groups or
departments.
In case the TICM is integrated in the common company infrastructure or contains data which should be protected
against misuse, the system must be secured by cyber-security means.
The IEEE Substation Committee has published and continues to update and revise established standards for cyber
security. It is strongly recommended that the reader be aware of the requirements that both Substation Automation
Systems and IEDs must conform to.
a. The expansion of serial cryptography in IEEE Standard 1711 from one method to two different methods.
b. Development of PC37.240 Standard for Cyber Security Requirements for Substation Automation, Protection and
Control Systems, which is presently setting a very high bar for securing substations. This standard is presently
being balloted.
c. Update to IEEE 1686-2012, which provides cyber security requirements for substation IEDs. Work will begin to
address issues with the cryptographic suite.
d. A new working group is being formed in the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee and Substations
Committee to address “data at rest” related to substation automation systems, which is related to cover that gap in
PC37.240. This work is just starting, likely as WG C19 that will be a joint effort with the PSRC WG H22.
e. A new working group in the IEEE Substations Committee to address interoperability of commonly implemented
security protocols, such as IPSEC, SSH, X.509, LDAP, Syslog, SSL/TLS, SNMP, NTP, HTTPS, SFTP, etc. This is
working group C16, where P2030.102.1 is the first underway on Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) which uses
cryptographic security services to protect communications over Internet Protocol (IP) networks.
f. The adoption of version 5 of secure authentication in the DNP3 protocol, IEEE 1815-2012.
g. Update to IEEE 1402, physical security for substations.
Of specific note, PC37.240 provides the standard for cyber security of control and protection systems. It recognizes
that there are many applications running over the communication channels within and to/from substations. In the
present draft, it does not differentiate what applications are running over any communications link nor provide a risk
based assessment of any specific application, like transformer monitoring.
A general rule is that all servers and gateways should be equipped with firewalls and anti-virus programs that are
approved by the company IT service.
For data stored usually in a company information system (ERP, asset inventory systems, maintenance planning
systems) special programs copying the generic database (special data storage systems) are available for data to
be used by other applications.
During the design phase of new monitoring systems a security/protection level determination shall be accomplished
at an early stage. The security/protection level determination process is for example described in the IT security
level of the applicable national standards e.g. ”Requirements for Secure Control and Telecommunication Systems”
[52].
The process should start with the IEDs. The IEEE Standard 1686 [12] provides a comprehensive list of cyber
security features required for substation IEDs.
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Furthermore, IEC 62351 is a security standard developed by WG15 of IECTC57. This standard was developed for
handling the security of TC 57 series of protocols including IEC 60870-5 series, IEC 60870-6 series, IEC 61850
series, IEC 61970 series and IEC 61968 series.
Here the different security objectives include authentication of data transfer through digital signatures, ensuring
only authenticated access, prevention of eavesdropping, prevention of playback and spoofing, and intrusion
detection.
In case of a high or very high protection level a complementary risk analysis is mandatory. The risk analysis shall
assess whether the security measures are adequate to fulfill the protection level requirements of the utility.
Otherwise these security measures shall be enhanced.
6.7 TICM Output Data Use in Utility Systems
TICM system is delivering valuable output data which have to be considered and integrated with other utility
systems for proper use and for obtaining the functionality required.
The WG recommendation is to consider as a minimum the following systems in connection to TICM outputs:
- Alarm management systems

o need to adapt the alarm reaction procedures to consider the monitoring system output
- Condition based maintenance systems

o TICM outputs to be considered together with diagnostics, events and alarms,
- Fleet management / asset management systems – use the TICM output data:
o For ranking and prioritization of units for replacement;
o To develop a spare transformer strategy;
o For long term planning.
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7. STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
7.1 Fundamental Questions
Transformer on-line condition monitoring has certainly economic and strategic impacts which need to be analyzed
before a given solution is implemented. Below are some examples of strategic questions which have cost as well
as “modus operandi” impact on the enterprise:
 How does the company view asset monitoring? Local solution at the individual transformer? Integrated
solution into SCADA system/LAN? Fleet wide implementation?
 Is this in line with general company strategy (i.e. Smart Grid initiatives, change to CBM, postpone
investments, increase availability, reduce risks, etc.) and trend?
 Who is going to be the end-user of the product? Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Planning, All?
 How is the end user going to get the information (locally at the transformer, locally at the substation control
room, remotely etc.)?
 How is the system going to be integrated into the company’s IT infrastructure (Protocols, databases,
historians etc.)?
 Which assets have the highest priorities to receive the new solution (New Transformers, existing
transformers, both)?
 Are the substations prepared for the integration (Cables, ditches, communications etc.)?.
 Who, inside the enterprise, is going to be responsible for the maintenance of the system (Sensors,
communications, data integrity as well as Hardware and Software tools)?
 What are the specifications of the monitoring solution (parameters, format, storage, communications,
hardware, software, configurations, alarms, messages etc.)?
 How is each of those parameters going to be used internally?
 Has the customer performed a cost-benefit analysis after the mentioned an other relevant questions?
The fundamental questions above will be discussed in more details in the following sections, with the aim of
providing the end-user with a useful check list which, if not thoroughly visited, at least covered in some of its most
important aspects.
7.2 Questions Discussion
7.2.1 Scope of Transformer Monitoring
It is important to determine how the user locates transformer monitoring using the chart of Figure 5.1. Some users
might consider monitoring the installation of a few sensors on some “unhealthy” or “suspicious” units, in order to
provide them with more frequent and recent data, as compared to normal tests done in the laboratory or even
annual overhauls. These users might be content with sending service crews around and from time to time
performing a “visual” inspection of the transformers and capturing the latest readings of the sensors, manually. To
these users this is a lot more than they had before and they consider this some sort of “advanced” transformer
monitoring.
Another group of users might want to interconnect the output of the new sensors to an IED and, perhaps, move
alarms/messages to a SCADA system or to a higher level, with some sort of communication protocol. Some might
even require a HMI at the Substation control room, with integration to alarm annunciation panel and also SCADA.
There are some which see transformer monitoring at an ever higher level, at the enterprise Head Quarters,
requiring a much more comprehensive and complex solution even with ERP integration and other on-line and off-
line data sources.
Whatever the concept, it is necessary that the philosophy of the implementation as well as the associated costs be
thoroughly evaluated by the end user.
7.2.2 Company Strategic Plan
The strategic aspects discussed above must be in line with the company’s general view of the future and how it
intends to face the challenges of the present, such as lack of expertise, early retirements, aging infrastructure,
maintenance practices and so forth. Another fundamental driving force which needs to be factored in is the group
of so called “smart grid initiatives” which, somehow, every company is or will be implementing at one level or
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another, depending on size, importance, level of connectivity to larger networks, responsibility to deliver power and
so forth.
Many transformer owners are also moving away from the traditional time based maintenance program to one of
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). In other words they are targeting equipment repairs or replacements for
when they are really necessary. The major objectives of a CBM program are to optimize the life and utilization of
critical assets by leveraging technology to proactive maintenance and grid operations decisions.The move to apply
TICM methods may provide them the tools to achieve this goal and enable the process of managing the risks and
condition of their fleets of transformers.
All these aspects play a lesser or more important role in the decision to move forward with some sort of on-line
asset (transformer) monitoring with not only strategic but also economic impact.
7.2.3 Determination of the Stakeholders
Natural stakeholders are the engineering groups, maintenance and operations, as well as planning departments.
However strange it may sound to some, it is imperative to have this very well defined. It is unfortunate and
counterproductive to find different areas of an organization surprised with the introduction of a given solution,
without having taken part in the decision process or without having been informed about its implementation. This
alone may impose serious and costly consequences to the organization.
The move to CBM, for example, by its nature involves in most cases a complete change in the management
processes once employed in Time Based Maintenance (TBM). To this end the successful companies who have
joined the movement to CBM had to look at their internal processes, and methods, and personnel that would be
involved in making this significant change in their business. They assembled a small project team to lead the
implementation efforts. Working with their own subject matter experts, the teams validated the project requirements
and conducted a rigorous request for proposal process. The groups included asset management, substation
construction and maintenance, substation design and engineering, systems, protection and controls engineering,
distribution operations, information technologies (IT), regulatory affairs, and supply management departments. This
broad-based, cross-functional approach proved vital in defining the project requirements, or architecture and
selection of the vendor partners.
7.2.4 Access to Information
Now that everybody knows what transformer monitoring is and who is going to be the end user of the solution, it is
time to define how the information is going to be made available to that particular group. This may require
additional efforts such as hiring solution providers, expanding the corporate intranet, changing communication
protocols, adapting databases, creating new hardware infrastructures, writing new procedures and safety codes,
and so forth, with obvious cost impact.
7.2.5 Integration into IT Infrastructure
As from 7.2.4 above, the IT Department should be involved in the decision making process from the beginning of
the implementation of a given solution. It again may sound obvious to many but it is more frequent than not to find
the IT colleagues “shocked” by the fact that they are now responsible for the integration of a given solution which
was decided by a Transformer Monitoring staff, months ago, without any knowledge or participation in the process.
This may bring along serious costs or delays which also have to be carefully considered
7.2.6 Asset Selection – Monitoring Allocation
This is a really complex decision-making process as it involves a large number of issues. For example,
transformers in operation for a long time are typically the ones requiring some sort of additional help, particularly
those showing operational issues, such as increased levels of dissolved gas in oil, OLTC reliability and so forth.
Those units are aged and difficult to economically justify further investments in, rather than the “typical”
maintenance procedures normally employed by a given utility.
Contrary to that, new transformers with their initial high costs make it easier for asset managers to incorporate new
sensors, as these are only marginal costs comparatively to the investment already compromised on new units at
the factory or in procurement. Of course the cost of a TICM may easily justify its implementation on aged units if
one takes into account not only the health of the unit but also the deferral of investments to acquire new units.
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Another point to consider: is the implementation of the solution going to be based on existing asset condition or is it
going to be wide spread, fleet wide, irrespective of condition or age? This is a difficult equation to solve but it is
certainly something which needs to be strategically addressed as it might certainly have a significant impact on
costs.
Such a decision is generally based on a cost benefit evaluation, for the short term and/or for the long term.
 The costs are first of all the costs of installing sensing devices and monitoring equipment. It should be realized
however that most of the costs will be related to the “implementation of the new process”. It involves a change
in process descriptions and procedures, information and communication technology, development of
knowledge rules and decision criteria, staff responsibilities and competences required;
 The benefits may be expressed in terms of: avoiding failures (reliability improvement), optimizing maintenance
(reduction of operational costs), and postponing replacements (reduction of reinvestments). A secondary
benefit, hard to express in financial terms, is the gain in knowledge and understanding.
The cost benefit evaluation will be different for new and existing transformers, and different for “young” and “old”
transformers:
 New transformers: New transformers are funded from an investment budget. The cost of including
monitoring sensors and equipment is low compared to the overall transformer cost, and as a result an extensive
cost benefit evaluation is often omitted. The benefits are usually not expressed in terms of avoiding failures
(although monitoring may help tracking “teething problems” and improper installation) but with a view to reducing
maintenance costs. Most of the benefit however will be in the long term benefits.
 Existing transformers: Refurbishment of existing transformers is usually funded from operational

