Henry H. Perritt Jr. - Kosovo Liberation Army - The Inside Story of An Insurgency-University of Illinois Press (2008)

KOSOVO
PERRITT
eastern european history / political science
the strategies of recruitment, training, and financ- LIBERATION
Kosovo Liberation Army

ARMY the inside story
ing that made the KLA one of the most success- “There is no one else capable of writing a book about any
ful insurgencies of the post–Cold War era. This modern insurgency that would combine this kind of in-
volume also tells the personal stories of young
people who took up guns in response to repeated
sider’s knowledge with such an acute appreciation for Kosovo
humiliation by “foreign occupiers,” as they per-
all the external factors surrounding the struggle.”
Liberation
of an insurgency
—Andrew Baruch Wachtel, dean of the Graduate School
ceived the Serb police and intelligence personnel.
Perritt illuminates the factors that led to the KLA’s
and director of the Roberta Buffett Center for International
and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University
Army
success, including its convergence with political the inside story
developments in eastern Europe, its campaign for of an insurgency
popular support both at home and abroad, and “Henry H. Perritt Jr. has written an impressive and com-
its participation in international negotiations and Henry H. Perritt Jr.
prehensive study of the personalities, strategy, and tactics
a peace settlement that helped pave the long road
T
of the Kosovo Liberation Army. His book is sure to be the he military intervention by NATO in Kosovo
from war to peace.
definitive source on the KLA and its role for researchers was portrayed in American media as a neces-
and policy makers.” sary step to prevent the Serbian armed forces
—Michael Peters, President, St. John’s College, Santa Fe from repeating the ethnic cleansing that had so
deeply damaged the former Yugoslavia. Serbia
Henry H. Perritt Jr. is a professor of law and trained its military on Kosovo because of an on-
director of the graduate program in financial going armed struggle by ethnic Albanians to wrest
services law at the Chicago-Kent College of Law. independence from Serbia. Warfare in the Balkans
He is the author of numerous law review articles seemed to threaten the stability of Europe, as well
and books on international relations and law, as the peace and security of Kosovars, and yet
university of illinois press
of an insurgency
the inside story
technology and law, and employment law. armed resistance seemed to offer the only pos-
Urbana and Chicago sibility of future stability. Leading the struggle
www.press.uillinois.edu against Serbia was the Kosovo Liberation Army,
also known as the KLA.
Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an

Insurgency provides a historical background for
ISBN 978-0-252-03342-1 the KLA and describes its activities up to and in-
Jacket photo: A KLA memorial in the Sharr region
of Kosovo. Photo by author. cluding the NATO intervention. Henry H. Perritt
Jr. offers firsthand insight into the motives and
Design by Dennis Roberts
organization of a popular insurgency, detailing
ILLINOIS
Henry H. Perritt Jr.
kosovo
liberation army
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i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 2 6/4/08 1:50:05 PM
henry h. perritt jr.
Kosovo
Liberation Army
the inside story

of an insurgency

urbana and chicago
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© 2008 by the Board of Trustees
of the University of Illinois
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
c 5 4 3 2 1
∞ This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Perritt, Henry H.
Kosovo Liberation Army : the inside story of an insurgency /
Henry H. Perritt.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn-13 978-0-252-03342-1 (cloth : alk. paper)
isbn-10 0-252-03342-6 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 1998–1999. 2. Kosovo
(Serbia)—History—Autonomy and independence movements.
3. Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosovks. 4. Kosovo (Serbia)—Politics
and government—1980–5. Albanians—Serbia—Kosovo.
6. Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 1998–1999—
Personal narratives, Albanian.
I. Title.
dr2087.p46 2008
949.703—dc22 2007046798
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To the young fighters and
leaders of the KLA,
for whom courage
replaced humiliation
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i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 6 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1. Faces of the KLA and Its Kosovar Antagonists 13
2. Building and Maintaining Public Support 25
3. Recruiting Fighters and Commanders 36
4. Avoiding Annihilation, Taking Advantage

of Milosevic 46
5. The KLA at War 61
6. Financing 88
7. Training 100
8. Supplying 110
9. Shaping International Reaction 130
10. Postwar Politics: The KLA at the Ballot Box 152
11. The KLA in the Dock 167
12. Conclusion 181
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Acronyms and Organization Names 185
Roster of Key Individuals 189
Notes 195
Bibliography 207
Index 211
Illustrations follow page 60
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Acknowledgments
This book started with a conversation with Fahri Rama, then

a waiter at the Hotel Victory in Prishtina. Fahri was twenty-two at the
time, handsome, graceful, and shy. My friend Alban Rafuna, also a waiter
in the hotel, introduced me to Fahri, telling me that Fahri has been a KLA
soldier. What ensued was a riveting hour-long conversation about how
this timid, apparently soft kid had decided to risk his life by taking up
an AK-47. Repeatedly humiliated by the Serb police, he had decided he
did not care whether he got killed, as long as he could fight for dignity
and the independence of his people. Before the evening was done, he had
given me a KLA shoulder patch, which he extracted from his wallet, and
Commander Remi’s book, which he retrieved surreptitiously from the
trunk of his car.
Intrigued by Fahri’s story, I met with Ramush Haradinaj on the same
trip—in March 2004. “What do you think about a book on the KLA?”
I asked. “Great idea!” he said. “Do you think it is too soon?” “No. It’s
exactly the right time.” He was emphatic that I should write it, and I,
never shy intellectually and welcoming new challenges, said I would.
Before long, Hashim Thaçi and Commander Remi also expressed en-
thusiastic encouragement and support, and we were off and running.
Hashim Thaçi, Ramush Haradinaj, and Commander Remi have become
important friends to me. All three were consistently generous with their
time, open in disclosing information, and invaluable in arranging inter-
views with others.
Valon Murati, Ajet Potera, Besim Beqaj, Afrim Ademi, and Lirim
Greiçevci were particularly helpful in arranging for interviews and site
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x Acknowledgments
visits. Alban Rafuna put me in touch with many interesting participants

and encouraged them to talk openly with me. He regularly pinch-hit as an
interpreter for interviews. Driton (“Toni”) Kukalaj also regularly served
as a patient and effective interpreter.
Andy Gridinsky did yeoman’s work in reviewing multiple drafts of
chapters and vetting them with senior Kosovar Albanians with whom
he had professional relations. My colleague Dan Hamilton, on two dif-
ferent occasions, read the complete draft of the book and provided coher-
ent, concise, and intelligent advice on themes and organization. Andrew
Wachtel, who took time from his demanding job as dean of the Graduate
School at Northwestern University, read the book three times as it ma-
tured, providing invaluable advice to me and to the University of Illinois
Press, drawing upon his extensive knowledge of the Balkans. Julian Mulla
translated KLA communiqués. Matt Stefon did great work in assisting
with final editing.
Several people were kind enough to work through chapter drafts
and give me the benefit of their candid comments and suggestions for
improvement: Ambassador Lisen Bashkurti, Besim Beqaj, Carson Block,
Bujar Bukoshi, David J. Gerber, Agim Gjinali, General David Grange,
Enver Hasani, Rob Katchedorian, Harold J. Krent, Hajredin Kuqi, Brad
Loberg, Valon Murati, John F. Murphy, General William Nash, Margaret
G. Stewart, and Hashim Thaçi.
I benefited greatly from the analytical, creative, and fact-gathering
efforts of three of my students: Ben Shanbaum, Jacob Ramer, and An-
drew Strong. Mr. Shanbaum gathered much of the basic factual material
about the historical foundations of KLA in the LPRK. Mr. Ramer provided
thoughtful analysis of International Criminal Law and drafted analyses
of ICTY case law. Mr. Strong suggested improvements in methods for
recording interviews, interviewed a number of KLA fighters, and con-
tributed several evocative vignettes about personalities. All three were
valuable sounding boards as basic theses for the book crystallized from
January to July 2005.
My assistant at Chicago-Kent, Patricia O’Neal, contributed greatly by
helping organize trips and transcribing interviews and dictation. The Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law funded student research assistance throughout
the project and also provided a “challenge grant” to support research.
Dino Asanaj assisted in identifying key people to interview in Kosovo
and Albania. Ambassador Lisen Bashkurti provided invaluable help in
arranging conversations with senior officials and former officials of the
Albanian government. Irina Faskianos, vice president of the Council on
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Acknowledgments xi
Foreign Relations, arranged for a manuscript discussion in which partici-

pated Andrew Wachtel, Kenneth W. Dam, and John J. Mearsheimer.
Willis Regier, director of the University of Illinois Press, expressed
interest in the project in its early stages and was patient through the
process of preparing the manuscript for publication.
Many others provided information about the KLA, the political con-
text within which it operated, and their own experiences: Haki Abazi,
Sadri Abazi, Afrim Ademi, Sami Ahmeti, Arxhient Bajraktari, Harry Ba-
jraktari, Skender Berisha, Tom Berisha, Kurt Bexheti, David Bonior, Luf-
tar Braha, Sabit Brokaj, Agim Çeku, Lirak Çelaj, Bekim Collaku, Driton
Dalipi, Luan Dalipi, Adem Demaçi, Gani Demaj, Shkumbin Demaliaj,
Skender Doci, Naim Eanri, Shyqri Galica, Driton Gashi, Naim Gashi,
Suzana Gervalla, Agim Gjinali, Luigj Gjokaj, Lek Gjonaj, Dritan Gjon-
balaj, Lirim Greiçevci, Klaus Grewlich, Xhavit Haliti, Astrit Hajrullahu,
Enver Hasani, Ermal Hasani, Lufti Haziri, Mensur Hoti, Hajredyn Hyseni,
Naser Hyseni, Nuredin Ibishi (“Commander Leka”), Ardian Jashari, Mu-
rat Jashari, Rafet Jashari, Agron Jusufi, Fatos Klossi, Adrian Koller, Bajram
Kosumi, Florin Krasniqi, Jakup Krasniqi, Safet Krasniqi, Hajradin Kuqi,
Albin Kurti, Liridon Ladifi, General Kulusi Lama, Fatmir Limaj, Arben
Limani, Xhavid Loshaj, Doda Lucaj, Sami Lushtaku, Haki Maliçi, Rifat
Maloku, Agron Martini, Gjok Martini, Myzafer Mehmeti (“Freddie”),
Robert Muharremi, Rexhep Murati, Valon Murati, Bedri Mustafa, Dastid
Pallaska, Lulzim Peci, Ajet Potera, Bekim Ramadani, Agron Ramaj, Ba-
jram Rexhepi, Chad Rogers, Rexhep Selimi, Avni Selmani, Bedri Selmani,
Ahmet Shala, Blerim Shala, Ardian Spahiu, Azem Syla, Rrahim Tërnava,
Afrim Zejnullahu, and Arianit Zeka.
All these people made this book possible, and I am very grateful to
them. While their factual reports and interpretations of events color the
story that follows, the story and its conclusions are mine alone. Those
mentioned here—and others—who helped so much do not necessarily
share them.
I also appreciate the support and encouragement from my partner of
twenty-three years, Mitchell Bergmann.
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kosovo
liberation army
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LLAP KLA zone names
KLA zone boundaries
S E R B I A
Podujevë
Mitrovica
MONTENEGRO
LLAP
DRENIC A Prishtina
Peja
Decani KO S O V O
D U K AG I N I
Junik Malisheva
Bajram Gjakova Ferazaj

Curri
Prizren
Kukes
Tetovo Skopje
HUNGARY
SLOVENIA
ROMANIA
ALBANIA CROATIA VOJVODINA
Belgrade
BOSNIA
MACEDONIA SERBIA
MONT.
BULG.
0 10 20 mi
ˆ
ADRIATIC SEA KOSOVO
0 10 20 30 km ITALY Area of
main map F.Y.R.O.M.
0 30 60 mi ALB.
0 50 100 km GREECE
Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) area of operations, March 1999.
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Introduction
Every Albanian knew that we would never escape from

oppression by Serbia if we did not fight. Everyone. Rugova
knew; LPK knew. But people initially choose the easy
way. They always wanted to believe they wouldn’t have
to pay the higher price for achieving what we wanted.
But it’s traditional in our culture that every generation
tests the older one. Also, in our society, there were people
that were exposed more than the others as enemies of
the regime. Those families were already the targets; they
had to make the choice earlier than the others. We didn’t
have much choice at the time. We knew that we could
be killed one way or another—in the prisons of Serbia,
by being assassinated, or by resisting them directly. We
knew that, every day, we could be one of those; we could
be killed. There would be no warning. We had no choice
but to fight.
—Ramush Haradinaj
The first time I was in Kosovo, during the cease fire in De-
cember 1998—or more accurately, as the cease fire was breaking down—I
asked our UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) hosts if they
could take me to see the Kosovo Liberation Army. After some hemming
and hawing, the mission chief of the UNHCR in Prishtina requisitioned
a bulletproof SUV and persuaded a driver to take us to Malisheva. Ev-
erywhere we went, on paved roads and on dirt roads so rutted they were
almost impassable, we saw burned out police stations and houses that
had been shelled by Serb armor. It was a wasteland. Once or twice, we
saw clusters of men in civilian clothes, with pieces of uniform among
them, manning checkpoints. Only once did we see a true civilian, an
old man walking slowly out from his house through the mud, carrying
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2 Introduction
a rusted and dented bucket. Where were all the other people? They were
somewhere, out of sight, watching and waiting. Our driver was nervous
as a cat, eager to get back to Prishtina. I wanted to stay longer.
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; Albanian, UÇK) was one of the
most successful insurgencies of the post–cold war period, although it
engaged in a relatively short period of widespread armed conflict. It il-
lustrated the twentieth-century apogee of “Fourth Generation War” or
“4GW,” a term that signifies the integration of political and military
aspects of warfare. Guerrilla attacks are a means not only of holding ter-
ritory or destroying foreign forces, but of moving the hearts and minds
of those among whom the guerrillas operate, within the populations of
foreign states whose policies could make or break the resistance, and of
the fighters themselves.
In many respects, the development of the KLA followed the pattern
of other insurgencies around the world. It flourished only when it had
broad popular support, while its activities helped to build that support.
It recruited fighters and less-active supporters in proportion to grow-
ing oppression by the regime it opposed, repression stimulated by KLA
tactics. Continued existence of the KLA depended on the execution of a
sophisticated public relations strategy aimed not only at the local popu-
lation but also at the international community. It depended on financial
support from outside, and on a reliable flow of appropriate arms.
Unlike other insurgencies, however, the KLA made relatively little
use of terrorist attacks on civilian targets. It also won relatively few
battles against opposing military forces. Its evolution into a full-fledged
guerrilla force engaged in a war of attrition was interrupted by its suc-
cess in the political arena. Although the KLA insurgency took place in
a region where the population was predominantly Muslim, it rebuffed
offers of aid from Islamic fundamentalists.
This book tells the story of the KLA mostly through the voices of
those who organized, led, and fought in it, and through the voices of its
critics. It then positions elements of this story on a template shaped by
theoretical and empirical knowledge about other insurgencies, concluding
that the KLA experience illuminates general characteristics of insurgen-
cies. The KLA was an exemplar of 4GW concepts, and its story reinforces
well-understood precepts about insurgency developed in the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-first centuries. Insurgencies flourish only when
they have support from the civilian population in which they operate;
they are most often fueled by nationalism—a product of the nineteenth
century; and they are most successful when they oppose regimes that
can be characterized as foreign occupiers. They can effectively oppose
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Introduction 3
military forces that are vastly superior in numerical, technological, and

organizational terms, because they rely on hit-and-run ambushes, and
hide among a local population where the opposing forces, often ethni-
cally and linguistically foreign, cannot identify them. Insurgencies are
difficult to stamp out once they reach a critical mass of fighters and
popular support. Guerrillas have a politico-military advantage; they are
almost impossible to defend against. Trying to annihilate them usually
builds popular support for them. “Massacres” by the military and police
forces of a regime often fuel an explosion of recruits for an insurgency.
Successful insurgencies usually rely on external financial support and
arms supplies. They develop more quickly when they have safe areas in
which to train, to resupply, to reorganize, and to rest. Passionate young
people without much training or experience can lead insurgencies suc-
cessfully.
Despite these reasons for classifying it as a model insurgency, the
quick success of the Kosovo Liberation Army owed predominantly to an
unusual configuration of geopolitical and popular phenomena. The stars,
it seemed, aligned just as the KLA reached the point at which it could
operate effectively all over Kosovo, and as it had achieved a sophisticated
understanding of how to use armed force to shape international public
opinion. Crucial to the success of the KLA was its prowess in presenting
its case to the outside world. Looking forward, however, replicating KLA
strategies in other insurgencies would have a less dramatic effect. The
international community was especially receptive in 1998 and 1999 to
the possibility of a human rights intervention in Kosovo because of the
bloodshed in Bosnia and the absence of strategic threats sufficient to refo-
cus major-power attention on other places. Further, the KLA understood
diaspora power. Efforts at raising money and recruiting soldiers from the
Albanian Diaspora were energetic, and mobilization of Diaspora voices
in domestic political forums was strong. Eventually the U.S. Congress,
the British Parliament, and the German Bundestag listened.
The KLA experience also shows that not every nominally Muslim
population will buy into Islamic fundamentalism and align itself with
Al-Qaeda when it is pursuing primarily nationalist goals. Far more than
religion motivated the KLA. Indeed, religion was largely irrelevant; a num-
ber of the KLA’s most enthusiastic fighters and fund raisers were Catholic
rather than Muslim. Islam was essentially irrelevant as a driver of the
insurgency, and Muslim religious affiliation did not interfere with a pas-
sionate pro-American stance after the conflict ended. Moreover, the KLA
listened when the United States said, through the CIA, “Don’t get involved
with Islamic extremists.” What mattered was not religious reverence but
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4 Introduction
political humiliation. In Kosovo, recruitment was made easier—indeed

made possible in the first place—by Serb policies under Slobodan Milosevic
that were disdainful of values held by the Albanian community.
I began learning about the forces that led to conflict in the former
Yugoslavia in 1996, when I mobilized teams of law students to work on
postconflict projects in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia after the breakup
of Yugoslavia. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, famous for brokering the
Dayton Accords, encouraged me, then dean of the Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law, to focus on ameliorating the effects of the rapidly growing
crisis over Kosovo. Beginning in August 1998, I sent teams of students,
faculty, and staff to refugee camps in northern Albania and Macedonia
and to Tirana, Albania’s capital. Hearing about these adventures, more
students wanted to gain hands-on experience in linking their professional
education with the realities of the world in which they would practice. In
December 1998, an assistant dean, two students, and I interpreted our Ser-
bian visas “elastically” and went to Prishtina, where we helped UNHCR
and other organizations deploy Internet-linked databases to track refugee
relief. On that trip we evaded Serb checkpoints and toured areas where
KLA activity was most intense. During the NATO bombing campaign,
I met with the leaders of both Albanian political parties in Macedonia,
and with representatives of the Albanian Diaspora in Germany, to dis-
cuss the course of the violence in Kosovo and prospects for postconflict
reconstruction. By the last few months of the war, my students were
using a database we had developed to record testimony from refugees
about war crimes, and that proved useful to human rights organizations
looking for patterns of ethnic cleansing. In June 1999, shortly after the
end of the bombing campaign, I dispatched a small group of students, who
were accompanied by a freelance reporter, to Kosovo itself. In August
and September, we began providing technical assistance to the interim
government on economic reconstruction and development. Since then,
and almost always with one or more students, I have visited Kosovo
several times a year, continuing to work on economic and political party
development and assisting former KLA commanders charged by the ICTY
prosecutors. Over the course of these visits, I heard many accounts of
personal experiences from those who led the insurgency, those who actu-
ally fought, those who helped finance it, and those who were skeptical
and yet remain skeptical about the bonafides of the KLA.
The background of the Kosovo conflict can be confusing. The first
potential source of confusion is that the majority population in Kosovo
is ethnic Albanian, but there also exists a separate state called “Albania.”
The second potential source of confusion is Kosovo’s multilayered politi-
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Introduction 5
cal and legal relationship with Yugoslavia. Those preliminary matters

should be sorted out. Kosovo is a small, diamond-shaped patch of land
that is about three-quarters the size of the Chicago metropolitan area. At
the outbreak of the KLA insurgency, it was part of Serbia, which in turn
was the dominant republic within Yugoslavia. Albanians are a distinct
ethnic group concentrated in the southwestern part of the Balkans in
southeastern Europe. Some three and one-half million Albanians live in
the Republic of Albania, about two million in Kosovo, a half million in
the northern and western parts of Macedonia, and a hundred thousand or
so in Montenegro. Defined more by language, history, and culture than
by race or religion, Albanians proudly trace their history to the Illyrian
people, who flourished along the Balkan Peninsula before the Roman
Empire subdued and integrated them.
The antecedents of Albanian discontent with foreign domination in
Kosovo stretch back for centuries. In every generation, Albanians living
in the southwest Balkans engaged in armed resistance or mass demonstra-
tions, or both, seeking to displace Turkish or Slavic regimes that denied
their national aspirations. Each time, the regime crushed the resistance,
bought it off with modest concessions, or both. Fragmented politically,
and isolated from the rest of the world because of rugged geography,
the Albanian region was regularly divided by a succession of empires.
The Ottoman Empire in particular divided the Albanian territories into
separate pashalets (imperial administrative units). The modern state of
Albania was assembled and granted recognition as an independent state
at the end of the First Balkan War in 1912–13 in the Treaties of London
and Bucharest. Its borders were confirmed in the “Paris Peace Confer-
ence” following World War I,1 which redrew the map of Europe after the
collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Pleas by the
Albanian people for incorporation into an enlarged state of Albania fell
on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the region that came to be known as Yugoslavia
was being acknowledged as a state by the Paris Conference diplomats as
they mostly formalized realities on the ground. Croatia, Serbia, Slove-
nia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo were all glued together
into a “Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats.” This kingdom was not
a product of nationalism but rather of pragmatism. It tottered through
the interwar period, its politics dominated by assassinations and ethni-
cally based intrigue. During World War II, the Balkan region was a major
battlefield. Italy set up an administrative and political unit encompassing
most of the Albanian population early in the war, and comprising the
territories of the state of Albania and significant parts of Serbia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, and a sliver of Montenegro.
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6 Introduction
The war ended for most of Europe in June 1945 but went on in the
Balkans for another three years until the Communist forces, led by Jo-
sip Broz (Tito) and Enver Hoxha, came out on top. Tito consolidated his
territories into a state called “Yugoslavia,” “the union of the southern
Slavs,” while Hoxha kept the state of Albania. Tito divided Yugoslavia
into six separate republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montene-
gro, and Macedonia. Serbia, by far the largest, was further divided into
three parts: a central region and two provinces. These two provinces
were geographically and ethnically distinct from each other and from the
central region. Vojvodina, the northern and larger province, was made
up of a mixture of Serbs, Hungarians, and other ethnic groups while Ko-
sovo, to the south, was populated mostly by ethnic Albanians but had a
significant Serb minority. As a province within a republic, Kosovo had
less autonomy than if it had been a republic on its own.
The Kosovar Albanians, already feeling betrayed by Kosovo’s incorpo-
ration into Serbia rather than Albania after the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire, had tasted the flavor of a unified Albanian “state” during the
wartime Italian occupation. Now they had been betrayed again, despite
Tito’s promise toward the end of the war that they could decide through a
referendum whether they wanted to be part of Albania or Yugoslavia. The
very name “Yugoslavia” caused Kosovar Albanians to bristle. As noted
above, “Yugoslavia” translates roughly as “union of the southern Slavs.”
The dominant populations of the six Yugoslav republics were Slavs—Slo-
venes, Croats, most Macedonians, Bosniaks, and Serbs, all of whom could
point to Slavic ancestors and spoke Slavic languages at home. Albanians
were not Slavs, and those in Kosovo saw no reason they should be forced
to be part of Yugoslavia rather than of the independent state of Albania
next door. Moreover, they spoke Albanian—a completely different lan-
guage from the Serbo-Croatian used in most of the rest of Yugoslavia.
The KLA story can be told chronologically or thematically. The fol-
lowing paragraphs provide a chronological summary. The rest of the book
takes a thematic approach. Five time periods bracket the major develop-
ments.
1945–85—Restless Nationalism Erupts Sporadically

Yugoslav strongman Marshal Tito alternated between placating Alba-
nian nationalism by allowing greater autonomy and ruthlessly insisting
on assimilation of all ethnic groups into a new “Yugoslav” culture. The
Kosovar Albanian experience inside Yugoslavia was therefore tumultu-
ous. As World War II concluded, some thirty thousand Yugoslav Partisan
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Introduction 7
troops suppressed a revolt by the same young Albanian fighters who had
helped the Partisans drive Axis forces from Kosovo. In February 1945,
Tito declared martial law in Kosovo. Thereafter, Serb authorities pro-
hibited the display of Albanian flags and other nationalist symbols, and
treated teaching of Albanian history and literature as a deviation from
Communist doctrine. Serbs held all of the main Communist Party and
government offices in Kosovo. Hoxha’s alignment with Stalin against
Tito only fueled Serb suspicions that Albanians in Kosovo were a secu-
rity threat. From 1947 to his downfall in 1966, Serbian Minister of the
Interior Aleksandar Rankovic oversaw ruthless Serb security forces in
Kosovo, confiscated Albanian weapons, and pressed Albanians to emi-
grate. Both Rankovic’s removal from office in 1966 and Tito’s 1968 offer
of more opportunities to Kosovar Albanians gave breathing space at last
to Albanian nationalism, which, paradoxically, led to widespread riots
in 1968 supporting incorporation of Kosovo and Albanian areas of Mace-
donia either into Albania or into a new Albanian republic in Yugoslavia.
Tito responded with half a loaf: establishment of an Albanian-language
university in Prishtina in 1969 and greater political autonomy to Koso-
vars under a new constitution adopted in 1974. Things were calm on
the surface, but Kosovo continued to slip behind the rest of Yugoslavia
economically, and Serb-Albanian tensions grew as Kosovar Albanians
demanded greater political opportunity and Kosovar Serbs resisted it.
In 1981, a few months after Tito’s death, massive demonstrations
started at the University of Prishtina and rapidly spread throughout Ko-
sovo. Order was restored, but scores of Albanians were killed and thou-
sands more were arrested, often for little more than passing out literature.
Others, predominantly young men who managed to avoid arrest, fled
mostly to Switzerland or Germany to escape repression and seek better
lives. As the numbers of exiles grew throughout the 1980s, leaders of
several clandestine organizations worked to reawaken and intensify their
sense of Albanian nationalism.
1985–93—Dreams and Plans for a Revolution

The core of these “Planners in Exile”—the LPRK (Popular League for the
Republic of Kosovo), which later became the LPK (Popular League for
Kosovo)—was in place in Switzerland, Germany, and Albania by 1985.
Tiny and obscure, LPRK began making contact with militants inside
Kosovo, the “Defenders at Home.” It also tried to learn how to organize
a guerrilla insurgency by studying the experiences in Ireland, Vietnam,
Algeria, and the Basque region of Spain; learning where and from whom
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 7 6/4/08 1:50:08 PM

8 Introduction
to get arms; and crafting a fund-raising network. Meanwhile, the iron

curtain was raised and Yugoslavia struggled with political pluralism.
The Albanian political elite in Kosovo and Serb party boss Slobodan
Milosevic were on a collision course. After Milosevic consolidated his
power in Serbia, he revoked Kosovo’s political autonomy. The Kosovar
Albanian elite formed its own political party, the Democratic League
of Kosovo (LDK), declared independence, and established in Germany a
“Government in Exile.” For a time, some of these “Peaceful Path Institu-
tionalists” tried to work with the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at
Home. They organized training camps in Albania for would-be Albanian
guerrilla fighters, but the training program was infiltrated by the Serb
secret police in 1993, and almost everyone was arrested or dispersed back
into exile before they could do anything.
1993–96—The Intelligence War

The LPRK changed its name and organized the Kosovo Liberation Army.
From 1993 to 1996, the KLA worked to recover from the 1993 arrests and
to consolidate recruitment, fund raising, and logistics structures for war.
It sent agents on missions around Kosovo to identify and recruit people
to replace those who had been arrested. It was nearly invisible inside
Kosovo, among the Diaspora, and to the international community. This
silent period from 1993 to 1996 was the period during which the KLA
fought and won an “intelligence war.” Winning the intelligence war
meant two things. First, it meant preventing penetration of the KLA.
Second, it meant eliminating or intimidating individuals who were for-
mally or informally part of the Serb secret police.
1996–98—The KLA’s War for Popular Opinion

The 1995 signing of the Dayton Accords discredited the Peaceful Path
Institutionalists. Although Kosovar Albanians had waited to be rescued
from Milosevic by the international community rather than fighting his
regime as did the Croats and Bosnians, the international community con-
centrated its attention on stopping the war in Bosnia and ignored Kosovo.
Support for the KLA grew inside Kosovo, and it gradually accelerated the
pace of its attacks on police stations and convoys and on collaborators.
The government of the state of Albania collapsed in the spring of 1997,
clearing the way for substantial shipments of arms. Milosevic’s forces,
now freed from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, began to turn their atten-
tion to Kosovo, intending to stamp out the emerging insurgency.
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Introduction 9
1998—A Shooting War

Milosevic’s most aggressive attempt to annihilate the KLA backfired. A
siege on the home of KLA leader Adem Jashari, one of several launched
on leading families of the Defenders at Home in the spring of 1998, re-
sulted in the deaths of nearly sixty individuals, including women, the
elderly, and young children, as well as Jashari himself. Instead of squelch-
ing the insurgency, the attack galvanized Kosovo and horrified the rest
of the world. Leaders of the Planners in Exile returned to Kosovo. Over-
whelmed with volunteers and struggling to arm them through the supply
chain now functioning through the recently collapsed state of Albania,
the KLA made use of its newfound riches by broadening its attacks and
declaring itself to be an “army” rather than a mere guerrilla movement.
As the scale of military conflict escalated, and as hundreds of thousands
of Kosovar Albanian refugees overwhelmed the capacity of neighboring
Albania and Macedonia to deal with them, the international community
no longer could sit back, smug with the success of the Dayton Accords.
Frantic diplomacy followed, but was only frustrated by Milosevic’s in-
transigent insistence on his sovereign prerogatives to deal with internal
“terrorism” in his own way, by international reluctance to legitimate
the KLA by negotiating with it, and then by the difficulty that emerged
in figuring out how to deal with it. A cease fire in October 1998 per-
mitted the KLA to recover from the Serb onslaught of the late summer
and fall, and then renewed fighting in late December and early 1999
produced one last diplomatic effort in Rambouillet, France, in Febru-
ary and March 1999. When Milosevic would not budge, NATO began a
campaign of aerial bombardment that ultimately drove Serb forces from
Kosovo in June 1999. On or about June 12 (there is some dispute about
the date and circumstances of the KLA’s entry) the KLA marched into
the capital city of Prishtina in uniformed military columns, with flags
flying and the Kosovar civilian population throwing flowers at them.
Then the KLA disbanded, with some of its soldiers becoming part of the
new Kosovo Police Service and others becoming members of a mostly
unarmed Kosovo Protection Corps, and some of its leadership beginning
to organize new political parties.
The Book in Brief

The insurgency in Kosovo combined nineteenth-century motivations
with twenty-first-century techniques. Though fought in the last few years
of the twentieth century, it is the paradigm of how wars will be fought
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10 Introduction
in the twenty-first century. It shows the tenacious power of nationalism

as a motivation for conflict, but could not have been won in the absence
of contemporary political structures and public concerns. Kosovo shows
that all wars are now world wars. These are general realities, but they
materialized in Kosovo because Kosovo was ripe to receive them in the
uniquely relevant time period.
The first section, comprising chapters one through four, explores
the nineteenth-century forces at the heart of the KLA’s emergence. The
KLA emerged in a society that was deeply nationalist. Though others
defined it by its Muslim religion, Kosovar Albanian society was in fact
not particularly religious. Nationalism defined the struggle. Nationalism
is an old story, and in this sense the KLA had its roots in the nineteenth
century, and even earlier.
Chapter one profiles leaders, explains the nationalist matrix, and
introduces sources of conflict among the leaders and three roughly de-
fined groups they represented: the Planners in Exile, the Peaceful Path
Institutionalists, and the Defenders at Home. This first chapter places
the leaders of Kosovar Albanian separatism into a basic context for un-
derstanding their behavior. It begins with Albanian nationalism, but also
includes winds of change blowing both from the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact, and from the restlessness of a large Albanian
youth cohort dispersed into exile.
Chapter two evaluates the struggle to build support for armed resis-
tance both at home within the Kosovar Albanian population and within
the Diaspora—the half million or so Albanians living in western Eu-
rope and the United States. It explores how the KLA and its antecedents
worked to build support in the Albanian community in Kosovo and
around the world by strengthening Albanian nationalist identity. It ex-
plains how the KLA sought to build a consciousness of potentiality on
top of a spirit of defiance that was fueled by Serb repression. It introduces
the bitter conflict that developed between the leaders of the Peaceful
Path Institutionalists and the now mostly merged Planners in Exile and
Defenders at Home. Finally, chapter two explains how the KLA used
violence to move a critical mass of the population to its side.
Chapter three considers the factors that induced several thousand
young men, and some young women, to take up arms and put their lives
on the line against one of the most formidable military machines of the
second half of the twentieth century. Emanating from a youthful passion
for the Albanian nationalist dream, the spirit of defiance impelling KLA
volunteers turned into a willingness to act, as cultures of resistance, long
part of Albanian society, provided reinforcement in terms of peer and
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 10 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

Introduction 11
parental support. It explains how the KLA undermined Serb intimidation

of would-be Kosovar Albanian participants.
Chapter four examines how the Milosevic regime’s responses to the
KLA almost annihilated the organization several times, yet also fueled
the fire of Albanian nationalism and KLA recruitment. Wars do not oc-
cur without an enemy. Guerrilla insurgencies do not grow and flourish
without a regime that is sufficiently discredited in the eyes of the re-
sisting population for them to take sides with the insurgents. Slobodan
Milosevic’s forces were a casting director’s dream for the enemy that
helps its opponents demonize it.
The second section of the book, which comprises chapters five
through eight, offers the KLA as a paradigm of how nationalist insurgen-
cies will be fought in this century. Rooted in nationalism, postadolescent
pride, and aggressiveness, and strengthened by clumsy counterinsurgency,
the KLA fought in new ways and never lost sight of the fact that its ob-
jective was political and its targets lay in foreign capitals rather than on
the military battlefield. It embraced violence because it understood the
political power of carefully targeted—and portrayed—armed conflict.
Chapter five shows how the KLA as a military organization used
models of guerilla and conventional warfare to resist annihilation by
the Serbs while building domestic and international support by proving
that it would continue to fight. The KLA embraced 4GW: the shaping of
military strategy and tactics to achieve political objectives. This chapter
describes the KLA’s loose command and control systems, and explains
how a thinly connected bunch of guerrilla bands decided to be an “army”
and to engage in frontal warfare, only to be forced to fall back on guer-
rilla tactics. It explores the role of targeted killings and explains why the
KLA avoided broader forms of terrorism.
The KLA could not have achieved its objectives without money, train-
ing, weapons, and other supplies, all of which crossed national borders.
Chapter six explains how the KLA raised money, most of it from outside
Kosovo, despite the fact that Rugova and Bukoshi—the leaders of the
Peaceful Path Institutionalists—would not make money available to the
KLA from the Government in Exile’s Three-Percent Fund. Chapter seven
begins with the proposition that guerilla fighters do not need much train-
ing. Models from elsewhere—NATO, the U. S. Army, the Yugoslav Army
(VJ), the Albanian Army, and even American war movies—were used by a
handful of KLA commanders trained in the VJ and in the Croatian Army.
By the end of the war, the majority of zone commanders had organized
multiweek training programs under key commanders’ strikingly differ-
ent philosophies: Some believed that the best training was immediate
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12 Introduction
participation in armed attacks against Serb targets, while others sought

to institutionalize American-style basic training at the operation zone
level. Chapter eight considers how the KLA acquired arms and other
supplies. Until June 1998, recruits were turned away because the KLA
did not have enough light arms; later, it had enough light arms, but few
heavy weapons necessary to oppose regular Serb army forces. By the end
of the war, it began to acquire a modest supply of antitank weapons.
The third and final section of the book, comprising chapters nine
through eleven, acknowledges that the KLA flourished in a context de-
termined by the convergence of several unique developments—a con-
vergence unlikely to be repeated. Neither money nor weaponry for the
KLA was possible without international acquiescence, and international
military intervention was the byproduct of exceptional political devel-
opments in Europe and the United States. Chapter nine explores the
political dynamics of international intervention, especially political de-
velopments in the United States, which initially deferred involvement
in the rumbling volcano that was Kosovo, but then organized military
intervention against the KLA’s opponents. This chapter explains why
NATO was willing to intervene, and analyzes how the KLA pursued
international intervention as a central part of its strategy.
The tenth and eleventh chapters show that the wars of the twenty-
first century are not over when the guns are silenced and the armies
demobilized. As America’s experience in Iraq shows, the “end of ma-
jor combat operations” is the least of it. In Kosovo, the tensions both
between Albanians and Serbs, and within the Kosovar Albanian com-
munity, have defined postwar politics, which has been shaped by KLA
leaders who have now been retooled as the leaders of political parties.
Moreover, democratization was complicated by an uncertain political and
legal matrix created by the international community, for international
bodies and groups nurtured the democratic instincts and public admin-
istration skills of former KLA leaders even as other international bodies
were prosecuting several of them for war crimes. Chapter ten analyzes
the KLA’s impact in postwar politics. Chapter eleven considers the effect
and legitimacy of prosecutions of KLA leaders for war crimes.
A brief conclusion reconsiders the phenomenon of insurgency in the
light of the KLA experience and illuminates the role of cultural, social,
historical, and political context in the KLA’s success.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 12 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

1 Faces of the KLA and
Its Kosovar Antagonists
Over the centuries, we struggled against occupation, and

a couple of times we managed to come close to winning.
Now, a few things were different. One was that Russia
lost its power and now would not back up Serbia, and so
for once the world would not close its eyes and do what
Serbia says. Second, other peoples in the former Yugosla-
via like the Croats would not support Serbia this time.
Now, it was not too much of a stretch: a few million
Albanians against a few million Serbs. Everything was
more in our favor than it was in previous generations.
The communications were different; now the patriots
knew what was going on. The geostrategic possibilities
were different because the internationals had already set
a precedent, in Croatia and Bosnia.
—Ramush Haradinaj
The Kosovo Liberation Army fought a paradigmatic Fourth

Generation War. “Fourth Generation War” is a term coined by some of
the more perceptive military theorists in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps
communities. “Fourth-generation warfare (4GW), unlike previous genera-
tions of warfare, does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military
forces. Instead, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to
destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth generation wars are lengthy—
measured in decades rather than months or years.”1 Fourth generation war-
fare requires that fighters—and leaders of fighters—be astute about politics,
which is often characterized as the art of the possible and the science of
timing. What was possible in Kosovo was determined by geopolitical and
13
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 13 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

14 kosovo liberation army
demographic phenomena beyond the control of the KLA that shaped both
attitudes within Kosovo and attitudes of the world toward Kosovo.
Two of these phenomena—Great-Power geopolitical adjustment and
Albanian nationalism—were at work long before 1995. Three others—
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, international sensitivity to Slobo-
dan Milosevic’s human rights violations, and an astutely led, awakened
youth—intersected in the late 1980s and early 1990s to set the stage for
an armed revolt in Kosovo. The KLA might have been successful anyway,
but it would have taken ten or twenty years, and Kosovo might have had
an experience similar to that suffered by Northern Ireland or Lebanon. Its
quick success was fortuitous. The phenomena making early success pos-
sible were not simple in their composition, and their interaction surely
was not. Some of the phenomena had been at work for centuries or de-
cades; some were like shooting stars.
Faces of the Struggle

The KLA’s struggle, like most struggles, is the story of singular com-
binations of circumstances creating windows of opportunity. It is also
the story, however, of strong personalities who saw opportunity—and
frequently battled over how to seize it. Three relevant leadership groups
within Kosovar Albanian society defined the KLA and its path to suc-
cess: the Peaceful Path Institutionalists, the Planners in Exile, and the
Defenders at Home.
Ibrahim Rugova, who died in January 2006, symbolized the Peaceful
Path Institutionalists. He hid behind the trappings of power. An eccen-
tric and remote man, his advocacy of passive resistance and opposition
to violence may have saved Kosovo from a bloodbath. He infuriated not
only those who opposed his methods but some of his closest associates.
But fury or not, Rugova was the man who carried the Kosovar Albanian
torch for a long time. When Rugova could no longer deny the KLA, he
then tried to outflank it. But he never let the flame go out.
Rugova was formally schooled in France and always—always—wore
a mottled maroon and indigo scarf. He was president of Kosovo’s Gov-
ernment in Exile and also president of the Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK), the dominant Albanian political party. Rugova’s campaign of pas-
sive resistance and creation of a Kosovar Government in Exile fed Al-
banian desires to resist Serb oppression at low cost, while also allowing
Milosevic to deploy his military forces elsewhere, in Croatia and Bosnia.
Rugova became the face of Kosovo politics, and largely dominated it
even after the war was over. He is loved by those who watched him hold
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Faces of the KLA and Its Antagonists 15
the flame for so long. But the images of Rugova also are the images of a
slight, enigmatic man, with his strange silk scarf, standing outside the
fence at Dayton Air Force base, looking in and largely ignored by Rich-
ard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic as they negotiated an end to the
war in Bosnia and turned a blind eye to Kosovo. They include images of
Rugova pleading with student leaders to call off student demonstrations
lest they annoy the Serbs.
One image depicts Rugova sitting in a booth in a coffee shop during
a break at the Fifth Anniversary of the Dayton Accords, talking to the
author of this book in quiet, courteous English, smoking cigarettes, drink-
ing coffee, and arguing against any political initiatives until independence
had been achieved for Kosovo, and explaining how Kosovo needed only
one political party—his.
These images of Rugova wore thin after Dayton. It is very difficult
for many Kosovars to forget arguments broadcast and printed by Rugova’s
media and press outlets denying the existence of the KLA and describing
its members as a motley collection of bandits and archaic Marxists. When
KLA activity could no longer be dismissed so easily, Rugova insisted that
the KLA fighters and martyrs were Serb secret police and collaborators
in disguise, trying to draw innocent Kosovar Albanians into a trap that
would be sprung, extinguishing all that he had worked for. He ultimately
organized a competing army—the Armed Forces of the Republic of Ko-
sovo (FARK).
The other prominent face of the Peaceful Path Institutionalists was
Bujar Bukoshi. A urologist by training, he served as prime minister of the
Kosovar Albanian Government in Exile, operating initially from Croa-
tia and then from Germany. Charismatic in a more conventional way
than Rugova, his sparkling blue eyes, physical energy, and shock of well-
groomed white hair quickly charm new acquaintances. As talk begins, he
impresses them with his brilliant intelligence and penetrating analysis.
He has an infectious sense of humor, with which he can skewer oppo-
nents through memorable turns of phrase. Far less passive than Rugova,
Bukoshi recognized early that some form of armed resistance to the Serb
presence in Kosovo would be necessary to attract the attention of the
international community and keep pressure on diplomacy. Even before
the KLA was formed, he collaborated with the Planners in Exile and the
Defenders at Home to implement a guerrilla training program in camps in
Albania. Indeed, after Dayton, Bukoshi publicly broke with Rugova over
Rugova’s passivity. Rugova and Bukoshi understood the peaceful path
differently. There was merit in passive resistance, Bukoshi thought, but
there had to be some resistance, and it could not be merely passive.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 15 6/4/08 1:50:10 PM

Bukoshi’s personal force and charisma helped build credibility in

the West for the Kosovar insurgents, though he was slow to provide
resources to the KLA because he feared their recklessness, naivete, and
disorganization. As prime minister of the Government in Exile, he orga-
nized a “Three-Percent Fund,” whose name reflects the moral obligation
of Albanians around the world to contribute three percent of their total
incomes to the Kosovar cause, which financed both the Government
in Exile and a parallel system of schools and other Albanian institu-
tions in Kosovo. Some of the money funded the promotion of the Ko-
sovar cause. But Bukoshi was a committed institutionalist. Any armed
resistance had to be sponsored and controlled by the Government in
Exile. And it had to be prepared for, organized, and led by those with
experience. The eager “children” in the Planners in Exile’s leadership
who were clamoring for war were brave but dangerous. They would get
slaughtered and would bring down the wrath of Milosevic’s Yugoslav
Army on the heads of innocent Kosovar Albanians, unless they could
be brought under control.
Bukoshi had several opportunities to coordinate with the Planners
in Exile. Each time, his dismay at their naivete and recklessness caused
him to pull back from working with them as equals. Each time, he in-
sisted that they turn the war over to him, and promised them his help
to achieve success. Each time he did that, he drove a wedge deeper into
the fault line that already separated the Peaceful Path Institutionalists
from the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home. The Peaceful Path
Institutionalists particularly mistrusted two of the most prominent faces
of the Planners in Exile: Hashim Thaçi and Xhavit Haliti.
Thaçi caught the leadership bug in college. Grandson of a leader of
resistance to the Communists after the Second World War, he took part
in some of the earliest armed conflicts as the KLA was being formed, and
then escaped arrest by fleeing to Switzerland, where he studied political
science and history. The ambitious yet youngest member of the political
directorate that created the KLA, he linked generations and sneaked back
and forth across Kosovo’s border to keep the planners and strategists of
the exile group in touch with the group inside Kosovo, who thought it
had no choice but to begin fighting without waiting for a clear strategy.
Tall, straight, and handsome, Thaçi found himself the face of the KLA to
the outside world, and was the star of the 1999 Rambouillet conference,
the first international peace conference that supported Kosovar Albanian
aspirations. After this he was one of the architects of an independent,
democratic Kosovo, served briefly as prime minister of an interim post-
war government, and then became prime minister more formally in late
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 16 6/4/08 1:50:10 PM

2007, just in time to preside over Kosovo’s declaration of independence

on 17 February 2008.
Thaçi had combined his academic studies at the University of
Prishtina with practical learning at the foot of Adem Jashari, icon of the
Defenders at Home, about the need for a new generation of militancy. At
the University of Prishtina, he became student vice rector in 1992–93,
and sought to provide some nationalist fire for the backward-looking and
essentially passive attitudes of the faculty. Flexible and willing to learn,
Thaçi earned the nickname “Snake,” which was appropriate: His apparent
ability to be in several different places at the same time complemented
his knack for interpreting cues from the West about how the KLA could
shape its activities to maximize Western sympathy. Thaçi often was
the bridge between the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home. A
thinker and a political guy, he appears in some photographs in a jacket
and tie, with everyone else around the table in military uniform. But he
also was a fighter. He stayed in Jashari’s house in 1992 for two months
after the Serbs came to arrest him. He and Jashari held a rifle and had
their picture taken together. Later, Thaçi was a constant presence on the
battlefield who often participated in armed conflict and thereby earned
respect from both KLA camps.
The other prominent face of the Planners in Exile, Xhavit Haliti, is
about a generation older than Thaçi. While Thaçi is Western-style hand-
some, Haliti is a secretive, behind-the-scenes cross between a Communist
apparatchik and a clandestine shadow operative. Remote, suspicious, and
slightly dour in manner, Haliti nevertheless was, at heart, a strategist,
though one key American supporter of the KLA denied that Haliti was
capable of real strategy, and dismissed him as “a street fighter, with con-
nections.” Despite their differences in age and style—or more probably
because of them—Thaçi and Haliti were a perfect team. Haliti provided
greater sophistication forged from experience and an uncanny ability to
plot with hardened representatives of helpful groups from across the spec-
trum of legality and illegality; Thaçi brought not merely an appealing
public face, but the energy and physical courage to take the vision of the
Planners in Exile to the Defenders at Home. Thaçi’s bravery and participa-
tion in actual conflicts gave him credibility that overcame his youth, while
Haliti’s reputation for toughness and useful connections built respect for
the Planners in Exile that Thaçi could not have provided on his own.
The Defenders at Home were more impulsive than the Planners in
Exile. The Defenders focused on action, and figured that strategy could
come later. They were never able to rid themselves entirely of a slight
disdain for those who spent more time thinking than fighting. Never-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 17 6/4/08 1:50:10 PM

theless, they understood that they could not win the fight alone. They
needed the Planners in Exile—Thaçi and Haliti—to get money and arms,
and to build support in the international community.
Ramush Haradinaj and Rrustem Mustafa (Commander Remi) exem-
plify the Defenders at Home, though both came to prominence as leaders
of the group relatively late, only after others had fallen to Serb annihilation
efforts. Haradinaj looks like a tough street fighter but has charisma of the
Bill Clinton variety. He charms everyone—important or not, young and
old—with his friendly acceptance and genuine interest in whomever he
is talking to. Right after the war, young Kosovar Afrim Ademi, who went
to meet Ramush, found himself much in awe. Haradinaj “bounded down
the stairs, dressed in blue jeans, his arms full of folders and papers. When
he saw me, he stopped. ‘I am Ramush Haradinaj,’ he said. He was much,
much smaller than I expected. I had thought he must be a giant. Within
a few days of working for him, I decided that I would give him my life.”
Quick to answer, quick to make a joke, and quick to understand,
Haradinaj is more a man of action than a man of reflection, plans, and
strategy. When asked about the connection between grand strategy and
the KLA’s early initiatives, he says repeatedly, “We had no choice. It
would be good if we had international intervention in our favor, but we
were not going to wait for anyone else. We had to answer [the Serb forces
attacking our homesteads].” The Haradinaj family had long opposed the
Serb domination in Kosovo: Ramush’s uncle had known and worked
with Jusuf Gërvalla in the 1970s and early 1980s, and Ramush and his
brothers recognized that only force could make Kosovo independent.
As the commander of the KLA’s Dukagjini Zone, Haradinaj concen-
trated on military activities, while grudgingly respecting political leader-
ship by Thaçi and others. He washed dishes, dug latrines, fired weapons,
and commanded his troops in more traditional ways. He embraced his
young fighters, making them feel important and helping them shape their
roles in the fight. After the war, Haradinaj accepted the prime minister’s
post in a coalition government with the LDK, even though his party held
only eight seats out of 120 in the assembly. Haradinaj was indicted by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in 2005, and immediately resigned the prime minister’s office and sur-
rendered to the ICTY.
Rrustem Mustafa, usually known as “Commander Remi,” is smaller
than one might expect for the commander of the Llap Valley Zone of the
KLA. He stands about five-foot-nine and weighs 160 to 170 pounds. His
face more lined than that of most forty-year-olds, Commander Remi has
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 18 6/4/08 1:50:10 PM

piercing, intelligent eyes, and a big smile that he flashes with increasing
frequency as he warms up to a new acquaintance. Remi’s charisma is
manifest, though he is quieter in movement and speech than Ramush.
He fixes your gaze in his blue eyes and stops smiling while you are talk-
ing to him, pulling meaning out of you quickly. Otherwise relaxed and
affectionate, his smile and pat on the back make you feel that you and
he are buddies, though it is hard to ignore the intense seriousness that
comes when he is listening. His short stature is soon forgotten, as one
is drawn in to his careful assessment of how best to organize and deploy
outgunned and outnumbered but committed fighting forces. Remi learned
military tactics by watching American movies about the Marine Corps
and worked secretly with early resistance fighter Zahir Pajaziti north
of Prishtina, even while he was head of the LDK youth group in Podu-
jevë and, thus, nominally part of the Peaceful Path Institutionalists. In
2003, international judges in Kosovo sentenced him to seventeen years
in prison for activities conducted by forces in his area before and after
the war. His conviction was reversed on appeal in 2005 by another panel
of international judges in Kosovo.
Where Haradinaj was impulsive, Remi was deliberate. Alone among
the major figures in the KLA, Remi had administrative experience. He
thought and functioned as a good military manager should, delegating
pursuant to clear policies, and organizing a training academy and fi-
nancial networks of his own. Haradinaj’s methods enabled him to start
fighting sooner—indeed, the Serb focus on his location near the arms
smuggling routes near the Albanian border forced him to fight sooner.
Remi’s emphasis on preparation delayed hostilities and sometimes frus-
trated Ramush. But Remi was more willing than were any of the other
commanders both to recruit skilled, experienced subordinates and to
delegate responsibility to them. His was no do-it-yourself operation,
though Remi himself led groups of thirty to forty soldiers, walking to
Albania and back to fetch weapons.
The affection between Remi and his soldiers is still tangible. Six years
after the end of the war, one young soldier who worships Remi accom-
panied the author of this book to visit him in the Dubrava prison. Both
at the beginning and, more extensively, at the end of the meeting, Remi
leaned through the opening in the barrier, grasped the young soldier’s
neck with one hand and affectionately slapped his face, all the while
smiling and expressing his gratitude in seeing him. The young soldier
was aglow for an hour afterward.
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Albanian Nationalism and New Possibilities

The KLA’s war in Kosovo was a nationalist revolution, a final effort by
the 90 percent ethnic Albanian population to displace the Serbian au-
thorities—whom the Albanians saw as foreign oppressors. The six leaders
profiled were Albanian nationalists. None had a religious background.
Albanian nationalism, however, long had coexisted with an Albanian
defeatism and a sense of victimization. The League of Prizren, formed
mostly in Kosovo, fought for more autonomy and resisted the breakup
of Albanian territories as the Ottoman Empire crumbled. Three hundred
members of the league met in Prizren on June 10, 1878, declared Albanian
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently expelled the Ot-
tomans from a territory reaching as far north and east as Mitrovica and
Prishtina, before being crushed by a considerably larger Ottoman army.
During the two “Balkan Wars” of the early twentieth century, Kosovo
and Albanian areas of Macedonia were battlegrounds between Serb and
Ottoman forces in the first war, and then between Serb and Bulgarian
forces in the second.2 Serbia penetrated all the way to the Adriatic at
one point. Negotiations over the borders of the new state of Albania
continued, even as Serb forces took more territory. Finally the allies, not
wanting to anger Russia, reluctantly ceded Albanian-dominated lands
in present-day Kosovo in December 1913, in the Protocol of Florence.
For the remainder of the twentieth century, Kosovar Albanians nursed a
grudge not only against the Serbs, whom they saw as foreign occupiers
in Kosovo, but also against the great powers of Europe, whom they saw
as having repeatedly betrayed or ignored them, and, later, against Tito’s
Communism. The Albanian dream had not been extinguished. It lived
on in village custom and folk music. But it was hard to see how it could
ever be realized.
Protected both by a close-knit extended family structure and by geo-
graphic isolation, Albanian nationalism was fueled by a rich set of his-
torical myths, distinctive folk music closely tied to traditional celebra-
tions of marriage and harvest, and a well-developed body of clan-based
law. Kosovar Albanians viewed Yugoslavia and Serbia as oppressors who
replaced the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to a natural claim for national
autonomy. Foreign oppression was the central theme of Albanian folk
culture. The Highland Lute, a 15,613–line epic poem, composed between
1902 and 1909 by Albanian author Gjergj Fishta, begins, “Five hundred
years are now behind us, since Albania the fair was taken, since the
Turks took and enslaved her.”3 This part of the poem celebrates the spirit
of Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbeg, who organized Albanian nobles against
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 20 6/4/08 1:50:10 PM

the Ottoman Empire. Skenderbeg died in 1468, some thirty years before
Christopher Columbus “discovered” America.
Folk music fueled nationalism. After the Second World War, illit-
eracy was the norm in Kosovo, especially in the villages. Deprived of
formal education in their own language for generations, Albanians used
music. At weddings and at celebrations of the end of the harvest and
when someone slaughtered a cow or a sheep during the winter, half the
village would gather. As Besim Beqaj explained, each gathering started
with music.
Each village had two or three men who could play the Çiftelia (a two-
string plucked instrument) a Lahuta (a single-stringed instrument, played
with a bow) or Sharkia (a six-string instrument resembling a mandolin)
or, in the mountains, a short flute with six holes. Others could play the
drums—the kind you beat with sticks on both ends—or the bagpipes,
or a 14–inch tambourine. They were the village music-makers. They
couldn’t read music; they just had a talent. They could hear a song and
then it would go into their heads, and they could play it and sing.
This tradition continued into the 1990s. As people gathered, some-
one would say, “Play us a song about Adem Jashari,” or “Play us a song
about Luan Haradinaj,” and they would make it up on the spot, with
lyrics that awakened our dreams of winning our freedom and becoming
a nation once again. When they started playing, all talking stopped, and
everyone was lost in the music. Usually, there would be a guest or two
from another village who liked a song. He would say, “Can you come
play for me next month?” And thus the music and its dreams spread
through the people.
This had been going on for hundreds of years. The Rilindja period in Al-
banian literature, which began in the 1870s and was led by poet Naim
Frashëri, urged ethnic Albanians to overcome religious differences in
the interest of fostering a “national” consciousness. Many of Frashëri’s
poems were sung as folk songs.4 Folk “minstrels” are the protagonists
in Albanian writer Ismail Kadare’s famous novels Elegy for Kosovo and
File on H, which link traditional Albanian folk music of the fourteenth
century to modern events. Rugova, Bukoshi, Thaçi, Haliti, Haradinaj, and
Remi grew up with this music and these nationalist yearnings.
And nationalism had breathing space in Kosovo for a time. Following
a particularly vicious repression of Kosovar Albanians by Serb governor
and Tito intimate Aleksandar Rankovic, after which Rankovic was de-
posed in a 1966 power struggle with Tito, Tito made an effort to address
Kosovar Albanian grievances and rewrote the Yugoslav constitution in
1974, granting the province of Kosovo autonomy similar to that enjoyed
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 21 6/4/08 1:50:11 PM

by the six republics.5 Autonomy opened new pathways for Albanian

national awareness and expression, but also threatened to undermine
nationalist pressures for independence. Albanians, particularly those
among the emergent urban elite, experienced significant gains. As the
main architect of Yugoslavia, Tito emphasized a distinctive Yugoslav
national identity. He worked hard to construct a set of myths and cul-
tural forms that supplanted separatist Slovene, Serb, Croat, and Alba-
nian cultural traditions. The success of the elites and their complaisance
worried more ardent nationalists, who feared assimilation unless some
conscious effort was made to keep Albanian culture and national symbols
alive. Early Planners in Exile, encouraged sporadically by Enver Hoxha’s
Albanian intelligence services, worked hard at developing support for an
independent Kosovo but were largely regarded as radical movements on
the political fringes.
The goal for most of the militant Kosovar Albanians was to become
part of a “Greater Albania.” The secrecy and silence surrounding Alba-
nia acted to accentuate Kosovar fantasies that Albania was a paradise
for ethnic Albanians. Albania’s strictly regimented Maoist isolationism
prevented most Kosovar Albanians from visiting the country and real-
izing what an economic and political wreck Albania represented. Still,
the nationalists faced resistance and skepticism about their militancy
and their Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Things changed dramatically with the fall of the iron curtain and the
1989 election of Slobodan Milosevic as president of Serbia. Until 1989
the cold war not only inhibited Western intervention into the affairs of
Yugoslavia but also discouraged bold action within the Balkans. Both Tito
and Enver Hoxha had been frightened by the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its similar response in Hungary a decade
earlier.6 At odds since Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, Hoxha and Tito
drew closer together after the 1968 invasion. Hoxha promised to help
defend Yugoslavia against a possible Soviet attack; Tito promised to ac-
cede to some Albanian demands in Kosovo, resulting in the opening of
Prishtina University and elements of the 1974 constitution. While Tito
remained alive, Hoxha moderated his calls for establishment of a Greater
Albania, and kept his eye on the most radical Albanian nationalists who
might, after all, threaten Hoxha’s Marxist dictatorship in Albania as well
as Tito’s relatively benign sponsorship of Serbian control of Kosovo. The
collapse of Communist rule in central and eastern Europe opened pos-
sibilities for Kosovar Albanians in two respects. It removed the specter
that a conflict in Kosovo might draw in both the Soviet Union and the
United States and start a general war. Easing that fear made Western in-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 22 6/4/08 1:50:11 PM

tervention on the side of the Kosovar Albanians a realistic possibility. The

collapse in the east also set an example of how popular resistance could
topple regimes apparently backed by overwhelming military force and a
police-state apparatus. Although it would eventually become clear that
more would be required to free Kosovo than mere imitation of eastern
European freedom movements, the Planners in Exile and the Defenders
at Home were excited by the possibilities.
Most revolutions are led by the young, and especially by young men
(as one Albanian nationalist in his sixties put it derisively, the KLA was a
“tyranny of boys”). They have less to lose. They crave excitement. They
embrace symbols and idealism more readily than those whose dreams
have been ground down by failures large and small. Inside Kosovo, the
University of Prishtina became a crucible for young Albanian national-
ists. Though the university was a symbol of freedom, some of the most
ambitious young people were hugely disappointed by what they found
there. As one young activist who subsequently became a leader of the
KLA said, “The professors were a disgrace. All they cared about was main-
taining their positions, and extolling the virtues of Titoist Communism,
or telling tired stories of Albanian heroes of a hundred years ago. They
had no vision. They did not want to take any risks. It gradually dawned
on me that it was up to us. If anything was going to change, we would
have to change it. And so I set out to do that.”
The university quickly became a nest for organizing demonstra-
tions and for recruiting militants. In 1981, right after Tito died, an Al-
banian student at the University of Prishtina started a protest over food.
It quickly spread to Albanian miners from Trepça, who protested their
working conditions and low pay. Similar disturbances burst out all over
Kosovo. The Serbs responded brutally, rolling tanks into the streets of
Prishtina and killing many.7 More than one thousand were imprisoned.
Many young activists were jailed for years or exiled from the country for
doing something as simple as encouraging their friends to demonstrate.
The jails, however, merely acted as another way for political activists to
forge connections with each other and sharpen their desire to see Kosovo
liberated from the rest of Yugoslavia. Many of those imprisoned became
leaders of the precursors to the KLA.
The breeding ground for the Kosovo Liberation Army was as much in
Germany and Switzerland as it was in Kosovo itself. Young revolutionar-
ies like Jashar Salihu, Xhavit Haliti, Jusuf and Bardosh Gërvalla, and Kadri
Zeka made their way to Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium, among other
European countries, and began to organize a resistance against the Serb
presence in Kosovo. The Gërvalla brothers and Zeka met up in Stuttgart
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 23 6/4/08 1:50:11 PM

in 1981 and together captivated Albanians abroad with an accessible

message of an independent Kosovo. They sponsored Albanian music
concerts, Albanian Flag Day celebrations, and coffeehouse discussions of
politics. On January 17, 1982, while emerging from a political meeting,
the Gërvalla brothers and Zeka were gunned down (by the Yugoslav Secret
Service, as most people believe). A huge outpouring of public sympathy
for the victims and outrage at the Yugoslav regime followed. Ironically,
the killings of the Gërvallas and Zeka may have done more to crystallize
Kosovar Albanian nationalism than could possibly have been achieved
had they remained alive to continue their work.
The younger generation—those under thirty in 1989—had their ex-
pectations raised by the opening of Albanian-language education and
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Humiliated by Serb police, they left
their homeland by the thousands to seek political refuge or to earn a
living, or both. The exile phenomenon contributed to the possibility of
insurgency—to the consciousness of potential, a concept explored fully in
the next chapter—because it brought tens of thousands of young people
in contact with the West, and thereby broke the effect that isolation had
on much of the Albanian community. Beginning to crystallize into the
Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home, the young nationalists
were eager to do battle with their more conservative Kosovar Albanian
elders—the Peaceful Path Institutionalists—for the hearts and minds of
the Albanian population in Kosovo. In 1993, they organized the KLA.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 24 6/4/08 1:50:11 PM

2 Building and Maintaining
Public Support
Valon Murati slipped out of his apartment door and

into the cool Prishtina night. He moved quickly and
deliberately down the street and effortlessly avoided
two Serbian police patrols. The pamphlets taped to his
body that called for revolution meant a quick arrest and
imprisonment—or worse—if he got caught. Valon, just
nineteen years old, still struggled to get his elders to take
his ideas seriously, but his natural athleticism and wits
were enough to have avoided detection thus far. Before
long he would hold a gun and participate in the violence
on the horizon. For the time being he contented himself
to make these nightly treks across Prishtina distributing
his leaflets from door to door as he crawled through
apartment complexes and neighborhoods. The leaflets
themselves looked innocent. They had been printed
off his computer and folded in half to display the name
“LKÇK.” The content was more damning. They argued
that violence would be the only way that Albanian
Kosovars could shake free from Serb control. Most of the
intended audience needed considerable persuasion.
No one thought the KLA could win. Everyone knew that

Yugoslavia had the third strongest army in the world. If
we were patient, most Kosovars thought, the Serbs would
eventually come to their senses and let up on the repres-
sion. Occasionally, there were rumors of an organization
called the KLA, but Serb television rarely reported on
KLA activities, and word of mouth was filtered through
LDK adherents. The KLA seemed to be only one of a
number of historical dissident groups resisting the LDK
“government.” It was made up of a handful of bandits,
sociopaths, and Marxists from a few villages. If it had any
25
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 25 6/4/08 1:50:11 PM

effect, it would make things worse by justifying greater

Serb repression. Its founders, who were in Switzerland or
Germany, were always more militant than those who still
were in Kosovo; they had less to lose by an insurgency,
and probably more to gain.
So recalls Liridon Lidifi. He was fourteen in 1997, when the Kosovo

Liberation Army first went public, and sixteen when he and his family
were driven out of their village into a Macedonian refugee camp by Serb
forces. He was never tempted to join the KLA.
Revolution does not succeed without popular support. “Without a

political goal,” said Mao Tse-Tung, “guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must
if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people
and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.”1 Che
Guevara agreed: “The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of
the area. This is an indispensable condition.”2
Popular support is necessary to provide both a pool of fighters and a
matrix within which the fighters can operate and hide. Supportive com-
munities give psychological encouragement for sons, daughters, nephews,
and nieces who fight. They supply food, shelter, clothing, and vehicles.
They provide places where guerrillas can hide after attacks. When popular
support is lacking, insurgents are deprived of all these necessities and
are more vulnerable to regime efforts to crush the insurgency, because
then civilians are as likely to cooperate with the regime’s police and in-
telligence agencies as with the insurgents.
An insurgency can succeed, however, without universal popular sup-
port. All that is necessary is for a critical mass of support to exist in the
right places, geographically and within identifiable segments of political
opinion. As this chapter explains, for example, support for the KLA never
was strong in Prishtina, in such municipalities in the South and East as
Gjilan and Ferizaj, or among urban elites in other cities such as Prizren
and Mitrovica. The effort to win the hearts and minds of the Kosovar
population involved three competing visions. The KLA thought the best
way to win over the population was to start fighting to show that it was
possible. Other groups, such as Murati’s LKÇK (National Movement for
the Liberation of Kosovo), thought fighting should be deferred until after
the population had been conditioned to accept violence. The Peaceful
Path Institutionalists thought Kosovar Albanian goals could be achieved
without fighting.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 26 6/4/08 1:50:11 PM

Building and Maintaining Public Support 27
The KLA understood what theory teaches: Successful insurgencies

build popular support in several ways. They harness the spirit of defiance,
mobilize ideology, create a “consciousness of potentiality,” undermine
support for the regime by key elites by undermining confidence in the
regime to fulfill popular aspirations, and provide charismatic leadership.
The KLA could significantly boost the spirit of defiance, contribute the
ideology, stimulate consciousness of potentiality, and harness charisma.
Milosevic had more control over attitudes toward his regime. (He, the
means he used, and their effect are the subject of chapter four.)
Harnessing the Spirit of Defiance

When people decide whether to support an insurgency, they consider
a variety of factors, including the probability of success and the cost of
failure. Some potential supporters, however, are also motivated by a spirit
of defiance, a desire, as Rexhep Selimi put it, “to slap [the oppressors] in
the face and to get away with it.” Many young Kosovars like Fahri Rama
wanted to slap their Serb oppressors in the face. “When I was in high
school, I was walking home from school one day with my school books.
A Serb policeman stopped me and demanded to know why I was carrying
the books. I explained that I was just coming from school and was going
home. The Serb policeman took me to the police station and told me that
I had to eat the books because they were written in Albanian instead of
Serbian, and then proceeded to make me eat several pages.” Organizers
of the KLA, especially the Defenders at Home, harnessed the latent spirit
of defiance that was inherent in Albanian nationalism and that became
more and more patent in response to Milosevic’s brutality.
Elizabeth Jean Wood, building a model of insurgency from her field-
work in El Salvador, emphasizes the spirit of defiance as a motivator.
Some strongly defiant members, such as those who lost a loved one to
regime forces, will participate even if the probability of success is zero.
Anyone who participates in an insurgency realizes defiance benefits. But
“agency benefits”—the pleasure of successful assertion of their interests
and identity, somewhat akin to the pleasure of being on the winning side
in any conflict—and the cost of losing depend on success and failure,
respectively.3
Certain conditions “tip” the balance in favor of participation. The
larger the value given to defiance, the lower the insurgency threshold.
The higher the value placed on the pleasure of agency, of being on the
winning side, the less difficult it is to recruit supporters, once an insur-
gency gains momentum. The greater the cost of failed participation, the
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 27 6/4/08 1:50:12 PM

more demanding the requirements for self-sustaining collective action.

