Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18463             October 4, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter. 
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
 
MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of
the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero,
discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by
witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly
thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-
General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the
steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate,
September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published
an article reading as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery
of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this
time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be
discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the
persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in
order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable
obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing
more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have
surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in
which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with
serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the
Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its
committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with
reference to the article published inLa Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a
resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his
study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La
Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal
court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out
and in which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the
defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the
Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the
Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for
the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King against
free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed
because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's
representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the
other articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the
dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or
insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of His Majesty. We now have
no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines
representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal
Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of
the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of
the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this
court until otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and
little importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political
controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of
this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although
such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application
of the provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us
from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons
who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The
King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in
authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made
applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a
majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an
insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable under it.
(U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in
this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be
repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise
determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in
the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two
months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and
to pay the costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and
eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce
themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this
decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule
announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that
case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his
proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was
found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal
to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds:
(1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2)
that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a
motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance
had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a
principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and
ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial.
Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case
has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in
view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the
Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in
the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation.
Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the
Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the
appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision.
We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig
decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be
had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had
the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written
defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is
neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law.

The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three
members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic
principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss
the two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission
shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious
defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or
public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of
one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section
13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in
conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and
that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title
X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been
particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia
Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the
preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was
given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny
and insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny
and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel
Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for
instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which
may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the
Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which
is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a
libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual
members to be recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest
of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally
the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a
legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be
seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind,
recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . .writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule
of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of
antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by
necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical
reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes
defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have
affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main proposition in the lower court
and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic
principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as
before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II
punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state,
crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the
crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortesand its members and against the council of
ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against
religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes
of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts,
insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against
their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in
Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or
deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The
with an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being
weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive
minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the
Monarchy of Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of
America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with
such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts
of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination
of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the
nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the
laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance
Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of
the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the
case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter
of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions
and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United
States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of
the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be
of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States
Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise,
impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that
they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by
treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and
not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military
Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the
new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to
say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the
former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From
that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under
consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme
Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be,
except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal provisions and
a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great
principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But
when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to
hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S.vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil.,
273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American
sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his
instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to
prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they are
establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine
Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment
of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the
 Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to
understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made
the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the
maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied
the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government
which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty
and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established
and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much
they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is
evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the
importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time
command universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme
Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and
Congress framed the government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has
proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual
rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs,
habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to
authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of
Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It
was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing
institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and
makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown
or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with
bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a
freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of
respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank
stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is
qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person
for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is notmalum in se or malum
prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs.Shepherd
[1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are
derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not
be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the
realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The
Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for
instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however,
long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is
not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an
offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law
met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction
as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target
at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording
immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his
character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell,
Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the
spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out
by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the
protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands.  1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts
against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class.
Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon
American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority
greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their
authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect
and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the
individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo,
which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for
different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant
acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the
accused, for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation
of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with respect to calumny,
injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by
reason thereof, outside of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to
calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an authority by writing or printing, as was that
inserted in the said information.
ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either
under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to
"Ministers of the Crown," whom we do not have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or
insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by
reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.
Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, 
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
 
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts
unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this
case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition
filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant,
concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of
the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things
that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco
Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the
only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the
remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with
Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of
the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the
deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those
conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be
adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa
Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be
divided equally among his children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case
3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene
Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging
to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging
exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of
her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining
one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene
Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and
 one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half
(1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of
Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in
such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of
Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the
whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par
2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other
plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter
to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista,
14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9)
Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have
become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such
manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and
equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality,
nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the
costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and
two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims
of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16,
1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A.
Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion
approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for
approval the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case,
to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to
Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along
the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes
Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along
the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-
Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the
portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition
indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed
this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of
the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above-
quoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs
and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both
lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to
sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding
the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such
papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated
to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of
said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and
necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the
purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the
corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with
the project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half
thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was
the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project
of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed
Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court
the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-
A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's
court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq.
meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued
transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh.
12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an
area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion
(Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh.
F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries
Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and
the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as
"TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on
January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968
alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph
5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14,
paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by
closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a
member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on
October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to
then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation.
After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that
respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of
a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of
action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein
instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the
annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the
two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and
the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped
from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no
longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6,
1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion
was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil
Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza
Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P.
Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A.
Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was
directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister
of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit
"B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.
Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for
moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for
exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal
damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
 B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN,
FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO
VILLASIN —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the
deceased Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo
Villasin the cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES,
ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer,
Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon
perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first
cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the
subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de
Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965  a portion of Lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963  was already final because none of the
parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order
dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963  approving the October 16,
1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was
no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964  Lot 1184-E
from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof
was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and
Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot
1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was
issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion
of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The
subsequent sale on August 31, 1966  by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective
shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which
respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project
of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition
and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent
conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or
affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice,
was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year
after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of
partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon
by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and
unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of
partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the
acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the
whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the
Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of
partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between
the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no
evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E,
in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that
Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from
the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible
and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith
and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous
understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of
partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating
Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the
parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him
for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was
done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio
Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to
submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is
true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in
evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations
of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project
of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following
documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban
Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a).
