Collegio de San Juan Letran - Calamba vs. Villas

8/16/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 399
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba vs. Villas
*
G.R. No. 137795. March 26, 2003.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA, petitioner,

vs. BELEN P. VILLAS, respondent.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Due Process; Requisites.—Under the Labor

Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from
employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in
Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee
must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural
aspect). The procedural aspect requires that the employee be given two
written notices before she is terminated consisting of a notice which
apprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the
dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee
of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
Same; Same; Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Misconduct is improper
or wrongful conduct; To be a just cause for termination, misconduct must be
serious, i.e., it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant.—Misconduct is improper or wrongful
conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.Under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for termination, must be
serious. This implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated character
and not merely trivial or unimportant. Examples of serious misconduct
justifying termination, as held in some of our decisions, include: sexual
harassment (the manager’s act of fondling the hands, massaging the
shoulder and caressing the nape of a secretary); fighting within company
premises;uttering obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior;
misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and pressuring and intimidating
a co-teacher to change that student’s failing grade to passing.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Findings of fact of administrative
agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only great respect but even finality.—With regard to respondent’s alleged
failure to report for work on April 1, 1996 and failure to enroll during the
first semester, the Court of Appeals and the Voluntary Arbitrator found that
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b4d5eac8b24617ee3000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/13
she did in fact report for work on April 1, 1996 and that she was in fact
enrolled during the first semester. Well-settled is the rule that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
551
VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 551
are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. And they carry even more weight
when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of a lower fact-
finding body, in this case the Voluntary Arbitrator. Likewise, findings of fact
of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding
upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or
where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Schools and Universities; Although the Court gives
credence to respondent school’s argument that a private high school teacher
still has work at the end of the schoolyear—to assist in the graduation
preparations—and in the beginning of the school year—to assist in the
enrollment—such tasks cannot be considered a teacher’s main duties, the
failure to perform which would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or
abandonment.—Her alleged failure to report for work exactly on April 1,
1996 is not equivalent to “failure to return for work,” a sanctionable offense
under the Faculty Manual. As correctly pointed out by the VA, petitioner
failed to establish that there was a distinct and definite assignment that
needed to be done personally by respondent, and specifically on April 1,
1996, which she failed to do on said date. Although we give credence to
petitioner’s argument that a private high school teacher still has work at the
end of the schoolyear—to assist in the graduation preparations—and in the
beginning of the school year—to assist in the enrollment—such tasks cannot
be considered a teacher’s main duties, the failure to perform which would be
tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment. Besides, there is no
disagreement that respondent reported for work on May 15, 1996 at which
time petitioner School could have asked her to assist in the enrollment
period. At most, respondent failed to help out during the preparations for
graduation and this, to us, was not a significant reason for terminating or
dismissing her from her job.
Same; Same; Same; Moonlighting; In the instant case, the act of a

teacher in selling insurance and cookware could not be the “employment”
contemplated by the prohibition by the Faculty Manual.—We find the
provision of the Faculty Manual ambiguous as the term “employment”
connotes a number of meanings. Employment in its general sense connotes
any work or service rendered in exchange for money. The loose connotation
of employment may therefore cover jobs without an employer-employee
relationship. However, inasmuch as in this case, petitioner School drafted
the said policy, the term “employment” should be strictly construed against
it. Moreover, it is a settled rule that in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former’s
favor. The act of respondent in selling insurance and cookware
552
was not the “employment” prohibited by the Faculty Manual. The

prohibition against outside employment was enacted to prevent the teacher
from using the study leave period for unsanctioned purposes since the
School pays the teacher while pursuing further studies. That rationale was
not violated by respondent for the reason that her part-time activity of
selling insurance and cookware could not have prevented her in any way
from studying and, more importantly, she was not being paid by the School
while on leave. How did the school expect her and her family to survive
without any income for one whole year?
Same; Same; Labor Unions; The rights of an employee to be informed
of his proposed dismissal are personal to him and, therefore, notice to the
union is not notice to the employee.—These letters did not comply with the
requirements of the law that the first written notice must apprise the
employee that his termination is being considered due to a certain act or
omission. These letters merely required petitioner to submit proof of her
studies and respondent could not have reasonably inferred from them that
her dismissal was being considered by the petitioner. The fact that there was
a hearing conducted by the grievance committee pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement did not work in petitioner’s favor because this was
done after petitioner had informed respondent that she was already
considered resigned from her teaching job. Besides, the rights of an
employee to be informed of his proposed dismissal are personal to him and,
therefore, the notice to the union was not notice to the employee.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are recoverable only where
the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud, or constitutes an act
oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.—We similarly affirm the Voluntary Arbitrator’s