Wood’s factors are mutually reinforcing. Success breeds success, and the
larger the number of adherents, the greater the likelihood of success.
Success in specific engagements increases popular estimates of future
success. Popular pessimism about success reduces support and makes
success less probable.4
In Kosovo, the spirit of defiance was strong, especially within the
Defenders at Home group, which was the kernel around which operations
on the ground crystallized. “The most important factor in our eventual
success was the pent-up energy, [the] rage of our young people,” said Rex-
hep Selimi. “It was unlike anything in other parts of Yugoslavia.” Arianit
Zeka recalled, “The Serb police came to arrest several Albanians, close
to our flat in Sunny Hill. They fought back, and the Serbs killed them.
I remember thinking, ‘I hope one day I will be able to fight back.’” The
organizers of the KLA took this spirit of defiance as a given, and worked
to condition popular opinion to increase the perceptions of the likelihood
of success and the “consciousness of potentiality” (considered later in
this chapter). As KLA ranks swelled after the Jashari Massacre, the value
of agency increased more than proportionally.
Mobilizing Ideology
An insurgency’s political leadership must articulate a cause or ideology in
terms that attract sympathy from enough different groups to constitute
a successful coalition.5 An ideological appeal avoids the need for leaders
of an insurgency to articulate a precise program. Ideological commit-
ment increases the spirit of defiance and the value of agency. Ideological
motivations for supporting insurgency are unaffected by the probabil-
ity of success or failure. The KLA had three ideologies with which to
work: Marxism-Leninism, Albanian nationalism, and Islam. Nationalism
eclipsed the other two.
The Peaceful Path Institutionalists, the Planners in Exile, and the
Defenders at Home all had roots in Marxism-Leninism. Both Yugoslavia
and Albania were, after all, socialist states until the end of the 1980s. The
Planners in Exile emerged from the Popular League for the Republic of
Kosovo (LPRK), which changed its name to Popular League for Kosovo
(LPK) in the early 1990s, associated with a handful of Marxist-Leninist
Albanian nationalists in Germany and Switzerland. The Peaceful Path
Institutionalists were anchored by the Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK), Kosovo’s dominant political party, which had emerged as Kosovar
Albanians seceded from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1991.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 28 6/4/08 1:50:12 PM

The Defenders at Home were more eclectic: some tilted toward the LPK;
others left the LDK in frustration at its passivity. But they also had been
brought up as communists.
The Planners in Exile understood that they needed to shed the Marx-
ist-Leninist label associated with the LPRK/LPK. What once had appeared
to be an empowering ideology was now an embarrassment. The early
identification of the LPRK with Hoxha and Marxism-Leninism limited
popular support for the militants among Kosovar Albanians, especially
after 1989. The iron curtain had fallen. The Soviet Union had collapsed.
Tito was dead. Everyone in eastern Europe was rushing to embrace mar-
ket economics. Marxist-Leninist leanings seemed quaint, for “as Serb
response to student demonstrations became more brutal in the 1980s, the
general reaction was, ‘Those are only Enver Hoxha’s kids getting killed,
barking for Communism.’ The association of those advocating militant
resistance with Hoxha’s brand of Marxism-Leninism represented a sig-
nificant barrier to broad popular support.”6 By the mid-1990s, no Koso-
var in his right mind thought Marxism-Leninism would be an effective
ideological pillar of resistance in Kosovo. An important motivation for
establishing the KLA as an organization separate from the LPK, and with
a different name, was to avoid the Marxist-Leninist label.
Religion, of course, is a powerful ideology in many contexts.7 But it
played little role in building popular support for the KLA. Islamic funda-
mentalism had played a significant, albeit not a dominant, role in mobiliz-
ing Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). Indeed Alia Izebegovic, the president of
Bosnia, wrote a number of Islamic-oriented tracts while in prison. Obvi-
ously, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Islamic fundamentalism has been a
powerful ideological theme for Muslim insurgents. But this did not happen
in Kosovo. Islam had less psychological pull in Kosovo than Catholicism
did in Ireland. Kosovar Albanians were Albanian before they were Muslim.
To the Irish, being Irish and being Catholic were inseparable.
Kosovar Albanians have historically been quite secular, for they nour-
ished nationalist aspirations against fellow Muslims in the Ottoman Em-
pire. Ten to 20 percent of Kosovar Albanians are Catholic. The Albanian
cultural identity is sufficiently strong that the apparently foreign ideas
of Islamic fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere achieved
little resonance when they came to Kosovo in relatively small numbers
to infiltrate the KLA and its predecessors. Moreover, the organizers of
the KLA understood that embrace of Islam would seriously undercut
international support for the insurgency in Kosovo.
The ideology of the KLA was almost exclusively the ideology of
Albanian nationalism: Emphasis on Albanian ethnicity, culture, and na-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 29 6/4/08 1:50:12 PM

tionalist aspirations undercut competing impulses favoring assimilation

into the emerging Yugoslav identity. In order to build popular support for
armed resistance, the KLA had to undermine the credibility of the myth
of Yugoslavia; it had to convince the Albanians in Kosovo, in western
Europe, and in the United States that Kosovo was a police state—that
the Serbs were an occupation army, not the agents of Yugoslav intereth-
nic tolerance. Under Milosevic, the Serbs made it easy for the Kosovar
Albanians to characterize them as “foreign” because, unlike Tito, Serbs
placed little emphasis on everyone’s common identity as a “Yugoslav.”
Milosevic reinforced the perception that Albanian solidarity was distinct
from the increasingly Serb identity of his regime.
Ideology and a spirit of defiance are not enough for an insurgency,
however, absent a consciousness of potentiality.8 Defiance by itself ex-
presses little more than smoldering resentment and random acts of hos-
tility. Ideology by itself merely breeds debating societies.
Creating a “Consciousness of Potentiality”

Ladifi recalls, “We thought there was no possibility of changing things.
My mom used to say, ‘We’ve been fighting for two hundred years. I’ll get
you a bike when we get independence.’ I never expected to get the bike.”
In some quarters, however, there were stirrings of hope.
Sometime in 1994, when I was about fourteen, Zahir Pajaziti and some
others came and talked to my father. My father closed the door, but I put
my ear to it and listened. They told my father about people who were
training to fight back. Over the next few years, I would occasionally
hear of attacks on the police north of Prishtina. They always killed the
most brutal policemen—the ones everyone knew were beasts. I won-
dered whether this was what I had heard my father and Pajaziti talking
about. (Arianit Zeka)
In 1996, when I was still in secondary school in Drenas in the Drenica
Valley, there began to be rumors of people seeing armed men in the
woods. Then, in 1997, actual armed attacks began in Drenica. These
armed attacks got across the message that KLA might be real after all and
that armed resistance was possible. Most people still thought that the
Serbs were doing it to themselves, as part of a feigned plot to justify the
repression. The weight of public opinion was so strong that Albanians
were incapable of effective resistance, I wasn’t so sure. I thought maybe
Albanians were doing it. But I lacked conviction. Remember that before
August of 1997 no one had ever seen a KLA member. (Lirim Greiçevci)
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 30 6/4/08 1:50:12 PM

The greatest challenge for organizers of the KLA and its predecessors was
to create a “consciousness of potentiality.” This is what Ramush Haradi-
naj meant in saying, “We had to show that it was possible to answer.”
The KLA had to persuade the population that armed revolt would
not simply be crushed, thus achieving little and exposing not only the
actual fighters but also the civilian population to an increased risk of
repression. Before the Yugoslav Army withdrew from Slovenia in 1991,
thus allowing Slovenia to become independent, Yugoslav forces were
generally viewed as almost invincible even against Western or Soviet
military force. Though the withdrawal from Slovenia may have seeded
doubt about that proposition, the long and brutal course of the war in
Croatia and Bosnia gave no reason to believe that a small and poorly or-
ganized Kosovar Albanian force could achieve success against Serb forces
without enormous bloodshed.
The KLA organizers not only had to overcome the perception that de-
feat was certain. They also had to persuade the mass of Kosovar Albanians
that the KLA was the right agency to lead rebellion, that the potential for
the KLA and its predecessors was greater than that for Ibrahim Rugova’s
passive resistance. Such an effort to change public opinion among Koso-
var Albanians manifestly did not succeed in the first half of the 1990s.
One reason was that the KLA was nearly invisible. As the author was
told confidentially, “KLA was very clandestine. It was not necessary to
be ‘public’ in the way that term came to mean later. KLA very carefully
targeted particular uniformed police military and Serb security agents.
Everyone knew who these were. When they were eliminated, the people
applauded and began to understand that successful armed resistance was
possible.” The Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home believed that
actual armed resistance was the most potent symbol of potential suc-
cess. The 1997 collapse of the Albanian government after mass protest
strengthened the argument and helped energize the Kosovar Albanians.
They thought, “If they can do it, so can we.” The collapse of the Albanian
regime also relieved constraints on the KLA’s ability to demonstrate po-
tentiality through action, because it made arms more readily available.
Undermine Support for the Regime by Key Elites

Gandhi emphasized the need to separate elites from the regime.9 In the
Kosovo conflict, the relevant elites were not Serbian ones in Belgrade;
they were Albanian ones in Prishtina. For the KLA, the most salient
elites were those adhering to Rugova within Kosovo itself. The KLA had
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 31 6/4/08 1:50:12 PM

to separate the Albanian political class from Rugova; it also had to sepa-
rate the people from Rugova’s elite. The LDK engaged in no atrocities
that would repel these elites. Yet it was possible to persuade increasing
numbers of these elites that continued pursuit of the Rugova policy of
passive resistance was hopeless.
Initially, Rugova’s LDK was better at public relations than the KLA.
Rugova sustained a barrage of announcements broadcasting invitations
from foreign states for Rugova to participate in international conferences.
If the international community was so receptive to Rugova, surely inter-
vention on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians was just around the corner.
But others, some within Rugova’s own party, were not so sanguine. Jakup
Krasniqi was an example. He helped connect the KLA with mainstream
Kosovar politics. A tough, smart, articulate schoolteacher and regional
leader of Rugova’s party in the Glocovac (Drenas) municipality, Kras-
niqi became a senior strategist and spokesperson for the KLA. He began
working with the KLA clandestinely in the early 1990s. He served as the
KLA spokesman beginning in 1998 and is now the general secretary of
the PDK. Krasniqi recalls that his was a “voice in the wilderness,” as he
worked hard in the early 1990s going into the community to persuade
people that Serbs were running a repressive police state and that the
Kosovar Albanians should resist.
Every step of the way, the majority of Rugova’s LDK Peaceful Path In-
stitutionalists undercut this message. The hardest public education task
for the KLA was to persuade enough ordinary Kosovars that alternative
pathways represented by the LDK would not bear fruit. KLA communi-
qués issued during 1996 and 1997 consistently cajoled and threatened
the Albanian political class to stop propaganda against the KLA,10 and to
avoid bargaining away Albanian territories.11 A 1997 communiqué called
upon Albanians “wherever they are” to support the KLA both financially
and by “joining its lines.”12
In the early nineties, the KLA was still a tiny, fragmented, mostly
rural organization whose existence was denied by the Peaceful Path In-
stitutionalists. The outcome of the struggle for the hearts and minds
of Kosovar Albanians remained very much in doubt. The crucial event
that turned the tide in favor of the KLA was the signing of the Dayton
Accords at the end of 1995. The agreement was a bombshell to the Ko-
sovars. Rugova’s strategy of passive resistance was bankrupt. The inter-
nationals had intervened in Yugoslavia, but Kosovo had been forgotten.
The results of the Dayton Accords afforded the KLA instant credibility.
KLA supporters consistently argued that the international community
only responded to violence. Increasingly people began to listen.
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The struggle between Rugova’s Peaceful Path Institutionalists and the

KLA’s Planners in Exile and Defenders at Home grew increasingly bitter.
This is how one early Planner in Exile supporter described sentiment:
The militant resisters felt that Rugova, the LDK—and all other political
parties—and their sympathizers had undermined the Albanian cause.
Too often, the LDK message was the same as Milosevic’s: the only good
Albanian is an uneducated passive one. There was a widespread belief
among the militant resisters that they had to fight on two fronts, whether
with rhetoric or direct action. They had to fight the Serbs, but before
they could fight the Serbs effectively they had to win a war against the
Albanian pacifists. (Kurt Bexheti)
Disaffection with Rugova grew after he unilaterally extended his term

as president in May 1996, declining to convene a scheduled session of
the parallel government’s parliament.13 Even elites grew disaffected with
Rugova.14 It was difficult, however, for them to turn to the KLA because
they trusted the KLA even less. “Their frustration with Rugova was le-
gitimate, and I understand their anger,” Bukoshi said. “It was not just that
Rugova sought a peaceful resolution. It was that Rugova was passive in
the execution of his own strategy. But the KLA’s “political directorate”—
eventually the “general staff”—was diffuse and disorganized. Thaçi was
a part of it but no one could speak for it. There was no one with whom
anyone else could deal. They were like children. Excited at the prospect
of war and convinced, ‘If you’ll just give us a few Kalashnikovs [automatic
rifles], we’ll take Belgrade.’” Eventually, however, Bukoshi and other
critical members of the Kosovar Albanian elite came around. Having
initially refused KLA requests for money from his Three Percent Fund,
he was actively channeling money into the KLA by late 1998.
To abandon Rugova, the people of Kosovo needed to see some alter-
native leaders. The KLA had an abundance of charismatic leaders like
Hashim Thaçi, Ramush Haradinaj, and Commander Remi. The problem
was that they were invisible to the general public in Kosovo; they had to
be to avoid annihilation by the regime. Until late in the war, in late 1998
and in 1999, the general public only saw Rugova, Bukoshi, and longtime
Albanian political prisoner Adem Demaçi, had heard the words of young
Valon Murati, and been informed about those KLA fighters who had been
killed. Later in the war, from the summer of 1998 onward, they began
to see Jakup Krasniqi and Hashim Thaçi, the youthful Planner in Exile,
more prominently during and after the Rambouillet Conference.
Crucial to the KLA’s growing legitimacy among the political elites
was validation by two important opinion leaders: one from Kosovo and
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 33 6/4/08 1:50:13 PM

one from the United States. Adem Demaçi’s concept of leadership was
to sacrifice himself to Serb abuse to build courage in the Albanian com-
munity. Further, his tough rhetoric helped provide cover for compromise
that made the NATO intervention possible. Before the Jashari Massacre,
Demaçi was the most visible contemporary symbol of Albanian resis-
tance to the Serb occupation. As a long-term political prisoner, he was
the Kosovar Albanian Nelson Mandela, and his courage in prison was the
fire that kept the colors of Albanian hope vivid in the early days. Demaçi
helped organize one of the first underground movements for Kosovo’s
liberation from Yugoslavia in the 1960s: The Revolutionary Movement
for Albanian Unity.15 As a result of that and other causes, he would serve
several lengthy prison sentences during his lifetime, being released from
prison for the last time on April 18, 1990.
Now in his seventies, Adem Demaçi leans across the table. His strik-
ing blue eyes, magnified through his thick glasses, sparkle as they pull
you into his argument. He envelops you with the force of his personality.
His English and Albanian are rhythmic and filled with vivid metaphors
as he tells you,
Everyone has his own time. Some people, they take up weapons. They
fight. That was not my style. For example, I am your uncle. And you are
going to fight. Albanian blood relations, they are pretty strong. And I tell
you that I know that you are fighting against oppression and you are fight-
ing for our independence. I chose my own style. I would speak out. And
the Serbian Army and police would come for me. I would die for Kosovo.
My life is only for Kosovo, and I would give my life for Kosovo.
Demaçi became the political spokesman for the KLA in August 1998. His
embrace of the KLA lent enormous respect to the organization, because
he was the uncompromising symbol of Kosovar Albanian militancy. And
U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s meeting with KLA soldiers at Ju-
nik in the late summer of 1998 cemented KLA respectability because it
suggested endorsement by the United States.
The insurgency in Kosovo relied on charisma—not only that of liv-
ing individuals, but often also the charisma of the dead “martyrs,” as
the Kosovars refer to almost every KLA casualty. Zahir Pajaziti’s statue
sits across the street from the main hotel in Prishtina. Adem Jashari’s
picture adorns many walls. The statue was not there before the Serb
forces withdrew in 1999, however, and most people were afraid to display
Jashari’s picture where the Serbs could see it. The charisma of Pajaziti’s
and Jashari’s martyrdoms was felt and heard widely but clandestinely.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 34 6/4/08 1:50:13 PM

Although the KLA had managed by 1998 to peel away key members of
the Kosovar Albanian political elite, significant loyalties to the Peaceful
Path Institutionalists remained. The KLA leaders and martyrs were not
charismatic for everyone. As one leading Peaceful Path Institutionalist
told the author on condition of anonymity,
The characteristics of the KLA nomenclatura were ominous. And they
were murky. Thaçi tended to be out in front because he was glamorous.
Others, like Haliti, Selimi, and Krasniqi had as much influence and
power as Thaçi, but they kept themselves more in the background. All
of them thirsted for power. Haradinaj was second-string. He was brave,
but he did not know what he was doing. Remi was looking after his own
interests. He knew nothing. And Adem Jashari was not a “legendary
commander.” He commanded no one. He was a rural ruffian who was
killed in a botched attempt to arrest him.
Even as support for the KLA grew, popular opinion in Kosovo re-
mained divided. Opinion polls conducted by the U.S. State Department
during the NATO bombing campaign showed Rugova commanding more
popular support than KLA leaders. And, after the war, Rugova’s party con-
sistently led the KLA parties at the ballot box. These LDK loyalists were
willing to bite their tongues as long as the KLA achieved success on the
battlefield, but they remained ready to criticize the KLA’s ineffectiveness
and recklessness when it encountered reverses. These internal tensions
produced conflict between the KLA and Bukoshi’s FARK (discussed in
chapter five). The underlying divisions also threatened to wreck the KLA’s
success at Rambouillet. But Thaçi came out on top, as described in later
chapters. In order to raise the consciousness of potentiality, the KLA had
to start fighting. It needed fighters to do that.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 35 6/4/08 1:50:13 PM

3 Recruiting Fighters
and Commanders
I wasn’t going to take it any more. I decided to fight.

I didn’t care if I got killed. I was going to fight for
independence. After my training, I was told to go home
until a unit could be formed, but I wasn’t going to go
home; I was ready to fight. I was afraid at first, but after I
had the first shot fired at me by the Serbs, I wasn’t afraid
any more. Even if we got killed, we were going to make
the Serbs pay a price.
—Fahri Rama
Fahri Rama, slim and well built, looks taller than his 5'11".
He now works as a waiter in the Hotel Victory in Prishtina, where his
boyish smile breaks through his shyness whenever he greets a guest. (The
hotel caters to internationals.) Fahri joined the KLA when he was twenty,
in the village where he grew up. His father had worked for the railway,
but was fired because he was Albanian, when Slobodan Milosevic came
to power.
Fahri’s sentiments and bravery exemplify the hostility to continued
Serb repression felt by thousands of others in his age group. But hostility
to a regime by a large portion of a population is not an insurgency. Hope
that other states will intervene to change the status quo is not an insur-
gency. An insurgency exists only when individuals are willing to fight.
Moreover, the KLA’s local hearts-and-minds strategy was to build popular
support by showing that it was possible to fight. That meant recruiting
fighters and motivating them to put their lives at risk. Kosovo is a place
where action against oppressors is deeply embedded in the culture. It also
36
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 36 6/4/08 1:50:13 PM

Recruiting Fighters and Commanders 37
is a place where pessimism is embedded almost as strongly. In order for

the KLA to exist—in order for it to prevail—something had to happen
to tilt the balance in favor of action and against pessimism. Individuals
had to be motivated to take the risks associated with taking up arms;
leaders who could shape their efforts and add to their numbers had to be
identified. The KLA’s eventual fighters were part of the target population
in which the KLA struggled to build support. This chapter explores why
those who joined the KLA were especially moved by its message.
It took far less time than the twenty years envisioned by some of the
early Planners in Exile for isolated pockets of armed resistance among
the Defenders at Home to grow into a tidal wave of youth seeking to
demonstrate their courage and finding both excitement and camaraderie
under charismatic commanders. Eventually, the KLA was in the posi-
tion—“forced,” one influential leader put it—to seek skill, expertise,
and organization as well as passion. But that came later. At first, the
KLA was all heart.
A long-standing “culture of resistance” in Kosovar Albanian society
created moral dilemmas for those who chose not to fight, and helped
induce a critical mass of individuals to embrace violence. The earliest
KLA fighters were members of families who had been targeted as threats
to its security by the Yugoslav/Serb regime. They were members of the
Defenders at Home. In a sense, the Milosevic regime “recruited” the first
fighters and the first leaders of a guerrilla insurgency.
Defiance also motivated a number who were not in immediate danger
of attack by regime forces. Exile resentment at their treatment by the
regime simmered, and a longing to go home to see their families preoc-
cupied them. It did not take much to stir them up. Because of how they
ended up in exile, this group was knowledgeable about the politics of re-
sistance. The majority of them—or at least the leaders among them—had
become targets precisely because they were thinking and talking about
Albanian national aspirations and about resisting efforts to undermine
Albanian autonomy in Kosovo. Many had led large demonstrations and
had written or spoken against the regime. They actively sought to learn
about insurgency. Already schooled in the political dynamics of antico-
lonial movements during the Communist era, they read avidly about
other insurgencies, particularly the IRA, the ETA, and the PLO.
By the early nineties, members of an entire generation of Kosovar
Albanians in Germany were saying to themselves and to each other, “We
have to fight; we’re ready to die.” They were vague on how they would
fight and how they would die, but they were ready. “I’m very proud to be
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 37 6/4/08 1:50:13 PM

part of this generation, who actually fought for their country,” said Gani
Demaj, who “kept going” by remembering that “I fought so my cousins
and friends did not die for nothing. What made me brave was hearing my
cousin say, ‘I’m happy that I’m dying from a bullet of my enemy. I am
immortal for my country.’” “It was an honor to be killed for my country,
for my friend who stays with me,” said KLA commander Ajet Potera.
“The Serbs were afraid to die for Kosovo,” he added. “We were not.”
The largest group of potential recruits, however, was on the fence. The
KLA had to convert them, mainly by raising their consciousness of po-
tentiality. Its examples of early armed resistance weakened fear of the
regime’s police and the Yugoslav security service, thus emboldening
more to fight. As armed attacks against the regime grew in number and
prominence, it became easier to recruit still more people because of
a growing consciousness of potentiality—this time resistance actually
might succeed, and the KLA already was succeeding in taking the fight
to the regime. A growing number of known oppressors within the police
and the Serb secret police (SDB) were victims of organized gunfire, and
Albanians were on the trigger end of the guns.
The Jashari Massacre and similar attacks by Serb forces on other
prominent resistance families in March 1998 caused thousands of fence-
sitters to abandon caution and join the insurgency. In part, the victim-
ization of noncombatant members of the Jashari family demonstrated
that one’s own family would not be safe if the status quo were allowed
to continue; it turned fence-sitters into Defenders at Home. In part, it
increased consciousness of potentiality because the Jashari resistance
was so powerful and effective that it had scared off the regime for seven
years, and now it took a small army to overcome it.
Exploiting the “Culture of Resistance”:

A Social Environment for Violence
Defiance is individual. Kosovo’s culture of resistance provided a social
matrix in which an individualistic spirit of defiance was translated into
action. Many young people who considered fighting assumed their par-
ents and other authority figures within their families would be opposed.
Many like Dritan Gjonbalaj were surprised:
One day in 1995 I was at my friend Luftar’s house talking with Luftar’s
uncle about politics. Luftar’s uncle was a member of LDK, Rugova’s
political party that opposed all forms of violence and resistance. I was
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 38 6/4/08 1:50:13 PM

preparing for an argument when I directed the conversation towards vio-

lence. But as I broached the subject, no argument came. Our uncles did
not disagree with us any more; all of them were fed up with passively
surrendering our existence and future to Serbia. All of them were ready
to fight for change. Luftar and I looked at each other across the room
and realized, for the first time, that our vision would become a reality.
Our homes would become a battlefield, and we would become soldiers.
We could smell war.
As soon as the KLA had overcome the barriers to broad public support
for armed resistance, and events had discredited the Rugova alternative,
a culture of resistance, deeply embedded in Albanian society, ensured
a supply of individuals who actually would take up arms. Multigenera-
tional “cultures of resistance” provide better breeding grounds for revolu-
tion and guerrilla insurgencies than cultures within which children are
taught the virtues of political participation and accommodation.1 When
young men have been brought up in an environment in which they hear
from their fathers and grandfathers stories of aggressive, violent resis-
tance to oppression, they are more likely to engage in violent resistance
themselves and to be open to recruitment by guerrilla groups and other
revolutionary agents.2 Outsiders lacking sympathy with the Albanian
population in Kosovo often emphasized “banditry” as a trait inextricably
intertwined with traditional Albanian culture. “Banditry” to the Otto-
mans or to the Serbs was, of course, “resistance to oppression” to the
Albanians. KLA soldier Luftar Braha laughed when asked when he had
first heard about someone fighting the Serbs. “It’s in our blood,” he said.
“I was six years old when the Serbs first arrested my father. My brother
was four-and-a-half at the time and used to point his tiny hand towards
passing police officers and call out with a child’s falsetto, ‘I want to kill
him. I want to kill him to free my father.’”
The manner of Adem Jashari’s death, in which Serb tanks and gunships
demolished his house and killed his family and friends, exemplifies both a
defiant spirit and the Albanian culture of resistance. He can be imagined
as saying to his Serb attackers, “Go ahead. Try to destroy me. I don’t care.
I defy you. You may kill me, but there will be thousands more after me.
Kosovo will be free,” and turning up the volume on his Albanian folk mu-
sic as the tank rounds punched holes in the stone walls of his house. But
the Jashari Massacre made clear that no Albanian was safe from Milosevic.
He would kill not only resistance fighters but also grandfathers, mothers,
and children. After the massacre, young men from all over Kosovo, from
Europe, and from the United States swarmed to make contact with the
KLA, seeking to enlist in the fight to defend their families.
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Once public opinion, parental attitudes, and peer pressure turned the
corner, excitement was in the air. It would trivialize the KLA experience
to suggest that KLA fighters did what they did just for the thrill of it. Still,
the role of excitement and camaraderie should not be ignored in under-
standing any high-risk activity by young men in which unit cohesion is
important. Jessica Stern, in her exhaustive research on suicide bombers,
found that a number of recruits to insurgencies are drawn mainly by a
desire for adventure or to be part of a friendship or social network. In
some cases, the desire to be with friends is more important, over time,
than the desire to achieve any particular goal. One operative told Stern
about the appeal of living outside normal society under extreme condi-
tions, on a kind of permanent “Outward Bound.”3 The young men who
took up arms in the KLA regularly describe how they signed up with
their friends or cousins, and thus experienced a common adolescent and
early adult male desire to affiliate with other males embracing risk and
working together to achieve a common goal. “The widespread Diaspora
put many young Kosovars in contact with other nationals,” Ramush Ha-
radinaj said. “When a young Kosovar would leave school to come fight
in the war, his Swedish, or German, or British roommate often would
say, ‘I am coming too.’”
Moreover, opportunity costs for volunteering were low. Recruitment
was more likely if someone felt that life offered him little outside the
insurgency. Young men in Kosovo had few opportunities. Their parents
had been pushed from their jobs as professionals; how could their children
expect more from the regime that had so mistreated their parents? Worse,
the economy in Kosovo was in a tailspin. There were chances for making
money by smuggling, or individuals could go abroad, get jobs, and send
money home. And, of course, young men could sit in urban coffee shops
and drink and talk with their friends. But these opportunities paled in
comparison with fighting to realize the Albanian national dream and to
expel Serb occupiers from the homeland.
It was not as though potential KLA recruits were being asked to drop
out of Harvard or to give up jobs on Wall Street to join a movement with
which they sympathized only mildly. Most were being asked to give up
jobs as waiters to help their homeland deal with a once-in-a-lifetime
threat and to take advantage of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. They
had already been helping by sending money home, but now they wanted
to do more. “After I first saw the KLA soldiers, I was terribly conflicted,”
said Afrim Ademi, who describes the inner conflict he felt about whether
he should join the KLA as “the worst time of my life.” I turned down an
opportunity to go the London School of Economics for two years on a
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scholarship,” he said. “I was going to stay and fight. All my friends said,
‘You must stay here; if you go, it will be the biggest mistake in your life.’”
Few had opportunities that competed with the culture of resistance.
Undermining Deterrence
Early recruitment for armed resistance in Kosovo was stunted by the de-
terrent effect of vigilant Serb antiresistance efforts, backed by an efficient
secret police—the Yugoslav UDB and, later, the Serb SDB. But the KLA
gradually undermined fear of Milosevic’s sanctions. Among the Planners
in Exile and Defenders at Home, the numbers of those who found that
they could tolerate prison and could escape future arrest were growing
rapidly as the regime imprisoned more and more protesters. The very
methods the regime used to increase deterrence undermined it. In the
early 1990s, the KLA leadership consciously used attacks on police sta-
tions and other targets as a way not only of increasing the consciousness
of potentiality but also of diminishing deterrence. The majority of at-
tackers did not get caught. One leader and strategist said, “We modified
Marxist theory. Mao said to build popular support first, before engaging
in operations. We did operations first, to build popular support.” Part of
the effect was to prove that one could fight the Serb oppressors and not
get killed or imprisoned. Early KLA attacks showed that the feared re-
sponse was not forthcoming. Indeed, the typical response in the first few
years of the insurgency was for the police simply to withdraw from areas
where they were likely to come in contact with KLA. The result was a
growing number of Kosovar Albanians who thought to themselves, “If
these KLA fighters can get away with it, maybe I can too.”
Profile of the KLA Soldier

The typical KLA recruit was under twenty-five, physically fit from doing
manual farm work, male, imbued with the Albanian national dream, in-
experienced in warfare—many had never fired a gun before they joined—
and attracted to risk to the point of recklessness. They initially came from
key families who had been targeted by the regime. Later, their ranks were
swelled with members of the Diaspora who had emigrated after earlier
Serb crackdowns against them, sometimes after serving prison sentences.
Of the regular soldiers, 60 to 80 percent came from inside Kosovo, and
20 to 40 percent came from outside. At the end they constituted a broad
slice of the youth of Kosovo itself, many of whom were eager to fight as
soon as they could find guns.
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Che Guevara profiles the ideal guerrilla soldier as an inhabitant of

the zone of operations: He will have friends to help him, knowledge
of the physical territory, and sensitivity to local peculiarities that will
make him more effective with the people. Moreover, he will have the
enthusiasm associated with defending his own people and territory. He
also must be “audacious, resourceful, determined, and willing to risk
his life and endure long term physical hardship.”4 These are qualities
usually associated with young men between the ages of twenty-five and
thirty-five.5
Tens of thousands of potential KLA recruits met Che Guevara’s pro-
file. Indeed, by late 1998, a major problem for the KLA was to screen out
eager applicants from the United States, Albania, Macedonia, and from
parts of Kosovo itself who lacked the requisite physical toughness and
local knowledge to be effective guerrilla fighters:
My brother came to see me, on his way to join the KLA in the mountains
of northern Albania. “Now is the time of decision,” my brother said.
“We cannot sit this out. Our family’s honor requires that I fight.” I ar-
gued with him. “You have nothing to offer them,” I said. “You’ve never
been to Kosovo; you don’t know the countryside; it’s a foreign country
to you. You would have none of the advantages that are supposed to
belong to a guerrilla fighter. And you don’t know how to fight. I’m not
sure you’ve ever held a gun. What would you do? All you have is a hot
head, and you’d just be in the way. This is a crazy idea; you shouldn’t
do it.” (anonymous)
In the KLA, excitement and camaraderie fueled early solidarity. As the

going got tough, friendship was powerful, as Dritan Gjonbalaj recalls:
Once while carrying supplies across the mountain I found myself at the
end of the column with forty kilos of weight strapped to my back that I
had lugged up the hill all day. I fumed as my sore muscles revolted un-
der the weight and looked over my gear to see what I could throw away.
My vision tunneled and I had to will each foot in front of the other. I
stumbled, teetered, caught my balance, exhausted, and turned to the
figure walking next to me and yelled, “I hate this shit! It’s useless; I’m
going to throw this crap away.” The form next to me answered. It was
Luftar’s voice; he had appeared out of nowhere and he calmly said, “Give
me your load, Dritan . . . I will carry it the rest of the way.” Luftar—my
friend who had been with me through everything—took the machine
gun and the ammunition and added to his already bulging pack, which
he silently carried the rest of the way over the mountain to camp.
KLA soldiers were volunteers. They came on their own; they could
leave on their own—and many did. They were bound to the movement
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by national loyalty, family pride, and a passion to prevail. Sometimes

adversity cut these bonds, and cleavages between the Planners in Exile
and the Peaceful Path Institutionalists continued to get in the way. Here
is the story of one unsuccessful effort to volunteer:
I heard about the Jashari Massacre from a friend of mine who was from
Drenica. That was the moment where we said, “The hell with it, we’re
all going.” We bought hunting uniforms and all that at the normal shops
in Germany. There was a bus to take us to Albania. I was waiting to get
on the bus, with seven, eight, nine, or ten people. This guy comes up
and says, “Listen, which bus do you want? This one is for Rugova; this
other one is for ‘them.’”
And one of the guys exploded. He had someone killed in his family; he
started grabbing that man and started hitting him. He said, “I’m going to
lose my head eventually there for this nation and for the family and for
everyone and you ask me who I am with? You go to hell with all your
organizers.” And he made the whole group turn back. Everybody went
back home. At the moment, if you don’t do it then, then you are gone.
Florin Krasniqi added, “Too many did not really want to fight. They just
wanted to put on a uniform, have some pictures taken which they could
show to their mothers and girlfriends.”
In many instances, KLA soldiers lost their will, for Milosevic’s forces
nearly annihilated the KLA time after time. For some it was the terror of
seeing the turret on a tank turning toward them. They simply ran away.
Few were battle-hardened. In other cases, the line between desertion and
tactical retreat was blurred. Guerrillas, after all, are supposed to “hit”
and then to “run.” In addition, Milosevic’s accelerating ethnic cleans-
ing campaign, though it touched world opinion and made international
intervention on the side of the KLA possible, undermined morale within
the KLA. The KLA was not numerous enough to protect 850,000 refugees
and displaced persons, although it altered its positions and changed its
tactics to do its best. Soldiers in KLA units were forced to watch help-
lessly as crowds of thousands of civilians, which they knew included their
sisters and mothers, were driven from their homes into the mountains.
Many of the soldiers simply decided to go to their sisters and mothers
to be of whatever aid they could.
Finding Skilled and Charismatic Commanders

As the ranks of recruits swelled, leadership became critical. The soldiers
needed someone to tell them what to do. Across the street from the
Grand Hotel, in the center of Prishtina, stands a statue of a trim, mus-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 43 6/4/08 1:50:14 PM

cular young man. His hair tousled, he holds an automatic rifle and wears
a pistol and stares into the distance, watchful. At any time of the day
or night, bunches of fresh flowers adorn the base of the statute, which
reads, “Zahir Pajaziti, 1962–1997.”
Pajaziti was a veteran of the Serbian police academy and the VJ. He
was one of the first young Kosovars to organize armed attacks against Serb
police units north of Prishtina, in the Llap Valley, in the 1980s and early
1990s. His actions won trust. “Trust in him was bigger than a mountain.
He first began concrete action in 1995,” Remi says. Serb intelligence
forces assassinated him and two other KLA leaders in a highway attack
in January 1997, between Prishtina and Mitrovica.
Today, symbols of the power of other early leaders abound. About
an hour south of Prishtina, near the village of Prekaz, are the ruins of a
stone house riddled with holes from artillery shells, the family compound
of the Jashari family. An enormous banner with a photograph of Adem
Jashari hangs over the walkway to the ruins. He wears a green camouflage
uniform, a military hat, a cape, and a full black beard. He has a pistol
in his belt and carries a large, three-barreled weapon in his right hand.
Sixty kilometers away in the middle of Prishtina, Hashim Thaçi, a Jashari
protégé and major political power, shows a visitor a picture of himself
with Jashari. Thaçi, then in his early twenties, wears a military hat and
sits on a couch beside Jashari, holding a rifle. “He was the father of the
KLA,” Thaçi says. “He had traveled widely. He encouraged us, helped us
understand what we had to do.” In the oda (traditional receiving room)
of the Haradinaj home in Glogjan, in the Dukagjini region, a huge red
and gold “UCK” hangs on the long wall, bracketed by large photographs
of Ramush Haradinaj’s two brothers who died during the war while or-
ganizing the Dukagjini resistance.
An insurgency, like any political movement, requires not only eager,
resourceful, and courageous foot soldiers. It requires organizers and com-
manders who know something about the technical aspects of resistance
and warfare; it requires leaders who understand the political context
and can manipulate it through propaganda to build and maintain public
support; it requires operatives who can organize finance and logistics; it
requires training in weapons, strategy, and tactics. Pajaziti, Jashari, and
the Haradinaj brothers were such leaders, and the Serbs killed them.
But the Serbs were never able to kill them all. Commander Remi
filled in the hole left by Pajaziti’s death. Thaçi and the Planners in Exile
took up the Jashari banner. Ramush Haradinaj seized the baton his broth-
ers had been carrying. Others, like Sami Lushtaku and Fatmir Limaj, re-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 44 6/4/08 1:50:14 PM

turned from exile to buttress leadership in Drenica. In each of the three

most important regions, new leadership replaced the old.
None of the leaders had real expertise in military matters, though
some had served in lower ranks in the Yugoslav army. They were, how-
ever, committed to the cause and ready to learn. Remi, as mentioned
earlier, read everything he could about guerrilla warfare and watched
movies with U.S. Marine Corps themes. Sami Lushtaku, later zone com-
mander for the KLA in Drenica, read Albanian Army manuals. From
1998 onward, the KLA filled gaps in expertise by deliberate outreach to
Western military experts and by self-help measures.
Their amateurism was not unusual for insurgencies. “A lot of guer-
rilla leaders historically were not big-shot, known people,” says David
Grange, the American general who planned a possible NATO ground
invasion of Kosovo. They “were just dedicated citizens—twenty-five,
twenty-eight years old, who just had the savvy for that kind of thing and
the desire and determination to carry it forward.” However, Grange adds,
“in the case of the KLA there also was outside assistance, from Albania
for sure, that helped school early leaders in tactics.”
From the beginning, the military leadership pool was enhanced by
a cadre of Albanians who had fought elsewhere in the Balkans, on the
side of the Croats and of the Bosniaks. A number of Kosovars still in the
Yugoslav Army deserted and joined Croat forces, alongside Kosovars liv-
ing in Croatia. Significantly for the future of the KLA, one of these Croat
fighters was Agim Çeku, then a captain, who rose to the rank of brigadier
general in the Croatian Army and later became the KLA’s overall com-
mander (albeit not until the spring of 1999, a month or so before the war
was over). Çeku became prime minister of Kosovo in early 2006.
As these leaders emerged, they faced two challenges. For their fighters
to become an insurgency, they had to avoid being annihilated by regime
forces. They also needed to be molded into a force armed with viable
military strategy and tactics.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 45 6/4/08 1:50:14 PM

4 Avoiding Annihilation,
Taking Advantage of Milosevic
It was crazy. The shells came down and down. I had

heard them before and could tell the type of shell from
the sounds they made, but this was unlike anything I
had ever experienced. It was like rain . . . it really was
like the air had gone crazy. Metal fell from above and dirt
exploded below us, peppering our exposed skin and draw-
ing blood. We had nowhere to go but forward towards the
Serb position because that was the only direction that
provided a bit of cover. So we went. Then the shelling
stopped and I found my friend, Dritan. We jumped up
and down, embraced in our excitement, and immediately
started trading stories about our day. We hadn’t known
who had survived the assault. We had shared so much in
preparing for the war, lived through our first real taste of
battle, and now I found my childhood friend on a dark
battlefield in a Serb trench. We couldn’t stop laughing
as we shared our stories and began to plan for the next
day. And it was in the middle of a story, the middle of a
sentence. I heard the silent whistle of a grenade breeze
past my shoulder and land a few meters away from Dritan
and me. It had come out of nowhere, out of the dead
black, soundless until the last second when it exploded.
My heart sank.
—Luftar Braha
At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is

to keep himself from being destroyed.
—Che Guevara, in Guerrilla Warfare
46
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 46 6/4/08 1:50:15 PM

Avoiding Annihilation 47
Slobodan Milosevic did more for the KLA than anyone else. Though the
KLA militarily had to avoid his efforts to annihilate it, his tactics only
advanced its political objectives. The KLA confronted both one of the
most powerful armies in the world and a brutally efficient secret police
apparatus. Alone among a historical succession of Kosovar Albanian re-
sistance groups, it not only survived but eventually prevailed in achiev-
ing its strategic political objectives. Evaluating its success requires an
assessment of Serb efforts, which were formidable, to annihilate it.
Milosevic and his backers were well schooled in a variety of tech-
niques for suppressing insurgency. They knew how to penetrate resistance
organizations. They knew how to decapitate a resistance movement by
imprisoning or killing its leaders. They thought they knew how to drain
the swamp feeding an insurgency by removing the population. In the end,
however, Serbia failed to annihilate the KLA because it never quite got
all the leaders, because its military population-removal tactics backfired,
and because the civilian population was tougher than Milosevic had an-
ticipated.
The Milosevic regime had the overriding strategic goal of maintain-
ing control over Kosovo and, if possible, altering the demographic bal-
ance there by expelling the Albanian population. To achieve this goal,
Milosevic needed to:
1. Annihilate the KLA, by decapitating its leadership and intimidating
or dispersing its fighters;
2. Starve the KLA by blocking the border with Albania, the only fea-
sible route over which the KLA could get arms;
3. Keep Serb supply routes open through the Llap region;
4. Maintain and, if possible, increase support by the civilian popula-
tion in Kosovo for the Peaceful Path Institutionalists;
5. Convince the international community that his efforts to annihi-
late the KLA were internal police matters within his sovereign pre-
rogative, and thus stave off international intervention that would
reduce or eliminate his control of Kosovo.
The first three strategic objectives conflicted with the fourth and fifth.
The more forcefully Milosevic pursued the first three, the greater the
likelihood he would build popular support for the KLA. As the KLA grew,
from the early 1990s, and intensified its armed attacks, Milosevic shifted
his emphasis from the first objective to the second and third, and also
focused more strongly on altering the demography of Kosovo by expel-
ling the Albanian population. In doing so, he ultimately drove not only
a critical mass of the Albanian population but also the international
community into the KLA’s arms.
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David Grange, the former commander of U.S. Army forces who were
ready to invade Kosovo if the NATO bombing campaign failed, recalls:
The Serbs relied heavily on special police. They’re pretty tough—like
Gestapo in many ways, as in Bosnia. The Serbs were very good at using
special police. They were all over Kosovo, some in plainclothes, many
in uniform.
But the KLA got the better of them—the same way insurgents were
tough antagonists for our guys in Iraq—the best army in the world.
In guerrilla warfare, the guerrillas have the advantage. They hit when
they want. The KLA had popular support, so they also hid when they
wanted.
There are only two ways to defeat insurgents: You’ve either got to re-
move the insurgents from the population or remove the population from
the insurgents. You can only remove them from the population if the
population is not on their side—and the opposite was true in Kosovo. So
that left Milosevic with only one alternative, once he and his strategists
focused on the problem: he had to expel the population.
This brought international intervention—which is exactly what the KLA

wanted.
Anti-Insurgency Theory
Any insurgency can be stamped out by the simple brutal expedient of
exterminating the entire population that supports it.1 In countering in-
surgencies, “brutality pays”—in the short run. Indiscriminately killing
civilians requires relatively little military skill and produces long-lasting
results.2 What begins as a narrowly targeted anti-insurgency campaign,
however, focused on leaders of an insurgency, or on isolating insurgent
fighters from the population, easily degenerates into a slaughter of civil-
ians. It is easier that way. Brutality against civilians, however, facilitates
recruitment for the insurgents.
Milosevic’s Tactics
Initially, Milosevic relied on Interior Ministry (MUP) police to eradi-
cate the KLA, introducing regular army troops only in the spring and
summer of 1998. By the end of the 1998 Summer Offensive, more than
eleven thousand MUP and twelve thousand VJ forces were in Kosovo.3
Just before the bombing campaign in the spring of 1999, Milosevic had
up to sixteen thousand MUP and twenty thousand VJ forces in Kosovo,
supported by 350 tanks, 450 armored combat vehicles, and 750 artillery
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 48 6/4/08 1:50:15 PM

weapons. These were reinforced by another five thousand or so para-

militaries.4 Milosevic employed three counterinsurgency techniques:
decapitation, interdiction of infrastructure, and, occasionally, reform.
Together, these three almost wiped out the KLA. His fourth technique,
ethnic cleansing, was his undoing.
Decapitation: Targeting Leaders of the Insurgency

If a regime can eliminate individuals possessing the requisite leadership
talents and ambitions by killing or imprisoning them, it can quash an
insurgency—or at least greatly reduce its intensity. Decapitating a guer-
rilla movement obviates the “need” for ethnic cleansing, with its atten-
dant risks of international intervention. Milosevic and his predecessors
in the leadership of Serbia understood this. Decapitation was his first
counterinsurgency strategy. Only later, after decapitation failed, did he
resort to other strategies that posed greater risks for him in the competi-
tion for hearts and minds.
Insurgencies reduce the risk of decapitation by operating clandes-
tinely and ensuring that their leaders are anonymous, especially when
they are in the early stages—Phase I in Mao’s model.5 Anonymity makes
it more difficult for the regime to capture and imprison or kill insur-
gent leaders. Also, anonymity makes it possible to conceal regime suc-
cess in decapitation. The regime never knows for sure if those it kills
were really the leaders of an insurgency. New leaders can simply step
forward and pick up the batons of the fallen.6 Decapitation depends on
good intelligence to overcome the deliberate anonymity. As a Human
Rights Watch report observed, “The state security [service’s] role in the
wars of the former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo in particular should not be
underestimated. The SDB maintained a large network of operatives and
informants in Kosovo, among them many ethnic Albanians.”7
The perception that the Serbs were omniscient had three adverse ef-
fects on the KLA insurgency. First, it intimidated those who otherwise
might be inclined to become actively involved or to assume leadership
positions. Second, it also reduced the likelihood of broad popular support,
both because the population was afraid and because it had no reason to
believe that the insurgency could be successful. Third, it reinforced the
KLA instinct that it had to be profoundly clandestine. But staying un-
derground undercut the KLA’s need to be visible in order to be credible
among the general population in Kosovo and in the West.
The KLA was able to mitigate the effects of police penetration by
relying on family linkages and other indicia of trust within the closely
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 49 6/4/08 1:50:15 PM

knit, village-oriented Albanian culture. “We went to a gathering of vol-

unteers in Bardosh, in the hills near Kaqanoll,” recalls Mensur Hoti.
“There were about twenty-five young men in a house. Remi and some
soldiers were waiting in the field. No one was there who had not been
recommended by someone known to Remi. Basically, it was only sons
from the best families in the Podujevë region. The goal was to have ten
to twenty volunteers from each village.” The KLA and its predecessors
also were careful in other ways. The leaders hid their roles from each
other. “When I met Adem Jashari for the first time, I didn’t really know
who he was,” said Remi. “I had just been told that he was a good person
to talk to regarding KLA activities in Drenica. Everyone was careful not
to reveal too much about the organizational linkages.” Fund raisers and
supply managers were discreet, as Freddie Mehmeti said: “When we
delivered the funds we had raised, we never asked too many questions
about what would happen to the money. In particular, we never asked for
details about weapons purchases or transportation. It was better to know
as little as possible, in case someone was caught and tortured or in case
the Serb secret police had penetrated some part of the organization. Even
in the U.S. we were careful, because we knew that the SDB operated here
as well.” KLA leaders assumed that all phones were tapped, and never
discussed important activities on the telephone. Fighters in the field
knew just how long they could talk on a cell phone before eavesdropping
equipment could lock on to the call.
Interdiction of Infrastructure
Regimes almost always seek to disrupt aspects of the logistical network,
without which no insurgency can succeed. The regime can interrupt
financial networks and block the supply of arms, food, clothing, and
footwear, but interdiction efforts combined with decapitation easily be-
come indistinguishable from ethnic cleansing. A singularly effective
interdiction technique is to remove the civilian population supporting
the insurgents. Milosevic was no exception. The Jashari Massacre was
an effort to implement decapitation and interdiction strategies. Instead,
it spawned a tidal wave in the KLA’s favor.
A logistic-interdiction strategy can succeed only in direct proportion
to the quality of the intelligence possessed by the regime. As popular
support for an insurgency grows, the likelihood is greater that logistical
support for the insurgents comes from elements of the population and
from foreign sources that resist penetration by regime intelligence ser-
vices. Even uninhibited efforts to annihilate insurgencies often fail in
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 50 6/4/08 1:50:15 PM

societies whose insurgents are widely dispersed and live independently

of modern infrastructure and urban social connections. The KLA’s origi-
nal strength was in rural areas, where traditional folkways were stronger
than the law. The ten-year period of Milosevic domination and parallel
government by Rugova strengthened the capacity for Kosovar Albanian
self-sufficiency.
Supplies of food, clothing, and footwear may be the most difficult
for a regime to target effectively, because this kind of support can come
relatively easily from parts of the population supporting the insurgency.
Everyone, whether supportive of the insurgency or not, needs food, cloth-
ing, and footwear. It is inherently difficult to destroy only that portion
on its way to the insurgents without also destroying what the population
needs to survive. Interdicting arms supplies can be easier because the
general population does not need arms to survive, and anything other
than small arms would be far more visible to intelligence services sym-
pathetic to the regime. In the case of the KLA, the Milosevic regime
focused much of its counterinsurgency effort on arms in trying to seal
the border between Kosovo and Albania, in raiding villages suspected of
supporting the KLA, in searching houses for weapons, and by then expel-
ling the populations.
Reform and a Sense of “Relative Deprivation”

