OPINION RULE
Respondents elevated the case to mind of the donor was the result of
LAVAREZ v. GUEVARRA
Facts: On June 7, 1996, Rebecca died
intestate and without any issue, leaving
several properties to be settled among
her nearest kins – the sons and
daughters of her siblings – who later
became the parties in this case. On
October 16, 1996, the petitioners, filed
an action for reconveyance, partition,
accounting, and nullification of
documents, with damages, against
respondents.
For their defense, respondents alleged
that there was nothing to partition since
they were not aware of any real or
personal properties which their aunt
Rebecca had left behind. Said
properties which were included in the
complaint had already been validly
donated to them by Rebecca, resulting
to new Certificates of Title being issued
in their names. It is the contention of
respondents that Rebecca still had full
control of her mind during the execution
of the deeds. The fact that she was
already of advanced age at that time or
that she had to rely on respondents’
care did not necessarily prove that she
could no longer give consent to a
contract.
On May 26, 2010, the Lucena RTC
granted the complaint in favor of
defendants-appellants are declared
valid.
the CA. The appellate court partly
granted the appeal and sustained the
validity of the subject Deeds of
Donation. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Rebecca
possessed sufficient mentality to
effect consent?
Rulings: No. Rebecca did not possess
sufficient mentality to effect the contract
of donation. Putting together the
abovementioned circumstances, that at
the time of the execution of the Deeds of
Donation covering numerous properties,
Rebecca was already at an advanced
age of 75, afflicted with dementia, not
necessarily in the pinkest of health since
she was then, in fact, admitted to the
hospital, it can be reasonably assumed
that the same had the effects of
impairing her brain or mental faculties so
as to considerably affect her consent,
and that fraud or undue influence would
have been employed in order to procure
her signature on the questioned deeds.
The correctness of the trial court’s
findings therefore stands untouched,
since respondents never provided any
plausible argument to have it reversed,
the issue of the validity of donation
being fully litigated and passed upon by
the trial court.
Petitioners claim, as confirmed by Dr.
Conde, that the unsoundness of the
senile dementia.
As to Dr. Conde's expert opinion, it is
settled that the testimony of expert
witnesses must be construed to have
been presented not to sway the court in
favor of any of the parties, but to assist
the court in the determination of the
issue before it.13 Although. courts are
not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever
weight they may choose upon such
testimonies in accordance with the facts
of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial
court to decide, considering the ability
and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and
process of the reasoning by which he
has supported his opinion, his possible
bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he might be a paid
witness, the relative opportunities for
study and observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other
matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert
may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and
when common knowledge utterly fails,
the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect. The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling
pg. 1
on such is not reviewable in the absence
of abuse of discretion.
Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, the Court gives
great respect to the evaluation of the
trial court for it had the unique,
opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment Ion the
witness stand, an opportunity that is
unavailable to the appellate courts,
which simply rely on the cold records of
the case. The assessment by the trial
court is even conclusive and binding
if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and
influence.19 Here, the CA failed to show
any presence of abuse, arbitrariness, or
any clear disregard of evidence on the
part of the trial court when it gave full
credence to Dr. Conde's expert opinion.
AVELINO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Renato Sosas (Sosas) was an
employee of Bobby Avelino (Avelino)
in his wood business. Sosas was
instructed by avelino to summon the
Toto Mata, Nato, Domeng Bakukang,
Bobot Tuwad, Boy Muslim, Angkol,
Charlie, Sonny Muslim and Mon. an
hour later, the group convened at
Avelino’s warehouse at Tagaytay,
Baseco Compound, Tondo Manila.
While Sosas was only 1 step away he
heard that the group planned to kill
Chairman Generoso Sosas kept mum RTC Ruled in favor of Avelino
about what he had heard. CA reversed and convicted Avelino
Alfredo Manalangsang Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to
(Manalangsang) was riding a tricycle to reverse his conviction, arguing that the
the Baseco Compund. The tricycle gave CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
way to the home owner jeep of the prosecution witnesses
Chariman Generoso Hispano Manalangsang and Cañada and
(Hispano). Suddnely 2 men blocked the disregarding the inconsistencies
path of the jeep and another fired between the statements of
gunshots at Hispano. Manalangsang Manalangsang and the findings of the
hed behind the island and waited for the medico-legal and SOCO PSI
incident to finish. While hiding he was Cabamongan as to the position of the
near the gunman and saw that the gunman. He also reiterated his defense
gunman had removed his bonnet and of denial and alibi.
saw it was Avelino who was them
making sure that Hispano was dead. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in
The 3 persons then took the jeep of rejecting the expert witness
Hispano and drove off. Manalangsang presented by Avelino?
once again rode the tricycle and went
home. HELD: No.
The defense of the petitioner is based,
While the assailants were riding the secondly, on his allegations that
jeep, it was incidentally blocked by a prosecution witnesses Manalangsang
tricycle and a white car. A Mary Ann and Cañada failed to positively identify
Canada (Canada) saw Avelino driving him as the gunman who mortally
the jeep of Hispano. wounded Hispano, and that
Manalangsang’s testimony as to the
When the police arrived at the crime locations and number of gunshot
scene, Chairman Hispano was already wounds, as well as the position of the
dead. gunman, is inconsistent with the
Denying the accusation, the defense physical evidence as provided by the
presented as evidence the medico-legal officer and the testimony of
testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony SOCO PSI Cabamongan.
P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and These allegations cannot exculpate the
Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) petitioner from criminal liability.
PSI Lito D. Cabamongan
(Cabamongan).7 Further, as can be gleaned from the
excerpt below, the petitioner’s defense
pg. 2
that Manalangsang’s testimony
contradicts with the medical findings,
and should then be disregarded,
must fail. Petitioner claims that
Manalangsang’s statements that
Hispano was shot in a downward
direction conflict with the findings of the
medico-legal that the trajectory of the
bullets is in an upward direction. The
testimony of Dr. Salen
Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the
bullets is in an upward direction does
not negate the veracity of
Manalangsang’s statement that Hispano
was shot by the gunman from an
elevated plane.
The CA was also correct in not giving
credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI
Cabamongan as regards the position of
the gunman when the latter shot
Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the
gunman was on board the owner-type
jeep when Hispano was shot, which is
opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony.
However, case records reveal that
Cabamongan was presented as an
ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion
regarding the location of the gunman
in relation to the place where the
empty shells were found is
immaterial.
Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a)
the matter to be testified to is one that
requires expertise, and (b) the witness
has been qualified as an expert.27 In this
case, counsel for the petitioner failed to
make the necessary qualification upon
presenting Cabamongan during trial.
Jurisprudence further provides that
minor inconsistencies in immaterial
details do not destroy the probative
value of the testimony of a witness
regarding the very act of the accused.
PEOPLE v. DURANAN
Doctrine: It is competent for the
ordinary witness to give his opinion as to
the sanity or mental condition of a
person, provided the witness has had
sufficient opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and conduct of
the person in question.  and raped her. After the
Facts: Appeal from the decision of the
RTC finding Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a.
“Kalbo,” guilty of two counts of rape
against AAA, a feebleminded girl. He
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
- Complainant AAA, who was 25
years old when she was raped, is
considered to be retarded and
finished up to the sixth grade
only.  She is unemployed and
simply does household chores for
her family.  Accused-appellant
lived with the complainant’s
family in the same apartment in
where he rented a room.
o The first incident: AAA was
standing by the door of her
grandfather’s house when
accused-appellant
suddenly placed his arm
on her neck and dragged
her inside the common
bathroom. Duranan kissed
her and then removed her
shorts and underwear as
he held her hands with his
other hand.  She did not
cry for help because
accused-appellant
threatened her that he
would get angry if she did.
o The second incident: AAA
was cleaning the family
residence when Duranan
took her to his
room. Duranan threatened
her, laid her on the floor
incident, Duranan sent her
letters professing love for
her and telling her how
beautiful she was. 
o Third incident: He
attempted but stopped
when he heard someone
coming. After the
attempted rape, BBB
testified that she noticed
that her daughter’s lower
lip was bruised.  The latter
revealed for the first time
what had happened to her.
- Apart from claiming that he
wasn’t in the house during the
first incident and that he couldn’t
have raped her in his room
because there were six other
people in his room during the
second incident, on appeal,
pg. 3
 Duranan claimed that the court
erred in holding that AAA is
“deprived of reason” because
there was no testimony by a
competent medical expert to that
effect, especially since her own
mother described AAA as “quite
intelligent”. He contends that he
cannot be convicted of rape
since the victim’s mental age
was not proven (Remember, her
actual age is 25).  person with whom he is
o He argues that under Art.
335(2) of the Revised
Penal Code, an essential
element for the
prosecution for rape of a
mental retardate is a
psychiatric evaluation of
the complainant’s mental
age to determine if her
mental age is under
twelve. He further claims
that only in cases where
the retardation is apparent
due to the presence of
physical deformities
symptomatic of mental
retardation can the mental
evaluation be waived.
Issue: WON the court erred in holding
that AAA is “deprived of reason”
because there was no testimony by a
competent medical expert to that
effect
Held: No, the trial court was correct.
RTC decision affirmed.
- Rule 130, §50 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. --
The opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given may
be received in evidence regarding
--- (a) the identity of a person
about whom he has adequate
knowledge; (b) a handwriting with
which he has sufficient familiarity;
and (c) the mental sanity of a
sufficiently acquainted.
- The mother of an offended party
in a case of rape, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of
the party, how she was born,
what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is
competent to testify on the
matter.
- It is competent for the ordinary
witness to give his opinion as
to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided
the witness has had sufficient
opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and
conduct of the person in
question.  FACTS: Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her
o Generally, it is required
that the witness details the
factors and reasons upon
which he bases his opinion
before he can testify as to
what it is. (conversations
or dealings which he has
had with such person, etc.)
- The statement that complainant is
“quite intelligent” must be read in
the context of BBB’s previous
statement that complainant
“thinks like a child but from her
narration or statement we can
see that her declaration are (sic)
true or believable.” Thus, what
complainant’s mother meant was
that complainant, although she
thought like a child, nevertheless
could tell others what happened
to her.
- Accused-appellant cites the
medico-legal report which
describes complainant as
“coherent” and contends that this
is an evaluation of the mental
state of complainantNO! The
medico–legal report’s purpose is
limited to determining whether the
complainant had been sexually
abused.
Digest by: P.M.R. Gairanod
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PEOPLE v. DEOPITA
way home from work when suddenly a
man appeared from behind, looped his
arm around her neck and warned her
not to shout or else she would die. The
man dragged her through the banana
plantation towards the cornfields.
Dominga got a good look at the man,
who turned out to be Rafael Diopita,
pg. 4
as he sat on her thighs and proceeded
to divest her of her belongings.
Thereafter, Diopita announced his
desire to have carnal knowledge of
Dominga. After having his way with her,
Diopita threatened Dominga not to tell
anyone about the incident or else he
would shoot her.
Dominga was able to report the incident
to the police and gave the description of
the suspect and his possible
whereabouts. A colored white/yellow,
size 10 slipper was found in the scene of
the crime. In a police line-up, Dominga
readily pointed to Diopita which was
further bolstered by the fact that when
the police had him try the slipper, it
easily fitted him. In his defense, Diopita
posed the alibi that he was at an
informal Bible session of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses at the time of the crime.
The trial court convicted Diopita stating
that alibi is a weak form of defense.
Among Diopita’s arguments is that it
was impossible for him to have
committed the crime charged since
he is a person of good moral
character, holding as he does the
position of “Ministerial Servant” in
the congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and that he is a godly
man, a righteous person, a RULE 131
responsible family man and a good
Christian who preaches the word of
God.
ISSUE: Whether or not Diopita is
entitles to an acquittal simply
because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct?
RULING: The conviction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court , ratiocinating that
the fact that Diopita is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies
the conclusion that he is innocent of the
crime charged. Similarly, his having
attained the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in his faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion and
plunderous proclivity on his part.
Indeed, religiosity is not always an
emblem of good conduct, and it is not
the unreligious alone who succumbs to
the impulse to rob and rape. An accused
is not entitled to an acquittal simply
because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct.
The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved on the basic
issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Since the evidence of the crime in the
instant case is more than sufficient to
convict, the evidence of good moral
character of accused-appellant is
unavailing.
BURDEN OF PROOF v. BURDEN OF
EVIDENCE
FEBTC v. CHANTE
Facts: 1. Robert Chan, also known as
Robert Chan was a current account
depositor for petitioner.
a. He was issues a “Do-it-all” card to
handle credit card and ATM
transactions.
b. A PIN, known only to Chan, was the
security feature.
2. FEBTC bought a complaint against
Chan to recover P770,488.30 as unpaid
balance for an amount allegedly
withdrawn using the card at the ATM
facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in
Manila.
a. The withdrawals were done in a
series of 242 transactions with the use
of the same machine at P4,000 per
transaction.
b. The transactions were processed
despite:
b. 1. the offline status of the branch of
account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch);
b. 2. Chan’s account balance being only
P198,511.70 at the time, as shown in
the bank statement;
b. 3. the maximum withdrawal limit of
the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day;
and
b. 4. his withdrawal transactions not
being reflected in his account, and no
debits or deductions from his current
account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch
being recorded.
b. 5. FECTC alleged a bug allowed
Chan to withdraw more than his account
would allow.
3. Chan denied liability alleging he was
home at the time of the withdrawal.
pg. 5
a. He argued it was humanly impossible
to stand long hours in front of the ATM to
withdraw those funds.
4. The RTC rendered judgment in favor
of FEBTC.
a. Regardless of lack of precedence
regarding computer errors, respondent
should return what is not rightfully his.
5. The CA reversed the decision.
a. The evidentiary dilemma was that
there was no direct evidence on who
made the actual withdrawals.
Issue: Is Chan liable for the amount?
Held: The FEBTC argues that Chan
authorized the withdrawals based on the
fact that only Chan knew the correct
PIN. We disagree with FEBTC.
Although there was no question
that Chan had the physical possession
of Far East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 at
the time of the withdrawals, the
exclusive possession of the card alone
did not suffice to preponderantly
establish that he had himself made the
withdrawals, or that he had caused the
withdrawals to be made. In his answer,
he denied using the card to withdraw
funds from his account on the dates in
question, and averred that the
withdrawals had been an "inside job."
His denial effectively traversed FEBTC’s
claim of his direct and personal liability
for the withdrawals, that it would lose the
case unless it competently and
sufficiently established that he had
personally made the withdrawals
himself, or that he had caused the
withdrawals. In other words, it carried
the burden of proof.