budgets, and retrofitting could be more expensive than an add-on to new equipment. As a result decision makers
will demand for a substantiated cost benefit analysis. Whether or not the cost benefit analysis will be in favour of
monitoring to a large extent depends on whether only short term benefits are considered, or whether also long term
benefits are taken into account. For existing transformers there will be a different trade-off for “aged” transformers
(close to the end of their expected life) and “midlife” transformers. For transformers that are “aged” the
postponement of replacement may not weigh up against the costs of introducing monitoring. “Midlife” transformers
have an expected remaining life of 10 or 20 years. For this category monitoring has potential benefits such as:
being able to estimate the remaining life, and thereby postpone replacement (for the healthy transformers) or
prevent failures by preventive replacement (for the poor transformers).
From the perspective of fleet risk management, the asset manager may identify a population at risk, and introduce
monitoring for that population first. The identification of this population may be based on the risk of failure,
consisting of:
 The failure probability, which may be derived from a combination of age (distribution), failure statistics, load
patterns, condition parameters, inspection reports, etc.
 The impact of failure (impact on duration and interruption frequency indicators SAIDI/SAIFI, number of
customers, cost, safety to workers and the public, etc.).
Setting up monitoring for part of the population implies that also the generic investment is being done (monitoring
infrastructure, process descriptions and procedures, training, etc.). This will make it more cost effective to roll out
monitoring for next parts of the population.
7.2.7 Substations Infrastructure
Having the decision in place on what asset to monitor the next obvious question in line is the substation
infrastructure. In some countries, it is common to find substations which were built in the 50’s and 60’s which still
accommodate relays and protective devices from that generation, without communications infrastructure capable of
incorporating more modern devices without major renovations. Basic issues related to, whether ditches exist, or if
not, the cost to build new ones, availability of wireless, LAN and so forth need to be properly addressed.
7.2.8 Ownership of Transformer Monitoring
This also needs thoughtful consideration as it may require organizational adaptation or even the creation of new
areas inside the company org chart. It must be considered that the implementation of a complex solution, from,
Figure 5.1, requires permanent attention to multiple aspects, from sensors to hardware and communications, from
software tools to data management with their associated costs. The last thing the utility would like is to have a very
powerful system in place without a clear internal ownership and described responsibilities.
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7.2.9 Transformer Monitoring Specification
The usefulness of a transformer monitoring solution starts from a clear and well defined specification. This is a
challenge as again it must involve multiple areas inside the enterprise such as transformer experts, maintenance
and operations personnel, planning and IT people. The higher the collaboration between all these areas, the better
the end result will be, and at a lower cost.
7.2.10 Application of Transformer Monitoring
This is a more technical issue as it is related to the end use of transformer operational data, some of it now
acquired on-line. As discussed before, the enterprise needs to define, well in advance, what to monitor, who is
going to be the recipient of that information and what to do with the information. For example, a given utility
requires that the supplier of a given monitoring solution provide a very accurate thermal model to describe a
number of things, such as continuous calculation of multiple windings hot-spot, cooling system condition, etc. In the
end, for that particular user, the Loadability of its transformers is a “key” parameter which requires special attention.
That utility will be making decisions based on those calculations with respect to overloading a given unit, for such
an amount of time and so forth. The same may not be even significant to another user which is not involved with
directly fulfilling customer’s demand or which has most of its transformers operating at a typically low load, most of
the time or for which thermal issues have not played a role in any decision making process. This latter user may be
much more concerned with the reliability of a given accessory, for example, OLTC, which typically has been a
cause of concern over the many years of experience. In that case, this particular user may be interested in knowing
when and how to perform a given maintenance action on its OLTC’s. All these aspects must be carefully
considered during the whole process of implementing a monitoring solution.
7.3 Cost Benefit Analysis
In order to determine the cost-benefit of applying an “intelligent transformer monitoring” solution it is recommended
to list all possible risks with the associated costs of having and not having the solution. This is not a trivial exercise
as it may encompass a large number of items, difficult to obtain probabilities as well as items which are of
“perception” with economic significance, rather than objects with their costs.
Several interesting works are available in the literature such as the proposed probabilistic model found in the
CIGRE Brochure 462-2011 [1], CIGRE Brochure 248-2004 [53] and IEEE C57.143.2012 [43], whose main points
on economic benefits are provided below as a starting point to a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.
It is interesting to try to estimate the probabilistic impact of having a given monitoring solution by factoring the
multiple probabilities as illustrated in Figure 7.1 below which is similar to that shown in TB 248 slightly modified to
facilitate understanding.
The same document goes on to define multiple costs to be taken into account, which should then be multiplied by
the probabilities given in Figure 7.1 in order to compute the annual cost avoidance by the introduction of the
monitoring solution.
The fundamental economics used in the document mentioned before is the risk or cost avoidance, calculated as:
Risk = Cost of Event  Probability of Event
The probabilities may be estimated as above (with and without monitoring) where as a list of events, with an
example of associated costs, given in the document are:
- Cost of major failure (all annualized);
- Cost of catastrophic failure;
- Cost of monitoring solution;
- Cost to maintain monitoring solution;
- Cost of energy not sold/delivered;
- Cost of system degradation (penalties etc.);
- Cost of early detection of fault (failure avoidance).
The follow up arithmetic is simple and can be extracted from Cigre Brochure 248 [53].
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Figure 7.1: Example of impact of having a monitoring solution on the final probability of catastrophic
as well as non-catastrophic failures, considering an initial transformer failure rate of 1% (converted to
probability = 0.01), chances of detecting a given failure mode of 30%, probability of a catastrophic
failure of 10% and only 60% chances of detecting an otherwise undetected issue, applying a given
monitoring solution.
Notice that Figure 7.1 shows just one possible way of looking at the analysis. In the figure it is assumed that the
benefit exists from the detection of defects that are otherwise not detectable. It does not take into account that
defects may also be detected sooner or more reliably with monitoring.
Additional items which could also be included in the list and not considered in [53] are:
- Cost of deferred investment due to failure avoidance capability (this item alone may prove to be a major
contribution to cost avoidance!);
- Cost of optimized maintenance (instead of using a flat budget for all transformers, maintenance can now be
optimized based on operating condition!).
7.4 Suggested Scoring Methodology
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 below are based on the above discussion and show the example of a simple procedure to
assess the user’s readiness to move forward with a comprehensive TICM.
First identify a list of important aspects to be taken into account before, during and after the implementation of
TICM as illustrated in the sequence of items from 1-11 in Table 7.1. Next attribute weights, W i, to each individual
parameter – weights are typically associated to the relative importance of individual parameters.The list shown in
Table 7.1 (e.g. range 1-5, 1 - not important, 5 - very important) contains a suggestion of weights from the WG
A2.44 but it can be adapted to individual user’s requirements.
The user must then associate a score level (say, in the range 0-100%) to each individual parameter of the list,
indicating the truthfulness of that parameter to the specific case applicable to company. Take for example item b) in
the list, and let us assume that the implementation of TICM is totally in line with the current company’s strategic
direction. In that case the score would obviously be 100%. In case it is not at all in line with the company’s strategic
planning than the score would be 0%.
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The user must then apply the best judgment to fill out Table 7.1 and apply Equation (1) to find out the “level of
readiness” of the company to fully deploy a TICM.
The scores shown in Table 7.1 are the average scores calculated from the contribution of 17 WG members relative
to their individual companies. Table 7.2 shows the ranges applicable to individual cases.
Company
Issue
Score
Item Issues to be addressed Weight W
S W.S
(1 to 5)
(0 to100%)
The company has clear idea about the type of solution that should be
1 implemented? (Substation level, Enterprise-wide, integrated with SCADA, 4 59.4 237.6
LAN/WAN, cloud, a few units or Fleet wide etc.)
Is that fully in line with general company strategy? (i.e. Smart Grid initiatives,
2 current trends, change to CBM, postpone investments, increase availability, 5 54.4 272.1
reduce risks, etc.)?
Are stakeholders clearly identified (Planning, Engineering, Maintenance,
3 4 59.1 236.5
Operations, IT, etc.)?
IEDs, Substation Gateways and Enterprise Gateways in place for the solution?
4 3 54.4 163.2
Have eventual changes in databases and IT solutions been properly addressed?
Have the issues related to communications, protocols, interfacing with existing
5 4 51.5 205.9
solutions been sufficiently discussed?
Is it clear which assets have the highest priorities to receive the new solution?
6 4 75.3 301.2
(New Transformers, existing transformers, both)
Are the substations prepared for the integration? (Cables, ditches,
7 3 57.6 172.9
communications etc.)
Has the company defined a full strategic implementation, including ownership of
8 3 48.8 146.5
the solution, maintenance providers, detailed responsibilities etc.?
Has the TICM specification been defined and approved internally (parameters,
9 format, storage, communications, hardware, software, configurations, alarms, 4 50.3 201.2
messages, etc.)?
Is it well defined how and by whom each output of the system is going to be used
10 3 54.4 163.2
internally?
Has the company performed a thorough cost-benefit analysis after questions 1-10
11 4 47.1 188.2
that shows adequacy of the chosen solution?
TOTAL 41 2228.5
Table 7.1: Readiness to Incorporate TICM
User readiness to TICM [%] =(Wi . Si)/ (Wi) (1)
User readiness
Evaluation Recommendation
(%)
Very weak
0-25 The company is not prepared yet to adequately deploy and maintain TICM systems
situation
Company shows several weaknesses which may impact negatively full deployment of
26-50 Weak
TICM
Some Company may deploy TICM but will certainly have to fix several internal issues
51-65
weakness simultaneously to take full advantage of TICM.
Company may certainly deploy TICM but will eventually have to fix several internal
66-85 Strong
issues simultaneously to take full advantage of TICM.
>85 Very strong Company is already in a very strong position to deploy and take full advantage of TICM.
Table 7.2: Company current position (max = 100%)
As from Table 7.2, final scores <50% strongly indicate the need for a number of internal actions to improve the
company’s readiness to deploy TICM. Score >50% indicate a stronger position but may also require some action to
improve readiness.
The result using the WG survey data and assumed weights and mean scores used in Table 7.1 example shows
that, in a general approach, the readiness of companies is in “some weakness” evaluation (readiness to TICM =
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55.82%). This in a qualitative way shows that TICM concepts still need further work inside the companies before
they become a real valuable solution, helps to explain some of the nowadays considered unsuccessful results
associated with monitoring, and, is useful for benchmarking.
Figure 7.2 shows the readiness of each one, using the scores of the individual companies that participated in the
WG survey. Individual readiness values are in the range of 30 to 80%.
WG Members (17)
Application of methodology in Table 7.1
90
My company readiness, %
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Member i.d.
Figure 7.2: User companies readiness, according to the results of the internal WG survey
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8. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATION
This TB presented a methodological approach for the definition of TICM and discussed the basic specification
aspects of a TICM system.
Guidance was provided for:

- the identification and processing of transformer data into relevant information through a uniform process
using generic functional and information models;
- the identification of the most appropriate diagnostics algorithms;
- the discussion of system structures / architectures and data flow necessary to achieve the users’ required
functionalities;
- the indication of the monitoring data design aspects that are important for future data integration, and
transformer condition assessment benefits that can be obtained by the application of a standardization and
harmonization of the diagnostics methodologies;
- the identification of strategic and economic aspects that may influence the transformer monitoring use.
It may be concluded that a TICM system’s successful technological implementation and integration into a
company’s processes depends on particular challenges:
 The user’s first challenge is to define which are the important transformer functions and defects they want
to have considered in the TICM system, together with the associated analysis that should be performed to
try to maintain, in a proactive manner, the transformer’s health, its longevity and low risk of failure. The
chosen analysis algorithms and methods could be developed in-house or contracted from external
development sources, but should be specified to allow a standard interface and modular implementation
(even by different providers) and an adequate functionality commissioning.
 Secondly, for the long term success of TICM systems, the users have to be sure that their companies are
prepared to work within the new reality of intelligent systems and that these systems will be adequately
maintained and periodically updated to take advantage of new and evolving technology. Companies should
prepare to incorporate condition monitoring into their processes. Instructions for use and maintenance for
completely new or extended systems have to be prepared before such an application can be installed. It is
important to provide a high level of staff training and carefully plan each step to be taken.
 From the point of view of solution suppliers, the challenge is to develop reliable, standardized, open and
modular tools able to meet the specifications of the users, as well as help users of devices for continuous
monitoring to obtain high availability and good return on investment of such equipment. The TICM generic
model developed in Chapter 3 and Annex A example could be used in the development process of such
tools.
Further CIGRE work in TICM should be directed towards IEC groups that are developing Condition Monitoring and
Diagnosis as logical nodes for the next IEC 61850 versions.
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9. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES
[1] CIGRE WG B3.12: Technical Brochure 462, “Obtaining Value from On-Line Substation Condition Monitoring”,
jun/2011.
[2] NASH, F.A. “Differential Diagnosis – An Apparatus to Assist the Logical faculties”, The Lancet – special articles,
pg.875, vol. April/24,1954.
[3] MOUBRAY, J., “RCM2 – Reliability-centered Maintenance” Industrial Press Inc., New York, second edition,
2000.
[4] SAE – International Society of Automotive Engineers, “SAE JA1011 – Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-
Centered Maintenance (RCM) Processes”, Warrendale, Pennsylvania, USA, SAE Publications, 1999.
[5] CIGRE WG A2.18: Technical Brochure 227, “Life Management Techniques for Power Transformers”, jun/2003.
[6] CIGRE WG C1.16: Technical Brochure 422, “Transmission Asset Risk Management”, aug/2010.
[7] VERMEER, M WETZER, J, “Asset management decision support modelling, using a health index for
maintenance and replacement planning”, CIGRE SC A2 & C4 JOINT COLLOQUIUM, Zurich, Switzerland, 2013.
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Page 73
ANNEX A
Page 74
Guide on Transformer Intelligent Condition Monitoring (TICM Systems
ANNEX A – TRANSFORMER MAIN SUBSYSTEMS FMEA EXAMPLE
This annex shows an example on how FMEA can be used to find which are the transformer main subsystems, critical functional failures, and components failure modes that
may be accessed by using on-line continuous monitoring inputs. It also exemplifies how to associate the available continuous input timestamp series data with common
defects (symptoms) analysis.
Transformers characteristics change according to the manufacturer projects and users specifications.So, the example is limited to a typical ONAN-ONAF or OFAF
transformer with SF6 or oil filled bushings, dehumidifier/membrane and OLTC. Auxiliary subsystems like control cabinet, protection, monitoring systems, and other
accessories, were not considered in the example.
The shown analysis is not focused in all the possible failure modes and symptoms that may occur in a power transformer. Only some of those considered related to critical
operational conditions on the transformer health, demanding special care and short-medium time actions are presented.
There are hundreds of failure modes that may be better accessed through visual inspections or other on-line periodic or off-line techniques different from on-line continuous
monitoring. These other periodic on-line and off-line conditions were not here considered.
The adopted nomenclature in the tables reflects what is available in the literature according to the below references and also, to some extent, the brochure text needs for
uniform treatment.
Tables A1 to A5 show the WG performed analysis results. Tables A6 and A7 reflect the former tables’ content in a more compact vision, with a list of analysis that could be
performed and the associated list of on-line continuous data inputs needed to perform these health analysis.
The user is incentivized to adapt the tables to his own context and needs. It is only recommended the names chosen to be the common “defect analysis names” be kept, as
long as possible, compatible with the generic model proposed in Chapter 3 of this brochure.
REFERENCES:
- “Reliability-centered Maintenance”, John Moubray, second edition, Industrial press Inc, 1997.
- “CIGRE Brochure SC-B5 – Brazil, Transformadores Imersos em Líquidos Isolantes - Guia de Manutenção Centrada na Confiabilidade”, dez./2006
- “WD IEC 61850-90-3, Part 90-3: Using IEC 61850 for Condition Monitoring Diagnosis and Analysis, Technical Report”, (draft version 57-1372/DC), may/2013.
- “CIGRE Brochure 227 – Life management for Power Transformers”, jan.2003.
- “IEEE PC57.143 ™/D21 - Guide for Application for Monitoring Equipment to Liquid-Immersed Transformers and Components”, August 2010.
- “On line Condition Monitoring of Substation Power Equipment – Utility Needs”, CEA 485 T 1049, December 1996.
1
Transformer Functional Main Subsystems
Bushings
– Table A.4
Oil Containment and

Preservation
– Table A.2
Cooling System
– Table A.3
OLTC
– Table A.5 Active Part
– Table A.1
Transformer Subsystems Mapping – Only Continuous On-line Data Inputs Considered
2
Table A.1 – Transformer Functional Subsystem “Active Part”

(Only functions and functional failures that can be characterized through continuous on-line condition monitoring data)
Functional Subsystem: Active Part
Defect Analysis Name Measured on-line continuous

Primary Function Functional Failure Modes Components / Subcomponents Failure Causes
(Abnormal Symptoms) values (data inputs)
- Rate of change and total gas
(primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
- Electric Arc (in the tank)
- Nucleous / Magnetic Core - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
Has high eddy currents - Core steel sheets shorted - Partial Discharges (in the
(legs/yokes) measurement)
tank)
- Partial discharges measurement
(electric, UHF, acoustic)
Provide a path for a magnetic - Error in assembly - Electric Arc (in the tank)
primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
induction / transformation of - Poor fixing pads/ clamps / screws - Partial Discharges (in the
Shows abnormal electrical - Nucleous / Magnetic Core - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
voltages without generating high - Magneto striction (contractions and tank)
losses in the core (legs/yokes) measurement)
leakage flux with localized heating stretching of the blades) - Conductor Overheating (in
and abnormal losses in the core - Core steel sheets shorted the tank)
- Deficiency in isolation of bolts for (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
Shows high surface - Nucleous / Magnetic Core - Partial Discharges (in the
fixing the steel blades - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
overheating (due magnetic (legs/yokes) tank)
- Localized dispersing magnetic flux measurement)
leakage flux) - Magnetic shield - Conductor Overheating (in
- Core steel sheets shorted - Partial discharges measurement
the tank)
(primarilyH2) dissolved in the oil
- 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
- Partial Discharges (in the
Shows windings - Broken insulating paper of windings / measurement)
- Main insulation (paper + oil) tank)
displacement coils - Load current transformer (3
- Conductor Overheating (in
phases)
the tank)
Provide electrical insulation - Poor fixation - Rate of change and total gas
between layers, coils, windings, - Loose with loss of insulation between - Electric Arc (in the tank) (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
core, tank, and electric blades - Partial Discharges (in the - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
Shows loss of the dielectric - Nucleous / Magnetic Core
contacts,without reduction of - Problem in the ground (floating tank) measurement)
insulation of the core (legs/yokes)
electrical resistance and external potential in the core) - Conductor Overheating (in - Core ground current
insulation, and without generating - Problem in Shims/Clamps/Screws and the tank) - Partial discharges measurement
arc, sparks, partial discharges mounting hardware (electric, UHF, acoustic)
and floating potential - Accumulation external of surges or - Short-circuit current of the
- Coil /winding
short circuits in substation or system, transformer (disturbance of the 3
-Turns / Conductor winding - Electric Arc (in the tank)
not directly involving the transformer phases)
- Main insulation (paper+ oil) - Partial Discharges (in the
- Accumulation of overvoltages or over - Moisture (and temperature) in oilt
- Coil spacer tank)
Shows decreasing dielectric current due to transformer switching ank
- Bushing / active part connectors - Conductor Overheating (in
insulation of the active part - Contamination by high moisture - Load current transformer (3
- Core ground connector / lead the tank)
- Electric field generating excessive phases)
- Nucleous / Magnetic Core - Excessive Oil Moisture (in
sparking - Peak voltage of the transformer
(legs/yokes) the tank)
- Displacement of coils or windings surge
- LV Bushings
- Bad electrical contact - Rate of change and total gas
3