The most benign way for a regime to take the wind out of an insurgency’s
sails is to remove the grievances fueling it. Insurgencies cannot succeed
as long as the majority of the population maintains hope in the regime.
Regimes can preserve such hope through reform. Milosevic sporadically
employed this strategy by cooperating with Rugova, though he rarely fol-
lowed consistently the accommodative approach Tito had used. Milosevic
was never fully committed either to reform or to annihilation.
“Relative deprivation”—the gap between expectations and the abil-
ity of regimes to deliver results meeting expectations—is a major deter-
minant of broad popular willingness to rebel.8 Relative deprivation may
mean simply a gap between expectations and delivery—as in Harlan
Cleveland’s “Revolution of Rising Expectations.”9 A perception of relative
deprivation also can be stimulated by regime vacillation between repres-
sion and liberalization, by a sense that one population group is worse off
than another similarly situated in the same state, or by a sense that a
population group in one state is worse off than the same population group
in another state.10 Organizers of insurgency must then do everything
possible to widen the gap. They must reinforce public perceptions that
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 51 6/4/08 1:50:15 PM

the regime has no capacity to deliver what the people want. Milosevic
made it easier for the KLA to do that. In Kosovo, the condition of rela-
tive deprivation was easily satisfied. Regardless of whether Albanian
aspirations were strong enough to support an insurgency before the late
1980s, developments then and later stimulated and increased a sense
of relative deprivation on the part of the majority Albanian population.
In this regard, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was as important as the
loss of autonomy and economic opportunity occasioned by Milosevic’s
repression. Things were getting better in Poland and Hungary. Why not
in Kosovo?
One of the strongest sources of relative deprivation arises when re-
gimes alternate between opening up opportunities and repressing them.
This kind of policy vacillation surely operated in Kosovo. After Yugo-
slavia was created, constant tensions among the Albanian population in
Kosovo, the majority Serb population in Serbia proper, and the Yugoslav
government gave rise to cycles of opening up opportunities for Albanians,
followed by crackdowns on the Albanians after Tito’s death. Opening
up was symbolized especially by the establishment of the University of
Prishtina as the first Albanian-language institution of higher learning in
Kosovo and only the second Albanian university in the world (the Uni-
versity of Tirana opened in 1957). Some demonstrations through the late
1980s and into the 1990s were brutally suppressed, while other demon-
strations were allowed to go forward virtually without interference by
the Serb authorities. Revocation of Kosovar autonomy by the Milosevic
regime, which began in 1989 and was followed by the expulsion of most
Albanian elites from their jobs, provided an especially stark contrast be-
tween what Albanians had enjoyed in the 1970s and early 1980s, when
it was reasonable for them to hope to realize their aspirations within the
Yugoslav state, and the period after that, when their hopes were thwarted
based simply on their ethnicity. Also, it was easy for almost every Alba-
nian to compare the opportunities afforded Serbs who had displaced the
Albanians from their jobs with the more modest possibilities available
for the now-unemployed Albanians. The Dayton Accords exposed the
difference between Western support for those in the former Yugoslavia
who fought and support for those who did not.
Not only must the population have a sense of relative deprivation,
it also must believe there is no hope for redress through the existing
regime, or through peaceful alternatives.11 Milosevic never pursued con-
crete reform energetically enough to give credibility to Rugova’s prom-
ise that the Serbs would eventually create opportunities for Albanians.
As Robert Taber writes, an insurgency “cannot logically come until all
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 52 6/4/08 1:50:16 PM

acceptable peaceful solutions—appeals, legislative and judicial action,

and the resources of the ballot box—have proved worthless.”12 Formal
democratization “decreases the chances for revolutions by channeling
discontent into legal arenas.”13 On the other hand, inaccessibility to
nominally democratic political structures and “rule of law” increases
reliance on informal friendship, clan, and ethnic networks that well may
include embryonic guerrilla and revolutionary networks.
Milosevic apparently sensed that Rugova’s parallel pathways could
take the steam out of any insurgency, and he thus did little to close them
off. Unwilling to make real change, Milosevic nevertheless was a canny
enough politician to give symbolic ground when his back was to the wall.
At some level, he understood that the LDK and Rugova were his most
important allies in holding on to Kosovo. A September 1996 agreement
with Rugova to restore Albanian-language education is a good example.
The agreement would have allowed Albanian teachers back into the
schools. It had the effect, for at least a time and at least to some extent,
of undermining the more militant critics of the LDK. But Milosevic
never implemented it.
The KLA also benefited from pervasive corruption in Serb institu-
tions. Corruption is the friend of any insurgency, and that surely was the
case in Kosovo. Owing to their newness, the LDK’s parallel institutions
were not yet especially corrupt. But the Serb institutions were riddled
with corruption to the extent that the KLA obtained a significant frac-
tion of its arms simply by bribing the Serb police or military. Corruption
undermines governmental effectiveness because it drains resources nec-
essary to an effective government. Corruption thus undercuts the inter-
nal legitimacy of the existing regime and increases the popular sense of
victimization and hopelessness. Governmental decisions are made for
the benefit of those receiving bribes rather than to fulfill the legitimate
rights of the public to fair decision making and resource allocation. Cor-
ruption is antagonistic to the successful functioning of the institutions of
a liberal democracy because it makes formal participation and following
the rules a sham.
Ethnic Cleansing
“Ethnic cleansing,” a strategy pursued often at the end of the twentieth
and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, can be an effective anni-
hilation and interdiction strategy, but it has an explosive effect on hearts
and minds. The more brutal form of ethnic cleansing simply kills mem-
bers of the disfavored ethnic group supporting—or likely to support—an
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insurgency. A less brutal form seeks not to kill all the members of the
group but rather to remove them to another geographic area. This milder
form of ethnic cleansing was pursued throughout Bosnia, although there
were more brutal forms pursued in such spots as Srebrenica. In Kosovo,
what began as a law-enforcement and secret-police effort to eradicate
militants who organized the KLA (decapitation and interdiction) dete-
riorated into a massive ethnic cleansing campaign that far exceeded the
scale experienced in Bosnia. In its early stages, the campaign of attacks
on population centers was retaliation for KLA attacks. The Serb forces
could not find the KLA, so they attacked the nearby civilian population.
Their strategy was a form of collective punishment that sought to inhibit
further KLA aggressiveness and bog the KLA down in frontal warfare to
try to protect civilians. The shift from counterinsurgency tactics to ethnic
cleansing also reduced the likelihood of Serb casualties.
Milosevic’s 1998 replacement of the leaders of both MUP and the VJ
with hard-liners reinforced the emphasis on ethnic cleansing. His most
aggressive push occurred late in the NATO bombing campaign when Serb
forces managed to drive the majority of Kosovo’s Albanian population
out of their homes and nearly half entirely out of the country, even as
Serb forces had failed in other forms of counterinsurgency and had lost
the battle for international public opinion.
Human Rights Watch reported 3,453 executions in Kosovo by Serb
forces or those allied with them during the conflict.14 The most com-
mon human rights violation was “separation” of the victim from fam-
ily (5,122 instances), followed by forced displacement (4,485 instances),
detention (3,478 instances), executions, beatings (2,439 instances), and
indiscriminant shelling (1,987 instances).15 The patterns of the killings
showed “sprees” concentrated in particular municipalities over short
periods—suggesting a strategy of terrorizing the civilian population.16
Data collected by Human Rights Watch and by the American Academy
of Sciences supports the inference that a “centrally devised and imple-
mented strategy” existed to force Kosovar Albanians from their homes,
and that executions occurred to expedite the expulsions.17 After the with-
drawal of international monitors in March 1999, “[t]hree months of terror
followed [in Drenica] as Serbian police and paramilitaries backed by the
army attacked and cleared of its civilian population village after village
in its efforts to destroy both the KLA and its base of support. Adult males
were detained en masse and hundreds were executed. . . . [W]omen and
children from the families of persons linked to the KLA were also killed.
. . . Abuses in the Drenica region were so widespread that a comprehen-
sive description is beyond the scope of this report.”18
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Milosevic distributed arms to Kosovar Serb civilians and encouraged

criminal elements to organize militias. “Serbia had to arm criminals, be-
cause only criminals are ready to kill innocent Albanian men, women,
and children,” said Adem Demaçi. “They had to enlist the international
Mafia—Arkan—the Frankie group.” Striking the table for emphasis with
his fist, Demaçi adds, “Until Serbia could let go of Kosovo, it would be
controlled by these groups.”
Slobodan Milosevic’s strategy in Kosovo employed ethnic cleansing
not only to achieve an insurgency-suppressing goal but also to reverse
changes in the ethnic composition that had caused the Albanian population
of the province to grow substantially, in relation to the Serb population.
The KLA insurgency and the NATO bombing campaign provided Milosevic
with an opportunity. He could drive the Albanians out of Kosovo. Indeed,
he had largely done so by the time the bombing campaign ended.
Milosevic’s strategy backfired, however, in three ways. The brutality
and disruptive effect of ethnic cleansing strategies poisoned popular at-
titudes toward the regime and increased support for the KLA. “The Serbs
gave my family two-hours’ notice to vacate their houses,” recalled Arben
Limani. “My mother and my sisters had to walk across the mountains
to Macedonia. After they left, the Serbs burned the houses and killed the
livestock.” Second, removal of the majority of the civilian population,
as had occurred by the end of the NATO bombing campaign, actually
enhanced the operational freedom of the KLA fighters. Now they did
not have to worry so much about protecting and supporting the civilian
population; they could concentrate on fighting. Third, Milosevic had
not scared the Albanians off forever; as soon as they could, they came
back. Now Milosevic was no longer in a position to oppress them. He
had overdrawn his account with the international community.
Because the KLA used armed methods to challenge the authority of
the regime, it evoked especially harsh responses. A major effect of KLA
attacks on police stations and other symbols of Serb authority—whether
or not it was a conscious strategic objective—was to cause overreaction by
Serb forces. The KLA, like other successful resistance organizations, was
masterful in inducing and then exploiting repression by the regime.19 Each
act of repression potentially converted another member of the Kosovar
Albanian population into a resister motivated by a defiant impulse. The
implementation of a carefully organized campaign of ethnic cleansing by
the Milosevic regime spread the sense of repression to wider parts of the
population who might otherwise have thought they would be allowed
to live in peace, however impoverished their opportunities, if only the
KLA and its adherents would lie low and avoid antagonizing the Serbs.
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Whether Milosevic intended his ethnic cleansing campaign merely

to “drain the swamp”—to use a phrase associated with U.S. strategy in
Vietnam and now used by the Bush administration to explain its “War
on Terrorism”—in which the KLA could flourish and grow, or whether
he intended it to expel the majority of the Albanian population from
the territory of Kosovo, it had the effect of convincing larger and larger
numbers of ordinary Kosovar Albanian civilians that their lives would
be completely disrupted, if not terminated altogether, if they did not do
something dramatic: embrace the KLA.
Missed Opportunities
The Serbs came very near to wiping out the KLA on four separate occa-
sions. The ethnic cleansing campaign in 1999 was Milosevic’s fifth and
final strike in a decade-long pattern of escalation. His first time at bat was
in 1993. About one hundred Kosovar militants, including Adem Jashari,
had received training in Albania. When they returned to Kosovo at least
half of them were immediately arrested, and the other half—except for
Jashari—felt so threatened that they left Kosovo almost immediately
for Germany and Switzerland. The second time was in January 1997,
when Serb security forces assassinated Zahir Pajaziti and arrested more
than one hundred other Kosovar militants. This was a body blow to the
then-maturing insurgency that was deprived of its most prominent and
effective leader in the Llap region and decimated the ranks of those in
more junior positions who would have been natural candidates to re-
place the top leadership. The third was in March 1998, when Serb forces
stormed the Jashari compound in Prekaz and killed Adem Jashari—the
most prominent of the crystallizing KLA leadership and probably its best
strategist and fighter. At more or less the same time as the Jashari Mas-
sacre, Serb forces killed another twenty-four, including ten members of
the Ahmeti family and rounded up other suspected KLA leaders from
around the country, once again decimating the leadership ranks.
The fourth high-water mark for the Serb annihilation strategy fol-
lowed the 1998 Summer Offensive by the KLA.20 Whether or not the Serbs
had lured the KLA into such a position intentionally, the KLA’s efforts
to create free zones and to demonstrate its capacity to conduct frontal
warfare like a regular army, aimed at defending civilians and increasing
its credibility with the Kosovar population and with Western powers,
put it in a position that allowed the Serb forces to use their superior
military power more easily. The free zone strategy made the battlefield
more symmetric, while the quantity of forces and fire power were still
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 56 6/4/08 1:50:16 PM

as asymmetric as they had been from the beginning. Indeed, forces were
more starkly asymmetric because Milosevic now had introduced more
experienced army units with heavier firepower and armor. Now by mili-
tary rather than police-state means, the KLA was nearly wiped out. Ra-
mush Haradinaj was down to not more than sixty soldiers in the entire
Dukagjini region. Remi was told that he had more soldiers under his
command in the Llap Zone than any other zone commander elsewhere
in Kosovo had, and that was still fewer than one hundred. The Drenica
Valley was under a pervasive state of siege, and remaining KLA soldiers
and commanders were preoccupied with helping their families survive
rather than organizing effective fights against the Serbs.
But then, the cease fire of October 1998 gave the KLA time to recover.
Fighting resumed in early December 1998, and it was clear that the KLA
had not been wiped out. The KLA did not always win, but neither did the
Serb forces. The Battle of Kaçanoll Mountain in the Llap Zone is a good
example. Fresh, untrained recruits, not sufficiently entrenched, badly out-
numbered, completely outgunned by Serb armor, and hampered by civil-
ians fleeing Serb forces, were forced to retreat after a vicious and bloody
three-day battle. But KLA activity and harassment on Serb flanks and
rear caused the Serbs in turn to withdraw after three days. It is no wonder
that, when asked, “Was there a time when you thought, ‘This is going to
work. We may prevail?’” Commander Remi responded, “Yes. Christmas
of 1998,” referring to the Kaçanoll engagement and related battles.
Some of Milosevic’s near misses were the result of his strategic mis-
calculation; some were the result of the geopolitical stars aligning against
him; some were the result of simple bad luck. His assassinations and
arrests of 1997 and early 1998 might have succeeded had he eliminated
those ultimately taking command: Thaçi, Krasniqi, all of the Haradinaj
brothers, the Selimis, Azem Syla, and Remi. The Jashari Massacre and
onslaught in Drenica in March of 1998 could have had the effect of para-
lyzing Kosovar activists in the population instead of galvanizing thou-
sands of young men to volunteer to fight with the KLA. The October 1998
Holbrooke-Milosevic ceasefire agreement might never have been put in
place, either because Richard Holbrooke was not available to negotiate
it or because Milosevic refused to agree to it. Some of these facts were
more a matter of bad luck for Milosevic than a failure to arrange matters
under his control.
Further, Milosevic might have agreed at Rambouillet (the story is
told in greater detail in chapter nine, including an explanation of why
the proffered agreement was unacceptable to Milosevic), or the KLA
might have followed Demaçi’s advice and torpedoed any agreement. Serb
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 57 6/4/08 1:50:16 PM

agreement would have put Milosevic in a far better position militarily

and politically. He would have been in a better military position because
his forces would have remained in Kosovo and, whatever the subsequent
efforts to get him to reduce or withdraw them, he could have used his
mastery of stall-and-divide tactics to prolong the status quo, which in
any event had been far more favorable to him than was the status quo
after the conclusion of the NATO bombing campaign.
By signing the Rambouillet agreement, Milosevic would have de-
prived the KLA of moral high ground both within Kosovo and in the in-
ternational community. The KLA still would have enjoyed the increased
legitimacy deriving from its participation in the Rambouillet negotiations
and its agreement to the Rambouillet draft. But Milosevic’s agreement
would have made it impossible for U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright to say to Milosevic, “You had your chance and you didn’t take
it. We will give you no more chances.” Had Milosevic signed, it would
have been inconceivable for the international community to mobilize
armed intervention in Kosovo within less than a year, even if Milosevic
obviously breached the terms of the Rambouillet Accords. The West
was hungry for a diplomatic solution, and the appearance of one would
have fractured international support for military intervention, even if
the subsequent reality involved further brutality.
Equally important would have been the effect on the elites and the
general public in Kosovo, torn as they were between Rugova’s passivism
and the KLA’s activism and violence. Agreement by Milosevic at Ram-
bouillet would have facilitated the conclusion by the critical mass of
public opinion in Kosovo that the Rugova approach was the right one after
all, once it had been supplemented by a short period of KLA-sponsored
violence. In any event, they would have seen no need to reject Rugova
and to place fundamental reliance in the KLA.
The final window of opportunity would have opened wide if Milosevic
had proven correct in his plausible ex-ante beliefs that the Albanians,
once driven from their homes, would not return, and that the NATO al-
liance would fracture under the pressure of sustained and expanding air
warfare, and the potential need to introduce ground forces, both of which
public opinion, even in the United States, opposed.
Indeed, even if only the first assumption had proven correct, Milosevic
would have prevailed. His behavior suggests that he thought so too. It
is hard otherwise to explain his capitulation in June 1999. While the ex-
pansion of NATO targets to include infrastructure in Serbia important
to the urban populations of Belgrade and elsewhere no doubt increased
pressure on Milosevic, nothing fundamentally different happened with
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 58 6/4/08 1:50:17 PM

respect to the air campaign or military events on the ground in Kosovo

just before Milosevic gave in.21
Kosovo was not like Bosnia, where important military reversals
against Serb forces occurred at the hands of combined Bosniak and Croat
forces and NATO finally took the dramatic step of aerial bombardment
of a few selected military targets, both preceding the Dayton Accords by
only a few weeks. Indeed, a close examination of the facts suggests that
the only watershed reached shortly before the Serb agreement to NATO
terms in June 1999 was the completion of ethnic cleansing. That rein-
forces the inference that Milosevic capitulated not because he thought
he had lost, but because he thought he had won. He had, he thought,
annihilated the Albanian resistance in Kosovo by getting rid of almost
all the Albanians in Kosovo. By agreeing to NATO’s terms, he could
stop the costs inflicted by the bombing without giving up anything of
significance. He had all he wanted, and nothing in NATO’s terms would
ensure return of the Albanians to Kosovo.
It was reasonable for Milosevic to assume that few of the displaced
Albanians would wish to return to a place of increasing repression, and
that those few who did return, or who remained, would be so thoroughly
intimidated that they never again would be tempted to support an insur-
gency or otherwise resist Serbian control. At the same time, the NATO
bombing campaign, while it obviously made it more difficult for Serb
forces, especially armored units and large infantry battalions, to operate
effectively, also eliminated much of the physical infrastructure on which
the KLA relied.
There is evidence that by the time the bombing campaign began, the
KLA was much better organized and supplied than it had been in 1998. It
is not clear, however, that its numbers or effectiveness improved during
the bombing campaign despite substantial circumstantial evidence that
NATO forces tried clandestinely to be helpful to the KLA. The details
of the KLA Order of Battle presented in chapter five reinforce the con-
clusion that the KLA was in desperate straits at the end of the bombing
campaign. To be sure, arms supply routes through Albania were kept open,
and NATO forces hoped to rely on the KLA to provide sufficient ground
combat capability to forestall the need to introduce NATO ground forces.
How effective the KLA ultimately would have been in this role will never
be known, but it surely could not have performed it in June 1999.
No one knows whether the KLA could have bounced back again.
In purely military terms, Serb activities during the bombing campaign
were seriously detrimental to the KLA, which suffered major reductions
in force numbers. KLA enclaves remained, although they were mostly
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 59 6/4/08 1:50:17 PM

isolated from each other and were smaller than the KLA free zones of
1998. Regime forces moved freely throughout most of Kosovo.
If the NATO military intervention had stopped before Serb forces
were withdrawn from Kosovo, Milosevic would hugely have improved
his position vis-à-vis the Kosovar insurgency. He would have established
a Kosovo in which the Albanian population was a minority, thereby
extinguishing the popular infrastructure on which the KLA, like any
insurgent force, relied. He would have maintained and enhanced over-
whelming military superiority over the KLA even if it had increased its
effectiveness and numbers during the bombing campaign. In addition, he
would have acquired more intelligent leadership in his forces, knowing
better how to disable the insurgency, and he would have been free from
the overhanging threat of military intervention. If NATO had intervened
militarily and then terminated the intervention without a fundamental
surrender by Milosevic, he would hardly have been cowed by threats of
Western military intervention in the future.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 60 6/4/08 1:50:17 PM

Hashim Thaçi
Bujar Bukoshi
PHOTOS_A-N_Perr.indd 1 6/4/08 1:49:27 PM

Rrustem Mustafa
(“Commander Remi”)
Ramush Haradinaj

Xhavit Haliti
Ajet Potera

Agim Çeku
Azem Syla

Commander Leka
Florin Krasniqi

Jakup Krasniqi
Rexhep Selimi

Afrim Ademi
Ajet Potera and Mensur Hoti

Arxhient Bajraktari
Dritan Gjonbalaj

Gani Demaj
Luftar Braha

Valon Murati
Xhavid Loshaj

Lirim Greiçevci
Adem Jashari and Hashim Thaçi

Bajgora Training Camp
Agim Kuleta, Commander Remi, and Valon Murati

KLA soldiers take the oath in Drenica
KLA fighters move

through the woods
in Drenica
KLA soldiers ready

to fight

Hashim Thaçi
inspects the lines
Valon Murati and

Agim Kuleta

5 The KLA at War
A convoy came out of a police station, traveled through

the edge of the town, traversed a traffic circle, and
proceeded down a main road to a railroad crossing. There
was good intelligence that the convoy would move
between 10 and 11 p.m. One observer was stationed at the
police station, another by the edge of the village that the
convoy would have to pass, a third at the traffic circle.
Five fighters were within five meters of the road on the
far side of the railroad track. When the convoy left, the
observers passed word to each other and then to a fourth
observer who would be able to see the convoy approach-
ing the railroad crossing. The fighters opened fire just as
the leading edge of the convoy reached the railroad track,
and killed five policemen and wounded three others.
Later, the KLA followed three policemen known by
everyone to have abused us and our mothers. We found
out that they would be eating at a restaurant located
across from a bus station with several stalls and adjacent
to a bus parking area. An observer was posted outside the
police station and another some distance further away.
The observer informed the attackers of the entry of the
police into the restaurant, and then when they were about
to leave. Three KLA soldiers had positioned themselves
in a hidden area inside the bus station and opened fire on
the police, killing all three. To become a KLA soldier you
had to prove yourself in a fight of this sort.
In both settings, an essential part of the planning was
to identify an escape route. In the case of the restaurant
attack, the fighters were instructed to melt away
immediately into the civilian population, and at the first
opportunity to appear openly in the civilian population in
civilian clothes.
—confidential interview
61
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 61 6/4/08 1:50:17 PM

Military actions that were precursors to KLA operations be-

gan in the late eighties with armed resistance to Serb police trying to
take Albanian activists into custody. By the early nineties they included
organized attacks on police convoys, police stations, and individual po-
lice and secret-service officials infamous for their abuse of Albanian ci-
vilians. By mid-1998 the KLA was engaged but badly outnumbered and
outgunned in frontal warfare.1 During the NATO bombing campaign
in 1999, necessity forced a return to guerrilla warfare, now more often
aimed at Serb military units than at police and collaborators.2 The KLA
claimed as many as twenty-four thousand fighters at the end of 1998 (the
actual number was closer to fifteen thousand, as chapter eight explains).
That number had dwindled to fewer than five thousand by the end of the
NATO bombing campaign.3 As the conflict escalated, Serbia increased the
firepower of its special police units and introduced regular army forces.
The KLA responded by improving its coordination among local armed
elements, erecting chains of command, establishing a “General Staff,”
and introducing uniforms and other features of army organization.
Having begun with courageous acts of defiance, the KLA now em-
braced the strategy of bringing about international intervention on the
side of the Kosovars. Purity of tactical guerrilla doctrine was regularly
sacrificed to that overriding strategy. Even before the first sporadic at-
tacks on police convoys, stations, and agents in Kosovo, many leaders of
what was to become the KLA understood that theirs was a political and
not predominantly a military campaign. They also knew that military
action could help them in winning this political campaign, while they
accepted the reality that they would win few battles militarily once the
Serbs brought their overwhelming firepower and manpower to bear on
scattered and not very well-coordinated guerrilla forces.
KLA’s Strategic Goals and Objectives

The Kosovo Liberation Army’s overarching strategic goal was an inde-
pendent Kosovo. To achieve this goal it had to pursue a number of stra-
tegic objectives:
1. Show that it was possible to resist;
2. Survive efforts by the Milosevic regime to annihilate it;
3. Eliminate key members of the Serb police, military, and security ap-
paratus, including ethnic Albanian collaborators and spies;
4. Defend civilians;
5. Keep open the arms-supply routes to Albania;
6. Interdict Serb supply routes through the Llap region;
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 62 6/4/08 1:50:17 PM

The KLA at War 63
7. Build international sympathy, by implanting into geopolitical dis-

course the ideas that the Serb forces in Kosovo represented a foreign
occupation and persistently violated human rights, that resistance
was building and could not be eliminated, and that KLA fighters
were not terrorists.
The KLA did not confront as sharp an internal inconsistency in pur-

suing its objectives as Milosevic did in pursuing his (please see the previ-
ous chapter). The principal strategic problem for the KLA was to manage
the conflict between the third objective and the seventh. In the end it
managed to do that masterfully, although postwar prosecution of KLA
leaders (addressed in chapter eleven) reopens the issue of whether the
KLA legitimately pursued the third objective.
Political Strategy
Some KLA leaders worked to define a long-term strategy; others thought
it was a waste of time. Xhavit Haliti, the older Planner in Exile profiled
in the first chapter, explains how strategy evolved. From 1991 to 1992
the LPK/KLA hoped to open a second front against Serbia by cooperating
with Croatia, with which it was then at war.4 An Albanian brigade then
fighting in Croatia would return to Kosovo. Armed conflict in Kosovo
would pull in international support—or, at least, interest—that was al-
ready beginning to emerge with respect to Croatia and Bosnia. It was
clear by 1995, however, that the Kosovar Albanians would have to go it
alone. There would be no help from Croatia or from the internationals, no
assistance from Albania, and only opposition from the Rugova “govern-
ment.” The Planners in Exile would have to integrate the Defenders at
Home into their plans. The strategic concept was a guerrilla war lasting
twenty years, though the Planners in Exile thought they might, eventu-
ally, attract international support.
A number of the Defenders at Home thought strategy should take
a backseat, even as they embraced the central strategic goal of building
popular support inside the Albanian community. Ramush Haradinaj re-
ports one meeting with the Planners in Exile in Tirana: “I thought they
were a bunch of chatterboxes, and I said to them, ‘We will see each other
in Kosovo if you want to come; if you don’t, stay here because it will
be very difficult for you.’ I threatened them.”5 As Haradinaj later told
the author, strategy was not helpful because “We were on our own. The
international community might never intervene, but we didn’t have a
choice. We didn’t start fighting just because someone might stand with
us . . . we just wanted to convince individuals that it’s possible to fight
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 63 6/4/08 1:50:17 PM

the Serb regime and Serb forces [and that] [e]ven if we are killed, it’s pos-
sible to answer. We have an expression: ‘When someone gets married,
there will be money for the wedding.’ That was our position as well. If
we started, support would come somehow.”
Young, slight, and baby-faced, piano and guitar player, but tough,
Rexhep Selimi helped bridge the gap. He imparted strategic and tactical
guidance to fighters inside Kosovo and operational information to the
exile group as he moved fluidly between the groups. He describes the
goals of the KLA as “damag[ing] the enemy, embolden[ing] ourselves,
arous[ing] international sympathy, sow[ing] confusion among the Serbs,
and ‘slap[ping] them in the face’ with impunity.” Though the KLA’s slaps
got harder and more frequent, there was a problem: The international
community was beginning to show interest, but the KLA was invisible,
and it was easy for diplomats, reporters, and Kosovar Albanians to believe
that it was not real. Beginning in 1998 the need to increase visibility,
even at the cost of inducing greater Serb repression, greatly influenced
tactics. As another senior KLA leader told the author, “We modified
Marxist guerrilla warfare doctrine. Mao said that popular support had
to come first. KLA proved that armed resistance could come first—as a
way of building popular support.”
Military Theory and Practice

The KLA’s fighting had to be organized and directed to achieve the stra-
tegic goals of avoiding military annihilation and building popular sup-
port. Three bodies of military doctrine are relevant toward an evaluation
of KLA tactics: that pertaining to conventional war, that pertaining to
guerrilla war, and that pertaining to terrorism.
According to Carl von Clausewitz, the leading classical theorist on
war, “Superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory.”6
Insurgencies are unlikely to achieve success in conventional warfare
because they lack superiority of numbers and have inferior technology.
They can, however, make up for some of their deficiencies with other
assets identified by Clausewitz: moral superiority, boldness, surprise,
and perseverance. “Moral elements” include the skill of the commander,
the experience and courage of troops, and “patriotic spirit.”7 Boldness in
commanders and troops also matters.8 Perseverance goes a long way be-
cause not all battles go well and not all plans are executed appropriately.9
Surprise is almost as fundamental as superiority of numbers. Surprise
compensates for deficiency in numbers because it permits a force of a
given size to confront an enemy before the enemy has been able to con-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 64 6/4/08 1:50:18 PM

The KLA at War 65
centrate his forces and, therefore, can provide the superiority of numbers
necessary to a particular engagement. It also has a psychological effect
and tends to lower the enemy’s morale.10 Guerrilla warfare is a way of
enhancing these advantages, diminishing the importance of the superi-
ority of numbers.
These principles of Clausewitz’s schema illuminate the one clear
advantage from which the Kosovo Liberation Army benefited: the KLA
fighters were ready to die for their cause. The skills of many command-
ers may have been limited—at least in terms of their skill in organiz-
ing conflict according to received doctrine. The majority of the soldiers
had no military experience and only the most rudimentary training. But
they had courage and “patriotic spirit.” One soldier said, “I didn’t want
to get killed, but it was worth it to contribute to the cause my cousins
and brothers had died for.” Another, older observer agreed, but was con-
cerned:
The soldiers were enthusiastic and courageous, but completely unpre-
pared. They had childhood enthusiasm. They were heroic. Dozens of
young Kosovar Albanians, and their friends from elsewhere in the world,
would discover that the Serbs had mined the paths they used to bring
arms into Kosovo yesterday. So they opened new paths. The Serbs killed
almost all of them. They were courageous and heroic, regardless of how
effective they were. (Bujar Bukoshi)
Though they “had no idea at all” about what was necessary “to fight
successfully,” Bukoshi added, the “brave and very noble” young volun-
teers “showed great courage” in this way: “They embraced the morality
of being willing to die for your country.”
The Serb forces, though enjoying substantial numerical superiority,
were fighting either for purely professional reasons or out of an abstract
notion of Serbian history. Alcohol abuse and corruption were rampant in
Serb ranks, even at the beginning of the KLA insurgency. As frustration
grew with their inability to annihilate the KLA insurgents, who rose again
and again from the ashes of Serb scorched-earth tactics, Serb morale and
commitment plummeted further. As one experienced KLA fighter said
to his scared cousin, “Niti, you will get used to this. The Serbs are more
scared than you are. You know why you have a weapon. They don’t.”
A brigade commander later observed, “The Serbs were afraid to die for
Kosovo. The KLA soldiers were not.”
Guerrilla tactics supplement Clausewitz’s basic principles.11 Insur-
gencies in their guerrilla phase employ tactics that permit them suc-
cessfully to oppose an enemy that has superior numbers and firepower.12
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 65 6/4/08 1:50:18 PM

Militarily, effective guerrilla tactics prevent an enemy from concentrating

its forces, thus diluting the enemy’s superiority of numbers. Confronted
with guerrilla attacks, the enemy is inclined to scatter its forces to chase
the guerrillas. Politically, effective guerrilla tactics weaken the enemy’s
will and strengthen the will of the population sympathetic to the guer-
rillas. Hit-and-run tactics goad the regime into stern repressive measures
that only deepen popular opposition. Such attacks increase the regime’s
costs of opposing the insurgency by building a popular consciousness of
potentiality—rooted in the possibility for success—by causing symbolic
casualties, especially those of leading military and political figures. The
desired effect was expressed evocatively a half-century earlier by a young
member of the Lehi, one of the guerrilla groups opposing British occupa-
tion in what became Israel. He said, before being hanged for shooting a
policeman, “This is how you British will walk the streets of Zion from
now on: armed to the teeth, prepared for anything and with fear in your
eyes: fear from every dark corner, and every turn in the road . . . fear
day and night because the Jewish youth have become dynamite in this
country [and] no guards, no tanks, no fines, no curfews, no tortures and
no hangings, no prisons and no detention camps, will help your high
commissioners, your officers, your policemen.”13 KLA guerrilla com-
manders were well aware of this effect. When they attacked police sta-
tions or convoys, they knew that it was good enough simply to launch
the attack and kill a few of their opponents; rarely was it necessary to
kill them all or capture vehicles or structures. The attack itself would
put the Serbs on edge. They would find excuses not to venture out from
their police stations again.
Like all guerrilla groups, the KLA took advantage of its superior
knowledge of the local countryside to set up ambushes and establish in-
accessible bases as points of refuge. Recognizing that their central tacti-
cal technique must be mobility, they attacked the enemy and then faded
away toward bases in nearby inaccessible terrain or across a border before
the Serbs could effectively respond. Movement by night was important
to undermine superior enemy reconnaissance technology and enhance
the prospect of surprise. Terrain favorable to guerrillas and unfavorable
to the forces of the regime reduced opportunities to capture large quanti-
ties of weapons from the regime, but it provided greater opportunities for
guerrillas to dig in, engage in positional warfare, and establish medical,
training, and resupply operations. Rrustem Berisha, a former KLA com-
mander in the Dukagjini region, remarked that his brigade used terrain
against the “heavy machinery” of the Serbs. In both Llap and Dukagjini,
the KLA anchored its activities in rugged mountainous territory.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 66 6/4/08 1:50:18 PM

The KLA at War 67
The KLA practiced a form of guerrilla war known as Fourth Genera-

tion Warfare, or “4GW” (introduced at the beginning of chapter one).14
Though based on Mao’s concepts of guerrilla warfare, 4GW “does not
attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces.”15 Rather, it
uses military action as one part of a broader political strategy to per-
suade the enemy to withdraw or—more often, and more relevant to the
KLA—to persuade the international community to intervene on the side
of the insurgents. Thomas X. Hammes wrote that “like Clausewitz,”
Mao, “the first practitioner to define insurgency, understood that war is
fundamentally a political undertaking.”16 Clausewitz himself proceeded
from the premise that war is at its heart “a continuation of political in-
tercourse, carried on with other means.17 Clausewitz also recognized the
great effect highly publicized events in armed conflict have on public
opinion.18 Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, the architects of the Viet-
cong, refined Mao’s model to include a conscious, sophisticated attack
on the national will of their enemy—the United States, located halfway
around the world.19 The Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Hammes notes, took
the next step: “In the Sandinista strategy, political maneuvering would
not be the precursor to a conventional [military victory]—it would serve
as [victory] itself, by destroying external support for the [regime].”20 After
the Sandinistas experienced repeated failure in trying to organize an ef-
fective guerrilla war in Nicaragua because they could arouse neither the
peasants nor urban labor, they used their own military setbacks to arouse
upper-class youth, the church, and the international community.21 “They
never conducted large-scale military operations and certainly never con-
ducted the Phase III conventional operations characteristic of a Maoist
insurgency.”22 They focused as much on U.S. and international opinion
as on the battlefield. The KLA resembled the Sandinistas more than it did
the Vietcong. Prolonged guerrilla warfare in Kosovo lasting ten years or
more, as the Planners in Exile and Bukoshi originally envisioned, might
have sapped Serbia’s will to hold on to Kosovo. In the short span of the
actual conflict in Kosovo, however, undermining the will of the Serbs to
fight was not a realistic possibility. Therefore, invoking the Sandinistas’
playbook, the KLA used armed conflict to arouse international sentiment
in its favor even when it lost militarily.
Robert Pape concludes that suicide terrorism is closely associated
with nationalist insurgencies opposing foreign occupiers. To understand
why the KLA did not resort to terrorism as the term commonly is under-
stood—large-scale, indiscriminate attacks on ordinary civilians—requires
analyzing the incentives that motivate some resistance movements to
use terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. Suicide attacks offer advan-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 67 6/4/08 1:50:18 PM

tages to insurgencies in certain circumstances of weakness but also im-

pose obvious costs on the suicide attackers as individuals. Suicide terror
eliminates the possibility of intelligence for the regime resulting from
apprehension of a successful attacker. It obviates the need to plan and
execute escapes. It has dramatic symbolic effect. Suicide attackers obvi-
ously are more than mere bandits: The total commitment of the suicide
attackers adds human interest. On the other hand, suicide attacks impose
an evident cost on the insurgency: A suicide-based strategy turns on its
head the usual concern by insurgencies to preserve their forces to fight
again another day, especially when facing numerical disadvantage.
No reported instances of suicide attacks occurred during the KLA
insurgency, and very few attacks on purely civilian targets were made.
Four reasons explain the KLA’s exclusion of terrorist attacks on purely
civilian targets: Such attacks would have undermined the overriding
strategy to induce Western intervention; they were inimical to the Ko-
sovar Albanian culture of resistance; they were not tactically necessary;
and they would have diminished popular support within Kosovo. Ter-
rorism targeted at civilians was inconsistent with the historic Albanian
culture of resistance. The “Program of the Albanian General Uprising of
Spring 1919 in the Dukagjini Plateau” contained instructions that “no
insurgent must harm the local Slavs apart from those who put up armed
resistance against the Albanian cause; no insurgent must burn houses or
damage churches; [and that] the local Slavs and the market place must
be guarded by trustworthy people.”23 Moreover, civilian-targeted terror-
ism was not necessary. Serb counterinsurgency actions were sufficiently
maladroit that types of violence lower on the violence continuum were
sufficient to achieve KLA objectives. As the KLA matured, it was increas-
ingly able to attack Serb police, military, and civilians without significant
risk that the attackers would be apprehended or killed. Moreover, the
strong bonds of the Albanian culture reduced the likelihood of defection,
even if someone was captured.
On the other hand, the conditions for recruitment for suicide mis-
sions and other terrorist attacks were favorable, given the strong attach-
ment by young Kosovar Albanians to the cause of Albanian nationalism,
and the indifference expressed by many of those interviewed for this book
about risks to their lives. “I didn’t care if I got killed; I was going to fight
for freedom.” Further, had the insurgency continued for a longer period
of time, and had the Serbs gotten better at protecting likely targets, it is
entirely possible that the KLA eventually might have resorted to more
terrorism against civilian targets, inherently less likely to be protected,
and possibly ratcheted up the violence to include suicide attacks. It was
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The KLA at War 69
in the end a combination of Serb incompetence and KLA success at in-

ducing Western intervention that contained the violence at lower levels
on the violence continuum.
KLA strategy and tactics crystallized only gradually, and theories of
warfare played varying roles, depending on the individual KLA leader. At
first the only strategic goal was to free Kosovo from Serb control. The only
tactical concept was to fight somewhere, sometimes, because of a convic-
tion that independence could come only through armed action. For many
of the Defenders at Home, not even that strategic goal existed; for them it
was a simple instinct to defend their families and villages against armed
Serb encroachment. Over time, however, the KLA integrated its political
goals with its military goals remarkably well. Tactics shifted back and
forth. Sometimes the KLA operated in accordance with classical guerrilla
war theory, engaging in hit-and-run attacks and melting afterward into
the civilian population or retreating to safety in bases secure from Serb
attack. During the same periods of time, the KLA also sometimes dug
into defensive positions and sought to hold territory by engaging in frontal
warfare. Never, however, was it able to achieve superiority of numbers,
the starting point for success in the Clausewitz model.
Apparent inconsistency in tactical doctrine can be explained by three
realities. First, the KLA had to be visible to achieve its political objec-
tives, and this pushed it toward the Clausewitz model; it had to appear
to be an army, not a guerrilla band. Second, the military objectives were
different in the three zones where most of the fighting occurred. Third,
the KLA felt compelled to try to protect the civilian population against
Serb attacks.
The KLA began with classic guerrilla tactics designed to achieve as
many of its strategic objectives as possible and consistent with the asym-
metrical nature of its power compared to that of the regime. Pockets of
armed resistance existed in the 1980s and before. In many cases, those
taking up arms had little choice: The Serbs came to arrest members of
their families and they simply fought back. As the scope and intensity
of Serb repression grew, the number of pockets of resistance also grew.
Resistance increasingly took the form of offensive attacks on police sta-
tions and police patrols, as by Jashari in the Drenica Valley, the Haradinaj
family and others in Dukagjini, and Pajaziti in the Llap Valley. This early
offensive phase grew throughout the first half of the 1990s, and by 1996
attacks were occurring almost weekly throughout Kosovo. The attacks
on police and the SDB followed classic guerrilla doctrine: the KLA used
surprise, popular support, terrain, and local knowledge and engaged in
hit-and-run tactics.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 69 6/4/08 1:50:18 PM

As the KLA grew, its tactics changed from pure guerrilla engage-
ments to positional conflict, adapted to take into account the KLA’s
inferior numbers and weaponry. This shift occurred for three reasons:
opportunity, necessity, and public relations. Events in later 1997 and
early 1998 created an opportunity for the KLA to become an organized
armed force. A flood of arms after the collapse of the Albanian state in
1997 was followed by a flood of volunteers after the Jashari Massacre in
1998. Both tempted the KLA to become an actual army rather than a col-
lection of guerrilla bands. The result was the KLA’s Summer Offensive
of 1998, the high-water mark of the KLA’s use of conventional tactics.
By mid-June, the KLA had closed the Peja-Gjakova road, and the Serbs
had lost control of the Prishtina-Peja and Mitrovica-Peja roads. Only the
Prishtina-Prizren road remained open. On June 24, the KLA seized the
Bardh coal mine near Prishtina. It controlled towns throughout Drenica
and Dukagjini, and for one brief period, Ferizaj, well outside the territory
in which the KLA had traditionally been strong. At the end of June, the
KLA was reported to control 40 percent of the territory in Kosovo.
The KLA discovered, however, that success as an army requires more
than recruits and weapons. The Summer Offensive of 1998 was a military
disaster. The Serbs had overwhelming superiority of numbers, especially
after they introduced the VJ. The Serbs not only lured the KLA into am-
bushes along the arms routes, they also suckered the KLA into overcon-
fidence. “Let them get confident. Let them have their ‘free zones,’” the
Serbs reasoned. “Then they will be out into the open where the VJ can
annihilate them.” That is what they basically did in the summer of 1998.
In the KLA’s defense, its commanders argue that the shift to conventional
tactics was necessary to preserve supply routes and to protect the civil-
ian population, which was increasingly targeted by the Serbs. Moreover,
even during the Summer Offensive, the KLA engaged in conventional
or positional warfare in a limited sense. It did not march (or ride jeeps)
toward the Serb forces with trumpets blaring and banners flying, seeking
to destroy them. Rather, it launched guerrilla attacks on its objectives—
for example, the roads or the coal mine—and then engaged in positional
warfare to defend its gains. It dug in and sought to prevent Serb forces
from entering its territory. Clausewitz recognized that defensive forces
have important advantages over offensive forces: terrain, surprise, support
of the people, and moral strength. Only absolute superiority of numbers
provides an advantage to offensive forces.24
Public relations needs subordinated military tactics to political strat-
egy. The need to build credibility and to overcome accusations of terror-
ism made it desirable for the KLA to seem to be an army rather than a
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The KLA at War 71
network of ragtag guerrilla bands. “We needed be an army rather than a

guerrilla group operating in the woods in order to reassure the popula-
tion,” said Xhavid Loshaj. “They needed to see us, and they particularly
needed to see the commander, Ramush Haradinaj.” Even military defeat
for the KLA served this overriding political goal, for it had a galvanizing
effect on the people: They saw their sons fighting and being martyred.
They now saw that the KLA was real. “Our compromise with pure guer-
rilla tactics was needed big time to overcome Rugova’s propaganda,” one
commander said. “We had to avoid appearing to be terrorists. So we had to
be out in the open so that the media could come and see us. That meant
big battles, on a front, even though we needed more and heavier weap-
ons to oppose the strength of the VJ. We could have done more with the
weapons we had if we had hidden and waited to ambush the Serbs. But
then we would have been invisible. We would have been more effective
militarily, but we had to act for the civilians and for public opinion.” To
gain credibility with the international community, KLA soldiers wore
official-looking patches and uniforms in fighting battles that could be
reported in the media, and in declaring “free zones.” They cultivated the
impression that scattered guerrilla bands had become a real army that had
Milosevic on the run. They were consolidating victories and progressing
to Mao’s third phase. By the end of the war, organization had evolved
into something that resembled, at least in aspiration, a conventional
army. Zones were organized into brigades with a target strength of two
thousand men each, although no brigade came close to reaching that
goal. Each brigade comprised four battalions. Each battalion comprised
three or four companies, each of which had three or four platoons. The
target strength of a platoon was thirty men. Every brigade had a medic, an
M.D., or a nurse. Irregular forces included civilian defense militia forces,
which were intended to stay close to home. Would-be fighters who lacked
weapons dug trenches and handled ammunition. Neither organization
nor military doctrine was monolithic, however. Tactics differed in the
three main regions, Llap, Drenica, and Dukagjini.25
In the Llap Zone, the principal military opportunity was to interdict
Serb lines of communication. Llap was in the north, and Serb reinforce-
ments, arms, and supplies had to move through the zone. Zone Com-
mander Remi (Rrustem Mustafa) focused his tactics on controlling—or at
least interfering with Serb movements on—three main roads: that connect-
ing Mitrovica with Prishtina, that connecting Podujevë with Prishtina,
and that connecting the Preshevo Valley in Serbia with Prishtina. Remi,
inexperienced in military matters, relied more than other zone command-
ers on subordinates with military and police experience. He was much
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 71 6/4/08 1:50:19 PM

more deliberate, influenced no doubt by these experienced lieutenants.

Remi emphasized training, supply, strategy, and organization. He wanted
to be ready when he fought. Yet he did not abandon the guerrilla culture
he inherited from Zahir Pajaziti, who often eschewed strategy to demon-
strate that armed resistance was a possibility. His experienced advisers
pushed Remi toward Clausewitz; the Pajaziti heritage pushed him toward
guerrilla engagements. As his forces were outmatched by Serb numbers
and weaponry later in the war, he shifted from frontal warfare aimed at
controlling roads to guerrilla means of interfering with movements over
them. Remi sought above all to protect the lives of his fighters.
In Drenica, the traditional heart of Albanian resistance, the early
attacks on police stations and SDB agents exhibited the merits of hit-
and-run guerrilla attacks. The KLA could take the fight to the Serbs,
rather than merely defend Albanian families from Serb initiatives. For
Drenica, Planner in Exile Thaçi and the others emphasized security from
penetration by the SDB. Weapons distribution, like other aspects of KLA
organization and membership, was kept to a circle of people who knew
each other. Then, as Serb forces withdrew from large sections of Drenica
in 1997 and mid-1998, KLA forces in Drenica became exhilarated with
the prospect of holding territory, and embraced the strategic objective of
demonstrating that the KLA constituted a real army and that military
progress was possible through Clausewitzian means.
In Dukagjini, the spirit was defensive from the beginning. Haradinaj
emphasized getting everyone armed and starting to fight; strategy could
come later. Putting everyone under arms would make it more difficult for
Serbs to attack families and villages. He then focused on defending KLA
lines of communication in order to permit arms to flow across the Alba-
nian border, which was located mostly in Dukagjini. Finally, Haradinaj
sought to defend the civilian population against Serb ethnic cleansing,
which was aimed at “sanitizing” the border. Offensive guerrilla operations
played a secondary role in fulfilling these objectives. “It was very simple.
It was the decision to say yes and getting a gun. It was not too compli-
cated: just having a gun.”26 The Dukagjini fighters were forced into frontal
warfare only to resist Serb incursions into KLA territory. Still, despite the
defensive orientation, Dukagjini KLA forces engaged in some five hundred
offensive hit-and-run attacks during the course of the war, sometimes at-
tacking big VJ convoys. “We always said, ‘hello’ to them, whenever we
could,” Ramush Haradinaj says. The hit-and-run attacks resulted in almost
no KLA casualties. All of the KLA fatalities occurred from frontal warfare.
There was so much fighting in Dukagjini, where the Serbs sought to dry
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The KLA at War 73
up the arms flow, that not much time, energy, or manpower was left for
planning or establishing new organizational structures.
Targets
Targeting is at the heart of insurgency strategy and tactics. Picking a tar-
get represents a decision about when and where to fight. The KLA used a
model that had been developed eighty years earlier in Ireland. After the
1916 “Easter Rising,” Irish nationalists realized they could not defeat
the British using conventional military tactics. Michael Collins was the
“supreme architect of the hit and run ambush technique [with] which
[the Irish Republican Army (IRA)] effectively countered [British] superi-
ority.”27 He did so in an environment in which transatlantic politics was
crucial, and concentrated on eliminating British intelligence agents and
their collaborators through special assassination squads.28
Before mid-1998, the KLA, like the IRA, used classic guerrilla war-
fare tactics, attacking police stations and assassinating particular police,
military, intelligence, and—occasionally—public officials associated with
the regime. It used light weapons—AK-47s, crew-served machine guns,
sniper rifles, hand grenades, and an occasional antitank weapon. Once
the KLA shifted its tactics and began engaging in positional warfare, tar-
gets were self-defined: Serb military units. Almost no attacks occurred
on general civilian targets, in either phase. A Serb-sympathetic Web site
offering extensive information on 153 “criminals” from the Kosovo con-
flict, while describing every violent attack as a “terrorist” one, in fact
describes only attacks on police and army facilities and units, and assas-
sinations of Serbs and ethnic Albanians supportive of Serb intelligence
services.29 Western press reports of violence in Kosovo described attacks
on police stations and police and army convoys and, with the exception
of a few early attacks on Serb refugee housing complexes, reported no
attacks on purely civilian targets.30
Throughout the war, KLA targets often included ethnic Albanians be-
lieved to be informers for the Serb intelligence sources (this is consistent
with Che Guevara’s advice to be “absolutely inflexible” with informers
and with Michael Collins’s practice). Virtually every KLA communiqué
issued during 1996 and 1997 reported at least one attack against an Al-
banian collaborator of the Serb “occupiers.”31 Although the assassina-
tions and confinement of suspected ethnic Albanian sympathizers with
the Serb regime later gave rise to war-crimes prosecutions against KLA
soldiers and leaders, a distinction nevertheless must be drawn between
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 73 6/4/08 1:50:19 PM

targeting perceived sympathizers and targeting general civilian targets,

whether Serb or Albanian. The former occurred, by all reports and evi-
dence. The latter almost never occurred.
Battle Plans
Tactical concepts must be translated into operational plans, and the
plans must be carried out. This section offers examples of specific guer-
rilla attacks and preparations for conventional engagements with Serb
forces. Here is what U.S. Army doctrine says about guerrilla attacks on
convoys:
Conceptually, the commander of the attacking force has to do three
things: (1) establish a kill zone; (2) keep the target inside the kill zone for
as long as possible; and (3) direct sufficient firepower into the kill zone.
It’s not so much a matter of aiming well; it’s a matter of directing suf-
ficient fire into the kill zone to increase the chances that anyone inside
it will get hit. (General William Nash)
To elicit concrete explanations, the author presented a hypothetical

“Battle of the Bridge” situation to a number of KLA commanders, and
to U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers in interviews, involving a pos-
sibility for KLA attack against a police convoy comprised of ten vehicles
about to cross a bridge over a creek.
You can trap them on the bridge. You want to block them front and
back. Your people on the high ground will attack by fire. They would
use sniper rifles to hit drivers or tires to stop the front and rear vehicles.
They also would target radio operators—identifiable by antennas on the
vehicles—so the targets can’t call for reinforcements. With the river and
the swampy area on the other side of the road, the target can’t go any-
where. They’ve got to get out of their vehicles, and the attackers can
continue to shoot people. The targets don’t know exactly where the at-
tackers are, but the attackers know exactly where their targets are. Ten
guys can wreak havoc against thirty to forty guys. The attackers don’t
have to stay and kill everybody; they just kill a few and then leave. Also
they don’t have to stop all the vehicles; you just have to slow them down.
If you disable one or two, the others have to slow down to get past, pre-
senting better targets as they do so. (General David Grange)
That is exactly what the KLA did, time after time. The dominant con-
sideration in organizing attacks was to ensure that KLA forces could es-
cape. “Success requires retreating with no casualties,” said Ajet Potera.
“If there were thirty Serb soldiers, and I only killed three but retreated
without casualties on my side, that would be success.”32
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The KLA at War 75
The second consideration, dictated by necessity, was to plan for the

effective use of a very limited number of men. No matter what the pur-
pose of an attack, no more than seven soldiers would ever be used, as a
matter of policy. KLA commander Potera described how he would fight
the “Battle of the Bridge.” He said that he could have used only two KLA
soldiers if the objective was only to scare the police and to increase their
feelings of insecurity wherever they traveled.
Suppose I wanted to attack a police convoy with ten to fifteen vehicles
moving east along a road across a bridge. The terrain involves two lightly
wooded hills to the north of the road, on either side of the creek flowing
under the bridge.
I would not attack during the day. That would get everyone killed
because the terrain is too flat and open. I would only do it in daylight if
it was meant to be a kamikaze attack. Otherwise I would do it only at
night. Or, if it were summer, I would attack at the end of the day, so we
could escape after nightfall. I would only do it if I had machine guns or
mortars available.
I would choose a place where the convoy must slow down. The bridge
might be okay if it was in bad repair. A railroad crossing would be better.
The important thing is to get the convoy to slow down or stop.
I might position a civilian automobile on a bridge, so that it appeared
to be broken down, with civilians pretending to push it. We would signal
the civilians to run away just as we launched the attack.
I would put one man in the trees on the hill to the north with a ma-
chine gun, positioned to attack the lead vehicles of the convoy frontally.
Once he started firing, the convoy would immediately stop and panic. I
also would have spotters with radios up the road so they could transmit
to the attacking force with messages such as “they’re coming with cer-
tain types of vehicles and weapons.” This would give me time to decide
what to do.
I would place snipers in the hills perhaps a little farther back from
the position of the machine gun, maybe in the trees on the hill to the
west. They would target anyone who shoots back. I would put two to
three other men near the machine gun crew to shoot at the flank of the
column. I also would put a heavy machine gun near the snipers to attack
any Serb retreat. Once the attack started, I would unload almost every-
thing we had. If it was safe after the attack, I would have my soldiers try
to get the target convoy’s weapons and documents. If anyone survived,
I would take them “hostage.”
I would not position any soldiers in the rear of the target column; nor
would I place soldiers on the other side of the road. Instead, I would
use an “L” position as I suggested. This would reduce the possibility of
friendly fire, and also make escape easier.
Every soldier with an AK-47 would tape two clips together. Once
empty, the first clip could be removed, the assembly quickly switched
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 75 6/4/08 1:50:20 PM

180 degrees and the other clip plugged in the weapon. It was customary
to fire the first clip on automatic, quickly, and hold the ammunition
in the second clip in reserve for single-shot firing. In every action, our
squads had at least one M84 belt-fed machine gun. (Ajet Potera)
Every other KLA commander interviewed said something similar.

KLA commanders were mindful of Clausewitz’s precept about quanti-
tative forces. Noting that “instill[ing] fear in Serb forces” and “break[ing]
their morale” was the strategic objective of this approach, Potera said
that a guerrilla attack would only target small convoys and “would be
held to a duration of five to ten minutes regardless of the degree of suc-
cess achieved.” Because “Serb stations were placed closely together,” this
was necessary, for Serb reinforcements “could reach an attacked column
quickly [and] [w]e never knew what kind of reinforcements might be
available.”
To a certain extent, the frontal war that crystallized in the summer
of 1998 was a smoke-and-mirrors operation. The KLA may have “held”
40 percent of Kosovo, but it did so with miniscule numbers of fighters
and relatively light armament, largely because Serb forces withdrew af-
ter encountering modest, albeit more-than-expected, amounts of fire.
Because the Serbs sought to return with heavier forces, the KLA had no
alternative but to try to defend its “front” until its lines broke. Even in
defeat, however, the KLA was now visible to the entire world. No one
could deny its existence, and no one could deny that a full-fledged war
was on in Kosovo.
Smoke and mirrors or not, the KLA grew sophisticated in its plans.
Soldiers and commanders in the Llap Zone prepared to oppose the Serb
army forces lined up in the Podujevë Valley. In August and September
1998, fewer than two hundred KLA soldiers fought to defend KLA control
of the road leading into the Llap Valley from Podujevë against more than
five thousand Serb troops backed by tanks and artillery. The number of
KLA fighters grew to several thousand by December. KLA forces were
positioned in the Llap Zone along the ridge separating the Prishtina-
Mitrovica road from the Prishtina-Podujevë road. Both of these roads were
of enormous strategic importance because they were the main logistical
links between Kosovo and Serbia proper, over which Serb forces in Kosovo
could be supplied and reinforced. By September 1998, Brigade 152 in the
north and Brigade 151 in the south had dug trenches all along the north-
east face of the ridgeline, from Kaçanoll Mountain in the north to the
village of Godishnjak in the south, almost to the road. Special guerrilla
units operated to the east, on the other side of the Podujevë road. In the
summer of 1998, total KLA forces in Brigade 151 numbered about 150,
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The KLA at War 77
with smaller numbers in Brigade 152. After the rebuilding that occurred
during the October 1998 cease fire, total KLA forces along the ridgeline
numbered about 1,700. The forces were equipped with AK-47s for each
man in uniform, several heavy machine guns, a 75–mm artillery piece,
and a few 12.7–mm antiaircraft weapons.
The entrenchment had two purposes: to defend the KLA-held ter-
ritory in the mountains behind the trenches, where training camps and
supply depots were located, and to provide a base for launching guerrilla-
style attacks on Serb highway movements. KLA forces in the south of the
ridgeline were essentially defensive. Any KLA attack would be launched
farther north, where the hills are higher. The plan was to send the main
KLA force directly down the slope in jeeps and trucks against the main
Serb force massed near Podujevë. On September 15, 1998, Serb forces,
apparently with the benefit of intelligence from Albanian informers, at-
tacked the smaller KLA force of Brigade 152 at Bajgora, and gained three
advantages: They faced a smaller opposing force, they got behind the
stronger Brigade 151, and they were able to link directly with their lines of
supply at Mitrovica. Brigade 151 had to retreat to reinforce Brigade 152 on
the ridge just south of Llapashticë. More-experienced Brigade 151 forces
under Remi’s and Potera’s command relieved less-experienced Brigade
152 troops who had held off an attack by vastly superior Serb forces for
three days. The relief forces included specialty units skilled at making
flank attacks to create the illusion that Serb forces were surrounded.
After the September engagements, armed but nonuniformed civilians
operating under the same command as the regular KLA forces augmented
the 1,700 regulars. As the October cease fire was breaking down, espe-
cially from December 24, 1998, to March 24, 1999, KLA forces operated in
the valley with a mixture of guerrilla and more conventional attacks. The
mountain of Kaçanoll, overlooking Podujevë, was the scene of two fierce
positional battles, the one on September 15 and another in December
1998, after the Holbrooke-Milosevic cease fire broke down. The terrain
at Kaçanoll resembles that of West Virginia. Three adjacent mountain
peaks, separated by a few hundred yards, frame a winding, rutted, narrow
dirt road leading from the Podujevë Valley into the mountainous terrain
that was the haven for the Llap Zone KLA.
After pounding KLA positions with artillery, Serb armor and infantry
moved up the road to the KLA positions. The heaviest fighting occurred
on Christmas Eve 1998. The Serb forces had more tanks than the KLA had
men. The KLA forces had one 12.7–mm RPG antitank weapon. Otherwise
they were armed only with AK-47s, sniper rifles, a couple of crew-served
machine guns, and some grenades and mines. They could not mine the
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 77 6/4/08 1:50:20 PM

road because civilians were streaming up it, fleeing the Serb attackers
just ahead of the Serb tanks. The defenders initially thought that the road
would be impassable for tanks, but they were wrong. The Serbs advanced
through the village of Dobratin, destroyed it, and came up the road, led
by their armor. Eventually, the KLA fighters had to withdraw from the
mountaintop not only because they were so badly outnumbered and
outgunned but also because they were inexperienced. They had not dug
trenches except in a few places, and were thus in the open, exposed to
Serb fire. After the KLA forces withdrew, the KLA continued harassing
actions against the Serb flanks and Serb supply lines. The harassment
was sufficient to cause the Serbs to withdraw again after three days.
Elsewhere, there was less opportunity to plan. The battle for control
of the roads in Drenica was fierce. On May 29, 1998, the KLA blocked the
Prishtina-Peja road near Lapushnik. On June 18, Serbs lost control of the
Prishtina-Peja and Mitrovica-Peja roads; only the Prishtina-Prizren road
remained open. On June 15, the KLA closed the Peja-Gjakova road. On
July 27, Serbs retook the Prishtina-Peja road, and reportedly had regained
control of all the main roads in Drenica. Two days later, the Serbs reas-
serted control over the Mitrovica-Peja road. But the KLA bounced back.
In a three-day battle from July 28 to 31, it had again closed the Prishtina-
Peja road with nighttime attacks involving automatic weapons, machine
guns, and mortars.
Fighting in Drenica was ferocious, as this transcript of Ruzhdi Kar-
puzi’s testimony in the ICTY Limaj Trial indicates.
There were over 400 Serb vehicles. In the evening of Friday when we saw
them coming from Prishtina road, all the soldiers took up positions. . . .
It was about midnight. . . .
They started shelling early in the morning, but from a distance. They
used all possible means at their disposal against us. . . .
In the evening we withdrew from that position because the Serb forces
came very near, maybe 50, 60 meters away from us. The tanks started
to fire at us. They played music. They were celebrating. We didn’t have
heavy vehicles to fight back at them, heavy armaments.
While they stopped firing for a while to see whether anyone was still
alive, I attempted to fire a mortar at them; it was about 120, 30 meters
from the position I was in. The first three shells did—were not activated.
The fourth one hit it. I saw two bodies flying up in the air because of the
explosion.
A second tank shelled us. And we all flew up in the air. When we fell
on the ground—I had an injury. So I told my comrades to withdraw.33
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The KLA at War 79
During the same time period, KLA forces in the Dukagjini Zone concen-
trated on keeping weapons supply routes open and on protecting larger
population centers from siege by Serb forces. Strategy was confined to
“giving everyone a gun.” A more decentralized approach in Dukagjini
did not mean the absence of frontal warfare. As the weapons distribution
program penetrated one village, the residents of that village would begin
to resist the Serbs. The Serbs would surround the village, intending to do
a house-to-house search to seize weapons. The KLA would undertake to
defend the village. The boundary between surrounding Serb forces and
defending KLA forces would become a front. In Deçan itself, the KLA
had constructed a series of meter-and-a-half-deep trenches to serve as a
defensive measure, thus allowing KLA soldiers to retreat in safety from
guerrilla forays toward the Serb lines in the hills.
As it mobilized to become an army, the KLA discovered that it was
much easier to fight the police and special police forces, as it had done
through mid-1998, than the regular VJ forces that began to be introduced
in Kosovo in late 1998. By June 1998, Ramush Haradinaj had some eight
to ten thousand people available to him in Dukagjini, including not only
regulars under his direct command but all those under arms and wear-
ing uniforms. Some of them operated autonomously as “islands.” By
September, forces available to Haradinaj in Dukagjini had melted away
from the initial number to only fifty-six people, the majority of them
relatives and elderly or young neighbors.34
All the others had left, going mostly to refuge in Albania. A large
unit comprising several thousand fighters and their weapons had been
deliberately removed by its FARK (Forces of the Army of the Republic
of Kosovo; see below) commander. Of the soldiers who had withdrawn,
Haradinaj thought two thousand had hidden in the mountains with their
weapons and another thousand were in Albania with access to weapons.
These troops might return if conditions got better. Others hid with fami-
lies in the cities and towns. Still, Haradinaj’s position was desperate, and
the Planners in Exile and the Drenica command sent several hundred
soldiers to relieve him. But despite fear and doubts, the fighters had
not given up. They had proven to themselves that they could resist. “It
wasn’t a real army [but] a guerrilla organization, made of volunteers,”
said Haradinaj. “It was the right of everyone to agree to fight and it was
the right of everyone to leave. They were inexperienced and they were
scared. When they saw that a battle was not going so well or saw two or
three of their friends killed or wounded, they just sought the safest pos-
sible place. They would run for a half-day until they got there.”
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 79 6/4/08 1:50:20 PM

By February 1999, the weapons flow to fighters in the Llap Zone had
dried up, though the commanders there hoped that Operation Arrow
would open up new arms routes near Pastrik Mountain in Dukagjini.35
The worst time was April 1999, when KLA command-and-control was
broken. Serb forces could do pretty much whatever they wanted in the
Podujevë Valley. The NATO bombing was of no help. The Serb forces ap-
parently knew exactly when NATO attacks would occur, and the absence
of low-altitude NATO bombings meant that targets were limited to those
in the targeting databases. By being mobile and concealing themselves
only slightly, the Serb forces were able to avoid effective attack. They
expelled the Kosovar population from the villages and towns and drove
them into the mountain range to the east, and continued to drive them to-
ward Prishtina. KLA soldiers still in position on the ridgeline were forced
to watch, more or less helplessly, as crowds of civilians, which likely
contained their mothers and sisters, were expelled from their homes and
driven into the rugged, mountainous terrain.36 This demoralized them.
The new KLA Llap Zone strategy focused on saving soldiers so they
could fight later.37 Brigades 151 and 152 were withdrawn from the moun-
tains and joined Brigade 153 in the south. If the Serb forces attacked the
mountains, they would find them empty. If they attacked in the south,
the KLA forces could be moved back to the mountains. The best soldiers
were removed from the brigades and reassigned to a special elite unit
commanded by Ajet Potera. The idea was that the depleted units would
be able to protect themselves; they were not expected to attack. The
elite unit would be better prepared to engage in guerrilla attacks on Serb
forces over the entire zone. Serb removal of the population facilitated
KLA engagement in uninhibited guerrilla warfare. They no longer had
to fear, as they had earlier, that a guerrilla attack would be rewarded by
Serb reprisals on a nearby Albanian population center.
The elite unit established a base in the mountains south of Batllava
Lake, not far from Dyz. The area is sparsely populated, without much
vegetation. The unit comprised about sixty men who improvised tents
out of nylon sheeting. The Serbs controlled every house but had more
trouble controlling the open spaces. Every morning units of six to eight
men would go to the north near the Serbian border and attack Serb forces.
Every twenty-four hours, a unit representative would go to higher terrain
and broadcast a radio message advising the zone command that they were
intact. Otherwise no one, not even in the zone command, knew where
they were.
On June 9 Remi began moving his forces from Llap toward Prishtina,
a movement that continued until June 12, when they stopped for the
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The KLA at War 81
night, just outside Prishtina. A few days later, Remi and his forces en-
tered the city of Prishtina and were able to move around freely, arriving
just before the vanguard of the NATO troops. Smaller KLA intelligence
units were in Prishtina before that.
Command and Control

Command and control of the KLA fighting forces evolved from initial
loose linkages and understandings among a handful of people who knew
each other to more formal structures at war’s end. Most of the KLA’s early
attacks were initiatives by groups of individuals acting independently.
The leaders of the insurgency did it themselves. They took up weapons,
they made the plans, and they shot the opponents. In this context, the
commanders acted for themselves; they did not need soldiers. And they
did not need the Planners in Exile. This pattern of operation continued
until the fall of 1998. Even with such informality, coordination between
the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home was desirable. The
fluid boundary between these two groups, and the shuttle diplomacy of
Hashim Thaçi and Rexhep Selimi, reinforced linkages that already existed
because of prior personal and family relationships. “It is misleading to
draw a hard distinction between the Planners in Exile and the Defend-
ers at Home,” Selimi said. “It was all the same group; we just found
ourselves in different places. We couldn’t do politics and logistics from
inside; they couldn’t do operations from outside.” Through what their
critics, like Ramush Haradinaj, said was “just talking,” the Planners in
Exile built an intellectual foundation for key infrastructures that permit-
ted the Defenders at Home first to become an effective guerrilla force
and then to take on the shape of an army. Kadri Veseli, a member of the
General Staff and head of the KLA intelligence service, is credited with
especially strong contributions toward a coherent strategy. Nevertheless,
differences in style, location, and participation in actual fighting created
ongoing tensions, though different segments of the KLA understood that
they needed each other. The most serious breakdown in coordination
occurred when the Peaceful Path Institutionalists organized their own
army, Forces of the Army of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK).
Plans for coordination between the two KLA groups had been laid
earlier. Leaders of the Planners in Exile met in November 1994 in Tirana,
agreeing on a division of duties. Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, and Ali Ah-
meti, among others, would work outside Kosovo, concentrating on the
political representation of KLA, and would supply money and weapons
to the inside group, which would coordinate operations. Hashim Thaçi,
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 81 6/4/08 1:50:21 PM

Rexhep Selimi, and Nait Hasani would work inside Kosovo, forging link-
ages with the fragmented Defenders at Home. In the meantime, the Plan-
ners in Exile would launch a public relations campaign aimed at making
the KLA seem more coherent than it actually was at the time. The first
KLA communiqué, numbered “13,” was issued after a series of KLA ac-
tions in June 1995. That was the first time the name “Kosovo Liberation
Army” was communicated to the public.
From 1996 to 1998, Selimi, Thaçi, and Hasani worked hard to forge
bonds both among the Defenders at Home and between the Defenders and
the Planners in Exile. “Snake” Thaçi was the communication channel
between the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home, and crossed
the border with Albania dozens of times with stealthy ease. Selimi trav-
eled sometimes by car but more often by bus or on farm equipment so he
would be less likely stopped by the Serb police. Never using documents
during the early days, he communicated orally. He was always armed.
Adem Jashari relied on them. He could not go far away from home for
fear of arrest. Zahir Pajaziti was acting independently in the Llap region,
and only linked up in August 1996 when he contacted Rexhep Selimi.
Pajaziti told Selimi, “I know Adem Jashari but he doesn’t know me.” Se-
limi was arranging a meeting between Jashari and Pajaziti when Pajaziti
was killed, in January 1997.
Despite these efforts to connect pockets of resistance “horizontally”
on the ground in Kosovo, it was easier to connect them vertically with
the growing political leadership of the Planners in Exile in Albania, Swit-
zerland, and Germany. Horizontal connections on the ground inside Ko-
sovo were too dangerous; the SDB would find them. But everyone in
Switzerland and Germany, it seemed, had a cousin or two involved in
armed resistance in one of the pockets in Kosovo, and the cousins found
ways to stay in touch with each other. The many individuals who were
prepared to fight immediately, and who had actually begun fighting, were
prepared to accept help from whatever organization offered it. The clan-
destine Planners in Exile were eager to attach themselves to someone
who actually might fight, and were prepared to make any of them the
“chief” of some part of the Defenders at Home. Thus did early military
organization emerge.
Extremely small operational units of two or three men, called
“points,” skulked around watching the Serbs, digging trenches at night,
going where they heard something interesting was going on. To the extent
they received orders at all, they were told to shoot at Serbs when they got
a chance and to attack police stations, soft targets almost always in the
middle of population centers. As fighting spread, points and other small
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The KLA at War 83
units would sometimes come to one another’s aid, but not because they
were ordered to. Individuals identifying themselves as KLA would hear
the sound of gunfire, or would hear about battles. They would assemble
some of their friends and move toward the sound of the fighting to see if
they could help. This remained standard operating practice in Drenica
even in the early summer of 1998. And Drenica was better organized
than the other zones.
The collapse of the Albanian state in the spring of 1997 opened access
to weapons, and the Jashari Massacre in March 1998 stimulated a flood of
volunteers for the KLA both inside Kosovo and from the Diaspora. These
opportunities “forced” the KLA to become an army some years before it
had planned to do so. “KLA appeared as a meteor,” one former insurgent
said. “It was enough to say that we were members of KLA [and] we were
referred to as saviors . . . the hope, the solution.” Having once struggled
to gain visibility, the KLA now became an inspiration: “Everyone joined
each other around the flag [even though the KLA had] no infrastructure
on these occasions [and] [e]verything was done on a voluntary basis at
that time.”38
The KLA was getting massive, but it still was not an effective mili-
tary organization, even after its 1998 Summer Offensive. The KLA oper-
ated in units in different villages. It was enough for ten people to carry
weapons, and one of them to be elected commander. That election was
turned into an appointment by the Planners in Exile’s self-styled general
headquarters. “In May [1998] we were only seven. At the place which
I led, in the municipality of Malisheva, which has 53,000 inhabitants,
there were 35 soldiers, approximately. In three months, the number of
the armed soldiers in that municipality exceeded 2,000, whereas 5,000 or
6,000 others were expecting to get weapons.”39 By August 1998, the Plan-
ners in Exile became more assertive. Having already reconstituted their
executive committee at first as the “General Headquarters” and then the
“General Staff,” they began to issue instructions and orders to members
of the Defenders at Home, usually passed orally by Hashim Thaçi, Kadri
Veseli, or Rexhep Selimi.40 The General Staff defined operational zones
and appointed zone commanders, inevitably ratifying the identity of those
who had already emerged as regional insurgency leaders. It instructed
zone commanders to reorganize their forces into brigades and battalions,
and to appoint commanders of each subordinate unit. The Defenders at
Home gradually fell into line, though at varying rates. “The “battalions”
were platoon size—ninety to one hundred men each, Haradinaj recalls,
and “some would run; some would fight.” Among the battalions, “little
real command and coordination” existed: “The smartest guy would say,
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 83 6/4/08 1:50:21 PM