Burden of proof is a term that
refers to two separate and quite different
concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-
persuasion, or the burden of persuasion,
or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the
duty of producing evidence, or the
burden of going forward with the
evidence, or simply the production
burden or the burden of evidence.10 In
its first concept, it is the duty to
establish the truth of a given proposition
or issue by such a quantum of evidence
as the law demands in the case at which
the issue arises.11 In its other concept,
it is the duty of producing evidence at
the beginning or at any subsequent
stage of trial in order to make or meet a
prima facie case. Generally speaking,
burden of proof in its second concept
passes from party to party as the case
progresses, while in its first concept it
rests throughout upon the party
asserting the affirmative of the issue.12
The party who alleges an
affirmative fact has the burden of
proving it because mere allegation of the
fact is not evidence of it.13 Verily, the
party who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of
proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is given on
either side.15This is because our system
frees the trier of facts from the
responsibility of investigating and
presenting the facts and arguments,
placing that responsibility entirely upon
the respective parties.16 The burden of
proof, which may either be on the
plaintiff or the defendant, is on the
plaintiff if the defendant denies the
factual allegations of the complaint in
the manner required by the Rules of
Court; or on the defendant if he admits
expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises an affirmative
defense or defenses, that, if proved,
would exculpate him from liability.17
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court sets the quantum of evidence
for civil actions, and delineates how
preponderance of evidence is
determined, viz :
Section 1. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also
pg. 6
their personal credibility so far as the
same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with
the greater number. (Emphasis
supplied)
As the rule indicates,
preponderant evidence refers to
evidence that is of greater weight, or
more convincing, than the evidence
offered in opposition to it.18 It is proof
that leads the trier of facts to find that
the existence of the contested fact is
more probable than its nonexistence.19
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must
rely on the strength of its own evidence
instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s
evidence. Its burden of proof thus
required it to preponderantly
demonstrate that his ATM card had
been used to make the withdrawals, and
that he had used the ATM card and PIN
by himself or by another person to make
the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it
could not recover from him any funds
supposedly improperly withdrawn from
the ATM account. We remind that as a
banking institution, FEBTC had the
duty and responsibility to ensure the
safety of the funds it held in trust for
its depositors. It could not avoid the
duty or evade the responsibility because
it alone should bear the price for the
fraud resulting from the system bug on
account of its exclusive control of its
computer system.
Did FEBTC discharge its
burden of proof?
The CA ruled that FEBTC did
not because –
After a review of the records of
this case, we find the totality of evidence
submitted by FEBTC insufficient to
establish the crucial facts that would
justify a judgment in its favor.
To our mind, the fact that Chan’s
account number and ATM card number
were the ones used for the withdrawals,
by itself, is not sufficient to support the
conclusion that he should be deemed to
have made the withdrawals.
FEBTC offers in this regard the
PNB ATM’s journal tapes to prove the
withdrawals and their details – the time
of the transactions; the account number
used; the ATM card number; and the
amount withdrawn – and at the same
time declared that these tapes are
authentic and genuine. These tapes,
however, are not as reliable as FEBTC
represented them to be as they are not
even internally consistent. A disturbing
internal discrepancy we note relates to
the amounts reflected as "ledger
balance" and "available balance". We
find it strange that for every 4,000.00
pesos allegedly withdrawn by Chan, the
available balance increased rather than
diminished. Worse, the amount of
available balance as reflected in the
tapes was way above the actual
available balance of less than
Php200,000.00 that Chan’s current
account had at that time. These
discrepancies must inevitably reflect on
the integrity of the journal tapes; the
proven inconsistencies in some aspects
of these tapes leave the other aspects
suspect and uncertain.
But more than this, we are not
convinced that the tapes lead us to the
inevitable conclusion that Chan’s card,
rather than a replacement card
containing Chan’s PIN and card number
or some other equivalent scheme, was
used. To our mind, we cannot discount
this possibility given the available
technology making computer fraud a
possibility, the cited instances of
computer security breaches, the
admitted system bug, and – most
notably – the fact that the withdrawals
were made under circumstances that
took advantage of the system bug.
System errors of this kind, when taken
advantage of to the extent that had
happened in this case, are planned for.
Indeed, prior preparation must take
place to avoid suspicion and attention
where the withdrawal was made for
seven (7) long hours in a place
frequented by hundreds of guests, over
242 transactions where the physical
volume of the money withdrawn was not
insignificant. To say that this was done
by the owner of the account based
solely on the records of the transactions,
pg. 7
is a convenient but not a convincing
explanation.20
In our view, the CA’s ruling was
correct.
To start with, Edgar Munarriz,
FEBTC’s very own Systems Analyst,
admitted that the bug infecting the
bank’s computer system had facilitated
the fraudulent withdrawals.21 This
admission impelled the CA to thoroughly
dissect the situation in order to
determine the consequences of the
intervention of the system bug in
FEBTC’s computer system. It ultimately
determined thusly:
Significantly, FEBTC made the
admission that there was a program bug
in its computer system. To digress,
computers are run based on specific
pre-arranged instructions or "programs"
that act on data or information that
computer users input. Computers can
only process these inputted data or
information according to the installed
programs. Thus, computers are as
efficient, as accurate and as convenient
to use as the instructions in their
installed programs. They can count,
sort, compute and arrive at decisions but
they do so only and strictly in
accordance with the programs that
make them work. To cite an easy
example, a computer can be
programmed to sort a stack of cards
prepared by male and female clients,
into male and female stacks,
respectively. To do this, the computer
will first scan a card and look at the
place ("a field") where the male/female
information can be found. This
information may be in an appropriate
box which the bank client checks or
shades to indicate if he/she is male or
female. The computer will check if the
box beside the word "Female" is
shaded. If it is, it will send the card to the
"Female" bin. If the box beside the
"male" is shaded, it will send the card to
the "Male" bin. If both the squares are
shaded or none is shaded or the card
cannot be read, it will send the card to
the "Unknown" bin. This way, the female
cards and the male cards can be sorted
efficiently. However, the program
instructions can be written in such a way
that the computer can only make two
decisions, that is, if the Female box is
shaded, then the card goes to the
"Female" bin; otherwise, the card goes
to the "Male" bin. In this program, all the
Female cards will be sorted correctly but
the Male bin will contain all the other
cards, that is, the Male cards, the cards
with no shading at all, and all the other
cards that cannot be classified.
The imperfect results arose from
the imperfect program instructions or
from a program "bug". Something very
close to this example happened in the
present case.
According to the testimony of the
FEBTC’s systems analyst, there were
two computer programs that were
involved in the transactions:
CAPDROTH and SCPUP 900.
CAPDROTH is the program that
validates if the account exists in the
FEBTC files, if the transaction is valid,
and if the branch where the account is
maintained is ON-LINE (i.e. continuously
sending data). When the Chan
transaction entered the system, it was
validated by CAPDROTH which, on
seeing that the FEBTC-Ongpin branch
was off-line, returned a decision code
passing on the decision to authorize the
transaction to the SCPUP 900, another
module. However, SCPUP 900 was not
expecting this type of response or
decision code. As the SCPUP 900
program was originally written, it will
send back an error message and abort a
requested transaction if it receives an
error message from any other module;
otherwise, it will send a message
authorizing the transaction. In other
words, SCPUP 900 had only two
decisions to make: check if the message
is an error message, if not then,
authorize. Since what it received in the
disputed transactions were not error
messages and were not also
authorizations, it sent back authorization
messages allowing the cash
withdrawals. It kept on sending
authorization messages for the 242 cash
withdrawal transactions made from
Chan’s account between the evening of
May 4 and early morning of May 5,
1992. This program bug was the reason
the 242 cash withdrawals were allowed
by the PNB ATM-Megalink machine.
pg. 8

The program bug occurred
because of the simultaneous presence
of three conditions that allowed it to
happen: (1) the withdrawal transactions
involved a current account; (2) the
current account was with a branch that
at that time was off-line; and (3) the
transaction originated from MEGALINK
(i.e., through MEGALINK through a
member bank other than FEBTC).
Because of the bug, Chan’s account
was not accessed at the time of the
transactions so that withdrawals in
excess of what the account contained
were allowed. Additionally, FEBTC’s rule
that only a maximum withdrawable
amount per day (in the present
case P50,000.00 per day) can be made
from an ATM account, was by-passed.
Thus, 242 withdrawals were made over
an eight hour period, in the total amount
ofP967,000.00.22
Secondly, the RTC’s
deductions on the cause of the
withdrawals were faulty. In holding
against Chan, the RTC chiefly relied on
inferences drawn from his acts
subsequent to the series of withdrawals,
specifically his attempt to withdraw
funds from his account at an FEBTC
ATM facility in Ermita, Manila barely two
days after the questioned withdrawals;
his issuance of a check for P190,000.00
immediately after the capture of his ATM
card by the ATM facility; his failure to
immediately report the capture of his
ATM card to FEBTC; and his going to
FEBTC only after the dishonor of the
check he had issued following the
freezing of his account. The inferences
were not warranted, however, because
the subsequent acts would not
persuasively establish his actual
participation in the withdrawals due to
their being actually susceptible of other
interpretations consistent with his
innocence.
We join the CA’s observation that
Chan’s subsequent acts "could have
been impelled by so many reasons and
motivations, and cannot simply be given
the meaning that the lower court
attributed to them," and, instead, were
even consistent with the purpose and
nature of his maintaining the current
account deposit with FEBTC, rendering
the acts "not unusual nor …
illegal."23 Although he was expected to
forthwith bring his card’s capture to
FEBTC’s attention, that he did not do so
could have other plausible explanations
consistent with good faith, among them
his being constantly occupied as a
businessman to attend to the
multifarious activities of his business. He
might have also honestly believed that
he still had the sufficient funds in his
current account, as borne out by his
issuance of a check instead after the
capture of the card so as not for him to
undermine any financial obligation then
becoming due. Nor should his opting to
withdraw funds from his account at the
ATM facility in Ermita in less than two
days after the questioned withdrawals
manifest responsibility on his part, for he
could also be properly presumed to be
then still unaware of the situation
involving his account. We note that his
letters24 written in response to FEBTC’s
written demands to him disclosed
honest intentions rather than malice.
Thirdly, the RTC ignored the
likelihood that somebody other than
Chan familiar with the bug infection
of FEBTC’s computer system at the
time of the withdrawals and adept
with the workings of the computer
system had committed the fraud. This
likelihood was not far-fetched
considering that FEBTC had
immediately adopted corrective
measures upon its discovery of the
system bug, by which FEBTC admitted
its negligence in ensuring an error-free
computer system; and that the system
bug had affected only the account of
Chan.25 Truly, the trial court
misapprehended the extent to which the
system bug had made the computer
system of FEBTC stumble in serious
error.
Fourthly, and perhaps the most
damaging lapse, was that FEBTC
failed to establish that the PNB-
MEGALINK’s ATM facility at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel had actually
dispensed cash in the very
significantly large amount alleged
during the series of questioned
withdrawals. For sure, FEBTC should
have proved the actual dispensing of
pg. 9
funds from the ATM facility as the
factual basis for its claim against Chan.
It did require PNB to furnish a validated
showing of the exact level of cash then
carried by the latter’s ATM facility in the
Manila Pavilion Hotel on May 4,
1992.26 Yet, when PNB employee Erwin
Arellano stood as a witness for FEBTC,
he confirmed the authenticity of the
journal tapes that had recorded Chan’s
May 4 and May 5, 1992 supposed ATM
transactions but did not categorically
state how much funds PNB-
MEGALINK’s ATM facility at the Manila
Pavilion Hotel had exactly carried at the
time of the withdrawals, particularly the
amounts immediately preceding and
immediately following the series of
withdrawals. The omission left a
yawning gap in the evidence against
Chan.
And lastly, Chan’s allegation of
an "inside job" accounting for the
anomalous withdrawals should not
be quickly dismissed as unworthy of
credence or weight. FEBTC employee
Manuel Del Castillo, another witness for
FEBTC, revealed that FEBTC had
previously encountered problems of
bank accounts being debited despite the
absence of any withdrawal transactions
by their owners. He attributed the
problems to the erroneous tagging of the
affected accounts as somebody else’s
account, allowing the latter to withdraw
from the affected accounts with the use
of the latter’s own ATM card, and to the
former’s account being debited.27 The
revelation of Del Castillo tended to
support Chan’s denial of liability, as it
showed the possibility of withdrawals
being made by another person despite
the PIN being an exclusive access
number known only to the cardholder.28
It is true that Del Castillo also
declared that FEBTC did not store the
PINs of its clients’ ATM cards.
However, he mentioned that FEBTC had
stored the opposite numbers
corresponding to the PINs, which meant
that the PINs did not remain entirely
irretrievable at all times and in all cases
by any of its officers or employees with
access to the bank’s computer system.
Accordingly, Del Castillo’s assertion that
the PINs were rendered useless upon
being entered in the bank’s computer
system did not entirely disclose how the
information on the PINs of the
depositors was stored or discarded as to
become useless for any purpose.
In view of the foregoing, FEBTC
did not present preponderant evidence
proving Chan’s liability for the
supposedly fraudulent withdrawals. It
thus failed in discharging its burden of
persuasion.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals; and
DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit. SO ORDERED.
PRESUMPTIONS
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
IBAAN RURAL BANK v. CA
FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Leonila
Reyes (Sps Reyes) owned 3 parcels of
land registered in the Register of Deeds
of Lipa. Those 3 properties were then
mortgaged to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc.
(Ibaan). Sps. Reyes with the consent of
Ibaan and private respondent, Mrs.
Ramon Tarnate (Tarnate), agreed to
sell the property with assumption of
mortgage with Tarnate. Tarnate failed to
pay the loan hence Ibaan extrajudicially
foreclosed the same without the
knowledge of Tarnate. The Provincial
Sheriff issued a certificate of sale which
stated that the redemption period
expires 2 yrs from registration of the
sale.
Later on Tarnate wanted to
redeem the properties but the banks
refused because it had consolidated
titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff
also denied the redemption on the
ground that private respondents did not
appear on the title to be the owners of
the lots.
Tarnate on the other hand
contended that the 2 year redemption
period was still not up and they were not
informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of
Tarnate.
pg. 10
ISSUE: 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A
REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN IT
SUSTAINED AVAILABILITY OF
REDEMPTION DESPITE THE LAPSE
OF ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF
REGISTRATION OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF SALE.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A
REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN
THE RESPONDENT COURT
ALLOWED RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS FEES SIMPLY BECAUSE
THE PETITIONER DID NOT ALLOW
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO
EXERCISE BELATEDLY
REDEMPTION OF THE FORECLOSED
PROPERTY.[
HELD: 1. When petitioner received a
copy of the Certificate of Sale registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City, it had actual and constructive
knowledge of the certificate and its
contents. For two years, it did not object
to the two-year redemption period
provided in the certificate. Thus, it could
be said that petitioner consented to the
two-year redemption period specially
since it had time to object and did not.
When circumstances imply a duty to
speak on the part of the person for
whom an obligation is proposed, his
silence can be construed as consent. By
its silence and inaction, petitioner misled
private respondents to believe that they
had two years within which to redeem
the mortgage. After the lapse of two
years, petitioner is estopped from
asserting that the period for redemption
was only one year and that the period
had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais
arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his
own silence when he ought to speak
out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other
rightfully relies and acts on such belief,
so that he will be prejudiced if the former
is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts.
In affirming the decision of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on
Lazo vs. Republic Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc., where the court
held that the one year period of
redemption provided in Act No. 3135 is
only directory and can be extended by
agreement of the parties. True, but it
bears noting that in Lazo the parties
voluntarily agreed to extend the
redemption period. Thus, the concept of
legal redemption was converted by the
parties in Lazo into conventional
redemption. This is not so in the instant
case. There was no voluntary
agreement. In fact, the sheriff
unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the
period of redemption to two (2) years in
the Certificate of Sale. The parties were
not even privy to the extension made by
the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above
discussed, the bank cannot after the
lapse of two years insist that the
redemption period was one year only.