- Core steel sheets shorted with (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
winding/tank - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
- Poor winding fixation measurement)
- Core ground current
- Electric Arc (in the tank) - Rate of change and total gas
- Mounting Problem
Presents bad electrical - Tap changer connectors - Partial Discharges (in the (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
- Problems resulting from natural
To present good tap contact at connection or bad - Connector bushing / active part tank) - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
vibration
tap changer and good connection mechanical contact - Core ground connector / lead - Conductor Overheating (in measurement)
- Poor fixation
between external HV, LV and the tank) - Partial discharges measurement
grounding terminations keeping (electric, UHF, acoustic)
windings electric resistance within - Rate of change and total gas
the design parameters and with (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
- Deterioration of contacts - Partial Discharges (in the
no local abnormal elevations of - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
Displays electrical windings - Tap changer selector contacts - Poor fixation tank)
temperature measurement)
R greater than the design - Tap changer connectors - Badelectrical contact - Conductor Overheating (in
- Low pressure in contacts the tank)
- Electric Arc (in the tank) (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
Presents bad electrical - Partial Discharges (in the - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
connection, not grounding - Core ground connector / lead - Poor fixation tank) measurement)
effectively the magnetic core - Conductor Overheating (in - Core ground current
Provide grounding of the the tank) - Partial discharges measurement
magnetic core, without presenting (electric, UHF, acoustic)
high contact resistance and hot - Rate of change and total gas
spots primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
Presents localized - Core ground connector / lead - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
- Poor fixation - Conductor Overheating (in
overheating in the core - Tap changer connectors measurement)
- Bad initial sizing the tank)
ground and connections - Connectorbushing / active part - Core ground current
- Partial Discharges (in the
Allows noise / excessive - Shims/clamps/through bolts for - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
- Poor fixation tank)
vibration in the active part fixing the core / windings measurement)
Provide mechanical support for - Conductor Overheating (in
the active part and core via the tank)
shims,etc, minimizing vibrations,
keeping it enough far from the
- Electric Arc (in the tank) (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
tank to prevent loss of the
Does not mechanically - Shims/clamps/through bolts for - Partial Discharges (in the - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
insulation while maintaining the - Poor fixation
supports the core fixing the core / windings tank) measurement)
windings rigid enough to with
stand the stresses of dynamic
Icc<25In
- Shims/clamps/through bolts for - Rate of change and total gas
- Poor fixation
Does not mechanically fixing the core / windings (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
- Poor assembly of shims or clamps - Electric Arc (in the tank)
supports the windings - Coil / winding - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
-Loose structure
- Nucleous / Magnetic Core measurement)
4

(legs/yokes)
To allow the flow of currents
smaller or larger than the - Electric Arc (in the tank)
Shows abnormal electrical (primarilyH2) dissolved in the oil
nominal, producing total losses in - Coil / winding - Short circuit between turns or layers - Conductor Overheating (in
losses in the windings - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
the winding compatible to the the tank)
measurement)
nominal values of design
- Load current attransformer (3
phases)
- Primary / secondary / tertiary
- Breaking of conductors - Electric Arc (in the tank)
Does not transform the - Coil / winding voltages (3 phases)
- Breaking insulating paper of windings/ - Conductor Overheating (in
voltages - Main insulation (paper + oil) - Rate of change and total gas
coils the tank)
To transform voltages between (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
primary, secondary or tertiary - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
maintaining minimum error in the measurement)
theoretical transformer ratio - Rate of change and total gas
- Short circuit between turns or layers or
Presents turn voltage - Coil / winding conductors - Electric Arc (in the tank)
relations with excessive - Turns/ Conductor winding - Breaking insulating paper of windings/ - Conductor Overheating (in
measurement)
error - Main insulation (paper+ oil) coils the tank)
- Primary / secondary / tertiary
- Error in assembly
voltages (3 phases)
- Load current at transformer (3
phases)
Support,in the windings and core,
- Short-circuit current of the
short circuit currents less to 25 In,
- Poor fixation - Electric Arc (in the tank) transformer (disturbances of the 3
atmospheric surges less than or - Connector bushing/active part
Does not support high - Problems of tightness setting between - Partial Discharges (in the phases)
equal to its BIL, switching surges - Coil / winding
overcurrent / over-voltages the core and the windings tank) - Rate of change and total gas
less than or equal to its BSL, 60 - Nucleous / Magnetic Core
in the windings - External excessive short-circuit - Conductor Overheating (in (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
Hz voltages less than or equal to (legs/yokes)
current values the tank) - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
2pu (1 minute), without electric
measurement)
disruptions
-Electrostatic shielding (ring, pipe)
- Load current at transformer (3
- Connection cable wrap
phases)
- Shims/clamps/through bolts for
fixing the core / windings
- Internal oil channels blocked (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
- Tap changer selector contacts
Shows accelerated thermal - Bad initial sizing - Abnormal Winding Paper - Winding temperature (thermal
Allow currents smaller than those - Conductor of taps
winding paper degradation - Presence of abnormal and continuous Degradation imaging)
maximum specified and - Connector bushing/active part
occurring with currents lower moisture - Conductor Overheating (in - Top oil temperature
guaranteed for the windings, with - Core ground connector / lead
than specified - Presence of localized or generalized the tank) - Moisture(and temperature) in oil
temperature rise in the tank and - Coil / winding
hot spots (bubble possibility) tank
windings respecting its - Turns / Conductor winding
- Membrane rupture detector
temperature class, in order to not - Main insulation (paper+ oil)
actuation
thermically deteriorate the - Nucleous / Magnetic Core
insulation (legs/yokes)
measurement)
Shows temperature rise in -Electrostatic shielding (ring, pipe) - Channels internal oil blocked - Electric Arc (in the tank) - Load current transformer (3
the oil tank and coils / - Connection cable wrap. bush. - Poor fixation - Partial Discharges (in the phases)
conductors inconsistent with - Conductor of taps - Loose connection tank) - Rate of change and total gas
the applied load and - Shims/clamps/through bolts for - Bad electrical contact - Conductor Overheating (in (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
temperature class fixing the core / windings - Bad initial sizing the tank) - Winding temperature (thermal
5

- Connector bushing / active part - Presence of localized or generalized imaging)
- Contact CDST hot spots (bubble possibility) -Top oil temperature
- Coil / winding - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
- Turns / Conductor winding measurement)
- Nucleous / Magnetic Core - Partial discharges measurement
(legs/yokes) (electric, UHF, acoustic)
- Load current transformer (3
- Tap changer selector contacts phases)
- Breaking total connection - Electric Arc (in the tank)
Do not allow any electrical - Tap changer connector - Rate of change and total gas
- Poor fixation - Conductor Overheating (in
current flow - Connector bushing/active part (primarilyH2) dissolved in the oil
- Breaking of conductors the tank)
-Coil / winding - 8 gases dissolved in oil (single
measurement)
6
Table A.2 – Transformer Functional Subsystem “Oil Containment and Preservation”

(only primary functions and functional failures that can be characterized through continuous on-line condition monitoring data)
Functional Subsystem: Oil Containment and Preservation

(Abnormal Symptoms) values (inputs)
- Oil leaking
- Expansion tank enclosure
Shows insufficient oil level - Too much oil sampling - Low Oil Level (tank) - Oil level sensor in the tank
- Main tank enclosure
- Error in the filling process
- Degradation of material (increased
porosity)
- Bad fastening of the bag / membrane
- Poor fixation of gaskets
- Loose mounting screws
Store / Contain / Barring the total - Bad initial sizing
volume of oil inside tank / radiator / - Expansion tank enclosure - Punching in bag / membrane
expansion tank at an appropriate - Connection valve expansion - Degradation of the bag / membrane
level, without leaks in valves, bolts, tank to tank - Rupture of membranes / membrane - Oil level sensor in the tank
Shows insulating oil - Bag / Membrane Rupture
welds, gaskets, flanges, fittings, - Flange connection of radiator - Poor fixation between the tank and - Membrane rupture detector
leakages - Low Oil Level (tank)
tubing, gaskets, or oil pumps - Bag / membrane expansion tank actuation
- Pipes between oil tank and - Fatigue of seals / gaskets
expansion tank (clearances) FRN
- Strong corrosion
- Defective welds
- Vandalism
- Inappropriate closing
- Internal valve broken
- Connecting thread damaged
- Bad initial sizing
- Manufacturing problem
- Poor fixation
To control the penetration of H20 and - Bag / membrane - Moisture and temperature in oil
- Drilling
O2 from ambient into the tank / Does not controls the - Dry-Cool - Ambient Moisture
- Degradation of material - Excessive Oil Moisture (in
radiator / expansion tank through penetration of moisture and - Main tank enclosure - N2 pressure level of the
- Clogging the tank)
gaskets, membranes, bag, silica gel / or oxygen into the oil / - Tank gaskets transformer
- Installation on a site with excessive - Bag / Membrane Rupture
(dehumidifier) system or drycol, N2, winding - Silica-gel - Membrane rupture detector
moisture
keeping levels consistent with design - N2 System regulator actuation
- Use of shoddy silica gel
- Saturated silica gel
- Problem in pressure control device
7
Table A.3 – Transformer Functional Subsystem “Cooling System”

(only primary functions and functional failures that can be characterized throught continuous on-line condition monitoring data)
Functional Subsystem: Cooling System

- Power supply inoperative or
inadequate - Top oil temperature
To command automatically and
Does not automatically - AC cooling power supply - Selector local control wrong position - Oil pumps motor current
remotely pumps and cooling stages
commands coolant oil - Oil pump engine - Deterioration of control components - Refusal of Oil Pump/Fans - Cooling system AC supply
of forced ventilation, when the
pumps from the - Oil-forced control system - Malfunction of buttonholes in Remote Command voltage
temperature of the oil / winding
temperature evaluation - Oil pump valve - Problem in connection circuit - Forced pumps oil flow
reaches the user settled limits
- Problem in command, motor or wiring - Status of the oil pumps (on / off)
- Problem with the temperature sensor
- Fin / radiator - Problem in control of oil pumps
- Transformer (3 phases) load
- Cooling Air - Deterioration of components
current
- Oil Pump - Clogging
- Oil pumps motor current
- Oil winding channels - Inappropriate Closing
To efficiently dissipate the heat - Fans motor current
Keep temperature rises - Ventilation stages / engine - Impurities in the air
generated in the core and active part, - Cooling system AC power
and oil windings switches - Bad initial sizing - Inefficient Cooling of Active
keeping temp rises of oil and voltage
incompatible with the - Ventilation control circuit - Malfunction of oil pumps Part
windings compatible with the applied - Forced pumps oil flow
applied load, ambient - Oil pump engine - Presence of sludge - Inadequate Oil Flow
loads, via natural convection, forced - Ambient temperature
temperature and the type of - Fan engine - Problem of power supply Through the Pumps
ventilation (one or more stages), - Winding temperature (thermal
cooling - Insulating oil - Lubrication problem
forced circulation of oil imaging)
- Oil-forced control system - Problem in bearings
- Top oil temperature
- Cooling oil pipes - Problem in fan blades
- Bottom oil temperature
- Oil pump valve - Problem in circuit electric connection
- Cooling / Fans status (on / off)
- Fan (Mechanical) - Problem in the fans control system
- Power supply inoperative
- Inappropriate valve closure by human - Oil pumps motor current
- AC cooling power supply
- Problem in command or wiring - Inefficient Cooling of Active - Cooling system AC supply
- Oil pump
Maintains no oil circulation - Problem of the motor or circuit Part voltage
- Oil pump engine
in the active part connecting the oil pump - Inadequate Flow of Oil - Forced pumps oil flow
- Oil-forced control system
- Problem in control system Through Pumps - Status of the oil pumps (on / off)
- Oil pump valve
- Bearing Problem
Keep the oil flowing in the cooling,
- Locked rotor
active part and cooling system, with
- Power supply inoperative
adequate flow and without
- Deterioration of components
generating excessive buildup of - AC cooling power supply
- Problem in the control system pumps
electrostatic charge due to the - Oil Pump
- Pipe obstruction - Oil pumps motor current
operation of the oil forced circulation - Oil winding Channels
- Inappropriate valve closure by human - Cooling system AC supply
Does not keep the forced - Selector switch forced oil - Inadequate Flow of Oil
- Bad electrical contact terminations voltage
oil flowing properly - Oil pump engine Through Pumps
- Bad initial sizing - Forced pumps oil flow
- Oil-forced control system
- Internal lubrication problem - Status of the oil pumps (on / off)
- Oil Pipe
- Problem in command, wiring or pump
- Oil pump valve
motor
- Bearings problem
8
Table A.4 – Transformer Functional Subsystem “Bushings”

(only primary functions and functional failures that can be characterized throught continuous on-line condition monitoring data)
Functional Subsystem: Bushings

- Low gas density gas
- Low oil impregnation
- Oil contamination by moisture
- Metallic particle contamination
- Short circuit (results in increased
capacitance)
- Corrosive sulfur contamination
- Main bushing conductor bushing
- Dynamic stresses
(lead)
- Excess carbonization
- Porcelain / polymer insulator
- Ground Fault
Provide internal and external - Test derivation
- Lack of potential equalization
electrical isolation to the bushings, Excess in leakage current - Paper core insulation of - Capacitance and tan-delta
- Insufficient oil
isolating the passage of the central between the inner condenser bushings (condenser - Insulation Deterioration - Leakage current
- Air / moisture penetration
conductor without arcing, partial conductor of the bushing core) (internal/external) - Bushing voltage from capacitive
- Loss of tightness
discharges and excessive leakage and casing - Insulating Oil coupler
- Leaking oil
currents occurrence - Resin insulation
- Surface polymerization
- SF6 insulation
- Folds in the paper
- Capacitive tap
- Presence of bubbles
- Conductor
- Presence of sludge
- Overheating (thermal instability)
- Bushing overcurrent
- Surges above the insulation capacity
- Cracks and insulting surface
deformations
- Loose connections
9
Table A.5 – Transformer Functional Subsystem “OLTC”

(only primary functions and related functional failures that can be characterized throught continuous on-line condition monitoring data)
Functional Subsystem: OLTC

- Internal defect or foreign agent
- Loose connections
- Component wear
- Status of the end of course
- Slack excess or misalignment of
(operation completion signal)
- AC power voltage shafts or engine gearbox
- Actuation of command keys /
- Gearbox(rods, shafts, gears) - Mechanical failure
button holes (event signal)
- Electric limit switch - Coupling failure
- Motor driving current
- Mechanical limit switch - Failed drive system
- Current accumulated in
- Reversing switch - Threshold limit misfit - Motor Drive Mechanism
Does not triggers the individual taps (load current)
- Remote selector switch - Fails when requested Abnormality
switching under remote or - Shaft torque curve of the engine
/pushbutton - Degradation of insulation between - Abnormal Automatic
local control switch (drive speed)
- Compensating circuitforvoltage contacts Operation
- Tap position indicator
drop control - Deteriorated
- AC supply voltage
- Internal electrical connections - Lack of contact
- Number of accumulated
- OLTC triggering device - Clearance
changes on each tap
Provide local or remote drive - Driving motor - Component failure
- Total number of operations of
(automatic or manual) only and - Degradation of fixing
the OLTC
when demanded, switching the taps - Lack of power to the drive motor
step by step and stopping the engine - Ineffectiveness
in both directions at the end of the
tap change switching - Status of the end of course
- Under-voltage (operation completion signal)
- Misalignment between axes - Motor driving current
- AC power voltage - Excessive friction in the movement - Current accumulated in
- Gearbox (rods, shafts, gears) - Excessive clearances individual taps (load current)
- Diverter Switch - Inability to drive - Shaft torque curve of the
- Electrical limit switch - Operation impossibility - Motor Drive Mechanism engine switch (motor drive)
Does not commute the taps - Mechanical limit switch - Threshold limit misfit Abnormality - Tap position indicator
step by step - Compensating circuit for voltage - Fails when requested - Abnormal Automatic - RMS phase-to-earth
drop control - Switching mechanism problem Operation transformer voltage (3 phases -
- Driving motor - Component misfit primary / secondary / tertiary)
- Automatic voltage regulator - Degradation of fixing - Number of accumulated
(Relay 90) - Ineffectiveness changes on each tap
- Insufficient torque - Total number of operations of
- Fails when requested the OLTC

