CHAPTER 3

Critiques of Deep Ecology

Since time immemorial there has been an incessant attempt to understand human

being‘s place in the cosmos and their interconnection with nature. One‘s sense of moral

constraint to ―others‖ – regarding human beings, biotic animals, and abiotic natural

environment comprises a considerate perception of both ―the moral self‖ and ―the other‖

with whom one enters into a relationship. This relationship seeks to understand the

ethical as well as the ontological status of the natural systems. In other words, in

environmental philosophy, two common perspectives are found in one or other form

regarding the man-environment-interaction. One is ―Man in Nature,‖ that distinguishes

the ontological status of the components of the universe from that of man, and the other

is ―Man and Nature,‖ that acknowledges a moral relationship between man and non-

human beings.

In the perspective of ―Man in Nature,‖ human being is conceived just as a part of

the scheme of things. The well-being of man is merged with the well-being of nature as

a whole. In this world-view, environmental justice is treated as the justice to all its

integral components and thereby justice to human beings, considering human beings as

a part of nature. In this outlook, the identity of ―Man‖ is overshadowed by that of

―Nature.‖ In the previous chapter, there was a discussion on deep ecology philosophy

that encompasses this perspective incorporating the symbiotic place of human beings in

the scheme of total things.

 On the other hand, the perspective of ―Man and Nature‖ is set on the belief that

human being and the non-human nature has an intimate relationship. This point of view

says that social injustice, such as inequality, racism, poverty, sexism, etc. and

environmental degradation has some common causes and accordingly, addressing of

one requires the addressing of other. In this philosophical position, one can point out a

kind of dualism between ―Man‖ and ―Nature‖ and assertion is made that environmental

justice and social justice go hand in hand. The theoretical framework of Social Ecology

and Ecofeminism, which are two streams of environmental philosophy along with deep

ecology, address the issue of social justice in dealing with environmental problems.

All these three streams, namely, Deep Ecology, Social Ecology and

Ecofeminism are broadly eco-centric in their outlook. But their critiques of the

dominant worldview and elaborations of the idea of ecological interconnectedness differ

to a certain extent. In the previous chapter, there has been a discussion on deep

ecology‘s position in the history of environmental philosophy. But the philosophy of

deep ecology of Naess has been criticized by various circles; among them, social

ecology and eco-feminism and the third world critics are the most prominent ones.

In promoting its position that social and ecological justice go hand in hand,

social ecology and eco-feminism attempt to discredit deep ecology. The basic focus of

this chapter, centres round the debate among the different schools of environmental

philosophy, particularly, the criticism of deep ecology by social ecology and eco-

feminism. Also, since social justice is concerned in handling an environmental issue,

this chapter will focus on the debate between the third world critiques of

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environmentalism and deep ecology. Before going into the critical part, it is important

to be acquainted with the standpoints of the critics.

3.1 The Critics: A brief Introduction:

3.1.1 Social Ecology:

The main tenet of social ecology is to understand the relationship between nature

and society. Social ecology believes that this relationship is a holistic unity in diversity.

It recommends one to use one‘s gifts of sociability, communication, and intelligence as

if one is ―nature rendered conscious,‖ instead of turning them into the very source and

origin from which such gifts derive. Its aim is to reintegrate human social development

with biological development and human communities with eco-communities. Therefore,

social ecology advocates the elimination of objective social causes like social hierarchy,

capitalism, nation-state, etc. By all these suggestions social ecology, accordingly, claims

itself to be in the enlightenment and revolutionary tradition (Arumugam 118).

The best-known exponent of social ecology is the American political

philosopher Murray Bookchin1. Bookchin seeks to eliminate the modern nation state

and advocates giving maximum political and economic freedom to decentralized

regional communities. He opposes all forms of social oppression as well as the

domination of the nonhuman world. According to him, the main causes of the

1
Bookchin (1921-2006) is considered as the founder of social ecology. His classic works include Post-
Scarcity Anarchism (1971), The Ecology of Freedom (1982), The Philosophy of Social Ecology (1994)
along with numerous papers of international repute. His criticism of deep ecology is mainly found in the
paper, ―Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology‖: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement‖ published in
1987 in ―Green Perspectives: Newsletter of the Green Program Project”, Summer nos. 4-5. According to
Clark, ―it is the single text representing the position of social ecology that has been most widely
reprinted‖ and considered as ―the most polemical and has become the most notorious critique‖ of deep
ecology (Dialogue 21). In this thesis the citation is referred to from the reprinted version of Nina
Witoszek and Andrew Brenan eds. Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of
Ecophilosophy. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. pp. 281- 301, 1999.

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environmental problems are inherent in the social relations and not in technology.

Therefore, he points out that if social life is organized in cooperative and humanistic

lines, the technology could be one of the major solutions to meet the environmental

problems. He claims that social ecology provides more than a critique of the gap

between humanity and nature; it also poses the need to rebuild them. Indeed, it poses the

need to completely transcend them (Ecology of Freedom 22). The social ecologists

explain the basics of Social Ecology from the historical argument and ontological

argument.

Firstly, the human-nature relationship is formed through the structural and

conceptual relation that is found to be predominant in any society. This basis is the

―historical argument of Social Ecology.‖ Bookchin traces the development of hierarchy

and domination of one group over another in pre-historical communities even before the

rise of class and statist societies. Particularly Bookchin is of the view that the drive to

dominate nature originated from the human oppression of humans. He believes that the

human domination of the natural world is the extension of the habits of domination

within society. In other words, one‘s idea of dominating the nature stems from the

domination of human. To root out environmental exploitation, all forms of the social

hierarchy2 will have to be eliminated. When a society is no longer predicated on the

dualistic principles of higher and lower, from the perception of economic status, gender

differences, and individual or group expertise, it will no longer conceive the human as

2
Defining hierarchy Bookchin writes: ―By hierarchy, I mean the cultural, traditional and psychological
systems of obedience and command, not merely the economic and political systems to which the terms
class and State most appropriately refer. Accordingly, hierarchy and domination could easily continue to
exist in a "classless" or "Stateless" society. I refer to the domination of the young by the old, of women by
men, of one ethnic group by another, of "masses" by bureaucrats who profess to speak in their "higher
social interests," of countryside by town, and in a more subtle psychological sense, of body by mind, of
spirit by a shallow instrumental rationality, and of nature by society and technology. (Ecology of Freedom
4)

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higher than the non-human. In such occasion, human beings will no longer consider

themselves as the rightful ruler and possessor of nature.

Secondly, social ecology centres round the interpretation of environmental

problems regarding distinct social origins and dynamics. It argues that humans can find

a ground for ethics and freedom within nature itself. Nature and society is a continuum

or a differentiated unity. This justification of continuity is the ―ontological argument of

social ecology.‖ This perspective opposes lifting humanity into a realm that is above the

natural world. Here he refers to a two-world image – one is the ―First Nature,‖ the

domain of ecosystems and tribal people which are neither hierarchical nor egalitarian

but complementary and ―mutualistic‖ and the other is the ―Second Nature,‖ the nature

of the civilized urban society.

Bookchin distinguishes between ―first nature‖ (the natural world) and ―second

nature‖ (human society). He says that second-nature has emerged from, and it preserved

the first nature so the human subjectivity cannot be evaluated apart from the subjectivity

inherent to first nature. Second nature is thus the ―first nature rendered self-reflexive, a

thinking nature that knows itself and can guide its evolution.‖ It evolves from the first

nature in the form of human species. It is the product of evolution that has the fullness

of mind of extraordinary communicative abilities, of conscious association, and the

ability to alter itself and the natural world knowingly. Social ecology views the

continuity between first nature and second nature where there is a possible synthesis

into an ecological society.

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3.1.2 Ecofeminism:

Ecological feminism or ecofeminism is an activist and academic movement in

the history of environmental philosophy interconnecting the relationship between the

domination of women and domination of environment. It signifies a bunch of various

positions that applies to the approaches of feminism3 to environmental philosophy.

There is no widely accepted definition of Ecofeminism. It is an umbrella term for a wide

variety of approaches related to the woman–nature connection. Although there is

disagreement regarding the specifics of the woman–nature connection, it is agreed that

there are conceptual links between sexism and abuses of nature. It also maintains that an

understanding of each is crucial to the understanding of the other. The thought behind

the Ecofeminists‘ activism is based on an assessment of critical links that are thought to

exist between militarism, sexism, classism, racism, and environmental destruction. It

tries to rebuild the web of life for the earth, for women and also for men. Ecofeminism

claims itself as to be an ideology of integration, preservation, protection and

sustainability. This ideology aims at the preservation and protection of the earth and the

humanity through sustainable means of existence and development.

The term ―ecofeminism‖ was first used by French feminist Francoise d‘

Eaubonne in her book Le Feminisme ou la Mort (Feminism or Death) in 1974.

d‘Eaubonne is of the view that the preservation of the earth is not merely an issue of

change or amelioration but a life or death concern for humanity. She speaks about the

3
Feminism is a complex social movement that advocates women emancipation. It believes that major
source of contemporary social and environmental ills are the fact that patriarchal culture has repressed
and devalued female experience. Simone de Beauvoir, one of the founder pillars of feminism movement
examined the human history to know how our world has always been a man‘s world. She says that
women face inferior status and discrimination because of their sex. The inferior status and the
discrimination are not by natural feminine characteristics but by social tradition, customs and institutions
controlled by man.

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accomplishment of ―the ecological revolution‖ which is to take place in a feminine

society. After the coinage of the term there evolved a series of ecofeminist thinkers.