Additionally, the rule on redemption is
liberally interpreted in favor of the
original owner of a property. The fact
alone that he is allowed the right to
redeem clearly demonstrates the
solicitousness of the law in giving him
another opportunity, should his fortune
improve, to recover his lost property.
Lastly, petitioner is a banking
institution on whom the public expects
diligence, meticulousness and mastery
of its transactions. Had petitioner
diligently reviewed the Certificate of Sale
it could have easily discovered that the
period was extended one year beyond
the usual period for redemption. Banks,
being greatly affected with public
interest, are expected to exercise a
degree of diligence in the handling of its
affairs higher than that expected of an
ordinary business firm.
ALCARAZ v. TANGGA-AN
FACTS: Virginia Tangga-an (Virginia)
is the mother of herein respondents.
Virginia allegedly leased a residential
building located at Hipodromo, Cebu
City. The lease only pertained to the
building and did not include the lot as it
was owned by the National Housing
Authority (NHA). The lot was leased to
Spouses Reynaldo and Esmeralda
Alcaraz (Sps. Alcaraz), herein
petitioners.
pg. 11
 The least was to last 5 years at
P4,000 a month. The lease began on
Nov 22, 1991 but starting Nov 1993,
Sps. Alcaraz refused to pay rent despite
multiple demands made by Virgina.
Hence a complaint was filed before the
MTC.
Sps. Alcaraz alleged that the
property was already owned by Virgilio
Tangga-an (Virgilio) son and brother of
the respondents herein. That Virgilio
acquired such property which resulted in
the cancellation of the contract, hence
cancelling the lease between Virginia
and Sps. Alcaraz. Thereafter, they
allege that they have been paying
Virgilio as the new owner.
MTC ruled in favor of Virginia
They failed to show that the
subject house belonged to Virgilio alone.
On the other hand, the respondents
proved that, after the death of Virgilia,
they registered said house in the name
of their trustees, co-respondents
Hermes Tangga-an and his wife.
Furthermore, considering that Virgilios
claim of ownership over the lot was the
subject of a pending litigation for
annulment of deed of sale and
reconveyance of property involving the
Tangga-ans
RTC affirmed the decision of MTC
[D]efendants failed to present any
documentary evidence modifying or
amending the contract of lease (Annex
C, complaint) to justify the transfer of
payment of the monthly rental to Virgilio
Tanga-an who claims only as the
registered owner of the lot on which the
leased house is located. It appears that
Virgilio Tanga-an does not possess any
proof of ownership of the rented house.
Clearly, defendants had violated the
lease agreement executed between
them and the deceased lessor Virginia
R. Tangga-an (sic) the predecessor in
interest of Hermes Tangaa-an and his
wife as shown in the Tax Declaration of
the said spouses (Annex A, complaint)
whose name appears under the space
for previous owner by stopping payment
of rental to the present owner despite
the existence of the contract of lease
which expires on November 22, 1996.
CA affirmed both MTC and RTC
We also concur with the holding
of both courts that as heirs of Virginia
Tangga-an, private respondents have
the right to institute the action for
ejectment, in accordance with Article
487 of the Civil Code; and that the claim
of petitioner that Virgilio Tangga-an
owns the lot where the leased
residential building stands and occupied
by petitioners is still the subject of a civil
action for annulment of the sale of the
lot before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. It does not follow as a matter of
course that whoever owns the lot owns
the building in question. Ownership of
the lot cannot change the nature and
ownership of the building, which belongs
to the plaintiffs as heirs of the late
Virginia Tangga-an through Ernest
Tangga-an and his wife. Respondent
court correctly reasoned out that xxx
defendants cannot hide over the cloak of
Virgilio Tangga-an, his claim of
ownership over the lot as far as the
Court is concerned being irrelevant to
this case xxx. Most importantly, the
action involving the question of
ownership of the lot is not a lawful
ground to suspend/abate the ejectment
proceeding. The rationale of the rule
being that an ejecment suit involves only
the issue of material possession or
possession de facto
ISSUE: 1. Whether tax declarations
are conclusive proof of ownership
2. Whether Sps. Alcaraz are
correct in assuming that the
lease contract has expired
upon
Virgilio’s assumption of
ownership
HELD: 1. NO, they are not conclusive
proof of ownership however they are
nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for
no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only
one’s sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against
pg. 12
the State and all other interested parties,
but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one’s bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
2. No. To support their argument
that the house necessarily became
Virgilios property as a result of the
acquisition of the lot on which the same
was built, the petitioner spouses invoke
the principle that the accessory follows
the principal. Being an accessory, the
house is necessarily owned by the
owner of the lot on which it is built. 
There is no need, however, to disturb
and analyze the applicability of this well-
entrenched principle because the
petitioner spouses are estopped from
raising the same. Both parties knew that
their contract pertained only to the lease
of the house, without including the land.
The contract states: 1. That the lessor is
the owner of a building of mixed
materials situated at Premier St.,
Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City.16 At the
time of the perfection of the contract, the
petitioner spouses, as lessees, were
aware that the NHA, and not Virginia,
the lessor, owned the land on which the
rented house stood yet they signed the
same, obliged themselves to comply
with the terms thereof for five years and
performed their obligations as lessees
for two years.
Now they assume a completely different
legal position. They claim that the lease
contract ceased to be effective because
Virgilios assumption of ownership of the
land stripped the respondents of
ownership of the building. They argue
that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code,
Virgilios title over the lot necessarily
included the house on the said lot, thus
automatically canceling the contract.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court provides as a conclusive
presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The
following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another
to believe a particular thing true, and to
act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration,
act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
After recognizing the validity of
the lease contract for two years, the
petitioner spouses are barred from
alleging the automatic cancellation of
the contract on the ground that the
respondents lost ownership of the house
after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
UNIVARSITY OF MINDANAO v. PSP
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: Guillermo B. Torres and
Dolores P. Torres (Gullermo &
Dolores) were stockholders in the
University of Mindana (UM). Guillermo
was the chair of the Board of Trustees,
while his wife, Dolores, was the
Assistant Treasurer during 1982.
Prior to such, Sps. Torres
incorporated and operated two (2) thrift
banks: (1) First Iligan Savings & Loan
Association, Inc. (FISLAI); and (2)
Davao Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (DSLAI). Guillermo B.
Torres chaired both thrift banks. He
acted as FISLAI's President, while his
wife, Dolores P. Torres, acted as
DSLAI's President and FISLAI's
Treasurer.
Upon Guillermo B. Torres'
request, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
issued a P1.9 million standby
emergency credit to FISLAI. On May 25,
1982, University of Mindanao's Vice
President for Finance, Saturnino
Petalcorin (Petalcorin), executed a
deed of real estate mortgage over
University of Mindanao's property in
Cagayan de Oro City in favor of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. "The mortgage
served as security for FISLAI's PI.9
Million loan" It was allegedly executed
on University of Mindanao's behalf. As
proof of his authority to execute a real
estate mortgage for University of
Mindanao, Saturnino Petalcorin showed
a Secretary's Certificate signed by
University of Mindanao's Corporate
Secretary, Aurora de Leon (de Leon).
The Secretary’s certificate states among
others the authorizing of the chairman to
appoint Satunino Pactolerin to represent
the University of Mindanao to transact,
pg. 13
transfer, convey, lease, mortgage, or
otherwise hypothecate the subject
properties.
Saturnino Petalcorin executed
another deed of real estate mortgage,
allegedly on behalf of University of
Mindanao, over its two properties in
Iligan City. This mortgage served as
additional security for FISLAI's loans.
FISLAI and DSLAI eventually merged
with DSLAI as the surviving corporation
in an effort to rehabilitate the thrift banks
due to the heavy withdrawals of
depositors. DSLAI later became known
as Mindanao Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (MSLAI).
MSLAI failed to recover from its
losses. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas later
on foreclosed the mortgaged properties.
University of Mindanao filed two
Complaints for nullification and
cancellation of mortgage.
One Complaint was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, and the other Complaint was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City. University of Mindanao
alleged that it did not obtain any loan
from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and
that Aurora De Leon’s certification was
anomalous. That it never authorized
Saturnino Petalcorin to execute real
estate mortgage contracts involving its
properties to secure FISLAI's debts and
it never ratified the execution of the
mortgage contracts.
The Regional Trial Courts ruled in
favor of University of Mindanao. The
Court of Appeals however ruled that
"although BSP failed to prove that the
UM Board of Trustees actually passed a
Board Resolution authorizing Petalcorin
to mortgage the subject real
properties, Aurora de Leon's Secretary's
Certificate" clothed Petalcorin with
apparent and ostensible authority to
execute the mortgage deed on its
behalf. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
merely relied in good faith on the
Secretary's Certificate. University of
Mindanao is estopped from denying
Saturnino Petalcorin's authority.
ISSUE: Whether it was proper for
BSP to assume that the corporate
action was not beyond the powers of
the corporation?
HELD: Yes. When a contract is not on
its face necessarily beyond the scope of
the power of the corporation by which it
was made, it will, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, be presumed to be valid.
Corporations are presumed to contract
within their powers. The doctrine of ultra
vires, when invoked for or against a
corporation, should not be allowed to
prevail where it would defeat the ends of
justice or work a legal wrong.
However, this should not be
interpreted to mean that such
presumption applies to all cases, even
when the act in question is on its face
beyond the corporation's power to do or
when the evidence contradicts the
presumption. Presumptions are
"inference[s] as to the existence of a fact
not actually known, arising from its usual
connection with another which is known,
or a conjecture based on past
experience as to what course human
affairs ordinarily take." Presumptions
embody values and revealed behavioral
expectations under a given set of
circumstances. Presumptions may be
conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are
presumptions that may not be
overturned by evidence, however
strong the evidence is. They are made
conclusive not because there is an
established uniformity in behavior
whenever identified circumstances arise.
They are conclusive because they are
declared as such under the law or the
rules. Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court identifies two (2) conclusive
presumptions
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions.—
The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions
(a) Whenever a party has, by his
own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act
pg. 14
 or omission, be permitted to falsify
it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
On the other hand, disputable,
presumptions are presumptions that
may be overcome by contrary evidence.
They are disputable in recognition of the
variability of human behavior.
Presumptions are not always true. They
may be wrong under certain
circumstances, and courts are expected
to apply them, keeping in mind the
nuances of every experience that may
render the expectations wrong.
Thus, the application of disputable
presumptions on a given circumstance
must be based on the existence of
certain facts on which they are meant to
operate. "Presumptions are not
allegations, nor do they supply their
absence" Presumptions are
conclusions. They do not apply when
there are no facts or allegations to
support them. If the facts exist to set in
motion the operation of a disputable
presumption, courts may accept the
presumption. However, contrary
evidence may be presented to rebut the
presumption.
Courts cannot disregard contrary
evidence offered to rebut disputable
presumptions. Disputable presumptions
apply only in the absence of contrary
evidence or explanations. This court
explained in Philippine Agila Satellite
Inc. v. Usec. Trinidad-Lichauco:
We do not doubt the existence of
the presumptions of "good faith" or
"regular performance of official duty,"
yet these presumptions are disputable
and may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence. Many civil actions are
oriented towards overcoming any
number of these presumptions, and a
cause of action can certainly be geared
towards such effect. The very purpose
of trial is to allow a party to present
evidence to overcome the disputable
presumptions involved. Otherwise, if
trial is deemed irrelevant or
unnecessary, owing to the perceived
indisputability of the presumptions, the
judicial exercise would be relegated to a
mere ascertainment of what
presumptions apply in a given case,
nothing more. Consequently, the entire
Rules of Court is rendered as excess
verbiage, save perhaps for the
provisions laying down the legal
presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of
Appeals were ever adopted as a
jurisprudential rule, no public officer
could ever be sued for acts executed
beyond their official functions or
authority, or for tortious conduct or
behavior, since such acts would "enjoy
the presumption of good faith and in the
regular performance of official duty."
Indeed, few civil actions of any nature
would ever reach the trial stage, if a
case can be adjudicated by a mere
determination from the complaint or
answer as to which legal presumptions
are applicable. For-example, the
presumption that a person is innocent of
a wrong is a disputable presumption on
the same level as that of the regular
performance of official duty. A civil
complaint for damages necessarily
alleges that the defendant committed a
wrongful act or omission that would
serve as basis for the award of
damages. With the rationale of the Court
of Appeals, such complaint can be
dismissed upon a motion to dismiss
solely on the ground that the
presumption is that a person is innocent
of a wrong.102 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
In this case, the presumption
that the execution of mortgage
contracts was within petitioner's
corporate powers does not apply.
Securing third-party loans is not
connected to petitioner's purposes as
an educational institution.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
ROSAROSO v. SORIA
Petitioners: Hospicio Rosaroso,
Antonio Rosaroso, Manuel
Rosaroso, Algerica
Rosaroso, Cleofe
Labindao
pg. 15
Respondents: Lucila Soria, Sps.
Ham and Laila Solutan,
Meridian Realty
Corporation
FACTS: Sps. Luis Rosaroso and
Honorata Duazo acquired
several real properties in
Daan Bantayan, Cebu City
including the subject
properties. The couple had
9 children: Hospicio,
Arturo, Florita, Lucila,
Eduardo, Manuel, Cleofe,
Antonio, and Angelica. In
1952, Honorata died. Later
on, Luis married Lourdes
Rosaroso.
In 1995, a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents with Damages was
filed by Luis against Lucila, Lucila’s
daughter, Laila, and Meridian Realty
Corp. Due to Luis’ untimely death, an
amended complaint was filed with the
spouse of Laila, Ham Solutan, and
Lourdes, included as defendants.
It was alleged by petitioners Hospicio,
Antonio, Angelica, and Cleofe that in
1991, Luis, with the full consent of
Lourdes executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale of some of the properties in their
favor. They also alleged that despite the
fact that said properties had already
been sold to them, a second sale took
place when the respondents, through
unscrupulous means, made Luis sign a
Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to
Meridian Realty Corp. 3 parcels of
residential land.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners
and declared that the first sale of the
properties valid and binding. On appeal,
the CA reversed and set aside the
trial court’s decision on the ground
that the petitioners failed to prove
that they indeed tendered a of
consideration for the parcels of land
sold to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first sale
of properties in favor of Luis’ children
enjoys the presumption that there
was sufficient consideration for said
contract?
HELD: Yes. The fact that the first deed
of sale was executed, conveying the
subject properties in favor of petitioners,
was never contested by the
respondents. What they vehemently
insist, though, is that the said sale was
simulated because the purported sale
was made without a valid consideration.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions
have been fair and regular; (2) the
ordinary course of business has been
followed; and (3) there was sufficient
consideration for a contract.