Operate the OLTC with appropriate - Under-voltage
- AC supply voltage - Inadequate speed in Taps individual taps (load current)
speed so that the switching times of - Misalignment
Shows inadequate drive - Gearbox (rods, shafts, gears) Switching - Shaft torque curve of the engine
the taps change are as specified, - Inadequate lubrication
speed - Driving motor - Motor Drive Mechanism switch (drive speed)
stopping the movement at the - Degradation of fixing
Abnormality - Tap position indicator
switching end limit - Insufficient torque
changes on each tap
10

- Total number of operations of
the OLTC
- Degradation of fixing
- Threshold limit misfit
- Mechanical wear
- Deterioration of electrical contact
surface (abrasion)
Does not interrupts the - Electrical limit switch (operation completion signal)
- Failure by internal defect or foreign - Abnormality in End of
movement of the mechanism - Mechanical limit switch - New position for the tap after
agent Course
at the right point (end limit) - OLTC Brakes switching (tap target)
- Fails when requested
- Threshold limit misfit
- Component misfit do component
- Blade damping damaged
Does not block electrically or
mechanically the oltc - Electrical limit switch - Threshold limit misfit
- Abnormality in End of (operation completion signal)
movement at the end of each - Mechanical limit switch - Command failure
Course - Number of accumulated
series of operations - Fails when requested
changes on each tap
(operation completion signal)
- RMS phase-to-earth
Incorrect / Wrong tap - Internal failure or foreign agent
- Electrical limit switch - Abnormal Voltage transformer voltage (3 phases -
switching - Wrong acting
- Mechanical limit switch Regulation primary / secondary / tertiary)
- Process error
To control the transformer bus changes on each tap
voltage between preset limits by - Total number of operations of
automatic switching of taps, the OLTC
regulating the flow of power to the - Open circuit
circuit - Compensating circuit for voltage - Insulation degradation
Inadequate bus voltage
drop control - Threshold limit misfit - Abnormal Voltage
control - AC supply voltage
- Automatic voltage regulator - Improper not solicited performance Regulation
(Relay 90) - Component failure
- Compensating circuit for voltage
Total lack of bus voltage - Threshold limit misfit
drop control - Abnormal Voltage
control - Component failure - AC supply voltage
- Automatic voltage regulator Regulation
(Relay 90)
Store / Contain / Barring the total Shows insulating oil leakages
- OLTC seals / gaskets - Wear of outer surface - Low Oil Level - OLTC Oil level
volume of oil inside OLTC at an
appropriate level, without leaks in
valves, bolts, welds, gaskets,
Shows insufficient oil level - OLTC external tank - Oil leakage - Low Oil Level - OLTC Oil level
flanges, gaskets or oil pumps (P)
Prevent moisture and oxygen - Dehumidifier or Air Dryer (Silica - Silica gel contamination
penetration through gaskets, Does not prevent the Gel) - Degradation of the absorption
- Moisture content in the oil
membranes, bag, silica gel, penetration of moisture - OLTC filter element/unit capacity of silica gel - Excessive Oil Moisture
- Oil filter pressure
dehumidifier and filter, maintaining and/or oxygen into the OLTC - Adsorbing filter - Excess of environmental moisture
compatible H2O and O2levels - OLTC seals / gaskets - Internal accumulated dirt
11

- Gradual loss of absorption capacity
- Contamination of the filter element
- Aging of the filter element
- Filter saturation
- Loss of tightness
To provide electrical oil isolation to
the limits imposed by the dielectric Oil does not adequately
- OLTC insulating oil - Oil contamination - Oil Dielectric Degradation - Moisture content in the oil
minimum characteristics isolate energized parts
- Oil degradation by hydrolysis (water

- Partial Discharges - Oil temperature (diverter switch
Presents isolation deficiency penetration into the oil))
- OLTC insulating oil - Oil Dielectric Degradation and compartment)
between the switching - Excess moisture (Class II Only)
- OLTC pre-selector - Internal Insulation - Gas sensor in insulating oil
contacts - Overheating
To provide adequate electrical Degradation - Moisture content in the oil
- Insulation degradation
insulation inside the tap changers
Shows cooking in the - Oil temperature (diverter switch
as to minimize the effects of arcing, - Contacts Cooking (diverter
contacts of the diverter - Main switching / arch contacts - Contacts carbonization and compartment)
maintain levels of partial discharges, switch)
switch - Gas sensor in insulating oil
cooking and resistance of the
- Oil temperature (diverter switch
contacts within the standard patterns
and compartment)
Shows cooking in the
- Contacts Cooking - Gas sensor in insulating oil
selector / pre-selector - Transition contacts - Contacts misfit
(selector/pre-selector) - Current accumulated in
contacts
individual taps (load current)
Resistors or reactors does - Open or with bad contact
- Transition reactor or resistor - Abnormality in Transition individual taps (load current)
To limit the current during switching not sufficiently limit the - Bad initial sizing
(bridging) Impedance - Shaft torque curve of the engine
between taps in accordance with switched current - Overheating
switch (drive speed)
standards / project by the use of
- Shaft torque curve of the engine
limiting resistors or reactors after the Does not inserts limiting
- Broken mechanism - Abnormality in Transition switch (drive speed)
taps pre-selection resistors or reactors - Diverter Switch
- Bad initial sizing Impedance - Total number of operations of
the OLTC
- Cables and connection - Current accumulated in
There is no current after - Broken conductor
conductors (leads) individual taps (load current)
To conduct steady state currents switching is completed (open - Connection degradation - Open circuit
- Internal electrical connections - OLTC current (transformer
with values smaller or equal than its circuit) - Bad contact
- Derivations selector winding)
project nomimal current,without
- Failed electrical contact
overheating larger than the
- Diverter Switch - High contact resistance
maximum temperature allowed for Shows excessive
- Internal electrical connections - Cooling problem - Abnormal Overheating (in - Oil temperature (diverter switch
the temperature class and without overheating when conducting
- Transition contacts - High contact resistance the OLTC) and compartment)
excessive vibration current
- Main switching / arch contacts - Reduced pressure
- Bad contact
12
Table A.6 – Defect Analysis Names and Suggested Common Codes (for Tables A1-A5)
Subsystem Analysis Code Defect Analysis Name

PTR_ARC - Electric Arc (in the tank)
PTR_PDS - Partial Discharges (in the tank)
Active Part (Tab. A.1) PTR_COH - Conductor Overheating (in the tank)
PTR_EOM - Excessive Oil Moisture (in the tank)
PTR_WPD - Abnormal Winding Paper Degradation
Oil Containment and PTR_LOL - Low Oil Level (in the tank)
Preservation PTR_BMR - Bag / Membrane Rupture
(Tab. A.2)
PTR_EOM - Excessive Oil Moisture (in the tank)
PTR_RPF - Refusal of Oil Pump/Fans in Remote Command
Cooling (Tab. A.3) PTR_ICA - Inefficient Cooling of Active Part
PTR_IOF - Inadequate Oil Flow Through the Pumps
Bushings (Tab. A.4) BSH_ISD - Insulation Deterioration (internal/external)
LTC_MDA - Motor Drive Mechanism Abnormality
LTC_AAO - Abnormal Automatic Operation
LTC_ITS - Inadequate Speed in Taps Switching
LTC_AEC - Abnormality in End of Course
LTC_AVR - Abnormal Voltage Regulation
LTC_LOL - Low Oil Level (in the OLTC)
LTC_EOM - Excessive Oil Moisture (in the OLTC)
OLTC (Tab. A.5) LTC_ODD - Oil Dielectric Degradation
LTC_PDS - Partial Discharges (in OLTC)
LTC_IID - Internal Insulation Degradation
LTC_CCD - Contacts Cooking (diverter switch)
LTC_CCS - Contacts Cooking (selector/pre-selector)
LTC_ATI - Abnormality in Transition Impedance
LTC_OCT - Open Circuit
LTC_AOH - Abnormal Overheating (in the OLTC)
13
Table A.7 – On-line Continuous Inputs Need to perform the Table A.6 Analysis
Subsystem Measured on-line continuous values (inputs)

- Rate of change and total gas (primarily H2) dissolved in the oil
- 8 gases dissolved in oil (single measurement)
-Load current transformer (3 phases)
-Short-circuit current of the transformer (disturbance of the 3 phases
-Peak voltage of the transformer surge
Active Part (Tab. A.1)
- Primary / secondary / tertiary voltages (3 phases)
-Winding temperature (thermal imaging)
-Top oil temperature
-Moisture (and temperature) in oil tank
- Membrane rupture detector actuation
- Partial discharges measurement (electric, UHF, acoustic)
- Oil level sensor in the tank
- Membrane rupture detector actuation
Oil Containment and Preservation
- Moisture and temperature in oil
(Tab. A.2)
- Ambient Moisture
- N2 pressure level of the transformer
- Oil pumps motor current
- Cooling system AC supply voltage
- Forced pumps oil flow
- Status of the oil pumps (on / off)
- Transformer (3 phases) load current
Cooling (Tab. A.3) - Fans motor current
- Ambient temperature
- Winding temperature (thermal imaging)
- Top oil temperature
- Bottom oil temperature
- Cooling / Fans status (on / off)
- Capacitance and tan-delta
Bushings (Tab. A.4) - Leakage current
- Bushing voltage from capacitive coupler
- Status of the end of course (operation completion signal)
- Actuation of command keys / buttonholes (event signal)
- Current accumulated in individual taps (load current)
- Shaft torque curve of the engine switch (drive speed)
- AC supply voltage
- Number of accumulated changes on each tap
- Total number of operations of the OLTC
OLTC (Tab. A.5)
- RMS phase-to-earth transformer voltage (3 phases - primary /
secondary / tertiary)
- New position for the tap after switching (tap target)
- OLTC Oil level
- Oil temperature (diverter switch and compartment)
- Gas sensor in insulating oil
- Moisture content in the oil
- Oil filter pressure
- OLTC current (transformer winding)
14
ANNEX B
15
ANNEX B - IEC 61850 LOGICAL NODES FOR MONITORING
The following example (Table B.1) shows relevant Logical Nodes (LN) for Transformer and Tap Changer
Monitoring related to the actual standard of IEC 61850-90-3 and IEC 61850-7-4 ed. 2. The modulation of any
monitoring case can be different. So the content depends on the requirements of the specific environment of
transformer equipment and the substation. A Logical Node describes the physical value together with its common
data class (cdc).
An Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) is represented by:

- Logical Nodes,
- Data
- Data attributes
which are a part of a designated data class.
For the complete definition of any used abbreviations see IEC 61850-2 Ed. 2:
LN Logical Node
cdc Common Data Class always in combination with the data attribute
Example:
The load current of a transformer should be displayed:
ATCC loada, MV
- LN is ATCC (Automatic Tap Change Control)
- Loada is the Common Data Class, here load current phase A
- MV is the data attribute, here the measured value
Further Logical Nodes (see IEC 61850 Ed. 2) are useful for transformer condition monitoring:
SLTC Tap Changer supervision

SIML Insulation medium supervision
YLTC Tap changer control
CCGR Cooling group control
TFLW Liquid flow
SPTR Power transformer supervision
YPTR Power transformer control
ZBSH Bushing
16
Table B.1: Logical Nodes (LN) for Transformer and Tap Changer Monitoring related to the actual standard
of IEC 61850-90-3 and IEC 61850-7-4 ed. 2
17
The data mapping in IEC 61850 environment requires seamless architecture for data transmission as presented in
Figure B.1.
18
Figure B.1: Object and data mapping and seamless integration architecture [19][51] Future energy grid.
19
ANNEX C
20
ANNEX C – WG WORLDWIDE SURVEY
Overview on TFO monitoring experience – Results from a Worldwide Survey
This section contains selected results from the survey performed by the working group to identify experience in
using transformer monitoring worldwide.
The goals of the “Survey on TFO on-line Continuous Monitoring Experience” was to identify current practices
used for monitoring, and experience related to operation, cases, events, data, reliability and benefits.
In total 32 answers have been received from Europe, Americas, Asia and Australia and the results are shown in the
sections below, where Q2, Q3 etc. represent the question number from this survey. Question graphs presented are
accompanied usually by a short text representing the opinion of the working group.
Q2 - Experience
Question: What is your company’s experience with TFO monitoring?
WG opinion: the results show that the respondent companies have stronger experience with temperature and
DGA monitoring, followed by cooling systems and bushings monitoring. Monitoring of PD is not so common.
Q3 –Data inputs
Question: Data inputs interfaces and signals.
21
WG opinion: The data inputs indicated by respondents reflect the needs for monitoring main tank: temperature,
gas and moisture in oil and bushings (tan-delta) as important used data input for monitoring Partial discharges and
vibrations, e.g. for OLTC are also mentioned,
Q5 - Protocols
Question: Data transfer protocols used.
WG opinion: The IEC 61850 is the dominating data transfer protocol used by respondents. DNP3 are reflecting
especially the situation in North America installations, while Modbus and Profibus more the European situation.
Q6 - Data input interfaces and signals
Question: Data input interfaces and signals from sensors
22
WG opinion: The input interfaces of monitoring devices and the signals from sensors, as reflected in the
responses, show a mixed practice employing analog and digital signals. These could well reflect the historical
evolution of installations in monitoring and in substations.
Q7, 8, 9 – Data storage and location
Question 7: Where/how is monitoring data permanently stored
Question 8: Monitoring data amount per transformer in a year, which is permanently stored on monitoring device
Question 9: Data amount per transformer in a year, which is permanently stored for future use centrally in the
network
23
WG opinion: The two dominant cases of data storage are on the monitoring device and remotely in the utility; later
seem to be slightly more often the case. Also some storage is reported on substation level. The data amounts of
data stored permanently on the monitoring devices are typically pretty small (50MB) while considerably more data
(couple of hundreds of MB) are stored permanently on a central location for future use.
Q10, 11, 12 – Data storage and use
Question 10: How is data stored and used over time?