These thinkers include Ariel Kay Salleh, Karen Warren (b. 1947), Jim Cheney, Marti

Kheel (1948-2011), Val Plumwood (1939-2008), etc., who use a framework that

confronts issues of gender, race, class, and nature in their critical eco-feminists’

literature4. These thinkers are of the view that nature is a feminist issue. According to

Warren, something is a "feminist issue" if an understanding of it helps one to

understand the oppression, subordination, or domination of women. She adds that some

of the most important feminists‘ issues are conceptual ones. In other words, some of the

most important connections between the domination of women and the domination of

nature are conceptual. Warren explains three significant features of oppressive

conceptual framework5 namely, Value-hierarchical thinking, Value dualism, and the

Logic of Domination.

Firstly, there exist some ontological entities which are ―above‖ others. This said

superiority provokes them to dominate and oppress those who are considered as

―below.‖ It is a value hierarchical thinking. For example, human beings enjoy higher

value, status, and prestige in the biotic communities. Therefore, human beings stand at

the top of the hierarchy. The value hierarchical thinking morally allows human beings to

oppress or subjugate the rest of the species of the biotic community.

4
Specific philosophical discussions on deep ecology and ecofeminism took place under the auspices of
the journals like Environmental Ethics, The Trumpeter, Hypatia etc. For example, the academic journal
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy devoted an entire issue in 1991 under the editorship of Karen
J Warren to a debate with the deep ecology standpoint. Many trend changing papers published in that
issue have made explicit connections between feminism and deep ecology.

5
Warren defines a conceptual framework as ―a set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions
which shape and reflect how one views oneself and one‘s world. It is a socially constructed lens through
which we perceive ourselves and others. It is affected by such factors as gender, race, class, age,
affectional orientation, nationality and religious background‖ (The Power 125-46).

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 Value Hierarchies:

X Y

Male or masculine Female or feminine

Civilized Uncivilized or primitive

White Non-white

Human or reason Nature

X is different than Y in some way that makes X superior.

Therefore, X is justified in dominating Y.

To address environmental destruction, according to Warren, one must challenge

value hierarchical ways of thinking frameworks. Therefore, addressing environmental

injustice requires addressing social injustice.

Secondly, there are disjunctive pairs within the biotic community, known as

value dualism, where the disjuncts are oppositional and exclusive rather than

complementary and inclusive. For example, male-female is a pair of disjuncts. Here,

one disjunct possesses higher value and enjoys superiority over the other. Similarly,

reason/nature, masculine/feminine, civilized/primitive, etc. are some disjunctive pairs

which make different forms of oppression like sexual, racial, class, etc. This conceptual

framework is very much prevalent in western cultures. Needless to say here that

ecofeminism is originated as a revolt against the concept of value dualism. Plumwood

also believes that these dualisms lie at the heart of the domination of women, nature,

and ―others.‖ According to her, this dualistic principle is used to legitimize the

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subjugation of many social groups. Not only women, but it does also include elites

subjugate people of colour where blacks are subjugated by whites, the working class

and the poor. Moreover, there are colonized people, indigenous people and nonhuman

nature which are being dominated. In this way, ecofeminists offer the central their

insight that says that struggles for social justice and environmentalism are inseparable.

Thirdly, Logic of Domination justifies and legitimizes subordination and

subjugation. Warren says that contemporary Western culture‘s eco-destructive practices

are rooted in the ―logic of domination.‖ Women and nature have historically been

relegated to the inferior realm of ‗below.' In the same tune, the same kind of reasoning

serves to justify the oppression of both women and nature. There is an oppressive

framework that explains and justifies the logic of domination amongst the different

species of the biotic community. Again, there is the patriarchal framework that justifies

and maintains subjugation of females by the males.

3.1.3 The Third World Critiques:

The environmental historian Ramachandra Guha (b. 1958) stands as a prominent

critic of deep ecology considering the economic and social perspective of third world

countries. The works of Guha‘s environmentalism include Environmentalism: A Global

History, How Much Should A Person Consume: Thinking through the Environment and

Savaging the Civilized: Verrier Elwin, His Tribals, and India. The most notable work of

Guha, in the context of the critique of deep ecology, is his paper, ―Radical American

Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique‖ which is an

exposition of ecological conflict between the Third Worlds and the developed West.

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 Guha has pointed out two fundamental ecological problems which he believes is

being faced by the Globe: (i) ―overconsumption by the industrialized world and by

urban elites in the Third World‖ (ii) ―growing militarization, both in a short-term sense

and in a long-term sense‖. Guha claims that there is no substantial connection to these

problems with the anthropocentric-biocentric dichotomy (―Radical ...‖ 74). Moreover,

the ecologically wasteful characteristics of industrial society and the militarization are

far more common both at an aggregate level of the dialectic of economic and political

structures and at a micro-level of the lifestyle choices of individuals. Guha believes that

these causes cannot be reduced. Guha focuses his concern on the difference between

rich and poor. Strategically this difference is of great significance about the formation of

environmental policy. In support of Guha, Anup Shah, in his paper, ―Poverty and the

Environment,‖ says that ―both environmental degradation and poverty alleviation are

urgent global issues that have a lot in common but are often treated separately‖ (web).

He further adds:

The third-world nations, with 70 percent of the world's population, subsist

on only 30 percent of the world's GNP. Their per capita income is only one-
twelfth of that of the other countries, and the discrepancy is still rising. The
third-world nations contain the majority of the world's population; they are
an indispensable force in the legislation and implementation of the
international environmental law. (Web)

The third world critics have brought into notice the difference between the rich

or the First World and the poor people of the Third World countries regarding the

standard of lifestyles and thereby their environmental policies. In this connection, Peter

Singer‘s view on the differing positions of the people of Developed countries and Third

World brings into notice some important issues. Singer exemplifies this difference with

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his reference to Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank. Regarding the

difference between rich and poor Singer quotes McNamara, ―Poverty at the absolute

level . . . is life at the very margin of existence. The absolute poor are severely

deprived human beings struggling to survive in a set of squalid and degraded

circumstances almost beyond the power of our sophisticated imaginations and

privileged circumstances to conceive‖ (Practical Ethics 219).

Singer again speaks about the nature of rich people of the First World countries.

Singer writes that the affluent choose their food for the pleasures of the palate, not to

stop hunger. The rich people of the First World buy new clothes to look good. But the

poor people of the Third World need clothes to keep themselves warm (219). According

to Singer people in rich countries are allowing the developing countries to suffer from

absolute poverty, with consequent malnutrition, ill health, and death. Singer, therefore,

blamed the rich people of the First World as murderers.

Guha believes that survival of man and nature is more important than betterment

of lifestyle or standard of living. In a third world, people think for their existence as

their primary concern and people know how to take care of nature around them. Guha

says that for the poor people basic existence is more important than a tiger project or

national park. He maintains that the needs and aspirations of underdeveloped third

worlds cannot be neglected in the name of equal share and responsibility of global

citizens for environmental protection. He, therefore, suggests that protecting the

underpowered masses must go along with protecting the environment. He believes that

his stand is neither anthropocentrism nor ecocentrism, rather a call for the care for man

and environment with an eye on social, cultural, economic and other influencing factors.

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 Guha maintains that his criticism of deep ecology is from ―historical and

sociological, rather than philosophical‖ perspective (―Radical …‖ 72). In other words,

Guha uses the consideration of social justice for the treatment of deep ecology. His

main allegation lies in the fact that the ―cultural rootedness of philosophy‖ in the form

of deep ecology tries to ―present itself in universalistic terms‖ (72). He writes,

I make two main arguments: first, that deep ecology is uniquely American,
and despite superficial similarities in rhetorical style, the social and political
goals of radical environmentalism in other cultural contexts (e.g., West
Germany and India) are quite different; second, that the social
consequences of putting deep ecology into practice on a worldwide basis
(what its practitioners are aiming for) are very grave indeed (72).

In other words, Guha tries to posit deep ecology as an environmental philosophy

of the rich world. In this philosophy, there is the least consideration of the social and

economic inequalities among the people of the first and the third worlds in the name of

ecocentrism. In this section, there is a discussion on some crucial points of criticism of

deep ecology made by social ecologists, ecofeminists and third world critiques.

3.2 Critique of Deep Ecology:

Warwick Fox divides the development of the deep ecology movement into three

stages. The first stage, he points out is ―the latency period,‖ which is the coinage of the

term in 1973 and its initial development to 1980. From 1980 to 1983/84, it becomes the

touchstone for global environmentalism and ecophilosophical orientation. This period is

the second stage and is termed by him as the ―the honeymoon period.‖ By the late

1980s, under the initiatives of Naess and deep ecologists Bill Devall and George

Sessions, etc., this ecology movement becomes successful in attracting a large number

of supporters into their camp. Fox maintains that from 1984 onward this movement

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starts attracting critical as well as positive commentaries. He terms this stage as ―the

mature period‖ of deep ecology. A similar observation is offered by environmental

critic Ronnie Hawkins, in his paper, ―Why Deep Ecology Had to Die.‖ He is of the view

that the early years of deep ecology was filled with ―future promise and dashed hopes.‖

It is a period of ―outrage and optimism‖ that ―cheered the brave souls standing up

against the forces degrading and destroying life‖ (Hawkins 206). But ―the middle years‖

of deep ecology (the mature period as referred by Fox) had to face full of ―criticism and

an uncomfortable coexistence‖ (206).

Deep Ecology is an umbrella concept. Other than Naess, there are many deep

ecologists like Deval, Session, Fox as well as the leading deep ecology activist like

Dave Foreman of ―Earth First!‖ There is difference between theorists and the

supporters of deep ecology, where the first group is relatively few but the later group

includes ―numerous and varied from indigenous nomads to sedentary city dwellers‖

(Hallen 275). The camps of the social ecology, the eco-feminist and third world critics

fiercely target the other deep ecologists including Naess as an irrelevant, paradoxical

and problematic tendency.