These presumptions operate against an
adversary who has not introduced proof
to rebut them. They create the
necessity of presenting evidence to
rebut the prima facie case they
created, and which, if no proof to the
contrary is presented and offered,
will prevail. The burden of proof
remains where it is but, by the
presumption, the one who has the
burden is relieved for the time being
from introducing evidence in support
the averment, because the
presumption stands in place of
evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to
trounce the said presumption. Aside
from their bare allegation that the sale
was made without a consideration, they
failed to supply clear and convincing
evidence to back this claim. It is
elementary in procedural law that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court.
The CA decision ran counter to this
established rule regarding disputable
presumption. It relied heavily on the
account of Lourdes who testified that the
children of Luis approached him and
convinced him to sign the deed of sale,
explaining that it was necessary for a
loan application, but they did not pay the
purchase price for the subject
properties. This testimony, however, is
self-serving and would not amount to a
clear and convincing evidence required
by law to dispute the said presumption.
As such, the presumption that there was
pg. 16
sufficient consideration will not be
disturbed.
HEIRS OF TRAZONA v. HEIRS OF
CANADA
Facts: Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano
Trazona, who owned an untitled parcel
of land. The property, located in
Minglanilla, Cebu, is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 07764. In 1940 Cipriano
had taken possession of the land,
cultivated it and diligently paid taxes
thereon. In 1949, Dionisio bought the
adjacent parcel of land from Pilar Diaz. It
was later found that he had encroached
on a small portion of lot. He was then
summoned by Cipriano for a of Tax Declaration No. 23959, recovery
confrontation before
the barangay captain in 1952. Dionisio
offered to buy the encroached portion,
but Cipriano refused the offer. In 1956,
the latter gave Dionisio permission to
temporarily build a house on said
portion, where it still stands. No action
for ejectment was filed against Dionisio
during the lifetime of Cipriano, who
eventually died on 18 May 1982. The
latter’s son Hermogenes, one of the
petitioners herein who had cultivated the
lot since 1972, took over. On 24 March
1992, Dionisio died.
The present controversy arose in 1997.
Petitioners went to the Office of the
Municipal Assessor to secure a copy of
Tax Declaration No. 07764, as they
intended to sell Lot to an interested
buyer. To their surprise, they were
informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764
had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued
on 24 June 1996 in the name of
Dionisio. Apparently, respondents had
caused the issuance of Tax Declaration
No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956
supposedly executed by Cipriano in
favor of Dionisio.  determined that the signature of
Petitioners summoned respondents
before the Lupon Tagapamayapa, but
the conciliation was not successful.  he had examined a mere machine copy
petitioners filed a Complaint against
respondents for quieting of title,
annulment of deed of sale, cancellation
of possession and ownership, damages,
and payment of attorney’s fees.
Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956
was a forgery. Respondents, in their
Answer, alleged that the assailed deed
was a genuine document and asked for
the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees, as
counterclaims.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in favor of
respondent is valid?
Held: NO. It is true that notarized
documents are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution.
Nevertheless, while notarized
documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity, this presumption is
disputable. They can be contradicted by
evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant. Here,
contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we
find clear and convincing evidence that
is enough to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed.
First, the document examiner
Cipriano in the assailed deed had been
forged. No issue has been raised about
his expertise. The finding of the CA that
of the assailed deed was erroneous.
Second, the RTC did not just rely on
expert testimony in ruling that the
signature was forged. A scrutiny of the
signature on the questioned deed of
sale compared to the eleven (11)
signatures on the ten (10) standard
documents there exists a glaring
difference in the letter formation of
capital letters "C" in Cipriano and "T" in
Trazona. The capital C in questioned
signature, the initial stroke stopped at
the upper curve of the letter C while in
the standard signatures, it overlaps from
the upper curve. In the word Trazona,
the capital T in the questioned signature
is disconnected from the T bar to the
body of the questioned signature
whereas, in the standard signatures, the
capital T is connected. These
discrepancies can easily be noticed by
mere physical appearance that the
letters C and T were written.
pg. 17
Third, the existence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953
brings into question the regularity of the
assailed deed. This deed was never
disputed by respondents at any stage of
the proceedings, and was in fact
admitted by them in their Comments to
Plaintiffs’ Additional Formal Offer of
Exhibits. Indeed, the RTC was correct in
its observation that no one in complete
possession of one’s mental faculties
would buy the same property twice from
different owners. Respondents never
provided any explanation for this
anomalous situation. In any case, it has
been established that Lot No. 5053-H is
in the name of Cipriano, who bought it
from the government in 1940. Thus, only
Cipriano had the right to dispose of the
property, or portions thereof.
Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the
property and paid taxes thereon since
the time he acquired it from the
government, and even after its
purported sale to Dionisio, until his
death. Petitioners continued paying the
taxes thereon even after Cipriano had
died. Respondents started paying taxes
on the property only after Tax
Declaration No. 23959 was issued in
Dionisio’s name in 1997.
Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself,
petitioners were the ones enjoying the
fruits of the property from 1960 until the
present controversy. Again, it is
incongruous for petitioners to enjoy the
fruits if respondents owned the property.
Sixth, as the RTC noted, there was an
irregularity regarding the place of
issuance of Cipriano’s residence
certificate indicated in the assailed deed,
as compared with the residence
certificates of the other persons
indicated on the same page of the
notarial register.
Finally, when the record management
analyst from the Bureau of Archives
presented the assailed deed, the paper
was noted to be white, while its
supposed contemporaries in the bunch
from where it was taken had turned
yellow with age.  6.
UY v. LACSAMANA
DOCTRINE:
Persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, absent any
counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact
married.
Properties acquired during
cohabitation are presumed co-owned
unless there is proof to the contrary.
FACTS:
1. Uy filed with RTC Batangas a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents with Damages against
Petra Rosca and Sps. Lacsamana.
2. Uy alleged that he was the lawful
husband of Rosca, living together as
husband and wife from 1944 until
1973 (29 years) when they
separated (because of Uy’s alleged
affair).
a. They had 8 children.
3. Subject of this case is a piece of
residential land Rosca bought from
Sps. Manuel.
4. This property, together with the
house Rosca built was then
subsequently sold to Sps.
Lacsamana.
5. Uy alleges that the property is part
of the sale of Rosca to Sps.
Lacsamana was void for failure to
obtain his marital consent, the
property being conjugal in nature.
Uy then filed a complaint, praying
that the Deed of Sale (executed by
Rosca in favor of Sps. Lacsamana)
be declared null and void with
respect to his rights, interest, and
ownership and damages.
a. Rosca defense: purchase of
land was from her paraphernal
funds and that she was never
married to Uy.
7. Upon Uy’s death, 2 daughters
substituted. Upon Rosca’s death and
Sps. Lacsamana’s sale of the
property to Buena, Buena
substituted.
8. RTC: no valid marriage between
Uy and Rosca, Deed of Sale by
Rosca in favor of Lacsamana was
valid; CA- affirmed RTC; MR-
denied.
ISSUES: WON Deed of Sale executed
by Rosca alone, without Uy's
pg. 18
consent, in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana, is valid?
RULING + RATIO: YES. Valid Deed of
Sale.
1. Validity of sale of property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy
and Rosca had a valid marraige.
2. There is a presumption established
in our Rules "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.” Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence.
3. Marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence.
a. Testimony by one of the parties
or witnesses, person who
officiated at the solemnization
b. Documentary evidence – incapacitated from getting married
marriage contract
4. RTC findings – Uy and Rosca not
legally married.
a. In his Petition for Naturalization
as a Filipino citizen filed before
CFI, Uy said, "I am married (not
legally)."
b. The Sworn Statement of
Batangas Governor executed in
support of the Uy's Petition for
Naturalization categorically
states, that Uy was married (not
legally).
c. The Immigrant Certificate of
Residence - Uy also known by
his Chinese name of Uy Suan
Tee, regarded himself as
"single" when filling up his civil
status therein.
d. Alien Certificate
e. Affidavit of a prominent citizen of
Batangas – not legally married
f. Rosca’s testimony thay they
were not legally married
because their marriage was not
consummated (because of
WW2)
5. With the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus
probandi of Rosca shifted to Uy to
prove the marriage but Uy failed to
present any additional proof of such.
6. Since Uy failed to discharge the
burden that he was legally married to
Rosca, their property relations would
be governed by Article 147 of the
Family Code which applies when a
couple living together were not
------ co ownership of properties is
presumed unless there is proof to the
contrary.
7. Rosca was able to prove that the
subject property is not co-owned but
is paraphernal.
a. Land Registration Commission
Resolution recognized Rosca as
sole registered owner of the
property.
b. Deed of Sale with Sps. Manuel,
where Uy stood as a mere
witness so he admitted the
paraphernal nature of Rosca’s
property
c. In the loan application of Rosca,
affidavit of ownership stated
Petra Rosca, married to Luis G.
Uy.
i. Word “married to” is merely
descriptive of Rosca's status
at the time the property was
registered in her name.
ii. Otherwise, if the property
was conjugal, the title to the
property should have been
in the names of Luis Uy and
Petra Rosca.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we
DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
Decision dated 14 September 2011 and
Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
93786.
DIAZ v. PEOPLE
FACTS: On March 11, 1999, an
Information4 for estafa was filed against
petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, alleged failure to return or remit
the proceeds from various merchandise
valued at P32,000.00 received by her in
trust - i.e., on consignment basis from
respondent.5 During arraignment,
petitioner entered a negative plea.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.6
The prosecution anchored its case on
the testimony of respondent who
claimed to be a businesswoman
engaged in the business of selling
goods/merchandise through agents (one
pg. 19
of whom is petitioner) under the
condition that the latter shall turn over
the proceeds or return the unsold items
to her a month after they were
entrusted. Respondent averred that on
February 20, 1996, she entrusted
merchandise consisting of umbrellas
and bath towels worth P35,300.00 to
petitioner7 as evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt8 dated
February 20, 1996 duly signed by the
latter. However, on March 20, 1996,
petitioner was only able to remit the
amount of P3,300.009 and thereafter,
failed to make further remittances and
ignored respondent's demands to remit
the proceeds or return the goods.10
In her defense, petitioner admitted
having previous business dealings with
respondent but not as an agent. She
clarified that she was a client who used
to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and
gift checks (GCs) from respondent on
installment basis and that, during each
deal, she was made to sign a blank
sheet of paper prior to the issuance of
POCs and GCs. She further claimed
that their last transaction was conducted
in 1995, which had long been settled.
However, she denied having received
P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from
respondent on February 20, 1996.11
The CA Ruling
It ruled that respondent was able to
establish by preponderance of evidence
her transaction with petitioner, as well as
the latter's failure to remit the proceeds
of the sale of the merchandise worth
P32,000.00, or to return the same to
respondent in case the items were not
sold, the fact of which having been
substantiated by the acknowledgment
receipt dated February 20, 1996.16 To
this, the CA rejected petitioner's attempt
to discredit the said receipt which she
denied executing on the ground that she
was only made to sign blank documents,
finding that even if petitioner was indeed
made to sign such blank documents,
such was merely a safety precaution
employed by respondent in the event
the former reneges on her obligation.17
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's
resolution is whether or not the CA
committed reversible error in finding
petitioner civilly liable to respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the CA.
Petitioner's claim that she was required
to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper
and a trust receipt in blank31 during her
transactions with respondent, which she
allegedly failed to retrieve after paying
her obligations,32 is a bare allegation
that cannot be given credence. It is well-
settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence."33
On the contrary, the CA correctly found
that respondent was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence the fact of
the transaction, as well as petitioner's
failure to remit the proceeds of the sale
of the merchandise worth P32,000.00,
or to return the same to respondent in
case such merchandise were not sold.
This was established through the
presentation of the acknowledgment
receipt34 dated February 20, 1996,
which, as the document's name
connotes, shows that petitioner
acknowledged receipt from respondent
of the listed items with their
corresponding values, and assumed the
obligation to return the same on March
20, 1996 if not sold.35
In this relation, it should be pointed out
that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the legal presumption is
that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. To this, case law dictates that
the natural presumption is that one does
not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and
consequences.36 Further, under Section
3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally
presumed that private transactions
have been fair and regular.37 This
behooves every contracting party to
learn and know the contents of a
document before he signs and delivers
it.38 The effect of a presumption upon
the burden of proof is to create the need
of presenting evidence to overcome
the prima facie case created, thereby
pg. 20
which, if no contrary proof is offered, will
prevail.39 In this case, petitioner failed to
present any evidence to controvert
these presumptions. Also, respondent's
possession of the document pertaining
to the obligation strongly buttresses her
claim that the same has not been
extinguished.40Preponderance of
evidence only requires that evidence be
greater or more convincing than the
opposing evidence.41 All things
considered, the evidence in this case
clearly preponderates in respondent's
favor.
SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY
PEOPLE v. PADRIGONE
FACTS: Roberto Padrigone a.k.a.
Roberto San Miguel, Michael San
Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and Abelardo
Triumpante were charged with rape of
Rowena Contridas. Before they left, they
warned the sisters not to report the
incident or else they will kill them.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa
reported the incident to the police and
identified appellant and his co-accused
as the perpetrators. However, based on
the police blotter, Rowena stated that it
was only appellant who raped her.
During the medical examinations, Dr.
Belmonte diagnosed her illness as
"Acute Psychotic Depressive
5
Condition."  She found that her mental
disorder was not hereditary because
before the incident took place, she did
not exhibit any unusual behavior. She
concluded that her mental illness was
strongly related to a traumatic
experience.
Pedrigone assails the procedural
irregularities committed by the
prosecution and by the trial court. He
claims that the prosecution
SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE by not
presenting Rowena, the rape victim,
when the latter should have had her
sane moments. As a consequence, the
trial court deprived Pedrigone of the
opportunity to cross-examine her when
she was allegedly declared before the
Chief of Police that it was only
Pedrigone who raped her which
declaration became the basis for the
latter's conviction.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution
committed the alleged “suppression
of evidence”?
HELD: No. The non-presentation of
Rowena on the witness stand cannot be
considered as SUPPRESSION OF
EVIDENCE. Under Rule 131, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced, does not apply if:
1. the evidence is at the disposal of
both parties;
2. the suppression was not willful;
3. it is merely corroborative or
cumulative; and
4. the suppression is an exercise of
a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of
evidence in this case.
FIRST: The defense had the opportunity
to subpoena Rowena even if the
prosecutor did not present her as a
witness. Instead, the defense failed to
call her to the witness stand.
SECOND: Rowena was certified to be
suffering from Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition and thus, cannot
stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-
presentation therefore, of Rowena was
not willful.
THIRD: In any case, while Rowena was
the victim, Nimfa was also present and
in fact witnessed the violation committed
on her sister.
METROBANK v. CA
FACTS: The subject property is a parcel
of land in Diliman, Quezon City
consisting of six hundred ninety (690)
square meters originally owned by
businessman Tomas Chia under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
16753 (106901) of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with
debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia
offered the subject property for sale to
private respondent G.T.P. Development
Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with
assumption of the mortgage
indebtedness in favor of petitioner
METROBANK secured by the subject
property.
pg. 21
Pending negotiations for the proposed
sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in
behalf of respondent GTP, went to the
METROBANK to inquire on Mr. Chia's
remaining balance on the real estate
mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a
statement of account of Mr. Chia
amounting to about P115,000.00 as of
August, 1980.