Question 11: What data format is used for permanent data storage?
Question 12: Is data export possible and which format?
24
WG opinion: The storage and use of data over time is an essential aspect and it was reflected in questions 10, 11
and 12.
Present practices regarding data storage are characterized by 3 main aspects:

- Data is stored most often locally for quick access to monitored data. The data is stored as such for typically
1-2 years
- Data is archived typically as is, i.e. as it was recorded without any processing.
- Alarms from the monitoring devices are permanently stored.
- The most often used data stored are databases and only in few cases files are used.
Data collected form monitoring systems is practically always exported for future use. The preferred export format
for future use is Excel, however exports can also be done in XML, csv or any other including COMTRADE
conventions.
11 - Data format for Storage

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Binary files Ascii files Database
25
12 - Data Export and Format

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Yes No XLS CSV TXT
Q13 – Data access
Question: Access to Monitoring System/Data
WG opinion: The access to monitoring system data is possible predominantly remotely, and only few cases
allowed local-only access directly connecting to the device.
The remote access data from monitoring systems weather from central location, or from inside substation via
SCADA systems has to consider the cyber security concerns and threats.
Q14 – Data visualization
Question: Data visualization
26
WG opinion: The remote data access and visualization is used in the majority of cases, however at the same time
data visualization local monitoring device and in substation is also used on demand.
Q15 – Data analysis/processing
Question: Access to Monitoring System/Data
WG opinion: The TFO on-line continuous monitoring data is analyzed. Most often this is done remotely and it is
access by the responsible or specific department in utilities on demand, in special cases or after alarms and
warnings. Local analysis of the data by the monitoring system itself is also used. This allows having local
information for decisions on site and also reduces the data transport and processing to/at remote locations.
Q16 – Data security
Question: Data security related to monitoring data
27
WG opinion: The responses of the survey indicate that there is awareness of aspects related to TFO-monitoring
data security. In most cases the security aspects are handled by the utility network data security policies. A
complex situation result in case data has to be accessed / exchanged across departments.
Q17 – Service/maintenance for the monitoring system
Question: How is the Service/Maintenance of installed monitoring systems done?
WG opinion: Maintenance and life considerations of TFO-monitoring systems are related to their intrinsic more
reduced lifetime than of a power transformer. Current practices reported by respondents indicate the use of own
staff for servicing monitoring installations. Remote access for service comes into discussion most often for
software/firmware updates.
Q18 – Monitoring system reliability
Question: Experience – reliability of the monitoring system.
28
WG opinion: The reliability of TFO-monitoring systems has been reported as mainly good of fair. Some cases
have been found out from users where failures stem from auxiliary installation part such as power supplies and not
form monitoring device itself.
Q19 – Motivation to install monitoring systems
Question: What is your motivation to install transformer monitoring systems?
WG opinion: Main incentives reported have been the increase in system reliability followed by reduction in
maintenance costs. High ranked are also aspects often encountered in practice related to the extension of
transformer lifetime or keeping a TFO operational until the replacement is delivered to substation. Fleet
assessment aspects and benefits in case of more advantageous insurance contracts can be mentioned.
Q20 – Company policy regarding installation of Mon Sys
Question: What is the strategy or policies of your company (utility) regarding installation of Transformer monitoring
systems?
29
WG opinion: The utility internal strategies regarding TFO-monitoring systems have a strong impact on the
installations. Predominant case is to always have from the beginning TFO-monitoring systems for new and
important transformers. On majority of installed and running units installation on demand is the main case.
Q21 - Users of Transformer monitoring systems
Question: Who are the main users of transformer monitoring systems and data?
WG opinion: The use of data and alarms/warnings from monitoring systems by maintenance and asset
management is expected. It will be interesting follow the use of the information content from TFO-monitoring
systems in current operation especially with increasing requirements and constraints in future grids.
Q22, 23, 24 – Commissioning and training
The Q22, Q23, Q24 group of questions has addressed the aspects related to the way commissioning, tests and
training is done at monitoring systems installations.
Question results are shown in short below:
30
Who does it: own staff, subcontractors or manufacturers – responses indicate that in most cases it is done by own
staff;
How is the functionality test done: predominant response was that it is done by following the manufacturer’s
checklist.
How is the training done: responses indicate that in most cases it is done at station/site by monitoring system
vendor, often at least 8 hours, and it is attended by maintenance operator and station engineers.
WG opinion: Well performed commissioning, tests and training has positive results avoiding miss-operation, better
understanding results and alarms delivered and leads to a better and more effective use of the monitoring system.
Retraining should be done at least at updates or every 2 years.
31
ANNEX D
32
ANNEX D – TRANSFORMER MONITORING CASES EXAMPLES
Monitoring Cases Examples
This section will present a few selected monitoring cases examples with focus on data and access and usability.
These four cases described in the annex are dealing with:
Case1 - Transformer with gas in oil and moisture monitoring of features

- Case1-1: Transformer with gas in oil and moisture monitoring - Shunt reactor 400kV, 55MVAr, 6 years
- Case1-2: Transformer with gas in oil and moisture monitoring - 220/132kV single phase transformer, 40
years
Case2 – Monitoring with multi-gas observations

- Case 2: Monitoring substation transformer with multi-gas analyzer
Case3 - Monitoring case with focus on bushing transformer

- Case3-1: Monitoring case with focus on bushing 430 kV
- Case3-2: Monitoring case with focus on bushing failure with fast evolution
Case4 – Monitoring for OLTC

- Case 4-1: Monitoring case with focus on OLTC heavy, “non-standard” operation due to network conditions
- Case4-2: Monitoring case with - tap changer torque monitoring
The details are gathered in a standard systematical template-like set of details such that each case describes:
- The monitoring system and installation, in substation, industrial, power plant etc.
 What subsystem or physical chemical aspect was supervised e.g. TFO, OLTC, gases in oil, PD
 Interfaces used for the monitoring system
 Standards which apply to the installation, e.g. 61850
 Data aspects such as amount, data storage, data access local or remote
 Visualization of results analysis, security aspects considered etc.
- The service history of the monitoring system and reliability of hardware, software , sensors, malfunctions
e.g. false alarms, cables or EMC aspects in case apply
- The avoided critical situations if they apply
- Lessons learned
33
Case 1 - transformer with gas in oil and moisture monitoring of features
Case1–1: Transformer with gas in oil and moisture monitoring - Shunt reactor 400kV, 55MVAr, 6 years
1. Describe the monitoring system and installation
A gas-in-oil and moisture-in-oil monitoring system. A monitoring system following the composite value of
gases dissolved in oil and moisture in oil. Attached to shunt reactor 400kV, 55MVAr
The main data of the system are the following:
o TFO Location type: substation

o Supervision: gas in oil, moisture in oil
o Years in operation TFO monitoring system: 6 years
o Years in operation TFO: 6 years
o Input from sensors: thermometers, gas and moisture sensors in oil
o Interfaces and signals: interfaces 4-20mA, 485, TCP/IP,
o Standards: IEC 104, DNP3
o Data amount: <20MB, locally stored or remotely in utility systems
o Storage: Local storage, remote storage
o Access: Remote access over FO, S/S LAN, modem
o Data visualization: local, remote
o Data analysis: local, remote
o Data security: standard security measures of the company computer network (LAN/WAN), network
related
2. Service history of the monitoring system
o False alarms
- Software alarms coming from gas or moist daily or hourly trends,
- Seldom sensor problems – sensor needs replacing
o Reliability of software - OK, firmware built in the monitor, special electronic cards used for computing
models and LAN communication.
o Reliability of hardware - OK, seldom sensor replacing necessary
3. Avoided critical situation(s):
Gassing in a 400kV shunt reactor – frequent sampling decided, 8-gas nursing monitor connected, gas values
continued increasing. After some weeks SR was taken out of service and sent to manufacturer for repair.
Real incipient failure detection! The shunt reactor is used for reactive power compensation / voltage
regulation in one of the biggest substations with high amount of incoming generated power. Loss of the rector
could cause problems with voltage regulation and increased losses in the network. The shunt reactor is used
irregularly according to the needs of network (some 20% of time).
4. Lessons learned
Combining information from gas monitors with operational data from SCADA may bring lot of value in fault
detection or investigation.
34
Case1–2: Transformer with gas in oil and moisture monitoring - 220/132kV single phase transformer, 40
years
Transformer 220/132kV, single-phase, placed in a Substation. The transformer has almost 40 years in
operation. It’s placed in a critical point of the grid.
It has a Gas in oil, temperature and moisture monitoring system based in continuous on-line measurement.
The sensor is placed in the bottom side of the main tank. The measurements are made via a fuel cell type
sensor behind a gas permeable membrane in contact with mineral transformer insulating oil through a
flooded manifold.
The monitoring system measures basically three parameters:

 Temperature of the oil in the measured point.
 H2O content in oil.
 DGA (mixture of gases).
The main data of the system are the following:
o TFO Location type: Substation

o Supervision: Gas in oil and moisture on-line monitoring system, OLTC.
o Years in operation TFO monitoring system: 6
o Years in operation TFO: 39 at installation, 45 at replacement
o Input from sensors: Moisture, mixture of gases in oil, temperature.
o Interfaces and signals: as in this case used
o Standards: Proprietary protocol
o Data amount: once per day, main store remotely in a centralized system. Backup secondary store on
the equipment.
o Storage: main store remotely in a centralized system. Backup secondary store on the equipment.
o Access: Remote access over modem. Local via direct cable connection..
o Data visualization: Local & remote
o Data analysis: Remote
o Data security: Network related
False alarms - One internal error alarm of the equipment was set due to a malfunctioning of its protection
relay, not from the measuring equipment itself.
Reliability of software - The reliability of the software is rather good, but with some problems.The
software performs a routine of phone calls to the different modems of the different substations. Sometimes,
the routine is suddenly interrupted causing problems in the data acquisition and storage. In those cases, a
manual reset is needed.
Reliability of hardware - The reliability of the hardware is also rather good. Among the population of
sensors, the main problems found were related to the reliability of AC energy source of the equipment.
The transformer is placed in a very critical node of the grid. Last failure in this node made a big outage in this
substation and partly in others with an amount of 170000 clients affected and a loss of 136MW in power.
A monitoring system has been installed on a critical aged transformer with a not very good condition. The
transformer was planned to be replaced in some years. The aim of the monitoring system was to prevent an
unexpected internal failure in the transformer which can cause a big blackout in the grid.
35
Oil Filtering process Oil treatment process Allowed time for

(28-4-08) (04-12-10) replacement
Figure D.1: On-line monitoring measurements. Mixture gases in oil.
Some additional periodic DGA tests in laboratory were performed in order to discriminate the evolution of
each gas in oil. Those tests showed that the gases were mainly hydrogen.
Figure D.2: Laboratory off-line measurements. Hydrogen.
The good performance of the system has made possible to maintain this transformer working in a critical
place of the network, in a controlled condition, during a specific term, resulting in life prolongation of 6 years.
The lifetime of the transformer has been increased several years, optimizing its maintenance activities, until
its final replacement. The maintenance operations were performed in a condition-based maintenance policy
according to the level of gases measured in the transformer.
After replacement of the equipment, an internal inspection has been performed on the active part of the
transformer. Some marks of discharges (partial discharges) were detected on the isolation.
8. Lessons learned
The monitoring systems are not only useful to be installed in new transformers but also for older transformers
with a suspicious general condition. By this way, the decision of the asset managers and the maintenance
staff are made with a bigger accuracy. This is very important to consider in cases of critical transformers or
36
specific transformers were the asset manager needs to take special care. The real lifetime can be much
longer than expected.
In this case, a periodic follow up off-line measurements in laboratory were performed in order to verify the
reliability of the monitoring system. The results showed that, in terms of trends, the measurements of this
system were fully validated. In terms of absolute value, some slight differences were found between
monitoring and laboratory test.
At ordering time, it’s very important to clarify which are the consumable parts of the systems, which are the
periods of expected lifetime, and which is the price of it. It’s very usual to ignore these kind of items while a
monitoring systems business case is performed.
During mounting, it’s crucial to follow up accurately the manufacturer instructions of the different sensors in
order to have a representative measurement. Generally, manufacturer guaranties a correct measurement
only in the same conditions as it has been tested. If there are differences, they should be considered and
dealt with the manufacturer in advance.
After commissioning, it’s suitable to let the system “work alone” for a period of time before setting alarms on
it. In every commissioning, an adaptation period should be respected. It includes the stabilization of the
measurements, the purge of the possible disturbances, and the establishment of an initial patern of behavior
of the transformer. Once it’s made, the intelligence will be added to the system, not only in terms of absolute
values of measurements or indicators, but also in terms of trending.
37
Case 2: Monitoring with multi-gas analyzer
1. Transformer Monitoring Case: Monitoring transmission S/S TFO by multi-gas analyzer
2. Monitoring system and installation
o TFO Location type: Transmission substation transformers are selected for on-line dissolved gas
monitoring based on known family problems, likelihood of a failure resulting in tank breach, and
criticality to the network. Regular meetings are held between National Grid and the Electrical Test/DGA
Interpretation contract holders, at which electrical testing and DGA evidence is used to decide which
transformers to monitor on-line. Around 60 transformers are monitored at any one time.
o Supervision: Transformer oil and tap changer oil.
o Years in operation monitoring system:The system has been operating since 2004.
o Years in operation: depend on the TFO
o Input from sensors: Dissolved gas is monitored using one of four types of unit. Two types of
composite gas analyzers are set to record every 15 minutes, while a 9-component multi gas analyzer
captures data every one to four hours. An 8-component multi gas unit captures data every 20 minutes.
o Interfaces and signals: Data from all analyzers is collected to a central data warehouse repository
using cellular technologies.
o Standards Both 3G and GPRS are used, depending on the site.
o Data amount The multi gas analyzer generates approximately 9MB of data per year. Monitoring is
applied to approximately 60 transformers. This data is stored remotely in the utility’s data warehouse.
o Storage: All data is ultimately stored remotely, but there is some local storage to mitigate connection
difficulties. The current generation of substation gateway has significant local storage, whereas older
systems will continue to retry connections to the server.
o Access: Data is accessible through multiple interfaces to the utility’s data warehouse. A website gives
visual access to engineers. Cellular SMS (text messages) are used to alert key engineers. Alarm pods
are taken to sites inside risk management hazard zones, which give visual and audible warning of
severe issues.
o Data visualization: Remote (web and SMS) and local (alarm pods)
o Data analysis: All data analysis is performed remotely, on the server. Alarms are set on gas level
thresholds and percentage rate of change, which result in an SMS being sent to engineers both within
the utility and the Electrical Test / DGA Interpretation contract holders. For a minor rise in gas levels,
the thresholds will be revised and the system will be more closely monitored for further activity. If the
rise is significant and is predominantly ethylene (e.g. 100ppm in 6 hours), the transformer will be
removed from service for investigation.
o Data security: Currently security is intrinsic to the network, since the cellular uploads of data are uni-
directional and encoded with a bespoke compression protocol. The next generation of substation
gateway implements further security measures, and this is currently deployed at trial sites.
o False alarms - Most of the alarms are due to rising gas levels breaching the threshold settings on the
server, these are of course ‘real’. False alarms are generated occasionally as a result of analyzer
issues such as a void analysis, due to external issues which lead to a single very high peak (or a zero)
gas value. In such a case, the next result returns to normal levels. This sequence will often raise a gas
alarm ‘high’, or due to a large increase from zero to ‘normal’ a %change alarm. Mostly these are dealt
with by requiring non-critical gases to give at least 2 or 3 results at the same concentration before
generating an alarm. Causes have been analyzer component failure, contamination of ambient air with
gases from close proximity sources, sewerage, engines etc.
o Reliability of software - The server based system has been successfully implemented for nearly 10
years. It has been organically grown to take on more systems, new technology and vast expansion.
Due to great care and a very hands-on development, plus excellent working relationship with the
provider, the system has been extremely reliable with only one fault for a few hours due to a
unexpected data rate upload problem whereby the onsite data system was sending a continuous
stream of data at millisecond resolution. A buffer over-run caused the server to freeze. Mitigation is in
place to prevent this type of accident occurring again.
38
o Reliability of hardware - Generally the % ‘uptime’ of the entire analytical systems is in the high 90s for
DGA systems. There have been problems with hardware, but it tends to be a systematic problem that
occurs, so we can plan ahead to manage the faults and minimize downtime.
In one particular case, a multi-gas analyzer was installed on the transformer main tank, due to its family type
and a slight DGA signature rise in ethylene. A rise in ethylene, methane, and ethane was observed, with no
corresponding rise in acetylene. The ethylene increase triggered a %change alarm, with a 100ppm rise
occurring exponentially over six days. The last six hours showed clear signs of a serious problem, and the
transformer was removed from service. Subsequent strip down of the tap changer revealed tiny winding
breakages that if left in service would have escalated to a full scale catastrophic fault, with associated fire,
collateral damage to surrounding assets, and risk to personnel. As a result, several high risk family members
were put under hourly on-line DGA analysis.
In a second incident, the multi-gas and composite gas analyzers both clearly showed a severe fault in the
main tank. Electrical testing showed no real evidence of a fault, and the recommendation was to return to
service. The transformer failed catastrophically after approximately six weeks, proving that both types of DGA
were far more sensitive to winding damage than electrical testing.
5. Lessons learned
In the future, we will be delivering a much higher degree of business network integrated data transport
facility. All data is to be transported back and forth on high security prioritized business WAN facilities using a
variety of transport media, including cellular. This will enable us to fully internalize our own data and easily
link gathered asset data with commercially sensitive network data.
Servicing is done either on a ‘Fault’ basis, or at the end of the monitoring mission. We run our analyzers at
the highest resolution possible. There is no scheduled servicing point as such, as, our general plan is that
any analyzer has an average mission time of 3-4 years. After this time it will be serviced and reused.
If the analyzer has a major fault before this time we repair it.
We do not have the luxury of ease of access to have a planned servicing intervals due to the nature of the
work the analyzers perform (Risk Mitigation). In a world where a car can have a 7 year warranty, we would
expect an analyzer to run for 3 years without intervention.
The use of cellular communications and a centralized utility data warehouse greatly simplifies the deployment
of this type of monitoring system. Firstly, the gas analyzers can be moved from site to site with changing
priorities and requirements, while still reporting data back to the central warehouse using the same hardware
and infrastructure. In addition, multiple personnel can derive the benefit of access to the data. This includes
engineers tasked with transformer monitoring through to ensuring the safety of personnel on site for reasons
other than transformer monitoring.
39
Case 3- Transformer with bushings monitoring
Case3-1: Monitoring case with focus on bushing 430kV
1. Transformer Monitoring , Bushing 430kV
o TFO Location type: Substation SE Taubaté, TR-2, 330 MVA, 430/230/13,2 kV
o Supervision: Bushing – 430 kV and 230 kV
o Years in operation TFO monitoring system: 5 year