3.2.1 The problem with vocabulary:

The deep ecological vocabularies have become a prime target of the critics. The

ambiguity of what ―deep‖ means in this context, has led deep ecology to be interpreted

differently by its many adherents (Sarkar 70). Social ecologists criticize the shallow-

deep diversification of deep ecology. They believe that the use of the word ―deep‖ to

mean an ecological movement by one‘s personal philosophy (ecosophy) is problematic.

Bookchin writes that the coinage of ‗shallow‘ and ‗deep‘ ecology is to reflect not

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merely the stupidity of the deep ecology‘s terminology but to affirm the shallowness of

the founder. Similarly, the ecofeminists believe that their approach is more than a

correction of deep ecology terminology. In this connection, Mary Mellor, in her book

Feminism and Ecology, expounds the background of Ariel Kay Salleh‘s paper ―Deeper

than Deep Ecology‖ that takes a polarized position of Naessisn philosophy. Mellor says

that Salleh is suggested by one of her colleagues to amend the title of her paper to

―Deepening Deep Ecology‖ instead of ―Deeper than Deep Ecology.‖ But Salleh prefers

to keep the original title for she believes that would better reflect her position (Mellor

140). In this paper, Salleh shows how Naess‘s original approach criticizes the dualism

of man and nature without seeing the dualism of man and woman that lay within it.

Naess encourages everyone to formulate one‘s interpretation. He projects

himself as to be very liberal in saying that everyone may have his Ecosophy. Therefore,

the supporters who claim to be part of the movement hold incompatible viewpoints

from each other. Thereby, deep ecologists differ among themselves as to the content of

their approach. According to Arumugam, it renders deep ecology itself into a vague and

inconsistent principle. Bookchin very callously tries to bring forth the exposition of

deep ecology:

Deep ecology is so much of a black hole of half-digested, ill-formed, and

half-baked ideas that one can easily express utterly vicious notions like
Foreman's and still sound like a fiery radical who challenges everything that
is anti-ecological in the present realm of ideas. The very words deep
ecology, in fact, clue us into the fact that we are not dealing with a body of
clear ideas but with a bottomless pit in which vague notions and moods of
all kinds can be such into the depths of an ideological toxic dump. (―Social
Ecology versus …‖ 284)

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 In contrast to this picture of deep ecology, Bookchin defines social ecology as a

―coherent form of naturalism.‖ At the same time, deep ecology has been parodied by the

defining of social ecology as neither deep nor tall, nor fat, nor thick but as social. On the

one hand, an attempt has been made to upgrade the thesis of social ecology by pointing

out its theorization with societal norm, on the other a parallel attempt is made to

discredit deep ecology by pointing out the Naessian way of the formation where there is

a selective interpretation of Eastern traditions. Bookchin writes:

It does not fall back on incantations, sutras, flow diagrams, or spiritual

vagaries. It is avowedly rational. It does not try to regale metaphorical
forms of spiritual mechanism and crude biologism with Taoist, Buddhist,
Christian, or shamanistic Eco-la-la. It is a coherent form of naturalism that
looks to evolution and the biosphere, not to deities in the sky or under the
earth for quasi-religious and super-naturalistic explanations of natural and
social phenomena (297).

Similarly, Guha points out that in comparison to the West, the East has been

finely tuned with nature. The spiritual essence of human relations with nature was

supported by a society of cultivators whose relationship with nature was a far more

active one. Many rural communities do have a sophisticated knowledge of the natural

environment that may commensurate and sometimes even outperform the highly

educated city dwellers of developed countries. The elaboration of such traditional

ecological knowledge can hardly be said to rest on a mystical leaning with nature of a

deep ecological kind. Moreover, the Eastern man exhibits a spiritual dependence on

nature. They do also have ecological wisdom and much needed ecological

consciousness which they do not term as ―Deep Ecology.‖It is the normal way of life

based on the religious and cultural way. But the deep ecologists have acknowledged

only a few names and some religious traditions in interpreting the formation of deep

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ecology by ignoring these important factors. Guha says that deep ecology is politically

motivated. By taking the reference of selective eastern religions, it tries to provide an

―authentic lineage,‖ and to prove that is a universal philosophy.

Social ecology criticizes Naess for advocating a so-called ecology movement. It

tries to depict deep ecology as an ―invertebrate,‖ ―parachuting,‖ ―spiced thing.‖

Bookchin is not satisfied with the Naessian attempt to give a new meaning to the word

―maturity.‖ It is to be mentioned here that Naess uses this term concerning the maturity

of the self. Social ecology criticizes deep ecology‘s use of this sense of the word

―maturity.‖ Bookchin writes:

What we so facilely call "maturity" is not ordinarily an ethically desirable

process of growth and humanization. To become an "autonomous,"
"perceptive," "experienced," and "competent" adult involves terms that
historically possess very mixed meanings. These terms become very misleading
if they are not explicated in the light of the social, ethical, economic, and
psychological goals we have in mind. (Ecology of Freedom 305)

Bookchin claims that his use of the vocabulary is mostly in connection with the

nature of man and his role to find the way out in mitigating the social crisis that goes

parallel to the environmental crisis. One is to be matured in keeping the social, ethical,

economic, and psychological goals in one‘s mind. To clarify the concept, Bookchin

exemplifies the areas of an adult regarding "autonomous," "perceptive," "experienced,"

and "competent" which he believes historically possess diverse meanings.

Ecofeminism points out that ―deep ecology movement is shockingly sexist‖

(Mellor 139). Salleh also charges that deep ecologists often use sexist language. She

says that there is inequality between man and woman. But the use of such language

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reveals that deep ecologists have not acknowledged this inequality. She writes that the

master-slave role which marks man‘s relation with nature is replicated in man‘s relation

with a woman. She suggests that Naess could have started from women as the

immediate living basis for an alternative consciousness. Salleh criticizes deep ecology

for the formulation of the common word ―man‖ that ―presupposes the difference

between the sexes in an uncritical way, and yet overlooks the significance of this

difference‖ (―Deeper …” 340). Similarly, environmental critic Robert Sessions says that

the major political organizations of the deep ecology movement are headed almost

universally by men, and their organizational structures are hierarchical. As women are

subsumed under the general category of deep ecologists‘ ―humans,‖ thereby problem

arises. Ken Wilber in his Sex, Ecology, Spirituality argues that by portraying humankind

as merely one strand in the web of life, deep ecology adheres to a one-dimensional, or

―flatland‖ metaphysics. He writes, ―All values become equalized and homogenized in a

flatland devoid of individual values or identities; nothing can be said to be deeper or

higher or better in any meaningful sense; all values vanish into a herd mentality of the

bland leading the bland‖ (Wilber 11).

Ecofeminist Deborah Slicer opines that deep ecology suffers from the problems

of essentialism or ―certain arrogance underlying essentialism‖ (Slicer 111). This

arrogance leads hierarchical and dualistic thinking. Deep ecologists can never get rid of

masculinist thought and as such always remain sexist. She says that deep ecologists fail

to recognize and respect the integrity of the ―other‖ of animals and non-sentient nature.

Slicer says that deep ecologists fail it when they describe their relationship to nature

regarding nature being a part of them. Quoting Cheney, Slicer says that the ―deep

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ecologists merely expand the self to include that in relationship to which it feels

alienated‖ (111).

Robert Sessions suggests deep ecologists to be careful not to confuse

abstractness with depth. Ecofeminism alleges that by terming their movement as

―deep,‖ Naess and his supporters advocate a kind of abstractness. Plumwood criticizes

the ―abstraction and universalization‖ as lofty ideals of deep ecology (―Nature, Self …‖

6). According to her, deep ecology advocates a gradual increase of abstraction, away

from my self, my family, my land, towards abstract moral codes. She writes that ―on

such a view, the particular and the emotional are seen as the enemy of the rational, as

corrupting, capricious, and self-interested‖ (6). Moreover, Plumwood adds that care for

the specific is more likely to lead to concern for the general good than adherence to

lofty ideals. She says that deep ecology has a problem for it fails to deal with

particularity. Referring to Fox, Plumwood says that deep ecology seems more

concerned with a shift in general orientation towards a more ecocentric view than with

specific applications.

Critics point out that the term ―vital needs‖ is misleading since it may lead to

relativistic ethics. This qualifier is not adequate to avoid impracticality. Thereby they

say that this term needs a redefinition not regarding material things but a level of

physical comfort. Moreover, Bookchin holds that the Naessian use of the ―empathy‖

and attribution of ―intrinsic value of nature‖ should not be confused with ―sophisticated

ethical rights or democracy‖ that carries moral and political meanings.

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3.2.2 The problem with the conceptual framework:

In the Naessian perspective, social causes of the ecological crisis are accredited

to the ‗shallow‘ category. But the social justice schools of environmentalism give a lot

of importance on social equality by eliminating dominations and hierarchies. It is

alleged that Naess has not written a single line about the social issues like

decentralization, a non-hierarchical society, democracy, small-scale communities, local

autonomy, mutual aid, communalism, and tolerance.

Critics contend that deep ecology locates the origin of the ecological crisis in

belief systems. These belief systems cover religious as well as a philosophical belief

system. In its approach, it is seen that Naess is more inclined to eastern religions.