The deed of sale 2 and the memorandum
of agreement 3 between Mr. Chia and
respondent GTP were eventually
executed and signed on 04 September
1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza.
Twelve (12) days later, or on 16
September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to
METROBANK and paid
(P116,416.71), 4 for which METROBANK
issued an official receipt acknowledging
payment.
This notwithstanding, petitioner
METROBANK refused to release the
real estate mortgage on the subject
property despite repeated requests from
Atty. Atienza, thus prompting
respondent GTP to file on October 17,
1980 an action for specific performance
against petitioner METROBANK and Mr.
Chia.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision reversing the trial
court's 11 December 1990 judgment,
ruling in the main that the (P116,416.71)
paid by respondent GTP to petitioner
METROBANK did not extinguish the real
estate mortgage inasmuch as there are
other unliquidated past due loans
secured by the subject property.
With this unfavorable turn of events,
respondent GTP, on 07 November
1994, 7 filed before respondent Court of
Appeals a "motion for reconsideration
with alternative prayer to require
METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP)
of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr.
Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral
arguments on 08 March 1995 where
METROBANK was supposed to bring
before the respondent Court the current
statement of the mortgage debt of Mr.
Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage
sought to be released, METROBANK's
counsel did not appear; only the lawyers
of respondent GTP and Mr. Chia
appeared. Thus, the Court required
GTP's counsel to file a memorandum in
lieu of oral arguments in support of its
motion for reconsideration. 8 GTP filed
its memorandum on March 17, 1995 9 to
which a reply memorandum was filed by
METROBANK on April 10, 1995. 10  In Maneclang vs. Baun, 14 this Court
On 03 July 1995, 11 the now assailed
amended decision was rendered
reconsidering the original 24 October
1994 Decision and thus affirming the 11
December 1990 judgment of the
regional trial court. Respondent Court of
Appeals took a second hard look at the
evidence on hand and seriously
considered METROBANK's refusal to
specify any unpaid debt secured by the
subject property, in concluding anew
that "the present case for specific
performance is well-grounded, absent
indubitable showing that the aforesaid
amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee
on September 16, 1980 did not suffice to
pay in full the mortgage debt assumed
under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with
assumption of mortgage, it inked with
the late Tomas Chia. There is therefore
merit in its motion for reconsideration at
bench." Petitioner METROBANK is now
before us after its motion for
reconsideration of the 03 July 1995
amended decision was denied by
respondent Court of Appeals per
Resolution of 04 December 1995. 12
ISSUE:
HELD: Petitioner METROBANK is
estopped from refusing the discharge of
the real estate mortgage on the claim
that the subject property still secures
"other unliquidated past due loans."
enumerated the requisites for estoppel
by conduct to operate, to wit:
1. there must have been a
representation or concealment of
material facts;
2. the representation must have been
with knowledge of the facts;
3. the party to whom it was made must
have been ignorant of the truth of the
matter; and
pg. 22
4. it must have been with the intention law of evidence, whenever a party has, No rule of law is better settled than that
that the other party would act upon it. by his own declaration, act or omission, a party having it in his power to prove a
intentionally and deliberately led another fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, to believe a particular thing true, and to benefit him, his failure to prove it must
requested from METROBANK that he act upon such belief, he cannot, in any be taken as conclusive that the fact
be furnished a copy of the full litigation arising out of such declaration, does not exist.
indebtedness secured by the real estate act, or omission, be permitted to falsify
mortgage. 15 In response thereto, it. 17  x x x           x x x          x x x
petitioner METROBANK issued a
statement of account as of September Just as decisive is petitioner Where facts are in evidence affording
15, 1980 16 which amount was METROBANK's failure to bring before legitimate inferences going to establish
immediately settled and paid the next respondent Court of Appeals the current the ultimate fact that the evidence is
day amounting to P116,416.71. statement evidencing what it claims as designed to prove, and the party to be
Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred "other unliquidated past due loans" at affected by the proof, with an
from taking a stand inconsistent with its the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. opportunity to do so, fails to deny or
representation upon which respondent It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, explain them, they may well be taken as
GTP, as an innocent third person to the lost for petitioner METROBANK to admitted with all the effect of the
real mortgage agreement, placed defend its non-release of the real estate inferences afforded. . . .
exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP mortgage. Thus, the following
had the reasonable right to rely upon pronouncements of this Court in Manila The ordinary rule is that one who has
such representations as true, Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of knowledge peculiarly within his own
considering that it had no Appeals et. al, 18 speaking thru Mr. control, and refuses to divulge it,
participation whatsoever in the Justice Ricardo Francisco, 19 find rightful cannot complain if the court puts the
mortgage agreement and the application, viz. — most unfavorable construction upon
preparation of the statement of his silence, and infers that a
account, coupled with the It is a well-settled rule that when the disclosure would have shown the fact
expectation that a reputable banking evidence tends to prove a material fact to be as claimed by the opposing
institution such as petitioner which imposes a liability on a party, and party.
METROBANK do conduct their he has it in his power to produce
business concerns in the highest evidence which from its very nature Verily, petitioner METROBANK's
standards of efficiency and must overthrow the case made against omission to present its evidence only
professionalism. For an admission or him if it is not founded on fact, and he created an adverse inference against its
representation is rendered conclusive refuses to produce such evidence, the cause. Therefore, it cannot now be
upon the person making it, and cannot presumption arises that the evidence, if heard to complain since respondent
be denied or disproved as against a produced would operate to his prejudice, Court extended a reasonable
person relying thereon. A party may not and support the case of his opportunity to petitioner METROBANK
go back on his own acts and adversary. . . . that it did not avail.1avvphi1
representations to the prejudice of the
other party who relied upon them. In the
pg. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The amended decision of respondent
Court of Appeals dated 3 July 1995 as
well as its resolution of 4 December
1995 is AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioner.
OFFICIAL DUTY
DE LOS SANTOS v. COA
FACTS: Sometime in October 2001,
then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco
(Cuenco) entered into a MOA with the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center,
represented by Dr. Eusebio M.
Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical
Center Chief, appropriating to the
hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00
from his Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the
medical assistance of indigent patients
under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health
Program (TNT Program).
Several years after the enforcement of
the MOA, allegations of forgery and
falsification of prescriptions and referrals
for the availment of medicines under the
TNT Program surfaced.
In the initial investigation conducted by
the CoA, it was found out that there
were unseen and unnoticeable
irregularities attendant to the availment
of the TNT Program. the results of which
were reflected in AOM No. 2005-001
dated October 26, 2005, it was found
that : (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines,
drugs and medicines for anti-rabies
allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy
costing P3,407,108.40, and already paid
by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco
appeared to be falsified; (b) 46
prescriptions for other drugs and
medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell
Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and
already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF
of Cuenco likewise appeared to be
falsified; and (c) 25 prescriptions for
drugs and medicines allegedly issued by
Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50
were also ascertained to be falsified and
have not been paid by VSMMC.
Leonor D. Boado (Boado), Director of
the CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu
City, Delos Santos explained that during
the initial stage of the implementation of
the MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the
hospital screened, interviewed, and
determined the qualifications of the
patients-beneficiaries through the
hospitals social worker. However,
sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the
TNT Office in VSMMC, which was run
by his own staff who took all pro forma
referral slips bearing the names of the
social worker and the Medical Center
Chief, as well as the logbook. From then
on, the hospital had no more
participation in the said program and
was relegated to a mere bag keeper.
Since the benefactor of the funds chose
Dell Pharmacy as the sole supplier, anti-
rabies medicines were purchased from
the said pharmacy and, by practice, no
public bidding was anymore required.
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008,
the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado,
issued ND No. 2008-09-01, disallowing
the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the
payment of drugs and medicines for
anti-rabies with falsified prescription and
documents, and holding petitioners,
together with other VSMMC officials,
solidarily liable therefor.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal to
the CoA and a motion for
reconsideration, respectively, but the
same were denied. Petitioner now
comes to the SC via petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not CoA
committed grave abuse of discretion
in finding petitioners solidarily liable
for the disallowed amount?
HELD: No. Petition dismissed.
Political Law- public officers who are
custodians of government funds
shall be liable for their failure to
ensure that such funds are safely
guarded against loss or damage.
The CoA correctly pointed out that
VSMMC, through its officials, should
have been deeply involved in the
implementation of the TNT Program as
the hospital is a party to the MOA and,
as such, has acted as custodian and
disbursing agency of Cuencos PDAF.
Further, under the MOA executed
pg. 24
between VSMMC and Cuenco, the
hospital represented itself as willing to
cooperate/coordinate and monitor the
implementation of a Medical Indigent
Support Program. More importantly, it
undertook to ascertain that [a]ll
payments and releases under [the]
program x x x shall be made in
accordance with existing government
accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. It is a standing rule that
public officers who are custodians of
government funds shall be liable for their
failure to ensure that such funds are
safely guarded against loss or damage,
and that they are expended, utilized,
disposed of or transferred in accordance
with the law and existing regulations,
and on the basis of prescribed
documents and necessary records.
In particular, the TNT Program was not
implemented by the appropriate
implementing agency, i.e., the
Department of Health, but by the office
set up by Cuenco. Further, the
medicines purchased from Dell
Pharmacy did not go through the
required public bidding in violation of the
applicable procurement laws and rules.
Similarly, specific provisions of the MOA
itself setting standards for the
implementation of the same program
were not observed. For instance, only
seven of the 133 prescriptions served
and paid were within the maximum limit
of P5,000.00 that an indigent patient can
avail of from Cuencos PDAF. Also,
several indigent patients availed of the
benefits more than once, again in
violation of the provisions of the MOA.
Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and
the staff of Cuenco to take over the
entire process of availing of the benefits
of the TNT Program without proper
monitoring and observance of internal
control safeguards, the hospital and its
accountable officers reneged on its
undertaking under the MOA to
cooperate/coordinate and monitor the
implementation of the said health
program.
Evidently, petitioners neglect to properly
monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's
PDAF facilitated the validation and
eventual payment of 133 falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims for
anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both
the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite
the patent irregularities borne by the
referral slips and prescriptions related
thereto. Had there been an internal
control system installed by petitioners,
the irregularities would have been
exposed, and the hospital would have
been prevented from processing falsified
claims and unlawfully disbursing funds
from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners
cannot escape liability for failing to
monitor the procedures implemented by
the TNT Office on the ground that
Cuenco always reminded them that it
was his money.
All told, petitioner's acts and/or
omissions as detailed in the assailed
CoA issuances and as
aforedescribed reasonably figure into
the finding that they failed to
faithfully discharge their respective
duties and to exercise the required
diligence which resulted to the
irregular disbursements from
Cuencos PDAF. Petition Dismissed.
PEOPLE v. CANDIDIA
FACTS: On July 31, 2002 at around
6:30 in the morning, Marilyn Trayvilla
(Trayvilla), personnel of the Philippine
National Police, while performing her
duties as a female frisker assigned at
the Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay
City, frisked the accused Hadji Cadidia
(Cadidia) upon her entry at the
departure area and noticed something
unusual and thick in the buttocks area of
the accused. Upon inquiry, Cadidia
answered it was only her sanitary napkin
which caused the unusual thickness.
Not convinced with the explanation she
and her co-employee, Leilani Bagsican
(Bagsican) brought the accused to the
comfort room to check. When the
authorities asked to remove her
underwear, they discovered two sachets
of shabu. The accused denied the
ownership of the said sachets of drugs,
and said she was only asked to bring
the same.
Bagsican marked the 2 sachets
(“LMB”) and surrendered it to SPO3
Musalli Appang (Appang) who then
marked the same with his initials at the
PDEA office in NAIA. Appang then
pg. 25
turned it over to SP04 Rudy Villaceran
(Villaceran). The drugs were then
referred by PO2 Samuel Cobilla
(Cobilla) to the Forensic Chemist
Elisa Reyes (Reyes) who examined the
specimens which were positive to be
Shabu.
Dadidia was arraigned before the
RTC of Pasay, and alleged the defense
that she was targeted by Trayvilla and
Bagsican asking if she was muslim.
They assumed she had gold or jewelry
and demanded for it. Seeing that she
had none, they brought her to the
confort room and aksed her to undress
and planted drugs on her. They
demanded for P200k, but her Cadidia’s
family failed to provide hence the filing
of the case.
The RTC found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
and ruled that the alleged minor
inconsistencies do not diminish the
credibility of the witnesses and the case.
ISSUE: Whether Cadidia’s contention
that the lower courts erred in the
application in the presumption of
regularity in the performance of
duties of the witnesses Trayvilla and
Bagsican, due to their self serving
testimonies, is correct?
HELD: No. In People v. Unisa,Bthis
Court held that "in cases involving
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers for
they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the
contrary suggesting ill-motive on the
part of the police officers."
In this case, the prosecution
witnesses were unable to show ill-
motive for the police to impute the crime
against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her
regular duty as an airport frisker when
she handled the accused who entered
the x-ray machine of the departure area.
There was no pre-determined notice to
particularly search the accused
especially in her private area. The
unusual thickness of the buttocks of the
accused upon frisking prompted
Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3
Appang of the incident. The subsequent
search of the accused would only show
that the two female friskers were just
doing their usual task when they found
the illegal drugs inside accused’s
underwear. This is bolstered by the fact
that the accused on the one hand and
the two friskers on the other were
unfamiliar to each other. Neither could
they harbour any ill-will against each
other. The allegation of frame-up and
denial of the accused cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of three
prosecution witnesses who corroborated
on circumstances surrounding the
apprehension.
COHABITATION
PEOPLE v. EDUALINO
Facts: This is a review of the conviction
of a rape case filed against Jesus
Edualino by the complainant Rowena
Nantiza a married and pregnant woman
at the time of the incident.
The complainant version of fact states
that she was invited to drink one bottle
of beer by then a drunk Edualino. When
she was semi-conscious she was
dragged in a place where the evil acts
were consummated.
The accused arguments rely on
alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1)
that there was foreplay and orgasm that
occurred in the alleged consummation
and that according to the defense bear
the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual
coition of a consensual intercourse 2)
that the character of the complainant is
of ill-refute on the basis that no
responsible and decent pregnant
married woman, would be out at two (2)
o'clock in the morning getting drunk
much less would a decent Filipina ask a
man to accompany her to drink beer 3)
that the complainant merely concocted
the charge of rape to save her marriage
since her husband had found out that
she was using drugs and drinking
alcohol and even made a spectacle of
herself when she tried to seduce
accused-appellant on May 1994 while
she was under the influence of drug and
alcohol.
pg. 26
Issue: Whether or not the crime of
rape was established?
Ruling: The crime of rape was
established beyond reasonable
doubt.
The court held that the victim Rowena
Nantiza's testimony was sufficient to
manifest that the carnal knowledge was
without her consent and with due force
and intimidation. The court further
provides that a person accused of
rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim provided the
testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and otherwise consistent
with human nature and the course of
things.
On the issue of morality of the
complainant, the court pointed out that
the moral character of a rape victim is
immaterial in the prosecution and
conviction of the accused. The
allegation of drunkenness and being a
drug user will not per se preclude a
finding that a woman was raped.  shame.”.