decision that respondent is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees because there is no evidence showing that bad faith or malice
attended the dismissal of respondent. Moral damages are recoverable only
where the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud, or constitutes an act
oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. A dismissal may be contrary to law but, by itself alone, it
does not necessarily establish bad faith.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Antonio M. Nuyles for petitioner.
Samson Alcantara for private respondent.
553
VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 553

CORONA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review
2
on certiorari of the decision of the
former Eleventh
3
Division of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Apolonio S. Mayuga that
respondent Belen P. Villas was illegally dismissed by petitioner
Colegio de San Juan de Letran (School) and thus, entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages.
The antecedent facts show that respondent Belen Villas was
employed by the petitioner School as high school teacher in
September 1985. On May 15, 1995, she applied for a study leave for
six months, from June to December 31, 1995. In a letter dated June
2, 1995, Mrs. Angelina Quiatchon, principal of the high school
department, told Villas that her request for study leave was granted
for one school year subject to the following conditions:
1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and

ends on March 31, 1996;
2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the
part of the School;
3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should
be submitted upon return on April 1, 1996;
4. Faculty Manual—Section 40 Special Provisions on the
Granting of Leave of Absence should be observed:
a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of

the approved leave of absence that the faculty member shall
engage himself in employment outside the institution, the

administration shall regard the faculty member on leave as
resigned;
b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be
applied for by the faculty member and granted by
administration is twelve (12) months. If, at the lapse of the
period, the faculty member fails to return for work, the4
administration shall regard the faculty member as resigned.
Respondent alleged that she intended to utilize the first semester of

her study leave to finish her masteral degree at the Philip-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas; Rollo, p. 52.

2 Composed of Associate Justices Bernardo Ll. Salas, Fermin A. Martin, and
Candido V. Rivera.
3 Rollo, p. 102.
4 Annex “B”, Rollo, p. 124.
554

pine Women’s University (PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push

through so she took up an Old Testament course in a school of
religion and at the same time utilized her free hours selling
insurance and cookware to augment her family’s income. However,
during the second semester of her study leave, she studied and
passed 12 units of education subjects at the Golden Gate Colleges in
Batangas City. In response to the letters sent her by petitioner to
justify her study leave, she submitted a certification from Golden
Gate Colleges and a letter explaining why she took up an Old
Testament course instead of enrolling in her masteral class during
the first semester.
On June 3, 1996, the President and Rector of the School, Fr.
Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P., wrote her, stating that her failure to
enroll during the first semester was a violation of the conditions of
the study leave and that the reasons she advanced for failure to
enroll during the first semester were not acceptable, thus:
In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have ascertained first
that you are still eligible to study at PWU to finish your masteral degree
before applying and securing the approval of your leave by the School. In
the second place, you should have informed the School at once that you
could not enroll in the first semester so that your leave could have been
adjusted for only one-half (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in some part-
time business instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is

sufficient justification for the School to consider you as resigned under the
Faculty Manual. And lastly, your failure to study in the first semester of
your study leave without informing the School beforehand constitutes
deception,
5
to say the least, which is not a good example to the other
teachers.
Her case was subsequently referred to the grievance committee, as

provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, and the report
was submitted on July 12, 1996, both to the union and the School.
However, since the grievance committee could not reach a decision,
the case was referred for voluntary arbitration.
Respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal and the case
was assigned to VA Mayuga who found that respondent was
illegally dismissed, thus:
_______________
5 Annex “G”, Rollo, p. 158.
555
VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 555

“WHEREFORE premises considered, we rule that complainant Mrs.