Bookchin holds that deep ecology is a varied blend of eastern traditions with western

heterodox philosophers which result in inconsistencies, immune to reasoned critique

and validation. According to social ecology, Naess views ―first nature,‖ in the abstract,

as a ―cosmic oneness‖ which bears fascinating similarities to ethereal perceptions

common to Asian religions. It is alleged that deep ecology stresses on the subjective

factors to deal with environmental issues. As such, deep ecology in the face of social

injustice is ―quietist‖ and escapes from activism. It speaks about an ecological

consciousness which is ―quasi-mystical.‖ Timothy Morton, an eco-critic, says:

The most ethical act is to love the other precisely in their artificiality, rather
than seeking to prove their naturalness and authenticity. Deep ecology
ironically does not respect the natural world as actual contingent beings, but
as standing in for an idea of the natural. Deep ecology goes to extremes on
this point, insisting that humans are a viral supplement to an organic whole.
(Ecology without 195)

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 The chief concern of social ecologists in their debates with deep ecologists is the

failure of Naess to make a distinction between human and non-human nature. They are

of the view that the theoretical structure of deep ecology is entirely a product of human

agency. This conceptual structure imparts to the ―human species‖ a unique status in the

natural world. Bookchin does not agree with Naess that human beings are simply part

and parcel of nature, plain members of the biotic community. One‘s true human

potential is a function of one‘s place in nature. Insofar as deep ecology fails adequately

to recognize the uniqueness of human life and attribute moral worth with other life

forms, he argues, it promotes ―eco-fascism,‖ namely the sacrifice of individual humans

for the benefit of the ecological whole. Social ecology holds that all ethical systems are

formulated by human beings in distinctly cultural situations. Therefore, if one removes

human agency from the picture, one will find that there is not the least evidence that

animals exhibit behaviour that can be regarded as discursive, meaningful, or moral.

Bookchin claims that humans are more advanced as a result of the evolutionary

process, a fact that the deep ecologists overlook. Denial of ―human distinctiveness‖

might invite stupidities like the legal cases against animals that damage crops. It is to be

mentioned that there were some instances of this sort in medieval Europe. If it is the

case, then one is to bear in mind that what makes humans morally relevant is also what

makes a carnivore‘s eating out on its prey morally neutral. Bookchin argues that such an

egalitarian attitude that deep ecologists promote presupposes the uniqueness of human

rational and moral capacity to think conceptually and feel empathy for the planet.

Denial of difference-in-kind is, itself, embedded within the discourse of human

distinctiveness.

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 According to Bookchin, there are contrasting points in deep ecology‘s

presentaion of ideas. As it is believed that in order to regain a balanced ecology one

needs to interfere in the rapidly deteriorating environmental situation. As far as the

question of altering the behaviour of a human being is concerned to meet up the

ecological crisis, man is to become decisive. But Naess emphasizes on contemplative

thought instead of interference. Human intervention on the first nature is considered as

destructive. The objective of deep ecology is ―to attain a state of awareness of the

alleged absence of boundaries between human consciousness and cosmic oneness‖

(Arumugam 119). In one occasion Naessian deep ecology says about the catastrophic

consequence of human interference on first nature and in another occasion, it urges

human beings to be decisive to protect the natural environment. There is the claim that

the intervention in nature should be guided by the need to preserve biotic integrity. As

such, Bookchin believes that there appears a logical contradiction in theorizing the deep

ecological framework.

Both social ecology and ecofeminism express the dissent over the conceptual

framework of deep ecology which is based on the philosophy of ―privileged male, white

academics.‖ It is criticized as a biased theoretical set up of a ―highly privileged sector of

Euro-American society‖ that has never reflected on the needs of the underprivileged

section of human beings. Similarly, the third world critics are of the view that deep

ecology is elitist. Guha refers to the over-consumption and industrialization based

―American environmentalism‖ as ―deep ecology‖ and thereby offers a critical stand

against it. He believes that the roots of global ecological problems lie in the

disproportionate share of resources consumed by the industrialized countries as a whole

and the urban elite within the Third World. The economic growth in the West has

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historically rested on the economic and ecological exploitation of the Third World.

Guha insists that the deep ecologists are not aware of this problem particularly because,

they are lacking of concern with inequalities within human society. Particularly, Guha

opines that the distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism is untenable. In

the words of Guha:

…the transition from an anthropocentric (human-centered) to a biocentric

(humans as only one element in the ecosystem) view in both religious and
scientific traditions is only to be welcomed. What is unacceptable are the
radical conclusions drawn by deep ecology, in particular, that intervention
in nature should be guided primarily by the need to preserve biotic integrity
rather than by the needs of humans. The latter for deep ecologists is
anthropocentric, the former biocentric. This dichotomy is, however, of very
little use in understanding the dynamics of environmental degradation.
(―Radical …‖ 74)

Guha claims that in deep ecology if a human being makes an intervention in

nature that is only for the meant of fulfilling the need of integration among the life

forms. Thereby, giving importance on preserving biotic integrity is considered as bio-

centric in deep ecology. Fulfilling the needs of humans is considered as anthropocentric

in deep ecologists‘ interpretation of intervention in nature. Guha holds that ―an

acceptance of the primacy of this distinction (anthropocentric-biocentric distinction)

constitutes the litmus test of deep ecology‖ (73).

In the same tone, Bookchin says that this is a fictitious opposition that stems

from a non-dialectical view of natural and social evolution. Bookchin does not view

humans in anthropocentric terms as essentially apart from and above nature. According

to him, humanity has evolved out of and remains inextricably continuous with the non-

human world, but is no longer part of it, in just the same way that other species are. In

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their critique of anthropocentrism, according to Bookchin, deep ecologists employ the

concept of ―humanity‖ indiscriminately, neglecting the social, ethnic and gender

differences, thus, implicating every human being equally and confusing the target of

political critique. Bookchin writes,

Deep ecology, despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense that
our ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and in social
problems. It preaches a gospel of a kind of "original sin" that accurses a
vague species called humanity---as though people of colour were equitable
with whites, women with men, the Third World with the First, the poor
with the rich, and the exploited with their exploiters. (―Social Ecology
versus …‖ 283)

Similarly, ecofeminism rests on the belief that ―androcentrism‖, not

anthropocentrism, is the source of the worldview related to the environmental crisis.

More or less all ecofeminist critics target deep ecologists as the advocates of

androcentrism. Deep ecology of Naess speaks of a gender-neutral anthropocentrism as

the root of the domination of nature. The main thesis of eco-feminists‘ critique of deep

ecology is that deep ecology ignores the decisive phenomena of ―patriarchalism‖ and

androcentrism. According to Zimmerman, ―feminists‘ critique of deep ecology asserts

that it speaks of a gender neutral anthropocentrism as the root of the domination of

nature when in fact, androcentrism is the real root‖ (―Feminism …‖183). Zimmerman

writes that only the interpretative lens of androcentrism enables us to understand the

origin and scope of dualistic, atomistic, hierarchical and mechanistic categories.

Women‘s complex treatment as a sexual, reproductive, and labour resource,

Zimmerman observes, is polished over the role of patriarchal ideology in creating socio-

ecological problems. Deep ecology obscures the crucial issue by talking about human-

centeredness, instead of about male-centeredness.

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 Bookchin suggests that a non-hierarchical society will necessarily be an

ecological one. Zimmerman points out that deep ecologists try to develop the human-

nature relationship ―without taking any radical step of eliminating both man‘s

domination of woman (including the woman inside of each man) and the culturally

enforced self-denigration of woman‖ (183). Zimmerman alleges that deep ecology is

formulated by man only. Men under patriarchy think only in distorted ways. Therefore,

if anyone tries to find similarity between deep ecology and ecofeminism, then it can be

found only in a superficial level. Similarly, Salleh criticizes Naess for trying to establish

an abstract environmental ethics. She says that deep ecology is a ―self-congratulatory

reformist move‖ (―Deeper …‖ 344). According to her, deep ecologists are males who

are damaged by patriarchy and are seeking to heal themselves. But many of the

problems that Naess sought to overcome are male-constructed problems. For example,

problems of pollution, resource depletion, destructive science, centralization, etc. are

male created. When deep ecologists call for decentralizing society, Salleh says, they

ignore the fact that patriarchal culture has always favoured hierarchy and centralization.

Therefore, unless patriarchal consciousness is abandoned, the advocacy for

decentralization is meaningless.

Moreover, Salleh blames that deep ecology presupposes a masculinist

psychology. For example, the concept of extending rights of nonhuman beings to

protect them from human abuse is one of the theses of deep ecology. But the concept of

rights is very much bound up with a masculinist interpretation. Therefore, it cannot

serve to end the exploitation of nature. Therefore, ecofeminists are of the view that,

deep ecology, to be successful in meeting its objectives, would have to be informed by

the ―insights‖ of ecofeminists because ecofeminism links the male domination of nature

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with the male domination of woman. Due to its pervasive masculinist bias, Naess‘ thesis

of equality loses its strength. Therefore Salleh observes that ―deep ecology movement

will not truly happen until men are brave enough to rediscover and to love the woman

inside themselves‖ (345).

Nature has become a disconnected abstraction for deep ecologists. Warren

maintains that although deep ecologists are devoted to nature, they relate to nature in a

way parallel to that of the dualists they oppose. In another word, nature is a lost part of

one‘s self or one‘s self is a lost part of nature. Robert Sessions quotes Warren from a

response to the draft of his paper, ―Deep ecology makes a big conceptual error in

supposing that the way to reduce a bad dualism is to affirm the neglected or historically

undervalued member of the pair. The bad dualism is the problem, not simply what got

undervalued‖ (96).

The supporters of deep ecology claim that Naess in his platform principles of

deep ecology asserts for self-sufficiency to work along with political decentralization.

But ecofeminism is suspicious of Naess‘s view of local autonomy and decentralization.

Salleh says that women like to choose to work in small, intimate collectivities. They do

not like the impulse to compete and dominate the ―other‖ that is prevalent in the larger

power blocs and hierarchical political structures which are an invariant historical feature

of patriarchal societies.