The Court ruled that even prostitutes
can be the victims of rape.
On the Accused-appellant argument
that the charge of rape was
concocted by the victim to save her
marriage; the Court did not believe that
a married woman would invent a story
that she was raped in an attempt to
conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in
order to save her marriage. The court
cannot understand how a false rape
story can save a marriage under the
circumstances.
RULE 132
ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE
PEOPLE v. FABRE
FACTS: Leonardo Fabre (Leonardo)
was adjudged guilty of raping his own
daughter Marilou Fabre (Marilou), a 13
year old girl. The trial court gave
credence to the evidence given by the
prosecution, particularly to the
narration of the young complainant,
expressing a quote from an observation
once made by this Tribunal in one of its
decision that “even when consumed with
revenge, it (would) take a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a
young woman to concoct a story which
(could) put her own father for the rest of
his remaining life in jail and drag herself
and the rest of her family to a lifetime of
Furthermore, it was corroborated
by the testimony of Dr. Reinerio
Jalalon (Dr. Jalanon), the government
physician who had conducted a medical
exam on Marilou. Also, the changing of
the testimony of her mother Adela
Fabre (Adela), from being away at the
time of the commission of the crime to 6-
10 in the morning is questionable.
On 26 April 1995, around four
o’clock in the afternoon, Marilou was
alone in their house in Barangay Manat,
Trento, Agusan del Sur. Adela, her
mother, had gone to Purok 4 to buy fish
while her siblings were out strolling.
After cleaning their yard, Marilou went to
the adjacent palm plantation, about
fourteen to fifteen meters away from
their house, to gather palm oil. Marilou
had been gathering palm oil for about a
minute when her father, appellant
Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He suddenly
gripped Marilou’s hands and forcibly
dragged her towards the house. He
closed the door and removed his
daughter’s underwear.
He took off his pants and asked Marilou
to hold his sex organ. In tears, Marilou
obeyed her father. He then began
touching the girl’s breasts and vagina.
He forced her to lie down, mounted her
and sought to insert his penis into her
organ. Marilou cried in pain.
When after some time he still could not
insert his penis into Marilou’s vagina, he
applied coconut oil to lubricate his and
his daughter’s sexual organs. He was
finally able to penetrate her. Once
inside her, appellant made push and pull
movements until he was through with
her. Appellant threatened to kill her if
she would tell anybody about the sexual
encounter. The young girl’s mother,
Adela Fabre, arrived home about five
o’clock that afternoon but, remembering
her father’s threats, she kept mum about
her ordeal.
pg. 27
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of
Leonardo should acquire added
strength for the failure of the
prosecution to conduct a cross-
examination on him and to present
and rebuttal evidence?
HELD: NO. The cross-examination of a
witness is a prerogative of the party
against whom the witness is called.[5]
The purpose of cross-examination is
to test the truth or accuracy of the
statements of a witness made on direct
examination. The party against whom
the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and
instead rely on any other evidence
theretofore adduced or thereafter to be
adduced or on what would be believed
is the perception of the court thereon.
Certainly, the trial court is not bound to
give full weight to the testimony of a
witness on direct examination merely
because he is not cross-examined by
the other party.
The alibi of appellant itself would
not appear to be deserving of serious
consideration. His account that at the
time of the alleged rape he was working
at a coconut plantation, just about one
kilometer away from the place of the
crime, hardly would amount to much.
Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre,
his wife, merit any better regard. At first,
she testified that on the day of the rape
incident, she had left their house at four
oclock in the afternoon. Later, however,
she changed her story by saying that
she had left the house in the morning
and returned only at ten oclock that
same morning, staying home the whole
day thereafter. In any event, in order
that alibi might prosper, it would not be
enough for an accused to prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he would have to
demonstrate likewise that he could not
have been physically present at the
place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its Commission.
Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at
all impossible nor even improbable for
appellant to have been at the crime
scene.
LEADING AND MIDLEADING
QUESTIONS
PEOPLE v. PEREZ
finding appellant Jose Perez @
Dalegdeg guilty of statutory rape
committed against AAA.
The prosecution presented four
witnesses,
Dr. Gundayao conducted the
examination and found that AAA had a
hematoma and abrasion in the right eye,
and contusion on her right dorsal thigh
and lower back; her vulva also had
contusions and swelling; the labia
majora had swelling and hematoma and
she had fresh hymenal lacerations at
6:00 and 9:00 o’clock positions. Based
on his findings, he concluded that AAA
had indeed been sexually abused.
After the examination, AAA and CCC
proceeded to the XXX Police Station
where they executed their affidavits and
filed charges against appellant.
A year after the incident, AAA was
brought to a psychologist to be
examined. Sheila Chan diagnosed AAA
to be suffering from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder. Per Psychological
Report dated 3 October 2000, AAA was
assessed to have "moderate difficulty in
social relationships and symptoms of
trauma are expressed through
nightmares, dissociation, and conflict
with parents and siblings."
On 28 May 2001, the prosecution
formally offered its documentary
evidence consisting of Exhibits A to F,
with sub-markings, to which the defense
filed its comment. The trial court
admitted all the exhibits on 27 June
2001.
For the defense, appellant and his
father, Leonardo Perez, took the stand. 
The trial court was convinced that AAA
was raped by appellant on that fateful
night of 19 September 1999. It accorded
credence to the testimony of the victim
who, at seven years old, testified in a
straightforward and credible manner.
She positively identified appellant as the
one who committed the dastardly act to
pg. 28
her. It found that it was inconceivable for
the victim, who was six years old when
the sexual assault was perpetrated, to
fabricate the charge of defloration and
undergo the medical examination of her
private parts, subject herself to public
trial and tarnish her family’s honor and
reputation, unless she was motivated by
a potent desire to seek justice for the
wrong committed against her. The
victim’s testimony was further supported
by the findings of the Dr. Jerry
Gundayao who, upon genital
examination, found lacerations in her
hymen at the 6:00 o’clock and the 4:00
o’clock positions. Consistent with his
findings, Dr. Gundayao concluded that
AAA had lost her virginity. In addition,
the trial court agreed with the findings of
psychologist Shiela Chan that the
victim’s behavior after the incident was
compatible with the behavior of a child
subjected to abuse.
In trying to exonerate himself, appellant
advances the following arguments, to
wit: (1) the truth cannot be determined
from the testimony of AAA because the
same was made up and coached. The
prosecutor was practically
suggesting to AAA how the latter
should answer. Although leading
questions may be asked on direct
examination, especially when the
witness is a child, the prosecutor
should not put words in the mouth of
the witness because a young child is
open to ideas which, if persistently
rammed into her mind, will appear
real to her; (2) no eyewitnesses were
presented to pinpoint the appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime; (3) nobody
in the movie house noticed anything
untoward happen to AAA or hear AAA
cry or make any sound to show that she
was being molested or attacked; (4) the
public health officer did not say that the
fresh hymenal injuries on AAA were
compatible with rape; and (5) no seminal
fluids were found in AAA’s vaginal area.  or a child of tender years,
ISSUE: WON the prosecutor was
practically suggesting to AAA how
the latter should answer?
HELD: NO! After examining the
testimony of the AAA, we find that it was
neither made up nor coached. The
questions propounded to AAA were
leading. A question that suggests to the
witness the answer, which the
examining party wants, is a leading
question. As a rule, leading questions
are not allowed. However, the rules
provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years, as it is
usually difficult for such child to state
facts without prompting or suggestion.
Leading questions are necessary to
coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.30
Section 10, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 10. Leading and
misleading questions. – A avoid waste of time. Leading
question which suggests to the
witness the answer which the
examining party desires is a
leading question. It is not allowed,
except:
xxxx
(c) When there is difficulty
in getting direct and
intelligible answers from a
witness who is ignorant,
or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf mute.
In the case at bar, the trial court was
thus justified in allowing leading
questions to AAA, as she was merely
seven years old when and was not yet
going to school when she testified. As
further explained in People v. Daganio31:
The trend in procedural law is to
give wide latitude to the courts in
exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness.
The reasons are spelled out in
our Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness, which took effect
on December 15, 2000, namely,
(1) to facilitate the ascertainment
of the truth, (2) to ensure that
questions are stated in a form
appropriate to the developmental
level of the child, (3) to protect
children from harassment or
undue embarrassment, and (4)
questions in all stages of
examination of a child are
pg. 29
 allowed if the same will further
the interests of justice.  rape in an unaffected manner
We agree with the Court of Appeals
when it said:  experience. It was doubtful that
[T]he accused’s contention, that
AAA was a coached witness, was
entirely baseless.
The leading questions made to
AAA did not take the form of
coaching a child witness,
because even the accused
himself was unaware of any
reason why AAA should accuse
him of rape if it was false. The
testimony of a rape victim is
credible where she has no ill
motive to testify against the
accused. The failure of the
accused to offer any explanation
as to why the complainant
implicated him in a very serious
accusation indicated that no
improper motive had impelled her
to charge him thus.
There was also no basis in his
suggestion that the answers
given by AAA had been merely
suggested to her, or that the idea
of rape had been rammed into
her head, or that words were
simply placed in the mouth of
AAA. For, how could a child so
young and so ignorant of worldly
ways be expected to consistently
point to the accused as her defiler
and to narrate the incidents of the
unless she had really gone
through the harrowing
she would even remember the
supposed coaching or that she
could memorize the coached
answers considering her inability
to recall even her own age.32
Both lower courts gave full faith and
credence to the testimony of AAA. They
found the same sufficient to convict
appellant of the crime charged. When it
comes to credibility, the trial court’s
assessment deserves great weight, and
is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. In the case at bar, even
though the testimony of AAA was not
flawless in all the particulars, it bore the
earmarks of truth.
This Court has held time and again that
testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full
credence, considering that no young
woman, especially of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being
subject to a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain
justice for the wrong committed against
her.36  armed with bladed weapons, took turns
IMPEACHMENT
PEOPLE v. CASTELLANO
Facts: Sometime in the early part of
June 1996, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun
indiscriminately. Afraid that a stray bullet
might hit any member of his family,
Diosdado accosted Jaime, Sr. and
asked him to desist from firing his gun
indiscriminately. Jaime, Sr. resented the
intrusion. He remonstrated that
neighbors did not even complain about
him firing his gun. A heated altercation
ensued. Jaime, Sr. then fired his gun
towards the house of Diosdado. The
incident germinated deep animosity
between the two and their respective
families.
On July 8, 1996, at around 8:00 p.m.
Luz heard voices near their house. She
saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and
his two sons, Jaime Jr. and Ronald, on
their way to the house. Luz immediately
alerted her husband and told him that
the Castillanos were in their yard.
However, Diosdado was nonchalant and
simply told Luz not to mind them. All of a
sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at
Diosdados house. Terrified, Luz hastily
carried her baby daughter Mary Jane,
sought cover and hid near the rear door.
She was about five meters away from
her husband when the Castillanos
barged inside their house and ganged
up on Diosdado. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald,
in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed
Diosdado on the right side of his breast,
pg. 30
right thigh and on the back. He also
struck him with a one-meter long pipe.
Not satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun
hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. Luz
was so shocked by the sudden turn of
events. To silence her one year old
baby, she breastfed her. As soon as she
could, Luz fled to the rice paddies where
she hid for a time. The Castillanos fled
on board a jeep parked in the NIA road
about 200 meters from the house of
Diosdado. When Luz returned to their
house, she saw her husband sprawled
on the ground in a pool of his own blood.
Diosdado, at the point of death, asked
her for help. Not knowing what to do,
Luz lost no time and ran to the house of
their neighbor Celedonio Espiritu for
help. Celedonio rushed to the Bula
Police Station and reported the incident.
A team of policemen was set out for the
conduct of an on-the-spot investigation
and manhunt and eventually arrest of
the Castillanos.
Issue: Whether the inconsistent
statements made by Luz may be
impeached?
HELD: The Supreme Court in the
negative.
How witness is impeached by evidence
of inconsistent statement. - Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence
that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of
the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether
he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.
The Court agrees with the Office of the
Solicitor General. Before the credibility
of a witness and the truthfulness of his
testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior
statements, which are inconsistent with
his present testimony, the cross-
examiner must lay the predicate or the
foundation for impeachment and thereby
prevent an injustice to the witness being
cross-examined. The witness must be
given a chance to recollect and to
explain the apparent inconsistency
between his two statements and state
the circumstances under which they
were made. This Court held in People
v. Escosura that the statements of a
witness prior to her present
testimony cannot serve as basis for
impeaching her credibility unless her
attention was directed to the
inconsistencies or discrepancies and
she was given an opportunity to
explain said inconsistencies. In a
case where the cross-examiner tries to
impeach the credibility and truthfulness
of a witness via her testimony during a
preliminary examination, this Court
outlined the procedure in United States
vs. Baluyot, thus: ...For instance, if the
attorney for the accused had information
that a certain witness, say Pedro
Gonzales, had made and signed a
sworn statement before the fiscal
materially different from that given in his
testimony before the court, it was
incumbent upon the attorney when
cross-examining said witness to direct
his attention to the discrepancy and to
ask him if he did not make such and
such statement before the fiscal or if he
did not there make a statement different
from that delivered in court. If the
witness admits the making of such
contradictory statement, the accused
has the benefit of the admission, while
the witness has the opportunity to
explain the discrepancy, if he can. On
the other hand, if the witness denies
making any such contradictory
statement, the accused has the right to
prove that the witness did make such
statement; and if the fiscal should refuse
upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the
contents thereof would be admissible.
This process of cross-examining a
witness upon the point of prior
contradictory statements is called in the
practice of the American courts laying a
predicate for the introduction of
contradictory statements. It is almost
universally accepted that unless a
ground is thus laid upon cross-
examination, evidence of contradictory
statements are not admissible to
impeach a witness; though undoubtedly
the matter is to a large extent in the
discretion of the court.
pg. 31

In this case, the appellants never
confronted Luz with her testimony during
the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. She was not afforded
any chance to explain any discrepancies
between her present testimony and her
testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement.
The appellants did not even mark and
offer in evidence the said transcript and
sworn statement for the specific purpose
of impeaching her credibility and her
present testimony. Unless so marked
and offered in evidence and accepted by
the trial court, said transcript and sworn
statement cannot be considered by the
court.
The Court fully agrees with the foregoing
ruminations of the Office of the Solicitor
General. The inconsistencies adverted
to by the appellants pertained only to
minor and collateral matters and not to
the elements of the crime charged;
hence, they do not dilute the probative
weight of the testimony. It bears
stressing that even the most truthful
witness can make mistakes but such
innocent lapses do not necessarily affect
his credibility. The testimonies of
witnesses must be considered and
calibrated in their entirety and not by
their truncated portions or isolated
passages. And then again, minor
contradictions among several witnesses
of a particular incident and aspect
thereof which do not relate to the
gravamen of the crime charged are to
be expected in view of their differences
in impressions, memory, vantage points
and other related factors.
PRESENT MEMORY REVIVED
PEOPLE v. PLASENCIA
FACTS: This case is about the robbery
with homicide of Herminio Mansueto
(Mansueto) by Antonio Plasencia
(Plasencia), Roberto Descartin
(Roberto AKA: RUBY) and Joelito
Descartin (Descartin) as filed before
the RTC San Juan, Province of Cebu.