‘You go here; you go there; here’s what we will do’; he knew the power
of surprise and would pick the targets. Sometimes I would hear about
it days later.”
The Defenders at Home were divided into seven operational zones,
each with its own commander. The most famous commanders were from
the Llap Zone (Remi), the Drenica Zone (Sami Lushtaku), the Pastrik
Zone (Shukri Buja), and the Dukagjini Zone (Haradinaj). Azem Syla was
the designated commander in chief. Zone commanders had a horizontal
relationship, and they occasionally helped each other with arms, troops,
and logistics. Yet they did not coordinate operations in any meaningful
way. Rather, they communicated with each other via cell phone or face-
to-face, and all shared a similar experience: They simultaneously planned
the war in their zone, participated in actual fighting, and controlled the
soldiers under their command. Yet tensions remained.
Ali Ahmeti, a member of the General Staff from Macedonia, is cred-
ited by some KLA commanders as being particularly influential on strat-
egy. Others say that he had to be marginalized because of his desire to
extend the conflict to Albanian areas of Macedonia, and for failing to
prevent Pajaziti’s assassination by telling him about arrests of KLA and
LKÇK activists a few days prior. Although the zone commanders uni-
versally respected the General Staff’s contribution to the war, they often
resented the orders that came from “above.” Thaçi put himself at risk
running messages from the General Staff to the commanders, and he
had personally participated in some of the earliest attacks in Drenica;
the majority of the General Staff members were not, however, as some
fighters grumbled, on the front line trading shots with the Serbs each
day. Haliti and Syla were never on the ground.
The level of tension depended largely on the personal characteristics
of the commanders. Ramush Haradinaj and Remi tended to follow their
own instincts, often disregarding General Staff orders. For a time, both
were in a position to do that. The Dukagjini Zone was flush with arms
that had been brought in through Haradinaj’s contacts, as well as those of
the General Staff who used the Dukagjini’s proximity to Albania as base
for its operations. Remi developed his own arms supply routes through
Serbia and had his own finance connections in Prishtina. Haradinaj, how-
ever, was chastened by his experience in late 1998, when FARK leader
Tahir Zemaj deserted with most of his troops and weapons. Then Hara-
dinaj badly needed help from the General Staff, which responded quickly
with several hundred fighters, just in time to mitigate Serb attempts to
completely wipe out Haradinaj and his remaining resisters. He had new
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The KLA at War 85
respect for the Planners in Exile: “I was very happy. I was happier than
anyone else, because I was in real trouble. Some of the others had an
easier time by comparison. They fight one morning and then for three
weeks, they didn’t see action. That was not my case.”
But not all of the relationships among the leadership went so smoothly.
In February 1999, twenty-nine-year-old Sylejman Selimi (alias “Sultan”),
the Drenica Zone commander, was named chief of staff—the KLA’s top
military commander. A couple of months later, after the Rambouillet
Conference, Agim Çeku succeeded Selimi. He and Thaçi said to each
other, “We have to get ready for a real war.” Çeku had been a brigadier
general in the Croatian armed forces, and had developed a close relation-
ship with U.S. Army General Richard Griffiths, who, as head of MPRI
(a private defense contractor), had administered the “Equip and Train”
program in Croatia.41 Jakup Krasniqi, widely credited with smoothing
relations among the commanders and between the commanders and the
General Staff, insisted in late 1998 that the commanders become mem-
bers of the General Staff. A number of the military leaders, however,
bristled when he announced that he was “the deputy commander” at
a meeting attended by several military commanders. Haradinaj called
Krasniqi “stupid,” and stalked out of the meeting.
One close U.S. observer says that the KLA leaders “were always
disorganized, putting their energies into jockeying for position after the
war. You would go to a meeting of the General Staff, and they would
be arguing, shouting at each other, plotting against each other. It was
completely disorganized and riven with conflicts.”42 Acknowledging the
tensions within the KLA, Haradinaj admits that some of the KLA’s devia-
tions from pure guerrilla tactical doctrine owed to lack of knowledge.
“We needed to be sneakier, to draw them into fights on our own terms,”
he said. “We should have tried to avoid having the civilian population
tie the guerrilla force down [and instead] made sure that our officers did
not act without regard to the impact on others.” But, “one day’s experi-
ence in the field, being shot at, is worth three days of studying military
doctrine,” he added. “It really concentrates your attention on what works
and what doesn’t.”
“We were lucky,” Haradinaj concludes. Others agreed: “The KLA
fighting the way they did . . . that’s not the way to liberate yourselves,
though it may be a good way to attract attention. They weren’t incom-
petent, just overmatched. Imagine a high-school football team playing
the Chicago Bears,” said a Chicago supporter and fund raiser. “They had
so many things breaking for them—it was like they won the lottery.”
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 85 6/4/08 1:50:21 PM

The Conflict with FARK

The failure of the Kosovar Albanians to unify undermined their efforts
and diverted resources into internecine warfare rather than fighting the
Serbs. Reorganizing the KLA was complicated by the presence of FARK—
a competing Kosovar Albanian “army” organized by Bujar Bukoshi and
the Peaceful Path Institutionalists. Bukoshi’s Ministry of Defense, now
under Ahmet Krasniqi, an Albanian former major in the army of Croa-
tia, organized FARK, and arm wrestled with the KLA over control of
resources and military operations. Seeking professionalism, Bukoshi
and Krasniqi hired dozens of former Yugoslav military officers to lead
his new army. Bukoshi believed that FARK represented a better-trained
and more professionally organized force with better discipline than the
KLA. The KLA leadership, furious with that assertion, in effect said to
Bukoshi, “Where were you when we needed you? We got this far without
your help and now you want to snatch it away from us? No dice. Give
us your money instead.”
Accommodation between the KLA and FARK, however, did appear
possible for a while in some areas, even in Dukagjini. At one point, Ra-
mush Haradinaj offered to step aside in favor of the FARK commander.
After that gesture was first accepted and then rescinded at the behest
of the General Staff, FARK–KLA relations in Dukagjini became more
poisonous than anywhere else. FARK commander Tahir Zemaj had in-
sisted on being in command and on not intermingling his forces with
KLA fighters who, he said, were inadequately trained and commanded.
Then, after brief skirmishes with Serb forces, he declared that the war
was unwinnable, and deserted to Albania with several thousand soldiers
and all their weapons. This nearly broke the back of the KLA.
There are contradictory explanations for the split from both sides:
Critics of the KLA say that it had amorphous, disorganized leadership
and immature expectations of how a war could be fought effectively.
The KLA says that the Government in Exile and FARK wanted to collect
their salaries but were never willing to fight and, further, that a number
of those involved in FARK had been compromised by the SDB. A more
benign interpretation of events exists, however. As early as 1992, Bukoshi,
unlike Rugova, recognized that Kosovo could never be liberated from Serb
control without armed resistance. The international community sim-
ply would not pay serious attention in the absence of armed resistance.
Regardless of the prospects for a purely military victory, a visible armed
resistance in Kosovo was a necessary lever for any successful diplomatic
initiative. So Bukoshi, from the early 1990s, was whispering in some ears
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The KLA at War 87
and informally encouraging those like Haliti to go ahead with their plans
for military action.
But Bukoshi also was focused on institutionalization, and sought to
recruit people who were both sympathetic to the Albanian cause and had
significant military knowledge and experience. These individuals warned
him about the magnitude of the tasks involved in organizing an army.
As the head of the official, albeit unrecognized, government for Kosovo,
Bukoshi was naturally inclined to prefer an official institutional approach,
and the advice he was getting said that it would take a long time to get
ready to fight—maybe five to ten years. On the other side, the Defenders
at Home and many of the Planners in Exile thought that the key was to
start fighting immediately and to develop the logistics and the popular
support later. “We’ll fight now and see what happens.” By the time Bu-
koshi came around in the later part of the war and was willing to provide
money through Haliti essentially on the KLA’s terms, it was too late to
mend relations or to forge any genuinely common effort.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 87 6/4/08 1:50:22 PM

6 Financing
The people were LDK through-and-through. They had

met in the church to raise money to send to Bukoshi,
but when we came in person that day and spoke about
the young men in the mountains, people opened their
eyes and they saw something new—a new vision of how
to get freedom. We asked them to help our soldiers, our
brothers, and sisters who had started in the mountains of
Kosovo with not even a bullet in their rifles.
“It’s time to give a hand to those people who want to
give their life for our land—to sacrifice everything they
have.” And I saw people even cry. They started to get
tears in their eyes and they said, “We are with you.” And
then one of the other guys stood up and shouted, “You
stole our meeting. This was a meeting of LDK.” And
he cursed me so bad that my brother also stood up and
wanted to fight with him. I got the microphone again
and I said, “This is the time to fight for Kosovo. We’re
not going to fight here. We have to be united to fight for
Kosovo and I forgive whatever you said because Kosovo
is more important than me and you and any bad blood
between us here.” And people started clapping.
—Luigj Gjokaj
Overall contributions in support of the Kosovo Liberation

Army ranged from $75 million to $100 million. Modest fund-raising ac-
tivities began in Switzerland in the 1980s, as part of the Planners in Exile’s
efforts to prepare for armed resistance. After the 1989 demonstrations
in Kosovo, Milosevic’s revocation of autonomy, and the first multiparty
elections in 1990, fund raising became more formal but also splintered
between the Peaceful Path Institutionalists, who wanted to finance the
88
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 88 6/4/08 1:50:22 PM

Financing 89
Kosovar Albanian Government in Exile, and the Planners in Exile, who

wanted to build an adequate war chest for guerrilla warfare against the
crushing Serb yoke of oppression. The Peaceful Path Institutionalists’
finance vehicle, formally the Fund for the Republic of Kosovo (RFK) but
universally known as the “Three-Percent Fund,” was established earlier
than was the Planners in Exile’s “Homeland Calls,” and both outraised
and outspent Planners in Exile’s funds throughout the 1990s by as much
as a factor of ten.1
Estimates of the effectiveness of the Three-Percent Fund vary widely.
Serb sources claim that up to $5 billion was collected through the fund.2
Bujar Bukoshi (who ran the fund) estimated the correct figure to be $260
million. Intermediate figures approximate more than one billion Deutsch-
marks (about $500 million) by the end of the war. Very little of the fund’s
proceeds was funneled to the KLA. The fund’s primary role was the main-
tenance of Kosovo’s parallel system of education: 20,000 teachers and
administrative staff, 5,291 preschool pupils, 312,000 elementary school
pupils, 56,920 pupils in sixty-five secondary schools, two special schools
for disabled children, and 12,000 students enrolled in twenty faculties
and colleges. The fund also supported both social welfare programs (food,
health care, and sports) and the work of Kosovo’s parallel government.
“Homeland Calls” or the “Homeland Calling Fund” (Vendëlindja
Thërret) was the most prominent vehicle for raising money for the KLA.
Its tight integration and overlapping leadership with the Planners in Exile
led to its dominance of financial management and logistics in Albania.
But a multitude of other funds and informal mechanisms for contribut-
ing to the KLA functioned parallel to, and sometimes in competition
with, Homeland Calls. Many contributors had ties with the Defenders
at Home—with individual commanders or with fighters in particular
operational zones—and made arrangements to channel their contribu-
tions directly to a particular operational zone, thus bypassing Homeland
Calls.
The Message
The KLA convinced potential contributors to support the insurgency
through appeals to Albanian nationalism that presented compelling sto-
ries of the young men and women who were putting their lives on the
line against overwhelming odds. “You have the chance to fuel the Alba-
nian national dream, which few generations before you have had,” was
the persistent, heartfelt message. Myzafer (“Freddie”) Mehmeti and Kurt
Bexheti, the organizers of fund raising in Chicago, still weep when they
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 89 6/4/08 1:50:22 PM

remember the hardship their families and friends faced while the KLA
resistance was still in gestation.
Luigj Gjokaj’s speech at the launch of the Michigan chapter of Home-
land Calls (see epigraph at the beginning of this chapter) is an example of
the KLA’s message. “People wanted to support bravery; they didn’t care
how the KLA would win or how long it would take,” he says. People had
a hard time, however, believing at first that the KLA actually existed. To
prove that the KLA was real, Luigj sent individuals to take pictures of peo-
ple organizing and training in the mountains. He invited “real soldiers—
fighters” to speak. On one occasion, Florin Krasniqi got Commander Remi
(Rrustem Mustafa) on the phone and patched him into a broadcast from
the New York–area LDK radio station, which electrified support for the
KLA among those who were otherwise stuck in Bukoshi’s orbit.
In Chicago, the most effective fund raising was face-to-face solici-
tation, reinforced by occasional large gatherings. As Freddie Mehmeti
recalls,
I would meet face to face with donors and say, “A thousand dollars now
will take us a million miles. A million dollars later may do nothing.”
I didn’t ask everyone for $1,000. Rather, I said, “You can help in many
ways. You can contribute money. You can agree to visit other families,
and ask them for support. You can help with publicity, or you can donate.
I remember visiting one man, who greeted me by saying, “You’re against
Mr. Rugova.” I said, “No. We’re all on the same side.”
The KLA itself consistently reinforced the message delivered by fund

raisers in the Diaspora. Beginning in 1996, almost all of its communiqués
called upon Albanians in exile to support the KLA financially.3
The managers of the Peaceful Path Institutionalists’ Three-Percent
Fund regularly tried to interfere with contributions to Homeland Calls.
Those efforts were especially effective in Germany, where per-capita con-
tributions were much lower than in Switzerland and the United States.
The Peaceful Path Institutionalists set up competing funds such as “Soli-
darity Fund,” “Everything for Drenica,” and “Everything for Kosovo.”
Fund raisers for the KLA tried to overcome this by urging people to sup-
port the war regardless of party.
KLA Contributors
The KLA was financed predominantly by private contributions, most
of which came from members of the Albanian Diaspora in Europe and
America. Many of these Albanian contributors had roots in Montenegro,
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Financing 91
Macedonia, Serbia proper (especially the Preshevo Valley), and Albania,

as well as in Kosovo. Kosovar businessmen made generous contributions,
usually directly to particular commanders. Many who were of modest
means contributed modest amounts, often as part of a group commitment
to contribute a certain amount per month or a certain percentage of their
incomes. Most of the money, however, came from larger contributions,
many of which exceeded $10,000, from wealthier businessmen.
The vast majority of contributions to Homeland Calls came from
Switzerland. Swiss Albanian expatriates paid membership dues to the
LPRK, even before it transformed itself into the LPK. The rate of contribu-
tions from a broader class of contributors began to accelerate only in 1996
and 1997, and mushroomed in 1998 and 1999. Swiss contributions aver-
aged perhaps SF 1,000 per capita; yet there was an enormous variation:
Many contributions clustered around SF 750; others clustered around SF
10,000. Some people took out loans of SF 10,000 or more to contribute.
In some cases, Albanian contributors made their own arrangements to
send money from Switzerland directly to the Dukagjini or Llap Zones.
One contributor sent DM 140,000 to Llap outside the Homeland Calls
channel, because his nephew was fighting for Remi, who requested the
money for a special need. Not all Kosovar Albanians in Switzerland were
dedicated to supporting the KLA, however. Many elected to spend their
money on BMWs, nice apartments, and Prada accessories, rather than
contributing generously to the KLA funds. Non-Albanian Swiss citizens
were struck by how many Kosovar Albanians ostentatiously spent money
on luxury goods.
Fund raising for the KLA in the United States began in a serious
way only in late 1997. Little was raised in the United States before then,
though contributions mushroomed in 1998 and 1999. The profiles of
contributors and the patterns of contribution were similar to those in
Switzerland. United States–based contributions exceeded those in Ger-
many and amounted to about one-quarter of the total funds raised in
Switzerland.
Sometimes people in Switzerland, Germany, and the United States
would contribute “in kind.” Instead of money, these benefactors sent
supplies, and especially weapons. On one occasion, supporters in Zur-
ich equipped a busload of volunteer fighters with boots, uniforms, and
other personal equipment and sent them to Albania, where they received
weapons. Sometimes Gjokaj went to buy supplies in Michigan or else-
where, only to be told, “It’s all paid for.” Florin Krasniqi encouraged
contributing in-kind because it connected contributors more closely to
the realities of the fighting. No evidence exists of significant financial
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 91 6/4/08 1:50:22 PM

support from the United States or other Western governments, though

NATO probably facilitated the weapons supply to the KLA during the
1999 bombing campaign. The only exception is that intelligence services
of the Republic of Albania provided modest financial and other support
to the Planners in Exile during the 1980s. Later, the Albanian state was
in too much financial distress and under too much political pressure to
avoid entanglement in the conflict in Kosovo for it to be a significant
source of direct support.
Total Amounts Raised

It is difficult to arrive at ballpark estimates for the total figure collected
by Homeland Calls. It is reasonable, however, to conclude that about $11
million was received from the United States, $50 million from Switzer-
land, and $10 to $12 million from Germany. An approximate total would
thus be $75 million to $100 million for Homeland Calls, with additional
money, probably between $10 and $25 million, flowing through other
channels directly to various zones, and to the Dukagjini and Llap Zones
in particular. Estimates of the numbers of KLA soldiers vary from fifteen
thousand to thirty thousand at the peak of KLA strength, as chapter eight
explains. Combining the high and low estimates for money and man-
power, one arrives at a range of $2,500 to $8,400 per soldier.
Overall, Dallas raised about $4 million; Detroit raised about $1.8
million; Alaska $400 to 500,000; Chicago about $500,000; and the New
York area the rest. The Dukagjini Zone raised and spent on the order of
$3.5 million, $1 million of which came from Homeland Calls, $1 mil-
lion of which came directly from contributors inside Kosovo, and the
rest from direct contributions from outside.
The Llap Zone raised and spent roughly $22 million: $2 million
came from Homeland Calls and $20 million came directly from local
contributors, especially businessmen in Prishtina. About half of the total
was spent on arms and half on uniforms, boots, and equipment. The Llap
Zone bought a higher proportion of its weapons than Dukagjini did, and
Dukagjini got a higher proportion of its weapons from Albania, where
Homeland Calls paid for them. That may explain the large difference
between the amounts reported for Dukagjini and Llap.
Ramush Haradinaj says that he had plenty of money by the time the
conflict was in full swing. “Money was not a problem; finding ways to
spend it on arms was the problem. Whenever I sent a team to Albania for
weapons, I would give them $2,000–3,000 in cash, sometimes more.”
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Financing 93
Dirty Money?
Though some commentators on insurgency—and some analysts of the
KLA—expressed horror at the possibility that an insurgency might engage
in illicit activities to raise money, such a reaction is naive. An insurgency
is, by definition, illegal in the state within which it occurs. Moreover,
most of the methods an insurgency must use to acquire arms are illegal
in a multiplicity of states, and many of its fund-raising techniques—at
least with respect to moving, if not to raising money—are likely to be
illegal as well. It is not illogical for an insurgency leader to reason, “I am
already a criminal; why shouldn’t I raise money through other criminal
activities?” On the other hand, an insurgency may undermine its repu-
tation in the international community, and possibly within the local
population, by becoming associated with types of illegal activity—like
prostitution and narcotics trafficking—to which significant social op-
probrium attaches.
All available evidence refutes the proposition aggressively advanced
by the Milosevic regime that the KLA was mainly financed by drug and
prostitution money. The author has himself identified $50 million in
contributions from individuals and businessmen engaged in legitimate,
aboveboard economic activities. Though the possibility exists that some
money, perhaps a substantial amount, came indirectly from illicit pro-
ceeds (it is widely believed by many Swiss citizens that elements of the
Albanian community in Switzerland controlled the local narcotics trade)
this possibility is a distraction from the facts. Little evidence exists that
the KLA raised money through extortion or criminal activities engaged
in by the KLA itself.
Organization of Fund Raising for the KLA
I was convinced that a handful of people can do miracles. I

had faith in the KLA. My teenage experiences in Montenegro
taught me that a small group of people can do miracles if
they have the will. It may take a long time, but eventually
their movement can grow. I was actually surprised that the
KLA grew so much faster than I expected.
—Freddie Mehmeti
KLA fund raising was decentralized and fragmented. Homeland Calls

was the most prominent organization and drew contributions from sepa-
rately organized chapters in Switzerland, the United States, Germany, and
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 93 6/4/08 1:50:22 PM

elsewhere. But there were dozens of other, less-formal mechanisms for

channeling contributions directly to KLA’s operational zones. Villages and
their contacts in the Diaspora would raise tens of thousands of dollars at
a time to support fighters they knew. Individual commanders, especially
Haradinaj and Remi, used their own Diaspora contacts. Homeland Calls
was more tightly integrated with activities in Drenica.
Homeland Calls grew from early, and very modest, efforts by the LPK
and its predecessor, the LPRK, to organize an infrastructure for Albanian
resistance in Kosovo. The LPRK began raising money in Switzerland in
the late 1980s for an eventual armed resistance, and had a small fund
supported by fifty Deutschmarks per month from each member (though
some members, of course, contributed more).
In the spring of 1993, Homeland Calls was organized in Arau, Swit-
zerland, under Swiss banking law, by Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, Jashar
Salihu, and others. Ibrahim Kelmendi, based in Bonn, coordinated fund
raising for Germany.4 Homeland Calls was dedicated exclusively to resis-
tance work, and raised money for weapons. The idea was to get started;
contributions would increase thereafter.
KLA fund raisers stressed that their activities were well organized
and thoroughly documented. Most coordination was effected face to face.
Meetings were arranged by cell phone. E-mail was used little. Azem Syla
and Xhavit Haliti coordinated requests from commanders for arms and
other supplies, and decided how to make the purchases from money re-
ceived by Homeland Calls. Syla and Haliti were equally responsible for
decision making, but Haliti was a more visible and, owing to his close
ties to the leadership of the Socialist Party in Albania, an especially im-
portant figure.
Fund raising in Switzerland was organized by canton. Fund raising in
the United States was decentralized, and organized in major metropolitan
areas with significant Albanian populations. Most Kosovars were concen-
trated in the New York area. In other centers of fund raising—Chicago,
Detroit, Dallas, and Alaska—Albanians from Montenegro, Macedonia,
and Albania itself predominated.
Florin Krasniqi was the linchpin of U.S. fund raising.5 The owner
of Brooklyn-based Triangle General Contractors, Krasniqi established
a base in the New York area, and then reached out to contacts in other
major cities who eventually worked somewhat independently from him.
Krasniqi has his detractors, especially among the Planners in Exile, but
everyone credits his generous financial contributions, his passionate and
effective advocacy for the KLA, and his resourceful management of lo-
gistics, including thousands of weapons, uniforms, and other supplies.
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Financing 95
Krasniqi was willing to “dedicate his life to the KLA” after his cousin
Adrian, a close associate of Ramush Haradinaj, was killed in KLA skir-
mishes with Serb forces in late 1997.6 After Adrian’s death, Krasniqi de-
cided that the existing support structure was inadequate. Krasniqi made
contact with Xhavit Haliti in Albania, even though he “couldn’t stand”
him, and paid the KLA General Staff in Zurich a visit that only reinforced
his “disdain” for what he saw as inept leadership.7 Thus, Krasniqi’s links
to the KLA were primarily with individual commanders, especially Ha-
radinaj and Remi, rather than through Haliti. Krasniqi made phone calls
to all Albanians he could identify in the United States and organized
fund-raising events at restaurants, to which he would bring KLA fight-
ers or survivors of Serb attacks, whose personal stories would move his
contributors to generosity.8 Among the people Florin Krasniqi reached
out to were Freddie Mehmeti in Chicago and Luigj Gjokaj in Detroit.
Luigj Gjokaj raised $1.2 million overall in Detroit. Born in 1961 in
Dushiq, Tuz, Montenegro, Gjokaj began study with the University of
Prishtina Law Faculty in 1978, but was arrested for his participation in
the 1981 demonstrations. After his release from jail but before his trial,
he escaped from Montenegro and went first to Mexico, and then to New
York, where he worked for twelve years before coming to Detroit. There
he followed the lead of his father-in-law, Gjok Martini, who encouraged
Detroit’s Albanian community to reconnect with its Albanian national
heritage and to become more active in Balkan politics.
In Chicago, Freddie Mehmeti and Kurt Bexheti, who had helped Gër-
valla and Zeka to organize the LPRK in Germany, focused on the LPK
and Homeland Calls for their first solicitations in February 1997. Initial
efforts at raising money through fund-raising dinners in Chicagoland did
not work. A significant problem was that the Chicago fund raisers had
to prevail on two fronts: against the Serbs, and against adherents of the
LDK. Further, some potential contributors were suspicious of any fund-
raising effort run from New York. Mehmeti and Bexheti concluded that
they would have to make a face-to-face appeal. They began with some
355 restaurant owners in Chicagoland. Putting many miles on their cars,
they traveled to Albanian neighborhoods in small towns and villages
throughout northeastern Illinois of which they had never before heard.
Moving the Money

Most KLA donors were in Switzerland, the United States, and Germany,
yet money needed to be spent on arms and other KLA supplies in Ger-
many, Albania, and Bosnia. And, of course, the fighting was in Kosovo.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 95 6/4/08 1:50:23 PM

Thus for the KLA, as for most insurgencies, the money raised had to
be moved to where it needed to be spent—and in this case, the money
had to be moved across national boundaries. A variety of methods were
available. The most straightforward method was what KLA supporters
did most of the time: simply carry cash from where it was raised from
multiple donors in the necessary quantities, to the place at which it was
needed for a particular purchase. Fund raisers found the Swiss banking
system useful because of its integrity and code of secrecy. But money to
be spent in Albania or in Kosovo and on large quantities of arms could
not be handled entirely through the banking system. The banking sys-
tem in Albania was unreliable and corrupt. Moreover, cutting a check
for several hundred thousand dollars to purchase arms was problematic
regardless of where the drawee bank was located, because either the bank
would raise questions or the arms supplier would find the idea of taking
a check to be ludicrous. Cash was used to purchase arms or supplies (for
example, the radio system for Llap) outside Kosovo, in Germany, Bosnia,
or Serbia, and was often smuggled into Kosovo.
Kosovar business owners provided channels for money from exter-
nal sources to reach designated beneficiaries—KLA units and families of
fighters—within Kosovo. They also contributed from their own resources,
hiding funds intended for the KLA in their regular business activities to
avoid detection and interdiction by the Milosevic regime. Their busi-
ness activities were already “informal” because of Milosevic’s exclu-
sion of Albanians from most of the regular legal mechanisms in Kosovo.
Their financial transactions were therefore less transparent to the regime
than they would have been in a state in which most businesses operate
aboveboard. These funds appeared to the commanders as intra-Kosovo
contributions from businesses even though some of the funds originated
as outside contributions.
Bukoshi developed a formal system for getting Three-Percent Fund
money where it needed to be spent. He established an Albanian bank, the
Dardania Bank, and transferred money out of German accounts and into
accounts there. Then he found a businessman in Kosovo—a printer, for
example. Bukoshi would say to the businessman, “Take your revenues
and do not send them out of the country. Keep them in Kosovo. We will
use our funds in Dardania Bank to pay your suppliers and otherwise pay
to your order. You, then, will use your revenues in Kosovo to buy arms
and otherwise pay to our order.” Therefore, much of the flow of Three-
Percent Fund money, like the flow of KLA money, appeared in the form
of contributions by local businesses in Kosovo, even though it was raised
abroad.
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Financing 97
Businesses outside Kosovo played similar roles. Supporters in Zurich,

for example, would visit an Albanian-owned travel agency, contribute up
to eighty thousand Swiss francs in cash, and be issued a receipt. A journal
of receipts and the total cash receipts would be delivered to Jashar Salihu,
a representative of Homeland Calls. Thereafter it would be deposited into
a Swiss bank or used to make immediate purchases. Homeland Calls,
like Bukoshi, used the Dardania Bank in Tirana for some of the money
raised from the West for use by the KLA in Albania.9
Considerable conflict occurred between Haliti and Florin Krasniqi
about whether money raised in the United States should be spent there
on supplies, or whether the money should go to Albania, where Haliti
would direct how it should be used. Krasniqi preferred to fulfill require-
ments for bulletproof vests, uniforms, boots, and sniper rifles within the
United States. About one-half of the money raised in the United States
was used to buy supplies there. The rest was moved to individual com-
manders or to Haliti.
Mehmeti and Bexheti moved money raised in the Chicago area di-
rectly to Switzerland, in cash. After substantial sums had been raised,
someone—often Bexheti—would take the cash, report it on Customs
Service forms, and deliver it to Salihu in Switzerland at some desig-
nated meeting place—usually a restaurant near a train station. Fear of the
Serbian intelligence services prevented everyone from asking too many
questions or knowing too many names. That way, if one person was com-
promised, it would not bring down the whole fund-raising network.
All of the Homeland Calls fund raisers in the United States empha-
sized that they operated through legally registered nonprofit corporations,
and mostly followed Customs Service reporting requirements. On one
occasion, a potential Chicago donor told Mehmeti, “I want to give a large
amount of money—maybe $70,000, but I want personal visibility. I want
to take it to Albania or Kosovo myself.” He then realized the potential
difficulty in getting through customs with $70,000 in cash. He asked
Mehmeti to help him smuggle the cash out of the country. Mehmeti
refused and said, “We must report it to Customs. That’s the law.” The
donor was amazed when Mehmeti went with him to the airport, told
the customs agent that the donor had $70,000 in cash, and was greeted,
“Thank you. Have a good trip. Good luck.”
Others, Gjokaj recounts, skipped a few steps.
Alex kept all the money under the bed at his house. On one occasion,
in April 1999, we took $400,000. We got stopped in the Detroit airport.
We had never reported the cash as we went through the airport. On this
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 97 6/4/08 1:50:23 PM

occasion, someone had been at the big public meeting where we said we
were taking it, and he reported us. The Customs agents made us spread
it out on the table and count it, delaying our flight while they figured
out what to do with us. When they counted the money, they found only
$383,000, because we had already spent some $17,000 on arms and other
supplies. That complicated things, because the agents thought that we
had stolen some of the money. The younger agents told us we were go-
ing to be arrested because we had not called in advance to report the
amount of cash we had. Then an older, more senior, agent came out and
we told him what we were doing, emphasizing humanitarian relief. He
eventually said, “Go ahead. Good luck.” Then, when we got to Tirana,
we had this nearly $400,000 with us in a suitcase. I kept it under my
bed in the hotel—a fleabag hotel, named “Minera” close to the center.
We were not armed. I don’t know what we were thinking.
Despite the difficulties, Gjokaj successfully delivered the $383,000 to

Haliti.
The Peaceful Path Institutionalists were highly critical of such meth-
ods, yet admitted some irregularities of their own. “Homeland Calling,
in contrast to our funds, was totally wild,” Bukoshi said.
Money was being carried around in suitcases. There was no accountabil-
ity whatsoever. No one knew where the money was going or what it was
being spent for. When the war came, we diverted money from schools
and that sort of thing to buy arms. We told the West that we were using
it to buy flour to make bread for the displaced persons and for the KLA
fighters who otherwise would starve to death. The West was not at all
ready to accept the idea that money from the Three-Percent Fund was
being spent on arms. (Bujar Bukoshi)
Protecting Against Detection and Interdiction

The KLA would have been ruined if its external financing had been dis-
rupted. It miraculously avoided that threat, though it had some close
calls. Bavaria banned KLA fund raising in October 1998. During and before
the NATO bombing campaign, as early as January 1999, the Swiss govern-
ment blocked KLA accounts for a period of about three months, during
which a number of Swiss supporters made “emergency” contributions
at levels of fifty thousand to sixty thousand Swiss francs per contributor.
Many of these “emergency” funds went directly to support Commander
Remi in the Llap Zone. Other than this, the Swiss government made no
effort to interfere with KLA funds.
In the United States, Ambassador Gelbard’s unofficial labeling of
the KLA as a terrorist organization in early 1998 rang alarm bells that
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 98 6/4/08 1:50:23 PM

Financing 99
the KLA might be formally designated a prohibited organization by the

United States government. But effective lobbying by KLA supporters, de-
scribed further in chapter nine, deflected the threat so that raising money
for the KLA in the United States continued to be legal throughout the
conflict. “The FBI came to see me a few times,” Luigj Gjokaj recalled.
“They typically would say, ‘Are you sure about what you are doing? Are
you sure there are absolutely no terrorists getting your money?’ I would
always say, ‘I am absolutely sure. We are fighting for our freedom, but
only inside our own country.’ After Gelbard later said the KLA was not
a terrorist organization, the FBI mostly left us alone.”
Fund raising for the KLA occurred in a different legal environment
than that which currently exists. The principal fund-raising activities
conducted within the United States on behalf of the KLA were legal at
that time, and the organizers (mostly) took pains to make sure they were
legal. Using the KLA as a model for understanding future insurgencies
must accordingly involve assessment of how the fund-raising climate for
insurgency has changed. New money-laundering and terrorist-financing
legal controls adopted after September 11, 2001, put the transfer agents
as well as the fund raisers for insurgency at risk if they do not determine
the purpose of the transfers and fulfill their registration and reporting
requirements.10 Still, it is hardly unheard of for entrepreneurs engaged in
the money-transfer business to evade their legal obligations. The post–
September 11 regulations would have seriously hampered KLA fund rais-
ing, because many activities would have raised alarm at banking and
other financial institutions even if the activities turned out to be legally
permissible. Listing the KLA and/or Homeland Calls as a designated
organization, either before or after adoption of the current regulatory
scheme, would have torpedoed fund raising.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 99 6/4/08 1:50:23 PM

7 Training
Guerrillas don’t need any training. They just need to be

motivated and physically fit, and have sense enough not
to talk or to smoke while they’re hiding. All they have
to do is to follow their leader’s instructions when he
tells them where to position themselves. He tells them,
“Shoot when I shoot. Run after me when I run up into
the hills.” His fighters don’t require much instruction
to follow those orders. As to weapons training, anyone
can show him how to operate an AK-47 in five minutes.
As long as a fighter can point it in the right direction
and pull the trigger, he’s doing enough. Earlier, the squad
leader would have picked out the best shot when they
shot at bottles or trees, and given him the sniper rifle.
—General David Grange
Before mid-1998, most KLA fighters received no training. They

just got guns, teamed up with some of their buddies, and improvised
attacks on police stations. As the conflict intensified in late 1997 and
early 1998, and after the number of volunteers mushroomed following
the Jashari Massacre, training was organized, after mid-1998, on a more
or less systematic basis in each of the three main operational zones:
Dukagjini, Drenica, and Llap. All of the training activities made use of
practical knowledge gained by some KLA officers from their service in
the VJ or in MUP. A number brought knowledge and experience from
fighting with Croatian forces against the VJ. To the extent that train-
ing materials were used, they came mostly from Albanian Army or VJ
sources. Few if any printed materials were prepared by the KLA itself.
Training curricula and methods varied widely. Training was most highly
organized in Llap. In Drenica, it varied according to brigade and the pref-
100
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 100 6/4/08 1:50:24 PM

Training 101
erence of the brigade commander until late in the war. In Dukagjini, it

also varied, tending to occur at lower organizational levels, if at all. The
intensity of the fighting in Dukagjini made it more difficult for soldiers
to take time off from fighting to train, and Zone Commander Ramush
Haradinaj was not enthusiastic about formal training.
Need for Training

Insurgencies have less need for formal training than regular armies. They
also have less capacity to conduct it. Commander Ramush Haradinaj be-
lieved that the best way to learn how to fight effectively was actually to
fight—as soon as possible. “No, we didn’t train them for two weeks! Not
even thirty minutes,” he said. “We gave them a gun, and sent them to fight.
They would learn how to use the weapon by shooting it at the enemy. If
they really had to, they could shoot at a tree on the way to a fight.”
Soldiers confirm what Haradinaj said: “Despite efforts to organize
training, people already on the ground had to learn in battle. . . . The aver-
age soldier was strong because he had worked in the fields . . . was com-
mitted . . . was taught how to shoot, but aside from that, he only knew
how to stand his ground—nothing fancy.” Nevertheless, by mid-1998,
most KLA soldiers received some systematic training. This may in part
have been driven by the KLA’s obsession with being perceived as a real
“army,” rather than a ragtag guerrilla band. When the KLA began engaging
in frontal warfare in mid-summer 1998, what would have been adequate
for impromptu hit-and-run attacks was no longer sufficient.
Training produces better troops. They are less likely to break and run
if they know what to expect. They can be more resourceful and able to act
appropriately on their own when confronted with the unexpected. They
are likely to have greater stamina, to defend themselves better, and to
avoid mistakes like shooting too soon before a target is in range, or failing
to pick the best terrain from which to attack or to defend a position.
Models
KLA training can be compared to a variety of models. The models share
with each other and with the several variants of KLA training the same
goals and also share most of the same subject matter. The KLA training
curricula cut some corners, but they were appropriate corners to cut. All
of the training models include obedience and military discipline, tactics,
weapons, communications, physical conditioning and agility, and mili-
tary and international law. All further promote leadership, principles of
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 101 6/4/08 1:50:24 PM

war, marksmanship, map reading and navigation, tactics, signals and

communications, military administration and logistics, military laws,
and physical training and combat fitness.
The KLA consciously drew upon models of training programs of the
VJ and of the Albanian Army, and, when it had knowledge of them, of
NATO, which are similar to the U.S. Army model. In adapting the mod-
els, the KLA had no capacity to do everything, including medical screen-
ing, done by regular armies. It could compress the U.S. Army schedule
by omitting days devoted to administrative tasks, to haircuts, and to
religious services—both Haradinaj and Remi discouraged prominence of
religion in KLA forces under their command. Commanders in Drenica
acted no differently. Likewise, training time devoted to history and or-
ganization of the state in the U.S. model for the Iraqi Army could be
omitted because the KLA soldiers had acquired the necessary informa-
tion from their close-knit families and their shared Albanian culture
and heritage.
Organization and Content of KLA Training

KLA training was decentralized to the zone level, and sometimes to the
brigade level. In Llap and Drenica, it was well organized, comprising four
to eight weeks, as early as July 1998. In Llap, Commander Remi organized
a training school in the mountains near Bajgora, where recruits lived in
barracks during the training. Training at Bajgora took two weeks, two
hundred recruits at a time, beginning in July 1998. “We had some train-
ing [in Drenica] but it was very short,” said Driton Gashi. “We saw that
it was urgent to have some weapons, because there already were more
volunteers than weapons. Most of the soldiers spent two weeks in train-
ing. Special units trained all the time. I spent ten days myself. We trained
with weapons, did physical training, studied, and practiced tactics.”
In Llap, the drill instructors, who were also brigade commanders,
screened recruits to separate complete beginners from those who had
some knowledge of or training in military or police activities, and ac-
cording to levels of physical fitness. They distributed them through the
different training units, so that each training unit of twenty or thirty
soldiers had some more-experienced members and some neophytes.
In Drenica, training was designed by brigade commanders. Recruits
for Brigades 113 and 114 trained in units of about thirty. The majority
of trainees were between twenty and thirty-two years old. “My training
took about two months,” recalls Arxhient Bajraktari, who completed
his training in August 1998. “We ran a little bit, exercised, marched . . .
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 102 6/4/08 1:50:24 PM

Training 103
I trained on the M49, which is like an AK-47. We also trained on crew-

served machine guns and sniper rifles. We didn’t really learn how to or-
ganize a guerrilla attack. We were told to attack only people in uniform.
All the instruction occurred outside, not in classrooms, much of it in
the mountains.”
For most Dukagjini soldiers, training occurred on an ad hoc basis that
began in Albania after they obtained weapons and before they returned
to Kosovo with them, and continued during periods when they were not
fighting in Kosovo, depending on the philosophy of their commanders
at the brigade level. As Ajet Potera recalls, “Training in Dukagjini was
more haphazard; war started earlier in Dukagjini, so they had less time to
get prepared than in Llap; people in Dukagjini tended to learn by doing.
A great variety of people passed through Dukagjini, some from Albania,
some very well trained; they tended to do the instruction. In Llap we
trained our own people. In Dukagjini, there were trained people in every
village.” In Dukagjini, some formal training began in late March 1998,
after the March 24, 1998, attack on the Haradinaj compound. Training,
for those who received it, occurred from morning to night over a three-
week period. Instructors often did not know the names of recruits. This
was done for reasons of security, to minimize the possibility that cap-
ture and torture would compromise the entire force. But the instructors
knew each other well and worked together closely. “As instructors, we
constantly talked to each other as to what we should teach them, how
to stimulate them morally, how to confront superior forces, how best
to prevent casualties among our people,” Potera said. “People who were
very successful would be designated as squad leaders; trainers would be
alert to identify the best: Those who demonstrated weapons proficiency;
strength and agility; mastery of tactics.”
Organized training took place in a number of camps in Albania, both
for KLA soldiers coming from Kosovo for weapons and for recruits coming
from the Diaspora who were on their way to Kosovo. In the early days
the training in Albania was limited to arms familiarization—shooting a
couple of hundred AK-47 rounds at targets one hundred to two hundred
meters away. “All of us wanted to look like Adem Jashari. After a few
months we were ordered to shave,” said Dritan Gjonbalaj. By March 1999
the training in Albania was much better organized and more formal, com-
prising intensive physical training, including marches of ten to twenty
kilometers, training with antitank missiles and sniper rifles as well as
AK-47s, and lectures on first aid and how to disarm a land mine. “The
first aid lecture saved my leg,” recalls Gjonbalaj. “I remembered the in-
structor saying, ‘Do not apply a tourniquet for more than two hours.’”
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 103 6/4/08 1:50:24 PM

Apart from training “members” of the KLA, all KLA components

trained village personnel in self defense. Haradinaj’s philosophy was to
give every man a gun, and he wanted to make sure each knew how to use
it. In Llap as well, every KLA soldier or commander constantly trained
villagers on village defense. On entering a village, a KLA unit would
identify people who wanted to get trained, and then would proceed to
train those volunteers in the basics—what constituted “basics” to be
determined by the commander of the unit in the village.
Obedience and Military Discipline

Obedience, military discipline, and respect for the chain of command
are qualities any program of basic military training seeks to instill. Get-
ting up early in the morning, performing personal hygiene, preparing
barracks areas for inspection, participating together in physical fitness
exercises, attending classes, and participating in practical tactical and
weapons exercises together, all under the command of a demanding drill
instructor, make this subject pervasive in almost any conceivable mili-
tary training program.
Basic training in the U.S. Army concludes with a “Victory Forge”
exercise—a three-day field outing in which recruits apply all that they
have learned.1 It worked in KLA training programs the same way it works
in U.S. Army basic training, except that the equivalent of “Victory Forge”
was usually participation in an actual battle. In addition, some units re-
ceived more formal instruction in military organization and discipline.
In Drenica Brigades 113 and 114, trainees were instructed on basic
military procedures and courtesies. They were taught to follow orders.
They marched in formation to training activities and to meals. Trainees
in Llap bunked together, prepared for inspections of their personal areas
together, and marched to exercises. Recruits rose each morning at six,
performed personal hygiene and secured their barracks areas for inspec-
tion, engaged in physical training for an hour, and then had breakfast.
Breakfast was followed by the curriculum for the day. At the end of the
day recruits would meet with their drill instructors, who typically were
the commanders of the brigades in which they would serve, to review
performance during the day and to prepare the curriculum and schedule
for the next day.2 In Dukagjini, instruction in this subject was less for-
mal, and perhaps less necessary considering the reverence most soldiers
had for Haradinaj.
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Training 105
Tactics
In U.S. Army basic training, tactical training begins in the classroom
and then is integrated with physical training and military discipline
in exercises such as Victory Forge. Serious tactical training of the KLA
developed slowly. “The early training in Albania was not focused on
any coherent strategy for insurrection in Kosovo,” said Bukoshi. “The
would-be fighters were enthusiastic. That’s all. They were preoccupied
with army uniforms and weapons. They wanted to—and did—send pho-
tographs of themselves in uniform, holding a weapon, to their families
in Kosovo, which, of course, made detection and proof by the Serbian
forces easy.”
After mid-1998, all formal KLA training programs included a tactical
component that built upon the experience of Tito’s Yugoslav Partisans,
the doctrine of the Yugoslav Army, and Marxist-Leninist doctrine for
guerrilla warfare that was drawn in large part from the writings of Mao
Tse-Tung and Che Guevara. Instruction in tactics for conventional warfare
depended largely on VJ and Albanian Army doctrine and NATO materials
with which instructors were familiar. Brigade 113, in Drenica, practiced
tactical maneuvers such as how to escape a knife and pistol attack, and
how to organize a guerrilla attack. Dukagjini soldiers practiced digging
in, movement in risky terrain, and offensive and defensive grenade ma-
neuvers. But, as Ramush Haradinaj put it, “one week’s experience was
worth more than three years of training.” In Llap, recruits studied and
practiced unit security; enemy offensive tactics; attacking different kinds
of objects: houses, police stations, checkpoints, and military emplace-
ments; trenching; sleeping and eating security; confronting mines; un-
dercover movements; camouflage clothes and camouflaging faces; night
movements; orienteering in unfamiliar terrain; and map reading. “Tactical
training included the NATO curriculum, short hit-and-run attacks, and
so on,” said Driton Gashi. “We trained in three-man units, for hit-and-
run attacks. Later, seven- to ten-man units trained for engagements of
fifteen or twenty minutes in length. We trained for guerrilla operations (no
established base) and partisan operations (an established base).” Trainees
in Albania had printed materials on tactics, battle positions, and with-
drawal. Some of these were Albanian government materials on partisan
tactics—coming from the woods to attack, falling back into the woods,
and staking positions to attack villages and Serb military units.
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Weapons Training
U.S. Army recruits train on the M16A2—the army’s standard-issue
weapon. Before recruits fire a single round, they learn and rehearse breath-
ing, stance, and mechanics.3 When recruits begin firing the weapons, they
begin with “shot grouping.” Each recruit must place three rounds within
a four-centimeter circle at twenty-five meters. Field firing exercises in-
clude single-target engagements at distances of seventy-five, one hundred
seventy-five, and three hundred yards. Each recruit engages two or more
fleeting combat-type, pop-up silhouettes that appear at the same time,
forcing the recruit to decide upon the order of engagement.
The KLA emphasized weapons training. The four- to six-week train-
ing for Brigade 113 in Drenica comprised four hours of weapons training
per day, and included two or three days each on AK-47s, sniper rifles, and
mines. Recruits who picked up their own weapons in Albania typically
had basic instruction on weapons operation and maintenance and engaged
in limited target practice. At the Bajgora school in Llap, all recruits were
trained on the AK-47 or equivalent personal automatic weapons, and the
M48, a single-shot, bolt-action, .30 caliber (7.9 mm) repeating sniper rifle
effective at four hundred to eight hundred meters. They received more
limited training, better characterized as “familiarization,” with heavier
weapons: crew-served machine guns, mortars, RPG antitank weapons,
and .50 caliber (12.7 mm) antiaircraft weapons, which were useful against
ground targets as well. They also trained with 75–millimeter cannons, of
which the entire zone had seven. These required a six- to ten-man crew,
and were moved with Land Rovers and tractors.
Weapons training occurred with old ammunition. Some trainees
had the opportunity for two live-fire exercises; others had only one such
opportunity. But everyone had some opportunity to fire the basic weap-
ons. KLA recruits fired at most five rounds from M48 sniper rifles, and
ten rounds from AK-47s. For heavier weapons, live fire was more of an
illustration than a hands-on exercise. Mortars would be fired once or
twice per unit, and RPG antitank weapons once per unit. Special units
received more intensive training in specialized weapons.
Physical Conditioning and Agility

In other societies, physical conditioning is an essential part of basic train-
ing because recruits come to basic training in poor shape. U.S. Army ba-
sic training uses “The Fit to Win Obstacle Course” as a physical fitness
training tool. KLA recruits were, for the most part, physically fit before
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Training 107
they joined. Many participated in organized athletics. Others regularly

engaged in hard physical labor on village farms. The few problems with
physical conditioning involved volunteers from the Diaspora, who com-
prised about one-fifth of the total recruit pool.
Despite less need to improve radically the physical condition of its
recruits, the KLA consistently emphasized physical fitness in its training
activities. In the Llap Zone, Commander Remi made sure KLA soldiers
engaged in physical fitness exercises whenever they were not occupied
with other activities. After reveille, Bajgora training center recruits ran or
marched up a trail in mountainous territory in formation, over distances
up to ten kilometers, with one instructor in the lead and another behind.
Some soldiers could not keep up at first, even over a one-kilometer track,
but physical fitness improved rapidly. Obstacle courses were not part of
the Llap Zone training program until late in the war.
In Drenica, trainees rose at five each morning during the training
period, went to the mountains for a three-kilometer run, and finished
with a one-kilometer, high-intensity run, calisthenics, and such exercises
as carrying another soldier on their backs for one hundred meters and
back. In Dukagjini, physical training continued “all the time” during the
three-week formal training program. Some of the trainers particularly
liked to put the trainees in water and to do grenade drills.
Military and International Humanitarian Law

KLA training on military law and on the law of war was haphazard, but
every recruit remembers being told about the Geneva Convention and or-
dered to attack only uniformed targets. Albanian traditions always spared
women, children, and the elderly in fighting, so all that was necessary,
recruits say, was reinforcement of these cultural norms. “Kanun law was
much more protective of noncombatants than the Geneva Convention,”
several said. “We didn’t need much training not to attack civilians. That
was part of the Albanian tradition. Even in 1999 I couldn’t kill a woman,
child, or old man, even after everything I had seen. You can imagine my
psychological situation, but even then I couldn’t have killed an old man
or a child.”4
In the Bajgora training center in Llap, recruits read portions of books
by University of Prishtina law professor Zejnullah Gruda on the law of
war. Professor Gruda also gave some lectures. Ajet Potera remembers
pamphlets on the laws of war and some “scripts” from the Albanian Army
on the laws of war and how to treat prisoners. In Brigades 113 and 114 in
Drenica, recruits were emphatically instructed not to molest civilians
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 107 6/4/08 1:50:25 PM

and only to target police and army personnel. They were instructed not
to attack military personnel who had surrendered. The instruction was
oral only; soldiers do not recall any printed materials, but it was clear
to them that the limitations on targets were emphasized by their com-
manders. “We were told that we could shoot at someone only during the
actual fighting.” In Dukagjini, said Luftar Braha, “There were two kinds
of groups. We—the real KLA—trained on the Geneva Convention, quite
seriously. But peasants trying to defend their families had never heard of
the Geneva Convention. And after the war, when people came home and
found their mother, or brothers killed, they went completely berserk, got
completely out of control. They were not KLA.” Later in the war, after the
KLA created specialized “military police” units, recruits were instructed
on treatment of prisoners, where to send them, and who was responsible
for dealing with prisoners. Capture, however, was relatively rare.
Who Were the Teachers?

The KLA had a generational problem. The majority of recruits were
too young to have served in the VJ. Kosovar Albanians began refusing
conscription into the VJ in about 1990, and the VJ essentially gave up
on trying to draft Albanians. By 1998, almost no one under thirty had
received any military training. So KLA commanders sought out those
who had served in the VJ or MUP to train the younger recruits. In Llap,
Commander Leka (Nuredin Ibishi), who had commanded MUP special
units, was responsible for tactical training at the Bajgora training center.
Brigade commanders like Ajet Potera served as drill instructors. Potera
had been trained during his service in the VJ. KLA soldiers in Brigade
113 in Drenica were taught primarily by other KLA members who were
former VJ soldiers or officers or police officers. One of the problems was
that, as one soldier put it, “‘educated’ commanders did not understand
how to fight a war with soldiers who had only AK-47s. Those with experi-
ence that Bukoshi recruited into FARK expected, and only knew how to
fight, a big war—one with artillery and air power. They essentially gave
up when they saw how little they had to work with.”
Effectiveness of KLA Training

Ajet Potera and other instructors thought that the effectiveness of the
training depended on the goals of different types of trainees. Some learned
nothing: They just wanted to be able to say that they had been trained
as KLA soldiers. Others wanted to learn something, get physically pre-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 108 6/4/08 1:50:25 PM

Training 109
pared, and go home. Potera always asked each recruit if he wanted to stay.
“About 30 to 40 percent of what we taught stuck,” he says. “Courage
was more important than knowledge; we wanted ‘Rambo.’”
General Agim Çeku, former Croatian Army general officer and chief
of staff of the KLA from May 1999 to the end of the war (and later, prime
minister), was disdainful of much of the KLA training. Too much of it
was dominated by old-style Eastern Bloc thinking instead of modern,
Western, “mission-oriented” doctrine. “Tell me what you want me to
accomplish, not how to do it,” Çeku said. He detached some of his most
able officers and sent them to Albania to conduct training, believing that
the procedure needed the additional credibility that it would get from
being conducted by people who actually were in the middle of the fight-
ing. It is important to remember, however, that Çeku took command of
the KLA only in May 1999, a month before the war was over. His ideas
had very little time to take root.
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8 Supplying
We cut short our training. There was an urgency to have

weapons. There were many people joining the KLA, but
there were only a few weapons, not nearly enough for
everyone who wanted to join. Ten days after joining, I
left as part of a group to walk to Albania for weapons.
About fifty of us brought back enough weapons for three
hundred soldiers.
—Driton Gashi
Early fighting effectiveness was constrained mainly by an

inadequate supply of arms. In 1996, there were only a few dozen armed
fighters. Many others wanted to fight but they had no weapons. There
was a tendency before mid-1998 for the KLA to underestimate the impor-
tance of logistics and supply. As one close observer said, “It was: Allegro!
Ho ho! A few AK-47s will expel the Serbs.”1 Others, slower to embrace
armed conflict, were cautious at least in part because they recognized—
and sometimes overestimated—the political and logistical challenges.
Bujar Bukoshi’s Military Advisory Committee told him in the early 1990s:
“Recognize that you need to arm and feed several thousand soldiers.
You have to remember that commanders of a ten-thousand-man army
have to know how they are going to prepare and to deliver ten thousand
breakfasts every morning. You need to have available twenty-five to fifty
thousand Deutschmarks per day. Your commanders need to know how
to make available several thousand pairs of shoelaces for boots on typi-
cal mornings.”
110
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 110 6/4/08 1:50:25 PM

Supplying 111
Arms
The story of arms supplies for the KLA begins with an assessment of re-
quirements, identifies sources of arms, and explains how arms could be
transported from where they were obtained to where they were needed.
It necessarily considers legal impediments to purchase and transport
of arms.
Requirements
Arms requirements are determined by the size and human capabilities of
the fighting force, and the size and armaments of its opposition. Human
Rights Watch reports a total KLA force size of about twenty-six thousand,
while suggesting that the figure is inflated.2 Jakup Krasniqi admits that
the KLA consistently inflated the size of its fighting forces, and hints that
the figure of thirty thousand, used in KLA public statements late in the
war, may have been double an actual number of about fifteen thousand.
Counting KLA numbers is complicated by difficulty in distinguishing
regular soldiers, who operated in organized units, from the irregular home
guard that had weapons and some training but functioned only to defend
its own villages, and was sometimes pressed into auxiliary service with
regular units. In addition, the KLA had every incentive to exaggerate its
numbers and military capability.
Remi says that, at the beginning of 1999, he had about two thousand
effective regular fighters in Llap organized into his three brigades, another
fifteen hundred partially trained soldiers, and another fifteen hundred vil-
lage defense forces, for a total of five thousand. Haradinaj estimates seven
to nine thousand people, including villagers, under arms in Dukagjini.
Estimates for Drenica range from forty-seven hundred to ten thousand.
Drenica Zone Commander Sami Lushtaku says he had forty-seven hun-
dred effective fighters at the end of 1998. These bottom-up estimates are
consistent with a total force size of twelve to twenty thousand. Thaçi
estimates total force size as twenty thousand at the end of 1998, 20 to 30
percent of which came from the Diaspora. Valon Murati gives much lower
estimates: five to seven thousand throughout Kosovo at the end of 1998.
A senior officer of OSCE’s KVM, British General John Drewienkiewitcz,
gave the lowest estimate in December 2006 testimony before the ICTY:
fewer than a thousand at the beginning of 1999, rigorously distinguish-
ing between fighters willing to fight anywhere and those only willing to
defend their own villages.3
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 111 6/4/08 1:50:25 PM

KLA arms requirements depended not only upon the number of KLA
fighters but also upon the forces the KLA was opposing. Che Guevara
suggested an arms kit for a guerrilla band of twenty-five men comprised
of ten to fifteen semiautomatic rifles, ten automatic weapons such as
AK-47s, and some hand-carried machine guns, preferably nine-millime-
ter guns, whose ammunition is easy to carry in quantities.4 Guevara’s
list is appropriate for hit-and-run guerrilla attacks against lightly armed
targets—ordinary police, or isolated infantry units, for example. But re-
quirements ultimately depend both upon the kinds of weapon the regime
uses against the insurgents and upon the tactics the insurgents intend to
use to avoid being killed or driven off by those weapons. In addition, it
is desirable to use the same kinds of weapons as the enemy so that cap-
tured arms and ammunition are readily usable by the insurgents. Small
arms like AK-47s are effective against personnel, but only at a short range
up to about two hundred yards. They are ineffective against armor and
artillery for two reasons: because their bullets cannot penetrate armor
and because the range is too great. AK-47s and simple hand-held and
home-manufactured weapons like hand grenades and Molotov cocktails
are better-suited for guerrilla forces focused on assassination and small-
scale property destruction.
A regime threatened with guerrillas possessing automatic rifles usu-
ally increases the manpower deployed against guerrillas first, and then
begins to use both armored personnel carriers to transport fighters and
some kind of armored weapons (often tanks) as a way of bringing heavier
firepower to bear on the insurgents without exposing regime personnel
to small arms. As a regime escalates its technological response, an insur-
gency equipped with small arms needs to escalate its own technology,
first with crew-served machine guns in order to confront larger regime
units, and then with antitank weapons like rocket-propelled grenades
(RPG) or sniper rifles with armor-piercing ammunition to confront ar-
mor and artillery. Large guns are cumbersome and can interfere with
the mobility that is at the heart of guerrilla tactics. Insurgents may also
need effective antiaircraft weapons if the regime uses airpower to attack
insurgents or merely for reconnaissance and spotting for artillery. This
abstract framework fits the situation of the KLA well. In the early days—
before the Serb counteroffensive in the summer of 1998, AK-47s, a few
crew-served machine guns, and hand grenades were sufficient for KLA
attacks on police stations and police convoys. They were not enough,
however, when Milosevic began to turn the war over to the VJ.
The minimum requirement for the KLA was an adequate number
of small arms: AK-47s, sniper rifles, and grenades were the small arms
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Supplying 113
of choice for the KLA. An AK-47 is an automatic assault rifle that fires
a 5.45–millimeter cartridge and has a magazine capacity of up to thirty
cartridges. Its loaded weight is 3.6–4.9 kilograms, and it has a practical
range of about two hundred meters and a practical rate of fire of about
one hundred rounds per minute in bursts. It can be fired in either single-
shot or automatic mode, in the latter of which the weapon continues to
cycle cartridges from the magazine into the chamber until the magazine
is exhausted. It is the most popular light infantry weapon in the world.
Sniper rifles are low-rate-of-fire weapons—bolt action or semiauto-
matic—designed with special precision to ensure accuracy over ranges of
up to fifteen hundred meters.5 They typically are equipped with telescopic
sights and range in caliber from .30 to .50 (12.7 mm). The larger-caliber
versions can fire armor-piercing ammunition, which is effective against
the light armor of some tanks, at ranges of up to two thousand meters.
Grenades are hand-held fragmentation bombs, which are thrown by
foot soldiers after releasing a trigger. Grenades are less lethal than com-
monly believed. They usually can be thrown between ten and twenty
meters, and injure about half of those within six meters of the explosion
(only 10 percent of whom die).6 But they are less useful in night attacks
or fights in cluttered areas such as forests and buildings.7 Their range can
be increased to one hundred or even three hundred meters by grenade
launchers attached to rifles.
To equip a KLA of fifteen thousand soldiers for a purely guerrilla
conflict would have required fifteen thousand AK-47s, 150,000 grenades,
and three thousand sniper rifles. This assumes an operational-unit size
of about ten, with small arms and ten grenades for each soldier, and one
sniper rifle per unit. But “[t]he real killing is done with heavier weap-
ons,” writes James Dunnigan in How to Make War.8 Heavier infantry
weapons, sometimes referred to as “crew-served” weapons, include mor-
tars, machine guns, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft missiles. Usually,
proficiency with these weapons requires specialized training and combat
experience.
Mortars deliver fragmentation and concussion munitions at high
angles, making them useful against dug-in enemy troops and other targets
protected by terrain or barricades from direct fire. Their range is limited
to a couple of kilometers. They are unlikely to be effective against tanks
or other armored vehicles. Their weapon- and ammunition-weight of
two hundred pounds requires several men. Medium and heavy machine
guns fire .264– to .50–caliber (6.5 mm to 14 mm) ammunition, weigh
from twenty-five to 125 pounds with fifty rounds of ammunition, and
are served by a crew of two to four to fire the weapon, to feed the am-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 113 6/4/08 1:50:26 PM

munition, and to carry it. They are effective at ranges up to one to two
thousand meters.
Tanks present a special problem for insurgent forces because they
are invulnerable to ordinary small-arms and machine-gun fire. But tanks
are vulnerable. Their tracks can fall off, and their engines are under
stress and can easily break down. Tank-mounted weapons require regu-
lar maintenance, and they are ineffective without trained crews. Tanks
also are vulnerable to a variety of weapons. Antitank guided missiles
(ATGM) can disable a tank and kill its crew, but they suffer from a vari-
ety of disadvantages including back blasts, and limited time to aim and
fire. Nevertheless, they are light enough for small infantry units to carry
and operate. Antitank weapons range from World War II–era Bazookas
to more modern RPGs. Both are shoulder-fired tubes that launch small
rockets designed to penetrate armor. Simpler and lower-cost versions are
unguided, which must be fired from relatively close to the target. They
generate flashes visible to the enemy, which attracts defensive fire. The
RPG-7, designed by the Soviet Union, is the most popular version. More
sophisticated and more expensive derivatives employ guidance systems
to improve accuracy and increase range. Though hard to estimate with
any precision, prices range from about $1,000 for older designs to several
million dollars each for current American or Soviet-era designs.
The Serbs typically attacked KLA and civilian positions with artillery
and tanks before moving infantry personnel in. They would often shell
KLA positions or nearby population centers for three or four days before
moving to the next stage of attack. Some KLA units had RPGs, 12.7–caliber
machine guns, mortars, antitank guns, and 75–millimeter crew-served can-
nons. Most units did not have any artillery and many units had only light
weapons, a few grenades, and maybe one mortar launcher. Ammunition
supply always was a problem. As a consequence, KLA units often were
in no position to attack Serb forces and simply had to hunker down and
wait for the Serbs to attack them. This style of warfare let the Serbs fight
on their own terms, and let them take advantage of their superior military
technology. In order to reduce this advantage, the KLA needed a greater
number of more effective antitank weapons. It is unlikely that the KLA
destroyed more than a half-dozen Serb tanks throughout the entire war.
The KLA had less need for antiaircraft weapons because the Serbs did not
use aircraft much in carrying out operations. They did use helicopters for
reconnaissance and spotting, but few KLA soldiers report helicopters or
fixed-wing aircraft being used to drop ordnance or transport Serb troops.
For a force of fifteen thousand, the KLA needed three thousand crew-
served machine guns, maybe six hundred antitank rocket launchers and
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Supplying 115
ammunition, assuming one machine gun for each unit of ten soldiers,
more antitank weapons than the Serbs had armored vehicles, and sev-
eral antitank weapons for each hundred KLA soldiers. The KLA suffered
chronic ammunition shortages throughout the conflict, as already noted
in this and earlier chapters. Ammunition shortages limited weapons
training. Most soldiers, even those who received two weeks or more of
training, had never fired more than ten rounds before facing the enemy.
When KLA soldiers brought weapons back from Albania, they typically
brought no more than five hundred to one thousand rounds for each
AK-47. Each AK-47 clip holds ten rounds. (Some hold more, up to thirty
rounds.) According to discussions about the “battle of the bridge” ambush
hypothetical by KLA commanders and fighters (summarized in chapter
five), a typical hit-and-run attack would employ between three and seven
fighters, each of whom would expend two clips of ammunition for his
personal weapon and no more, because tactics dictated keeping the ex-
posure of the KLA attackers to Serb forces and possible reinforcements
brief. Those assumptions produce an estimate of sixty to 120 rounds for
each guerrilla attack. If each AK-47 came with five hundred rounds of
ammunition, each fighter would be able to participate in only twenty-
five guerrilla attacks before he ran out of ammunition. And, of course,
the frontal conflicts with Serb forces expended ammunition at a much
higher rate.
KLA Arsenal
The KLA never had anything approaching the suggested “requirements”
developed in the preceding section. Remi remembers that, when he first
met Adem Jashari in late 1997, and Jashari urged him to revitalize the
KLA in the Llap region, “I was thinking. I want to do what he says, but
I can’t count more than twelve weapons available to us in all of Llap.”
This was after Zahir Pajaziti’s organization in Llap had been disrupted
by his assassination and associated arrests, which scattered all but about
four known fighters, including Remi. (Considerably more than twelve
weapons had been available in Llap before the Pajaziti assassination and
the arrests.)
Regularly, young men would volunteer to fight with the KLA only
to be told there were no weapons for them. Arxhient Bajraktari joined
Brigade 113 in Drenica on June 16, 1998. “I didn’t have a weapon when I
joined,” he said, though “I had a nice knife. It was my father’s knife. At
first, he wouldn’t tell me where it was. I went home one day and finally
found it, after about two hours.” Many soldiers’ first acts were to walk to
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 115 6/4/08 1:50:26 PM

Albania as part of a twenty- to thirty-man team to bring back weapons.