o Years in operation TFO: 5 year
o Input from sensors: type of signals, sensor used, interfaces, etc.: Adapter installed in the capacitive
tap of the bushing
o Interfaces and signals: as in this case used.
The system uses the current signal coming out of the capacitive tap via adapters connected to the tap
bushing capacitive test, allowing the leakage current of the bushings is carried to the measuring module.
The leakage current of the three phases are connected in Y (star) and the system is monitoring the
unbalance through the displacement of the neutral because as the currents are 120°out of phase in the
sum is equal to zero. When a change in capacitance of the bushing, the neutral displacement occurs and
the system will capture this variation.The signal collected in the measuring module is sent via cellular
modem to an external server where the programs that store information, generate graphs and make the
necessary analyzes.
o Standards e.g. 61850..other
o Data amount locally stored and remotely in utility systems
o Storage: Local storage, remote storage
o Access: Remote access over modem cellular
o Data visualization: local and remote
o Data analysis: remote
o Data security: The data are only obtained by using login and password, enabling the traceability of
access
o False alarms
On 28/9/2009 the bushing 430kV phase Blue TR-2 of the SE Taubaté exploded. The bushing monitoring
system was installed on 05/07/2009 and has not issued an alarm before the explosion of the bushing.
o Reliability of software - The software was notable to identify the rise in a short time interval.The
software was designed with filters against spurious values that have response timeless than one day.
o Reliability of hardware - The system comprises a measuring module, an interface module and the
tap adapter to the respective interconnecting cables in the measurement module
40
After the occurrence analyzed the records of the monitoring system has found that 1 hour before the
explosion of the bushing occured a significant increase in the value of the current phase of the bushing Blue
nearing the end of the scale adjusted.The monitoring system has not issued an alarm by the fact that the
algorithm would only see this variation of the value after 24 hours have been maintained at the level
measured. As the explosion took place in just one hour after the change in capacitance value that time was
not enough to alarm the system.
Figure D.3: Leakage Current (mA) of 440kV bushings before and after the failure of the phase
extracted from the monitoring system.
5. Lessons learned
Since this occurrence indicated that there was a defect with rapid evolution, in conjuction with the
manufacturer of the monitoring system algorithms were developed to allow the identification of the rapid
evolution of faults, additional to defects of slow evolution that existed. In this modification, the monitoring
system was also modified to enable the implementation of actions that the user deems necessary, for
example, the withdrawal of the emergency service or transformer only issuance of alarms by the criteria
described.
41
Case3-2: Monitoring case with focus on bushing failure
1. Transformer Monitoring of bushing

o Supervision: Bushing
o Years in operation TFO monitoring system: 6years
o Years in operation TFO: 6 years
o Input from sensors: bushing test tap current
o Interfaces and signals: None
o Standards: 61850
o Data amount:
o Storage: local storage
o Access: Remote access none
o Data visualization: local visualization only
o Data analysis: none
o Data security: no
o False alarms - some false alarms
o Reliability of software - some false alarms
o Reliability of hardware - some false alarms
Bushing failed causing porcelain explosion, transformer tripped on protection relays, On investigation the
bushing monitor had detected a developing failure, hours before the failure occurred. As the IDD was not
alarmed externally from the device system, operators were not alerted to the developing fault.
5. Lessons learned
Outputs from on-line monitoring devices need to be made available to maintenance / operational personnel
(remotely) such that data from these devices can be interpreted and evasive action if required is taken.
42
Case 4 - Transformer with OLTC monitoring
Case 4.1 - Monitoring case with focus on OLTC with high number of operations
1. Transformer Monitoring Case: Tap changer with a high number of operations
A complex monitoring system following the majority of parameters electrical, temperatures, torque, contact
wear, loading etc.
Due to specific installation unusually numerous operations have been encountered, especially in the no-
load condition of the step-up transformer.
o TFO Location type: step-up transformer in a pump storage plant

o Supervision: OLTC
o Years in operation:TFO and Monitoring System, seven years
o Input from sensors: thermometer (diverter-switch, selector, transformer-oil, ambient), CT
o Interfaces and signals: trip and alarm contacts, Ethernet, wireless modem
o Standards: IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-101, -103, -104, DNP3.0 Level 2
o Data amount: 8 MB locally stored or remotely transferred in utility database
o Storage: Local on solid state flash memory
o Access: Remote access over FO, S/S LAN, modem,
o Data visualization: Local, remote on notebook desktop or substation control software
o Data analysis: Local, remote,
o Data security: Coded locally, standard security measures of the company computer network
(LAN/WAN), network related
o False alarms: no
o Reliability of software: good, no possible interventions from outside possible, display for service
access (password coded), no operating system, software self-monitoring by soft and hardware watch
dog
o Reliability of hardware: good, retrofit solution for older transformer, hardware special designed for
TFO environment, proven EMC-level are two times higher than the requirements in IEC 61000-4
Disturbance of the tap changer switching sequence.

In this case the service alarm was generated too early.
5. Lessons learned
- The dimensioning of both switch-over resistors was correct, but the tap changer made a lot operations in
no–load condition of the step-up transformer.
- In case of no–load operation of the diverter the circulating current between selected and pre-selected tap
will play the major role in wearing the diverter switch contacts. The operation practice should avoid no–load
operation of resistor type tap changer.
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Case 4.2 - Monitoring case with tap changer torque monitoring
3. Transformer Monitoring Case: Tap changer torque monitoring

A complex monitoring system following the majority of parameters electrical, temperatures, torque, contact
wear, loading etc.

o Supervision: Tap changer
o Years in operation TFO and monitoring system: one month
o Input from sensors: Thermometer (diverter-switch, selector, transformer-oil, ambient)CT, resolver
(selector movement), motor current, motor voltage
o Interfaces and signals: Trip and alarm contacts, Ethernet, wireless modem
o Standards: IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-101, -103, -104, DNP3.0 Level 2
o Data amount 8 MB locally stored or remotely transferred in utility data bank
o Storage: Local on solid state flash memory
o Access: Remote access over FO, S/S LAN, modem,
o Data visualization: Local, remote on notebook desktop or substation control software
o Data analysis: Local, remote,
o Data security: Coded locally, standard security measures of the company computer network
(LAN/WAN), network related
o False alarms:
- sometimes false alarms by wrong or poor data connection possible
-
o Reliability of software: good, no possible interventions from outside possible, display for service
access (password coded), no keyboard, no operating system, software self-monitoring by soft and
hardware watch-dog
o Reliability of hardware: good, special designed for transformer environment, proven EMC-level are
two times higher than the requirements in IEC 61000-4
Figure D.4: Rough-running changeover switch of the tap changer because of too much
force on leads to transformer regulating winding.
7. Lessons learned:
- Transformer design should pay more attention to the internal wiring of the regulating winding.
- Tap changer torque monitoring should become a part of the final transformer test in the factory and should
be one of the tests after transformer transportation.
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ANNEX E
45
ANNEX E – INTELLIGENT INTERPRETATION METHODS

This annex contains more detailed descriptions and supplementary examples for several topics developed in
Chapter 4. Number in each title refers to Chapter 4 topic section.
E1. Data Cleaning (4.3.1)
The removal of bad data points will result in more accurate behavioural modelling. As an example, consider
clustering of data, which reveals groups of data points. If the data set contains outliers, i.e. bad data resulting from
sensor or logging faults, the clustering algorithm will try to incorporate the outliers within the clusters. This can lead
to a model which poorly fits the true situation. See Figure E.1 comparing results of clustering analysis, both with
and without a bad data outlier.
Figure E.1: Outliers in data cause incorrect grouping of points.
One technique for cleaning of outliers, illustrated in Figure E.2, relies on visualisation of multivariate data, to group
several variables in a single model. Software tools can then be used to mark the outlier data and remove it from
subsequent processing. Often it is necessary to repeat the process a few times to obtain satisfactory results.
step 1 step 2
Figure E.2: Example of multi-step data cleaning (bad data in blue) using multivariate analysis
E2. Transformation and Feature Extraction (4.3.1)
Data transformation may broadly be separated into three categories of approaches: clustering, feature extraction,
and functional decomposition techniques. In each case, transformation aims to condense the raw data into a form
that can be more easily processed by a chosen interpretation technique.
Clustering can reveal groups of data points that represent similar behaviour or conditions. Some techniques can be
directed to find a specific number of clusters - one example being k-means - whereas others perform true density
estimation and reveal "neighbourhoods" of similar points (e.g. Self-Organising Maps). The first type is useful when
there are a defined number of conditions or fault modes. Self-Organising Maps can help with data visualisation and
46
mining, or in situations where there are very few data points belonging to a distinct cluster (see section 4.4.4 for an
example).
Clustering can be used either for dimensionality reduction, or as an interpretation technique. Figure E.3 shows two
dimensional insulator data (oxidation index and ester/ketone ratio) being reduced to one dimension (insulator
location). This can either be the end of the interpretation (leading on to some action), or the cluster information can
be used as input to further interpretation [11].
Figure E.3: Clustering analysis of insulator material condition
Instead of clustering the raw data, and alternative is to calculate completely new dimensions from the data. So-
called features of the data aim to represent the key information relevant to the interpretation task, and generally a
feature vector of a smaller dimension than the original data would be created. This is a very popular approach to
pre-processing partial discharge data, and ranges from simple vectors of mean discharge value [10], to complex
statistical calculations [12] and identification of discharge pattern shape and regularity [13].
Another approach is to transform data from a time based signal to a frequency based value. This can be performed
with various methods such as the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and the Wavelet transform.
All wavelet transforms may be considered forms of time-frequency representation for analog signals and so are
related to harmonic analysis. Almost all practically useful discrete wavelet transforms use discrete-timefilter banks,
called the wavelet and scaling coefficients in wavelets nomenclature. The wavelets forming a continuous wavelet
transform are subject to the uncertainty principle of Fourier analysis, regarding sampling theory. A commonly used
wavelet family is the Morlet wavelet, composed of a complex exponential (carrier) multiplied by a Gaussian window
(envelope).
Figure E.4 illustrates the result of a wavelet transform (bottom) applied to the vibrational signal of a tap changer
operation (top). This figure shows a complete switching process of the tap changer. Each mechanical event is
characterised by its own fingerprint in the time-frequency domain and can be clearly distinguished from undesirable
noise.
47
Figure E.4: A vibration signal from an OLTC evaluated by continuous wavelet transform
The continuous wavelet transform (CWT) with complex Morlet wavelets can remove interference and noise from a
signal. To do this, the appropriate frequency domains must be chosen to strike a balance between frequency
resolution and temporal resolution over the frequency range. Since the frequency transfer function and the
envelope of the pulse response for a filter with the Morlet wavelet kernel are both Gaussian functions, the wavelet
transform has the properties of a Gaussian filter for both the time and frequency domain. Gaussian filtering has a
step response without an overshoot, while the rise and fall time are minimised. This allows a compromise to be
found on the temporal and frequency resolution appropriate to high resolution acoustic analysis of tap changer
operation data.
E3. Examples of Causal Models (4.3.2)
Two specific examples of complex causal models are detailed below: one for thermal performance of the
transformer, and another for transformer bushings.
Thermal Modelling
A thermo-hydraulic model of an oil immersed transformer represents the thermal behaviour of core, windings and
oil, for both transient and steady state conditions. The model input parameters are voltages, currents, ambient (or
cooling water) temperature, cooling status (fans or pumps), and, if a tap changer is present, the tap position. The
output parameters of the model are temperatures of the active parts of the transformer.
The specific components and properties of a Thermo-Hydraulic model are as follows:
A - Heat sources
Heat sources are used to model cores, windings and other loss generating parts (construction elements) of a
transformer. The losses are a function of the voltage, the current in individual windings and the tap changer
position, if installed.
The model distinguishes between ohmic and eddy current losses. Ohmic losses are determined using the
temperature dependent winding resistances and the measured, or calculated, currents through the windings. Eddy
current losses are calculated using the stray flux distribution in the winding block, which is determined by the
current distribution over all windings. When detailed information about the arrangement of windings is available, a
very precise representation of eddy current losses due to the axial and radial stray flux components is possible. If
not available, reasonable assumptions can be used. Alternatively, the amplification factors within the loading
guides for the determination of hotspot temperatures can be used.
48
Both I²R and eddy current losses are dependent on temperature, therefore the actual average temperature of each
winding is taken into account when losses are calculated. In the case of a three-phase transformer, the calculation
of the average temperatures is based on the RMS value averaged over all three phases, while for the hot spot
temperatures the maximum value is taken.
B- Thermal capacity
The heat stored in the core, the winding copper, the insulation material, and the oil is an important factor for
modelling of thermal transients. For an accurate representation of temperatures during transients, the thermal
capacity of all involved components is taken into account by the model.
C- Heat transfer mechanisms
The heat flux from winding to oil or from the cooler surface to the ambient air is governed by know physical laws.
Many quantities involved in heat transfer processes are temperature dependent (e.g. viscosity, density, thermal
expansion, specific thermal capacity). A typical example is the dynamic viscosity of the oil.
The oil flow can have a significant impact on heat transfer. It is therefore essential that the oil flow characteristics
are also included in the model.
D- Environmental influence
In addition to the ambient temperature (or cooling water temperature), the model can also include the heating
influence of sunshine (solar radiation) and the additional cooling effect of wind and rain.
E- Thermo-hydraulic system
The heat generated in the active parts is transported to the cooling system through the oil mass flow. In the case of
a transformer with natural cooling, oil flow is generated by buoyancy forces, created by temperature differences
between the heated oil in the windings and the cooled oil in the radiators. Alternatively oil flow could be forced
using oil pumps. Thus a hot oil mass flow transports the heat from the winding to the cooling system, where the
heat is dissipated to the ambient air or to the cooling water.
This model describes the heat and mass flow distribution inside the transformer. There are two basic elements in
the model: node elements which are connected by branch elements. A single node can connect to a random
number of branches. The model is based on a finite volume method where each node and branch have a well-
defined oil volume, corresponding to the specific section of the transformer. In each branch an oil flow is possible
between the connected nodes.
RADIATOR
Color Code
Heating
CORE TANK
Cooling
WINDINGS
Heat Transport
node
branch
Figure E.5: Transformer Thermo Hydraulic Model
An example is shown in Figure E.5. At each node, the oil from one branch can be mixed with the oil from other
branches. The oil temperature in such a node is determined by the amount and the temperature of the oil from
incoming branches. In a changing state condition, the thermal capacity of the oil in the node itself influences the
transient behaviour.
49
To calculate the oil flow distribution, the hydrostatic pressure difference and the dynamic pressure difference must
be known for each branch element. Therefore the geometry of the branches and nodes is part of the model. Also
the hydraulic behaviour (characteristics such as hydraulic resistance and oil viscosity) must be defined for each
branch.
Monitoring of Transformer Bushings
A monitoring system for HV bushings should provide early detection of transformer bushings’ common failure
mechanisms. These include partial breakdowns between field grading layers, and ageing and moisture ingress.
Partial breakdowns result in an increase in capacitance and in partial discharges. Table E.1a) shows the increase
in capacitance caused by the loss of one conducting layer for bushings of different voltage levels, with their typical
number of field grading layers.
Ageing and moisture increase the dissipation factor (DF) or power factor (PF). Standards as in Table E.1b) give
advice on evaluating the test results for resin-impregnated-paper (RIP), oil-impregnated-paper (OIP) and resin-
bonded-paper (RBP) bushings.
a) Voltage class and change of capacitance b) Acceptance level of dielectric losses

