Models of Revelation

The distinction between propositional and manifestational revelation is very general,

and a more fine-grained classification of conceivable means of revelation is
desirable. We have already seen that propositional (or non-manifestational)
revelation can be subdivided into “the causation model” and “the communication
model”. Beyond this, the theologian Avery Dulles has suggested a typology useful
for categorizing theories of manifestational revelation. He divides contemporary
theological accounts of revelation into five major classes depending on “their central
vision of how and where revelation occurs” (Dulles 1992: 27). Besides propositional
revelation (which he calls “Revelation as Doctrine”), Dulles discerns four basic
models for manifestational revelation.
Revelation as History. This model identifies revelation with God’s “great deeds” in
salvation history. The Bible is seen as the record of these deeds, for example the
Exodus or the resurrection of Jesus. The biblical text itself, however, is not part of
revelation. Some representatives of this approach hold that revelation must include a
supernatural cognitive assistance (illumination) so that the historical events can be
interpreted correctly (Baillie 1956: 65). Others deny that this is necessary
(Pannenberg 1968).
Revelation as Inner Experience. According to this model, revelation consists in
some kind of “privileged interior experience of grace or communion with God”
(Dulles 1992: 27). Some proponents claim that the interior experience is “pre-
conceptual” and occurs at a depth-level of consciousness that transcends and
embraces our ordinary experience of the world (Schleiermacher 1799 [1996: 25–26];
1830 [1999: 16–17]; Rahner 1978: Ch. V). Others take the relevant experiences to
be conceptually structured and more like perceptual experiences (Alston 1991; Pike
1992). The pre-conceptual view encounters epistemological puzzles about how non-
conceptual inner occurrences can justify beliefs about God, or how the experiences
can be about God in the first place (Proudfoot 1985).
Revelation as Dialectical Presence. This model intends to capture the thought of
Karl Barth—who is one of the most influential figures of revelation-theology in the
twentieth century—and his followers in the school of “dialectical theology”. For
Barth, revelation is a “non-objectifiable” encounter with God himself in Christ, an
event that is mediated by the Bible and the church’s proclamation about Christ. The
Bible itself, however, is not revelation but merely the channel through which
revelation “flows” whenever God wills this to happen. Moreover, since God is
“Wholly Other” and as such unknowable for humans, revelation must be described
in terms of a paradoxical dialectic of simultaneous “unveiling” and “veiling”.
“Revelation”, says Barth, “means the self-unveiling, imparted to men, of the God
who by nature cannot be unveiled to men” (Barth 1975: 320; see also Hart 2000). It
is unclear whether this model manages to present a coherent account of divine
revelation (for a sympathetic discussion, see McCormack 2008: 28–35). The
intention behind the model, however, is to reconcile the claim that revelation
provides real, objective knowledge of God with the claim that God radically
transcends all human categories and all created media of revelation.
Revelation as New Awareness. According to this model, revelation means a
transformation of human subjectivity, a “fulfillment of the inner drive of the human
spirit toward fuller consciousness”. Revelation does not disclose God as an “object”,
even though God might be “mysteriously present as the transcendent dimension of
human engagement in creative tasks”. In essence, revelation is more about seeing
the self and the world in a new light than about knowledge of God (Dulles 1992: 98,
99, 28).
Dulles’s models are theoretical constructions or “ideal-types”, and elements from
different models can be combined. For example, theologians like Paul Tillich and
Karl Rahner combine the “new awareness” model with experiential and historical
elements (Tillich 1951: 111–118, 120–122; Rahner 1966). It has been argued,
however, that none of the manifestational models presented above can provide—
either separately or in combination—a reasonable account of how knowledge of
God’s “theistic properties” (omnipotence, omniscience and infinite goodness) comes
about. Such an account requires appeal to propositional revelation at some point, or
at least to traditional natural theology (Wahlberg 2014: Ch. 3).