Gradually, however, the availability of light weapons increased. But ac-
quiring the heavier weapons needed to confront Serb armor and artillery
continued to be a problem.
Ramush Haradinaj says that throughout the war, the Dukagjini Zone
had a total of seven to nine thousand AK-47s and equivalent automatic
weapons, three hundred smaller-caliber sniper rifles, twenty larger-caliber
(12.5 mm) sniper rifles, three hundred crew-served machine guns, three
hundred antitank rocket launchers, and twenty 75–millimeter antitank
cannons. His zone had almost no antiaircraft weapons. The numbers of
sniper rifles grew toward the end of the war (he had only about twenty in
mid-1998). The number of machine guns he gives exaggerates the capabil-
ity, because many guns would function for only a few weeks because of
adverse conditions and the inability of his soldiers to shelter them from
the elements. Remi and Lushtaku report proportional estimates for their
forces in the Llap and Drenica Zones, respectively. Remi had a shortage
of antitank weapons, however, while Lushtaku had at least one for each
operational unit of five or ten men by early 1999.
If one extrapolates these numbers to the entire KLA, by assuming
that the Drenica and Llap Zones had slightly fewer of each category
of weapon than the Dukagjini Zone, and recognizing that the Pastrik
and Shalla Zones were smaller than the big three but had significant
forces, one can assume a total of fifteen to twenty-five thousand AK-47s
and equivalent automatic weapons, nine hundred smaller-caliber sniper
rifles, sixty larger-caliber (12.5 mm) sniper rifles, nine hundred crew-
served machine guns, nine hundred antitank rocket launchers, and sixty
75–millimeter antitank cannons. This estimate likely errs on the high
side, while recognizing that weapons were easier to get in Dukagjini
because it was adjacent to the Albanian border, and that Dukagjini had
proportionately more weapons given Haradinaj’s philosophy of arming
every male Albanian.
At the end of the war, the KLA voluntarily delivered thirty-six thou-
sand weapons to the NATO force, “KFOR,” including 173 mortars and
three hundred antitank weapons. Most of the rest were grenades. KFOR
confiscated another two thousand.9 Another report says, “The estimated
17,000–member KLA has only handed over 6,831 rifles and 737 machine
guns by KFOR’s own accounting. KFOR has confiscated some 1,300 rifles
and 300 pistols from KLA members.”10 These numbers support an infer-
ence that the figure for machine guns (nine hundred versus 737) is about
right, because machine guns are difficult to hide, and that the estimate
for the KLA’s arsenal of AK-47s is either way overstated (thirty-seven
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Supplying 117
thousand versus eighty-one hundred surrendered or seized) or that KLA

soldiers concealed a much higher proportion of AK-47s after the war.
Almost everyone believes that only a modest fraction of the KLA’s light
weapons were turned in after the war.
Cost
Fifty percent or more of the funds raised for the KLA was used to buy
weapons, say the fund raisers, although it is hard to square this assertion
with the estimates of weapons needs developed in this chapter. One can
assume the following average per-item prices for each type of weapon:
AK-47, $100; grenade, $10; sniper rifle, $750; machine gun, $1,000; an-
titank weapon, $2,500. Multiplying those prices by the estimated num-
bers of each type of weapon available to the KLA, one arrives at a total
of approximately $10 million for the weapons themselves. If one doubles
that figure to account for ammunition, and includes another $100,000
for uniforms and boots and another $2 million for communications and
night-vision equipment, the total cost of supplying the KLA was about
$25 million. If one uses the low figure developed in chapter six for total
funds raised—$50 million—the 50 percent assertion is about right. If one
uses the higher figure for funds raised—$100 million—there is a substan-
tial gap between money available and money expended on weapons and
other supplies and equipment—thus reinforcing Ramush Haradinaj’s ob-
servation that the KLA had plenty of money but encountered difficulty
in spending it on an adequate supply of weapons.
Sources
The sources of KLA weapons were almost entirely outside Kosovo. The
KLA captured few arms from the enemy. It did, however, buy them from
corrupt members of the enemy’s forces, especially in the Llap Zone. The
international arms market was the principal source for the KLA. State-
supplied weapons were a KLA dream and one of its greatest disappoint-
ments. No state stepped forward to supply weapons.
The KLA grew at a good time for weapons customers, however. The
end of the cold war in 1989 meant that enormous stockpiles of weapons
from the Eastern Bloc suddenly became surplus. These weapons flooded
the black markets, and one cannot exclude the possibility that the new,
noncommunist governments of these states actively supported the gen-
eration of foreign exchange through weapons sales to anyone who wanted
the weapons. Then, of course, the winding down of the conflicts in Croa-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 117 6/4/08 1:50:26 PM

tia and Bosnia made weapons amassed by the anti-Serb forces in those
areas available for sale, including machine guns, hand-held antitank and
antiaircraft missiles, such as the latest Russian RPG-22 antitank missile,
and the Igla (Needle) antiaircraft missile.11 The collapse of the govern-
ment in Albania after the 1997 pyramid-scheme crisis was a godsend for
the KLA not only because Albania was a source of light weapons from
unguarded Albanian army depots but also because Albania provided a
transit area for an otherwise geographically isolated Kosovo.
By late 1998, KLA zone commanders could “place orders” for weap-
ons. “Ramush or the headquarters would say, ‘We need ten more sniper
rifles’ or whatever else they needed,” said Luigj Gjokaj. “We would pick
up the arms from storage and then take them to the airport.” The most
important sources of arms were the United States, Bosnia, Croatia, Swit-
zerland, and Germany. Four channels for weapons predominated:
1. Albania provided the bulk of AK-47s and grenades.
2. Sniper rifles were available from the United States and Switzerland,
where the quality was good and they could be purchased legally.
Good sniper rifles came from the United States, mostly bought at
“hunting shops” and gun shows.
3. Most of the other good small arms came from Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia.
4. Heavier weapons, especially crew-served machine guns and anti-
tank rockets, were available from and through Germany. Shoulder-
fired antitank weapons came from Swiss and German manufactur-
ers through those countries, but they were very expensive.
The arms from the Albanian Army depots were mostly Chinese AK-
47s, which earned the reputation within the KLA of jamming after ten
rounds were fired. More and better arms from Europe flowed through
Albania to the KLA. The ministers of Fatos Nano’s Socialist govern-
ment in power after the spring 1997 collapse and general officers in the
Albanian Army did the bare minimum to enforce Albanian law against
weapons transfers because their sympathies lay so strongly with their
fellow ethnic Albanians.
In Switzerland, purchasers would prepare documentation and ID
cards for weapons purchases in the name of someone deceased or no
longer in Switzerland, although supporters sometimes purchased am-
munition in their own names. The documentation generally required
only the identity of the purchaser, and not disclosure of the destination.
Usually the ID and money were enough; merchants asked few questions.
Ammunition was generally easier to get in Switzerland than were weap-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 118 6/4/08 1:50:27 PM

Supplying 119
ons, because the documentation was less demanding. When occasionally

asked, purchasers said they were buying ammunition for hunting.
Significant numbers of weapons from Serbia were available through
bribes. During the freeze of the Albanian route in March and April 1999,
the KLA got weapons from Serb forces in the Sanxhak region of Serbia,
but they were more expensive than weapons acquired through Albania.
Remi got more than half of his arms from Serbs and European suppliers.
Remi refers to giving “shopping lists” for weapons to Albanian business-
men who went away and then brought back caches of weapons—usually
matching the shopping list only approximately.
Remi’s main channel was through two German Albanians who would
come to the Llap Valley and talk to Remi about what he needed. They
would then go to Sarajevo, where they initially made contact with another
Albanian, who then got arms from Serb forces in Banja Luka and through-
out Republika Srpska and from Europe. Some of the arms came from the
Preshevo Valley in Serbia proper. Heavy weapons were available through
this channel as well. Remi obtained at least one 120–millimeter cannon
through these sources, as well as antiaircraft guns, crew-served machine
guns, and similar weapons. Remi used Albania as something of a last re-
sort, once the conflict escalated. The inexpensiveness of the arms from
Albania was counterbalanced by the difficulty—the expenditure of time,
effort, and exposure to risk—of going to Albania and getting them.
KLA fighters also obtained weapons through friends, through the
Diaspora, or purchased from individuals. The transaction costs of get-
ting weapons in this way were high because of the small quantities in-
volved. Individual sellers often lacked the expertise to get weapons across
borders and otherwise delivered to the insurgents without them being
confiscated by authorities of the countries through which they moved.
Freddie Mehmeti, who lived and operated in the United States, recounts
the following: “All over the U.S., supporters like us probably provided
one thousand sniper rifles. Typically we would order them, and then get
enough people to carry two weapons each. We would round up brothers
and cousins, and each would buy two. The dealers ran out and had to
get them from elsewhere in the United States. We always had trouble
getting through the airport, but the law allowed it so they had to let
us through.” Italy posed a special difficulty, because customs officials
“wanted bribes.” Others tried to obtain arms from Turkey, but Turkey
was very standoffish about the whole conflict. Given the KLA’s deter-
mination to avoid the stigma of “Islamic fundamentalism,” the Middle
East was not a significant source of weapons.
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As the NATO bombing campaign approached and after it began in

1999, officials within the U.S. government gave serious consideration
to an explicit initiative to arm the KLA, emphasizing antitank weapons
and mortars.12 In the end the White House staff rejected the idea because
it did not want to further the KLA ambition of seeking independence for
Kosovo, a goal inconsistent with NATO’s position.13
Supply Lines and Distribution

The theory of war emphasizes the advantage that accrues to an army if it
can interrupt its enemy’s “lines of communication,” or its supply lines.
An army cannot fight if it is deprived of the inputs required for fighting.
One may kill an opponent, destroy his will to fight, or starve him into sub-
mission. Modern armies require elaborate supply lines. Vehicles require
fuel; sophisticated weapons require sophisticated ammunition; guerrilla
forces require less. Supply lines for the VJ and MUP forces ran through
the Llap and Shala regions. If the KLA could marshal its strength in the
Llap Zone, it could threaten Serb supply lines. That was the motivation
for the aggressive VJ actions near Podujevë in December 1998, which put
the final nail in the coffin of the Holbrooke-Milosevic cease fire of Octo-
ber 1998. The Serbs wanted to interrupt aggressive KLA efforts to dig in
along major roads and thus to threaten Serb resupply. Whether the KLA
efforts could threaten Serb lines of communications was a question of
whether the KLA could marshal the manpower and firepower. Whether
the Serbs could interrupt the KLA’s lines of communication presented
a different challenge. The Serbs had the manpower and firepower, but
they had to find the supply lines, and that was not easy. The KLA worked
hard to hide them.
Early supply lines were opportunistic. In one early case, Zahir Pa-
jaziti and Nait Hasani traveled to the Preshevo Valley in Serbia to pick
up one British AK-47–equivalent. Buses were not controlled much, so
that was a good mode for small quantities of weapons. Larger quanti-
ties came by boat and truck. Procurement agents were not picky about
sources. Wherever they could buy weapons, they did. If someone wanted
to sell or contribute two weapons, arrangements were made to get them.
Later, arms flowed from the Albanian port of Durres, through central
Albania, and north into the mountain villages—especially Tropoja and
Kukes—from which they could be carried into Kosovo by foot. At first,
Albania viewed the arms flow as illegal, and the result was the use of
KLA funds to bribe Albanian customs officers and police. Even after the
collapse of the Albanian government, KLA soldiers and the sympathiz-
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Supplying 121
ers bringing weapons north to the Kosovo border were often stopped by
the police, who confiscated their weapons. Sometime late in 1998, the
U.S. government, the British government, and others gave a green light
to the Albanian government, and the police arrests were stopped. Gen-
eral Kulusi Lama, commander of logistics for the Albanian Army and
commander of Albanian forces in the Kukes region in 1997–99, made it
clear (without saying so explicitly) in a January 13, 2005, interview that
he provided encouragement and assistance to KLA forces infiltrating
supplies and personnel into Kosovo, and often made sure the police did
not stop their convoys.
The Sigurimi (the Albanian intelligence service) also organized a
system based on trucks with Albanian Army markings and drivers in
Albanian Army uniforms. The police would not stop them. Every night,
five or six trucks would move from Durres, loaded with arms. The trucks
were bad-order trucks from Switzerland, but they functioned well enough
for this mission. The KLA paid for the fuel. The KLA had plenty of money;
that was not a problem.
As the arms supply lines filled, crates of weapons “sets” still packed
in lubricant were delivered to supply depots in northern Albania, where
they were distributed to KLA soldiers who had walked across the moun-
tains to get them. But distributing weapons was chaotic until late 1998.
Everyone who wanted to fight went to Albania to get his own weapons.
Someone would ask his friends, “Where did you go?” and would set out
with a few of his friends to find a few AK-47s. It was not until after the
Holbrooke-Milosevic cease fire that things were better organized.
Typically, a group of twenty to thirty KLA soldiers would cross the
border into Albania and make contact with someone identified in advance.
Often, weapons were moved from the transfer point into the border by
mules and donkeys because the terrain in that part of Albania is virtually
impassable by motorized vehicle, even on the roads. Once they reached
the immediate area of the border, KLA soldiers usually took the weapons
across on their backs. Each man in an ordinary weapons-supply opera-
tion could carry three weapons, one for himself and two for others. Bigger
men could carry almost twice as many. Often each soldier made two or
three trips across the border to get all the weapons across. Of course, they
tried to avoid regular border crossing points on the main roads because
those were tightly controlled by Serb forces. Nevertheless, these weapons
transporters often were surprised by Serb forces and killed.
Serb control of the Junik and Deçan Valleys in Dukagjini often made
it necessary to shift arms supply activities closer to the Montenegrin bor-
der, although the routes near Montenegro were the toughest, taking about
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 121 6/4/08 1:50:27 PM

twice as long to get to weapons stockpiles in Albania as routes through

the Junik or Deçan Valleys. Other times men with arms would have to
go over the crest of a mountain to avoid the Serb-controlled valleys. But
the valleys also were connected by hundreds of goat trails, which were
impossible to control entirely. As Xhavid Loshaj, Ramush Haradinaj’s
logistics expert in Dukagjini, said while walking the goat trails with the
author, “You can walk anywhere.” Thus the KLA had much more flex-
ibility than the Serb forces, who were tied to their vehicles.
A typical trip took ten to twelve hours to reach the Albanian destina-
tions, of which Tropoja was the most important. Recent local knowledge
was essential: Not only was it important to know which trails had been
mined recently, but the trails themselves were almost invisible from the
network of tractor roads connecting them to larger dirt roads, upon which
the Serbs moved up and down the mountains. KLA units kept track of
their whereabouts by listening for the noise of Serb vehicles as they pa-
trolled the vehicle-accessible roads through the mountains. Looking at
one of the trails in mid-July 2005, the author saw a steep but obviously
walkable path, its boundaries barely discernible, with breaks in the trees
cluttered with rocks and tree roots. Its steepness suggested that if you
climbed carrying a load of sixty kilos on your back, you would periodi-
cally use your hands to help you climb. If you were descending, your feet
would almost certainly slip out from under you from time to time.
The KLA almost always moved at night, perceiving the confines and
directional changes of the trails by the contrast the trees made with the
sky. When the KLA fighters heard Serb forces, they simply stopped. Under
no circumstances would they attack the Serb forces. They might prevail
in a guerrilla attack, but this would unnecessarily expend ammunition
and compromise the route, because the Serbs then would know about
it. The Serbs could not mine some of the trails because they were too
rocky. Where the Serbs did mine trails, KLA soldiers became adroit in
seeing the dying grass over a mine. Gani Demaj, a KLA soldier, recalls
his first night operation on July 7, 1998:
I was in a group of about a thousand people strung out over two kilo-
meters on the goat trails. I was focused on how tired I was and when we
could rest. Then someone came along and said that the line had broken.
Some at the rear were stopping to rest, figuring they would catch up later.
Others were selecting different trails, which they thought would be bet-
ter than the ones originally designated. Someone had to do something.
I forgot that I was tired, and somehow found the energy to run up and
down two kilometers of slopes, hollering at the soldiers to get back in
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Supplying 123
line and to follow the same route. I barked orders like I was in charge.
They thought I was, and it worked.
Later (in 1999) the KLA had night-vision binoculars, which greatly facili-
tated not only night movements but also keeping track of Serb forces.
When there was less fighting, Dukagjini commanders would dispatch
groups of the biggest men, those in the strongest physical condition, to
go to Albania for ammunition and for two or three weapons each for
the troops in the Dukagjini Zone and three or four for troops from other
zones, thus relieving the troops less familiar with the territory from hav-
ing to go over the mountains to get their own. When groups of KLA came
down the mountain toward the settled areas in Deçan and Junik, other
KLA forces would block the road and launch attacks on the Serb forces
to clear a way for the weapons to cross the roads into the settlements,
where the weapons could be dispersed and hidden until they could be
distributed in Dukagjini or other zones. Once the weapons were across
the border they were moved, usually at night, by caravans of a handful
of soldiers and a couple of vehicles holding the weapons. These caravans
avoided engaging the Serbs they observed because they understood that
their mission was to deliver the weapons, not to use them on the way.
By moving at night, they worked their way through KLA free-zones to
the destination. Dealing only with people they knew, the weapons trans-
porters moved substantial amounts of weapons this way.
Inside Kosovo, weapons could be hidden in multiple houses of sympa-
thetic civilians. If they were destined for places other than the Dukagjini
Zone, the group of soldiers who had crossed the border would move them
through KLA-safe areas, usually in tractors or trucks made available by
local villagers. Local civilian guides in each geographic area would di-
rect the soldiers: “Go this way, not that way; see this villager; you can
stay with him for the night; someone else will make his tractor and cart
available to you.” Had the KLA not already won the hearts and minds of
the local population, it would have been impossible to distribute arms.
One can calculate the theoretical throughput of this Albania-based
logistics system. A round-trip arms supply expedition to Albania typi-
cally took about two weeks: roughly a day to cross into Albania, a day or
two to recover, a week or more waiting for the arms or distributing them
from stockpiles already there, and another day to return to Kosovo. When
donkeys and horses were available, fifty men could carry three hundred
weapons. When pack animals were not available, each man carried three
weapons. Assuming that pack animals were available for only one-third
of the expeditions, delivering two weapons would have required one
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 123 6/4/08 1:50:27 PM

man-week. To supply all of the light weapons estimated as available to

the KLA, seventy-five hundred man-weeks of transportation would have
been required. The arms supply activities were in full swing by June or
July 1998 and continued through just before the NATO bombing cam-
paign began in April 1999, when the VJ increased its efforts to block the
border. That is a nine-month or thirty-seven-week period, which sug-
gests that as many as two hundred fighters were required full time just
to move weapons. The KLA casualty rate for arms transport was higher
than for other activities, and many hundreds were killed trying to move
arms across the border. Of course, different soldiers crossed into Albania
at different times, and weapons were available from other sources and
over other routes. But the cumbersome supply lines for weapons required
a significant commitment of KLA manpower that could have been em-
ployed in actual fighting if weapons access had been easier.
Weapons from Serbia proper and a smaller number from Bosnia moved
through the Sanxhak and Preshevo Valley regions of Serbia. The basic
strategic idea for arms logistics was to establish a kind of chain running
from Bosnia to the Sanxhak then to the Preshevo Valley, with Kosovo in
the middle. These arms were delivered through a variety of techniques.
Many times the Serbs would fill a lorry with arms, and would simply
leave it with keys in the ignition in a predesignated spot in Kosovo, of-
ten at a specific parking lot in Fushe Kosovo. The KLA would pick it up.
Usually the driver was a Serb. Sometimes these drop-offs were made in
the Preshevo Valley. KLA soldiers from the Llap Zone would wait there
for trucks or smaller vehicles loaded with weapons. They would then use
mountain roads to bring the weapons across the border. On one occasion,
the KLA brought a lorry filled with weapons. The lorry had a flour mill
as its apparent load, with a big picture of Slobodan Milosevic on it. But
the mill was filled with weapons, and the KLA brought it into Kosovo
through Serbia. The Serb driver did not know what his load contained.
He thought he was bringing a flour mill into Kosovo.
Smaller quantities of weapons sometimes were moved by individuals
traveling by bus. Sympathizers bringing a few weapons would conceal
them in luggage and take the bus from Novi Sad or another origin in
Serbia to Mitrovica or Peja and then use “illegal roads” to deliver them
to the KLA. The Serbs checked buses less thoroughly than they did au-
tomobiles or trucks. Bus traffic was heavy and it took too much time to
check every passenger and his or her luggage.
The KLA General Staff consistently tried to control the weapons flow
by controlling weapons stockpiles and transport within Albania. Early
in the conflict, when the zone commanders badly needed weapons, the
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Supplying 125
General Staff used its control over the flow as a source of leverage over
the zone commanders. But after the Albanian government collapsed in
1997 and KLA numbers mushroomed, multiple supply lines developed,
many of them controlled by Dukagjini Zone commander Haradinaj,
whose forces were astride the border, and whose people had the best lo-
cal knowledge. In 1999, after the operational zones were reorganized to
make them more responsive to direction from the General Staff, central-
ized control increased.
The KLA’s lines of communication were dispersed, thus making it
difficult for the Serb forces to interdict them. Every kullë was a poten-
tial arms depot.14 Every gap in the trees along the dirt roads crisscrossing
the mountains was a potential goat trail on which guns could be carried.
Every tractor, horse cart, truck, and bus might be carrying weapons,
clothing, or equipment. The only way to interrupt the KLA supply lines
was to kill every man, woman, and child and destroy every vehicle,
structure, and farm animal. The best the Serbs could do was concentrate
their forces in the Dukagjini Zone to make it more difficult to move
arms from Albania—and, eventually, to drive almost the entire civilian
population out of their homes and villages. That they did, but that was
not enough, because the other borders were too porous, and state con-
trol and regime loyalty were so weak in Serbia proper that arms could
be smuggled through territory the Serbs unquestionably controlled in a
military sense.
Legal Impediments
Because the KLA was never officially designated a terrorist organization
by states with the most rigorous arms-control regulations, legal restric-
tions were no more of an impediment for the KLA than for anyone else
who wants lots of guns. But arms controls on heavier weapons were a
significant consideration, and often required concealment of purchases
and shipments or falsification of destinations and intended use. The
arms-control regime in the United States is representative of the types
of regulations generally employed in Europe, recognizing that European
cultures embrace wide availability of firearms less than certain parts of
the United States.
In the United States, the Arms Export Control Act15 establishes a
regulatory regime under which the president may control the export
of defense articles and defense services.16 Items designated for control
constitute the “United States Munitions List.”17 Decisions on whether
to grant export licenses must take into account whether the requested
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 125 6/4/08 1:50:28 PM

export would “contribute to an arms race, aid in development of weapons

of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possi-
bility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development
of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements
or other arrangements.”18 Obviously, had the KLA been designated a ter-
rorist organization, or had Albania been subjected to an arms embargo,
weapons and other supplies and support from the United States would
have been impossible, except to the extent that violations of this legal
regime had gone undetected.
Other Supplies
Equipment other than arms was necessary to allow KLA units to coor-
dinate with each other and with higher authority. Vehicles were not a
particular problem. KLA tactics were well executed in many cases by
conducting operations on foot. When motorized transport was necessary,
the civilian population usually provided an adequate supply of ordinary
automobiles and trucks and farm equipment to supplement vehicles
owned by KLA fighters and commanders or their families.
Radio equipment came mostly from Sweden, and European cell
phones and American satellite phones were readily available early in
the conflict. Users of these communications systems were acutely aware
of Serb eavesdropping capability, and used pseudonyms and code words,
and kept communications brief to reduce the risk of interception.
Until the fall of 1998, KLA communications were primitive. Many
lower-level units did not have radio communication with other units or
with higher-level commanders. Messengers traveling on foot had to pass
intelligence and requests for reinforcement or heavier arms. After that,
Radio Shack hand-held devices were common. These could communicate
over ranges much greater than the one or two miles advertised when us-
ers were on top of hills. Further, beginning in October of that year, more
sophisticated communications systems were available. Luigj Gjokaj, the
Detroit fund raiser, reports, “Our guy, Agim Ziba, who was a cameraman
and also our technical expert, determined the specs for radio sets. We pur-
chased ten or fifteen radio sets, at forty to fifty thousand dollars each.”
Sympathetic businessmen made resources available for Commander Remi
to have $200,000 worth of VHF hand-held radios in the Llap Zone, and a
$700,000 base and repeater system for zonewide communications. Other
zones, including Dukagjini, never had central systems.
Night-vision binoculars and scopes were crucial for tracking and
attacking enemy movements, especially on the trails from Albania into
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Supplying 127
Dukagjini. These binoculars and scopes came mainly from Russia and
the United States. Night-vision equipment was becoming available in
June 1998, but supplies were not adequate until May or June 1999, near
the end of the war. The Michigan group supplied probably fifty sets of
night-vision binoculars (though two were seized at the airport).
Food and water were not a major problem. The KLA operated only
in areas where it enjoyed broad popular support, avoiding areas with
significant concentrations of Serb civilians. Accordingly, the civilian
population readily provided food, clothing, and shelter, and also helped
KLA fighters conceal themselves from Serb forces seeking to root them
out. After the civilian population was expelled, the KLA often had to
go through enemy lines to bring food in. They would not take food be-
longing to the civilian population; rather, they set up cooking facilities
about five hundred yards away from enemy lines, presumably to lessen
the distance the food had to be brought. Only after the massive ethnic
cleansing activities in 1999 did the KLA have to concern itself with food
and water supplies.
Getting appropriate clothing to KLA fighters was a prime necessity.
“When I walked to Albania for the first time, I was wearing sports clothes
and Nike athletic shoes,” said Safet Krasniqi. “When we got up into the
mountains, it started to sleet, even though it was June. I’d never been so
cold—but they say it’s better to be cold if you get shot or step on a mine.
By the time we crossed the border and headed down, my Nikes were in
shreds. When we went back after two days, I was wearing a uniform and
boots.” Supplying uniforms and boots was not a problem once logistics
were better organized. KLA uniforms were not really “uniform” for ev-
eryone. Fatigue-style clothing, available virtually anywhere in the world,
was relatively cheap. A KLA soldier could dress in fatigues, sew a KLA
arm patch on the sleeve, and he was in the proper uniform. Significant
supplies of uniforms and boots came from the United States. Few of the
soldiers or commanders interviewed for this book reported any significant
difficulty with supplies other than arms. The broad popular support for
the KLA by the time it numbered more than a few hundred apparently
made it relatively easy for fighters to get fed and to receive clothing from
the ordinary population.
Medical Care
Kosovar Albanian health care professionals began to organize health ser-
vices for the KLA as early as December 1996. “War requires good officers
and good surgeons,” says Bajram Rexhepi, a Mitrovica practitioner who
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 127 6/4/08 1:50:28 PM

helped the KLA organize health services, and subsequently served as

prime minister of Kosovo. Improvisation was the strategy. Not enough
trained personnel were available for the KLA to adopt the usual practice
of stabilizing wounds near the area of combat and then transporting ca-
sualties to a rear area for more intensive treatment. Instead, physicians
like Rexhepi set up a treatment facility within a kilometer or two of the
front line and provided as much treatment there as they were able.
When the KLA planned operations in a particular area, medical per-
sonnel would establish a treatment facility in a house nearby, where they
would stay for three or four days. Various types of professionals would
staff these facilities: surgeons, general physicians, pharmacists, nurses,
medical students, even veterinarians. Professionals brought instruments
and supplies from their offices and clinics. Some antibiotics were avail-
able, but the most important protection against infection was good sur-
gical procedure and ensuring good drainage. Lack of refrigeration was as
big a problem as insufficient supplies of pharmaceuticals. “Probably, God
helped us,” Rexhepi says. “Mortality was no higher than in hospitals.”
Each operational zone had a health services coordinator, and every
brigade had some services. Health care professionals were amazed at the
toughness and courage of wounded soldiers. When no anesthesia was
available, the patients would simply grit their teeth and endure the pain.
The most common injuries were from mines, grenade fragments, artil-
lery shells, and small arms. Treating civilians was as great a challenge
as treating wounded KLA fighters: Ninety percent of the patients were
civilians. Of various ages and with varying degrees of basic health, civil-
ians had been driven from their homes into the woods and mountains.
They had poor drinking water and poor sanitation. “We were scared.
The Serbs don’t need to kill us; we will all die from typhus,” Rexhepi
remembers. There was the full range of diseases to be treated, some
frostbite and heat exhaustion, and many children with malnutrition. “I
encountered a woman one day after childbirth,” Rexhepi recalls. “She
had retained the placenta, and sepsis was beginning. This was the first
time I had faced this kind of gynecological-obstetrics problem. I didn’t
have the right instruments or drugs. But if I didn’t do anything, she was
going to die for sure.” So Rexhepi did what he and other KLA physicians
had done before: He improvised. “I had no choice. Somehow I was able
to grab the placenta with two fingers and pull it out. She opened her eyes
and said, ‘I am still alive.’”
A major challenge involved educating the commanders to evacuate
patients and medical staff before soldiers when the Serbs pushed into
an area. Commanders’ natural inclination was to think of saving their
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Supplying 129
soldiers first. The KLA had a double obligation—to fight effectively and
to evacuate and protect civilians. “The KLA did the best it could to care
for civilians. Sometimes the Serbs used civilians as shields, forcing the
KLA to terminate attacks. It was impossible,” said Rexhepi. Supplies for
the KLA, especially of weapons, depended on a sympathetic international
community. If European states and the United States had tried seriously
to interdict KLA arms flows, it would have been a much less effective
fighting force.
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9 Shaping
International Reaction
First, I thought we could win by ourselves. We would just

shoot some bullets and we would win. But after I went
to Albania, and experienced problems with the police,
I begin to believe that international intervention was
necessary. All that was necessary was to give a green
light, and help us get access to heavy weapons and some
training.
—Luftar Braha
If it wasn’t for the United States coming in to help—and

NATO—they would have been dead, dead in the water.
I was a supporter of Rugova from the beginning. My
goals and my energy was basically all in Washington. I
was limited to that. I believed that if we could convince
Washington to help us out, in the end we will win. And
it proved right. If Washington didn’t get involved, today
there would be a couple of hundred thousand people dead
and there would be a minority group, and that would be
the end of it.
—Harry Bajraktari
My early commitment proceeded from a belief that Amer-

ica would not turn its back on liberty and democracy.
—Adem Demaçi
In late February 1998, the American envoy to the Balkans was

calling the KLA a “terrorist group.” Fifteen months later, and led by the
United States, NATO was bombing Belgrade. How did this come about?
The Kosovo Liberation Army was ultimately successful in 1999 because
130
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 130 6/4/08 1:50:29 PM

Shaping International Reaction 131
it brought about international intervention in the form of a NATO air

campaign that caused the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Kosovo.
International intervention became the paramount strategic goal of the
KLA in the mid-1990s, and joined its original goal of demonstrating to
the Kosovar Albanian population that it was possible to resist Serb op-
pression. From then on, strategy was built around these central pillars,
and tactics were adapted to serve the newer goal. Fortunately for the
KLA, the same tactics served both goals.
International politics shaped the Kosovo conflict mainly in response
to the KLA’s emergence, though other factions within Kosovo also sought
international intervention (which was the premise of Rugova’s policy
of passive resistance). The facts argue that intervention occurred only
because the KLA’s armed resistance ratcheted up the stakes and thus
increased the risk of withholding intervention.
Essentiality of the Intervention

Though a few among the ranks and leadership of the KLA believe that in-
ternational intervention was not essential to success, even they acknowl-
edge that the KLA could not have prevailed as soon as it did, without
much greater bloodshed, absent the intervention. None of the few who
thought the KLA could win by itself can explain, from the vantage point
of 1991, how the KLA could prevail without help from outside. Even the
most optimistic KLA fighters tend to condition their predictions of suc-
cess. “If you had helped us with weapons, we could have won this war on
our own.” Commander Remi, who never before 1998 expected NATO to
intervene, still expected some forms of help: “The most I expected was
clandestine U.S. help with respect to weapons supply.” KLA Chief of Staff
Agim Çeku says, “Kosovo had to be liberated from across its borders, not
simply from within. If NATO had not intervened, the KLA could have
gone on forever, but it’s not clear that it could have ‘won.’”
The NATO intervention sought by the KLA initially did not ben-
efit the KLA as much as it had hoped. The KLA faltered as the bombing
campaign began, and as the Serbs threw off the last restraints on their
campaign of ethnic cleansing and military efforts to annihilate the KLA.
Ultimately, however, the bombing campaign drove the Serbs from Ko-
sovo. This enabled the establishment of an Albanian-led government.
Ironically, it was not the tactical use of air power in Kosovo that produced
this result; it was strategic bombing in Serbia proper.1 The drama of the
NATO attacks tends to obscure other aspects of the growing international
intervention on the side of the KLA. These other aspects strengthened
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 131 6/4/08 1:50:29 PM

the KLA’s position by limiting Serb response, inducing Serb concessions

(although the concessions usually were not honored), withholding law
enforcement action against KLA leaders in other countries, permitting
fund raising for the KLA to continue and accelerate, allowing arms to
flow to the KLA, and stimulating recruitment of volunteer KLA fighters
in other countries.
Of greatest long-term significance, international intervention in Ko-
sovo set the stage for eventual international recognition of Kosovo as
an independent state. This was, after all, the most important and most
widely shared goal of all Kosovar Albanians. While UN Security Council
Resolution 1244, which ratified the Kumanovo Agreement that ended
the NATO bombing campaign, recited that Serbia retained sovereignty
over Kosovo, it also mandated a UN-supervised process to determine
Kosovo’s “final status.” International administration of Kosovo under
Resolution 1244 had made Kosovo de facto independent by the middle
of 2005. The final status negotiations that began in late 2005 were cer-
tain to give Kosovo at least partial independence, with the international
community reserving to itself some attributes of sovereignty.
Albania’s Assistance Depended on International

Acquiescence and Encouragement
International support for the KLA began with the Republic of Albania.
The collapse of the government of the state of Albania in 1997 was cru-
cial to the success of the KLA, but this does not mean Albanian “state
sponsorship” of insurgency in Kosovo. Even during Enver Hoxha’s regime,
support for an Albanian insurgency in Kosovo was muted by geopolitical
factors. Stirring up “trouble” in Yugoslavia was not necessarily in Hoxha’s
interest. Hoxha and Tito fought over ideology but were fundamentally
allies. Seventy percent of Albania’s trade was with Yugoslavia. Neither
Tito nor Hoxha wanted a complete breach with the other, because they
thought it might be necessary for Yugoslavia and Albania to help protect
each other against the threat of Soviet intervention, as had occurred in
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. After Hoxha died in 1985
and Albania’s concern with Kosovo grew, Albanian Communist Party
chief Ramiz Alia reached out to Yugoslavia with promises of noninter-
vention in its affairs. After he came to office in 1992, just after Kosovo
declared independence from Serbia, Albanian President Sali Berisha ini-
tially tried to serve as a voice to the West for independence for Kosovo
(indeed he had campaigned on the issue) but was discouraged by Western
threats of renewed isolation. Berisha needed Western support and needed
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 132 6/4/08 1:50:29 PM

to prove that Albania was a reliable member of the family of nations and
respected international law institutions.
In any event, the LDK was a more attractive client for Berisha than
was the KLA. Rugova, Bukoshi, and the LDK Diaspora—the Peaceful
Path Institutionalists—had supported Berisha’s rise to power through
his Democratic Party, while the KLA’s predecessors were associated with
Hoxha and his Socialist Party successors. Thaçi, Jashari, and Haliti all
were arrested by the Berisha government at one time or another. Berisha’s
control over the Albanian Army and intelligence services was shaky,
however. His purge of the top leadership helped the KLA by enabling
dismissed military and intelligence leaders to freelance and help the KLA
get its act together, and to begin winning its “intelligence war” against
the Serbs.
Fatos Nano’s Socialist government returned to power in mid-1997
through elections secured by international peacekeepers after the collapse
of a massive pyramid scheme linked to Berisha. Despite Nano’s sympathy
for the KLA, most of the instruments of government—and therefore, possi-
ble state sponsorship for the KLA—in Albania had fallen away into a state
of pervasive anarchy. Support from the West for rebuilding the Albanian
state became a higher priority than furthering Albanian nationalism in
Kosovo. Even though certain elements within the Albanian Army and the
leadership of the Sigurimi—including its head, Fatos Klosi—affirmatively
supported the KLA, they were forced to do so clandestinely, confronted
with opposition by other elements of the fragmented state apparatus.
People in the Albanian ministries were afraid. “What if Berisha comes
back?” they thought. They feared Berisha’s support of Rugova, the LDK,
and Bukoshi. The intelligence service could not convince the Ministry
of Defense to help, so Nano said to Klosi, “You help.”
On October 2, 1998, the Socialist Party replaced Nano with Pandeli
Majko. Majko had no communications with the intelligence service, so
it continued to operate without permission. Then a KLA arms shipment
through Italy went badly awry in November, three weeks after the party
conference. The Italian authorities called the Albanian authorities and
said, “Some arms for the KLA are on their way to Tirana. Watch for them
in the baggage claim area of the Tirana (Mother Theresa) Airport and you
can catch the smugglers.” The Albanian intelligence service intercepted
the weapons between the aircraft and the baggage claim machinery, so
there was nothing to find in the baggage claim area. The Italians publi-
cized the incident, forcing Majko to take further action.
Majko called Klosi and asked, “Where are the weapons?” “In my of-
fice,” was the answer. The police found a warehouse where the intelli-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 133 6/4/08 1:50:29 PM

gence service stored more weapons. They also caught one of Klosi’s trucks
ferrying weapons to the KLA. Majko ordered Klosi’s arrest, accusing him
of trafficking arms. Klosi said, “Trafficking is a criminal activity; we are
not trafficking; we are supplying arms for a war by our brother Alba-
nians.” Majko said that the intelligence service was profiting personally
and that any effort to support the Kosovars should be transferred from
the intelligence service to the Albanian military. Later in 1999, when it
was too late to make a difference, Majko made a big show of supporting
the KLA. But the blowup forced a shutdown of the arms flow to the KLA
in late 1998 and early 1999, which provoked a real crisis.
Public as well as governmental sympathy within Albania for the
KLA was modest at first. Albanians living in Albania were interested
in moving closer to the West, and it was not clear that support for the
KLA would help them do that. Public sentiment in favor of the KLA was
strongest in the north of Albania. Kosovars are Ghegs, and the Ghegs
lived in the north. A different ethnic subgroup, the Tosks, lived in the
south and traditionally had dominated the politics of the Albanian state.
The northern border was always porous. Albanian nationals and Koso-
var nationals interacted when they pastured their livestock on common
pastures in the mountains. Extended families lived astride the border,
some on one side and some on the other.
How International Attitudes Toward Kosovo Evolved

Kosovo’s struggle against Serb oppression had attracted attention beyond
Albania by the time Hoxha died in 1985, and culminated in the outgo-
ing Bush administration’s 1992 “Christmas warning” to Milosevic that
if Serbia caused a conflict in Kosovo, the United States was prepared to
employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.
However ineffectual it may have been, some of the early involvement by
the European Union and the United Nations in the breakup of Yugoslavia
focused on Kosovo. In September 1992 the Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), sent observer missions to Kosovo, Vojvo-
dina, and Sanxhak, but Milosevic expelled them in July of the follow-
ing year.2 In September 1996 Belgrade refused a proposal for a European
Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in Kosovo. A later ECMM
presence in Kosovo was restricted by Serbian forces.
But then Europe and the United States became preoccupied with
larger political and legal questions associated with the breakup of Yugo-
slavia in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Kosovo took a backseat to Euro-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 134 6/4/08 1:50:29 PM

pean efforts to develop a comprehensive framework for all of Yugoslavia

and then to quell the spreading violence in those breakaway republics.
The eventual framework left Kosovo in the lurch. It denied Kosovo’s right
to secede from Serbia because it was not a “republic” under the Yugoslav
constitution, and because international law and security concerns miti-
gated against changing borders. After the Bosnian conflict finally ended
in late 1995, concerns began to grow that something had to be done to
prevent Kosovo from spinning out of control. The overwhelming weight
of opinion in Europe was that the Kosovar Albanians must negotiate a
diplomatic solution that would forestall armed resistance by the Koso-
vars and would roll back Milosevic’s revocation of autonomy.
Europe was split. France historically favored Serbia. John Major’s Brit-
ain dithered and also favored Serbia in some respects. Germany, according
to some reports, tried to drive European opinion in a more supportive di-
rection for Kosovo. Some parts of the German government supported the
KLA and the idea of armed resistance in Kosovo long before the United
States, Britain, or France was prepared to do so. According to some reports,
the German government agreed with the government of Albania in 1995
to support self-determination in Kosovo. German intelligence services
reportedly trained and helped finance the KLA, and braved rebukes by
the United States, which favored a more cautious strategy until 1998.3
But persistent and growing armed conflict in Kosovo and the loss of what
patience remained with Milosevic eventually caused international sen-
timent to shift decisively—though not uniformly—in favor of the KLA.
As that happened, forms of international support less dramatic than the
NATO bombardment began to materialize relating to arms supplies, fi-
nancing, treatment of leaders of the insurgency, shaping the response of
Serbia, increasing the flow of fighters, and increasing the prospects for
international recognition of an independent state of Kosovo.
The success of the KLA insurgency in Kosovo was a result of pas-
sion and politics, and not of law. Nevertheless, international law sig-
nificantly shaped the international community’s reaction to the KLA.4
First, other states’ laws and enforcement priorities created a permissive
legal environment for KLA fund raising and gun flows, and those states
did not extradite KLA leaders to Serbia, which had lost international
political support. Second, public international law and preoccupation
with sovereignty forestalled, for almost ten years, international accep-
tance of Kosovar Albanian aspirations for independence. Not only formal
conceptions of “sovereignty,” but also artificial distinctions between the
powers of Yugoslav republics to secede and the impotence of autonomous
provinces or regions to do the same, justified allowing Milosevic to do as
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 135 6/4/08 1:50:29 PM

he wished with Kosovo. Even if the KLA insurgency qualified as a “just

war” under international law, the existence of a just war did not justify
international intervention, under the International Court of Justice’s de-
cision in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America).5 Once the
KLA intensified its armed resistance, however, and Milosevic’s forces re-
sponded with savagery against the civilian population, the human rights
strand of public international law permitted proponents of international
intervention to justify the NATO bombing campaign, though not without
continuing controversy over its legality.
The international march toward intervention began in earnest in
1998. After the attack on the Jashari compound, a series of diplomatic
declarations and UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR 1160 and
1199) endorsed tightening sanctions against Serbia unless special police
units were withdrawn from Kosovo within ten days, and condemned
“terrorist” action by Kosovar Albanians.6 These resolutions also called
upon Serbia to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a “genuine politi-
cal process,” to reopen OSCE missions in Kosovo, and to implement the
1998 agreement between Rugova and Milosevic to open up the education
system in Kosovo once again to Albanians.7 By September, the Security
Council was also condemning Serb displacement of 230,000 Albanian
civilians, while systematically expressing “firm” opposition to indepen-
dence for Kosovo. On July 6, 1998, following a June 16 announcement by
Milosevic and Russian President Yeltsin, the United States, Russia, and
the EU established a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) to
monitor developments in Kosovo. The violence in Kosovo only escalated.
The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, authorized force
to compel compliance with the Security Council resolutions on October
12. While reaffirming NATO’s authority to use force to back up Reso-
lutions 1160 and 1199, UN Security Council Resolution 1203, adopted
on October 24, 1998, welcomed the October 16 cease fire agreement by
Serbia (brokered between Milosevic and U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke)
to allow an OSCE verification mission in Kosovo, while reiterating ear-
lier demands.8 Earlier, on October 13, 1998, the OSCE announced the
deployment of two thousand unarmed personnel in Kosovo as the Kosovo
Verification Mission (KVM). Endorsed by UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1203 and headed by Ambassador William G. Walker, the KVM was
to verify compliance with Resolution 1199. Walker was a distinguished
American diplomat. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state for
Central American affairs and then as ambassador to El Salvador.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 136 6/4/08 1:50:30 PM

Intervention in Kosovo on the side of the KLA occurred for a num-

ber of compelling reasons. The first, and one of the strongest, is that the
leaders of the Atlantic Alliance did not want to repeat the mistakes the
international community made in Bosnia, when Europe dithered and
then NATO’s modest application of force apparently was decisive, but
came late. The carnage in Kosovo pinched a nerve in international pub-
lic opinion. Yet diplomatic and international legal sensitivities against
intervening in the local affairs of a sovereign state had to be overcome.
The international human rights movement, well advanced by the late
1990s, was essential for a relaxation of these barriers to international
intervention. The movement was important for two reasons. First, po-
litical support for human rights had been translated into a new balance
in international law that offset formerly absolute prerogatives of sover-
eignty by obliging states to respect the human rights of their citizens.
UN Security Council resolutions adopted after the first Gulf War were
interpreted by most international lawyers as precedent for “humanitarian
intervention”: the use of armed force against a sovereign state to prevent
human rights abuses. This seminal change in the content of international
law validated essentially political arguments for intervention in Kosovo.
The international human rights movement provided an army of activ-
ists to expose the facts of Milosevic’s repression and to lobby Western
capitals, mostly through the media, to intervene.
Milosevic’s repression, the KLA response, and human rights advo-
cacy would have had little effect on the outcome in Kosovo, however,
if no one outside Kosovo had known about them. The Western press,
working side by side with the local Kosovar press, was an essential com-
munications conduit. But it took them a while to get plugged in. News
from the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia had dominated the international
press and media in the mid-1990s. After the Dayton Accords ended those
conflicts in 1995, journalists and their editors began to think that stories
from the growing tensions in Kosovo might be more interesting than
stories about the erection of an internationally supervised bureaucracy
to administer Bosnia. When the KLA leaders introduced themselves to
the world in November 1997, it did not take long for them to make a big
splash. Rugova had long denied the existence of the KLA, and the world
had believed him. But though the KLA still had no more than about a
hundred members, the revelation that the KLA was for real ramped up
international press interest. No one knew how small it actually was.
The Serb attacks of spring and summer 1998 served as a public-
relations bonanza to the KLA. The brutal killings of both the Ahmeti
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 137 6/4/08 1:50:30 PM

and Jashari families were also picked up by international news agencies.

People everywhere were quick to condemn Milosevic, when only months
before they were praising him for his cooperation with international
measures imposed in Bosnia by the Dayton Accords. The Serb attacks
and the KLA’s announced intentions to resist gave the KLA legitimacy,
and international scrutiny quickly shifted back to Milosevic, Serbia,
and Kosovo. After the NATO intervention began, Serb forces quickly
escalated their campaign of ethnic cleansing, which at its high point
expelled roughly 850,000 Kosovar Albanians from their homes and into
neighboring countries. The ethnic cleansing campaign was accompanied
by acts of mass violence against Kosovar Albanians and their families by
Serb paramilitary, police, and military forces intending to induce terror
in the population. By then, even though coverage from inside Kosovo was
even more difficult, it was not necessary. Foreign journalists only needed
to make it to a refugee camp in Macedonia, talk to Kosovar refugees in
Tirana, or find a KLA refuge in northern Albania. Stories and scenes from
those camps were on the front page and led the evening news.
The press and the Western publics were sensitized by the Bosnian
experience. The gruesome images that came out of Bosnia and Croatia
created sympathy in the West for the Kosovar Albanians and discredited
Milosevic. So western Europe and the United States reacted more quickly
to apparent ethnic cleansing and other human rights abuses in Kosovo,
where it seemed that the Bosnian tragedy was about to be reenacted. It
was easier to “take sides” in Kosovo than it had been in Bosnia. Moreover,
expanding press and media coverage of the conflict in Kosovo fueled fears
that untamed conflict in Kosovo would spill over into Albania, Mace-
donia, and, eventually, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and thus erase the
fragile peace achieved by the Dayton Accords. These factors combined
with a late-nineties mindset within the international community that
favored the use of multilateral, forceful intervention in situations where
human rights were being violated. Finally, the United States was well
positioned and highly motivated to provide NATO with strong leadership,
and to use NATO to bypass some less decisive international organiza-
tions. The force of these circumstances, coupled with the pressure created
by the KLA, maneuvered Milosevic into a diplomatic blind alley.
Forceful U.S. leadership and popular political hostility to Milosevic’s
occupation, rather than international law or multilateral diplomatic
structures alone, brought about intervention and eventual KLA success.
Virtually everyone agrees that international intervention in Kosovo took
the form that it did only because of U.S. leadership. Only the United
States had the military assets necessary for the NATO bombing cam-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 138 6/4/08 1:50:30 PM

paign, and a significant part of European diplomatic opinion believed that

one of the lessons to be learned from Bosnia was that Europe could nei-
ther formulate nor execute a coherent policy with respect to Yugoslavia
without American commitment and leadership. American policy toward
Kosovo evolved slowly. Kosovo first appeared on the political radar in the
United States in the mid-1980s, grew for about six years, and peaked in
1992. Thereafter, Kosovo almost vanished from the congressional radar
screen until the KLA began to escalate armed conflict at the end of 1997,
provoking attention-getting reaction from Milosevic.
The chart below shows references to Kosovo on the floors of the
House of Representatives and the Senate from the mid-1980s until 1998.
Though congressional floor speeches often are motivated primarily by
the opportunity to copy the speech from the Congressional Record and
distribute it to constituents interested in the subject of the speech, the
fact remains that any form of congressional debate on a subject evidences
sufficient public interest to gain congressional attention.
On Christmas Day 1992, the outgoing Bush administration published
a formal warning to Milosevic that the United States would not allow
repressive action in Kosovo. President Clinton reiterated the warning
200
180
160
Congressional Record References
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1986 1989 1992 1995 1998
Figure 1. References to Kosovo in Congress, 1986 to 1998.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 139 6/4/08 1:50:30 PM

when he took office.9 But there had been no mention of Kosovo in the
1992 presidential campaign debates. After taking office, President Clinton
referred to Kosovo during two news conferences: each time he warned
Milosevic not to broaden the Bosnian conflict to Kosovo. Otherwise,
Clinton’s public papers, including his speeches as well as official dec-
larations, make no mention of Kosovo until 1998, when he made fifty
references.
Presidential reticence was occasioned by sharp political conflict in
the United States over Kosovo. By the end of 1989, expressions of support
for Kosovar Albanians were beginning to run into opposition. An amend-
ment condemning human rights abuses against the Albanian population
of Kosovo was added to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, but
was modified after Senate debate to make it more “even handed,” and
less focused on Serb abuses of Albanians.10 Lobbying efforts by Kosovar
Albanians failed to turn the political tide. In 1996 the sentiment of the
Congress was that the crisis in the Balkans had been averted by the Day-
ton Accords and that American foreign-policy makers could turn their
attention elsewhere. But the KLA made sure that this mood did not last.
As the KLA became more active, interest in Kosovo intensified dramati-
cally, concentrating initially on KLA use of “terrorism.”11 Influential
Democrats in the Congress, like Representative Lee Hamilton, were
cautious. “[T]he Administration should not blame Milosevic alone for
the current crisis in Kosovo. . . . [T]o be an effective intermediary, we
must also highlight the unacceptable use of violence by armed ethnic-
Albanian separatist groups, which is part of the reason for Serbia’s recent
crack-down in the first place.”12
President Clinton, in the middle of a growing clamor for his impeach-
ment and removal from office based on the sexual scandal involving
Monica Lewinsky, was caught in the political crossfire. Further, American
intelligence about the dynamics of the Kosovo conflict never was good.
“I didn’t want to believe how bad U.S. intelligence was,” says Florin
Krasniqi. “‘My God!’ I said, ‘how could they be so clueless?’ There were
some very effective agents, but most of them just wanted to collect their
paychecks and to retire without controversy. They did not want to take
any risks of getting in trouble, and you cannot collect intelligence if
those are your motivations.” Reinforcing this conclusion is the author’s
conversation with then-U.S. ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill,
who later served as the U.S. troubleshooter in Kosovo. In the spring of
1997, Ambassador Hill explained to the author and several students why
he believed that the collapse of the government in Albania would have
little effect on the insurgency in Kosovo.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 140 6/4/08 1:50:30 PM

The U.S. executive branch, including the FBI, flip-flopped on whether

it was sympathetic or antagonistic to those raising money and organiz-
ing logistics within the United States. When something would heat up
in Kosovo and make it to the evening news or the front pages, policy
makers would shift their positions, and the attitudes of agents of the FBI
and other agencies on the ground would reflect these shifts. Secretary of
Defense Cohen and the military were opposed to further commitment of
U.S. forces in the Balkans. The Clinton administration, which initially
had routinely reiterated the Christmas Day 1992 Bush warning that the
United States would not allow excessive Serb force in Kosovo, stopped
referring to this commitment.
In this jockeying over U.S. policy toward Kosovo, Madeleine Albright,
Richard Holbrooke, and Wesley Clark were essential players. All three
made sure President Clinton knew the stars had aligned in favor of the
KLA. Albright became secretary of state on January 23, 1997, and prob-
ably pushed harder and more effectively than did any other senior foreign
policy official for a tough stance toward Milosevic in Kosovo, despite
being criticized by National Security Adviser Berger as being irrespon-
sible for threatening air strikes. Albright persisted, however, and man-
aged to convince the president that the United States must take a hard
line by invoking NATO’s fiftieth anniversary as an opportunity to link
an effective position on Kosovo to the continued credibility of NATO.13
Richard Holbrooke, especially credible after his mediation of the Dayton
Accords, supported Albright despite some personal discomfort between
them. They and Wesley Clark, who became NATO commander on July
11, 1997, had extensive personal experience with the conflict in Bosnia.
They knew that Milosevic responded only to force and rarely honored
diplomatic agreements.
Support gradually spread across the political spectrum. During the
1999 NATO bombing campaign, the Heritage Foundation, an influential
conservative think tank, published a white paper urging American sup-
port for the KLA.14 As often is the case, the clandestine services were in
the vanguard of policy implementation. The U.S. intelligence services
signaled to the Albanian state that it was permissible to open the arms
routes in 1998. By that year, the CIA was quite explicit in its “advice”
to the KLA, which it delivered directly, on the ground:
1. There must be no Muslim influence; you must not repeat the Bos-
nian experience.
2. There must be no drug money supporting your activities.
3. There must be no terrorist attacks outside the geographic boundar-
ies of Kosovo.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 141 6/4/08 1:50:31 PM

4. You must target uniformed personnel rather than civilians as much

as possible.15
Rumors that the United States provided clandestine support for train-
ing early KLA cadres in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, are not
supported by any evidence.
Once it became clear to American policy makers that forceful action
against Milosevic was necessary in Kosovo, the United States still had to
bring the Europeans on board—a difficult challenge. Eventually, desires
to repent for failures of nerve in Bosnia, commitments to maintain soli-
darity within NATO, public revulsion with Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing,
and a determination not to see it repeated in Kosovo, caused Europeans
to make common cause with the United States in intervening.
An important facilitating development was the election of Tony
Blair’s Labour Party to govern Great Britain in 1997. From the begin-
ning of his tenure, Blair’s foreign secretary, Robin Cook, worked with
Albright to push the rest of Europe to take a tough stand on Kosovo,
and sought to defuse Russian support for Milosevic. With a major Eu-
ropean power behind her, Albright induced Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov to acquiesce privately and informally to the threat of air strikes,
while Russia maintained its formal position that it would veto any UN
Security Council resolution approving the use of force against Serbia.16
The result was the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement of October 1998,
providing for a cease fire and the withdrawal of Serb heavy forces. Then
in January 1999, the Reçak Massacre—the killing of forty-five civilians
in the Kosovo village of Reçak—occurred, which Ambassador William
Walker exposed to the world press as the work of the Serb police. Walker’s
distinguished reputation enhanced the impact of his public statement.
Public reaction to the Reçak Massacre was shaped further by Hague Tri-
bunal Prosecutor Arbour’s persistent public efforts to obtain access to
the massacre site, efforts that were rebuffed by Serb authorities in front
of the international press.17
How the KLA Shaped International Reaction

Even in its earliest days, the KLA perceived that international interven-
tion—or, at least, international abstention—was necessary to assure an
arms flow. As it matured, the KLA understood that the entire course of
the former Yugoslavia’s breakup was shaped by international involve-
ment. Kosovars believed that Serbia had lost the Croatian and Bosnian
wars only because of international intervention, which culminated in the
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Dayton Accords. By 1997 the KLA single-mindedly defined its strategy

according to its perception of what would make international interven-
tion most likely. Once it had that objective clearly in mind, the KLA
adopted and refined an interrelated set of initiatives aimed at inducing
the “right” kind of intervention. The KLA recognized that international
fears of a bloodbath in Kosovo could be strengthened only by objective
facts reifying the fears. There actually had to be some violence. Even
before Dayton, the most obvious difference between Croatia and Bosnia,
where the international community was heavily engaged, and Kosovo,
where it was not, was that there was a war in Bosnia and there was none
in Kosovo. The KLA intended to erase that difference.
Even as violence began and spread, however, Milosevic and the Peace-
ful Path Institutionalists worked hard to communicate a different message
to the outside world: There are only a few guerrillas in Kosovo—bandits,
really; the ordinary Serb security forces can deal with them easily; their
activities justify Serb repression; their terror alienates the international
community. The existence of the Rugova government in exile and the
unspoken understanding between the Serb government and Rugova’s
regime, the message continued, distinguishes Kosovo from Bosnia and
would assure a peaceful evolution toward autonomy in Kosovo. Attacks
on Serb police stations are simply the acts of isolated terrorists linked
culturally to historic Albanian clan violence. “Fail[ing] to recognize that
diplomacy requires pressure,” said Bukoshi, “Rugova was passive in the
execution of his own strategy,” for, “[h]e would not say to the interna-
tional community, ‘If you don’t put pressure on Belgrade, there will be an
explosion that we cannot control.’ Instead Rugova would receive foreign
delegations—and they came in swarms: NGOs, official delegations, in-
telligence service representatives—and he would say, ‘Don’t worry. We
have everything under control.’ That message was almost guaranteed to
cause the international community to ignore Kosovo and to focus their
attention elsewhere.” By contrast, Bukoshi “was pleased with the emer-
gence of the KLA and thought it would be good for Kosovo because it
would put pressure on Belgrade and get the attention of the international
community.”
Although it understood the political power of violence, the KLA also
understood a central precept of Fourth Generation Warfare: Insurgencies
rarely succeed militarily on the battlefield; they more often succeed be-
cause they can never be completely defeated. Perseverance is part of this
strategy. Milosevic almost annihilated the KLA on several occasions.
But the KLA continued to fight each time, reconstituting itself around a
core of committed individuals after each setback. Milosevic was never
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 143 6/4/08 1:50:31 PM

able to put the fire out. Moreover, the KLA proved itself tough enough to
resist international pressure to stop its fighting. Though it generally was
cooperative with internationally brokered cease fires and other efforts
to limit the scale of the conflict, the KLA demonstrated that it would
not sit on the bench while Milosevic reentered the field. It would resist
Milosevic with arms, no matter how much the international commu-
nity wished it would not. As a result, it sent a clear signal to the inter-
national community: You will not solve this conflict until we get what
we want—removal of Milosevic’s repressive forces from Kosovo and the
establishment of a viable path to independence.
As it fought, the KLA built international support by exploiting grow-
ing Serb repression. There is no evidence of any KLA operation motivated
primarily by the goal of provoking Serb reaction: Indeed, many com-
manders altered their tactics or their targets for fear of bringing down
Serb retribution on civilian populations. Nevertheless, the KLA knew
that one of the results of its continued fighting would be intensified Serb
repression of the innocent, and it grew more sophisticated in its ability
to make sure the outside world knew of the reaction each time.
The KLA was not alone in publicizing repression; the Peaceful Path
Institutionalists had been attempting to do this throughout the nine-
ties, with Rugova’s press conferences in Prishtina displaying the latest
evidence of Serb atrocities. But Rugova missed opportunities to shape
events as well as information. He always sought to cool things down—
discouraging student demonstrations as well as armed attacks on Serb
authority. The KLA understood that it must heat things up.
One of the most remarkable achievements of the KLA was its dis-
cipline in making sure it did nothing to undercut growing international
support. It avoided terrorist attacks on civilian targets. It steered clear
of militant Islamic influences. It kept the fight inside Kosovo. It raised
money in other countries openly. As a result, it blunted attempts by
Milosevic and Milosevic sympathizers in other countries to portray it
as a terrorist organization and a vanguard of militant Islam. All available
evidence shows that the KLA, unlike Bosniak forces in Bosnia, shunned
Islamic fundamentalists. As Bukoshi said,
We knew that accepting help from Iran or Saudi Arabia would be the
death knell of our effort to engage the West. I had an offer from Iran when
things were so desperate that “we were seeking help from Eskimos and
penguins.” I refused, because I knew it was a trap . . .
Serbia was rubbing its hands in anticipation that fundamentalists
would become involved in the Kosovo struggle. From the beginning,
Serbia had always argued to the West, “We protect you from the Muslim
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 144 6/4/08 1:50:31 PM

hordes—the atheists who will extinguish Christianity.” We did not want

to fulfill Serbian dreams.
The KLA leadership’s preoccupation with its twin goals of building

popular support within Kosovo and of obtaining international interven-
tion caused it forcefully, from the beginning, to oppose terrorist attacks on
civilian targets. There were a few isolated attacks that killed apparently
innocent civilians, such as an attack on a bar in Peja in December 1998,
and an attack on the hard-line Serb rector of the University of Prishtina.
“In 1993, we considered and then rejected the IRA, PLO, and ETA mod-
els,” says KLA strategist Xhavit Haliti. Milosevic might continue to say
that the KLA was a terrorist organization, but the KLA made sure there
was no evidence to prove it. Distinguishing itself from other nationalist
insurgencies such as the IRA, the PLO, and the ETA, the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army engaged in no armed attacks outside Kosovo. This may in part
have owed to lack of capacity—although the KLA certainly had a robust
presence in Macedonia, Albania, Switzerland, Germany, and elsewhere—
and to the relatively short duration of its activities. KLA communiqués,
however, consistently played on Western fears of a broader war. They
threatened to broaden the war if the international community did not
support its aspirations for liberation.18
Further, and somewhat paradoxically in light of the ethnic nation-
alism that helped it grow, the KLA had to disavow the objective of cre-
ating a “Greater Albania.” Experts on the Balkans in the United States
and Europe were preoccupied with maintaining existing borders. Cross-
border ethnic concentrations had produced the wars in Croatia and Bos-
nia. Appeals to Albanian solidarity, especially when reinforced by talk
of a “Greater Albania,” stoked fears of uncontrollable instability in the
southern part of the former Yugoslavia. It would break up Serbia and
Macedonia, outside observers feared, and expand Albania, which was
far from a model of either democracy or viable market economy in the
mid-1990s.
Lobbying and Public Relations