BELEN P. VILLAS was illegally dismissed from her employment by
respondent, and as prayed for, respondent COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE
LETRAN-CALAMBA is hereby ordered to reinstate Mrs. Belen P. Villas to
her former position or job in said school without loss of seniority and with
full backwages and other monetary benefits6 effective the start of school year
1996-1997 up to the time she is reinstated.”
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a

petition for review with the Court of Appeals. This was denied.
Thus, this petition for review. The sole issue is whether or not
respondent’s alleged violation of the conditions of the study grant
constituted serious misconduct which justified her termination from
petitioner School.
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of respondent was lawful
inasmuch as (a) the requirements of due process were followed and
(b) she not only violated several lawful regulations but also breached
her contractual obligations to the School. All this constituted a valid
ground for her dismissal. In assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals, petitioner School basically questions the court a quo’s
findings of fact on respondent’s alleged violation of petitioner
School’s policy on study leave grants.
The petition has no merit.
Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a

valid dismissal from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any
of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive
aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity
7
to be
heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect). The procedural
aspect requires that the employee be given two written notices
before she is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is
sought and the subsequent notice which
8
informs the employee of the
employer’s decision to dismiss him.
In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and
procedural aspects were not satisfied.
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 112.
7 Molato vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 42, 45 [1997].
8 Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602, 609 [1997]; Molato vs. NLRC, 266
SCRA 42, 45 [1997]; MGG Marine Services, Inc., et al. vs. NLRC and E.A Molina,
259 SCRA 664, 667 [1996].
556

According to petitioner, respondent violated the following

conditions of her study leave: (a) she failed to report for work on
April 1, 1996, the day after the lapse of her leave period, which was
violative of Section 40 of the Faculty Manual; (b) she failed to
submit proof of her studies during the first semester of her leave
period, suggesting that she was not enrolled during this period; and
(c) she engaged in employment outside the School. In sum,
petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached not
only the provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual
obligation) but also the Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty
of serious misconduct which was a ground for termination.
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that there was no
violation of the conditions of the study leave grant. Thus, respondent
could not be charged with serious misconduct warranting her
dismissal as a teacher in petitioner School. Petitioner has failed to
convince us that the three alleged violations of the study leave grant
constituted serious misconduct which justified the termination of
respondent’s employment.
Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
9
and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Under Article 282
of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for

termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of such
grave and 10aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. Examples of serious misconduct justifying
termination, as held in some of our decisions, include: sexual
harassment (the manager’s act of fondling the hands,
11
massaging the
shoulder and caressing
12
the nape of a secretary); fighting within
company premises;13 uttering obscene, insulting or offensive words
against a superior; misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and
pressuring and
_______________
9 St. Michael’s Institute, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371
SCRA 383; Department of Labor Manual, Sec. 4343.01.
10 Ibid.; Cosep vs. NLRC, 290 SCRA 704, 715 [1998].
11 Libres vs. NLRC, National Steel Corp., et al., 307 SCRA 675 [1999].
12 Royo vs. NLRC, 256 SCRA 639 [1996].
13 Asian Design and Manufacturing Corp. vs. Hon. Deputy Minister of Labor, 142
SCRA 79 [1986].
557
VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 557

intimidating
14
a co-teacher to change that student’s failing grade to
passing.
In this light, the alleged infractions of the respondent could
hardly be considered serious misconduct.
With regard to respondent’s alleged failure to report for work on
April 1, 1996 and failure to enroll during the first semester, the
Court of Appeals and the Voluntary Arbitrator found that she did in
fact report for work on April 1, 1996 and that she was in fact
enrolled during the first semester. Well-settled is the rule that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties
and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. And they carry even
more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings15
of a lower fact-finding body, in this case the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Likewise, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-
judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this
Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or
where it is clearly shown that they were16 arrived at arbitrarily or in
utter disregard of the evidence on record.
Assuming arguendo that she did fail to report for work on April
1, 1996 and enroll during the first semester, the most respondent
could be charged with was simple misconduct. In both instances,