for condenser type bushings for bushings of different design
Voltage in kV No. of layers Change in Standards RIP OIP RBP
% DF IEC60137 <0.7% <0.7% <1.5%
123 14 7.1 PF IEEE <0.85% < 0.5 <2%
245 30 3.3 C57.19.01 %
420 40 2.5
550 55 1.8
Table E.1 - Bushing Capacitive Changes and limits
Generally a reference signal is necessary for measuring capacitance or dissipation factor. In the case of off-line
measurements, the applied test voltage is measured directly and used as reference. For on-line application,
however, the phase voltage of several hundred kV is not directly available. Therefore various approaches for
deriving the reference signal are considered instead.
Inter-phase methods
The ‘sum current’ method is based on the principle that, in a three-phase system, if the system voltages are
perfectly balanced and the bushings identical, the vector sum of the bushing insulation currents will be zero. In
practice, bushings are never identical and system voltages are never perfectly balanced, and these factors need to
be addressed for data interpretation. When one of the bushings deteriorates, its capacitance and/or power factor
will change and, correspondingly, the sum current will deviate. A variant of this method is to use the amplitudes
and phase shifts of the fundamental component of the bushing tap currents on different phases, and calculate
parameters that would be sensitive to capacitance and power or dissipation factors of the bushings. Again, these
parameters will be influenced by inter-phase voltage imbalances.
Phase-to-phase method
The ‘relative measurement’ method uses two or more bushings connected in parallel on the same electrical phase
and calculates the ratio of the amplitudes and the tangent of the phase angle between the fundamental
components of the bushing insulation currents. The tangent of the phase angle (the relative tan) is sensitive to
any change in the power or dissipation factors of one of the bushings, and the ratio of amplitudes is sensitive to
change in the capacitance of one of the bushings. If relative measurements are performed using three items of
equipment in parallel, then the faulted bushing can be identified. The inter-phase voltage asymmetry will not
influence the interpretation, since the applied voltage is essentially the same for all equipment connected in
parallel. Decentralised measurement technology using GPS synchronisation has been especially developed for
this application.
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Voltage transformer method
Voltage transformers (VTs), also referred to as "potential transformers" (PTs), are designed to have an accurately
known transformation ratio in both magnitude and phase, and are available in virtually any HV substation.
Figure E.6 (left) depicts a system design for measuring capacitance and dissipation factor using the VTs of the
individual phases as references. Figure E.6 (right) depicts the on-line measurement results for capacitance and
dissipation factor, including the warning levels according to Table E.1. In this example, the on-line measured
capacitance value was 467 pF with a variation of less than ± 2 pF, recorded over a time period of 1.5 years. The
off-line measured reference value was 467.1 pF. For dissipation factor, the off-line value was 0.27 %. The on-line
measurement determined the dissipation factor with the same result of 0.27 % and had a variation of only 0.05 %
over a time period of 1.5 years.
This method for determining bushing capacitance and dissipation factor provides an accuracy similar to off-line
diagnostic tests, but depends on the accessibility of voltage transformers.
Figure E.6: System design for measuring bushing
E4. Example of Statistical Deviation: Bushing Capacitance Monitoring (4.3.3)
Generally speaking, bushing failure will occur through a sequence of small defects which impose the loss of
intermediary capacitive layers, frequently caused by short-circuit between two conductive aluminium sheets. That
phenomenon is normally irreversible and will provoke the elimination of one capacitive layer, thus causing an
increase in the overall capacitance C1.
A common technique to detect variations in C1 is illustrated in Figure E.7 where an additional (measurement)
capacitance is added to the circuit to operate as a voltage divider. Whenever there is an alteration in C1 the ratio of
voltage divider Cd - C2 will change accordingly. The drawback with this technique is that any change of U1 would
have an impact on U2, even if the change is “normal” or simply related to common voltage fluctuations. The
difficulty here is to differentiate between “normal” and “abnormal” variations of U1 (variations which would likely be
associated with changes in C1 and those which would not).
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Figure E.7: Voltage divider using a measuring capacitance Cd
Figure E.8 shows typical voltage fluctuation measured with this technique for a bank of single phase 340 kV
transformers units with OLTCs. These graphs show simulated data, drawn from real examples of in-field
monitoring.
Figure E.8: RMS voltages of phase A, B, and C for 5000 minutes and 100 minutes
Although individual voltages vary, they follow a “common path” or “normal” displacement around an average of all
three. Those oscillations are due to system topology, imbalanced load per phase, tap changing, and other factors.
It should be understood that voltages vary due to system and physical parameters which impose a similar variation
to all three phases simultaneously, so that one trace changes in line with the others and vice-versa. However,
when an anomaly occurs in the transformer and one phase starts to behave differently, it is extremely unlikely that
the other phases will also behave similarly. This type of voltage displacement is caused, for example, by a
progressive bushing failure, as illustrated in Figure E.9.
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Figure E.9: Shift in phase A voltage (1% increase) compared to phase B and C
In Figure E.9 (left), the solid blue line shows the average of all three phase voltages under healthy conditions.
Notice from Figure E.9 (right) that the voltage change caused by the "faulty" bushing shift does not alter the other
phase signals, so the average voltage in solid blue is still close to the healthy phase voltages.
Any change in the bushing capacitance C1 will produce a direct effect on U1 and, consequently, will be detected by
the measurement of U2. However, it is necessary to establish what is a significant change in U1 (phase voltage),
detectable by U2, that indicates an abnormal capacitance variation. To do so, computation of the relative voltage
deviation of one phase voltage against the average value of the two other phases is performed. Figure E.10 shows
the result of that computation for the normal system voltage deviations of Figure E.9.
Figure E.10: Statistical description of Relative voltage variation of phase A
As observed in Figure E.10, the histogram of voltage variation values along the time axis captures the probability
distribution of computed deviation. This distribution is the typical relative voltage displacement of that phase against
its sister phases and as such could be represented by a Normal probability density function, as illustrated in the
right part of the figure.
Figure E.11 illustrates the statistical distributions for a simulated abnormal voltage increase of 0.5% in Phase A,
due to a bushing failure which is not present in the other phase voltages. The normal distribution is illustrated with
the solid lines (A, B and C) while the abnormal distribution is illustrated with the dotted lines (a, b and c). Any
abnormal phase voltage increase will reflect in the other phases’ relative variation against the faulty one in such a
way that the faulty phase statistical distribution shifts strongly to the positive side (right in Figure E.11) whereas the
other phases shift to the negative (left). This allows location of the faulty bushing
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Figure E.11: Sample statistics for an abnormal voltage increase of 0.5% in phase A (dotted line) compared
to normal population statistics (solid line)
E5. Trending (4.3.4)
There are essentially two ways of computing a trend: by averaging, or by low pass filtering.
The first approach is to compute the average value of the signal over double the period of interest (say, the last
month and previous month). The trend is then equal to the difference between the two values divided by the period
of interest.
As an example, say the average moisture level of a transformer’s oil in January is 6.9% RS, and in February it is
7.3% RS. The trend for February is then 0.4% RS per month. It is not necessary to use a fixed calendar period, and
indeed a rolling average of the last 30 days versus the previous 30 is a more practical approach. This method
requires that all individual readings for the period are available for the computation and that there are no significant
gaps in the data.
The second technique is to apply a low pass filter to the signal (as a function of time) on a continuous basis, and
extract the first order derivative (slope) as the trend value. This technique is not an exact mathematical
replacement of the averaging method above. However, with the appropriate choice of filter value, its results are
quite close to the averaging method.
Filtering offers two key advantages over averaging. It require less storage and handling of data (that is, only a few
measurements and calculated values need to be stored, compared with two full periods of data). This means it is
better adapted to IED application. It is also less prone to error caused by missing data records.
It should be noted that, contrary to a common misconception, trend analysis is not well suited to detecting very
rapid and large increases. This is because the result of the trend is available only after some delay, proportional to
the period of study. As an example, a 24 hour trend will not pick up a sudden change occurring within a few
minutes, as this change will reflect in the computation only after the next 24 hour calculation. A simple level alarm
is better suited to detect a sudden large increase.
On the other hand, trend analysis is well suited to detecting small changes over long periods, as the normal noise
level of the signal is filtered out over the period of interest. This is demonstrated in the example detailed in section
4.3.4.
E6. Fuzzy Logic: Fuzzy Sets vs Conventional Sets (or crisp sets) (4.4.1)
In conventional set theory, a given element is said to belong to a crisp set if the element meets the given
requirements. For example, consider the set of "low ambient temperature". A given temperature x may be defined
54
as belonging to that set if x ≤ 0°C. A membership function may be defined to represent the participation of x in the
“low ambient temperature” set, such as:
If x ∈ [ low ambient temperatures] → μ low(x) = 1