3.2.3 Misanthropy:

―Mis-anthropism‖ implies ―hatred of humankind‖. ―Deep ecologists are

misanthropists‖ is the most discreditable criticism of the social ecology. The issue of

human beings‘ position in the planet has posited these two schools of ecological

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activism into two opposite platforms. This opposition, as mentioned in the introduction

of this chapter, is rooted in the beliefs of two diverse worldviews of ―Man in Nature‖

and ―Man and Nature.‖ The difference between these two can be found in social

ecology‘s criticism of deep ecology thesis. Bookchin in his paper, ―Social Ecology

versus Deep Ecology‖ has vehemently criticized deep ecology. According to Michael

Zimmerman, Bookchin has attacked deep ecology by statements made by certain ―Earth

First!‖ members who sometimes seem to risk ecofascism in their passion for protecting

the planet. The reason of Bookchin to these attacks was an interview by Bill Devall with

Dave Foreman, the editor of Earth First! In this interview, Foreman issued some

shocking statements. When Foreman was asked about the best solution for the problem

of famine in Ethiopia, he suggested the possibility of stopping international aid so as to

give nature a chance to repair its stability. Moreover, Foreman also advocated sealing

off of the US borders to people from Latin America, so as to prevent wholesale

destruction of the wilderness and further poisoning of water and air.

Critics of deep ecology believe that the denial of human uniqueness is an

inconsistent and impractical ethical principle for action. If taken, for example, it might

mean that human beings have no right to eliminate AIDS virus or malaria mosquitoes.

Bookchin criticizes the role of Foreman, for publishing an article behind the pseudonym

"Miss Ann Thropy," where it is written that AIDS is desirable as a means of population

control. The article entitled "Population and AIDS" in the Earth First! Keulartz explains

the proceeding of the fierce attacks on the advocates of deep ecology. He continues the

proceeding:

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 To cap it all, the house magazine of Earth First! published a statement by
someone writing under the pseudonym of ‗Miss Ann Thropy‘, to the effect
that AIDS should be welcomed as a blessing since this disease would help
relieve the human population pressure on the earth. It is no wonder that
these statements—immediately disowned by prominent deep ecologists,
incidentally—should have prompted Bookchin to launch a frontal attack
(Keulartz 117).

Bookchin is very much worried that these people feed on human disasters,

suffering, and misery, preferably in Third World countries where AIDS is by far a more

monstrous problem than elsewhere. Bookchin ―considered the misanthropy to which

these statements testified to be not just an incidental derailment of a bunch of runaway

activists but a symptom of ecocentrism, which does not distinguish between oppressors

and their victims and which, moreover, lumps human beings together with all other

forms of life, from mammals to germs‖ (Keulartz 117). According to Bookchin, there is

a kind of ―eco-brutalism‖ in deep ecology that has not come out of Hitler's Mein Kampf,

the autobiography. For this alleged encouraging of ―eco-brutalism,‖ the deep ecology

activists are compared with Hitler who killed millions of people. Bookchin charges that

deep ecology belittles the position of humanity which is allegedly gulping down the

resources by over populating the planet. He draws up:

This vague and undifferentiated humanity essentially seen as an ugly

"anthropocentric" thing – presumably a malignant product of natural
evolution – that is "overpopulating" the planet, "devouring" its resources,
and destroying its wildlife and the biosphere – as though some vague
domain of "nature" stands opposed to a constellation of non-natural human
beings, with their technology, minds, society, etc. (―Social Ecology versus
…” 283)

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 Social ecology‘s assertion is that the one-sided critique of humanism reinforces

―anti-humanism‖ and ―misanthropy.‖ It says that ―humanism‖ does not simply mean a

presumptuous claim of superiority over the non-human nature but more significantly an

appeal to reason, care, and cooperation. But deep ecology says that mere biological

presence of human beings (second nature) in large extent is intrinsically harmful to the

first nature. It even advocates the exclusion of human beings from ever larger tracts of

land and forest. In this connection, Arumugam says that ―Maximizing wilderness and

minimizing human population, some deep ecologists look upon even farming as such

with disfavour, views that have rightfully given rise to charges that deep ecology is

misanthropic‖ (117).

Social ecology even targets Malthusianism for applying "the ecological concept

of carrying capacity." Bookchin says that Malthus tries to demonstrate that hunger,

poverty, disease, and premature death is inevitable precisely because population and

food supply increase at different rates. For this reason war, famines, and plagues and

even "moral restraint" are necessary to keep the population down. George Sessions and

Bill Devall, two of Naess‘s defenders of deep ecology extol Malthus as a projection of

prophet for advocating population control. Bookchin charges Devall and Sessions are

calling them as ―the nineteenth-century radicals who have opposed the vicious abuses

inflicted by industrial capitalism on the oppressed of the world, often in the name of

Malthusianism‖ (―Social Ecology versus …‖ 293). He writes:

Thomas Malthus was not a prophet; he was an apologist for the misery
that the Industrial Revolution was inflicting on the English peasantry and
working classes. His utterly fallacious argument that population increases
exponentially while food supplies increase arithmetically was not ignored
by England's ruling classes; it was taken to heart and even incorporated

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 into social Darwinism as an explanation for why oppression was a
necessary feature of society and for why rich, white imperialists and the
privileged were the "fittest" who were equipped to "survive" – needless to
say, at the expense of the impoverished many (294).

Bookchin‘s assertion is that by population control these thinkers always kept

aside the privileged class, the whites and elite rich. Same is the case with the Darwinism

which says about the survival of the fittest. The social aspect of Darwinism considers

the rich, white imperialists and the privileged as the fittest. Bookchin is of the view that

―hunger has its origins not in "natural "shortages of food or population growth but in

social and cultural dislocations‖ (295).

Bookchin observes that there is a close connection between social factors and

demography. He says that population growth and attitudes toward population vary from

society to society according to the way people live, the ideas they hold, and the socio-

economic relationships they establish. Again, it can be said that the reproductive

behaviour of humans is profoundly conditioned by cultural values, standards of living,

social traditions, and the status of women, religious beliefs, socio-political conflicts, and

various socio-political expectations. For this Bookchin suggests providing people with

decent lives, education, a sense of creative meaning in life, and above all free women

from their roles as mere bearers of children and population growth begin to stabilize and

population rates even reverse their direction.

In "A letter to George Sessions", ecofeminist Greta Gaard maintains that

ecofeminists are opposed to coercive population control methods. In this connection

she condemns Sessions and Naess, the joint formulators of deep ecology platform

principles, as racist, sexist, imperialist, anti-poor. According to her they have denied the

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basic human-rights in formulating the population control thesis. She adds that the

contentious population control policies advocated by deep ecologists illogically blame

their female counterpart for over-breeding, polluting and exhausting resources. This

tendency of deep ecology ignores the original causes of these problems. Mies and

Shiva, in their book Ecofeminism, explicate the major causes of resource exhaustion and

other social problems. And they suggest that local pressure of raw material extraction

for debt servicing and other forces of economic exploitation should be properly

addressed by deep ecologists. Moreover, deep ecologists fail to address the issues of

power and control in looking at the population problem. Naess does not pay attention to

women‘s lack of power to control their own reproductive processes. Thereby

ecofeminists suggest the deep ecologists, if they can, to control themselves their male

counterpart in population control.

3.2.4 Biocentric Egalitarianism is problematic:

The term biological or ecological egalitarianism are used interchangeably by

Naess. According to Bookchin, ―biospheric egalitarianism‖ reduces human species into

an unqualified identity with the non-human nature. Bookchin criticizes deep ecology for

projecting humans from complex social beings to a simple species. The denial of human

uniqueness is an inconsistent and impractical ethical principle for action.

The man has been given due position in social justice schools of

environmentalism. Bookchin says that homo-sapiens are ―one of the nature's unique

species. It has slowly and painstakingly developed from the natural world into a unique

social world of its own‖ (Ecology of Freedom 22). Human beings are potentially the

most advanced life-form of natural evolution. They are superior in terms of intelligence;

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they have moral capacity and sharpness. Human beings are potentially intelligible of the

natural processes. They are potentially able to organize society along ecological and

rational lines. For all these, they are in no way licensed to destroy the first nature.

Thereby, keeping human beings, the second nature with the non-rational line of first

nature is problematic.

Bookchin is of the view that biocentrism threatens to trivialize humanity,

particularly its capacity for moral agency in nature. This trivialization nourishes

misanthropy. Besides, the ethical demand of biocentrism is twisted on a form of

ecological circular reasoning. Bookchin‘s argument rests on the conviction that

biocentrists cannot assign human beings an imperative for ethical behaviour that they do

not assign to other life forms. Biocentrists insist that humans are equal to other life

forms regarding inherent worth. In the ―Introduction‖ to the 1991 Edition of The

Ecology of Freedom entitled ―Twenty Years Later… Seeking a Balanced Viewpoint‖,

Bookchin points out that ―if a ‗biocentric‘ society were to emerge, it would be obliged

to ‗intervene‘ massively in first nature with nearly all the sophisticated technologies it

has its disposal to correct ecological dislocations on a scale that would leave the more

purist ‗deep ecologists‘ utterly aghast‖ (55).

Bookchin argues that the notion of equality when applied to human beings alone

ignores individual differences in intelligence, talent, age, health, physical infirmity, etc.