there was evidence of substantial compliance by respondent.
Her alleged failure to report for work exactly on April 1, 1996 is
not equivalent to “failure to return for work,” a sanctionable offense
under the Faculty Manual. As correctly pointed out by the VA,
petitioner failed to establish that there was a distinct and definite
assignment that needed to be done personally by respondent, and
specifically on April 1, 1996, which she failed to do on said date.
Although we give credence to petitioner’s argument that a private
high school teacher still has work at the end of the schoolyear—to
assist in the graduation preparations—and in the beginning of the
school year—to assist in the enrollment—such tasks cannot be
considered a teacher’s main duties, the failure to
_______________
14 Padilla vs. NLRC and San Beda College, 273 SCRA 457 [1997].
15 Spouses Uy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109197, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA
262.
16 Naguiat vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564, 574 [1997].
558

perform which would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or

abandonment. Besides, there is no disagreement that respondent
reported for work on May 15, 1996 at which time petitioner School
could have asked her to assist in the enrollment period. At most,
respondent failed to help out during the preparations for graduation
and this, to us, was not a significant reason for terminating or
dismissing her from her job.
With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first
semester, although we agree with the President and Rector, Fr.
Mendez, that respondent should have first ascertained whether she
was still
17
eligible to study at the PWU before applying for a study
leave, such lapse was more of an error in judgment rather than an
act of serious misconduct. If respondent intended to use her study
leave for other unauthorized purposes, as petitioner would like us to
believe, she would not have enrolled at the Golden Gate Colleges
during the 18second semester. Yet she did, as borne out by the
certification prepared by the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges.
Furthermore, we find that respondent did not violate the
prohibition on engaging in employment outside the school as
specified in her study leave grant and19
as provided in the Faculty
Manual. Section 40 (a) of the Manual states:
a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved
leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in
employment outside the institution, the administration shall regard the
faculty member on leave resigned. (Emphasis supplied)
We find the provision of the Faculty Manual ambiguous as the term

“employment” connotes a number of meanings. Employment in its
general sense connotes any work or service rendered in exchange for
money. The loose connotation of employment may therefore cover
jobs without an employer-employee relationship. However,
inasmuch as in this case, petitioner School drafted the said policy,20
the term “employment” should be strictly construed against it.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that in controversies between a
_______________
17 Letter of Fr. Mendez to Respondent, Rollo, p. 158.

18 Rollo, p. 125.
19 Rollo, p. 124.
20 Article 1377, Civil Code.
559
VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 559

laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence,
or in the interpretation of agreements
21
and writings should be
resolved in the former’s favor. The act of respondent in selling
insurance and cookware was not the “employment” prohibited by
the Faculty Manual. The prohibition against outside employment
was enacted to prevent the teacher from using the study leave period
for unsanctioned purposes since the School pays the teacher while
pursuing further studies. That rationale was not violated by
respondent for the reason that her part-time activity of selling
insurance and cookware could not have prevented her in any way
from studying and, more importantly, she was not being paid by the
School while on leave. How did the school expect her and her
family to survive without any income for one whole year?
Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements
for a valid dismissal. As earlier noted, the law requires the employer
to give the worker to be dismissed two written notices before
terminating his employment. Considering that these notices are
mandatory, the absence of one renders any management decision to
terminate null and void. Petitioner failed to give respondent the first
notice which should have informed the latter of the former’s
intention to dismiss her. Petitioner argues that it complied with this
requirement as there were several exchanges of communication
between the School and respondent regarding the cause of her

termination. However, we find that these letters did not apprise
respondent that her dismissal was being sought by petitioner School
as said letters only required respondent to submit proof of
enrollment. The
22
letter of Principal Angelina Q. Quiatchon dated
April 17, 1996 was worded as follows:
In accordance with the terms of your study leave from June 5, 1995 to
March 31, 1996, you must submit credentials/proofs of your study to justify
the approved leave.
To this date, April 17, this office has not received your credentials.
Please do so within the next three days from receipt hereof so that this office
can act accordingly.
_______________
21 Violeta vs. NLRC, 280 SCRA 520, 531 [1997]; L.T. Datu and Co., Inc. vs.
NLRC, 253 SCRA 440, 449 [1996].
22 Annex “D”, Rollo, p. 126.
560