But limiting its fight would not have been enough. The KLA also had
to win international—and especially American—hearts and minds affir-
matively. From the earliest days of the KLA’s predecessor organizations,
all Kosovar Albanian separatists worked to influence foreign govern-
ments. The 1981 Gërvalla-Zeka effort in Germany focused as much on
the German press and government as on the Albanian Diaspora. Rugova
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and Bukoshi were making trips to Washington almost as soon as they

took office in the Government in Exile. President Rugova visited Capitol
Hill in February 1994 and warned of the possibility of an “explosion” in
Kosovo that could draw in other countries in the region. On March 21,
1994, Bujar Bukoshi made a statement to the United Nations Press Asso-
ciation, which Representative Christopher Smith caused to be reprinted
in the Congressional Record.19 Bukoshi warned that the Government
in Exile’s “pacifist approach in Kosovo is losing credibility within our
population.” Congressmen David Bonior and Joseph Dioguardi worked
tirelessly to build support in the U.S. Congress, as did Senator Robert
Dole. They were consistently encouraged by such leaders of the Alba-
nian American Diaspora as Florin Krasniqi, Harry Bajraktari, and Dino
Asanaj. At one point, Krasniqi took Dioguardi to visit KLA resupply
camps in Tropoja. As early as 1986, Gjok Martini was buying advertise-
ments in the Detroit Free Press announcing that “Albanians are living
under a state of inhuman terror,” and appealing to the U.S. government
to “help our brothers and sisters who are living through a modern day
Holocaust.”20 Martini organized a hunger strike and demonstration to
protest revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, and a demonstration
near Wright Patterson Air Force Base in 1995 to protest exclusion of Ko-
sovo from the Dayton Accords.
Credit for hard lobbying belongs not only to KLA representatives. On
the U.S. political front, the KLA and the Peaceful Path Institutionalists
worked together—or at least their efforts were mutually reinforcing. The
KLA and others within the Kosovar Albanian community, certainly in-
cluding Rugova and the LDK, were tireless in their efforts to communicate
a simple message to the outside world: Milosevic is running an oppressive
police state in Kosovo; we are struggling against overwhelming odds for
basic human rights. Each KLA communiqué contained language empha-
sizing that its activities were aimed at expelling occupiers and did not
constitute a conflict of a terrorist, interethnic, or religious character.21
After the conflict intensified in 1998, Florin Krasniqi reached out
to individual commanders and urged them systematically to commu-
nicate a message to the Western press that emphasized Milosevic’s bru-
tality against ordinary Kosovars—children, families, schoolteachers,
physicians—and to avoid getting into history or religion. “Especially in
America, people do not want to hear that. It’s boring. They’re tired of
that. On the other hand, they understand someone who is trying to fight
for his family.”22 He emphasized the need to be open to journalists, and
to avoid trying to be big shots or important commanders. “We can win
this war with TV cameras; we cannot win it with battles.”
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The KLA and other Kosovar supporters of international intervention

made effective use of a receptive international press and media corps in
the Balkans, knowing that they would communicate their message to
Washington, London, and Berlin. The international press had already
been sensitized to the newsworthy character of the tides of refugees and
displaced persons—especially when Milosevic was the apparent cause.
Reporters already were in the region, and after the end of the Bosnian
war they were looking for new stories. Freelance reporter Greg Camp-
bell drove from Bosnia to Kosovo in search of more action.23 The title of
Anthony Loyd’s book, My War Gone By, I Miss It So, captures the spirit
held by many.24 Newshounds jumped at the chance to broadcast any
footage or print any information about the Serb destruction of Albanian
villages in Kosovo. British journalist James Pettifer mentions persistent
efforts to get news about Milosevic’s depredations and Kosovar Albanian
courage into the press and media.25
Press and media interests and growing political support in the United
States fed each other. The 1998 U.S. intervention in the form of send-
ing successful Dayton mediator Richard Holbrooke to Kosovo to try to
mediate a settlement ensured that Kosovo now was on the front page.
The subsequent massacre at Reçak and Ambassador William Walker’s
declaration that it was a massacre were the stuff of stop-press bulletins,
and made escalating intervention inevitable.
Some of the greatest contributors to the KLA media cause were young
men and women who worked hard and creatively among those not so
young to make sure that the Western publics had images of refugees,
burned villages, and massacred civilians on the front pages of their news-
papers, on their television screens every night, and on their Web brows-
ers. As one individual confided to the author:
I believed there was more than one way to fight the Serbs. My younger
brother was encouraged by one of his friends, a frequent brawler, to fight
the regime more physically, but our father cautioned, “Son, our family
fights with the pen, not with the gun.” So I went to Albania to attend uni-
versity. Not long after I was settled in Tirana, going to university classes
in computer science and working for a television station. My method of
fighting was through the media, using my technology background; I took
advantage of my job at the television station by broadcasting pictures of
slain Albanian citizens, or by influencing international polls on Kosovo’s
refugee situation. I knew I could be more useful to the cause this way, even
though I occasionally thought maybe I should pick up arms and fight.26
Florin Krasniqi took teams of journalists to refugee camps and KLA train-
ing camps in Albania, and made videotapes for others. He used his cell
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 147 6/4/08 1:50:32 PM

phone to facilitate conversations between journalists and fighters both

inside Kosovo and preparing in Albania. Proud of his contributions to
fund raising and logistics, he nevertheless says that his greatest contribu-
tion was in making sure the KLA got the right image out to the Western
press. He credits Haradinaj and Remi as being particularly responsive to
his encouragement to invite camera crews and journalists to cover their
activities. The Drenica KLA leadership was much more difficult, secre-
tive, and stubborn.
Albanian teams in Prishtina and Tirana, some working through Koha
Ditore, the English-language newspaper KD Times, and others working
in Tirana in activities funded by George Soros, collected pictures and
stories from wherever they could get them and put them up immedi-
ately on a series of Web sites. The Kosovo Action Network established
a listserv in December 1997 to support the Independent Student Union
at the University of Prishtina.27 The Government in Exile established
a Web site in Switzerland.28 The Kosovo Crisis Center and KCC-NEWS
were established on the Web in February 1998 to “keep the world in-
formed with facts from the ground about the Serb atrocities committed
against women, children, and elderly people, as well as the oppression
against everything Albanian in Kosovo.”29 The KCC Web site is full of
dispatches and photographs documenting the horrors experienced by the
civilian population.30 Koha Ditore’s Arta Web site published pictures of
Albanian victims of Serb terror,31 and AlbaNews, a mailing list, is now
archived at the University of Buffalo.32 The earliest postings are from
1995. Cell phones also played a major role. Kosovo was the first “mo-
bile phone war.”33 Cell phones worked better in Kosovo than in Bosnia
because there was more relatively flat terrain in Kosovo.
Getting human reporters plugged into the KLA itself was more daunt-
ing. James Pettifer, who wrote for several British newspapers, observed
that it was “hard to find the war” because it was occurring in villages
rather than towns and cities.34 Pettifer was consistent in his dismay at
the ignorance of the British Foreign Service, and distinguished himself
by his persistence and determination to get the truth out about the KLA
and its insurgency. Some thought the KLA was “clueless” about the press,
but a few reporters, like Pettifer, cynical and bored with “spin” from
Serb, LDK, and Western sources, worked hard to make contact with the
KLA. Many were sympathetic and believed that Europe and the United
States were seeking yet another excuse for inaction by viewing the KLA
negatively.35
Greg Campbell’s experience also is representative of entrepreneurial
reporting. An editor of a small Colorado weekly, Campbell had covered
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the aftermath of the war in Bosnia, beginning in March 1996. By spring

of 1998, he had turned his attention to Kosovo. When Campbell arrived
in Prishtina, he found a “herd” of Land Rovers with “TV” taped to their
sides, parked around the Grand Hotel. Inside he found a Serb-run “me-
dia center” equipped with laptop computers, fax machines, and stacks
of Serb-government press releases reporting on the latest “terrorist” at-
tacks. Campbell found the setup to be “an information vacuum of black
hole proportions.” He sought out Albanian journalists, whom he found
at the local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
latched onto one who was “more or less KLA.” Aside from that sort of
information connection, news channels were limited to the official Serb
media center and contact with Rugova. “No one had heard from the
KLA,” says Campbell.
Campbell, like others, struggled to get “out into the field.” His op-
tions were to bum a ride with other better-financed journalists (who had
bullet-proof vehicles), to take his own (vulnerable) vehicle, or to accom-
pany human rights workers. The other journalists were neither interested
in helping him nor particularly aggressive in going out. He mistrusted the
human rights workers, who seemed to mistrust each other. And to go in
his own vehicle was obviously foolhardy. Eventually, he was allowed to
accompany international observers attached to the Kosovo Diplomatic
Observer Mission (KDOM), which was not very useful, because their
itineraries were controlled by the Serbs.
But there were some things that could not be concealed. Jashari’s
death in a hail of Serb bullets in March 1998 was one of them. Everyone
heard about it, and Campbell and other reporters, when they accompanied
KDOM to inspect the now-deserted site, were moved by the destruction
of the residence and the personal effects still strewn around on the ground
outside. Campbell then decided to go out on his own, regardless of the
danger. Making his way through menacing Serb checkpoints to Mali-
sheva, he eventually found a KLA soldier on the other end of a sniper rifle
pointed at Campbell’s head. When he identified himself as an American
reporter, the rifle was lowered and the KLA welcomed him, eager to tell
him their stories.
Gradually, the KLA and other Kosovar sources of information sym-
pathetic to the KLA began to fill the gaps. Koha Ditore launched its
English-language newspaper KD Times precisely to create a channel of
information between the KLA and the Western press, which otherwise
would have been entirely dependent on Milosevic’s and Rugova’s pro-
paganda. The KLA established a radio station called Kosova e Lirë (Free
Kosovo) and a news agency called Kosova Press. One reporter thinks it
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turned out to be a good idea that KLA commanders and fighters kept
out of the limelight. Their militancy might have undercut their image
in the West. Far better was to have refugees on television. Some young
KLA supporters made sure that happened.
About three thousand of us were in a kind of camp towards the south-
west. I wanted to do something to protect my family, friends, and neigh-
bors, but there really wasn’t anything I could do. I couldn’t join the KLA
as a fighter because the KLA had disappeared.
Then I realized: I could use my English and my cell phone. I was able
to make contact with international journalists, and two of them came
to our encampment. Over time, I established regular contact with about
seven journalists and some NGOs. Journalists passed my cell phone
number around to others. They were, of course, delighted to have some
way of finding out what actually was happening on the ground. Journal-
ists would come in and out, and NGOs occasionally would bring aid. I
was the coordinator of all this.
Later, I became part of the team that produced Koha Ditore Times, the
only source of news from the Albanian resistance published in English.
We [Koha Ditore] also had a Web site—Arta—available in English. We
would e-mail the stories to a server located outside Kosovo. The news-
paper and the Web site broke the news blackout maintained by Rugova
and the LDK. Otherwise journalists would have viewed the war through
an LDK lens. The LDK could hardly deny the existence of the KLA by
this time, but they still were trying to minimize its significance and to
reinforce the idea that the KLA was just a handful of extremists.
We had pictures and stories right away because Veton Surroi [the pub-
lisher of Koha Ditore] was a genius. He sent his reporters right along
with the international reporters. It was a good deal for both sides: the
international reporters had people with them who knew the territory.
The Koha Ditore reporters had company that tended to protect them
from arrest and harassment by the Serbs.
I didn’t ever take up a gun. I thank God I had learned English. This and
my cell phone were my weapons—and I used them. (Lirim Greiçevci)
By the time the last diplomatic conference over prewar Kosovo was
over, the KLA had driven the last nail in the coffin of Milosevic’s repu-
tation. The February-March 1999 peace conference in Rambouillet was
a watershed for the Albanian nationalists. It was, they perceived, the
first time the international community had been aligned on the side of
the Albanians and against the Serbs. Under Albright’s tutelage, Thaçi
glimpsed what was the most important opportunity: The KLA must
seem to be avoiding war while making Milosevic seem to be embracing
it. Thaçi saw that he must insist on retaining the possibility of eventual
independence and on keeping but transforming the KLA—the two most
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important positions of the organization. And he must insist on the in-

troduction of NATO forces. These three demands not only served KLA
interests as the KLA understood them; more importantly they also made
it impossible for Milosevic to agree.
Eventually, Albright and Thaçi finessed the question of a referen-
dum on independence by incorporating code words such as “will of the
people” in mandating a subsequent process for determining final status,
and they finessed the question of disbanding the KLA by providing for
its incorporation into the Kosovo Police Service and a new self-defense
organization, the Kosovo Protection Corps.36 Thaçi could agree to this
approach, after he explained it at home. And both Thaçi and Albright
knew that Milosevic could not agree. Thaçi’s eventual signature on be-
half of the Kosovars, coupled with a refusal by the Serbs to sign, made
NATO military intervention virtually certain. Thaçi knew it would.
With Albright’s help, he outsmarted Milosevic.
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10 Postwar Politics:
The KLA at the Ballot Box
For me Rambouillet was very helpful. And afterwards

I proposed Thaçi for prime minister in a future govern-
ment. I proposed him because he was young, well-
educated, and articulate in the Western sense. We did not
need someone speaking for us who was old fashioned and
had difficulty getting beyond Communist-type rhetoric.
This guy Thaçi stands straight; he would be a good
representative for us.
—Ramush Haradinaj
The Kosovo Liberation Army experience defined postwar poli-

tics in Kosovo. The popularity that had allowed the KLA to operate did
not evaporate when the organization itself had ceased to exist. Thousands
of its fighters staffed the postwar Kosovo Protection Corps and Kosovo
Police Service. Others returned to their villages and jobs, heroes always
to families and friends because of their service. Its generals and political
leaders occupied the leadership ranks of the major political parties, and
the wartime cleavage between the KLA and the LDK simmered beneath
the surface of every important policy decision. But even as it moved into
mainstream politics, the KLA also had to confront international lawyers
who accused it and its leadership of committing war crimes—some of
whom went so far as to assert that the KLA was no better than Milosevic
had been in acting out ethnic hatred.
The KLA provided a context for postconflict nation building in which
the goals of democratization and the rule of law clashed with each other,
and with the international community’s overwhelming desire to avoid
152
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Postwar Politics 153
civil unrest. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which

ended the NATO bombing campaign and mandated withdrawal of Serb
forces, envisioned continued Serb sovereignty over Kosovo while virtu-
ally all of the attributes of sovereignty were exercised by the United Na-
tions through a “UN Mission in Kosovo” (UNMIK), headed by a Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).
The KLA’s political wing, led by Hashim Thaçi, had its own ideas.
The KLA had won the war, and its commanders and fighters would take
over responsibility for governing the territory. In July and August 1999,
Thaçi—the handsome, young, thirty-year-old KLA hero of television
broadcasts—formed a new political party from the political wing of the
KLA and called it the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). He cobbled to-
gether an “interim government,” appointed ministers, and sought to get
Kosovar enterprises going again to put people back to work. His ministers
were poorly prepared technically, yet eager to fulfill their responsibilities,
and sought international assistance.
Realities on the ground overshadowed formal institutional arrange-
ments. After the NATO bombing stopped and the Serbs left, the “boys”
of the KLA were the heroes of all of Kosovo, and willingly shared the
acclaim with NATO. Everyone who had fought, and thousands who had
not, made sure to get fatigue jackets and hats, and sew “UÇK” patches
on them.1 They naturally moved into the vacuum created when the Serbs
withdrew, and occupied not only territory but also factories, schools,
and town halls. Young men wearing KLA insignia or claiming to be KLA
veterans used strong-arm tactics to oust people from their lodgings and
to prevent them from returning to jobs they thought, often based on
pre-1989 realities, were theirs. A large number of murders, apparently
politically motivated, occurred. Thaçi’s control over people and events
was minimal. Worse, UNMIK, unprepared to fulfill by itself its mission
of civil administration for six months after the conflict ended, was un-
willing to allow anyone else to do it. UNMIK would not deal formally
with the Thaçi interim government, which lacked “political legitimacy.”
Rugova, seeking to restore his dominance, stiff-armed Thaçi and declined
to participate or otherwise give legitimacy to the interim government.
One of the terms of Resolution 1244 called for the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army to disarm completely and disband. Formally, the insurgency
did just that. Much of the political leadership, including Thaçi, moved
in and filled the power vacuum. A number of its soldiers took legitimate
positions in the Kosovo Police Service or the Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC in English or TMK, after its Albanian initials), Kosovo’s unarmed
civil defense force. Former KLA Chief of Staff Agim Çeku commanded
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 153 6/4/08 1:50:33 PM

the forces of the TMK for seven years, and became prime minister in
2006. Ramush Haradinaj was deputy commander of TMK before he, too,
entered politics and became prime minister (earlier than Çeku).
Veton Surroi, the highly respected publisher of the main Kosovar
Albanian newspaper, Koha Ditore, which had provided the first public
relations outlet from the KLA to the outside world, was a favorite of the
internationals, and interpreted local events for them. Many thought that
Surroi—given his elegance, confidence, and articulate sophistication—
could emerge as the only capable and trustworthy leader of postwar
Kosovo. In any event, his views were greatly respected by the interna-
tional community. But his international support was stronger than his
local support, and he did not start his own political party until 2004. In
December 1999, Surroi provided the author with an interpretation of
early postwar political developments in Kosovo. Rugova offered no “in-
terim government” ministers or institutions at first, Surroi said, because
Rugova knew that no one could do anything then. Whoever tried would
get blamed for everything that happened. No one would blame UNMIK
for murders of Serbs and Albanian opponents; they would blame Thaçi,
who held himself out as the head of local government. Rugova and the
LDK would be the beneficiaries.
For the internationals, the goals were peace and a multiethnic gov-
ernment, no matter how much that slowed economic development and
the emergence of local institutions. Toward that goal, Rugova was a
better bet than anyone from the KLA. The impulse to choose Rugova
over action-oriented Thaçi and to make the formation of a multiethnic
government a priority resulted in a stalemate. On December 15, 1999,
UNMIK formed a “Provisional Administrative Council of Kosovo” that
ended Thaçi’s interim government and substituted a structure that was
to include both the PDK and the LDK. The LDK boycotted this at first.
Then UNMIK established a “Joint Interim Administrative Structure”
in February 2000.2 This apparatus lurched along until elections could be
held in October.
The organization of the elections was driven by fear that the KLA
parties would win. Both locals and internationals had been afraid of the
organization during the conflict. Rugova realized he could take advantage
of these fears to make a political comeback that would be backed by the
only real political party in Kosovo—his. Resentment toward the KLA
simmered among those who thought they themselves deserved the places
and leadership positions now occupied by the former fighters. Returning
refugees and expatriates—many of whom had run factories, schools, and
town halls before 1989—expected to resume their places and provide po-
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litical and economic leadership for the New Kosovo. Although they were
ten years older, most had not fought, and the day seemed to belong to the
young men of the KLA. Rugova tapped into the popular perception that
the majority of the former KLA leaders and fighters lacked experience
in anything except fighting, and that many had only basic schooling.
Haradinaj left the TMK in April 2000 and formed his own political
party, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). Rooted in the Du-
kagjini wing of the KLA, but reaching out to other, non-KLA political
parties and movements, the AAK was a formal alliance of six parties (this
was later reduced to four). Haradinaj’s motives for entering politics are
unclear but have been the subject of vivid speculation: He was induced
to enter politics, some say, by a Western desire to split the KLA vote;
encouraged, others say, by dismay about Thaçi’s exclusion of non-KLA
elements; and inspired, still others say paradoxically, by Thaçi’s inclu-
siveness. Whatever the motives of those encouraging him, Haradinaj
emphasized effective government from the beginning. “Say that the AAK
works more than other parties, that AAK members wake up earlier than
members of other parties and that they will do more for you than the
others,” he declared in one campaign speech. “I can say that personally
I work more than Thaçi and Rugova.”3
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
organized the first postwar elections for members of municipal assem-
blies in October 2000. Going into this first round of elections, the former
leaders of the KLA appeared to be in the driver’s seat. Their success in
leading the fighting enabled them to enter politics; Thaçi and Haradinaj
certainly had not been part of the Kosovar Albanian political elite before
1998. But their association with the KLA also got in the way. Many were
surprised by the election results in 2000, however. The PDK—or the PDK
and the AAK together—were expected to sweep the field because of their
KLA identity, and Rugova and the LDK were expected to fade from the
scene. In the election, however, the LDK polled 58 percent, and the PDK
polled only in the low 30s. Haradinaj’s AAK polled about 8 percent.
Reassured that Thaçi’s party, the one most strongly identified with the
KLA, was unlikely to sweep national elections, UNMIK, with the acqui-
escence of the three parties, promulgated a “constitutional framework” in
May 2001 that called for the election of a national assembly, a president,
and a prime minister, thus constituting “Provisional Institutions of Self
Government,” or PISG. UNMIK reserved the power to nullify PISG’s deci-
sions. UNMIK also scheduled national elections for November 2001.
In the 2001 elections, the results were similar to those in the mu-
nicipal elections a year earlier: the LDK won about 46.3 percent of the
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 155 6/4/08 1:50:33 PM

vote, the PDK took 25.5 percent, and the AAK 7.8 percent. Turnout in
2001 was about 64 percent, well down from the nearly 80 percent turn-
out in 2000.
The results reflected two realities of Kosovar politics. First, even well-
educated young people voted as the head of their family suggested they
vote. Second, many urban people and others were never entirely sympa-
thetic to the KLA. As Blerim Shala, publisher of the second largest Kosovar
Albanian newspaper, Zëri, told the author, “The LDK would have won an
election [even] if it had been held during the middle of the war.”
A protracted postelection struggle ensued over formation of the gov-
ernment. Thaçi wanted to be prime minister, but Rugova would not ac-
cept that possibility. Eventually a national unity government was formed
on March 4, 2002, with representatives of all three major parties included:
the LDK’s Rugova became president, the PDK picked the prime minis-
ter, and the AAK was along for the ride. Thaçi picked as prime minister
Bajram Rexhepi, a respected physician who had organized health care
for the KLA during the war, but who did not have a political base in the
conventional sense. Nexhat Daci became speaker of the assembly. He
had been a long-time member the LDK and a professor of chemistry at
the University of Prishtina. In a public interview given soon after he was
selected as speaker of the assembly, Daci reached out to former KLA
fighters in the PDK and AAK.
The coalition governed for almost four years, passed legislation, put
together annual budgets, and upgraded public services. Its tendency to
produce tepid compromise government policy, however, prevented any
major policy initiatives, especially in the economic sphere. This strength-
ened the hands of the individual ministers. Each minister could afford
to be more partisan and more proactive than the prime minister because
each minister had his or her power base only in one political party. In
some cases, they used the opportunity corruptly.
The basic ratio of votes did not change after the 2001 elections—LDK
continued to poll twice as many votes as PDK (with percentages in the
high 40s and 50s), PDK polled twice as many as the AAK (high 20s to
low 30s), and the AAK remained steady with just less than 10 percent.
As a rough measure of party activity, the LDK reported to the OSCE that
it spent about €650,000 in 2003, while the PDK spent about €420,000
and the AAK just over €100,000.4 Thaçi and Haradinaj struggled to intro-
duce modern politics to Kosovo: Each sought advice from European and
American political experts, including the author. Thaçi and Haradinaj
privately expressed respect for the other and a determination to work
together against the LDK. Lines between these two war parties and the
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pacifists hardened. Former KLA elements increasingly branded Rugova

a “traitor.” The LDK fired back that KLA stalwarts Thaçi, Haradinaj,
Remi, and Haliti were thugs, murderers, crooks, and drug smugglers.
The LDK was basically the old Kosovo branch of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia and, containing three factions, was barely held to-
gether by Rugova. Despite his reputation for passivity, no one else but
Rugova could lead the LDK. Rugova ran a one-man show and undermined
anyone whose emergence might threaten his primacy. The strongest fac-
tion was the one led by Sabri Hamiti, which comprised the parliamentary
wing. Hamiti probably had the best ties to grassroots party structures in
the municipalities. A second faction that included Naim Jerliu and Daci
comprised the traditional urban elite supporters, and was relatively weak.
The third wing, often allied with the second, was led by Edita Tahiri,
of the former Agani wing of the party.5 As late as January 2004, no one
expected significant change in the LDK as long as Rugova was alive.
A major reason the LDK polled so much better than either the PDK
or the AAK in the first three elections was that it had a ten-year head
start on building a political party. In June 1999 neither the PDK nor the
AAK really existed as a party. They were simply names used by Thaçi and
Haradinaj. Neither had a grassroots organization, or either the experience
or the capacity to formulate a program and run campaigns. By 2004 that
all had changed, especially for the PDK. Both Thaçi and Haradinaj were
getting high marks from almost everyone on party building. Further,
voting trends did not favor LDK, which in two years saw a 73,000–vote
falloff while the PDK and the AAK witnessed increases of sixteen thou-
sand and nine thousand votes, respectively. These modest shifts were
accompanied by reduced turnout, which revealed diminishing public
confidence in all three political parties.
The PDK was composed of two quite dissimilar wings. The stronger
wing, referred to by some cynics as the “old wolves,” included former
fighters and was led by Jakup Krasniqi and Fatmir Limaj, the most power-
ful “number two” person in any of the political parties. The other wing
was composed of intellectuals who had been recruited one by one and
who, consequently, did not have much cohesion as a group. Prime Min-
ister Rexhepi, economist Besim Beqaj, and law professor Hajredin Kuqi
were part of this wing. A number of critics and skeptics said that the
members of the second wing of the PDK were only formally part of the
party and really constituted only window dressing. There was a tendency
within the PDK to undervalue the contributions of anyone who was not a
KLA fighter. One young, well-educated PDK operative described how he
had made a proposal in a party presidency discussion, whereupon Jakup
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Krasniqi, the secretary general of the party, said, “You are just a techni-
cian. You didn’t fight in the war.” Thaçi depended on the “old wolves”
because the other PDK factions had no power base of their own. Though
there was talk in January 2004 that the PDK might split, others thought
that unlikely. Everyone in the PDK understood that the party needed
Thaçi as its face. His attractiveness and moderation were necessary to
overcome the PDK’s greatest liability: a perception of thuggishness and
incompetence. No one who was in the wings could compete with Thaçi
in overcoming this perception.
The AAK was less a political party than a platform for Haradinaj.
Everyone was intrigued by its potential and by Haradinaj’s charisma and
leadership. But most observers believed that the AAK would cease to
exist as a party without Haradinaj. In the AAK, Ramush Haradinaj was
the old wolf, and so it was easier for him to move to the middle without
being threatened from the right in his own party. But real electoral suc-
cess eluded him. Haradinaj ran in 2000 as a moderate with good program
ideas, and he received only 8 percent of the vote. Then he moved to the
right and got 9 percent. Popular wisdom held that the AAK initially had
appealed to young professionals because Haradinaj, more than Thaçi, had
cozied up to internationals and to the NGO community. He was, as one
PDK staffer said, “the darling of the internationals and NGOs, probably
because they saw him as a reliably KLA yet nonmilitant alternative to
Thaçi.” For some adherents of the LDK, Haradinaj’s AAK was a way of
splitting the KLA vote and ensuring continued LDK dominance. Others
within the LDK sought to interdict the AAK’s early success in drawing in-
tellectuals and young professionals by portraying Haradinaj as a thug.
A 2003 effort to form a new political movement oriented toward
youth and young professionals fizzled. Senior members of the move-
ment, including Surroi and Bukoshi, advised the young organizers to
back away from direct political challenges and concentrate instead on
Surroi’s new “Forum 2015.” Young people were not willing to take the
risks of getting into politics, however, because the elections were a long
way off (municipal elections would not be held until 2006—and were
eventually postponed so as not to interfere with final status negotiations),
and because they depended on their good international and NGO jobs,
which would be jeopardized if they jumped into politics with both feet.
Moreover, political alienation was growing, especially among the young.
On the Serb side the “Return” Party, led by Milan Ivanovic, was obstruc-
tionist and took orders from Belgrade. Momcilo Trajkovic, a former ex-
tremist, led a competing Serb movement announcing that “we have to
work with Albanians directly on matters that concern us concretely in
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the short term, and we should stop depending on Belgrade to protect our
interests.” Despite considerable international pressure, Kosovar Serbs,
having participated very little in earlier elections and taking their direc-
tion from Belgrade, did not participate in the 2004 elections. All of those
factors posed obstacles to the start of a viable fourth party.
Both UNMIK’s veto power over important decisions and its sluggish-
ness in achieving results, combined with the absence of any discernible
progress or commitment toward determining Kosovo’s final status and
with political jockeying by Kosovar leaders, fueled a public resentment
and alienation that were already high because of massive unemployment.
On March 17–18, 2004, riots broke out all over Kosovo and overwhelmed
UNMIK and NATO attempts to restore order. This was initially disas-
trous for Kosovo’s image because the rioters targeted Serb enclaves and
religious sites. Over time, however, the riots proved to be the wakeup call
the international community needed to address final status for Kosovo,
and focused local political attention on finally achieving the popular goal
of independence.
A debate continues over how the riots started and spread. It is clear
that the precipitating events were blockage of the Prishtina-Skopje road
by Serb demonstrators from a nearby enclave, Qakllavici, and the rumored
drowning of some Albanian children near Mitrovica after they had been
chased by Serbs. The Serb intelligence service claimed that it had known,
weeks before, that the riots had been planned by the Albanians. But the
Serbs did perform one of the riot’s precipitating events by blocking the
Prishtina-Skopje road. The Albanians claimed a Serb conspiracy, and
pointed out a pattern of Serb demonstrations more or less along the line
of partition preferred by the Serbs. But that hypothesis is questionable as
well, because the Serbs took no initiative in any demonstrations except
for the blocking of the road at Qakllavici.
The weather was nice, and electricity was in the air. The war vet-
erans’ organization led protests against war crimes prosecutions of KLA
commanders on March 16. The Kosovo trade union was planning to bus
members into Prishtina from all over Kosovo on March 17 to protest the
halt in privatization. But the blockage of the road and the widely reported
drownings were the immediate triggers of the violence. The author, in
Kosovo during the riots, observed the riots’ early stages when students
poured out of the University of Prishtina as word of the drownings spread.
The author watched NATO tanks, clouded with tear gas, struggle to con-
trol a crowd of college students trying to move up the Prishtina-Skopje
road leading out of the city and toward the Serb road blockage at the
top of the hill. On the second day, he drove past the Serb enclave on the
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outskirts of Prishtina where a school had been burned the night before.
He was in the center of Prishtina as night fell, and watched high-school-
age teenagers burn UNMIK vehicles and mass in a disorganized way to
march on UNMIK headquarters. He was confronted on the evening of
the second day by heavily armed and aggressive riot police protecting
international facilities from an anticipated assault. He drove through
smaller towns in western Kosovo and saw orderly protest parades moving
through the town centers. When the author quizzed young participants
in the violence near Prishtina on how they knew where to go and what
to do, they said, “You talk to your friends and figure out what to do; it’s
not very complicated.” Streams of students headed up Mother Teresa
Street to the scene of the road blockage on Wednesday evening. Seeing
the crowds, young Albanians ran up and said, “Where are you going?”
and were told, “Up the hill, to break the roadblock. Come on!” Thus the
crowd grew. The targeting of Serbs and Serb churches was more consis-
tent with this hypothesis than with any carefully orchestrated strategy.
What conceivable Kosovar Albanian purpose could have been served by
two days of violence directed against Serbs?
Frustration against the UN had been high, and grew even more. The
prosecution of KLA commanders and the abrupt and unexplained halt of
privatization by a senior EU official just posted to UNMIK were concrete
additional “insults” to Kosovar Albanian hopes. The rumored drowning
of the children and the Serb roadblock were simply triggers. A huge and
growing young population that did not fight in the KLA wished it had,
and wanted to prove itself. The property destruction was widespread,
especially in Serb enclaves and in Prizren, where major sections of the
city were burned and dozens of fatalities resulted. No trivialization of the
riots is appropriate. Yet for many of the actual participants, it was like a
celebration in a college town of a football victory that got out of hand.
Prime Minister Rexhepi distinguished himself by visiting the site of
some of the most intense violence near Prishtina—at some physical risk
to himself—and successfully urging the crowds to disperse. Haradinaj
and Thaçi issued calls for calm. Thaçi, in the United States, interrupted
his activities to tape Voice of America broadcasts in both Albanian and
English calling for order, and flew back to Kosovo immediately after leav-
ing the VOA studios. His interview on Serbian Voice of America was his
first formal presentation in English. The riots sputtered out as these and
other local political leaders called for calm and NATO flew in additional
troops to complement KFOR.
Everyone, inside and outside Kosovo, was stunned. Was this a return
to the disorganized violence of 1998? Would it shift international opinion
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against the Kosovar Albanians and prejudice dreams of independence?

While the international community licked its wounds over the poor per-
formance of its police and of NATO KFOR troops, Kosovar political leaders
forced a new determination to work together to restore political control.
The solidarity of the ex-KLA political leaders after the March riots soon
eroded, however, in the run-up to the national elections scheduled later
in the year. The October 2004 national elections dramatically changed
Kosovo politics, once again along fault lines defined by the KLA.
Daci, more active than Rugova in charting a strategy for the LDK,
realized that his party needed some KLA coattails. Haradinaj, having
met with little success in his independent effort to develop an alliance
that could garner both KLA and moderate support, needed a badge of le-
gitimacy. Nominally, the AAK campaigned on its own, and was loosely
associated with the PDK because of its identity as “the other KLA party.”
But other possibilities were under the covers. Suppose Haradinaj and
Daci could align the LDK and the AAK? That would freeze Thaçi out
and make a combined LDK and AAK a political juggernaut.
Thaçi’s 2004 campaign emphasized his assets of youth and new ideas,
as well as his KLA background. He visited schools, hospitals, senior
centers, and small businesses, and took photographs and video to be
used with other audiences. Thaçi tried to present a clear message at the
beginning of the campaign that set the PDK apart from the LDK, but his
message did not resonate strongly. In late January 2004, the PDK accused
Daci of receiving one-half million Euros in ill-gotten gains from recon-
struction of the government building. Most people were not particularly
moved and said that the accusations were pure politics, although a later
audit by the independent auditor general, after Thaçi’s party was in op-
position, seemed to confirm some of the accusations.
The AAK ran a lackluster campaign, despite getting high marks from
NGOs for having become the most professional and democratic of the
three parties. Throughout the 2004 campaign, everyone expected another
broad coalition government. Election turnout was 54 percent. The LDK
received 45, the PDK 29, the AAK 8 percent of the vote, and Veton Sur-
roi’s new ORA (an Albanian word roughly signifying “the hour”) garnered
6 percent. The geographic pattern of voting showed that only the LDK
and PDK were national parties. The AAK polled more than 20 percent
in only two of the thirty municipalities. The PDK polled more than 40
percent in eight municipalities, while the LDK polled more than one-half
of the vote in ten municipalities.
Everyone (except those who had listened closely to Haradinaj’s pri-
vate vote predictions) was astounded when on November 17, 2004, the
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LDK and AAK formed a coalition, thus freezing out the PDK and ORA,
and selected Haradinaj as prime minister. Most people credit Daci with
putting the coalition together, based on his pragmatic realization that
he needed a partnership with a KLA figure, and that, conversely, he had
to split the KLA vote and drive a wedge between Thaçi and Haradinaj. It
worked. Thaçi felt betrayed by Haradinaj, while Haradinaj’s motivation
was murky. Many say that he sought to forestall his widely rumored
imminent indictment by the ICTY. More benign hypotheses are more
plausible: Haradinaj cared deeply about his country and was embarrassed
by the ineffectiveness of the previous broad coalition. Rugova would pass
from the scene eventually, and Haradinaj knew that there was no heir
apparent within the LDK. Perhaps Haradinaj (assuming he could dodge
the ICTY bullet) could take over the LDK and merge it with the AAK.
Then he would come out on top, thus besting Thaçi for good.
Adverse international reaction to Haradinaj’s selection was intense
because of widespread rumors that he was about to be indicted for war
crimes. But SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen, appointed in June 2004 as part
of the international community’s post-riots determination to reengage
in Kosovo in a more purposeful manner, and by far the best UNMIK top
administrator since 1999, deflected the criticism by saying that the demo-
cratic process in Kosovo should be allowed to make decisions unmolested.
In his hundred days as prime minister, Haradinaj accomplished much. He
was results-oriented and was tough with his ministers, who were scared
of him in various ways that were not all political. He grasped the nettle
of decentralization and interethnic harmony in ways that other Kosovar
leaders had been unwilling to do. Haradinaj appeared likely to be more
effective than Thaçi’s Bajram Rexhepi who, though very able, sophisti-
cated, and charismatic, was thwarted both by the necessity of obtaining
approval for every move from a divided PDK presidency and by the ever-
present possibility of an LDK or AAK veto. Thaçi initially floundered in
his unexpected role as leader of the parliamentary opposition.
But then Haradinaj was indicted by the ICTY in March 2005 and re-
signed, earning wide local and international acclaim for the grace with
which he did so. SRSG Jessen-Petersen lamented his departure and called
Haradinaj “my friend.” Haradinaj designated Bajram Kosumi to replace
him. Kosumi had supported the KLA but so insignificantly that he once
implored Remi to allow him to be photographed with Remi’s troops in
order to boost his credibility. (Remi borrowed a uniform for Kosumi to
wear.) Now the only prominent leader with a KLA background who was
not tainted by war crimes accusations, Thaçi gradually became more
sure-footed, but his path to political dominance remained blocked. When
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Haradinaj was let out of jail on provisional release in June 2005, he be-
came a behind-the-scenes kingmaker, though he was hampered both by
the restrictions of his provisional release and by the hatred of some KLA
adherents who saw him as a turncoat for cooperating with Rugova, and
beholden to the internationals who persuaded the ICTY to release him.
Yet even before the ICTY relaxed the conditions of his provisional release
on March 10, 2006, Ramush Haradinaj was the puppet master of politics
in Kosovo. He could not dominate publicly, but he could operate at the
margins that determined the outcome.
Ibrahim Rugova was diagnosed with lung cancer in September 2005
and died the following January. His death opened both a political vacuum
and the possibility that the LDK would fragment around three or four
power centers. Rugova’s death also opened the opportunity for a funda-
mental restructuring of the government, a goal shared by the interna-
tional community and the PDK after Haradinaj’s resignation. Assembly
Speaker Daci’s stubbornness and Prime Minister Kosumi’s political weak-
ness and insensitivity to appearances of conflicts of interest reinforced
the desire for change. A shakeup in February and March was procured by
the internationals, facilitated significantly by Haradinaj, and acquiesced
to by Thaçi. Having selected Kosumi as a placeholder in the prime minis-
ter’s office, Haradinaj dumped him not only because he was incompetent
but also because he was disloyal to the AAK. Haradinaj recruited former
KLA chief of staff Agim Çeku to be prime minister, in part because he
respected his capacity but also because he was aware that this would
split the KLA vote further between the AAK and Thaçi’s PDK.
Fatmir Sejdiu replaced Rugova as president. This was a surprise to
many. He was the LDK’s general secretary but was friendly to the PDK
leadership, a respected law professor, not publicly political. He got off
to a great start and was far more active than Rugova had been in years,
and Thaçi did not seem to resist his selection or his early initiatives.
The LDK forced Assembly Speaker Daci out under pressure from the
international community.
Though all of the KLA leaders now in politics were on their best be-
havior after the March 2006 reshuffling of the government, signs abounded
that they were preparing for a political showdown after independence.
Thaçi and Haradinaj, formerly political allies, were both circling their
wagons and taking potshots at each other, mostly through staff and other
party members. Young staffers in the Haradinaj camp were freezing out
those who were known to be friendly with Thaçi, while those in the Thaçi
camp were encouraging their interlocutors to write off Haradinaj because
of his “defection” to the LDK, his ICTY indictment, and his dependence
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on UNMIK permission to speak or meet. Whispers of Haradinaj’s ties to

corruption networks intensified, and the Haradinaj camp blamed Thaçi
for encouraging the rumors. Each camp withal expressed acute curios-
ity about what the other camp was planning. Though the antagonism
might be attributable to the overzealousness and immature loyalty of the
young, twenty-something political staff, a phenomenon well-known in
fully developed democracies, it also is reasonable to infer that the young
acolytes were responding to signals from their principals. Both Thaçi and
Haradinaj continued, personally, to express respect for the other, while
deemphasizing the contributions of the other during the war.
There were a number of wildcards. Within the LDK, Daci, Lufti
Haziri (a former KLA organizer who served as minister of local govern-
ment and, after the 2006 shakeup, as deputy prime minister), and Rugo-
va’s inner circle (his son and Hamiti) were at loggerheads and poised to
split up the party. LDK party elections were postponed until December
2006. In the PDK, Remi and Fatmir Limaj, who had served as KLA com-
mander in Drenica and had recently been acquitted of war crimes by
the ICTY, presented uncertainty. A top leader of the PDK close to Thaçi
before his trial, Limaj was enormously popular after his acquittal, and
possibly eclipsed in popularity both Haradinaj and Çeku. A number of
observers (especially those in the AAK) said that Limaj would compete
with Thaçi for the PDK leadership, but there were no signs of anything
except loyalty in the months after his release and reentry into politics.
Remi, after his conviction was reversed on appeal, reentered politics and
was for a while sought by all three major parties. He ultimately joined
the presidency of the PDK.
Meanwhile Çeku, nominally a member of the AAK and possessing
impeccable KLA credentials, was the most popular man in Kosovo, ac-
cording to opinion polls during the twelve to twenty-four months before
his appointment as prime minister. A strong personality, Çeku initially
seemed unlikely to be anyone’s lapdog during final status negotiations or
after independence was achieved. During his first year as prime minister,
however, he was complaisant to Haradinaj’s orders and made few waves
that might alienate either the LDK or Haradinaj. Would he ultimately
become his own man and throw his weight behind Thaçi or Haradinaj, if
he could not mediate a truce between the two—and would such a truce
be likely after independence? Former political prisoner in Serbia, deputy
spokesperson for the KLA, and then organizer of “Self Determination
Now!”, a protest movement opposing negotiations over Kosovo’s final
status and preferring instead unilateral action, Albin Kurti was the fourth
wild card. Kurti was energetic, interested in policy, and willing to take
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risks, yet it remained to be seen whether he could transform his youth

movement into a viable mainstream political force.
The new political leadership was much stronger than was its prede-
cessor, and was well suited to navigate the shoals of final-status nego-
tiations that were widely expected to produce independence for Kosovo,
either through a new UN Security Council resolution or through bilat-
eral talks toward recognition of Kosovo statehood by the United States,
Britain, Germany, and other major powers. But the Kosovar Albanians
would have to devolve considerable power to municipal governments, es-
pecially where Serbs were in the majority, allow Belgrade to finance some
activities in these municipalities, and agree to a substantial international
presence in the security, justice, and economic spheres. At least some of
these compromises would be unpopular with many Kosovars, and no one
without unimpeachable KLA credentials would be able to sell the final
outcome. Thaçi, Haradinaj, and Çeku were qualified. Meanwhile Çeku,
Sejdiu, and Kolë Berisha, the new assembly speaker, were perceived to
be better able to perform the role of day-to-day governing and less likely
to spend all their political capital on fighting with each other.
Greater Albania was, for all intents and purposes, off the table, though
it operated as a specter in the background as an alternative if final status
negotiations ran aground. The Kosovar Albanian leadership was drawn
to the eminent possibility that it would have its own state to run, and
did not want to muddy the waters by talking about merging with other
states or territories. The government of the Republic of Albania had its
hands full, and was not interested in forming some new political unit.
Leaders of the Albanian communities in Macedonia and Montenegro were
quiescent.
As the leaders of the KLA jockeyed with each other and with the
surviving Peaceful Path Institutionalists to steer Kosovo into indepen-
dence, ordinary KLA fighters and many in their age group who had not
personally fought charted diverse paths. A number, especially KLA unit
commanders, became soldiers or officers in the TMK or KPS. Others ob-
tained employment with local service enterprises, NGOs, UNMIK, or
OSCE. Some pursued education. Paradoxically, many of the young people
who were most actively engaged in postconflict politics were ones who
had supported the KLA and had longed to fight but had not. Several of
them took up positions as political advisers or administrative assistants
to the former KLA commanders-turned-politicians. Many of them were
the most loyal advocates of “KLA values.”
But political alienation was pervasive among the young and more
junior KLA fighters. They continued to respect their commanders for
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their wartime leadership, but they were disappointed by the lack of policy
initiatives and lack of results on day-to-day problems such as employ-
ment and electricity supply. Increasingly, they were willing to say that
nothing would change until current political leaders left the scene.
Postconflict politics in Kosovo were driven by attitudes and lead-
ers that emerged from the KLA. Prominent KLA leaders were those in
the best position to provide real political leadership because they were
proven risk takers, and because they had more political capital because
of their hero status with the domestic publics. Already intense because
of the insurgency, tensions between the Peaceful Path Institutionalists
and the former KLA leaders frequently paralyzed postwar policy mak-
ing. Tensions between the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at Home,
largely submerged during the war, cropped up again in 2004, as competi-
tion between Thaçi and Haradinaj heated up.
Prosecution by international war crimes courts of prominent KLA
leaders unsettled politics throughout the period between the end of ac-
tive fighting and final status negotiations. Leaders’ popularity was gener-
ally enhanced by the prosecutions, but they were often snatched away
from the political stage to stand trial. The following chapter considers
the impact of these prosecutions and the implications for the evolution
of the international law of armed conflict. Postindependence politics in
Kosovo will be driven for a long time to come by the tripartite tensions
among the Peaceful Path Institutionalists, the Planners in Exile, and the
Defenders at Home. Thaçi and Haradinaj were not likely to mend their
breach; each would compete for the allegiance of the remaining Peace-
ful Path Institutionalists, as would those acquitted of war crimes. The
relatively civil political behavior during the final status negotiations is a
poor predictor of how politics in Kosovo will evolve after independence.
After independence, the gloves will come off and competition among
the factions will intensify. Then the international community will be
a relatively less important constituency because the Kosovar political
leaders, now having what they want from the internationals, will be able
to focus more on domestic constituencies. The central question is this:
would Kosovo’s political leaders be results-oriented and, if they were,
would they be able to maintain popular support? Would the courage and
resourcefulness that marked their leadership of the KLA reemerge, or
would the temptations of holding on to power cause complacency and
policy stagnation as long as no one threatened their positions and hold
on patronage?
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11 The KLA in the Dock
The Accused Ramush Haradinaj . . . personally ordered,

controlled and participated in beatings of persons
detained by his forces and taking no active part in
hostilities, and on other occasions . . . encouraged or
instigated criminality by members of his own forces. . . .
He personally participated in the abduction of persons
who were later found murdered. . . .
—Haradinaj Indictment 26
Thanks to Ramush Haradinaj’s dynamic leadership,

strong commitment, and vision, Kosovo is today closer
than ever before to achieving its aspirations in settling its
future status. Personally, I am saddened to no longer be
working with a close partner and friend.
In his decision today, Mr. Haradinaj has once again
put the interests of Kosovo above his own personal
interests. . . . The decision announced by Mr. Haradinaj to
co-operate with the Tribunal, despite his firm conviction
of innocence . . . is . . . an example of Kosovo’s grow-
ing political maturity as a responsible member of the
international community. I trust that Mr. Haradinaj will
again be able to serve Kosovo to whose better future he
has sacrificed and contributed so much.
—Søren Jessen-Petersen
Any story of the KLA would be incomplete without consider-

ing postwar prosecution of many KLA leaders for war crimes. Postconflict
political evolution in Kosovo was significantly affected by these prosecu-
tions, a new feature of the international legal order, born of the desire
to do something about Milosevic. The International Criminal Court
for the former Yugoslavia, established ostensibly to try Milosevic and
167
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 167 6/4/08 1:50:35 PM

other perpetrators of human rights violations in Bosnia and Croatia, later

turned its sights on the KLA, joined by local Kosovar courts armed with
jurisdiction and staffed by international judges.
After the war, three high-level KLA commanders, Remi, Limaj, and
Haradinaj, were prosecuted for war crimes, along with key subordinates.
Remi was tried in Kosovo by international judges; Limaj and Haradinaj
were prosecuted in The Hague by the ICTY. Remi was convicted, but
his conviction was reversed on appeal. Limaj was acquitted in Novem-
ber 2005.1 Haradinaj, indicted in March 2005, was scheduled to be tried
beginning in January 2007, then postponed to March 2007. Daut Hara-
dinaj, Ramush’s younger brother, and other KLA fighters from the Duk-
agjini region, were convicted of the postconflict brutalization of wartime
adversaries. Pashtrik Zone commander Selim Krasniqi was convicted,
retried after winning an appeal, and convicted again of orchestrating the
postwar murder of another KLA commander who had become a postwar
adversary. Both of these prosecutions were tried by Kosovo courts staffed
by international judges. These were only the most visible cases.
The prosecutions unsettled some supporters of the KLA, especially
inside Kosovo. Internationally, they fueled arguments that conflicts in
the Balkans were intractable, and without heroes or victims, because of
a legacy of “ancient ethnic hatreds” that would always play out through
interethnic brutality. They angered much of the Kosovar Albanian pub-
lic, who saw the prosecutions as examples of yet another international
betrayal of Albanian dreams.
The prosecutions greatly complicated postwar political development.
They removed, at least for a time, strong leadership figures who could
have played more important roles in strengthening democratizing politi-
cal institutions in postconflict Kosovo. Remi, Haradinaj, and Limaj were
charismatic figures whose wartime leadership fueled hopes that they
could provide effective, results-oriented leadership for the postconflict
political system. For the most part, the popularity of KLA war crimes
defendants increased among the local Albanian population when they
were accused. Indeed, when Haradinaj’s indictment became public and
he resigned as prime minister, the top UN civil administrator in Kosovo
praised his political work and called him “my friend.” UNMIK subse-
quently, doggedly, and successfully sought to persuade the ICTY to release
Haradinaj from pretrial custody, and to permit him to resume active and
public involvement in Kosovo politics.2 When Limaj was acquitted, he
returned to a hero’s welcome in Kosovo. The prosecution of KLA leaders
electrified the population in Kosovo, which had favored prosecution of
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 168 6/4/08 1:50:35 PM

The KLA in the Dock 169
Serbs but thought that its own fighters were justified in defending both
themselves and the Albanian population against Milosevic.
The prosecutions also raised questions about the fairness and utility
of the international enthusiasm for war crimes trials. Always subjected
to pressure to be “even-handed” in its justice, the ICTY indicted the KLA
leaders for mistreating Serbs, Roma, and Albanians suspected (the KLA
defendants allege) of spying or collaborating with the regime during the
insurgency. The facts are in sharp controversy, but a comparison of the
indictments of the KLA leaders with those of the leaders of the Milosevic
regime show that KLA leaders were accused of international humanitar-
ian law violations on a much smaller scale than the violations alleged
against Milosevic and his forces. In the early KLA cases, international
courts began to recognize this. In acquitting Limaj, the ICTY found no
systematic ethnic cleansing by the KLA, and rebuffed efforts to crimi-
nalize the entire organization. It further held that the ICTY might not
even have had jurisdiction over early KLA attacks. A number of lawyers
doubted that the traditional law of armed conflict was suited for applica-
tion to guerrilla insurgencies, either for the insurgents or for the regimes
opposing insurgencies. The prosecutions exposed some serious difficul-
ties in molding international criminal law (ICL) to fit the circumstances
of a guerrilla insurgency. Developed out of the conventional wars of the
nineteenth century, ICL fits the circumstances of modern guerrilla war
poorly and, therefore, threatens to widen the breach between legal theo-
ries and the realities of nationalist insurgencies.
Prosecution of individuals for war crimes was a new feature of in-
ternational law that grew out of the Yugoslav conflicts. Before the ICTY
was established in 1993, war crimes were the purview of national courts,
which almost never prosecuted their own political leaders, generals, and
soldiers. The ICTY was established to apply international humanitarian
law codified by the UN Security Council in Security Council Resolution
1244 and in the ICTY Statute3 that had been drawn from Hague Regula-
tions,4 the 1949 Geneva Conventions,5 the two Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions adopted in 1977,6 and various human rights conventions.7
KLA leaders and fighters could be sent to jail for “violations of the laws
or customs of war” (colloquially, “war crimes” or, more formally, “vio-
lations of the law of armed conflict”) or for “crimes against humanity.”
Unlike Slobodan Milosevic, none was accused of genocide. The core ob-
ligations of KLA fighters under these sources of law, collectively known
as International Criminal Law (ICL) were the same as the obligations
of the Serb forces opposing the KLA: the duty to discriminate between
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 169 6/4/08 1:50:35 PM

participants and nonparticipants in the conflict, the duty to use only

proportional force, the duty to afford humane treatment, and the duty
not to “persecute” based on religion, political views, or ethnicity. These
duties, however, apply only in “armed conflicts,” and the prohibitions
against “crimes against humanity” only apply when there is a widespread
and systematic attack on a civilian population.
The ICTY decision in the Limaj case was the first judicial appli-
cation of ICL to the KLA. It thus is important as a foundation for the
prosecutions, most prominently that of Haradinaj, that followed. The
Limaj court took the first step toward adapting the law of war to uncon-
ventional warfare. It implicitly recognized that insurgents are burdened
asymmetrically by traditional interpretations of ICL. It struggled with
the threshold jurisdictional criteria of “armed conflict” and “attack on a
civilian population,” and contended also with application of the discrimi-
nation, proportionality, and persecution concepts in the KLA insurgency
context.
On the central jurisdictional issue, the Limaj defense took the posi-
tion that as late as the midsummer of 1998, armed conflict did not exist
in Kosovo; it argued rather that KLA activities were disorganized and
uncoordinated banditry, isolated fighting, or terrorism. Such a charac-
terization would divest the ICTY of jurisdiction over conduct occurring
during that period and would immunize the defendants from liability
under ICL. The ICTY found that the KLA was sufficiently organized, and
the intensity of the fighting in Kosovo was such that an armed conflict
existed no later than the end of May 1998.8 On the other jurisdictional
issue, however, the same court found that the KLA had not engaged in
a widespread and systematic attack on civilians and, thus, negated the
charges of crimes against humanity. Finding that “[t]he evidence does not
establish, or even indicate, a general policy of targeting civilians as such,
whether Serbian or Kosovo Albanian,” the Limaj court ruled that “The
individuals who were abducted and then detained were singled out as
individuals because of their suspected or known connection with, or acts
of collaboration with, Serbian authorities—and not because they were
members of a general population against which an attack was directed
by the KLA.”9
Another problem confronting the ICTY in the KLA cases was the
possibility of convicting military or political leaders for the acts of others.
ICL as developed by the ICTY permitted KLA commanders and soldiers to
be sent to jail for acts committed by others, as it had permitted Milosevic
to be accused of violations of ICL for orchestrating Serb activities in
Kosovo and Bosnia. Under the jurisprudence of the ICTY, not only are
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 170 6/4/08 1:50:36 PM

individuals criminally liable for their own acts violating ICL; they are
liable for the acts of others if they had “command responsibility” or were
participants in a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE). Command responsibil-
ity obliges commanders to prevent or punish violations of ICL by those
operating under their authority. JCE is akin to conspiracy, which allows
all those taking part in a common scheme to be punished for violations
of ICL, even those who only planned or aided the direct perpetrators.
Both doctrines of vicarious liability are problematic in the insurgency
context. For example, when commanders of guerrilla insurgencies like
the KLA are prosecuted for violating ICL, the elements of command re-
sponsibility may be difficult to establish. Most insurgencies, including
the KLA, are not as well organized as conventional armies. Some sol-
diers obey orders; some do not. Everyone is a volunteer, and comes and
goes, moving between combatant and noncombatant status. Command
and control often are weak or lacking altogether. Also, the territories for
which insurgents are responsible or have effective control usually are ill
defined and change as the relative fortunes of the insurgents shift during
the conflict. This creates difficulties in defining the boundaries of the
command-responsibility theory.
Confronted with proof problems of this sort with respect to the KLA,
the ICTY prosecutor shifted to JCE for the high-profile prosecutions of
KLA leaders. JCE made it easier to send KLA fighters to jail for the acts of
others. The shift occurred in midstream in the Limaj case,10 and was the
keystone of the Haradinaj prosecution. Under JCE the prosecutor need
not prove authority, effective command and control, or even knowledge
of the conduct by another. Instead the prosecutor need only prove a com-
mon criminal plan, define its membership, prove participation by the
defendant,11 specify the act directly violating ICL, and prove that it both
was done by a member and was either within the purpose of the plan or
a foreseeable consequence. JCE bears strong resemblance to the crime of
conspiracy under federal law in the United States. Under both theories,
a defendant may be convicted either for acts of coconspirators that were
consistent with the purpose and design of the conspiracy-criminal enter-
prise or for conduct that was merely foreseeable.12 The ICTY prosecutor
alleged JCE as though the entire KLA was a “criminal enterprise.” Under
this theory, mere participation in the KLA would be a war crime.
For example, the first part of the Haradinaj indictment, alleging that
the purpose of the JCE was the “consolidation of total control” over
Dukagjini,13 involved a military objective and not a criminal objective,
unless one believes that the KLA was per se illegal. The prosecution
favors such breadth because only such a JCE theory would permit it to
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 171 6/4/08 1:50:36 PM

convict Haradinaj based on such allegations as “Groups of KLA soldiers

repeatedly punched and kicked Novak Stijovic and Stanisa Radosevic all
over their bodies, causing them suffering,”14 or “KLA soldiers under the
command of Ramush Haradinaj were reported to have [abducted victims
whose bodies were later discovered].”15
In the Limaj case, the ICTY limited JCE liability by scrutinizing ex-
ceptionally broad JCE purposes alleged by the prosecution, commenting
on the breadth of the alleged JCE: “The JCE itself is alleged very broadly
[yet] no direct evidence . . . establish[es] either the existence or the scope
of the alleged criminal enterprise. At the most, there is a possibility of
inferring . . . that there was a design or plan by someone or some group,
probably in the KLA, to detain a number of individuals.”16 The breadth
of the alleged JCE created the risk that unknown persons with only tenu-
ous links to the accused participants could be included as participants in
the JCE,17 and that the named defendants could be sent to prison based
on the acts of these unknown and unspecified individuals. It would be
enough, in the prosecutor’s view, for the prosecution to demonstrate that
“persons unknown but affiliated with the KLA” abused or killed civilians.
The ICTY trial chamber rejected such an approach, finding insufficient
evidence to support the existence of the alleged JCE.
The problems exposed by the Limaj and Haradinaj prosecutions in
adapting ICL, designed for conventional state-based wars, to fit guerrilla
insurgencies suggest the need for a serious effort to rethink ICL doctrines.
Such a reshaping of law is necessary because the traditional norms of
international armed conflict do not fit the practical realities either of in-
surgent forces or of regime forces trying to quell insurgencies. This book
is not a suitable vehicle for articulating the specifics of reform. The KLA
insurgency does, however, permit identification of issues that deserve at-
tention. First, a more rigorous approach is desirable for the closely related
doctrines of command responsibility and JCE. Second, the obligations of
participants to afford due process to detainees should be clarified when
institutions are in a state of flux. Third, and far more difficult, is the
question of who constitutes a legitimate target of violence.
Liability for the Conduct of Others