On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the
project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
 2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes
Macariola onOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of
the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she
was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her
as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly
registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of
partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23,
1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4
thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of
the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth
share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C,
it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother,
Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth
of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the
owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason
than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as
per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted
during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of
Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that
she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the
project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties
adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however,
did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in
the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of said
properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were
inequalities in the distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however,
improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it
was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of
property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of
which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted
position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in
the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as
not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular
case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no
longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to
the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of
respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public
in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp.
395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having
been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor
can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal
judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law
as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees,
like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political
law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to
engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar,"
which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in
this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the
Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly
re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and
pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer
of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror,
the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political
laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the
new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative
act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's
Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and
Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief
Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
 denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in
force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto  (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle
of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of
the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the
Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding
effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing
that respondent participated or intervened in his official  capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in
which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business
of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised
Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming
interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a
public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in
said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which
have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp.
134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its
business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited
in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed
in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party
plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus
Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"  wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the
aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9
or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent
Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January
31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members
of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal
judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with
the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by
judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot
apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service
Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the
purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of
said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any
interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the
aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a
written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by
law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated
thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said
Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article
X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of
the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious
misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is
authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct
the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the
special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline
judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of
the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service,
remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not
more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a
violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and
employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head
of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the
Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20,
R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch
of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot
be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as
applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated,
Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct
and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who
has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it,
all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except
as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and
prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis
supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have
already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the
provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service
Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to
be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not
retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January
31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears
also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as
there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the
drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on
January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation.
Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the
incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became
involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of
the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and
WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated
and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of
the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and
claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see
no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant
that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the
extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and
1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that
matter to have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the
allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa
Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism
(Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any
canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family
did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned.
There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in
his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from
his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the
Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible
from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court
so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an
 element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a
Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for
disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official
actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not
violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging
in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his
conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be
above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO,
ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON.
ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA,
ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing
them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their
Reply to respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la
Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The
designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1,
1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S.
Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the
pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties
thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering
the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of
Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally
on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day,
February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of
1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and
shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is
also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,
promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
 SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the
Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the
1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of
the events mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the
designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which
ended on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in
keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede
all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the
barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.  2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution
ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a
part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly,
Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six
(6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for
elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as
still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987
designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the
Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the
ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
TEEHANKEE, CJ.,  concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987,
the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines,
Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of
Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification
shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This
view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its
proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the
very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's
judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of
the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who
would like to present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last
line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to
propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment
on that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof
insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN
RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions," add the
words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot
accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" because the
committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes
"AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President,
may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the Commission would
be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE
WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee
feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be
exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a
time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam
President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a provision which says that
the President shall make certain that all laws shall be faithfully complied. When we
approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be a proclamation by the President
that the Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in
accordance with the provisions in the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It
would be too much to impose on the President a time frame within which she will make
that declaration. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after
the results shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an
immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the proclamation of
the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the
ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think,
is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that particular
case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the
President was that the draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be
effective upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in
there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the
ratification or not. Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the
President since this will be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the
supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the
announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there
should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes
were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We
present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the
votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested
amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution is
supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say
that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the
effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the
results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is
immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of saying
"yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know
from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is reckoned
from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it
is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the
voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the
announcement of the results of the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of
the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body which will
make the formal announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President
or the COMELEC itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite,
and I opted for the President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner
Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the
casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The
announcement merely confirms the ratification  even if the results are released two or three
days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law, because an
announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification. If there should be any need for presidential
proclamation, that proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of
the President is  merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually
done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the
effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a
month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the
Davide amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for
the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes
the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the
Commission on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be
immaterial because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an
independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the
Commission on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when we say
that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that
the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single second of that day,
because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.So that even if the votes are cast in the
morning, the Constitution is really effective from the previous midnight.
So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or
anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, which is January 17,
1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of
the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is
precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of ratification
that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite date if we depend
upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC
or the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in
favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart
from the fact that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides
that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast,
although I would not say from the very beginning of the date of election because as of that
time it is impossible to determine whether there is a majority.  At the end of the day of
election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. So that is the time when the new
Constitution will be considered ratified and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others
because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote,
have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract,
say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by the
principal, the validity does not begin on the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date
the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on
his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming  tyranny of the opinion that it
will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the
assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC
will make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as
stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the original
committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
 THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members
raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the
date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution
promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on
the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying
clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen.
Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February
8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional
Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of
replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2,
1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would
have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions
in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court
of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on
February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council
created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the
appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the appointments
of the seven Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were
all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice likewise
show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in
completion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were made on January 31, 1987 and
transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record that since February 2,
1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the President, pending the constitution of
the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1987
as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than
the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that
it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted
that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the
new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25, 1987,
after the deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when
the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J.,  Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-
off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my
mind the 1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified
pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite
day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
 Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically
said that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had
not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that
would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the
1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71
provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17,
1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now
Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article
XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided,
shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments
thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the
ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation
states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this
certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are
therefore effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed
that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification by
the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of
office of judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that
said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall
take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April
7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring
Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said
amendments duly approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the date
of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the
Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these
amendments, the same:
. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or
Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa,
Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate
Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the
result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified
by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27,
1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas Blg.
643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines
shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval of the
amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people for
their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the
time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called
pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September
18, 1946, was adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive
application.
Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at
Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by
the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga  5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was
ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in
passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to
life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals
done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.
 
 
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ.,  concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987,
the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines,
Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of
Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification
shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This
view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its
proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the
very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's
judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of
the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who
would like to present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last
line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to
propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment
on that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof
insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN
RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions," add the
words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot
accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" because the
committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes
"AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President,
may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the Commission would
be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE
WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee
feels that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be
exactly necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a
time frame on the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam
President, in the approved Article on the Executive, there is a provision which says that
the President shall make certain that all laws shall be faithfully complied. When we
approve this first sentence, and it says that there will be a proclamation by the President
that the Constitution has been ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in
accordance with the provisions in the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It
would be too much to impose on the President a time frame within which she will make
that declaration. It would be assumed that the President would immediately do that after
the results shall have been canvassed by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an
immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the proclamation of
the President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the
ratification, not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think,
is what happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that particular
case, the reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the
President was that the draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be
effective upon the proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in
there precisely to give the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the
ratification or not. Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the
President since this will be a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the
supervision of the COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the
announcement that, in fact, the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there
should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly
when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes
were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We
present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the
votes are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested
amendment which says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS
BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution is
supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say
that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the
effectivity of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the
results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is
immaterial Madam President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of saying
"yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know
from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is reckoned
from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it
is a plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the
voters. Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the
announcement of the results of the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of
the plebiscite held all over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body which will
make the formal announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President
or the COMELEC itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite,
and I opted for the President.
 xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner
Davide. I support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the
casting of the "yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The
announcement merely confirms the ratification  even if the results are released two or three
days after. I think it is a fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law, because an
announcement is a mere confirmation The act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. So that is the date of the ratification. If there should be any need for presidential
proclamation, that proclamation will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of
the President is  merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually
done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the
effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a
month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the
Davide amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for
the Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the Commission on Elections which makes
the official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the
Commission on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be
immaterial because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an
independent Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which
announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the
Commission on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when we say
that the date of effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that
the Constitution takes effect on every single minute and every single second of that day,
because the Civil Code says a day has 24 hours.
So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from
the previous midnight. So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children
of Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of
the results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
 MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is
precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of ratification
that would have a definite date, because there would be no definite date if we depend
upon the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC
or the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in
favor of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart
from the fact that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides
that a constitution becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast,
although I would not say from the very beginning of the date of election because as of that
time it is impossible to determine whether there is a majority.  At the end of the day of
election or plebiscite, the determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held on such and such a date. So that is the time when the new
Constitution will be considered ratified and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of
Commissioner Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others
because the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote,
have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract,
say, between an agent and a third person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by the
principal, the validity does not begin on the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date
the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on
his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming  tyranny of the opinion that it
will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the
assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC
will make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as
stated by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the original
committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members
raised their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the
date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution
promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on
the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying
clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no
longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen.
Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February
8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional
Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of
replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2,
1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would
have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions
in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court
of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on
February 2, 1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council
created under the Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the
appointments, February 2, 1987, is incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the appointments
of the seven Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were
all appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3(Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice likewise
show that the appointment papers of the last batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in
completion of the reorganization of the prosecution service were made on January 31, 1987 and
transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.) It is also a matter of record that since February 2,
1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended by the President, pending the constitution of
the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has likewise considered February 2, 1987
as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than
the tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that
it in effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted
that the local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the
new Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25, 1987,
after the deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when
the new Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J.,  Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
with respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-
off period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my
mind the 1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified
pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite
day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically
said that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had
not, and could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that
would have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the
1987 Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71
provincial fiscals, and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under
Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17,
1973, the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Constitution Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now
Chief Justice, Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article
XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided,
shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments
thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the
ratification of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation
states, inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this
certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum — plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and
are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed
that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification by
the Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of
office of judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that
said amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall
take effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April
7, 1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring
Them Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said
amendments duly approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the date
of this Proclamation," It shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the
Batasang Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these
amendments, the same:
... shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or
Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa,
Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate
Funds Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the
result of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified
by the Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27,
1984, of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas Blg.
643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines
shall proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
held for the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval of the
amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Section 2
of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the
time of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called
pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September
18, 1946, was adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive
application. Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February
11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by
the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga  5 in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was
ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in
passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to
life on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals
done on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.