The Facts are as follows:
10: 00 am – Nov 29, 1984 –
Mansueto, wearing a blue and white
striped t-shirt, maong pants, Seiko 5
stopwatch, and a Pandan hat, left on his
bicycle for Brgy. Patao, Bantayan Cebu,
to purchase pigs with the P10,000 he
brought along.
In Patao, Francisca Espina
(Espina), whose house was just across
the street of the accused, saw Mansueto
and Roberto talking. She approached
them and asked Mansueto if he wanted
to buy her 2 pigs for P1,400. Mansueto
agreed but told Espina to wait as he still
had something to do with Roberto.
Mansueto and Roberto
proceeded to Roberto’s piggery. Joelito,
and his brother (Rene) were also seen
going to the piggery of Roberto.
Believing that Mansueto was already
prepared to leave. She promptly walked
toward the piggery which was 100
meters away form her house. Mid way
she halted her tracks as she suddenly
saw Plasencias stab Mansueto. Roberto
then stabbed Mansueto while Joelito hit
Mansueto’s head while Rene held
Mansueto’s legs.
Espina saw everything clearly for
only a coconut tree and only some ipil-
ipil leaves were the hindrances to her
sight. She immediately rushed back
home and did not immediately inform
the police in fear for her life.
The main defense of the accused
were alibi. The RTC convicted them of
homicide.
It is asserted that the testimony of
Francisca Espina should not be given
worth since, while testifying, she would
at times be seen reading some notes
written on her left palm
Appellants then question the credibility
of the prosecution’s witness, Espinas as
she had inconsistencies, she had issues
with Placensia (a debt worth 300 and a
dog bite), and she being jittery during
the giving of her testimony.
ISSUE: Whether the use of memory
aid during an examination is
prohibited under the rules of court?
HELD: NO. The use of memory aids
during an examination of a witness is
pg. 32
not altogether proscribed. Section 16,
Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness
may refer to
memorandum. — A
witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by
anything written or
recorded by himself or
under his direction at the
time when the fact
occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other
time when the fact was
fresh in his memory and
he knew that the same
was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case
the writing or record must
be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine
the witness upon it and
may read it in evidence.
So, also, a witness may
testify from such a writing
or record, though he retain
no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is
able to swear that the
writing or record correctly
stated the transaction
when madel; but such
evidence must be
received with caution.
Allowing a witness to refer
to her notes rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court. In this
case, the exercise of that
discretion has not been abused;
the witness herself has explained
that she merely wanted to be
accurate on dates and like
details.
Appellants see inadvertency on
Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on
the witness stand. Nervousness and
anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction
particularly in the case of those who are
called to testify for the first time. The real
concern, in fact, should be when they
show no such emotions.
Francisca did fail in immediately
reporting the killing to the police
authorities. Delay or vacillation,
however, in making a criminal
accusation does not necessarily
adulterate the credibility of the witness.
24 Francisca, in her case, has
expressed fears for her life considering
that the assailants, being her neighbors,
could easily exact retribution on her. 25
Also, the hesitancy in reporting the
occurrence of a crime in rural areas is
not unknown. 26
Francisca's inability to respond to the
summons for another appearance in
court for further questioning was
satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution. Francisca at the time just
had a miscarriage and was found to be
too weak to travel. The recall of the
witness was, after all, at the sound
discretion of the trial court. 27
The claim of appellant Roberto
Descartin that Francisca and her
husband, a tuba-gatherer, owed him
P300.00, and the assertion made by
appellant Antonio Plasencia on the dog-
biting story involving Francisca's son
truly were too petty to consider. It would
be absurd to think that Francisca, for
such trivial reasons was actually
impelled to falsely implicate appellants
for so grave an offense as murder.
Appellants questioned Francisca's ability
to recognize them from a distance.
Francisca knew appellants well; they all
were her neighbors while Antonio
Plasencia himself was her cousin. 28
The crime occurred at around three
o'clock in the afternoon only about fifty
(50) meters away from her. With an
unobstructed view, Francisca's positive
identification of the culprits should be a
foregone matter. 29
The alleged inconsistencies in
Francisca's testimony and in her sworn
statement of 18 December 1984, cover
matters of little significance. Minor
inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses do not detract from their
credibility; 30 on the contrary, they serve
to strengthen their credibility and are
taken as badges of truth rather than as
indicia of falsehood 31 even as they also
pg. 33
erase suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.32
All considered, the case against the
appellants has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt even with the
retracted extra-judicial admission of
Joelito Descartin. 33 The testimony of a
single witness, if found to be credible, is
adequate for conviction, The defense of
alibi hardly can overcome the positive
identification of a unprejudiced
eyewitness.
PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED
CANQUE v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a
contractor doing business under the
name and style RDC Construction. At
the time material to this case, she had
contracts with the government for (a) the
restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road;
(b) the asphalting of Lutopan access
road; and (c) the asphalting of Babag
road in Lapulapu City. In connection with
these projects, petitioner entered into
two contracts with private respondent
Socor Construction Corporation.  Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday,
On May 28, 1986, private respondent
sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing
a revised computation, for P299,717.75,
representing the balance of petitioners
total account of P2,098,400.25 under
the two contracts. However, petitioner
refused to pay the amount, claiming that
private respondent failed to submit the
delivery receipts showing the actual
weight in metric tons of the items
delivered and the acceptance thereof by
the government.
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private
respondent filed a collection suit.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the
existence of the contracts with private
respondent as well as receipt of the
billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986.
However, she disputed the correctness
of the bill:
. . . considering that the deliveries of
[private respondent] were not signed
and acknowledged by the checkers of
[petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it
delivered to [petitioner] consisted of
60% water, and [petitioner] has already
paid [private respondent]
about P1,400,000.00 but [private
respondent] has not issued any receipt
to [petitioner] for said payments and
there is no agreement that [private
respondent] will charge 3% per month
interest.
Petitioner subsequently amended her
answer denying she had entered into
sub-contracts with private respondent.
During the trial, private respondent, as
plaintiff, presented its vice-president,
its bookkeeper.
Petitioner’s evidence consisted of her
lone testimony
RTC ruled for private respondent. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed. It upheld the trial courts
reliance on private respondents Book
of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on
the basis of Rule 130, 37 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue: whether the entries in the
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K)
constitute competent evidence to
show such delivery?
Held: No.
First. Petitioner contends that the
presentation of the delivery receipts duly
accepted by the then Ministry of Public
Works and Highways (MPWH) is
required under the contracts (Exhs. A
and B) and is a condition precedent for
her payment of the amount claimed by
private respondent. Petitioner argues
that the entries in private respondents
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K)
cannot take the place of the delivery
receipts and that such entries are mere
hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in
evidence.
The stipulation in the two contracts
requiring the submission of delivery
receipts does not preclude proof of
delivery of materials by private
respondent in some other way. 
The question is whether the entries in
the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh.
K) constitute competent evidence to
show such delivery. Private respondent
cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court
and argues that the entries in question
constitute entries in the course of
business sufficient to prove deliveries
made for the government projects. This
provision reads:
pg. 34

Entries in the course of business.
Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify, who was
in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in
corporate books requires the satisfaction
of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must
be dead, outside the country or unable
to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the
time of the transactions to which they
refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know
the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary
or regular course of business or duty.
As petitioner points out, the business
entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet
the first and third requisites. Dolores
Aday, who made the entries, was
presented by private respondent to
testify on the account of RDC
Construction. It was in the course of her
testimony that the entries were
presented and marked in
evidence. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person
who made them was available to testify
in court.
Necessity is given as a ground for
admitting entries, in that they are the
best available evidence. The person
who may be called to court to testify
on these entries being dead, there
arises the necessity of their
admission without the one who made
them being called to court be sworn
and subjected to cross-
examination. And this is permissible in
order to prevent a failure of justice.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had
no personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the entry. She said she
made the entries based on the bills
given to her. But she has no knowledge
of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in
the bills. The deliveries of the materials
stated in the bills were supervised by an
engineer. The person, therefore, who
has personal knowledge of the facts
stated in the entries, i.e., that such
deliveries were made in the amounts
and on the dates stated, was the
company’s project engineer. Whether or
not the bills given to Aday correctly
reflected the deliveries made in the
amounts and on the dates indicated was
a fact that could be established by the
project engineer alone who, however,
was not presented during trial. The rule
is stated by former Chief Justice Moran,
thus:
[W]hen the witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts entered by him,
and the person who gave him the
information is individually known and
may testify as to the facts stated in the
entry which is not part of a system of
entries where scores of employees have
intervened, such entry is not
admissible without the testimony of the
informer.
Second. It is nonetheless argued by
private respondent that although the
entries cannot be considered an
exception to the hearsay rule, they may
be admitted under Rule 132, 10.
On the other hand, petitioner contends
that evidence which is inadmissible for
the purpose for which it was offered
cannot be admitted for another
purpose. 
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K
is not really being presented for
another purpose. Private respondents
counsel offered it for the purpose of
showing the amount of petitioners
indebtedness. This is also the purpose
for which its admission is sought as a
memorandum to refresh the memory of
Dolores Aday as a witness. In other
words, it is the nature of the evidence
that is changed, not the purpose for
which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a
memorandum, Exh. K does not itself
constitute evidence. As explained
in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:
pg. 35
Under the above provision (Rule 132,
10), the memorandum used to refresh
the memory of the witness does not
constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason
that the witness has just the same to
testify on the basis of refreshed
memory. In other words, where the
witness has testified independently of or
after his testimony has been refreshed
by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not
admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a
witness may not be corroborated by any
written statement prepared wholly by
him.  Toledo wharf project and the Babag-
As the entries in question (Exh. K)
were not made based on personal
knowledge, they could only
corroborate Dolores Adays testimony
that she made the entries as she
received the bills.
Third. Does this, therefore, mean there
is no competent evidence of private
respondents claim as petitioner argues?
NO. Aside from Exh. K, private
respondent presented other documents
like contract agreements, affidavits,
work accomplishment reports, bills,
certifications etc.
The entries recorded under Exhibit K
were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O
which are all Socor Billings under the
account of RDC Construction. These
billings were presented and duly
received by the authorized
representatives of defendant. The
circumstances obtaining in the case at - November 2002: Iwasawa and
bar clearly show that for a long period of Gangan married in Pasay.
time after receipt thereof, RDC never Resided in Japan after.
manifested its dissatisfaction or - July 2009: Iwasawa noticed that
objection to the aforestated billings Gangan became depressed
submitted by plaintiff.  o Gangan confessed that the
FINALLY, Exhibit D-1 is material proof of reason for her depression
plaintiffs complete fulfillment of its was because she was
obligation. informed that HER
There is no question that plaintiff PREVIOUS HUSBAND
supplied RDC Construction with Item HAD DIED
302 (Bitunimous Prime Coat), Item 303 o Turns out, Gangan was
(Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 previously married to
(Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) Raymond Maglonzo
in all the three projects of the latter. The Arambulo (Married June
Lutopan Access Road project, the 20, 1994)
- Iwasawa filed a petition to declare
Lapulapu Road project. their marriage null and void on
On the other hand, no proof was ever the ground of bigamy. He testified
offered by defendant to show the and presented the following
presence of other contractors in those evidence issued by the NSO:
projects. We can therefore conclude that 1. Certificate of his marriage
it was Socor Construction Corp. with Gangan
ALONE who supplied RDC with 2. Certificate of marriage
Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous between Gangan and
Tack Coat and Bituminous Concrete Arambulo
Surface Course for all the aforenamed 3. Certificate of death of
three projects. Arambulo
4. Certification from NSO that
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS there are 2 entries of
marriage recorded by the
IWASAWA v. GANGAN office for Gangan
- September 4, 2012: RTC denied
FACTS: 2002: Japanese national the petition due to
Yasuo Iwasawa met Filipina Felisa INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE that
Gangan during his visit to the prove Gangan’s prior existing
Philippines. Gangan said she was single marriage. RTC ruled that:
and had never been married.
pg. 36
 o Iwasawa’s testimony is
unreliable because he had
no knowledge of Gangan’s
1st marriage prior to
Arambulo’s death
o Iwasawa did not present
NSO records custodian to
certify the authenticity of
the documents
ISSUE: W/N the testimony of NSO
records custodian certifying
authenticity and execution of public
documents was necessary before
they could be accorded weight – NO.
RATIO/HELD:
1. NO, all the documentary
evidence Iwasawa presented
were PUBLIC RECORDS, which
are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of
authenticity (RA 3753: Law on
Registry of Civil Status, Art 410
NCC). The documents are
considered prima facie evidence,
enough to establish the fact that
there was a prior marriage. Even
the trial prosecutor admitted the
authenticity of the documents.
PETITION GRANTED. Iwasawa and
Gangan marriage declared NULL &
VOID
ASIAN TERMINALS v. PHILAM
INSURANCE
Facts:  The case is a consolidation of
three petitions for certiorari assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals where Nichimen Corporation
shipped to consignee Universal Motors
Corporation packages of automobiles,
where upon delivery, said goods were
found to have sustained damages.
However, being insured with Philam
against all risks, said insurance agency
compensated Universal Motors and a
subrogation receipt was issued
thereafter to the insurance company.
Philam, now the subrogee of Universal
Motors went after Westwind and Asian
Terminal for reparation of compensated
amount given to Universal Motors.
Issue: What document may be
effective used to prove loss and/or
damages on the part of the shipper or
consignee?
Ruling:    A letter of credit may be used.
A letter of credit is a financial device
developed by merchants as a nullified the agreement between
convenient and relatively safe mode of
dealing with sales of goods to satisfy the
seemingly irreconcilable interests of a
seller, who refuses to part with his
goods before he is paid, and a buyer,
who wants to have control of his goods
before paying. Letters of credit are
employed by the parties desiring to
enter into commercial transaction,
mainly for the benefit of the parties to
the original transaction. Accordingly, for
purposes of reckoning when notice of
loss or damage should be given to the
carrier or its agent, the date of delivery
to Universal Motors is controlling.
OFFER OF EVIDENCE
ALUDOS v. SUERTE
Facts: In Jan. 1969, Lomises Aludos
acquired leasehold rights from the
Baguio City Gov’t over two stalls in the
Hangar Market as evidenced by a permit
issued by the City Treasurer.
 On Sept. 8, 1984, Lomises
entered into an agreement with
Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer
of all improvements and rights
over the two market stalls for
P260,000.
 Lomises backed out of the
agreement and returned the
payments already received from
Johnny amounting to P68,000.
 Johnny sued him for specific
performance with damages
before the RTC but the latter
them for failure to secure the
consent of the Baguio City
Government.
 Lomises appealed to the CA
claiming that the real agreement
was merely a loan not a sale
which was rejected by CA. CA
ruled that the assignment of
leasehold rights was void but the
sale of the improvements was
valid.
 On motion for reconsideration,
Lomises contended that no valid
pg. 37
 sale of the improvements could
be made because the lease
contract dated May 1, 1985
between him and Baguio City
Government, supposedly marked
as Exh. A, provided that all
improvements shall ipso facto
become properties of the City of
Baguio.