Again, when intended to encompass the nonhuman world, the notion of equality proves

to be inappropriate. As such, the biocentric equality thesis of Naess is problematic. The

reason is very clear as the differences in species are far wider than that of individual

human beings. Bookchin writes:

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 Any form of ―equality‖ including those among humans that fails to
account for differences produced by the ―natural inequalities‖ of age,
physical capacities, and subjective differences in the nonhuman world
would be truly lacking in the empathy that underpins ―biocentric‖
attitudes. ―Biocentrism,‖ to put the matter bluntly, is as primitive and
unsatisfactory ethically as ―anthropocentrism.‖(55)

On the other hand, social ecology emphasizes on the gradations between first

and second nature. Social ecology sees the natural world as a process of the

development of increasing complexity and subjectivity. With the emergence of the

second nature or the human beings, the first nature or the biological evolutionary

processes have continued in and been negated by social and cultural evolutionary

processes. Therefore, social ecology says that there is the real boundary between human

and non-human nature.

According to Bookchin, Brian Morris's review of Arne Naess's Ecology,

Community and Lifestyle has revealed the intellectual poverty of the ―father of deep

ecology.‖ At the same time, it has also revealed, Bookchin observes, the silliness of the

entire deep ecology movement. By quoting the observation that Morris makes in his

review, Bookchin wonders whether deep ecology's philosophy that all living beings can

be equitable with one another would have had any meaning before human beings

emerged. ―Not Man Apart,‖ according to Bookchin, is perhaps the best argument

against deep ecology.

Bookchin outright rejects any notion like intrinsic value of nature. He is of the

opinion that nothing has value until some agent values it. As such if there is anything

like intrinsic value inherent in non-human nature as formulated by Naess, which is not

dependent on being valued by some other agents, then it must mean that non-human

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natural entities confer value on themselves. Bookchin rejects this latter possibility and

asserts that humans are what give value to the rest of the world. In an interview with

David Vanek, published in Harbinger: A Journal of Social Ecology, Bookchin says:

One of my critics, Robyn Eckersley, challenged me in the journal

Environmental Ethics to explain, "Why should human thinking be regarded
more valuable than the navigational skills of birds?" But that's just a silly
question. In "navigating," birds are affected by the magnetic field of the
Earth, they're affected by the changes of temperature; they're adapting to
their surroundings. But human beings, crucially, can innovate, as I pointed
out, and they live on another level of phenomena, culture. They can make
airplanes, and they know how to navigate. Now they can go beyond birds
and farther than birds and higher than birds. (Web)

In other words, Bookchin tries to place human beings in a higher place in the

scheme of things. A human being is culturally sound. Bookchin is not ready to

recognize the equal positions of biotic communities. The second nature is edged over

the rest of the life forms in his social ecology thesis. His rejection of the intrinsic value

of nature gives social ecology a polarized position to deep ecology.

There is a lack of continuity between two positions of Naess regarding equal

moral worth and that realistic egalitarianism determines how to deal with the

nonhuman nature. Naess‘s sense of being apologetic and the sense of regret when one

is bound to kill a life form are not sufficient to fill up this continuity. According to

French, Naess‘ view is utopian and normatively inconsistent. In concrete cases of

moral conflict, this view is of no use and fails to give normative guidance in one‘s

decision making and to perform an action. Even a supporter of biocentric egalitarian

principle can no longer continue to be governed by an equal inherent value which is

supposed to be possessing in all species. If realistic egalitarian principle permits one

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killing, then there would necessarily be an apparent conflict between theory and

practice in a moral situation.

…it is not helpful in ethics to separate as definitively as Naess does moral

principles from moral practice. If Naess‘s species egalitarianism can only
be promulgated ―in principle‖ and must be consistently reshaped into a
qualified ―realistic egalitarianism‖ that allows human to kill or injure
animals and plants and damage ecosystems in practice, then the latter
formulation is the genuinely normative position that governs decisions and
actions. (French 44)

From this observation, French is of the view that the Naessian biospheric

egalitarianism cannot guide an agent by any concrete normative judgment. To guide

one to deal with a concrete situation there is no way but ―reintroducing some normative

ranking of species.‖ French‘s argument is that if the proponents of deep ecology who

advocate biospheric egalitarianism cannot but acknowledge ―a normative privileging of

human interests and worth…. it is better to articulate our value hierarchy plainly, rather

than having it remain cloaked and unarticulated.‖ (52) In other words, French suggests

for an anti-anthropocentric species-ranking position. The intention of French is to bring

ethical consistency and clarity which he believes is lacking in Naess‘s formulation of

the ethical theory of deep ecology. To do this French adopts Lawrence Johnson‘s

Species Ranking Scheme from the book A Morally Deep World where a mid-course

between atoms and ethical holism between anthropocentrism and biospherical

egalitarianism is adopted. French quotes Johnson, ―Although we ought to revere life

….some life is more valuable than other life. This is not because only some interests

count while some do not –all interest count –but because not all interests are

equivalent.‖ (53) French gives a little edge to Johnson over Naess for he believes that

Naess moves away from the principle of biospherical egalitarianism ―when

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adjudicating conflict-of-interest cases.‖ (57) The problem with Naess, according to

French, is coherence and usefulness in the formulation of biospheric egalitarianism

principle.

Similarly, eco-feminism holds that biocentric egalitarianism in principle cannot

be achieved. Salleh views biological egalitarianism concept of Naess as an

―assumption,‖ which is ―cancelled in part by the implicit contradiction contained in

Naess' first premise‖ (―Deeper …‖ 340). She maintains that ―a self-consistent biological

egalitarianism cannot be arrived at unless men become open to both facets of this same

urge to dominate and use‖ (340). Again, Naess‘s view that ―total egalitarianism is

impossible‖ is criticized by Salleh. She writes:

Ecofeminists of a socialist persuasion are disturbed to hear the father of

deep ecology, Arne Naess, claim that ―total egalitarianism is impossible,‖
that some human exploitation will always be ―necessary.‖ Women‘s
complex treatment as a sexual, reproductive, and labor ―resource‖ is
glossed over in the deep ecological agenda. (―Class …‖ 226)

Concerning Salleh‘s criticism of biological egalitarianism, Mary Mellor

maintains that ―biological egalitarianism and the principles of diversity and symbiosis

did not seem to take account of women‘s experiences and lives‖ (Mellor 139). Mellor

adds that deep ecologists form an ―abstract environmental ethics‖ when they could start

from women as the immediate living basis for an alternative consciousness. Every biotic

community is related to each other. But they are distinct from each other. The

suggestion of ecofeminism is that since they are distinct from each other, one ought to

respect the individuality of these beings rather than seeking to merge with them. It is

true that deep ecology tries to relate them to egalitarian concept among all communities.

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Deep ecology says that all life forms are interconnected in the fabric or web of internal

relations. Ecofeminism believes it to be an abstract metaphysical pre-conceptualization

of deep ecology. Ecofeminism alleges that by this egalitarian biological concept of

integral relation, deep ecology ignores the identity of each species. According to

Zimmerman, this view may be only apparently consistent with the view that while men

think atomistically, women think relationally. More than giving importance on

―contextual‘ metaphysics,‖ Zimmerman believes in seeking a way to overcome the

effects of hierarchal and dualistic thinking. Deep ecology fails while it is sympathetic to

the aims of such an approach.

In this context, the view of Marti Kheel is important who says that we cannot

solve the ecological crisis simply by ridding ourselves of metaphysical and social

atomism and replacing such atomism with a metaphysical and social relationalism.

Kheel further adds that it is important to remember that relationships can only obtain

between individuals that have some measure of importance and reality of their own. If

we reduce individuals merely to the status of interconnection in a field of internal

relations, Kheel observes, we run the danger of removing all obstacles to regarding the

nexus of internal relations as being more important than the individual nodes

comprising the biome. That is, for the sake of the "overall good" of the whole set of

internal relations, individuals could justifiably be sacrificed since after all, they are only

temporary coagulations of the dynamic patterns at work in the vibrant field of life.

Guha points out that, biospherical egalitarianism of Naess is mere impossibility

if there is a dualism of rich and poor and inequality among the people of first and third

worlds. Egalitarianism will be meaningful if the problem of poverty of third worlds is

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given due place in any ecological movement. A deep ecologist‘s objective cannot be

fulfilled until the issue of the poverty is not attached in environmental agenda. At the

same time Guha states that rich countries or already developed economies cannot

become environmental bosses at the cost of a glossy egalitarianism which is nothing but

a new means of exploitation.

3.2.5 Absurdities of Ecosophy and Self-realization:

According to Naess, ecology movements are ecophilosophical rather than

ecological. Naess says that ecology is a limited science that makes use of scientific

methods. On the other hand, philosophy, according to Naess is the most general forum

of debate on fundamentals, descriptive as well as prescriptive (Ecology 35). Social

ecology alleges that Naess reduces ecology to a religion rather than a systematic and

deep critical body of ideas. Bookchin claims that there is a pattern of deep ecology

behind this. Naess entertains with the flow of diagrams and corporate-type tables of

organization as an attempt of systematizing his personal philosophy. Social ecology

believes that Naess‘s personal ecosophy cannot solve ecological problems. One‘s

personal ecosophy is problematic and cannot yield a free, rational and ecologically

oriented society.

Deep ecology believes that there is an integral whole of the biotic community.

Naess views ―first nature,‖ in the abstract, as a ―cosmic oneness.‖ He believes in the

possibility, the value, and the necessity of a sort of transcendental communion with the

cosmos. Deep Ecology‘s ―ecosophical,‖ ―cosmic spiritual identification‖ with an

―intrinsically valuable‖ nature, is characterized by a strong anarchic sentiment. It has a

biophilic component of the love of or empathy with nature and all living things. It

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speaks about an ecological consciousness which is pointed out by the critics as ―quasi-

mystical.‖ The quasi-mystical kinship of deep ecology with birds and spiders in the

―circle of life‖, in the ―council of all Beings‖ is ridiculed by critics of social justice

schools of environmentalism. In the rituals of deep ecology, individuals allegedly

represent themselves as non-human components like rabbits or trees. Continuing his

critical indication, Bookchin says that social ecology has been under attack ―by self-

professed adherents who continually try to collapse all the phases of natural and human

development into a universal "oneness" (not wholeness), a yawning "night in which all

cows are black," to borrow one of Hegel's caustic phrases‖ (Ecology of Freedom 22).