23
Similarly, the May 10, 1996 letter of the Academic Affairs
Director, Dr. Rhodora G. Odejar, was worded thus:
The Academic Affairs Office has received your certification of graduate

studies completed in the second semester of Schoolyear 1995-1996.
However, there is no report as to how you utilized your leave in the first
semester. You are therefore instructed to submit your report on the matter
within three days from receipt hereof.
The next letter from the petitioner, dated June 3, 1996, already
informed respondent that she was considered resigned effective
schoolyear 1996-1997.
These letters did not comply with the requirements of the law
that the first written notice must apprise the employee that his
termination is being considered due to a certain act or omission.
These letters merely required petitioner to submit proof of her
studies and respondent could not have reasonably inferred from
them that her dismissal was being considered by the petitioner. The
fact that there was a hearing conducted by the grievance committee
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement did not work in
petitioner’s favor because this was done after petitioner had
informed respondent that she was already considered resigned from
her teaching job. Besides, the rights of an employee to be informed
24
24
of his proposed dismissal are personal to him and, therefore, the
notice to the union was not notice to the employee.
With regard to the respondent’s claim for the 25
six-month study
leave and vacation pay, we affirm the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator that respondent is not entitled to such benefits:
While it is true that the collective bargaining agreement between respondent

and complainant’s union provides for six months’ pay for qualified teachers
who will go on sabbatical or study leave, the same was expressly waived by
complainant when she signed conforme to the letter dated June 2, 1995
approving her study leave which states among others, to wit: ‘2. The
requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the school.’
And considering that her leave of absence for the whole school year 1995-
1996 was presumed to be a leave of absence without pay, then she did not
earn her vacation leave incentive for the next coming summer.
_______________
23 Annex “E”, Rollo, p. 127.

24 Century Textile Mills vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528 [1988].
25 Rollo, pp. 111-112.
561
VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 561

We find it just, fair and reasonable to grant vacation pay on April and May
of every calendar as additional incentive only to those teachers who
rendered continuous service to the Collegio the preceding school year.
We similarly affirm the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision that

respondent is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees because there is no evidence showing that bad faith
or malice attended the dismissal of respondent. Moral damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal is attended by bad faith or
fraud, or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. A
dismissal may be contrary to 26law but, by itself alone, it does not
necessarily establish bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Separation pay is allowed as a measure of social justice

only in those instance where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. (Salavarria vs. Letran College, 296 SCRA 184 [1998])
It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of trust or that
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the
trust and confidence demanded by his position. (Del Val vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 296 SCRA 283 [1998])
——o0o——
_______________
26 Supra note 9 at 716.
562
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8/16/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 399

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA, petitioner,

Labor Law; Dismissals; Due Process; Requisites.—Under the Labor

VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 551

Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba vs. Villas

Same; Same; Same; Moonlighting; In the instant case, the act of a

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba vs. Villas

was not the “employment” prohibited by the Faculty Manual. The

customs or public policy.—We similarly affirm the Voluntary Arbitrator’s

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 553

1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and

a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of

engage himself in employment outside the institution, the

Respondent alleged that she intended to utilize the first semester of

1 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas; Rollo, p. 52.

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pine Women’s University (PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push

time business instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is

Her case was subsequently referred to the grievance committee, as

5 Annex “G”, Rollo, p. 158.

VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 555

“WHEREFORE premises considered, we rule that complainant Mrs.

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a

Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

According to petitioner, respondent violated the following

of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for

VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 557

could be charged with was simple misconduct. In both instances,

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

perform which would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or

We find the provision of the Faculty Manual ambiguous as the term

17 Letter of Fr. Mendez to Respondent, Rollo, p. 158.

VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 559

between the School and respondent regarding the cause of her

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Academic Affairs Office has received your certification of graduate

While it is true that the collective bargaining agreement between respondent

23 Annex “E”, Rollo, p. 127.

VOL. 399, MARCH 26, 2003 561

We similarly affirm the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision that

Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Notes.—Separation pay is allowed as a measure of social justice

26 Supra note 9 at 716.

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