 CA denied the motion after
finding that his lawyer
misrepresented Exh. A as the
lease contract when in fact it was
merely a permit issued by the
City Treasurer and that the lease
contract dated May, 1 1985 was
never formally offered in
evidence and could thus not be
considered pursuant to the
rules of evidence.
 Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue: Was the CA correct in not
considering the lease contract as
evidence?
Held: YES, under Section 34, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the
duty of the court to rest its findings of
fact and its judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by
the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of
paper barren of probative weight. What
was formally offered was the 1969
permit, which only stated that Lomises
was permitted to occupy a stall in the
Baguio City market and nothing else. In
other words, no evidence was presented
and formally offered showing that any
and all improvements in the market
stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City
Government.
WESTMON INVESTMENT
CORPORATION v. FRANCIA
FACTS: Francias filed Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages arising from their investments
against Wincorp and Pearlbank before
RTC.
 Wincorp and Pearlbank filed separate
Motions to Dismiss; both were
anchored on ground that Francias
failed to state a cause of action.
 RTC issued order dismissing MD of
both for lack of merit. Wincorp filed
Answer, Pearlbank filed Answer with
Counterclaim and Crossclaim (against
Wincorp).
 On the pre-trial order issued by the
RTC parties agreed that (1) plaintiffs
do not have personal knowledge as to
WON Pearlbank indeed borrowed
funds allegedly invested by plaintiff
from Wincorp and (2) that the alleged
confirmation advices which indicate
Pearlbank as alleged borrower of the
funds allegedly invested by plaintiffs in
Wincorp do not bear signature or
acknowledgement of Pearlbank.
 In 1999, Amos Francia was convinced
by the bank manager of Westmont
Bank to make an investment in
Wincorp. Since the interest rate
offered was impressive, 3% to 5%
higher than regular bank investment,
Amos was convinced.
 He invited his siblings to join in the
investment and so they invested
P1.4M & P2.5M with net interest rate
of 11% over 43-day spread.
 When the investment matured, the
Francia siblings demanded the
retirement of their investment but
Wincorp “rolled-over” their placements
and issued Confirmation Advices for
another 34 days.
 At the same time, Wincorp advised the
Francias that their money was
borrowed by Pearlbank. When the
extension asked by Westmont expired,
they again were not able to pay up and
so the Francias sued Westmont
Investment. Pearlbank was impleaded
in the complaint.
 Wincorp was unable to present their
evidence; denied their Motion to
Postpone by RTC and considered to
have waived its right to present
evidence. RTC ruled in favour of
Francias and held that Wincorp is
solely liable to them. Wincorp filed MR
– denied.
 CA affirmed ruling of RTC.
pg. 38
ISSUE: WON CA is correct in finding
Wincorp solely liable to pay the
Francias?
HELD: YES!
 Sec.34, Rule 132 of Rules on
Evidence “court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.”
 Attached documents in MR (RTC)
cannot be given any probative weight
or credit because the documents were
not formally offered as evidence in trial
court.
 Established by the oral evidence and
confirmed by Confirmation Advices,
Francias failed to get their investment
after 43 days and was rolled over for
another 34 days; Wincorp never
negated these saying it merely acted
as an agent of Francias and Pearlbank
is the actual borrower.
 “Contract of agency” and that
Pearlbank received Francias money
were never proven. The fact that
Pearlbank was printed in Confirmation
Advices does not automatically makes
it liable to Francias as nothing therein
shows that Pearlbank adhered or
acknowledged that it is the actual
borrower.
 Question of law; findings of CA are
final & conclusive.
 In contract of agency, a person binds
himself to render some service or to
something in representation or on
behalf of another with the authority or
consent of the latter.
 Elements of coa: (1) consent, express
or implied; (2) object is the execution
of a juridical act in relation to a third
person; (3) agents act as a
representative and not for himself; (4)
agent acts within the scope of his
authority.
 Principal-agent relationship between
Francias and Wincorp was not duly
established by evidence. The record
does not show that Wincorp merely
brokered loan transaction between
Francias and Pearlbank and the latter
was the actual recipient of the money.
Pearlbank did not authorize Wincorp to
borrow money for it. Neither was there
a ratification, expressly or implied.
There was not even a promissory note
validly and duly executed by
Pearlbank which would in any way
serve as evidence of borrowing.
 Francias had no personal knowledge if
Pearlbank was indeed the
recipient/beneficiary of their
investments. The Francias have
always maintained that they only
transacted with Westmont Investment
and never with Pearlbank. The fact
that the Francias impleaded Pearlbank
in their suit is understandable (it does
not defeat their suit) because they only
impleaded Pearlbank to protect their
interest when they found out that
Westmont was already bankrupt.
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
FORTUNE TABACCO CORP. v. CIR
FACTS: The subject claim for refund
involves the amount of excise taxes
allegedly overpaid. Petitioner is the
manufacturer/producer of cigarette
brands, with tax rate classification based
on net retail price prescribed under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4280.
Immediately prior to January 1, 1997,
the mentioned cigarette brands were
subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to
then Section 142 of the Tax Code of
1977, as amended. However, on
January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took
effect causing a shift from the ad
valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific
tax system. As a result of such shift, the
said cigarette brands were subjected to
specific tax under Section 142 thereof,
now renumbered as Section 145 of the
Tax Code of 1997.  Petitioner filed a
claim for tax credit or refund under
Section 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 (1997 NIRC) for
erroneously or illegally collected specific
taxes covering the period June to
December 31, 2004 in the total amount
of Php219,566,450.00. Respondent in
his Answer raised among others, as a
Special and Affirmative Defense, that
the amount of TWO HUNDRED
NINETEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SIXTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(Php219,566,450.00) being claimed by
petitioner as alleged overpaid excise tax
is not properly documented. The Court
ruled that there is insufficiency of
pg. 39
evidence on the claim for refund.
Although both the CTA Division and the
CTA En Banc provisionally admitted
petitioner’s Exhibit “C,” (Letter Claim for
Refund) the mentioned documents, as
well as the other documentary
evidence submitted by petitioner
were refused admission for being
merely photocopies.  In this case,
petitioner did not even attempt to
provide a plausible reason as to why the
original copies of the documents
presented could not be produced before
the CTA or any reason that the
application of any of the foregoing
exceptions could be justified. Although
petitioner presented one (1) witness
to prove its claim, it appears that this
witness was not even a signatory to any
of the disputed documentary evidence.
Petitioner posits that if their exhibits,
specifically Exhibits “G”, “G-1” to “G-7”
and Exhibit “H”, are admitted together
with the testimony of their witness, the
same would sufficiently prove their
claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to warrant the
grant of petitioner’s claim for tax
refund?
HELD: NO! The petition lacks merit.  Joseph Realty's rescission letter with its
Petitioner relied heavily on photocopied
documents to prove its claim. Granting
that the Court could take a second look
and review petitioner’s evidence, the
result would be the same.  The claim for
refund hinges on the admissibility and
the probative value of the photocopied
documents that allegedly contain a
recording of petitioner’s excise
payments. Petitioner failed to offer
any proof or tender of excluded
evidence.
It has been repeatedly ruled that where
documentary evidence was rejected
by the lower court and the offeror did
not move that the same be attached
to the record, the same cannot be
considered by the appellate court,  as
documents forming no part of proofs
before the appellate court cannot be
considered in disposing the case. For
the appellate court to consider as
evidence, which was not offered by one
party at all during the proceedings
below, would infringe the constitutional
right of the adverse party — in this case,
the CIR, to due process of law. In this
case, as explained above, petitioner
utterly failed to not only comply with the
basic procedural requirement of
presenting only the original copies of its
documentary evidence, but also to
adhere to the requirement to properly
make its offer of proof or tender of
excluded evidence for the proper
consideration of the appellate tribunal.
AMOQUIS v. BALLADO
FACTS: On November 24, 1969,
spouses Francisco Ballado and
Concepcion Ballado entered into two
contracts to sell with owner and
developer St. Joseph Realty, Ltd. to buy
on installment parcels of land,
designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2. The
Ballado Spouses amortized until 1979
when CrisantoPinili, St. Joseph Realty’s
collector, refused to receive their
payments because of a small house
they had erected therein in violation of
the rules of the subdivision. Francisco
informed St. Joseph Realty that the
small house had already been taken
down, but Pinili still did not come to
collect.
On February 17, 1987, the Ballado
Spouses discovered that St. Joseph
Realty rescinded their contracts. Filed a
case by the Sps. Ballado.
After numerous postponements, on
February 7, 1996, the Ballado Spouses
were finally able to present their
evidence in chief.30 They testified and
presented their evidence, among which
were receipts to prove payments of
installments, original copies of the
contracts, the transmittal letter of the
P30,000.00 check to St. Joseph Realty,
and the check. They also presented St.
envelope, addressed to the lots and not
to their residence, bearing "first attempt,
cannot be located," "second attempt,
cannot be located," and "third attempt,
pg. 40
cannot be located" written on it.31
Finally, they presented as evidence
Concepcion's February 21, 1987 reply
letter asking for her remaining
payables,32 St. Joseph Realty's letter
acknowledging receipt of Concepcion's
February 21, 1987 letter, documents of
sale of the lands from St. Joseph Realty
to the Amoguis Brothers, and
Concepcion's September 12, 1987 letter
to St. Joseph Realty, proving that she
did not know that the lands had already
been sold to and titled under the names
of the Amoguis Brothers in August 1987.
The Regional Trial Court noted that the
Ballado Spouses failed to file a
formal offer of evidence. However, this
was not detrimental to their case as
some of these documents were admitted
by St. Joseph Realty, including the
contracts to sell and the letters that it
sent to the Ballado Spouses through the
wrong address.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor
of the Ballado Spouses, and against St.
Joseph Realty and the Amoguis
Brothers. The Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision, affirming the
Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: whether or not testimonial
and documentary pieces of evidence
which are not formally offered may be
appreciated by a trial court?
HELD: On the issue of the admissibility
of the Ballado Spouses' testimonial and
documentary evidence, the Amoguis
Brothers argue that it was unfair to fault
them for not objecting when the former's
counsel started his direct examination
without offering the purpose of the
witnesses' testimonies. Had they done
so, it would alert the Ballado Spouses'
counsel of the defect. Rule 132,
Sections 34 and 35 of the Rules of Court
are mandatory, regardless if an
opposing party timely objected. The
jurisprudence relied upon by the Court
of Appeals is not applicable in this case
as People of the Philippines v.
Alicante[92] was a rape case and it was
the 13-year-old victim's testimony that
was not offered. Meanwhile, this is a
civil case. In Alicante, there was
already a sworn statement made by the
victim before she took the stand; in this
case, only Francisco verified the
Complaint, while Concepcion identified
the documents and testified on their
claims. The Regional Trial Court judge
could not have known the purpose of
Concepcion's testimony.[93] The Ballado
Spouses, on the other hand, reiterated
that timely objections should have been
made.[94]
Rule 132, Sections 34 to 36 of the Rules
of Court govern the manner of offering
and objecting to evidence:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court
shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.
Section 35. When to make offer. As
regards the testimony of a witness, the
offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall
be offered after the presentation of a
party's testimonial evidence. Such offer
shall be done orally unless allowed by
the court to be done in writing.
Section 36. Objection. Objection to
evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in
the course of the oral examination of a
witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be
objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different
period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the
objections must be specified.
Following these provisions, a witness'
testimony must be offered at the
start, when he or she takes the stand
for the first time and before questions
are propounded to him or her.
Documentary or object evidence, on
the other hand, must be orally offered
after the presentation of a party's
pg. 41
witnesses unless the court orders or
allows that a written formal offer is
filed.
All evidence must be formally offered.
Otherwise, the court cannot consider
them.[95] This rule ensures that judges
will carry out their constitutional
mandate to render decisions that clearly
state the facts of cases and the
applicable laws.[96] Judgments must be
based "only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties to the
suit."[97] This rule also affords parties
their right to due process by examining
the evidence presented by their
opponent, and to object to its
presentation when warranted.[98]
However, testimonial evidence not
formally offered but not timely
objected to by an opposing party may
be still be considered by the court.
The purpose of offering a witness'
testimony is for the court to expertly
assess whether questions propounded
are relevant and material, and if the
witness is competent to answer. It is to
aid the court in ruling over objections
made by opposing counsel. Catuira v.
Court of Appeals[99] was instructive:
The petition is devoid of merit. The
reason for requiring that evidence be
formally introduced is to enable the
court to rule intelligently upon the
objection to the questions which have
been asked. As a general rule, the
proponent must show its relevancy,
materiality and competency. Where the
proponent offers evidence deemed by
counsel of the adverse party to be
inadmissible for any reason, the latter
has the right to object. But such right is
a mere privilege which can be waived.
Necessarily, the objection must be
made at the earliest opportunity, lest
silence when there is opportunity to
speak may operate as a waiver of
objections.
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution
failed to offer the questioned testimony
when private respondent was called to
the witness stand, petitioner waived this
procedural error by failing to object at
the appropriate time, i.e., when the
ground for objection became reasonably
apparent the moment private
respondent was called to testify without
any prior offer having been made by the
proponent. Most apt is the observation
of the appellate court:
While it is true that the prosecution
failed to offer in evidence the testimony
of the complaining witness upon calling
her to testify and that it was only after
her testimony and after the petitioner
moved that it be stricken that the offer
was made, the respondent Court did not
gravely err in not dismissing the case
against the petitioner on the ground
invoked. For, she should have objected
to the testimony of the complaining
witness when it was not first offered
upon calling her and should not have
waited in ambush after she had already
finished testifying. By so doing she did
not save the time of the Court in hearing
the testimony of the witness that after all
according to her was inadmissible. And
for her failure to make known her
objection at the proper time, the
procedural error or defect was waived.
[100]
 (Citations omitted)
Catuira also discussed that litigation is
not a game of surprises. Rules of
procedure and evidence are in place to
ensure the smooth and speedy
dispensation of cases. Where the
opposing party belatedly raises the
technicality that the witnesses'
testimonies were not formally offered to
"ambush"[101] the party presenting them,
the court may not expunge or strike
them out.
Under the rules, a timely objection is
a remedy available to petitioners.
They waived their right to this remedy
when they waited until the case was
submitted for resolution to do so.
The rules on examination of witnesses
and objecting to them are not separate
for civil and criminal cases. A witness,
whether in a criminal or civil case, is
presented to support and prove the
allegations made by the party presenting
him or her. The witness must be
competent, and his or her testimony
must be relevant and material. Whether
the case is civil or criminal, objection or
failure to offer the testimony of a witness
must be made immediately.[102]
pg. 42
As to the Ballado Spouses' documentary
evidence, the Court of Appeals was
correct to consider only the contracts to
sell. These were the only documents
attached to the written formal offer of
evidence that they filed. Hence, these
documents should be considered as the
only documentary evidence formally
offered. When a party fails to formally
offer his or her documentary or object
evidence within a considerable period
after the presentation of witnesses, he
or she is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to do so.[103] The party,
therefore, as in this case, runs the risk of
weakening his or her claim or defense.

pg. 43