In the writings of Naess, the ecological self is often discussed in conjunction

with identification. The Naessian sense of fellow-feeling and empathy lose its strength

in the grip of identification. According to Mathews, if we are identifiable with nature as

the interconnectedness thesis implies then whatever we do, where this will include our

exploitation of the environment, will qualify as natural. In addition to this Mathews says

that ―if we are truly part of, or one with, Nature, and Nature knows best, then our

depredations of the natural world must be ecologically and hence morally

unobjectionable‖ (―Deep ecology or …‖ 160). Mathews terms this as a kind of

―identification dilemma‖ of deep ecology. This dilemma for deep ecology is read as

follows:

The insistence of deep ecology that we are one with nature which best
knows how to look after itself then, does seem directly to imply that we
have no ecological nor hence moral grounds for intervening in the
spontaneous course of human affairs as these affect the environment. (160)

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 Mathews is of the view that the metaphysical interconnectedness of Naess‘s

deep ecology implies an irreducible ontological ambivalence at the level of individuals.

Deep ecology is directed towards identification of nature as a whole. It sees reality as

something based on interconnections. But ecofeminism is directed towards care and

kinship. It sees reality as a web of relations. It can be seen as a manifold of individuals.

As such ecofeminism says that any attempt to relate human beings with nature, both

historically as well as individually need to be considered. This consideration, Mathews

believes, may lead the end of any ambivalence. According to him, individuals in the

scheme of things are analogous to the wave particles of quantum mechanics. In quantum

mechanics, light is analyzed in terms of wave particles. From one point of view it

manifests as a stream or photons and from another point of view, it manifests as a wave

phenomenon or a pattern in a field. Mathews says that light cannot be reduced to either

photons or field. Mathews, therefore, concludes that ontological ambivalence is intrinsic

to its nature. Moreover, he adds that the interconnectedness thesis of deep ecology tends

to view the natural world from the holistic perspective. Therefore, it considers

individuals as field-like rather than as particulate. Mathews says that the principle of

interconnectedness affects the principle of ―nature knows best‖. Mathews writes, ―The

principle that Nature knows best will be understood to mean that Nature knows best for

itself as a whole; but it is not taken to imply that Nature knows best for the individuals

that are its elements. Reading the principle in this latter sense raises obvious question

about it‘s validity‖ (160).

According to Mathews, the thesis of deep ecology that human beings are

identifiable with Nature-as-a-whole is inconsistent. The reason is that once we

recognize this identifiability we should ally ourselves with Nature against humankind.

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Mathews, therefore, claims that by doing this deep ecologist reasserts a sharp division

between humankind and Nature. Mathews prefers to label it as ‗cosmic ecology‘ instead

of deep ecology. He says that in cosmic ecology our identification with Nature-as-a-

whole entails a moral agreement in all human action in so far as it imposes on the

environment. But ecofeminism does not identify human beings with Nature in a

monolithic sense. Rather human beings are considered as members of a larger family.

Here human beings are motivated to treat those others with care and consideration. This

is how deep ecology is criticized in view of establishing an ecofeminist thesis. Mathews

adds, ―Cosmic ecology then appears to prescribe quietistic surrender to whatever is the

case, while ecofeminism advocates many-sided negotiation for the sake of

accommodating all our relations‖ (164). Ecofeminism hinges on a reawakening of one‘s

kinship with one‘s individual non-human realities. It is ―very much familiarized with

our individuality rather than any kind of our cosmic identification. It actually emerges

out of a sense of solidarity with our fellow beings‖ (Das 126).

Kheel‘s assertion is that individual beings must not be used in a kind of

psychological instrumentalism to help to establish a feeling of connection that in reality

does not exist. She is of the view that women and animals have been used as

psychological instruments for the establishment of the masculine self. She writes, ― …

when deep ecologists write of expanding the self, ecofeminists must be prepared to

examine more deeply the unconscious drives that fuel the self that one seeks to expand‖

(Kheel 69). Moreover, the Naessian thesis of Self-realization is full of absurdity

according to Kheel. She adds:

Nonetheless, animals are still used as instrument of self-definition; they are

killed not in the name of an individual, masculine ego but instead in the

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 name of a higher, abstract self. But whether one is establishing the ‗self‘
writ small or the larger ‗Self‘, the experience of the animal- the loss of her
life remains the same. (69)

In other words, Kheel‘s basic criticism of deep ecology is that of the danger of

an abstract identification with a larger whole. According to Kheel, an abstract

identification fails to recognize or respect the existence of independent living beings. It

is a risk of obliterating the uniqueness and importance of individual beings. Therefore,

she suggests that ―our deep, holistic awareness of the interconnectedness of all life must

be a lived awareness that we experience in relation to particular beings as well as the

larger whole‖ (69). Identification actually preserves the self-centeredness that it claims

to eliminate. In order to get rid of the boundaries between self and nature, what must

happen is that a person expands his or her conception of self to include those parts of

nature that were previously considered outside of the self. In this way, deep ecology

does not attempt to overcome the attitude of using the non-self as a means to achieving

self well-being; it only enlarges the self that one is selfish about.

Both social ecology and ecofeminism find a problem in conceiving oneself as

part of nature. As such, they criticize deep ecology labelling it as a metaphysical

principle. Hawkins maintains that ―the metaphysical charge is accompanied by

perceptibly gendered differences among key players‖ (208). Ecofeminists criticize that

this proposal of Naess does not actually result in changing the human-centeredness of

the attitude toward nature. Rather, it reinforces it.

According to Plumwood, the notion of identification ends to emphasize personal

transformation. It ignores social structures and political realities. According to her, deep

ecology‘s notion of self-in-Self is vague. She explicates it by sliding at least three

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different meanings of self that she claims Naess have given. They are indistinguishable

self, expanded self and transcended self. According to Plumwood, all these three

accounts are masculinist and imprecise. She analyses these three accounts of self-in-Self

and shows that they all are problematic.

Firstly, Plumwood is critical of deep ecologists‘ call for self-identification with

non-human nature. She claims that there are many problems in the self-merger theories.

She believes that the Naessian thesis of self-identification promotes an ―abstract,‖

―detached,‖ ―masculine,‖ ―atomistic‖ sense-of-self. This thesis rejects the boundaries

between ―self‖ and ―nature‖ and thereby denies the ―difference‖ and ―autonomy‖ of the

―other.‖ In other words, the Naessian account of self demolishes the self and another

dichotomy that insists on a cosmology of ―unbroken wholeness which denies the

classical idea of the analyzability of the world into separately and independently

existing parts.‖ Such dissolution fails to recognize and respect differences. Plumwood

says that instead of healing this dualism, deep ecology proposes a ‗unifying process‘.

This is a metaphysical process which insists that everything is really part of,

indistinguishable from, everything else. Plumwood says that ―this is not only to employ

overly powerful tools, but ones that do the wrong job, for the origins of the particular

opposition involved in human/nature dualism remain unaddressed and unanalyzed‖

(Feminism 177).

Secondly, the expanded conception of self is problematic. Plumwood

particularly takes Naess‘s articulation of the concept of self where Naess says that ‗the

self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications…… our self is that with

which we identify.‘ Plumwood says that in this version identification becomes not

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identity but something more like empathy. In her own words, ―Where ‗identification‘ is

used equivocally to mean both ‗identity‘ and something like ‗sympathy‘ or ‗empathy‘,

identification with other beings leads to an expanded self which encompasses all those

we empathize with‖( 179). According to Plumwood, the expanded self is not a critique

of egoism. According to her, the expanded self is simply another expression of the ego.

Plumwood, therefore, says that the expanded self does not question the structures of

possessive egoism and self-interest. Rather, Plumwood continues, it tries to allow for a

wider set of interests by an expansion of self. The motivation for the expansion of self is

to allow for a wider set of concerns while continuing allowing the self to operate on the

fuel of self-interest. (179). Thus we end up with an atomistic non-relational self, just a

bigger one. Plumwood writes:

If ‗identification‘ is interpreted to mean simply ‗empathy‘ or the assuming

of the other‘s interests as one‘s own, as Naess Suggests then the self which
identifies with the other will be a version of the relational self…. But the
problem for deep ecologists in treating the relational self as a further,
fallback interpretation of the Self is that it makes the whole problematic and
cumbersome account of ecological selfhood as self-expansion and Self-
realization entirely unnecessary, along with the claim that the Self is the
totality of its identifications. (180-81)

There are serious conflicts of interest among constituent members of larger

wholes. According to Plumwood, expansionary selfhood does not adequately recognize

the reality of these conflicts. Moreover, Plumwood is of the view that affirming the

ontological interconnectedness of all human and nonhuman organisms and the nonliving

environment does not necessitate an embrace of the holism of self-realization.

According to her, the concept of expanded self is a disguised form of human

colonialism, unable to give nature its due as a genuine other. For instance, the notion of

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the expanded self results in ‗‗boundary problems‘‘ stemming from the impulse of

subordination. In the words of Plumwood, ―The problem points towards a general set of

boundary problems encountered by forms of deep ecology which dissolve or expand the

self in this way. There is an arrogance in failing to respect boundaries and to

acknowledge difference which can amount to an imposition of self‖ (178).