If x ∉ [not low ambient temperatures] → μ low(x) = 0
Equation E1 Example of crisp membership equation
membership, µ(x)
Low Not Low
1
0 Ambient
0 temperature °C
Figure E.12: Graphical representation of a crisp membership function
Figure E.12 represents the crisp set “low ambient temperature” as defined by Equation E1. An alternative fuzzy set
for “low ambient temperature” is shown in Figure E.13. This does not have a hard boundary between neighbouring
sets, where the membership of the “low” set changes from 1 to 0 at a given temperature. Instead, the membership
of the “low” set tapers from 1 to 0 over a range of temperature values, while the membership of the “not low” set
increases from 0 to 1 over the same range. The total membership of all sets sums to 1 at any point on the
temperature scale.
x = 2°C
Low Not so Low
membership, µ(x)
1
µ low(x) = 0.8
µ not so low (x) = 0.2
0 Ambient
0 10 temperature °C
Figure E.13: Illustrative example of a fuzzy set
Notice that a given value in the boundary range (say, ambient temperature = 2 °C) has a dual membership, as it is
both part of the “low” set, with μ(x) = 0.8, and the “not so low” set, with μ(x) = 0.2. The total membership of both
sets sums to 1. This means that in this particular application, a temperature of 2°C is simultaneously considered to
be both low and not so low. The different membership values indicate different extents of belonging to each
temperature set.
E6.1 General Fuzzy Logic method
The fuzzy rule base is a collection of rules expressing the expert knowledge about the transformer. The rules are
formulated from linguistic terms derived from the fuzzy sets. For example: if the top oil temperature is high and the
TCDG is high, then the operational risk is high.
The fuzzy inference system uses the rule base and data from measurements to draw a set of fuzzy conclusions
about the transformer’s health. The fuzzy conclusions must go through a defuzzification algorithm, in order to
obtain a numerical output. This numerical output can be necessary to control, for example, transformer cooling, tap
changer motor torque, or similar.
55
E6.2 Mamdani Inference System:
One operation which is essential to the application of fuzzy inference systems is the Mamdani Inference [22]
implication rule, shown graphically below in Figure E.14. This Figure shows a fuzzy rule involving two input
variables, x = Top Oil Temperature and y = Total Combustible Gases in Oil, and a third output variable z =
Transformer Operational Risk. Given input data of top oil = 85 °C and TCDG = 960 ppm, the Mamdani inference
rule defines the Fuzzy output region of variable z, using the (max, min) compositional rule as follows:
 The top oil = 85 °C gives a membership of 0.8 in set “warm” and 0.2 in set “high”. The maximum set
membership is 0.8 “warm”.
 The TCDG = 960 ppm gives a membership of 0.6 in set “very high” and 0.4 in set “high”. The maximum set
membership is 0.6 “very high”.
 The minimum membership is taken of each variable. In this case, 0.6 is less than 0.8, so 0.6 is the result.
 Fuzzy Rule 1 is applied. This rule states that top oil “warm” and TCDG “very high” means the operational
risk is “high”.
 These two results are combined, to give a membership of 0.6 to the “high” set of operational risk (indicated
in black in the right graph).
Figure E.14: Example of application of Mandani rule of inference (max, min)
After multiple rules have been executed using this inference procedure, multiple areas of the operational risk graph
may be coloured. The defuzzification process is used to find a single value for operational risk, based on the
centroid of each coloured section. This process is denoted in Figure E.15.
Figure E.15: Example of a defuzification strategy (centroid)
E6.3 Example of fuzzy logic: Transformer Remnant Life
To demonstrate the implementation of a fuzzy logic system, an example of transformer remnant life calculation is
shown below. The procedure for accurate calculation of remnant life is open to debate, but one possible
implementation is to use as inputs furanic compounds and moisture (from RVM analysis), as shown in Figure E.16.
Membership functions for furans are considered on the scale 0 to 4 (mg/L) and moisture from 0 to 10 (%), based on
various examples of transformer test data and specified standards. The output is defuzzified into a traffic light
representation of remnant life.
56
Furan
Remnant Life
Moisture
Figure E.16: Example of a fuzzy system for transformer remnant life calculation
Another way of visualising the combination of these fuzzy sets is shown in Figure E.17. The two individual
parameters of furans and moisture contribute to the remnant life estimation, represented on the third axis.
Figure E.17: Visualisation of the combination of fuzzy rules for remnant life estimation
E7. Multivariate Analysis (4.4.2)
Multivariate analysis learns the normal correlations between related parameters. The learned model is then used
on-line to check whether the correlation relationships still hold, or whether parameters are deviating from the
expected pattern of behaviour. A simple example would be for top oil temperature to begin increasing above its
expected value, given its expected correlation with ambient temperature, loading, solar radiation, and any other
related parameters.
Two multivariate modelling techniques are principal component analysis (PCA, described in see section 4.3.1) and
primary least squares (PLS). PCA and PLS serve two purposes in regression analysis. First, both techniques are
used to convert a set of highly correlated variables to a set of independent variables by using linear
transformations. Second, both of the techniques can be used for dimensionality reduction. PLS can be more
efficient than PCA when one parameter of interest is being monitored, due to the algorithm being a supervised
technique [14].
The dataset used for learning the relationships should be as lengthy as possible: ideally at least 12 months of
continuous data to take into account seasonal load variations and ambient conditions. It is also possible to deploy
the technique with less data, but it will likely produce more "false positives", where the system incorrectly identifies
new operating conditions as a deterioration in health (such as winter data being compared against a summer
training data set). In such conditions, new data needs to be added to the training data set as it becomes available.
57
The operation of a transformer can be viewed as a process. The process variables should be chosen to include
those where there is some relationship between them. Returning to the example of load, top oil temperature, and
ambient temperature, by intuition there is a relationship between these variables. A change in one (or more) will
affect the other variables. Adding unrelated variables, such as tap changer vibration, will reduce the sensitivity of
the modelled behaviour [13].
50 1.2
Top-oil Temp.
40 1.0
Temperature, RH%
30 0.8
Load p.u.
Sensor Temp.
20 0.6
Load p.u.
10 0.4
RH% at Sensor
0 0.2
16-Sep 30-Sep 14-Oct 28-Oct 11-Nov 25-Nov 9-Dec 23-Dec
Figure E.18: Typical Variables from a transformer monitor
Figure E.18 shows a typical transformer monitoring data set viewed in a normal time series fashion. Figure E.19 is
a view of the correlation between each variable in such set. Each square in the figure corresponds to the
correlation between each pair of variables. The colour indicates the polarity of the correlation (blue is inversely
correlated, red is directly correlated) and its intensity shows the magnitude of the correlation (pale green for
unrelated variables; dark red or dark blue for strongly related variables). Note the diagonal line of dark red
indicating a correlation of 1 for each variable against itself.
Figure E.19: Cluster Mapping of Variables from the Monitor
Once the model of correlation between variables has been learned, it is possible to evaluate how a given set of
readings match the model. For each variable, the value is compared to the model prediction based on all the other
variables in the set. It is possible then to perform a mathematical evaluation of how well the set of data correlates
with the model by simply adding the square of all variables’ deviation from prediction. Then a single number
58
(Squared Prediction Error) represents how close a set of actual readings is from the model predictions, based on
the training data set (see Figure E.20 ).
Figure E.20: Squared Prediction Error Output of a Learned Behaviour
When the Squared Prediction Error is notably above its "baseline" value, it indicates that one or more variables
differ notably from the training set. See Figure E.21 (left).
Variable out of control
Figure E.21: Abnormal Behaviour Trend (left) and Identification of Out of Control variable (right) based on
one point in the trend
One of the key features of this technique is its ability to identify which of the variables is “out of control”, and how
much it is contributing to the out of control behaviour (Figure E.21 (right)). In this fashion it allows the operator to
focus on a specific area of the transformer for further investigation.
E8. Artificial Neural Network (4.4.4)
Neural networks can be used for supervised learning (where different fault types are known in advance), or for
unsupervised learning. In the latter case, learning is used to discover unknown patterns in the data.
The most common architecture for supervised learning is the Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), shown in Figure E.22.
This consists of three layers: an input layer, an output layer, and a so-called hidden layer between them. The MLP
is trained by showing the network training examples for which the true output value or classification is known, and
adjusting the neuron weights to reduce output error. This architecture has been used for tasks such as PD
diagnosis.
59
Figure E.22: Example MLP neural network
E8.1 OLTC Condition Monitoring using Kohonen Maps
Section 4.4.4 introduces an example of condition assessment for OLTC vibration signatures, using a self-
organising map (SOM). The SOM is also known as a Kohonen map [35], and is the most common architecture of
ANN used for unsupervised learning. Further details of the SOM and interpretation of its output are given here.
The SOM consists of a number of map units on a 1 or 2 dimensional grid [36]. It is a tool for mapping complex data
in multi-dimensional space into one or two dimensional clusters while preserving the inherent topological relations
among the input data. The SOM can adapt itself (self-organise) to intricate relationships between input data
parameters. The map is created in an unsupervised way. The U-matrix, which shows the distances between
neighbouring units, is widely used to visualise the cluster structure of the map. High values in the U-matrix mean
there are large distances between neighbouring map units, and thus indicate cluster borders. Clusters are typically
uniform areas of low values.
From field monitoring experience, it was found that there was a significant degree of inherent variability among the
signatures of normal operational condition. The training data for the SOM was therefore taken as the normalised
auto-correlation functions of the envelopes of vibration signals from normal condition equipment.
A SOM-based OLTC condition feature map is shown in Figure E.23. The map indicates that different conditions of
equipment produce well-defined clusters. Each hexagon in the map display represents a distance between two
adjacent map units. The bright (lighter) colour shading indicates the cluster boundaries. The darker regions
correspond to lower values of the distance between the map units, indicating data clusters of different equipment
conditions. The moderate change in shading within the same cluster indicates the variability of the signatures within
this cluster. The boundaries of the cluster areas, and the cluster identities corresponding to the conditions of
equipment were marked and labelled using known signatures for different fault conditions.
A: area of normal operation. C: area of worn fixed and moving contacts.

B: area of weak springs. D: area of worn moving contacts.
60
Figure E.23: OLTC condition feature map
Condition diagnosis is performed by projecting newly acquired signatures onto the labelled map. The
corresponding location of the signature on the map gives an indication of actual condition of the equipment. By
plotting the trajectory of sequential signatures onto the map, the condition can be followed over time. The proper
application of trajectory monitoring requires the map to be trained with both normal and faulty signatures.
E9. Example of Pattern Recognition: PD Defect Identification (4.4.6)

Automated PD defect identification can be used to discriminate between several classes of PD defects and
disturbances, such as:
 PD from particles with floating potential, e.g. loose screws or metal shards
 PD from bubbles, e.g. due to poor impregnation or in glue
 PD from disconnected bushing taps
 External Interferences such as corona or PD from other HV assets like GIS
The approach can combine probabilistic methods (pattern recognition) with deterministic (knowledge-based
analysis) techniques, as shown in Figure E.24 [38].
Automated analysis generally operates on the phase-resolved partial discharge pattern (PRPD), where PD
amplitude is resolved against phase of the high voltage waveform (see for example [10]). Probabilistic pattern
recognition is an effective means of classifying PD defects, but involves algorithms which are difficult to visualise.
Knowledge-based analysis imitates an expert's visual interpretation of the PRPD data and provides an explanation
of the reasons for the classification results.
61
Figure E.24: PD defect identification architecture
PRPD pattern recognition has two modes: supervised learning to build the model, and classification as an
operating mode. The supervised learning is based on a reference database which contains PRPD patterns labelled
with classes (defect identities). The result is a classifier model which recognises patterns relating to each type of
PD defect. Based on this model, a new sample is assigned to a particular class with some probability or is rejected
by the classification. The effectiveness of the classification is highly dependent on the algorithms and methods
implemented in each step.
The knowledge-based component of this system (see Section 4.4.5) has two modes as well: decision tree
generation (preparation mode), and decision making (operating mode). Decision tree generation aims to express
the PD diagnostic knowledge in the form of a classification tree by using semi-automated and manual input from
experts. The derived tree produces a sequence of heuristic rules using combinations of explanatory features
(series of questions). For each new data sample, tree descent is performed based on these rules. A diagnostic
explanation is attached to the sample which is assigned to a particular class.
Combining classification results from these two approaches provides a reasonable certainty of the identify of a
particular PD effect. For more reliable assessment of the insulation risk failure probability, additional information
has to be taken into account, such as particular transformer design knowledge, operational conditions, service
experience, visual inspections, maintenance history, and the results of various non PD off-line diagnostic tests.
Pattern recognition could also involve a number of different monitored variables which together may show a
particular problem.
System 1.3
System 1.3
Figure E.25: Example of a typical partial discharge pattern: Delaminating of the glue between winding and
pressboard
62
E10. Alarms Management (4.5.1)
To effectively monitor numerous assets it is essential to provide basic parameter monitoring combined with more
complex condition monitoring algorithms. If alarm levels are set appropriately, the operator can assume there are
no problems needing their attention unless highlighted by the alarms. In this way, an alarm system can remove the
burden of routine data analysis from human experts, and allow them to spend time on the critical cases. However,
the level of trust an engineer can place in the system is fully dependent on the capabilities and settings of the alarm
system.
The following functions are examples of what an advanced transformer Alarming & State Management system
should be able to perform
• The alarm system should have the ability to configure simple alarms on process variables (input
parameters). The simple alarming capability should include standard alarming concepts, such as, H
(High), HH (High-High), L (Low), LL (Low-Low), dead bands, minimum activation time, and rates of
change (hourly, daily), etc.
• It should have the ability to suspend alarm notification, for a period specified by the operator, of any
individual surveillance event. Although the notification is suspended, the alarm information is still
logged.
• It should have the ability to acknowledge alarms and record such acknowledgements, including the
user and timestamp of the acknowledgement. Each alarm may be acknowledged individually, or
alarms may be acknowledged in groups. It should allow the operator to enter the cause or other meta-
data regarding the alarm.
• It should differentiate between active alarms that have been cleared by a user (acknowledged) and
those which have not been cleared by a user (unacknowledged).
• It should differentiate between active alarms that are currently in alarm mode (current state is outside
of configured boundaries) and those that were in alarm mode, but are no longer in alarm mode, and
are still not acknowledged.
• It should have the ability to configure and monitor in real time statistical models. For example, PLS
(annex E.6), PCA (section 4.3.1), derived value (section 4.3.2), and other statistical methods (annex
E.4).
• It should have the ability to combine multiple events into a single alarm.
• It should allow complex conditions (combined events) to be arranged into logical statements with a full
range of logical operators.
• It should have the ability to view the current and historical alarm settings for complex (multi-data point)
condition alarms.
• It should have the ability to recognize 'stale data' and notify the user of its presence. Data will be
considered stale if no longer current, based on a predefined frequency of update.
• It should differentiate between 'stale' data and non-stale data and also between good data and bad
data (section 4.3.1). It should also track conditions not being monitored due to communications failure,
system failure, user determined suspension of monitoring, suspect data, or other reasons.
• It should incorporate an object model for easy propagation of configuration and to reduce the overall
maintenance of the system.
63
E.10.1 Alarm History
Via the Master Alarm Database, the alarm system should track changes to:
• Simple and complex alarm settings (at a minimum to see change from, change to, user name, date,
and comment).
• Alarm suppressions (date, user name, comment).
• Alarm Viewing
• The alarm system should have a configurable alarm display to show the current alerts in the system.
• The alarm display should provide enough different configurable views to display various alarm
information, by area, group, acknowledged/unacknowledged, etc.
• The alarm display should link to the master alarm database to retrieve alarm (active or past alarm)
documentation on cause, consequence, recommended action, etc. to provide supervisory guidance on
how to handle specific events
• The alarm display should provide configurable colour coding and filtering.
• The alarm display should consolidate alarms from the condition monitoring alarm system and the
simple alarm system, if required.
E.10.2 Alarm Response Procedures
In the process of implementation of TICM, it is important to understand that an entirely new set of alarms will be
required. Alarms currently exist in two classifications: major alarms and minor alarms. Procedures should already
be in place with respect to the reaction and timing of response to these alarm classes.
Planning the reponse to a new set of alarms requires consideration of:
 How to classify the new alarms (major or minor), and who is the intended recipient? Is it a trigger for
maintenance engineers only?
 Is the alarm driven directly by an on-line monitor, such as a gas or bushing monitor? Each source of data
requires a response plan which depends on the utility operations and/or maintenance practices.
64

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GUIDE ON TRANSFORMER INTELLIGENT

Guide on Transformer Intelligent Condition

4.5.1 Alarm Management ..........................................................................................................36

ANNEX A – TRANSFORMER MAIN SUBSYSTEMS FMEA EXAMPLE

1.2 Chapters Organization

Chapter 8 shows conclusions and recommendations for further work.

Chapter 9 presents the bibliographic references.

Annexes A, B, C, D and E have complementary material to the chapters.

2.1 TICM Definition

Figure 2.1: TICM Process and main sub-processes

Some important definitions for understanding the context of TICM are:

2.2 TICM in the Future Power System

RELIABILITY AND MANAGED OPERATIONAL

Transmission Grid Distribution Grid

Common Information Models and Communications Protocols

Figure 2.2: Equipment CM Positioning in The Future Smart Grids [1]

2.3 User’s Needs Identification

2.4 TICM Stakeholders Identification

Time Frame Primary User Required Outcome

3. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF A TICM SYSTEM

3.1 Main Functions and Requirement

3.1.1 TICM Stages

Data capture COM

Data pre- Presen-

Figure 3.1: Different stages in TICM

Stage Input Output

Table 3.1: Basic TICM process stages

3.1.2 Required Features of a TICM System

 It should identify an anomaly and its possible causes;

3.2 Relevant Attributes

3.2.1 Overall Data & Information Requirements

3.2.2 Information Hierarchy

Figure 3.3: Example of the Hierarchy of TICM data

3.2.3 Processing Complexity

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4

Sensor Physical Failure Required

3.2.4 Data & Information Classification

3.2.5 Static and Dynamic Parameters

3.2.6 Database Requirements

3.3 TICM Modelling

3.3.1 The Concept of a TICM Generic Model

Figure 3.5: TICM generic model concept and its context

3.3.2 The Concept of a Functional Transformer Model

Figure 3.6: Concept of a functional transformer model

The main functionalities of a transformer are:

3.3.2.2 Transformer Subsystems

Transformer primary systems:

Transformer secondary systems:

3.3.2.3 Transformer Failure Modes and Defect Types

For each of the primary subsystems, Annex A gives:

Then, for each failure mode Annex A gives:

3.3.3 The Concept of a Transformer Information Model

Figure 3.7: Concept of a TICM intelligent node, and an example structure

3.3.3.1 Transformer Condition

Figure 3.8: Schematic representation of condition development in time (top),

UNIVERSAL COMPANY SPECIFIC

CLASS COLOR DEFINITION ACTION

3.3.3.2 Condition and Recommended Action

3.3.3.3 Analysis Types

3.3.4 Structure of a TICM Intelligent Node

It is assumed here that the required data is available in an enterprise database:

Figure 3.10: An example of a TICM Intelligent Node