The Limaj judgment is a significant step in the right direction toward
reforming the jurisprudence of the ICTY related to liability for the con-
duct of others. Finding no widespread, systematic attack on the civil-
ian population by the KLA, the trial chamber was unwilling to convict
based on vague and broad allegations of JCE, and further said that JCE
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 172 6/4/08 1:50:36 PM

should not be construed to allow an entire insurgency—or one of its

regions—to constitute the enterprise. To do so would make the objective
of effectuating military control “criminal,” and expose to prison terms
any member of an insurgency guerrilla force (however “membership”
should be defined). One must be cautious, however, in believing that
the Limaj judgment settles the matter, for the court’s conclusions were
based more on evaluation of the evidence in the specific case than on
broad pronouncements about the law. The outcome well may be differ-
ent in the Haradinaj case.
The JCE doctrine must be tightened not only by requiring that the
members of the alleged enterprise be specified narrowly, but also by
drawing appropriate distinctions between purpose and effect. Careful at-
tention must be paid to the establishment of the requisite mental state
for the specific crime charged. One of the author’s former students, Jacob
A. Ramer, has offered a careful analysis of ICTY jurisprudence that sup-
ports the argument that the broader categories of JCE are inappropriate
for specific intent crimes such as persecution.18
A reformed JCE doctrine can draw on ICL’s proportionality rules,
which require a relationship between the purpose of a military initiative
and its effect. The foreseeability doctrine in JCE draws a similar distinc-
tion between purpose and effect, in the sense that it distinguishes be-
tween the purpose of the JCE and the foreseeable consequences (effects) of
its existence. In crafting and reforming these doctrines for the insurgency
context, one must be careful not to extend the scope of liability based on
foreseeability too broadly. In any war, it is foreseeable that soldiers may
occasionally go on a rampage and abuse civilians. This is especially true
when guerrilla strategists, as they did in the Dukagjini region of Kosovo,
elect to arm all the civilians so they can defend themselves against re-
gime attacks. The command responsibility doctrine appropriately cuts
off liability for commanders when, having learned about such rampages,
they take appropriate remedial and preventive action. As the JCE doctrine
was originally framed, however, remedial action does not cut off liability
for conduct that is not planned but is merely foreseeable.
International criminal law should not make insurgent soldiers or
officers responsible for conduct that is merely foreseeable in this sense,
once an insurgency is put in motion. Rather, the law should insist upon
a higher level of scienter (impermissible mental state) before inflicting
punishment. If the commander of an insurgent guerrilla force selects a
trusted subordinate and asks him to organize a special unit and lynch
people of the opposing ethnic group, that clearly should be within any
reasonable JCE doctrine because it is part of an explicit purpose of an
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 173 6/4/08 1:50:36 PM

enterprise smaller in scope than is the overall insurgency. Likewise, if

the commander or another de facto authority figure with moral authority
recruits one of his closest confidants and asks him to select a few good
men to go out and “make the Serbs leave, and I don’t care how you do it,”
that also should be culpable under JCE because whatever the special unit
does is surely foreseeable and more or less obviously within the scope
of the plan. The defendant should not be allowed to escape liability by
protesting, “I only meant for him to beat people up and break windows
of their houses and not to kill anyone.”
On the other hand, if a guerrilla leader does his best under adverse
conditions to establish an organization and a command structure and,
in the course of others’ executing his plan, some of the units or some
individual participants are uninhibited in the levels of violence they use
or in the targets they pick, it surely is foreseeable in some factual sense.
The level of pent-up rage almost certain to exist in the general popula-
tion in order for an insurgency to take root makes individual brutality
foreseeable, especially because of the level of disorganization and lack of
military discipline in the early stages of any insurgency. It surely is also
foreseeable that a disorganized, poorly disciplined army is more likely to
engage in atrocities against civilians than a well-organized, well-trained,
and highly disciplined one. Yet it is unsettling to have an international
criminal law structure that subjects to individual criminal liability com-
manders who are doing their best to overcome disorganization and ill
discipline, and yet fail to do the impossible.
Due Process
Many accusations against KLA fighters involved detention. International
criminal law does not prohibit detention unless persecution is involved;
it only requires that persons detained be the subject of reasonable suspi-
cion, be afforded some sort of due process, and be free from cruel treat-
ment and torture. What process is due depends on whether the detainee
is accused of a crime against municipal or martial law, or whether he
is accused simply of being a threat to the insurgency because he is a
collaborator with the other side. Further, the Geneva Conventions pro-
hibit the passing of sentences on prisoners, once detained, without first
granting them a trial held by a legitimate court. This is an obligation
impracticable for an insurgent group that, likely, is lacking the expertise
to set up judicial institutions. On the other hand, simplified procedures
for adjudicating claims that one detained is a combatant or is not in fact
a combatant, because of mistaken identity or other reasons, should be
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feasible in any circumstance when the insurgents have even the rudi-
ments of a military organization. Similarly, most insurgencies have the
capacity to make some kind of formal determination about whether a
detainee has violated municipal or martial law. For example, the Limaj
court found that the KLA in the Drenica Zone had some mechanism for
distinguishing individuals it identified as collaborators, because it let
some detainees go.19
Targets
The most difficult reform challenge involves defining legitimate tar-
gets in an armed conflict involving insurgency. The core problem is
distinguishing “participants” in an armed conflict (legitimate targets)
from “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” (not legitimate
targets). The most fundamental obligation imposed by ICL is the duty to
discriminate (sometimes called the principle of distinction): the duty to
target only participants (combatants) and not to target nonparticipants
(noncombatants or civilians). Closely associated with this obligation is
the obligation to use only proportional force against participants so as to
minimize harm to nonparticipants. This is the duty of proportionality.
Traditional ICL doctrines limited the class of participant to three basic
subclasses: members of the opposing armed forces; members of mili-
tias and volunteer resistance movements, but only so long as they are
subject to formal command, use a fixed distinctive sign such as flags or
uniforms, carry arms openly, and are capable of operating in accordance
with the law of armed conflict; and those who, while incapable of forming
regular armed units, spontaneously take up arms, “provided they carry
arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”20 Guerrillas not
engaged in actual fighting, the population sheltering and supplying guer-
rillas, regime police and intelligence operatives, and regime collabora-
tors all fall outside this definition. Literal application of this definition
of legitimate targets is at odds with standard anti-insurgency practice
and fails entirely to accommodate the tactics universally embraced by
guerrilla insurgents.
When the law is turned against insurgents, it should draw sharper
and more useful distinctions between narrowly focused guerrilla tactics
incident to an insurgency and indiscriminate terrorist attacks on civil-
ians, especially those occurring outside the territory of the regime the
insurgency opposes. Additional steps must be taken to interpret custom-
ary international law, according to relevant “state” practice both by states
opposing insurgencies and by guerrillas, instead of looking only at state
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practice against guerrillas. It would be fruitful in this regard to conduct

a principled analysis of past insurgencies in order to catalog practices
that have generally been found to be acceptable, and to isolate practices
that have generally been considered excessive and out of bounds with
international norms.21
Defining “nonparticipants” is much more difficult in a guerrilla
insurgency than in a conventional war. Guerrillas do not separate them-
selves from the civilian population as regular armies do. Their opponents
include police, intelligence services, and spies and collaborators, as well
as members of uniformed armed services of the regime. Defining the
universe of noncombatants protected by ICL from deliberate regime or
insurgent attacks may be the most vexing challenge in adapting ICL to
guerrilla insurgencies. In Limaj the ICTY, while declining to accept the
defense argument that collaborators did not qualify as civilians,22 held
open the possibility that evidence in another case might disqualify at
least some collaborators from such status.23
In any conflict subject to ICL, the legitimacy of a target should de-
pend on the threat posed by the target. Indeed the Geneva Conventions
disqualify for treatment as a nonparticipant any individual who “is defi-
nitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the activities of the
State”24 (or, by implication, hostile to the activities of an insurgent group).
Whether police forces are legitimate targets depends on the nature of the
threat they pose to insurgents. As part of a repressive regime enforcing
oppressive policies, the police are often indistinguishable from regular
soldiers walking through the streets and maintaining martial law. The
MUP special police in Kosovo fell into this category. In such circum-
stances, the police were legitimate targets because of the threat they
posed. Moreover, a spy or collaborator may pose a greater threat to in-
surgents than a regular regime soldier does, because insurgencies depend
upon maintaining secrecy of identity and movement to a much greater
extent than do regular forces. Under this model, any civilian who provides
assistance to regime forces, including paramilitaries, toward identifying
KLA members or leaders, or finding their locations, or disclosing their
armaments or manpower, has participated in armed conflict and may
qualify as a legitimate target of force by the KLA, either to prevent him
or her from helping regime forces on the spot or, afterward, to prevent
him or her from doing it again. KLA targeting policy reflected this reality.
The Limaj court accepted evidence of a KLA policy to target perceived
Kosovar Albanian “collaborators who were believed to be or suspected
of associating with Serbian authorities and interests.”25
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The range of measures that an insurgency may use against those

perceived as threatening insurgency objectives is large, and ranges from
brief detention to assassination. Merely qualifying a potential target as
a threat does not answer the question about what can be done to him.
One is privileged by ICL to use only that amount of force “proportional
to the military objective.” The key idea is proportionality, which can
be used to calibrate the amount of justifiable force under the duty to
discriminate, depending on the magnitude of the threat.
Several approaches to reform are conceivable. One possibility is that
some of the elements of just war should influence the application of ICL
to insurgencies. The central value expressed in ICL protects the weak
from the strong—and there is nothing stronger than a state-sponsored
army or special police force. According to this view, ICL should impose
duties only on regimes and their coercive instruments, because they
reflect the strength of the state. Ordinary citizens engaged in an upris-
ing against a foreign occupier should be able to use violence against the
regime (once the threshold of “armed conflict” has been reached). The
actor is weak with respect to the regime, and ICL should not weaken
him further. There is some support in the reasoning of the Limaj court
for this way of thinking about ICL as applied to insurgencies. There the
ICTY contrasted the power of state actors with the power of insurgency
groups possessing fewer resources and exercising more tenuous control
over their fighters.26
A second approach, developed by Andrew T. Strong (the author’s for-
mer student and later a paralegal on the Haradinaj defense team), would
make the duty to discriminate and the duty of proportionality depend
upon indices both of regime brutality and of the availability of peaceful
channels to register grievances over regime policies and practices.27 Thus
a KLA soldier would be allowed to do some things in Kosovo that he
could not do in Sweden—attack a police commander, for example. The
duty to discriminate would remain under both the threat and brutality
approaches; the only thing that would change would be the position of
the line dividing legitimate targets from illegitimate ones.
Redefining legitimate targets in an insurgency is riven with problems.
“Collaborator” is an inherently amorphous concept. Allowing guerrillas
to target an ordinary citizen for mere cooperation with the regular police
is instinctively unappealing, as is allowing regimes to target a neighbor
who provides refuge to a young guerrilla fighter.
Also, “what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.” Expanding
the class of actors that an insurgency is privileged to target also expands
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the class of actors counterinsurgency forces may target. If insurgents may

target collaborators with the regime, the regime may target collaborators
with the insurgency. Before long, expansion of the class of legitimate
targets creates a privilege for ethnic cleansing.
Even if one accepts the logic of broadening the category of legitimate
targets, one still must acknowledge its limitations. The privilege of deadly
force depends upon the imminence of the threat. Unless there is a rea-
sonable basis for believing that a released collaborator or spy would do
something that immediately threatens a combatant with grave injury or
death, application of deadly force against the former detainee would be
excessive. Deadly force is only proportional if both the conduct by the
former detainee is immediate and the conduct imminently jeopardizes
the lives of the combatants. Further, this analysis would not justify abuse
of detainees while they are in detention. Arbitrary confinement would
remain illegal, as would confinement based on ethnicity, and would con-
stitute the separate crime of “persecution.”
A number of the more recent ICTY cases, and the Limaj case in
particular, are encouraging. They show that the ICTY is capable of shed-
ding some of its earlier orientation toward prosecution and giving greater
weight to criminal law’s traditional concern for the rights of defendants.
The Limaj judgment was upheld on appeal, but it may not be applied
appropriately in other pending cases, such as the one against Ramush
Haradinaj. Moreover, the inherently political nature of an institution
like the ICTY, with its especially political prosecutor’s office, leaves the
field wide open to political prosecutions, as when Lord Owen expressed
to Cherif Bassouni (a DePaul University law professor who conducted
investigations that laid the foundation for early ICTY prosecutions) a
near directive that Bassouni falsify his investigation to get exactly the
same number of Serb, Croat, and Bosniak victims. It is not much of a
step from there to conclude that the ICTY prosecutor believed it neces-
sary to have the same number of KLA commanders in the dock at The
Hague as it did of Serb officials or of paramilitary agents, regardless of
what they did or of the relative magnitude of KLA violations of ICL.
Insurgencies, of course, always will be “illegal” under the law of
the regime against which they fight. But that does not mean that inter-
national law should always back up the regime retroactively by being
available to prosecute insurgents after they have won. Insurgencies will
occur regardless of what international law says, and it is always better for
law to fit rather than to be at odds with reality. The U.S. “War on Terror-
ism” should not become a war against nationalism. If it does, and if ICL
is marshaled as a weapon against nationalist aspirations, both the War
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 178 6/4/08 1:50:37 PM

on Terrorism and ICL will lose credibility. Moreover, when law matches
reality in most respects, it is likely to have more effect in regulating be-
havior. If it is illegal to give out leaflets, a dissident may as well give out
AK-47s. If a guerrilla soldier has committed a war crime the first time he
shoots at a special police commando, he does not increase his liability
much by pursuing his tactical instincts entirely without regard to ICL.
If the rules are out of line with reality, they do not qualify as rules in the
first place and will, in any event, have little effect.28 The same thing is
true with respect to the application of ICL to counterinsurgency forces. A
major effort to explore alternative formulations of ICL in the insurgency
context for both sides to such conflicts is appropriate.
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i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 180 6/4/08 1:50:37 PM
12 Conclusion
As this story of the Kosovo Liberation Army concludes and the

international community works with Kosovar Albanian political leaders
to chart Kosovo’s entry into the community as an independent state, the
KLA insurgency invites reconsideration of the realities of insurgency in
the twenty-first century, including careful reflection on the context for
the KLA’s success.
One reality that is often ignored after the attacks of September 11,
2001, is that nationalism is a more powerful engine of insurgency than
religion. Long-standing foreign occupation creates a spirit of defiance and
strengthens cultures of resistance, which provide a local political context
for an insurgency to take root. Religious difference between insurgent
and occupier can magnify the will to resist, as it did in Ireland in the
early part of the twentieth century. But nationalism was the fundamental
engine driving Irish calls for independence from British rule, as it was for
those of the Kosovar Albanians who supported the KLA.
The KLA demonstrated that an insurgency can get started and solidly
implanted on a shoestring with only a hundred or so active fighters. While
it is hard for a completely decentralized insurgency to make progress, it is
also almost impossible to stamp out altogether when it has local popular
support. The KLA withstood repeated attempts by a sophisticated regime
that used all the tools of a police state toward its annihilation. Though it
did not flourish until external events such as the collapse of the Albanian
state and the Holbrooke-Milosevic cease fire gave it breathing space, the
KLA would have continued no matter what Milosevic did.
181
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Counterinsurgency efforts fuel insurgency unless a regime is both

adroit and lucky. If the experience in Kosovo shows anything, it shows
how counterinsurgency efforts may and do backfire. But for the Jashari
Massacre, the KLA would have remained small. The massacre electrified
the youth of Kosovo and the Diaspora and flooded the small, fledgling
organization with recruits. Attacks on the civilian population, morphing
into comprehensive ethnic cleansing, reinforced the KLA’s consistent
message that the Kosovar Albanians had to fight back. Milosevic made
it impossible for the mass of Kosovar Albanians to sit on the fence.
Every war is now a world war. No more can a regime snuff out political
insurgents or argue that suppressing “bandits” and “terrorists” is a purely
local matter. Milosevic consistently invoked his sovereign prerogatives
to deal with the KLA insurgency in his own way. He could not, however,
hide the brutality of his methods, which further inflamed mass opinion
in western Europe and North America, which had already tilted against
him because of what he had done in Croatia and Bosnia. At the same time,
every insurgency must win a global war for hearts and minds if it is to
succeed locally. The KLA was careful to avoid conduct that would rein-
force accusations that it was a terrorist group or a Muslim fundamentalist
vanguard. It worked tirelessly to expose the Milosevic regime’s human
rights abuses in a way that resonated with influential human rights ad-
vocates. Counterinsurgency excesses and insurgent moderation together
strengthened both domestic and international support for the KLA.
If Milosevic had just left the KLA alone he probably would have been
better off. He could have continued to pick off commanders and orga-
nizers when he had the opportunity, and deepened his penetration of an
expanding KLA with minimum fuss. The reality was that Milosevic had
more on his mind than counterinsurgency—he wanted a Kosovo free of
Albanians, and not only free of the KLA. Ethnic cleansing was his over-
arching strategic goal, and the world community was right to stop it.
International intervention in Kosovo made success possible for the
KLA decades sooner than early KLA organizers had initially expected.
Peacekeepers (civilian monitors) in 1998 gave the KLA breathing space to
organize and then recover from damage inflicted by Serb forces. Without
NATO intervention, the KLA would not have won in a military sense,
and it would have taken years—maybe decades—to wear down Serbia’s
will to continue its occupation. Terrorism directed at civilian targets
might have developed as a KLA weapon of last resort; in any event, the
KLA was not going to go away.
Whether the world stands with or against future insurgencies will
depend upon the adroitness of the insurgency and the dexterity of the
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Conclusion 183
regime in shaping international perception. But it also will depend on

how geopolitical factors align. In the case of Kosovo, Milosevic-dominated
Serbian political capital was at a nadir, and Russia, its historic great-power
supporter, was weak, poorly led, and was backing away. As the interna-
tional community developed the will to intervene, the geopolitical path-
way for intervention was clear. Other sites of unrest—Chechnya, Tibet,
Turkey’s Kurdish region, Venezuela—present starkly different geopolitical
realities. To the extent that Kosovo was within any one sphere of influ-
ence, it was within NATO’s. Moreover, the plausibility of a self-determi-
nation argument for Kosovar Albanians was especially strong given the
near-complete breakup of Yugoslavia, and the already independent status
granted to other Yugoslav nationalities. Any bandwagon risk was low
because Kosovo came last rather than first when Yugoslavia imploded.
The Kosovo conflict intensified at a time when several currents of
revisionist thinking about international relations and international law
converged in the KLA’s favor. American-led coalition victories in the first
Iraq war, and NATO’s success in nudging the Bosnian conflict toward a po-
litical settlement with minimal application of force, produced optimism
about what a limited application of military force by the international
community could achieve in pacifying internal armed conflicts. The legal
notion that intervention could be justified on human rights grounds was
at its high-water mark. The difficulties and frustrations of nation build-
ing and democratization in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq lay in the future.
The United States and its allies were experimenting with doctrines that
might replace the cold war paradigms of security strategy. Human rights
intervention and nation building were attractive candidates, and Kosovo
seemed an ideal laboratory in which to try them out.
The years 1998 and 1999 were the perfect windows of opportunity for
the KLA. Two years later, reaction to the attacks of September 11 would
have posed far more difficulties for America and others to support an
insurgency that could be characterized as either “Muslim” or “terrorist”
(or, in the case of Kosovo, both). Four years later, the United States would
have been unwilling to be distracted from its military involvement in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Six years later, U.S.-led interventions would have
been discredited because of the difficulties in Iraq. Five years earlier,
the KLA would have lacked freedom of action to move arms through
the Republic of Albania, the Kosovar Albanian population would have
still been in the thrall of Rugova’s pacifism, and the muddled timidity
of European and American reaction to the initial events following the
breakup of Yugoslavia would have discouraged bold action in Kosovo.
Politics is the art of the possible and the science of timing. The Kosovo
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 183 6/4/08 1:50:38 PM

Liberation Army’s art was believing against all odds that armed resistance
could succeed in Kosovo. Its science was commencing armed resistance
to build public support instead of the other way around, and persever-
ing even when its strategy was inchoate by probing for opportunities as
events unfolded.
The conflicts and tensions engendered by the buildup of an insur-
gency do not disappear after a conflict is over. The most influential and
effective leaders in postconflict politics will usually be the leaders of the
armed conflict who went before, as was the case in Kosovo. International
reluctance to embrace them as the architects of a new political order ex-
acerbates preexisting internal tensions that are certain to be associated
with any insurgency, as the counterparts of the Peaceful Path Institu-
tionalists, the Planners in Exile, and the Defenders at Home discovered
in their struggles to chart the path of nationalist resistance. The leaders
of a recent insurgency will not fade away, and refusal to deal with them
stymies political, economic, and legal progress, even if it does not cause
armed conflict to break out again. In the case of Kosovo the international
community was wise to incorporate major parts of the KLA into such
new institutions as the Kosovo Police Service and the Kosovo Protection
Corps. UNMIK’s ambivalence about dealing with Thaçi’s PDK rather
than Rugova’s LDK, however, deprived it of an opportunity to demon-
strate early success in nation building, and undermined international
legitimacy with the local population.
International criminal law makes little difference during a conflict,
and makes postwar nation building more difficult. International law
did not make much difference in the KLA’s evolution or in Milosevic’s
response. It did not nip the KLA in the bud, it did not provide useful
guidance for international intervention, it did not restrain Milosevic
from ethnic cleansing and other depredations aimed at the civilian popu-
lation. It did not determine KLA strategies. Prosecution of KLA leaders
after the war, even as major architects of much greater Serb depredations
escaped apprehension, undercut popular support for international ef-
forts to build democracy and a rule of law in Kosovo. The prosecutions
removed, at least temporarily, much-needed political leadership and, in
the world press and in some diplomatic circles, continued to undermine
the credibility of a number of the most effective postwar political lead-
ers. International law probably will not have much more effect in the
future unless it is fundamentally reformed to match reality. The content
of international criminal law needs to be rethought if it is to have any
legitimacy in shaping—or preventing—future armed conflict associated
with insurgencies.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 184 6/4/08 1:50:38 PM

acronyms and
organization names
4GW Fourth Generation War; a type of armed conflict in

which guerrilla techniques are used to build political
support for an insurgency, within local populations and
internationally
AAK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo; formed by Ramush
Haradinaj; competitor of the PDK for KLA adherents
AK-47 Popular automatic weapon; the principal weapon of KLA
fighters; also known as a Kalishnikov, after its Russian
inventor
CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; the principal agency
of the United States government responsible for
collection and analysis of foreign intelligence and for
clandestine operations in support of U.S. policy
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe; later
OSCE
Defenders Kosovar Albanian resistance fighters who initially
at Home defended themselves against Serb security forces and
then became the organizers of armed attacks against
police and collaborators within Kosovo; one of the two
components of the KLA
ECMM European Commission Monitoring Mission; abortive EU
effort to monitor early developments in Kosovo
ETA Spanish Basque guerrilla and terrorist group
EU European Union
FARK Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo; military group
formed by Peaceful Path Institutionalists to compete
with the KLA
General Staff Executive Committee of the Planners in Exile, through
which they tried to give support and direction to KLA
185
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186 Acronyms and Organization Names
commanders on the ground; eventually expanded to

include KLA zone commanders
Government A collection of Kosovar Albanian leaders formed in 1991
in Exile to resist Serb oppression in Kosovo from outside
Kosovo; centered in Germany and led by Prime
Minister Bujar Bukoshi
Homeland The most prominent vehicle for raising money for the
Calls KLA; competed with Three-Percent Fund for Diaspora
contributions
ICL International Criminal Law; a synthesis of International
Humanitarian Law potentially resulting in criminal
liability for individuals violating the international law
of armed conflict
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, often referred to as “The Hague,” or
“the Hague Tribunal”; court established by the UN
Security Council to try persons accused of violations
of international criminal law on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia
IRA Irish Republican Army; Irish nationalist guerrilla
force organized after Easter Uprising against British
occupation of Ireland in 1916
JCE Joint Criminal Enterprise; ICL theory used by ICTY to
impose criminal liability on KLA fighters and com-
manders for conduct of others associated with them
KCC Kosovo Crisis Center
KDOM Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission; force of inter-
national civilian monitors introduced in Kosovo in
mid-1998 to monitor activities of Serb forces and KLA
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army (see UÇK)
Kosovo Action Internet-based e-mail and Web channel for disseminating
Network information about Serb human rights abuses in Kosovo
Kosovo Crisis Internet-based e-mail and Web channel for disseminating
Center information about Serb human rights abuses in Kosovo
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE); force of
international civilian monitors, introduced in Kosovo
to oversee the October 1998 Holbrooke-Milosevic
cease fire
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Acronyms and Organization Names 187
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo; successor to the Kosovo

branch of the Yugoslav Communist League and the
Socialist Association of Working People; principal
Kosovar Albanian political party during the Milosevic
regime; core of the Peaceful Path Institutionalists; led
by Ibrahim Rugova
Lehi Jewish guerrilla and terrorist group, organized to resist
British occupation of Palestine in the late 1940s
LKÇK National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo;
breakaway from LPRK/LPK and, for a time, competitor
of the KLA in organizing armed resistance in Kosovo;
placed higher priority than KLA on organizing mass
demonstrations as a way of building popular support
for Kosovar independence; later merged with the KLA
LPK Lëvizja Popullore e Kosoves; Popular League for Kosovo;
successor to the LPRK as a militant Marxist-Leninist
movement seeking to organize guerrilla resistance in
Kosovo; organizer of the KLA
LPRK Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo; Marxist-
Leninist group centered in Germany and Switzerland
that began work in the early 1980s to organize guerrilla
resistance to Serb control of Kosovo
MUP Serb Ministry of the Interior
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization; led the military
attack on Serb forces in Kosovo and in Serbia proper in
1999
NGO Nongovernmental organization; a type of private public-
interest organization, usually focused on ameliorating
humanitarian crises, exposing human rights abuses, or
assisting with democratization and establishment of
rule of law
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;
international governmental organization responsible
for monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo and for
shepherding political development, rule of law, and
democratization
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo; organized by Hashim Thaçi
after the conflict; principal KLA party until Ramush
Haradinaj formed the AAK
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188 Acronyms and Organization Names
Peaceful Path Members of the Kosovar Albanian political elite,

Institutionalists anchored in the LDK, who resisted the KLA and
embraced Rugova’s claim that Kosovo could be freed
without violence
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government; Kosovar
parliament, government, and presidency, established
pursuant to UNMIK regulation and legitimated by
national and municipal elections in Kosovo
Planners Kosovar Albanian resistance fighters and planners who,
in Exile clustered initially around the LPRK/LPK, worked
outside Kosovo, mostly in Switzerland and Germany,
and then in the Republic of Albania to plan and
support an insurgency inside Kosovo; organized the
KLA and drew the Defenders at Home into it
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization; guerrilla and
terrorist group organized to resist Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territories
SDB Sluzba Drzavne Besbednosti; Serb intelligence service
Sigurimi Intelligence service of the Republic of Albania
Three-Percent The treasury of the Peaceful Path Institutionalists;
Fund formed to finance operations of parallel Albanian
institutions in Kosovo and of the Government in
Exile; consistently rebuffed KLA requests for financial
support until late in the war
UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës; Albanian name for KLA
UDB Uprava Drzavne Besbednosti; Yugoslav intelligence
service
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees,
responsible for dealing with the refugee crisis as
Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo accelerated
UNMIK United Nations interim administrative Mission in
Kosovo; civil administration of Kosovo, organized
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and
exercising most sovereign powers in Kosovo beginning
in June 1999
VJ Yugoslav Army; also used to refer to army of Serbia
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roster of key individuals
Afrim Ademi Youngster who wished he had fought with KLA;

later, a devoted assistant to Ramush Haradinaj
Fehmi Agani Leader of theoretical wing of LDK; assassinated by
Serbs
Ali Ahmeti Member of KLA General Staff
Ramiz Alia Socialist Party leader of Republic of Albania after
Hoxha died; sympathetic to KLA
Louise Arbour ICTY prosecutor
Arkan Zeljko Raznatovic; leader of Serb paramilitary
forces in Kosovo
Dino Asanaj U.S. political adviser and lobbyist for KLA and PDK
Arxhient Bajraktari KLA fighter in Drenica
Harry Bajraktari U.S. businessman and lobbyist for Kosovar
Albanians; organizer and fund raiser for LDK
Besim Beqaj Economic adviser to Prime Minister Bajram
Rexhepi and PDK leader
Sandy Berger National security adviser to President Clinton
Kolë Berisha Became speaker of Kosovo Assembly in 2006
Sali Berisha President of Albania; adherent of LDK and
opponent of KLA
Kurt Bexheti KLA fund raiser in Chicago
Tony Blair Prime minister of Great Britain from 1997 until
2007
Luftar Braha KLA soldier in Dukagjini
Josip Broz See Tito
Bujar Bukoshi Prime minister of Government in Exile; organizer
of Three-Percent Fund; resisted KLA demands
for money; organized FARK
189
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190 Key Individuals
Greg Campbell Freelance reporter

Agim Çeku Last KLA chief of staff; became prime minister of
PISG in 2006
Wesley Clark NATO commander during NATO intervention in
Kosovo
Michael Collins Organizer of IRA
Nexhat Daci LDK speaker of PISG Assembly; deposed in 2006
Adem Demaçi Kosovar Albanian political prisoner and resistance
hero; political spokesperson for KLA; opposed
KLA participation in Rambouillet Conference
Gani Demaj KLA fighter
Freddie Myzafer Mehmeti; leader of KLA fund raising in
Chicago
Dritton Gashi KLA soldier; trained in Drenica and Pashtrik;
fought for Remi
Jusuf Gërvalla Early Kosovar Albanian nationalist; assassinated in
Germany in 1982
Agim Gjinali Swiss fund raiser and contributor to KLA
Luigj Gjokaj Headed KLA fund raising in Detroit
Dritan Gjonbalaj KLA fighter
David Grange U.S. Army major general responsible, as
commander of the First Infantry Division of the
U.S. Army, for planning possible NATO ground
invasion of Kosovo
Lirim Greiçevci Youngster who organized earliest access by
Western press to civilian displaced persons in
Kosovo; later assistant to Hashim Thaçi
Professor Zejnullah Gruda University of Prishtina law professor who
instructed KLA trainees on law of war
Che Guevara Cuban guerrilla fighter and theorist
Xhavit Haliti Leader of Planners in Exile; controlled Homeland
Calls Fund; member of KLA General Staff
Ramush Haradinaj KLA zone commander in Dukagjini; later prime
minister of PISG; indicted by ICTY
Nait Hasani KLA leader who moved around Kosovo, tying to-
gether Planners in Exile with Defenders at Home
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 190 6/4/08 1:50:39 PM

Key Individuals 191
Richard Holbrooke U.S. ambassador who mediated Dayton Accords

and brokered October 1998 cease fire in Kosovo
Mensur Hoti KLA commander in Llapi
Enver Hoxha Dictator of Communist regime in Albania
Adem Jashari Early organizer of armed resistance in Drenica
regarded by many as the “father of the KLA”;
killed in Serb attack on his family compound in
March 1998
Fatos Klosi Head of Albanian intelligence service who helped
move weapons for KLA through Albania
Bajram Kosumi Designated by Ramush Haradinaj to succeed him
as prime minister of PISG; deposed by Haradinaj
in 2006
Jakup Krasniqi Public spokesman for KLA; former LDK regional
president who surreptitiously organized for KLA
Safet Krasniqi KLA soldier in Drenica
Hajredin Kuqi Confidant of Hashim Thaçi; law professor at
University of Prishtina; member of PDK
presidency
Albin Kurti Wartime spokesperson for KLA; political prisoner;
organizer of “Self Determination!” (Vetë-
vendosje)
Liridon Ladifi Youngster in Gjilane who was never tempted to
join KLA
General Kulusi Lama Albanian Army general who facilitated movement
of KLA arms through Albania
Fatmir Limaj KLA commander in Drenica; acquitted of war
crimes charged by ICTY; leader of PDK
Arben Limani Youngster whose family was expelled to
Macedonia during ethnic cleansing campaign
Sami Lushtaku KLA commander in Drenica
Gjok Martini Organizer of Albanian Americans in Detroit
Myzafer Mehmeti “Freddie”; leader of KLA fund raising in Chicago
Slobodan Milosevic Serbian strongman; orchestrated wars in Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo
Valon Murati Leader of LKÇK; KLA soldier
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192 Key Individuals
Rrustem Mustafa (“Commander Remi”) Commander of KLA in Llapi

Zone; sentenced for war crimes; conviction
reversed on appeal
Fatos Nano Socialist Party prime minister of Albania;
supporter of KLA
William L. Nash Retired U.S. Army major general; UNMIK
administrator in Kosovo
Zahir Pajaziti Early organizer of armed resistance in Llapi
Ajet Potera KLA commander in Dukagjini and then in Llapi
Fahri Rama Youngster who joined KLA in Llapi
Aleksandar Rankovic Yugoslav minister of interior who organized
repression of Kosovar Albanians from 1947 to
1966
Commander Remi Rrustem Mustafa; KLA zone commander in Llapi
Bajram Rexhepi Physician who organized medical care for KLA and
served as PDK prime minister
Ibrahim Rugova President of Kosovo; president of LDK; president
in PISG; advocated pacifist methods to achieve
independence; opposed KLA
Jashar Salihu Leader of KLA fund raising in Switzerland
Fatmir Sejdiu University of Prishtina law professor; longtime
LDK officer; elected president of PISG in 2006
Rexhep Selimi Member of KLA General Staff who moved around
Kosovo to tie together Planners in Exile and
Defenders at home
Blerim Shala Publisher of Kosovar Albanian newspaper Zëri
Skenderbeg Gjergj Kastrioti; fifteenth-century organizer of
Albanian resistance to Ottoman Empire; icon of
Albanian nationalism
Veton Surroi Publisher of Koha Ditore and later leader of ORA
political party
Azem Syla Member of KLA General Staff, and early
commander in chief
Edita Tahiri Leader of Aganiwing of LDK; broke away from
Rugova in 2004 and tried to organize new
political movement
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Key Individuals 193
Hashim Thaçi Youngest member of KLA General Staff; political

director of KLA; prime minister of interim
government after war; president of PDK; prime
minister of Kosovo when independence was
declared
Tito Popular name of Josip Broz, organizer and
president of Yugoslavia
Kadri Veseli Member of KLA General Staff and head of its
intelligence service
William G. Walker U.S. ambassador; led KVM; exposed Serb Massacre
at Reçak
Arianit Zeka (“Niti”) KLA fighter in Llapi
Kadri Zeka Kosovar Albanian nationalist assassinated in
Germany in 1982
Tahir Zemaj FARK commander who withdrew his forces from
Dukagjini to Albania
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i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 194 6/4/08 1:50:39 PM
notes
Introduction
1. Actually, a series of postwar conferences occurred in various places. Collec-

tively, they are sometimes referred to as the “Paris Conference,” as in Margaret
McMillan’s Paris 1919.
Chapter 1: Faces of the KLA and Its Kosovar Antagonists
1. Hammes, Sling and Stone, 2.

2. The First Balkan War occurred in 1912–13 and focused on the boundaries
of Macedonia, and the liberation of Albania from Ottoman control. One result
was the creation of Albania as an independent state. Carnegie Endowment, The
Other Balkan Wars.
3. Fishta, The Highland Lute.
4. Robert Elsie, Albanian Literature, An Overview of Its History and Develop-
ment, http://www.elsie.de/pub/pdf_articles/A2003AlbLitOsthefte.pdf [visited
December 4, 2006].
5. One glaring difference was that the six republics technically had the right
to secede from Yugoslavia if they chose. That right was expressly left out of the
autonomy granted Kosovo.
6. On October 23, 1956, Hungarian students sought to overthrow the Commu-
nist government. The Soviet Army responded with overwhelming force, killing
many. Thirty-five thousand were arrested and put on trial.
7. The Albanians said thousands; the Serbs said ten. Malcolm, A Short History
of Kosovo, 335 (describing 1981 demonstrations).
Chapter 2: Building and Maintaining Public Support
1. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 43.

2. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 10 (distinguishing bandit gangs from guerrilla
army; bandit gangs are similar in every respect to guerrilla army except for sup-
port of the people, resulting in capture and extermination of bandits by public
force).
3. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action, 18 (explaining defiance and agency val-
ues); ibid., 270 (noting that strongly defiant individuals might be those who lost
195
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 195 6/4/08 1:50:39 PM

196 Notes to Pages 27–39
a loved one to the armed forces or a death squad); ibid., 268 (explaining interac-
tion).
4. Ibid., 269 (setting forth equation and providing graphical portrayal).
5. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 76–77 (noting importance of appeals to
theology and other ideologies as important factors in gaining popular support);
Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 353 (ideological appeals offer the best means to mobilize
insurgency “to the extent that their content is designed to justify new aspirations
and specify means toward their attainment”).
6. Kurt Bexheti interview.
7. Pape, Dying to Win, 87 (explaining that religious differences are powerful in
helping insurgents distinguish their constituents from occupiers).
8. The term “consciousness of potentiality” is derived from Taber, War of the
Flea, who writes that popular will supporting a guerrilla struggle expresses “a
newly awakened consciousness, not of ‘causes’ but of potentiality.” Ibid., 5. Later,
he writes that a “reasonable expectation of success” is “perhaps the most power-
ful of motives.” Ibid., 23.
9. Jerry M. Tinker, The Political Power of Non-Violent Resistance: The Gan-
dhian Technique, 21 Western Political Q. 775–76 (1971) (analyzing Gandhi’s
philosophy); Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, 114–16 (noting that
military was in serious danger of disintegrating and each use of force increased
this danger, stimulated in part by ideological and religious appeals to ordinary sol-
diers by insurgents and also because of exposure to demonstrators who sometimes
“put a flower in the end of a rifle barrel” causing soldiers’ morale to disappear);
see also DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 38 (noting how
in early stages of the Russian Revolution of 1917, soldiers and sailors no longer
automatically obeyed their officers).
10. KLA communiqués Nr. 27 (27 Oct. 1996) (“we will knock on your doors and
will deliver the appropriate punishment”); 30 (3 Feb. 1997); 32 (27 Mar. 1997); 33
(18 May 1997); 36 (19 Oct. 1997).
11. KLA communiqués Nr. 18 (14 Feb. 1996); 21 (14 July 1996); 24 (30 Aug.
1996); 28 (12 Jan. 1997).
12. KLA communiqués Nr. 30 (3 Feb. 1997); 33 (“we are your sons and daugh-
ters and we need your material and moral support for the liberation of our terri-
tories”); 35 (12 Aug. 1997) (“we need your funds”); 36 (15 Sept. 1997); 38 (7 Nov.
1997) (“call upon Albanians who are in emigration to help the fund established
for the liberation of Kosovo”); 39 (22 Nov. 1997).
13. Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 124.
14. See ibid., 118–19 (reporting splits in LDK and criticism of Rugova in
1994).
15. Malcolm, Short History, 322.
Chapter 3: Recruiting Fighters and Commanders
1. Tetreault, “Overthrowing the Fathers,” 262–63.

2. See Goldstone, Revolutions, 290 (noting that guerrilla movements dispro-
portionately take root in areas with histories of popular rebellion against national
authorities, such as Cuba and Colombia, in contrast with certain areas of Bolivia);
O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 65 (noting helpfulness of “age-old resistance
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 196 6/4/08 1:50:39 PM

Notes to Pages 39–59 197
to authority in defense of tribal autonomy and individualism” in Pathans in Af-

ghanistan).
3. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 4–5.
4. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 42–46.
5. This is not sexist. The literature shows a considerable difference between
young men and young women.
Chapter 4: Avoiding Annihilation
1. It is virtually impossible to stamp out guerrillas in rural areas except by

exterminating the rural population itself. Taber, War of the Flea, 26–27.
2. Merom, How Democracies Lose, 45.
3. Daalder, Winning Ugly, 52.
4. Ibid., 103, 113–14, 153.
5. Mao’s theory of guerrilla warfare is explained in chapter five.
6. Hammes, Sling and the Stone, 101 (explaining utility of anonymity in Pal-
estinian leadership).
7. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders, 82.
8. Gurr, Why Men Rebel.
9. The insight afforded by Cleveland’s Revolution of Rising Expectations theory
was that what matters in the genesis of revolutions is not absolute hardship,
but the gap between actual conditions and expectations. As expectations rise,
conditions may become ripe for revolution even if actual living conditions have
remained the same or improved somewhat.
10. See DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 39–40 (explain-
ing how relaxation of repression, followed by regime policies that disappointed
expectations, were crucial factors in fomenting the 1917 Russian Revolution).
11. See O’Malley, Destabilization Policy (identifying three factors: popular dis-
content resulting from relative deprivation; organized opposition; and state crisis,
including defection of military/police from leadership; citing de Tocqueville).
12. Taber, War of the Flea, 22–23.
13. Foran, Introduction to the Future of Revolutions, 9; Goodman, Renewal of
Socialism, 67 (characterizing democracy as inhospitable to revolutionaries, and
quoting Che Guevara).
15. Ibid., 418.
16. Ibid., 426.
17. Ibid., 430.
18. Ibid., 157.
19. This was hardly a new technique. In the early stages of the American Revo-
lution, insurgents such as Samuel Adams used incidents of British overreaction,
such as the “Boston Massacre,” to recruit support for the insurgency. See gener-
ally Zobel, The Boston Massacre.
20. The term “Summer Offensive” is used to describe both the KLA’s grow-
ing assertiveness in the summer of 1998, and to describe the Milosevic regime’s
response. In other words, there was a “Summer Offensive” on both sides.
21. A study conducted by the RAND Corporation for the U.S. Air Force con-
cludes that Milosevic gave in because he feared that middle class reaction to
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 197 6/4/08 1:50:40 PM

NATO bombing in Serbia threatened his hold on power and because he thought he
could sell the Kumanova Agreement better than the Rambouillet Agreement.
Chapter 5: The KLA at War
1. In frontal warfare, armies fight each other from static positions.
2. Guerrilla warfare involves hit-and-run attacks.
3. See generally Hosmer, Why Milosevic Decided to Settle, 87–88 (reporting
that KLA forces had dwindled from twenty-four thousand to as few as three thou-
sand by May 1999, necessitating a return to guerrilla tactics carried out by small
groups).
4. This phase had actually begun in 1985.
5. Hamzaj, Narrative About War and Freedom, 73.
6. Clausewitz, On War, 194.
7. Ibid., 186.
8. Ibid., 190–92.
9. Ibid., 193.
10. Ibid., 198–99.
11. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 9: “War responds to a certain series of scientific
laws; whoever ignores them will go down to defeat. Guerrilla warfare as a phase
of war must be ruled by all of these; but besides, because of its special aspects, a
series of corollary laws also must be recognized.”
12. Mao envisioned three phases of guerrilla warfare. In Phase I, insurgents con-
centrate on building public support, limiting military action to selected attacks
on particular targets that serve mostly as a way to build popular support. In Phase
II, insurgents gain strength and consolidate control of “base areas,” conducting
military operations to capture arms and wear down government forces. In Phase
III, the insurgents commit regular forces, which they have been building and
protecting over time to prevail in a final offensive against the regime. Hammes,
Sling and Stone, 52 (summarizing Mao’s three phases). See also Guevara, Guer-
rilla Warfare, 13: “Triumph will always be the product of a regular army, even
though its origins are in a guerrilla army.”
13. Taber, War of the Flea, 110.
15. Ibid., 2.
16. Ibid., 51.
17. Clausewitz, On War, 87: “the political object is the goal, war is the means
of reaching it, and means can never be considered an isolation from their pur-
pose.”
18. Ibid., 253–55 (explaining the effect of victories and defeats on public opin-
ion).
20. Ibid., 76.
21. Ibid., 79–86.
22. Ibid., 86.
23. International Crisis Group, Kosovo After Haradinaj, 9, note 66 (quoting
document from Albanian State Archives, and noting consistency of KLA policy
with traditional prohibition).
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 198 6/4/08 1:50:40 PM

24. Clausewitz, On War, 372.

25. The Llap Zone lay north of Prishtina, and included the city of Podujevë.
James Pettifer observes that most of the international press ignored the conflict
in the Llap Zone. Pettifer, Kosova Express, 116. The Drenica Zone lay generally
southwest of Prishtina, and encompassed central Kosovo. The Dukagjini Zone
lay to the far southwest, and encompassed the border with Albania.
26. Ramush Haradinaj, June 2005 interview.
27. Coogan, Michael Collins, 54.
28. Ibid., 60 (reporting British dependence on American financial support); ibid.,
109–10 (reporting on Irish nationalist exaggerated hopes for American support
of Irish independence). Ibid., 116–17 (describing 1919 formation of “The Squad,”
popularly known as “The Twelve Apostles”).
29. http://www.serbianna.com/features/lawless/.
30. The author reviewed the archives of the Times (of London), the Washington
Post, CNN, and the New York Times, which are complete for the 1990s, reading
every story that contained the word “Kosovo.”
31. KLA communiqués Nr. 21 (13 July 1996); 24 (30 Aug. 1996); 27 (27 Oct.
1996); 28 (12 Jan. 1997); 30 (3 Feb. 1997); 32 (27 Mar. 1997); 33 (18 May 1997); 35
(12 Aug. 1997); 36 (15 Sept. 1997); 39 (22 Nov. 1997).
32. Ajet Potera interview.
33. ICTY, Limaj Trial Transcript, 3213–15 (9 Feb. 2005 testimony of Ruzhdi
Karpuzi, regarding the battle of 26 July 1998 at Lapushnik Gorge).
34. See generally Daalder, Winning Ugly, 27, 35, 40 (describing interaction
between KLA and Serb military forces in summer 1998).
35. Operation Arrow was a major KLA offensive launched on May 26, 1999. It
involved up to four thousand KLA fighters, and was intended to eliminate Serb
units operating near the Albanian border to open up the arms supply for the
KLA again. Though the initiative may have lured VJ forces out of their places of
concealment, making it easier for NATO airpower to attack them, the operation
was not a success.
36. Ibid., 101, 115 (during the NATO bombing campaign, Serb forces operated
more or less with impunity, expelling the population denied KLA fighters a place
to hide).
37. See generally Hosmer, Why Milosevic Decided to Settle, 87–88 (report-
ing that KLA forces had dwindled from twenty-four thousand to as few as three
thousand by May 1999, necessitating a return to guerrilla tactics carried out by
small groups).
38. Statement by Fatmir Limaj, ICTY, Limaj Trial Transcript, 407–9.
39. Ibid.
40. The Albanian translates literally as “Central Committee.”
41. See www.mpri.com [last visited 29 Oct. 2005].
42. Confidential New York interview.
Chapter 6: Financing
1. Bujar Bukoshi’s Fund was based on a 3 percent tax on all Kosovars in exile.
The formal name of this “Three-Percent Fund” was the Republic of Kosovo Fund
(RFK). The RFK was a registered charitable organization in each country where
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 199 6/4/08 1:50:40 PM

it operated. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces/iss5pg1.htm [visited 27 May

2005].
2. http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/kosovo/html/Albania_Terrorism
.html [visited 27 May 2005]; Id. ¶ 36 (half of $10 billion committed to acquisi-
tion of weapons and supplies for KLA). Id. ¶ 35 (identity and location of funds
supportive of KLA). Id. ¶ 17 (Homeland Calling contact addresses and phones are
regularly published in »Zeri e Kosoves« (»The Voice of Kosovo«) organ of LPK,
printed at Aarau in Switzerland).
3. KLA communiqués Nr. 30 (3 Feb. 1997); 33 (“we are your sons and daughters
and we need your material and moral support for the liberation of our territories”);
35 (12 Aug. 1997) (“we need your funds”); 36 (15 Sept. 1997); 38 (7 Nov. 1997)
(“call upon Albanians who are in emigration to help the fund established for the
liberation of Kosovo”); 39 (22 Nov. 1997).
4. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces/iss5pg1.htm (visited 13 Feb. 2005).
5. Sullivan, Be Not Afraid.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 141.
8. Ibid., 167–68.
9. www.eccmei.net/E/E009.html [visited 27 May 2005].
10. Title III of the Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001), the “In-
ternational Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of
2001.”
Chapter 7: Training
1. http://www.todaysmilitary.com/wil/t5_wil_training_basic.php [visited 5
Aug. 2005].
2. In the U.S. Army, instructors in basic training are referred to as “drill ser-
geants.” In the U.S. Marine Corps, they are referred to as “drill instructors.” This
chapter uses the “drill instructor” term.
3. http://www.goarmy.com/life/basic/index.jsp (syllabus for U.S. Army basic
training).
4. Interview with Driton Gashi.
Chapter 8: Supplying
1. Interview with Bujar Bukoshi.

2. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders, note 140.
3. Testimony of John Drewienkiewitcz before ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milutinovic,
IT 05-87 (Dec. 4, 2006).
4. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 27–28.
5. A semiautomatic weapon fires one shot each time the trigger is pulled, with-
out the shooter having to operate a lever, bolt, or slide to move a new round into
the firing chamber. A fully automatic fires rounds continuously as long as the
trigger is depressed.
6. Dunnigan, How to Make War, 44–45.
7. Ibid., 45.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 200 6/4/08 1:50:40 PM

8. Ibid., 44.
10. Wade Boese, Belgrade, KLA Move Forward on Arms Control, Disarma-
ment (Sept./Oct. 1999), available on http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/
yugso99.asp [visited 27 Aug. 2005].
11. Christopher Bellamy, “Flight From Croatia: How the Croats armed and
trained for victory; weapons,” The Independent (London), Aug. 8, 1995, reprinted
in http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/greenside/761/168krajina95.html [vis-
ited 22 July 2005].
13. Ibid., 135.
14. A kullë is a traditional Albanian housing compound, with one or more
three-storey stone or brick houses, surrounded by a ten- to twelve-foot-high stone
wall.
15. Arms Export Control Act, Pub.L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1320, as
amended, codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2771–81.
16. 22 U.S.C. § 2778.
17. Id. § 2778(a)(1). The Munitions List is part of the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR pt. 121.
18. Ibid., § 2778(a)(2).
Chapter 9: Shaping International Reaction
1. See generally Daalder, Winning Ugly, 136–41, 239 (arguing that NATO was
losing the war until it unleashed airpower on strategic infrastructure targets in
Serbia proper).
3. “How Germany’s Independent Line Paved the Way to the Kosovo War” (Apr.
16, 2000) (anti-NATO essay) (summary of Matthias Küntzel, Der Weg in den Krieg.
Deutschland, die Nato und das Kosovo, Elefanten Press, Berlin, 2000), http://
www.espresso-verlag.de/kuentzelfr.htm.
4. See generally Murphy, United States and the Rule of Law (analyzing alterna-
tive scenarios for future U.S. attitudes toward multilateral institutions, including
the International Criminal Court).
5. [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 (judgment).
6. UNSCR 1160 31 March 1998; UNSCR 1199 23 September 1998.
7. Id. paras. 2–3.
8. UNSCR 1203.
9. Human Rights Watch Under Orders, 29.
10. After the modifications, it was adopted, 135 Cong. Rec. S8107-03 (July 18,
1989), but then dropped in conference committee. Mr. Dingell, 135 Cong. Rec.
H8698 (Nov. 15, 1989) (commending conferees on Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act for not including Senate wording criticizing repression of Albanians in
Kosovo, which could have harmed U.S.–Yugoslav relations). On June 19, 1991,
the House voted 289–127 to remove language calling for autonomy for Kosovo
and free and fair elections of a Kosovo assembly. 137 Cong. Rec. H4653 (sec.
866, expressing sense of Congress that autonomy should be retained for Kosovo
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 201 6/4/08 1:50:41 PM

and that free and fair elections in Kosovo should select assembly); Id. at H4690
(recorded vote to remove language).
11. Mr. Hamilton, U.S. Policy on Kosovo, 144 Cong. Rec. E825-01 (May 12,
1998) (endorsing National Security Adviser Berger’s view that the United States
must make it clear that Kosovo cannot become independent and that Albanians
must refrain from violence); Sen. Nickles, 144 Cong. Rec. S2221-01 (Mar. 18, 1998)
(Senate resolution condemning Serb human rights violations and also condemn-
ing “terrorist actions by any group or individual in Kosovo”).
12. 144 Cong. Rec. E825-02, E826 (May 12, 1998) (reprinting Mar. 31, 1998,
letter from Representative Hamilton to National Security Adviser Berger).
13. Albright, Madam Secretary, 383.
14. See http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/BG1280.cfm.
15. Confidential interview.
16. Albright, Madam Secretary, 389–90.
17. Hazan, Justice in a Time of War, 125 (2004) (describing Louise Arbour’s con-
frontation at Kosovo border, accompanied by foreign journalists, in the context
of the broader exposure by Walker and the foreign press of the Reçak Massacre);
Hagan, Justice in the Balkans, 114–18 (describing how Arbour’s border confronta-
tion over Reçak led to New York Times coverage and influenced public opinion
in favor of intervening against Milosevic).
18. See KLA communiqués Nr. 19 (25 Apr. 1996) (“broadening of the conflict
in the Balkan region”); 27 (27 Oct. 1996) (“fire of war will spread to Balkans and
wider”); 33 (18 May 1997) (“stability in Balkans will be a valueless idea”); 35 (12
Aug. 1997) (“bloodshed will be bigger than Bosnia . . . after guerrilla war has in-
cluded all of the Balkans”); 38 (7 Nov. 1997) (“peace and stability in the Balkans
will not exist”).
19. Mr. Smith, 140 Cong. Rec. E515-02 (Mar. 22, 1994).
20. Paid advertisement, Detroit Free Press, Mar. 12, 1986.
21. See, e.g., communiqués Nr. 19 (25 Apr. 1996); 21 (13 July 1996); 26 (30 Sept.
1996).
22. Interview with Florin Krasniqi, 12 Jan. 2006.
23. See Campbell, Road to Kosovo. In 1999 Campbell took a follow-up trip to
Kosovo, in the company of several Chicago-Kent students and staff, participating
in the law school’s “Operation Kosovo.”
24. Loyd, My War Gone By (describing experiences as a reporter covering the
Bosnian war).
25. Pettifer, Kosova Express.
26. Confidential interview with author.
27. http://www.alb-net.com/mailman/listinfo/kan-info [visited 21 July 2005].
28. Republic of Kosovo Web site: http://web.eunet.ch/government/.
29. www.alb-net.com (summary description of KCC) [visited 23 June 2005]. For
other Albanian sites, see http://mprofaca.cro.net/kosovo.html [visited 23 June
2005].
30. See http://www.alb-net.com/kcc/fbi-report.htm (describing discovery of
children thrown down well) [visited 23 June 2005]; http://www.alb-net.com/
warcrimes-img/prekaz.htm (photographs of victims of Jashari Massacre) [visited
4 Dec. 2006].
31. See http://www.kohaditore.com/ARTA/drenica_ChildrenAndWomen.htm
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 202 6/4/08 1:50:41 PM

(photographs of corpses of women and children from Jashari Massacre) [visited

12 Nov. 2005].
32. http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/albanews.html [visited 23 June
2005].
33. Pettifer, Kosova Express, 8.
34. Ibid., 5, 7.
35. Ibid., 152, 161.
36. Albright, Madam Secretary, 402.
Chapter 10: Postwar Politics: The KLA at the Ballot Box
1. “UÇK” is the Albanian acronym for Kosovo Liberation Army.

2. UNMIK Regulation 2000/1.
3. ICG, Landmark Elections, 11.
4. OSCE, Financial Disclosure Report, 9.
5. Fehmi Agani was a top LDK thinker, and was killed by Serb forces toward
the end of the NATO bombing campaign. His death left Rugova unchallenged
within the LDK.
Chapter 11: The KLA in the Dock
1. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66–T (Trial Chamber Judgment, 30 Nov.

2005).
2. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. 04-84 ¶ 6 (Appeals Chamber Decision
on Ramush Haradinaj’s Modified Provisional Release, 10 Mar. 2006) (referring to
UNMIK submissions and affirming decision allowing participating in political
affairs).
3. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as
amended through 19 May 2003 by UN Security Council Resolution 1481).
4. Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague,
18 Oct. 1907, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd
6?OpenDocument [visited 4 Dec. 2005].
5. The first is entitled the “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949.”
The second, entitled, “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August
12, 1949,” similarly applies only to international conflicts, expressed in identical
language. The third, entitled, “Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949,” also applies only to international conflicts.
The fourth, entitled, “Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949,” regulates the conduct of armies re-
garding noncombatants. Each of the conventions contains the same article two,
known as “Common Article 2,” which limits their application to international
conflicts: “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war
is not recognized by one of them.” Each also has a “Common Article 3,” which
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 203 6/4/08 1:50:41 PM

protects noncombatants in “armed conflicts not of an international character,”

i.e., internal armed conflicts.
6. Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977, extends their
coverage by amending their Common Article 2 to include wars of “national
liberation” and for “self determination” within the four Geneva Conventions.
The scope of Protocol I includes “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their right of self-determination.” Protocol I, art. 1(4). It also adds
details to the obligations imposed by the first three Geneva Conventions related
to wounded, sick, shipwrecked, missing, and dead persons, Protocol I, Part II,
means of warfare, and treatment of prisoners of war. Protocol I, Part III.
7. The broadest source of international human rights law with global scope
is the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www
.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (opened for signature 1966; entered into
force 1976) [last visited 8 Oct. 2005], which is generally viewed as having codi-
fied the principles of the 1948 Declaration on Human Rights. http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html [last visited 8 Oct. 2005].
8. Limaj Trial Chamber Judgment ¶ 171.
9. Limaj Judgment ¶ 215, 227.
10. Compare Limaj Second Amended Indictment ¶¶ 7-13 (joint criminal en-
terprise); id. ¶¶ 14-17 (command responsibility) (12 Feb. 2004) with Limaj First
Indictment ¶¶ 7–10 (command responsibility; no allegations of JCE liability) (18
Feb. 2003).
11. Blagojevic and Jokic, Trial Chamber Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 698
(citing Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgment para. 227).
12. An important formal difference between the two criminal theories is that
conspiracy under U.S. federal law is a crime distinct from the predicate crimes,
while JCE is not a crime independent of the predicate crimes, but only a theory
for imputing criminal responsibility to participants in the JCE who did not actu-
ally commit the predicate crime.
13. Haradinaj Indictment, 24 February 2005, ¶ 24.
14. Haradinaj Indictment, ¶ 50.
15. Haradinaj Indictment, ¶ 52.
16. Limaj Judgment ¶ 666.
17. Limaj Judgment ¶ 667–68.
18. Ramer, Hate by Association.
19. Limaj Judgment ¶ 202 (noting evidence that KLA released some detainees),
225 (referring to “some process of decision” resulting in release of some suspects
by KLA).
20. Third Geneva Convention, art. 4 (defining those qualifying for prisoner-of-
war status).
21. See generally Brooks, War Everywhere (proposing a functional reconstruc-
tion of the law of armed conflict because its categories have become unwork-
able).
22. Limaj Judgment ¶¶ 222–23 (summarizing and rejecting defense argument
that collaborators were combatants).
23. Limaj Judgment ¶ 224 (“[A]t least as a general rule, perceived collaborators
abducted by the KLA were entitled to civilian status.”).
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 204 6/4/08 1:50:41 PM

24. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 5.