Thirdly, the transcended self account of deep ecology says that we detach from

the particular concerns of the self. Warwick Fox develops Naess‘s version of deep

ecology to transpersonal ecology. Plumwood says that Fox urges to strive for impartial

identification with all particulars, the cosmos. We disregard our identifications with our

own particular concerns, emotions and attachments. According to Plumwood, this

account devalues particular attachments. It subsumes the emotional to the rational.

As such, reason has been ridiculed and even been demonized. Intuition is

prescribed alternatively because the cosmic oneness can be realized by intuition only.

Ecofeminists say that deep ecology makes particular inferior in its concept of

transcended self. It does also make emotional and kinship-based attachments inferior.

As such, deep ecology is nothing but another variant on the superiority of reason and the

inferiority of its contrasts. Thereby, ecofeminism tries to expose the futility of the

Naessian claim of the rejection of reason.

3.2.6 The concept of wilderness is problematic:

Deep ecology advocates the preservation and expansion of the wilderness. Naess

advocates wilderness as well as the wild, ―non-rational‖ as opposed to the irrational side

of human nature. Deep ecology‘s ecological consciousness suggests feeling human

beings as the part of the natural world. In concrete terms, it views first nature as

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―wilderness,‖ a concept that by definition means nature is essentially separated from

human beings and hence ―wild‖. ―The myth of wilderness‖ considers the presence of

humans as a threat to other species. Critics consider this myth as ridiculous and anti-

civilizational in character.

Social ecology charges the notion of wilderness as the advocacy of primitivism.

Bookchin does not prefer to stand in the row of the Primitivists. One can see the twenty

first century‘s man-made world. According to Bookchin, this stage of human-

civilization utterly rejects deep ecology‘s optimism of returning to a primitive world.

The Primitivists believe that mankind has acquired too much of civilization. But

according to Bookchin, we are not civilized enough. Primitivists believe in personal

autonomy. But Bookchin believes in social freedom. Primitivists believe that there is a

natural man, an uncorrupted ego which civilization has corrupted. But for Bookchin,

competition and other class and hierarchical relations have corrupted society. Therefore,

Bookchin is in favour of a cooperative civilization which he believes goes against deep

ecology. Moreover, ―deep ecologists emphasize an ungraded, non-evolutionary

continuity between human and nonhuman nature, to the point of outright denial of a

boundary between adaptive animality and innovative humanity‖ (Biehl and Bookchin

web).

Plumwood criticizes Arne Naess who advocates a road to ecological selfhood in

terms of the concept of self-realization in which the self is identified with as much of

the world as possible. In this concept of Naess, wilderness is suggested to be seen as

part of the self. According to Plumwood, there certainly seems to be something

problematic and even paradoxical in the notion of relating to uncolonized areas via their

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incorporation into or assimilation to self. Deep ecology, according to Plumwood, fails to

recognize and value nature‘s otherness and independence as exemplified in the

wilderness. She writes that ―accounts which stress only the independence of wilderness

have foregone any basis for countering the western construction of nature as alien, or

for providing a foundation for ethical relations to it‖ (Feminism 161). Plumwood says

that the use of hyper-separated concepts of human and nature rule out the ground of

interaction. Deep ecology says that the true nature excludes all human influence on it.

According to Plumwood, the concept of wilderness is extremely problematic in relation

to indigenous peoples who both sustain and are sustained by their land and its

ecosystems. What is wilderness in the terms of the master identity is to these others a

home. Plumwood observes that the forest gardens and tended landscapes which are

home to such people come to be viewed by the ‗master consciousness‘ as pure nature.

Plumwood writes:

‗Wilderness‘, traditionally the territory excluded as the underside of the

contrasts of reason and civilization, is also traditionally a wasteland empty
of culture and inviting colonization. It is named as terra nullius, the alien,
fearful and disordered domain of animals, women, savages and the
underside of the human psyche. (Feminism 163)

In this connection, Plumwood gives the reference of Vandana Shiva who speaks

about the master culture. The master culture, according to Shiva, arrogantly speaks of

‗discovering‘ and ‗exploring‘ areas which other species and other human cultures have

been occupying for an immensely long time period, and appropriates as ‗nature‘ germ-

plasm which embodies the labour of generations of indigenous agriculturalists (163).

Freya Mathews alleges that ―the typical deep ecological reverence for untouched

Nature, idealized in the concept of wilderness, is rooted in the very same dualistic

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understanding of the world that by setting humankind above and beyond Nature, paved

the way for ecological crisis‖ (164). He elaborates that if we make a fetish of untouched

Nature, then we are implicitly reinforcing the dualistic view. It contradicts the basic

metaphysical premise of man-nature-oneness thesis of deep ecology.

The third world critics assert that preserving wilderness is an agenda for

economically and socially well-offs. Quoting Gandhi, Guha says, ―Even God dare not

appear to the poor man except in the form of bread‖ (―Radical …‖ 71). Guha‘s

allegation is that the international conservative elites are using the philosophical, moral,

and scientific arguments in the name of deep ecology in advancing their wilderness

campaign. The Third World countries are being affected in the name of environmental

and biodiversity protection.

Guha justifies it by tracing the historical legacy of wilderness. According to him,

from the perspective of ancient lineage of wilderness, one can see the ―elite feudal

traditions of ‗hunting preserves‘ –prevalent in Norman England, Qing China and

Mughal India—where animal species such as the tiger and the deer were reserved for

the exclusive pleasure of lords and kings‖ (Environmentalism 61). In the modern

perspectives, the legacy of wilderness is carried forth by the colonial powers of the

America and Europe. Guha further adds, ―The background to wilderness conservation

was the despoliation of the American continent by the westward movement of European

settlers‖ (67). He considers these projects as ―elite ecological imperialism‖ that result in

―a direct transfer of resources from the poor to the rich.‖ He cites the example of the

first-ever international conference which was held in London in 1900. The topic of this

conference was ―Protection of wildlife of Africa,‖ where there was a discussion on the

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massive destruction of African wildlife by hunters. The delegates were from ministers

of the European colonial powers where there was nobody from Africa. Guha observes

that ―if there was indeed a ‗crisis of African wildlife‘ this crisis had been created by the

white man‘s gun and rifle, not the native spear and sling shot‖ (66). It is to be

mentioned that the game reserves and national parks were the hunting and recreation

grounds of the colonial whites which is positively harmful to the poor people of third

worlds. Because the normal daily lifestyle which is coexistent with the natural

environment in a rural set up is compatible with the view of wilderness. According to

Guha, deep ecology‘s thesis of wilderness preservation is of no use in third worlds. The

implementation of the wilderness agenda is causing serious deprivation among the poor

people of the Third World. This argument of Guha is based on the dichotomy of

anthropocentrism and biocentrism. He says that biocentric egalitarianism of Naess

―place humans on a more or less equal footing with other species‖ (117). But this

dichotomy is irrelevant when applied to the Third World.

Guha has cited the example of India which is a long settled and densely

populated country in which agrarian populations have a finely balanced relationship

with nature. If wilderness is advocated by following the deep ecology principle then one

is to set aside the wilderness areas which will be resulted in a direct transfer of resources

from the poor to the rich. Guha shows his concern to this acquiring and exploitative

tactic of elite deep ecologists. He writes:

The initial impetus for setting up parks for the tiger and other large
mammals such as the rhinoceros and elephant came from two social groups,
first, a class of ex-hunters turned conservationists belonging mostly to the
declining Indian feudal elite and second, representatives of international
agencies, such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International

167
 Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IDCN),
seeking to transplant the American system of national parks onto Indian soil
(―Radical …‖ 75).

The marginalized section is the most sufferers in terms of environmental ill-

effects. The rich become policy makers being affluent in global perspective. In their

own convenience, they try to expand the policy of establishing national parks in the

third worlds advocating recreation centres in the name of wilderness. In this connection

the view of Anil Agarwal, as quoted by Erach Bharucha, carries significance. In the

Fifth World Conservation Lecture in London on "Human-Nature Interactions in a Third

World Country: The case of India," Agarwal states, ―I am often amazed and extremely

angry when people talk about environment education for the villages. It is the so-called,

educated people who need environment education more than anyone else‖ (Bharucha

184). In other words, people in the third world countries live in conformity with the

balance with the natural environment. Guha alleges that the national park system set for

‗the general public‘ and ‗city dweller‘ refer exclusively to whites and males only. In his

words, ―These ―over-civilized‖ folk lived the year round in the cities and only seasoned

their lives, a week at a time, with the wild. By the early twentieth century, growing

urbanization had spawned a leisure industry which created a powerful social force for

the preservation of wild areas‖ (Environmentalism 71).

This is how the third world critics claim to have exposed the concealed intention

of deep ecologists as the advocate of consumerist view in the name of conservation. For

this wilderness is instrumentally advocated without having the least consideration for

the poor of the third world countries. They condemn Naess and other deep ecologists for

advocating wilderness without addressing the problems of the third worlds.

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 In the conclusion it can be said that, in his concern of social justice, Naess has

used the broad meaning of social justice covering almost all facets of human problems

inviting equality principle of mankind. It is seen that for an ecologically balanced

future, deep ecology‘s aerial view to its fellow counterparts falls short in comparison to

the ideas of individual distinctiveness as well as love and kinship of social justice

schools. Naess‘ world view of ―Man in Nature‖ makes him view the humanity as a

blanket category that has allegedly neglected social and gender differences. His

overemphasis on the criticism of anthropocentrism keeps him away to view the roles of

white and rich-men‘s world in creating many-sided oppressions and inequalities. Of

course, Naess tries to defend his standpoint stating that he has been misinterpreted by

the critics. The next chapter evokes a glimpse of Naess‘s attempt to defend the deep

ecological thesis.

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