25. Limaj Trial Chamber Judgment ¶ 216.
26. See Limaj Judgment ¶ 191 (contrasting superior ability of a state to organize
widespread and systematic attack on civilian population from guerrilla groups
like the KLA, with “extremely limited resources, personnel and organization”).
27. Strong, Neutralizing Threat.
28. See Glennon, How International Rules Die, 980 (2005) (analyzing doctrine
of “desuetude,” under which widespread noncompliance extinguishes norms of
conventional international law).
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i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 206 6/4/08 1:50:41 PM
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i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 210 6/4/08 1:50:42 PM
index
AAK: along for the ride, 156; associa- KLA from, 95, 145; paradise for
tion with PDK, 161; Çeku’s nomi- Albanians, 22; popular support for
nal membership, 164; coalition KLA, 134; PR for KLA from, 147;
with LDK, 162; election results refugees’ effect on public opinion,
2004, 161; electoral expectations, 138; refugees in, 4; resupply point,
155; establishment, 155; Kosumi 91; spillover of Kosovo conflict,
insufficiently loyal to, 163; orga- 138; state of, 4; support for KLA,
nizational weakness, 158; postwar 7, 45, 94, 121, 130, 132–33, 135;
election results, 156; reason for traditional stories, 20; training
electoral disappointment, 157; 2004 camps, 15, 42, 43, 56, 103, 105, 109;
campaign, 161; veto of grand coali- weapons through, 92, 106, 115–16,
tion decisions, 162 118–27
Ademi, Afrim, 40; loyalty to Haradi- Albanian Army: training materials,
naj, 18 107; training models, 100–102, 105
adolescents: and risk, 40 Albanian intelligence service. See
agency benefits, 27 Sigurimi
Ahmeti, Ali, 84; responsibilities of, 81 Albanian literature, 7
AK-47: ammunition for, 115; as basic Albright, Madeleine: leadership, 141;
KLA weapon, 73; Chinese, 118; cost referendum on independence, 151;
of, 117; description of, 113; require- warning to Milosevic, 58
ments, 113; total supply, 116; train- Algeria, 7
ing, 100, 103, 106; use of clips, 75 Alia, Ramiz, 132
AlbaNews, 148 ammunition: civilians handled, 71;
Albania: arms, quality, 118; arms purchases in Switzerland, 118;
through, 47, 51, 95, 110; borders, requirements, 112; reserving for
20, 72; collapse of government, single-shot, 76; for training, 106
8, 9, 118, 132, 140; creation of, 5; annihilation as counterinsurgency
Diaspora from, 94; Enver Hoxha strategy, 3, 9, 11, 47, 51, 56, 131;
and, 6; Greater, 22; journalist visits avoidance of, 33, 45, 64; completion
to, 147; KLA infiltration from, 82, of, 59; ethnic cleansing as means of,
84; KLA oversight from, 82; KLA 53; failure in closely knit societ-
recruits from, 42; KLA withdrawal ies, 50; failure of Serbian, 47; fear
to, 79, 86; Kosovars left out of, 6, 7; in KLA soldiers, 43; frustration, 65;
little support for KLA, 63; manuals KLA defense, 62; luring KLA into,
as source of training for KLA, 45; 70; Milosevic’s use, 47; near suc-
money through, 89, 96, 97; origin cess, 143; Serb efforts, 181
of contributors, 91; oversight of antiaircraft weapons: from Bosnia,
211
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 211 6/4/08 1:50:42 PM

212 Index
118; need for, 114; requirements, assassination: and ICL, 177; IRA, 73
112; training, 106 autonomous province, 6
anti-insurgency theory, 48; decapita- autonomy, 185; goal of Rugova, 143;
tion, 49; ethnic cleansing, 53; inter- loss of, 52; revocation of, 8, 52; un-
diction, 50; reform, 51 der 1974 constitution, 21
antitank weapons, 114; from Bosnia,
118; at Kaqinoll, 77; KLA use of, Bajgora: attack at, 77; leadership,
114; need for, 114; requirements, 108; physical fitness training, 107;
114; supply in Dukagjini, 116; total training on law of armed conflict,
supply, 116; training, 103, 106 107; training school, 102; weapons
Arkan, 55 training, 106
armed conflicts: international law, Bajraktari, Arxhient, 102, 115
170; Thaçi participation in, 16 Bajraktari, Harry, 130; lobbying, 146
Armed Forces of the Republic of Ko- Balkan Wars, 20, 185
sovo. See FARK banking system, 96; Swiss, 97
armored personnel carriers, 112 Bardh coal mine, 70
arms: acquiescence by other states, Bardosh, 50
132, 135, 141, 142; Albania as Basque model for separatists, 7
transit point, 8, 31, 47, 80, 120, Bassiouni, Cherif, 178
121; capture of, 117; coordination Batllava Lake, 80
of supply, 94; defense against, 112, Battle of the Bridge, 74; Potera reac-
114; distribution through local tion, 75
population, 123, 125; Dukagjini battle plans, 74
flush with, 84; KLA reliance on, bazookas, 114
62; Kosovar civilians and, 72; for Beqaj, Besim, 21, 157
Kosovar Serbs, 55; injuries from, Berisha, Kole, 165
128; interdiction, Serb ambushes, Berisha, Sali, 66, 132; arrests of KLA
70; interdiction of, 50, 51, 129, 133, leaders, 133; fear of, 133; and LDK,
134; logistics system for, 123, 124; 133; pyramid scheme, 133
mines on goal trails, 65; money Bexheti, Kurt, 33, 89; and Chicago
spent on, 92, 95, 96, 98; mutual as- fundraising, 95
sistance among zones, 84; need for, Blair, Tony, 142
2, 3, 110; open during NATO bomb- Bonior, David, 146
ing, 59; opportunity for KLA, 70; boots: donated, 91; spending on, 92
poor quality of those from Albania, borders, changing, 135
118; Remi and, 191; requirements, Bosnia: arms from, 95, 124; brutality
111, 112, 113; for Serb forces, 71; of war, 31; competition for interna-
Serbia as source of, 53, 119; shop- tional attention, 8; effect on press
ping lists, 119; sources of, 8, 118; and media, 138; end of war, 8, 135;
training, 103; U.S. as source of, 118 ethnic cleansing in, 54; failures in,
arms control, 93, 125. See also legal 142; international interest in, 63;
restrictions on weapons and Islam, 144; Kosovo unlike, 59;
Arta, 150; source of news about KLA, lessons learned, 139; mistakes in,
148 137; as precedent for intervention,
artillery: attack on Kaçanoll, 77; 13; precursor to Kosovo, 3; violence
casualties, 128; near Podujeve, 76; brought international intervention,
Serb use of, 114; use in summer of- 143; weapons stockpiles, 118; why
fensive, 48 Serbia lost, 142; Yugoslav republic,
Asanaj, Dino, 146 5, 6
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 212 6/4/08 1:50:43 PM

Index 213
Braha, Luftar, 39, 46, 108, 130 membership in AAK, 164; popular-
brutality: and insurgent recruitment, ity, 164; prime minister, 45, 163;
48 training, 109; weakness as prime
Bukoshi, Bujar, 98; charisma, 16; co- minister, 164
ordination with Planners in Exile, cell phones, 50, 150
16; criticism of KLA, 98, 105; criti- charisma: of Bukoshi, 15, 16; of dead
cism of Rugova, 143; discouraging martyrs, 34; Haradinaj, 18, 158;
advice from experts, 110; emphasis KLA leadership, 27, 33, 37; Remi,
on institutionalizing resistance, 19; Rexhepi, 162
87; and fundraising, 88, 90; on Chicago: center of fundraising, 94;
KLA unpreparedness, 65; lobbying chief fundraisers, 95; fundraising
in Washington, 146; ministry of methods, 90; movement of funds,
defense, 86; nationalist upbringing, 97; total amounts raised, 92
21; opposition to funding KLA, 33; Chicago-Kent College of Law, 4
opposition to Muslim extremists, Christmas warning, 134, 139; weak-
144; outlook for insurgency, 67; ening of, 141
pleased with emergence of KLA, CIA: advice to KLA, 141; warning to
143; postwar political role, 158; KLA, 3
praise for KLA soldiers, 65; prime Çiftelia, 21
minister of government in exile, 15; civilians: attack on, 170; CIA warning
recognized need for armed resis- against targeting, 142; decoys, 75;
tance, 86; on Rugova, 33; support evacuating, 129; as KLA auxiliary,
for Berisha, 133; system for moving 77; KLA defense, 62; KLA inability
money, 96; Three Percent Fund, 89; to defend, 56; as KLA supporters,
visibility, 33 123; massacre of, 142; media atten-
bus transportation, 82; of weapons, tion, 147; Serb armed by Belgrade,
124, 125 55; support for insurgency, 26; sup-
Bush administration, 139 port for the KLA, 56, 71, 127; vic-
tims of Serb repression, 62; victims
Campbell, Greg, 147, 148; arrival of ethnic cleansing, 43, 54, 57, 78,
in Pristhina, 149; in Bosnia, 148; 80, 136; wounded and sick, 128
information black hole, 149; looked clan: reliance on, 53; tradition of vio-
for KLA, 149; at site of Jashari mas- lence, 143
sacre, 149; struggle to get into the clan-based law, 20
field, 149; threats to, 149 clandestine: international support,
cash: and Customs, 97; movement of, 131; nationalist organizations, 7;
96; for weapons, 92 nature of KLA, 31; nature of Plan-
Catholicism, 3, 29 ners in Exile, 82; reaction to Serb
ceasefire: and arms distribution, 121; police state tactics, 49
effect on KLA, 77; Llap force levels, Clark, Wesley, 141
77; negotiation of, 142; October Clausewitz, Carl von, 64, 65; defend-
1998, 9, 57; reasons for collapse, ers’ advantage, 70; KLA adherence
120; and Resolution 1203, 136 to, 69, 76; political nature of war,
Çeku, Agim, 109; commander in chief 67; public opinion, 67; relation to
of KLA, 85; credibility regarding guerrilla tactics, 65
final status, 165; governing capac- Clinton, Bill: Christmas warning,
ity, 165; head of TMK, 153; military 139; evolution of attitude, 141; po-
background, 45; need for interna- litical crossfire over Kosovo, 140
tional intervention, 131; nominal clothing: difficult to target, 51; inter-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 213 6/4/08 1:50:43 PM

214 Index
diction of, 50; need for, 127; sup- criminal enterprise: KLA as, 171;
plied by civilians, 127; supplied by scope of, 172
population, 26 Croatia: Albanians as soldiers in, 45;
Cold War: effect on Kosovo, 22; weap- brutality of war, 31; Bukoshi base,
ons stockpiles, 117 15; end of war, 8; as precedent for
collaborators, 178; due process, 175; intervention, 13; second front, 63;
early KLA targets, 8; KLA labeled source of arms, 118; U.S. “Equip
as, 15; KLA targeting of, 176; risk to and Train” program, 85; violence
insurgents, 176; targets of IRA, 73; brought international intervention,
targets of KLA, 62 143; weapons stockpiles, 118; Yugo-
collective action, 28 slav republic, 5, 6
Collins, Michael, 73 CSCE. See OSCE
command and control, 81; relation to culture of resistance, 181; Albanian
war crimes liability, 171 culture, part of, 37; effect of, 39; en-
command responsibility, 171, 172 couragement for participation, 10
Commander Leka, 108 custom, 20
Commander Remi: emergency funds Customs Service: compliance, 97
for, 98; exemplar of Defenders at Czechoslovakia, 22; Soviet interven-
Home, 18; optimism, 57; personal- tion in, 132
ity, 18; physical fitness emphasis,
107; radio equipment, 126; replaced Daci, Nexhep: accused of corruption,
Pajaziti, 44; tactics, 71; telephone 161; architect of LDK-AAK coali-
appeal for money, 90; training tion, 161; forced out, 163; influence
school, 102. See also Remi in LDK, 157; international opposi-
communications, 126 tion to, 163; outreach to KLA veter-
communiqué. See KLA communiqués ans, 156; role in framing LDK-AAK
Communist, 132, 152, 185; intoler- coalition, 162; speaker of assembly,
ance for Albanian culture, 7; origins 156
of LDK, 28; Tito’s forces, 6 Dardania Bank: and Bukoshi, 96; and
concentration of forces, 65 Homeland Calls, 97
Congress, United States, 139 Dayton Accords, 15; discredited
consciousness of potentiality, 24; Rugova approach, 8; effect on Alba-
building, 28; creating, 27; effect nian attitudes, 32; fragility of, 138;
of guerrilla attacks, 66; effect of impact of NATO bombing, 59; and
Jashari massacre, 38; efforts to international complacency, 9, 140;
build, 10; fighting to increase, 35; reward for those who fought, 52;
KLA’s goal, 31; raising, 38 Rugova locked out of, 15
conventional warfare: requirements, Deçan, 79, 121, 123
64; training for, 105 decapitation: avoidance of, 49; as
Cook, Robin, 142 counterinsurgency strategy, 49;
corruption: benefit, 53; in Serb forces, early anti-KLA strategy, 54; Jashari,
65 50
counterinsurgency, 49, 54; decapita- defeat: advantages of, 71; perception
tion as stragegy, 49; focus on arms, of likely, 31; utility of, 76
51; fuels insurgency, 11; incompe- Defenders at Home, 7, 14, 23; at-
tence of Serbs, 68 tractiveness to Planners in Exile,
crimes against humanity: definition, 82; Bukoshi collaboration with, 15;
169; widespread and systematic at- conflict with Peaceful Path Insti-
tack, 170 tutionalists, 16; coordination, 81;
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 214 6/4/08 1:50:43 PM

Index 215
direct ties to donors, 89; disdained Drenica, 30, 57, 85; aid to Haradinaj,
strategy, 63; impatience to start 79; battle report, 78; battles for
fight, 87; impulsiveness of, 17; control of roads, 78; coordination
integration with Planners in Exile, through friends, 83; discouraged
63; Jashari as leader of, 9; links to religion, 102; force size, 111; guer-
Planners in Exile, 82; members, rilla tactics, 72; Homeland Calls,
37; orders from General Staff, 83; 94; KLA control of, 70; leadership,
organization, 84; ranks increased 45; less forthcoming to media,
by Jashari massacre, 38; Remi and 148; physical fitness training, 107;
Haradinaj exemplify, 18; roots in rumors of KLA, Serb attacks in, 69;
Marxism, 28; spirit of defiance, 28; state of siege, 57; tactical training,
strategy, lack of, 69; Thaçi as am- 105; tactics, 71; terror in, 54; Thaçi
bassador to, 17; Thaqi and Selimi participation in attacks, 84; total
links to, 82 arms, 116; training, 100, 104; train-
defiance: individual trait, 38; spirit of, ing, law of armed conflict train-
as motivation, 37 ing, 107; training instructors, 108;
Demaçi, Adem, 33–34, 130; advice to training organization, 102; weapons
avoid Rambouillet, 57 training, 106; Zone, 84
Demaj, Gani, 38, 122 drug money, 141
Democratic League of Kosovo: reac- Dubrava prison: Remi incarcerated
tion to Milosevic, 8; Rugova as in, 19
president of, 14. See LDK due process, 172
democratization: complication by Dukagjini, 104; arms supply, 116;
KLA experience, 12; reduces appeal border crossing points, 121; com-
of insurgency, 53; tension with rule manded by Ramush Haradinaj,
of law, 152 18; concentration of Serb forces,
detention, 54; and ICL, 177; ineffec- 125; control of weapons flow, 125;
tiveness of in Palestine, 66; under defensive spirit, 72; direct contribu-
international criminal law, 174 tions, 92; FARK and KLA conflict,
deterrence, 41 86; focus on weapons supply, 79;
Detroit, 95, 146; Customs stop, 97; force size, 111; KLA control of, 70;
fundraising, 94; total amounts management of arms movement,
raised, 92, 95 123; maximum force strength, 79;
Diaspora: contributors, 90; early KLA 1919 uprising, 68; Pastrik transit
invisibility, 8; flood of volunteers point, 80; physical fitness training,
from, 83; fundraising, 94; KLA 107; radio equipment, 126; roots
fundraising message to, 90; KLA of AAK, 155; Serb attacks in, 69;
reliance on, 3; physical fitness, 107; source of independence, 84; spend-
sources of recruits, 41; support for ing totals, 92; Swiss contributions,
armed resistance, 10; training for, 91; tactical training, 105; tactics,
103; volunteers, 111 71; terrain, 66; training, 100, 103;
Dioguardi, Joseph, 146 weapons purchased, 92; Zone, 84
dirty money, 93 Durres: arms movement through,
disarming and disbanding, 153 121; arms transit point, 120
disorganization: of KLA, 85; of leader- duty of proportionality, 175, 177
ship of KLA, 86 duty to discriminate, 169, 175, 177
Dole, Robert, 146
drain the swamp, 47; through ethnic ECMM, 134
cleansing, 56 elections: postwar, 155; 2000 results,
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 215 6/4/08 1:50:43 PM

216 Index
155; 2001 results, 155; 2004 results, tion of, 50; supplied by civilians,
161 127; supplied by population, 26;
elites: exclusion after 1989, 52; sepa- supplies, 127; Three Percent Fund
rating from regime, 31; success of support, 89
Albanian, 22; support for regime, foreign occupation: incentive for ter-
27; weak support for KLA, 26 rorism, 67; motivation for insur-
ETA, 37; KLA rejected tactics, 145 gency, 2
ethnic cleansing, 53, 54, 55, 127; Fourth Generation War (4GW), 67;
blurred with interdiction, 50; com- definition, 2; paradigm for KLA, 13,
pletion of, 59; counterinsurgency 143
strategy, 49; defense against, 72; France, 135
effect of NATO bombing, 131, 138; Frashëri, Naim, 21
effect on public opinion, 138; en- frontal warfare: defensive, 79; forced
larged sense of repression, 55; evi- into, 72; KLA attempts at, 56, 62,
dence of, 4; fifth strategy in Kosovo, 69; need for training, 101; Remi use
56; killing targets, 53; by KLA, 169; of, 72; risks to KLA, 54
Milosevic goal, 47; morale, effect fundraising in Chicago, 89
on KLA, 43; pubic revulsion with, funds, use of, 117
142; risk of international interven-
tion, 49 Gandhi, 31
European Union: early involvement, Gashi, Driton, 102, 105, 110
134 General Staff, 81; commanders as
excitement: after Jashari massacre, members, 85; control of weapons
40; magnet for youth, 37; role in supplies, 124–25; criticism of, 33;
recruiting, 42; role of, 23 disorganized meetings, 85; establish-
expertise: lack of, 45 ment, 62, 83; Krasniqi visit to, 95;
limited influence on Haradinaj and
family structure, 20 Remi, 84; reinstated Haradinaj, 86
FARK, 15, 81, 86; accommodation Geneva Conventions, 169; and pris-
with KLA, 86; conflict with KLA, oners, 174; training on, 107–8
35; origins of, 86; retreat, 79; train- geopolitical factors, 183; Albania, 132
ing, 108; unwilling to fight, 86; German intelligence services, 135
withdrew Haradinaj’s troops, 84 Germany: breeding ground for KLA,
FBI: flip flops, 141; interest in fund- 23; Bukoshi base, 15; clandes-
raising, 99 tine activities, 7; contributions in
fear: of death, 65; Serbian less than kind, 91; Disapora during NATO
Albanian, 38 bombing, 4; early fundraising, 94;
Ferizaj: KLA control of, 70; weak sup- effectiveness of LDK interference
port for KLA, 26 with KLA fundraising, 90; favored
financing: businesses as conduits, 97; Albanians, 135; as haven for politi-
contributors, 90; dirty money, 93; cal activists, 7; Homeland Calls
message, 89; moving the money, 95; chapters, 93; KLA links through,
organization, 93; protecting against 82; LPRK in, 28; no attacks in, 145;
interdiction, 98; total amounts, 92; recognition of independence, 165;
total contributions, 88 resistance attitudes, 37; source of
first aid training, 103. See also medi- arms, 118; total contributions, 92;
cal care total funds, 91
folk music, 20 Gërvalla: and Bexheti, 95; influence
food: difficult to target, 51; interdic- German government, 145
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 216 6/4/08 1:50:44 PM

Index 217
Gërvalla, Jusuf, 23 training, 103; twenty-year duration,

Gërvalla brothers, 23 63; war crimes liability, 172
Giap, Vo Nguyen, 67 Guevara, Che: avoiding annihilation,
Gjergj Fishta, 20 46; inflexibility with informers,
Gjokaj, Luigj, 88, 90, 99; and FBI, 73; influence on KLA training, 105;
99; Detroit fundraiser, 95; total ideal guerrilla, 42; popular support
amounts raised, 95 for guerrillas, 26; suggested arms
Gjonbalaj, Dritan, 38, 103 kit, 112
Glogjan, 44 Gulf War, 137
goat trails, 122
Government in Exile: and Bukoshi, Haliti, 23; arrest, 133; conduit for Bu-
15; competed with fundraising, 89; koshi money, 87; early fundraising,
establishment, 8; lobbying in Wash- 94; early mistrust of, 16; encourage-
ington, 146; media relations, 148; ment from Bukoshi, 87; influence,
unwilling to fight, 86 35; and Krasniqi, 95, 97; LDK ac-
Grange, David, 45, 48, 74, 100 cusations, 157; leader of Planners
Greater Albania, 7, 22; KLA dis- in Exile, 17; nationalist upbring-
avowal of, 145; off the table, 165 ing, 21; never on the ground, 84;
Greicevci, Lirim, 30, 150 rejection of terrorism, 145; requests
grenades: at Kaçanoll, 77; require- for arms, 94; responsibilities, 81;
ments, 113 strategy, 63
Gruda, Zenellah, 107 Hamilton, Lee, 140
guerrillas, 46, 74: advantage in war- Hamiti, Sabri: center of LDK power,
fare, 48; amateurs effective as, 45; 157
arms requirements, 112; base for Hammes, Thomas X., 67
launching, 77; classical, 69; com- hand grenades, 73
peted for funds, 89; compromise of Haradinaj, Daut, 168;
tactics, 71; culture of resistance, Haradinaj, Ramush, 33, 57, 152; AAK
39; dependent on popular support, platform for, 158; appeal of LDK-
26; Drenica, 72; east of Podujeve, AAK coalition, 161; arm every
76; effect of limited attacks, 66; fa- civilian, 72; brothers’ deaths, 44;
cilitated by population removal, 80; charges against, 170; chastened by
failure of Sandinistas, 67; forestall 1998 experience, 84; commander
concentration of forces, 66; 4GW, of Dukagjini zone, 84; control of
relation to, 67; ideal, 42; image, arms supply, 84; control of Çeku,
71; IRA use, 73; KLA as, 2; KLA 164; control of weapons flow, 125;
began with, 69; KLA limits of, 69; corruption rumors, 164; cred-
KLA movement away from, 70; late ibility regarding final status, 165;
operations in Llap, 80; limited to crisis, 57; criticism of, 35; criti-
small targets, 76; Marxist doctrine, cism of Krasniqi, 85; criticism of
105; offensive, 72; poor coordina- talkers, 81; discouraged religion,
tion, 62; prolonged, 67; relation- 102; estimate of arms supply, 116;
ship to conventional tactics, 65; estimated forces, 79; exemplar of
Remi commitment to, 72; roads Defenders at Home, 18; Florin Kras-
and coal mine, 70; sacrifice purity niqi, links to, 95; force levels, 83;
of doctrine, 62; suitability of law force size, 111; fundraising, 92, 94;
of armed conflict for, 169; superior and General Staff, 84; geopolitics,
local knowledge, 66; tactics during views on, 13; give every man a gun,
NATO bombing, 62; theory, 64; 104; indictment, 162, 167, 171; lack
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 217 6/4/08 1:50:44 PM

218 Index
of knowledge, 85; learn by fighting, Hoti, Mensur, 50

101; maximum force strength, 79; Hoxha, Enver: alignment with Sta-
media effectiveness, 148; memorial lin, 7; association with KLA, 133;
in home of, 44; modern politics, death, 134; early attitude toward
156; nationalist upbringing, 21; Kosovar separatists, 22; fear of
offer to step down as commander, Soviet Union, 22; support for KLA,
86; opposition to prime minister- 132; victory after World War II, 6
ship, 162; personality, 18; postwar human rights, 136: abuses’ effect
political role, 155; prime minister, on public opinion, 138; basis for
154; prosecution problems, 172; intervention, 3; conventions, 169;
resignation as prime minister, 163; effect on international law, 137;
reverence for, 104; role of luck, 85; Milosevic record, 14; visibility to
“saying hello to them,” 72; target international community, 63
of Serb attacks, 69; Thaçi, compe- Human Rights Watch, 49; KLA size,
tition with, 166; Thaçi, tensions 111; reports on violations, 54
with, 163; threats to Planners in humiliation: by Serbian police, 24
Exile, 63; training, disdain for, 101; Hungary, 22; relative status, 52; So-
training by doing, 105; and 2004 viet intervention, 132
riots, 160; visibility of, 71; why we
fought, 1 Ibishi, Nuredin. See Commander
Hasani, Nait, 120; responsibility, 82 Leka
Haziri, Lufti, 164 ICL: adapting to insurgencies, 172;
health services, 127; at zone level, application to KLA, 170; attack on
128 a civilian population, 170; due pro-
hearts and minds, 53, 123, 145, 182; cess requirements, 174; duties same
competing visions for winning, 26; for KLA fighters as for Serb forces,
goal of insurgency, 2; Milosevic 169; permissible targets, 175; poor
risked, 49; struggle for within Alba- fit with insurgency, 169; protected
nian community, 32 persons, 176; vicarious liability, 170
Heritage Foundation, 141 ICTY: decision in Limaj case, 170;
heroism, 65 establishment, 169; Haradinaj in-
Highland Lute, The, 20 dictment, 162; liabililty for acts of
Hill, Christopher, 140 others, 170; no jurisdiction unless
Ho Chi Minh, 67 armed conflict, 170; pressure to
Holbrooke, Richard: crucial to cease- be evenhanded, 169; prosecutorial
fire, 57; encouraged Operation Ko- strategies, 171; provisional release
sovo, 4; essentiality of leadership, of Haradinaj, 168; vicarious liabil-
141; ignored Rugova, 15; Kosovo ity, 172
efforts, 147; meeting with KLA, 34 ideology: KLA, 28; Marxist, 22; mobi-
Homeland Calls: centralization, 93; lizing, 27; nationalist, 29
definition, 89; early fundraising in Illyrian: root of Albanian people, 5
Chicago, 95; early stages, 94; effect independent state, 181, 185; Kosovo
of being designated organization, as, 132, 135
99; funds for Dukagjini, 92; funds informers: compromised Llap posi-
for Llap, 92; interference from LDK, tions, 77; as targets, 73
90; KLA fund, 89; legally registered, intelligence war, 8, 133
97; Michigan chapter, 90; pur- interdiction: blurred with ethnic
chases, 94; source of contributions, cleansing, 50; counterinsurgency
91; total amounts, 92; in Zurich, 97 strategy, 49; dependent on intelli-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 218 6/4/08 1:50:44 PM

Index 219
gence, 50; early anti-KLA strategy, Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, 142
54 Ivanovic, Milan, 158
interim government, 153; Rugova Izebegovic, Alia, 29
rejection of, 153
Interior Ministry, 48 jails, 23
International Criminal Court for the Jashari, Adem, 28, 57; arrest, 133;
former Yugoslavia. See ICTY charisma, 34; criticism of, 35;
international criminal law. See ICL death, 56; decapitation, 50; effect of
international intervention, 47; Alba- massacre of, 182; effect of massacre
nia, 132; aspects other than NATO on international community, 136;
bombing, 131; borders, changing, effect on consciousness of poten-
135; dependent on U.S. leadership, tiality, 38; effect on international
138; evolution, 134; goal of KLA, public opinion, 138; effect on KLA,
48; human rights justification, 137; 34; escaped capture in 1993, 56;
and international law, 136, 166; flood of volunteers, 83; manner of
KLA efforts to shape, 142; lobbying, death, 39; massacre, 56; massacre,
145; necessity, 130, 131; prompted effect of, 38; meeting with Remi,
by ethnic cleansing, 49; public 50; memorial, 44; mentor of Thaçi,
relations, 145; significance of, 132; 44; 1998 attack on, 9; picture on
strategy to procure, 62; and terror- walls, 34; relationship with Thaçi,
ism, 145 17; reliance on Thaçi and Selimi,
international law: backseat to politi- 82; Remi, instructions to, 115; re-
cal factors, 138; and intervention, placed by Thaçi and Planners in Ex-
137; role, 135; state practice, 175; ile, 44; reporter access to, 149; role
training, 101; war crimes prosecu- model, 103; stimulated volunteer
tion new feature of, 169 flow, 100; target of Serb attacks, 69;
international sympathy, 63, 64 training in Albania, 56; volunteers,
IRA, 37; hit-and-run tactics, 73; KLA assassination of induced, 70; and
rejected tactics, 145; KLA similar Zahir Pajaziti, 82
to, 73 JCE, 171, 172; foreseeability, 173;
Iraq: insurgents, toughness of, 48; theory of Haradinaj liability, 171;
similarities, 12 tightening of, 173; vague allega-
Ireland: Catholic identity in, 29; tions, 172
model for Albanian separatists, 7; Jerliu, Naim, 157
protracted struggle, 14; sources of Jessen-Petersen, Soren, 162, 167
KLA targeting strategy, 73 Joint Criminal Enterprise. See JCE
Iron Curtain: fall of, 22, 29; raising Joint Interim Administrative Struc-
of, 8 ture, 154
Islam: accusations by Milosevic, Junik, 121, 123; site of Holbrooke
144; ideology available to KLA, 28; meeting with KLA, 34
threat to international support, 29 just war, 136, 177
Islamic extremists, 3
Islamic fundamentalism, 119; role in Kaçanoll, 50: battle of, 57, 77; north-
Bosnia, 29; threat from, 3 ern limit of KLA line, 76; terrain, 77
Israel, 66 Kadare, Ismail, 21
Italian occupation, 6 KCC, 148
Italy: arms interdiction, 133; obsta- KDOM, 136; convoyed reporters, 149
cles to arms supply, 119; World War Kelmendi, Ibrahim: early fundrais-
II administration of Kosovo, 5 ing, 94
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 219 6/4/08 1:50:44 PM

220 Index
KFOR: confiscation of KLA weap- did not fight, 158; early support for
ons, 116; poor performance in 2004 KLA, 32; inflated estimates, 111;
riots, 161; reinforcements for 2004 influence, 35; smoothed relations
riots, 160 with commanders, 85; survived, 57;
kill zone, 74 visibility, 33
KLA arsenal. See weapons: require- Krasniqi, Safet, 127
ments Krasniqi, Selim, 168
KLA communications, 126 Kukes, 120
KLA communiqués, 32; emphasis on Kuqi, Hajredin, 157
foreign occupation, 146; first, 82; Kurti, Albin, 164
fundraising theme, 90; manipulated KVM, 136; force size estimates, 111
Western fears, 145
Klosi, Fatos: accused by Majko, 133; lack of knowledge, 85
arrest, 134; support for KLA, 133; Ladifi, Liridon, 26, 30
weapons for KLA, 133 Lahuta, 21
Koha Ditore, 150; English language Lama, General Kulusi, 121
news, 149; role in getting the story Lapushnik, 78
out of Kosovo, 148; Veton Surroi, law of war, 107; adapting to guerrilla
150 insurgencies, 170; training, 107
Kosovar Serbs, 159; non-participation LDK, 8; after the war, 154; anchor for
in elections, 159; opposition to Peaceful Path Institutionalists, 28;
greater autonomy, 7 barrier to independence, 53; and
Kosovo Action Network, 148 Berisha, 133; certain to win, 156;
Kosovo Police Service: absorption of coalition with AAK, 162; Commu-
KLA personnel, 151; KLA veterans nist heritage, 157; control of stories
in, 9, 152 about KLA, 25; controlled presi-
Kosovo Protection Corps: absorption dency, 156; dominance of fundrais-
of KLA personnel, 151; KLA veter- ing events, 88; election results
ans in, 9, 152 2004, 161; electoral expectations,
Kosovo 2015, 158 155; hostility to KLA continued
Kosumi, Bajram: loyalty to Haradinaj after war, 152; leadership contend-
insufficient, 163; missteps as prime ers, 164; message consistency, 146;
minister, 163; as prime minister, news blackout on KLA, 150; op-
162; thin links with KLA, 162 position in Chicago, 95; opposition
Krasniqi, Ahmet, 86 to KLA fundraising, 88; political
Krasniqi, Florin, 43; congressional vacuum after Rugova’s death, 163;
trip to KLA camps, 146; criticism postwar election results, 155; radio
of U.S. intelligence, 140; and Haliti, station used for fundraising, 90;
95, 97; in-kind contributions, 91; reasons for electoral success, 157;
journalist trips, 147; leadership, 95; Sejdiu as general secretary of, 163;
lynchpin of fundraising, 94; links skill at public relations, 32; spin for
to Haradinaj, 95; links to individual media, 148; support for KLA, 35;
commanders, 95; lobbying, 146; undermining KLA message, 32; use
public relations advice to com- of AAK to split KLA vote, 158; veto
manders, 146; recruited other fund- of grand coalition decisions, 162
raisers, 95; speakers for fundraising League of Prizren, 20
events, 90 Lebanon, 14
Krasniqi, Jakup, 157; criticized by Ha- legal restrictions on weapons, 125
radinaj, 85; disdain for those who legal treatment, 175; recruitment, 68;
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 220 6/4/08 1:50:45 PM

Index 221
Serb description of KLA, 73; Serb mander of Drenica Zone, 84; esti-
media releases, 149; U.S. legisla- mate of arms supply, 116
tion, 99
legitimacy: challenges to Thaçi’s in- Macedonia: Albanian parties, 4; Al-
terim government, 153; corruption banian population, 5; contributors,
undermines, 53; KLA increased by 94; extension of conflict to, 84; no
Rambouillet, 58; KLA reinforced by attacks in, 145; origin of contribu-
Serb attacks, 138; KLA’s, 33 tors, 91; recruits from, 42; refugee
Limaj, Fatmir, 44, 157, 164 camps, 9; refugee camps effect on
lines of communication, 120; disper- public opinion, 138; refugees, 4;
sal of, 125; Haradinaj defense of, 72; spillover of Kosovo conflict, 138;
Llap goal, 71 Yugoslav republic, 5, 6
literature (Albanian), 21 machine guns: Battle of the Bridge,
LKÇK: Murati’s role in, 25; strategy, 75; description, 113; Kaçanoll, 77;
26 KLA use of, 73; Lapushnik, 78;
Llap, 47; direct contributions, 92; drill requirements, 112, 114; supply in
instructors, 102; effect of Pajaziti Dukaghini, 116; total supply, 116;
assassination, 56; emergency funds training, 103, 106
for, 98; force size, 111; goals, 71; Majko, Pandeli, 133–34
haven in mountains, 77; indepen- Major, John, 135
dent from other regions, 82; Jashari Malisheva: Campbell, Greg, in, 149;
plans for, 115; KLA strategy in, 62; center of KLA activity, 1; force lev-
Pajaziti in, 44; preparations, 76; pre- els in, 83
serving forces, 80; radio equipment, Mao Tse-Tung, 26; foundation of
126; radio system, 96; Remi as 4GW, 67; military strategy, 105;
commander of, 18; Serb attacks in, phase I, 49; political nature of war,
69; Serb supply lines, 120; spending 67; popular support, 64; third phase,
totals, 92; Swiss contributions, 91; 71
tactical training, 105; tactics, 71; Marine Corps: See U.S. Marine Corps
terrain, 66; total arms, 116; train- Martini, Gjok: early Detroit activi-
ing, 100, 104; training instructors, ties, 95; newspaper advertisements,
108; training on law of armed con- 146
flict, 107; training well organized, martyrs, 34
102; villagers, 104; weapons flow Marxism-Leninism, 29
dried up, 80; weapons training, 106; Marxist: guerrilla doctrine, 105; ideol-
Zone, 84 ogy available to KLA, 22, 28; KLA
local knowledge, 122, 125; guerrilla labeled as, 15, 25; modification of
advantage, 66; of KLA recruits, 42; doctrine, 64
KLA reliance on, 69 media: access to KLA, 71; Bosnia, ef-
Loshaj, Xhavid, 71, 122 fect of, 138; essentiality, 137; inter-
Loyd, Anthony, 147 est in KLA, 137, 147; KLA reliance
LPK, 7; early hopes for second front, on, 147; reaction to Racak massa-
63; formerly LPRK, 28; and Home- cre, 142; Rugova attacks on KLA,
land Calls, 94; membership dues, 15; Serb media center, 149; way to
91 fight the war, 147; young Kosovars
LPRK, 7; Bexheti and, 95; change of worked on, 147
name, 8, 28; and Homeland Calls, medical care, 127
94; membership dues, 91 Mehmeti, Myzafer (“Freddie”), 89,
Lushtaku, Sami, 44, 45, 111; com- 90, 93, 119; Chicago fundraising,
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 221 6/4/08 1:50:45 PM

222 Index
95; compliance with Customs, 97; mines: detecting, 122; disarming, 103;
face-to-face solicitation, 95; re: on goat trails, 122; infeasibility at
secrecy, 50 Kaçanoll, 77; KLA target, 70
message: fundraising, 89–90. See also Mitrovica: drowned children, rumors
public relations of, 159; KLA positions east of, 76;
M48, 106 Serb supply lines in, 77; weak sup-
Military Advisory Committee, 110 port for KLA, 26
military discipline: training, 101, 104; Mitrovica-Peja road, 70
and war crimes liability, 174 money: from Bukoshi, 87; from busi-
military police, 108 nessmen, 91; channeled through
military theory, 64: anti-insurgency, businesses, 96; contribution re-
48; classical, 64; Fourth Generation quested, 90; drug and prostitution,
War, 67; guerrilla war, 65; suicide 93; Haliti responsibility, 81; illicit
terrorism, 67 activities, 93; invisible trail, 98;
Milosevic, Slobodan: abandoned KLA desire for Bukoshi’s, 86; Swiss
reform, 52; accusations against contributors directly to command-
KLA, 144; alternatives, 48; arms ers, 91; for terrorists, 99; under the
for Kosovo Serbs, 55; assumptions bed, 97; versus in-kind, 91; and vis-
about ethnic cleansing, 58; assump- ibility, 97
tions about refugees, 59; bad media money for the wedding, 64
image, 147; capitulation reasons, money laundering: U.S. legislation, 99
59; Christmas warning to, 139; Montenegro: Albanian population, 5;
claims of dirty money, 93; conflict arms through, 121; contributors,
with Albanian political elites, 8; 94; experiences in, 93; origin of
disdain for Albanian values, 4; ef- contributors, 90; Yugoslav republic,
fect of agreement in Rambouillet, 5, 6
57; election, 22; facilitated for- mortars: description, 113; training,
eign characterization, 30; ignored 106
Kosovo, 14; influence on popular mules and donkeys, 121
attitudes, 27; international hostility MUP, 48; supply lines, 120; training
to, 14; international opprobrium, models, 100
135; KLA recruiter, 37; KLA threat Murati, Valon: force size estimates,
to, 71; lack of public confidence, 111; political activities, 25; strat-
52; near misses, 57; near success egy, 26; visibility, 33
against KLA, 143; 1998 agreement music: Albanian folk, 21; Serb use
with Rugova, 136; original target of of, 78
war crimes judicial machinery, 167; Muslim: character of Kosovo, 2; little
public hostility to, 138; reaction to role in training, 102; propensity for
NATO failure, 60; rejection of key fundamentalism, 3
terms at Rambouillet, 151; replaced
army leadership, 54; revocation of naiveté: of Planners in Exile, 16
autonomy for Kosovo, 52; sporadic Nano, Fatos, 118, 133
reform efforts, 51; strategic goal and National Movement for the Libera-
objectives, 47; strengthened Alba- tion of Kosovo. See LKÇK
nian self-sufficiency, 51; support national unity government, 156
for Rugova approach, 53; threat to nationalism, 6, 169: breathing space
families, 39; understood risk of in- under Tito, 21; fundraising ap-
ternational intervention, 49; upper peals to, 89; future insurgencies,
hand over KLA, 57 11; ideology available to KLA, 28;
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 222 6/4/08 1:50:45 PM

Index 223
KLA was, 20; long history of, 14; opportunity costs: for KLA volun-
motivation for insurgency, 2; power teers, 40
of, 181; primary KLA ideology, 29; oppression, foreign, 27
product of isolation, 20; stimulus ORA: frozen out of 2004 coalition,
for conflict, 10; strengthening, 10; 162; organization, 161
terrorists, motivation, 67; Thaçi as, Order of Battle: KLA, 59
17; Yugoslav, 5 OSCE, 156; first elections, 155; force
nationalist symbols under Tito, 7 size estimates, 111; missions in Ko-
NATO, 54, 98; arms routes, 92; ar- sovo, 136; observer missions, 134
rival in Prishtina, 81; authoriza- Ottoman Empire: collapse of, 6; divi-
tion of force, 136; in Bosnia, 137; sion of Albanian population, 5;
Bosnia bombing, 59; confiscation Leage of Prizren resistence to, 20;
of KLA weapons, 116; disorganized Skenderbeg revolt against, 21
response to 2004 riots, 160; effect overconfidence, 70
of bombing on KLA, 59; effect of
failure, 60; effect of fiftieth an- Pajaziti, Zahir, 30, 115, 120; assas-
niversary, 141; effect on ethnic sination, 56; assassination, effect
cleansing, 138; effect on KLA, 131; of, 115; background, 44; charisma,
effect on Milosevic position, 58; 34; demonstrate armed resistance
effects on KLA, 59; end of bombing as possibility, 72; failure to protect,
campaign, 153; forced KLA back 84; independence from other KLA
to guerrilla tactics, 62; fragility of, groups, 82; influence on Remi, 72;
58; human rights justification, 136; Remi worked with, 19; replaced by
inevitability after Rambouillet, Remi, 44; and Rexhep Selimi, 82;
151; insistence on at Rambouillet, statue of, 44; statute, 34; target of
151; little help to KLA, 80; onset of Serb attacks, 69
bombing campaign, 9; poor perfor- Pape, Robert, 67
mance in 2004 riots, 161; reinforce- paramilitary forces, 49
ments for 2004 riots, 160; reliance partisans: military strategy, 105;
on KLA, 59; response to 2004 riots, Tito’s forces, 7
159; training model, 105; training patriotic spirit: KLA, 65; military ad-
models, 102; U.S. leadership, 138; vantage of, 64
U.S. military assets essential to, PDK, 156; approval for Rexhepi deci-
138 sions, 162; association with AAK,
New York, 90; Kosovars in, 94; suspi- 161; controlled prime minister post,
cions of, 95; total amounts raised, 156; creation by Thaçi, 153; elec-
92 tion results of 2004, 161; electoral
NGOs: enthusiasm for Haradinaj, 158 expectations, 155; factions, 157;
1974 constitution, 22 frozen out of 2004 coalition, 162;
night vision binoculars, 126–27: sup- Krasniqi in, 32; leadership conten-
ply of, 123 tion, 164; old wolves, 157, 158; as
non-participants, 170 opposition party after 2004 elec-
tions, 161; postwar election results,
occupation, 30; breeder of resistance, 156; reasons for electoral disap-
181; British in Palestine, 66; Serb pointment, 157; Sejdiu friendly to,
control of Kosovo as, 13; Serb forces 163
as, 63 Peaceful Path Institutionalists, 47;
Operation Arrow, 80 army, 81; and Berisha, 133; Bukoshi
opinion polls, 35 as leader of, 15; conflict with KLA,
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 223 6/4/08 1:50:45 PM

224 Index
10, 16; criticisms of fundraising, Remi’s early activities in, 19; Serb
98; denial of KLA, 32; discredited forces near, 76, 77; Serb free hand,
by Dayton Accords, 8; interference 80; Serb supply lines, 120; source of
with KLA fundraising, 90; intro- recruits, 50
duction of term, 8; introduction to, points: unit of KLA, 82
14; joint lobbying effort with KLA, points of refuge, 66
146; leadership competition re final police: harassment, 27; Lehi, target of,
status, 165; postwar tensions with 66; targets of KLA, 61; vulnerable
former KLA leaders, 166; public- in Palestine, 66
ity to repression, 144; reassurance political elite. See elites
of international community, 143; political parties, 156
roots in Marxism, 28; Rugova as popular support, 127; building, how
leader of, 14; splintered fundraising, to, 27; building through operations,
88; strategy, 26; undermining KLA 41; civilian attacks undermine, 68;
message, 32 effect of police state techniques,
Peja, 145 49; essential for revolution, 26;
Peja-Gjakova road, 70 essentiality for insurgency, 2; fight-
pessimism: embedded in Albanian ing to build, 36; goal of Defenders
culture, 37; role in insurgency orga- at Home, 63; KLA goal, 64; KLA
nization, 28 reliance on, 69; lack of, 26; makes
Pettifer, James, 147, 148 counterinsurgency impossible, 181;
physical fitness: emphasis on, 107; makes interdiction harder, 50; Mao
guerrillas and, 100; KLA recruits, emphasis on, 64; need for critical
41, 106; screening for, 102; training, mass of, 3; need not be universal,
104, 106 26; for postwar leaders, 166; result-
Planners in Exile, 7, 14, 23; aid to ing from Milosevic policies, 47; role
Haradinaj, 79; Albania, Republic of, of Islam in building, 29; for Rugova,
support, 92; appointment of com- 35; stimulated by fighting, 87; and
manders, 83; Bukoshi collaboration terrorism, 145; undermining Yugo-
with, 15; characterized as children, slav myth, 30
16; critical of Krasniqi, 94; divi- positional warfare: defensive, 70; KLA
sion of duties, 81; early fundraising, movement toward, 70; targets self-
88; Haliti as leader of, 17; Hara- defined, 73; terrain advantages, 66
dinaj respect for, 85; impatience postwar politics, 152; Albin Kurti,
to start fight, 87; integration with 164; effect of war crimes prosecu-
Defenders at Home, 63; need for, tions, 166; elections, 155; KLA
81; opposition to assimilation, 22; experience defined, 152, 166; KLA
outlook for insurgency, 67; overlap popularity, 153; LDK-AAK coali-
with Homeland Calls, 89; postwar tion, 161
tensions with Defenders at Home, Potera, Ajet, 38, 74, 76, 80, 103; as-
166; replaced Jashari, 44; return to sessment of training effectiveness,
Kosovo, 9; roots in Marxism, 28; 108; training leadership, 108
shedding Marxist label, 29; Thaçi Prekaz: Jashari massacre, 56; Jashari
and Selimi outreach to Defenders memorial, 44
at Home, 82; Thaçi bridge with, 17; Preshevo Valley: arms source, 119;
threats by Haradinaj, 63; vertical connection to Llap, 71; origin of
links for Defenders at Home, 82 contributors, 91; weapons through,
PLO, 37; KLA rejected tactics, 145 124
Podujevë: Kacinoll overlooks, 77; press. See media
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 224 6/4/08 1:50:46 PM

Index 225
Prime Minister, 152; Çeku, 45, 154; recklessness: Bukoshi’s fear of, 16;
Haradinaj, 162; postwar weakness, KLA, 35; KLA recruits, 41; of Plan-
156; Thaçi as interim, 16; under ners in Exile, 16
constitutional framework, 155 recruiting, 36: culture of resistance,
principle of distinction, 175 effect of, 39; deterrence by Serbs,
Prishtina: center of political elites, 31; 41; facilitated by brutal regime, 48;
contributions, 92; herds of report- suicide attackers, 68
ers, 149; KLA marches into, 9; KLA relative deprivation, 52; causes, 51;
positions north of, 76; Operation vacillation, 52
Kosovo activities, 4; Remi connec- religion: avoidance of, 146; limited
tions in, 84; trade union demonstra- role in Albanian culture, 5; power
tion, 159; 2004 riots in, 159; weak of, 181; weak motivator, 3
support for KLA, 26 Remi, 57, 164; accusations by LDK,
Prishtina-Peja road, 70 157; affection with soldiers, 19;
Prishtina-Prizren road, 70 arms sources, 119; arms supply,
prisoners: due process, 174; treatment 119; commander of Llap Zone, 84;
of, 107 criticism of, 35; direct contribution,
privatization: blockage of, 159; frus- 91; discouraged religion, 102; early
tration with, 160 recruiting efforts, 50; effective with
Prizren: 2004 riots, 160; weak support media, 148; end of war, 80; estimate
for KLA, 26 of arms supply, 116; fundraising,
profile of typical KLA soldier, 41 94; independence from General
Protocol of Florence, 20 Staff, 84; links to Krasniqi, 95;
Provisional Administrative Council movies, watching, 45; nationalist
of Kosovo: establishment, 154 upbringing, 21; prosecution for war
public relations: core of KLA strat- crimes, 168; subordinates, reliance
egy, 2; effect of early attacks, 30; on, 71. See also Commander Remi
influence on tactics, 70; launch repression: effect of increased, 69;
of campaign, 82; LDK skill at, 32; KLA exploitation of, 10, 55; KLA
message, consistency of, 146; mes- use of, 144; publicized by Peaceful
sage in 1981, 24; Rugova’s message, Path Institutionalists, 144; risks
143; Serb attacks in 1998, 137 of, 64; stimulus for insurgency, 2;
pyramid scheme, 133 vacillation, 51
Republika Srpska, 119
Qakllavici, 159 returning refugees and expatriates:
entitlement to positions, 154
Raçak: effect of, 142; media attention, Revolutionary Movement for Alba-
147 nian Unity, 34
radio equipment, 126 Rexhepi, Bajram, 127, 128; influence
Radio Shack radios, 126 in PDK, 157; as prime minister,
Rama, Fahri, 27, 36 156, 162; 2004 riots, 160
Rambouillet, 9, 85, 150, 152; Alba- Rilindja, 21
nian divisions at, 35; effect of Serb riots of 1968, 7, 159
agreement, 57; Thaçi as star of, 16; riots of 2004, 159; author witnessed,
Thaçi visibility at, 33 159; debate over origins, 159; politi-
Ramer, Jacob A., 173 cal solidarity after, 161; serious-
Ramush. See Haradinaj, Ramush ness, 160; Thaçi’s role, 160; wakeup
Rankovic, Alexandr: repression of call, 159
Kosovo, 7, 21 risk, 40
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 225 6/4/08 1:50:46 PM

226 Index
roommates as KLA volunteers, 40 etration of FARK, 86; presence in

RPGs, 114; KLA use of, 114 Kosovo, 49; as targets, 38; threat to
Rugova, Ibrahim: alternatives to, 33; horizontal links, 82
background, 14; and Berisha, 133; secede, 185; Kosovo’s right to, 135;
better for Milosevic, 53; blocked power to, 135
Thaçi as prime minister, 156; secret police: assassination of Ger-
branded as a traitor, 157; charisma, vallas and Zeka, 24; assassination
15; disaffection with, 33; early post- of Pajaziti, 56; deterrent effect on
war attitudes, 15; effect of Dayton recruiting, 41; fundraisers wor-
Accords, 32; electoral expectations, ried about, 50; interdiction of 1993
155; fear of KLA, 154; final illness, training, 8; KLA labeled as, 15;
163; fundraisers not opposed, 90; masquerading as KLA, 143; target
international attitudes toward, 154; of intelligence war, 8; targeted by,
leader of Peaceful Path Institution- 31; as targets, 38
alists, 14; leadership of LDK, 157; Security Council: early resolutions,
lobbying in Washington, 145; mes- 136; establishment of ICTY, 169;
sage consistency, 146; Milosevic resolution for Kosovo indepen-
reforms, 51; news blackout on KLA, dence, 165; Russian veto, 142
150; news monopoly, 149; 1998 Security Council Resolution 1244,
agreement with Milosevic, 136; 132, 153
opposed armed resistance, 86; oppo- Sejdiu, Fatmir: becomes president,
sition to KLA, 63; overcoming his 163; governing effectiveness, 165
propaganda, 71; postwar role, 154; self-determination, 135
press conferences exposing repres- Selimi, Rexhep, 27, 28, 64, 81; bond-
sion, 144; promise of Serb oppor- ing Defenders at Home with Plan-
tunities, 52; public preference for, ners in Exile, 82; influence, 35;
31; public support, 35; refused to mode of travel, 82; Pajaziti contact
deal with Thaçi, 153; skill at public with, 82; responsibility, 82; trans-
relations, 32; sought international mitted orders from General Staff,
intervention, 131; succeeded by 83
Sejdiu, 163; successorship, 162; un- Selimi, Sylejman, 85
dermining KLA message, 32 September 11, 2001, 99
rule of law: decreases appeal of insur- Serb security. See secret police
gency, 53; tension with democrati- Shala, Blerim, 156
zation, 152 Sharkia, 21
Russia, 183; loss of power, 13; and Sigurimi, 121, 133
NATO bombing, 142; role in defin- size of KLA, 111
ing Albania, 20; source of night vi- Skenderbeg, 20
sion binoculars, 127 Smith, Christopher, 146
Snake, 82; Thaçi’s nickname, 17
Salihu, Jashar, 23; early fundraising, sniper rifles: in Battle of the Bridge,
94; in Zurich, 97 74; description, 113; from U.S., 119;
Sandinistas, 67 at Kaçanoll, 77; KLA use of, 73; pur-
Sanxhak, 119; OSCE in, 134; weapons chased in U.S., 97; requirements,
through, 124 113; supply in Dukagjini, 116; total
satellite phones, 126 supply, 116; training, 103, 106; U.S.
scorched-earth tactics: Serb, 65 source, 118
SDB: Drenica attacks on, 72; KLA sources of KLA weapons, 117
target, 69; operated in U.S., 50; pen- sovereignty, 153; and international in-
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 226 6/4/08 1:50:46 PM

Index 227
tervention, 137; legal concept, 135; superiority of numbers, 64; guerrilla

Serbian, 132 tactics dilute, 66; KLA lacked, 69;
Soviet Union, 10; collapse of, 29; Summer Offensive, 70
threat to Albanian and Yugoslavia, supply lines, 120; difficulty in inter-
22 rupting, 125; for KLA arms, 121;
special police: increased firepower, KLA harassment of, 78; KLA man-
62; less formidable than VJ, 79; as power commitment, 124; multiple,
targets, 176; withdrawal of, 136 125; opportunistic, 120
spirit of defiance, 10, 181; concept, surprise: defender advantage, 70; guer-
27; effect of ideology on, 28; har- rilla use of, 66; KLA reliance on, 69;
nessing, 27; KLA assumed, 28; military role of, 64; use of, 84
stimulus for participation, 10; Surroi, Veton: Kosovo 2015, 158;
strong in Kosovo, 28; Wood’s work negative view of Thaçi interim gov-
on, 27 ernment, 154; organization of ORA,
SRSG, 153 election results 2004, 161; political
Stalin: split with Tito, 7; Tito’s break assets, 154; postwar political role,
with, 22 154, 158; public relations genius,
stars aligned, 3 150
Stern, Jessica, 40 Swiss contributions, 91
stockpiles, weapons, 117, 122, 123 Swiss government, 98
strategic bombing, 131 Switzerland: Albanian community,
strategic objectives: of KLA, 62; of 93; Arau, 94; arms purchases in,
Milosevic, 47 118; breeding ground for KLA,
strategy: Ali Ahmeti’s role, 84; civil- 23; contributions higher than in
ian attacks undermine, 68; dis- Germany, 90; contributions in-
dained by Defenders at Home, 17, kind, 91; early fundraising, 88,
63; ethnic cleansing, 53, 55; force 94; fundraising organization, 94;
preservation, 80; 4GW, 67, 143; as haven for political activists,
Haliti emphasis on, 17; Haradinaj 7; Homeland Calls chapters, 93;
deferral of, 72; health care, 128; KLA links through, 82; location of
Kadri Veseli, contributions to, 81; clandestine organizations, 7; LPRK
KLA for international intervention, in, 28; money to, 97; no attacks in,
143; lack of for 2004 riots, 160; 145; similarity to U.S., 91; source of
maturation of KLA, 69; procure in- arms, 118; source of contributions,
ternational intervention, 62; public 91; Thaçi’s escape to, 16; total con-
relations, 2; public relations trumps tributions, 92
military, 70; reform, 51; Remi’s Syla, Azem, 57; commander in chief,
emphasis on, 72; Rugova’s passive, 84; early fundraising, 94; requests
143; Sandinistas, 67; suicide, 68; for arms, 94; responsibilities, 81
targeting, 73; terrorizing civilians,
54; training, 105; waste of time, 63 tactics: altered to protect civil-
Strong, Andrew T., 177 ians, 144; Battle of the Bridge, 75;
Stuttgart, 23 changes in, 43; changing KLA, 70;
suicide attacks, 67 convention, shift to, 70; evalua-
Sultan, 85 tion of, 64; how Remi learned, 19;
Summer Offensive: disaster of KLA, maturation of KLA, 69; practice,
70; KLA, 70; KLA poorly organized, 102; Remi, 71; stall and divide, 58;
83; Serb forces involved in, 48; Serb strong-arm after war, 153; subor-
response to KLA, 56 dination to public relations, 70;
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 227 6/4/08 1:50:46 PM

228 Index
tagetting, 73; training, 101; vis- tion leader, 162; less popular with
ibility, 64 internationals than Haradinaj, 158;
tanks: attack on Jashari, 39; attack limited postwar control, 153; link
on Kaqinoll, 77; attack on KLA, 78; between Planners in Exile and De-
impotence of in Palestine, 66; near fenders at Home, 81; modern poli-
Podujeve, 76; Serb use of, 114; use tics, 156; nationalist upbringing,
of in 1981, 23; use of in 2004 riots, 21; need for old wolves, 158; politi-
159; use in summer offensive, 48; cal opposition after 2004 elections,
vulnerability of, 114 161; postwar political leadership,
targets, 177; Albanian informers, 73; 153; Prime Minister, desire to be,
Battle of the Bridge, 74; Bosnia, 59; 156; protégé of Jashari, 44; put self
chosen to undermine deterrence, at risk, 84; recruitment of Çeku, 85;
41; CIA warning, 142; civilian, 2; referendum on independence, 151;
civilian, KLA, 68, 73; expansion relationship with Adem Jashari, 17;
of NATO, 58; foreign capitals as, relationship with Haliti, 17; rela-
11; insurgency strategy, 73; IRA, tionship with Limaj, 164; replaced
similar to, 73; keeping in kill zone, Jashari, 44; responsibility, 81; rises
74; KLA selection of, 144; military to top, 35; security emphasis, 72;
units, 73; NATO, 80; permissible, survived, 57; tension with Haradi-
108; police as, 176; reinforcements, naj, 162; tensions with Haradinaj,
74; selection, 84; Serb protection of, 163; transmitted orders from Gen-
68; small, 76; soft, 82; training on eral Staff, 83; and 2004 riots, 160
permissible, 107 Three Percent Fund: Bukoshi and, 16;
terrain: defender advantage, 70; flat definition, 89; denial to KLA, 33;
and open, 75; guerrilla advantage, interference with KLA fundraising,
66; Kaqinoll, 77; KLA reliance on, 90; total amounts raised, 89
69; radio communication, 80; selec- Tirana: banks, 97; confrontation
tion of, 101; tactical training, 105 between Haradinaj and Planners
terrorism, 125: accusations of, 70, in Exile, 63; PR for KLA from, 147;
98, 130; accusations of KLA, 140; refugee crisis, 4; safeguarding cash
characterization of KLA, 9; CIA in, 98
warning, 141; KLA avoidance of, 2, Tito: conflict with Hoxha, 132; con-
68, 144–46; not necessary for KLA, trast with Milosevic, 30; death, 7,
68; resort to, 68; theory, 64, 67 23; effect of death, 29; fear of Soviet
Thaçi, 152; acquiescence in Sejdiu’s Union, 22; military strategy, 105;
selection, 163; action-oriented, 154; promise of referendum on accession
arrest, 133; blamed for postwar to Albania, 6; reforms, 51; vacil-
unrest, 154; bonding Defenders at lated regarding Albanian national-
Home with Planners in Exile, 82; ism, 6; victory after World War II, 6
charisma, 33; competition with tractors: arms movement, 123; weap-
Haradianj, 166; credibility regarding ons transport, 125
final status, 165; early background, training: Albania camps, 103; Çeku
16; early mistrust of, 16; estimates disdain for, 109; decentralized, 102;
of force size, 111; exclusion of early, 100; early camps in Albania,
non-KLA elements from PDK, 155; 8; effectiveness, 108; guerrillas
filled power vacuum, 153; frozen don’t need, 100; Jashari, Adem, 56;
out, 161; glamor, 35; glimpsed journalist visits, 147; law of armed
opportunity at Rambouillet, 150; conflict, 107; limited KLA, 65; little
growing confidence as opposi- needed, 3; materials, 100; military
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 228 6/4/08 1:50:47 PM

Index 229
discipline, 104; models, 101; need, Battle of the Bridge, 74; ties to
101; old ammunition, 106; physi- Çeku, 85; training models, 102;
cal conditioning, 106; pictures for weapons training, 106
fundraising, 90; protection of camp, U.S. intelligence community, 141
77; Remi’s emphasis on, 72; tactics, U.S. Marine Corps: movies as training
105; teachers, 108; terrain, 66; U.S. for KLA, 45; reaction to Battle of
Army, 104; of villagers, 104; weap- the Bridge, 74
ons, 106 U.S. support, opposition to Kosovo
training models, 101, 102; adaptation intervention, 140
of, 102; NATO, 102 University of Prishtina: attack on rec-
training school, 102 tor, 145; crucible for nationalists,
Trajkovic, Momchala, 158 23; effect on relative deprivation,
Treaties of London and Bucharest, 5 52; establishment, 7; 1981 demon-
Trepça, 23 strations, 7; 1981 protest, 23; open-
Tropoja: arms depot, 120, 122; con- ing of, 22; students in 2004 riot,
gressional trip to, 146 159; Thaçi as student vice-rector, 17
Turkey: source of arms, 119; spillover UNMIK: constitutional framework,
of Kosovo conflict, 138 155; control of Haradinaj, 164; es-
tyranny of boys, 23 tablishment, 153; Jessen-Petersen
as head, 162; provisional adminis-
UNHCR: database for refugee relief, trative council, 154; rioters burned
4; 1998 visit to, 1 vehicles, 160; unprepared, 153; veto
uniforms: contributed in-kind, 91; power, 159
introduction of, 62; preoccupation
with, 105; spending on, 92; supply Veseli, Kadri, 81
of, 127; utility of, 71 Viet Cong, 67
United Nations, 134 Vietnam, 56; model for Albanian
United States, 119; Albanian popula- separatists, 7
tion, 10; approved Albanian arms visibility: of armed resistance neces-
supply, 121; arms dealers, 119; sary, 86; even from defeat, 76; KLA
Arms Export Control Act, 125; arms need for, 69; of larger arms, 51; re-
regulations, 125; Christmas warn- duced by clandestine nature, 49
ing, 134; contributions higher than VJ, 48; arms used in Kosovo, 48;
in Germany, 90; early attention to desertion of Albanians from, 45;
Kosovo, 139; and Europe, 142; exist- introduction of, 70; KLA leader ser-
ing borders, commitment to, 145; vice in, 45; military strategy, 105;
fundraising, 91; fundraising leaders, more formidable than special po-
95; fundraising organization, 94; lice, 79; perception of invincibility,
Homeland Calls chapters, 93; lead- 31; sealing the border, 124; supply
ership, 138; legality of fundraising, lines, 120; targets of KLA, 72; train-
99; no financial support, 92; preoc- ing models, 100, 102, 105
cupation with Bosnia, 134; recogni- Vojvodina: autonomous republic of
tion of independence, 165; source of Serbia, 6; OSCE in, 134
night vision binoculars, 127; source volunteers, 42; courageous, 65; after
of uniforms and boots, 127; spend- Jashari massacre, 9, 70, 83, 100;
ing in, 97; target of Viet Cong, 67 limitations of, 79; in villages, 104
U.S. Army, 48; basic training, 104–5;
guerrilla attack doctrine, 74; physi- Walker, William G., 136, 142, 147;
cal conditioning, 106; reaction to statement to media about Racak, 142
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 229 6/4/08 1:50:47 PM

230 Index
war crimes: accusations against Hara- weapons on their backs, 107, 121
dinaj, 162; charges based on targets, White House, 120
73; database, 4; effect on postwar windows of opportunity, 14, 183
politics, 166; fairness of prosecu- Wood, Elizabeth Jean, 27
tions, 169; prosecution of individu-
als, 169; prosecution of KLA lead- youth, 40, 50, 57, 152, 164; adequate
ers, 167; protests over prosecutions, for insurgency, 3; casualties, 65;
159; Remi charged with, 19; threats disappointment in professors at
to prosecute KLA leaders, 152 university, 23; drawn by excite-
war veterans, 159 ment, 40; expectations in 1980s,
Warsaw Pact: collapse, 10, 52; disso- 24; nationalism, 68; newly awak-
lution of as factor, 14; effect of col- ened, 14; no military service, 108;
lapse, 24; weapons stockpiles, 117 older generation resentment of,
weapons: from Albania, 92; Albanian 155; political alienation, 165; post-
collapse, 83; capture, 66; cellphone adolescent pride and aggressive-
was my weapon, 150; concealment, ness, 11; postwar voting patterns,
123; confiscation of, 7; control of 156; recruitment, 10; restless with
supply by General Staff, 124; cost elders, 24; restlessness of, 10; San-
of, 117; distribution of, 121; early dinista, 67; support for as fundrais-
KLA, 73; flow to Llap, 80; from ing theme, 89; tend to lead revolu-
enemy, 75; Haliti responsibility, 81; tions, 23; Thaçi, 17; 2004 riots, 160;
influenced selection of commander, of volunteers, 65
83; in-kind contributions, 91; insuf- Yugoslavia, myth of, 30; 1974 Consti-
ficient supply, 115; at Lapushnik, tution, 7
78; legal control of heavier, 125;
logistics throughput, 123; from Zeka, Arianit, 28, 30
Middle East, 119; money for, 94; Zeka, Kadri, 23; assassination, 24;
mules and donkeys, 121; need for and Bexheti, 95; influence German
heavier, 71; orders, 118; purchased, government, 145
92; removal to Albania, 86; require- Zemaj, Tahir: insistent on separate
ments, 112–13; scarcity of, 110; command, 86; retreated with Duk-
searches for, 51; sources, 117; from agjini troops, 84
Serbia, 119; surrender to NATO, Ziba, Agim, 126
116; targets, 75; training, 101, 104, zones, 71
106; training, no need for, 100; Zurich: in-kind contribution, 91;
training in Albania, 103; transport money processing, 97
by individuals, 124; trips to Albania
for, 19; use of heavier, 113
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 230 6/4/08 1:50:47 PM

henry h. perritt jr. is a professor of law and
former dean at the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
He is the author of more than seventy law review
articles and fifteen books on international relations
and law, technology and law, and employment law.
He is a member of the bars of Virginia, Pennsylvania,
the District of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois, and the
United States Supreme Court. He is a member of the
Council of Foreign Relations and of the Economic
Club, is on the board of directors of the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, and has served as sec-
retary of the Section on Labor and Employment Law
of the American Bar Association. He was the Demo-
cratic nominee from the U.S. House of Representa-
tives from the Tenth Congressional District of Illinois
in 2002. He is currently working on a book about
final-status negotiations for Kosovo.
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 231 6/4/08 1:50:47 PM

The University of Illinois Press
is a founding member of the
Association of American University Presses.
__________________________________________
Composed in 9.5/12.5 Trump Mediaeval LT Std

by Jim Proefrock
at the University of Illinois Press
Manufactured by Thomson-Shore, Inc.
University of Illinois Press

1325 South Oak Street
Champaign, IL 61820-6903
www.press.uillinois.edu
i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 232 6/4/08 1:50:47 PM

KOSOVO
PERRITT
eastern european history / political science
the strategies of recruitment, training, and financ- LIBERATION
Kosovo Liberation Army

ARMY the inside story
ing that made the KLA one of the most success- “There is no one else capable of writing a book about any
ful insurgencies of the post–Cold War era. This modern insurgency that would combine this kind of in-
volume also tells the personal stories of young
people who took up guns in response to repeated
sider’s knowledge with such an acute appreciation for Kosovo
humiliation by “foreign occupiers,” as they per-
all the external factors surrounding the struggle.”
Liberation
of an insurgency
—Andrew Baruch Wachtel, dean of the Graduate School
ceived the Serb police and intelligence personnel.
Perritt illuminates the factors that led to the KLA’s
and director of the Roberta Buffett Center for International
and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University
Army
success, including its convergence with political the inside story
developments in eastern Europe, its campaign for of an insurgency
popular support both at home and abroad, and “Henry H. Perritt Jr. has written an impressive and com-
its participation in international negotiations and Henry H. Perritt Jr.
prehensive study of the personalities, strategy, and tactics
a peace settlement that helped pave the long road
T
of the Kosovo Liberation Army. His book is sure to be the he military intervention by NATO in Kosovo
from war to peace.
definitive source on the KLA and its role for researchers was portrayed in American media as a neces-
and policy makers.” sary step to prevent the Serbian armed forces
—Michael Peters, President, St. John’s College, Santa Fe from repeating the ethnic cleansing that had so
deeply damaged the former Yugoslavia. Serbia
Henry H. Perritt Jr. is a professor of law and trained its military on Kosovo because of an on-
director of the graduate program in financial going armed struggle by ethnic Albanians to wrest
services law at the Chicago-Kent College of Law. independence from Serbia. Warfare in the Balkans
He is the author of numerous law review articles seemed to threaten the stability of Europe, as well
and books on international relations and law, as the peace and security of Kosovars, and yet
of an insurgency
the inside story
technology and law, and employment law. armed resistance seemed to offer the only pos-
Urbana and Chicago sibility of future stability. Leading the struggle
www.press.uillinois.edu against Serbia was the Kosovo Liberation Army,
also known as the KLA.
Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an

Insurgency provides a historical background for
ISBN 978-0-252-03342-1 the KLA and describes its activities up to and in-
Jacket photo: A KLA memorial in the Sharr region
of Kosovo. Photo by author. cluding the NATO intervention. Henry H. Perritt
Jr. offers firsthand insight into the motives and
Design by Dennis Roberts
organization of a popular insurgency, detailing
ILLINOIS
Henry H. Perritt Jr.

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KOSOVO

the strategies of recruitment, training, and financ- LIBERATION

Kosovo Liberation Army

Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 1 6/4/08 1:50:05 PM

the inside story

university of illinois press

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 3 6/4/08 1:50:05 PM

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 4 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 5 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

1. Faces of the KLA and Its Kosovar Antagonists 13

2. Building and Maintaining Public Support 25

3. Recruiting Fighters and Commanders 36

4. Avoiding Annihilation, Taking Advantage

5. The KLA at War 61

9. Shaping International Reaction 130

10. Postwar Politics: The KLA at the Ballot Box 152

11. The KLA in the Dock 167

12. Conclusion 181

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 7 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

Roster of Key Individuals 189

Illustrations follow page 60

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This book started with a conversation with Fahri Rama, then

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 9 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

visits. Alban Rafuna put me in touch with many interesting participants

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 10 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

Foreign Relations, arranged for a manuscript discussion in which partici-

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 11 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 13 6/4/08 1:50:06 PM

Bajram Gjakova Ferazaj

ADRIATIC SEA KOSOVO

Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) area of operations, March 1999.

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 14 6/4/08 1:50:07 PM

Every Albanian knew that we would never escape from

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 1 6/4/08 1:50:07 PM

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 2 6/4/08 1:50:07 PM

military forces that are vastly superior in numerical, technological, and

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 3 6/4/08 1:50:07 PM

political humiliation. In Kosovo, recruitment was made easier—indeed

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 4 6/4/08 1:50:08 PM

cal and legal relationship with Yugoslavia. Those preliminary matters

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 5 6/4/08 1:50:08 PM

1945–85—Restless Nationalism Erupts Sporadically

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 6 6/4/08 1:50:08 PM

1985–93—Dreams and Plans for a Revolution

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 7 6/4/08 1:50:08 PM

to get arms; and crafting a fund-raising network. Meanwhile, the iron

1993–96—The Intelligence War

1996–98—The KLA’s War for Popular Opinion

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 8 6/4/08 1:50:08 PM

1998—A Shooting War

The Book in Brief

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 9 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

in the twenty-first century. It shows the tenacious power of nationalism

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 10 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

parental support. It explains how the KLA undermined Serb intimidation

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 11 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

participation in armed attacks against Serb targets, while others sought

i-xiv_1-232_Perr.indd 12 6/4/08 1:50:09 PM

Over the centuries, we struggled against occupation, and

The Kosovo Liberation Army fought a paradigmatic Fourth