Imagination in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

The purpose of this essay is to try to explain Wittgenstein’s view about

Imagination and especially the idea of seeing as. The term, Imagination, is not

clearly explained in Wittgenstein’s works, he doesn’t concentrate on developing this

concept but we can infer his meaning indirectly from his Philosophical

investigations. The aim of Wittgenstein is to define the term seeing as, which I will

explain later.

When Wittgenstein talks about the experience called seeing as, he is trying to explain

that we can perceive some aspect of an object that we didn’t perceive before, we can

see an object as something else, or in some other way, that we hadn’t noticed before,

but the important part of this experience is that the object has not changed in any way.

For example, we can talk about seeing a tree through my window as a man, or the

jacket on the chair as a cat.

I’m going to explain the differences and similarities that Wittgenstein sees in the

terms seeing as and see, then I will look at the relation between seeing as and

thinking to finally explore the concept of Imagination in Wittgenstein’s

philosophical thought.

To understand Wittgenstein we first have to appreciate the style he used throughout

his work. He doesn’t try to create a philosophical theory, instead, he tries to clarify

and analyse the concepts we use in the language. For him, all philosophical problems

start because we have some kind of linguistic confusion. This confusion usually

appears when we use the language in a way that is different from the usual.
The confusion, which make these philosophical problems arise, consists in using

some words out of the language game. Wittgenstein believes that the meaning of the

words is the function and the use of them in the language, so we need to understand in

what way or how we can use these words to understand the meaning.

Many different ways exist to use the symbols, sentences and words in a language.

This variety is not static, indeed, it is dynamic. New ways or games in the language

appear while others we forget. The different language games give us the possibility to

analyse different aspects of grammar. Wittgenstein talks about two types of grammar;

“The first one, which is the surface level of grammar and the second one is called

depth grammar” (Wittgenstein, PI: 664) For Wittgenstein all philosophy is the

analysis of a language and the limits of thought are to be delineated by clarifying the

limits of language. (Baker and Hacker, Rules, Grammar and necessity: 34)

In his early work, Tractatus, Wittgenstein explains the concept of a rule in language.

Every language has a complex system of syntax and logic rules. So these rules give us

possible combinations of symbols and also delimit sense. These rules have some

characteristics. First, most of the logical syntax rules are hidden and we can’t see

them. Secondly, these rules are going to create some consequences independently of

our activities. Thirdly, the correct analysis of a proposition is unknown to the person

who understands it. Fourthly, in so far as a one person knows a language, he must be

presumed to have implicit knowledge of the logical syntax rules. (Baker& Hacker,

Rules, Grammar and Necessity: 35)

This person is using the rules all the time; he must know that because these rules are

the limit of sense and non-sense. Further to this work, Wittgenstein moves gradually

to a different idea and introduces the concept of “language game”.

He moves away from the forms of expressions and concentrates on uses. He thinks

that philosophy is not about what is true or false, but rather what makes sense and

gives us the limits of sense. But because we can use a word in many ways, it is

necessary to have some rules and these rules are given by the context, this context is

called a “language game” for Wittgenstein. Therefore if a word is used out of this

language game it will be an incorrect use of that word. (Wittgenstein, PI, 654).

His intention when he used the notion of language game is, try to explain that when

we use a language it is part of some activity or a kind of life. The existence of

language games lie in human activities, indeed, in human life styles. These languages

games are made up by different expressions, which, in human activity are related to

each other. With this idea we don’t need to find an external justification to the rules of

language, instead we try to know the use we give to the language in our life.

“Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light

on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings

concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain

analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of

language.” (Wittgenstein, PI, 90)

The question, which follows this idea, is: what is the meaning of grammar for

Wittgenstein? Grammar consists of rules for the use of symbols in natural languages.

These rules of language are specific for one language and they are a kind of

instrument, they can be used in various ways or not used. We can explain this idea by

saying that Wittgenstein considers that grammar is like a study and description of the

rules of language and also like a network of rules, determining which linguistic
movements and combinations of words are allowed in order to make sense, and which

aren’t.

The rules of grammar are not only technical instructions from or for correct usage;

rather they express the norms for meaningful language. Therefore every change of

rule implies a change in sense.

Grammar is wider than logical syntax, because it could explain meaning as well as

formal definitions. Grammar also gives us a kind of limit or delineation for the nature

of languages, so these rules of grammar are specific to each language.

We can conclude that something will be a rule if it is used in some specific way in a

normative activities. (Baker & Hacker; Wittgenstein, rules, gramar and necessity:47-

50)

Now with this idea that Wittgenstein gives us about the concept of grammar, I’m

going to explain what mental images mean for him. First we have to say that “having

an image” is related and connected with “imagine”, but these two terms are not the

same, but it is a common mistake to use them as synonymous.

The principal problem is the belief that when I imagine something, this must imply

having a mental image, if we think that this idea is correct, it is like accepting that we

have some kind of internal or private mental image. This is a mistake. Wittgenstein

accepts the idea of mental images, but he doesn’t believe that these mental images are

private and in accessible to others. They are not private because others could see them

too; they (images) depend on my description and what I say. Therefore others can

grasp these mental images through the description I make about them, and in order to

have these descriptions we need to have some agreement and make this description
using a common language with others, thus, in this way, these mental images are not

private.

We can summarize this idea of mental images with the following premises:

1. Having a mental image implies the capacity to make a description of it

2. If we make a description, we need some common language with other people

3. At the moment of making this description, others have the possibility to grasp

the idea of my mental images through language

4. Therefore, mental images described through language, are not private entities.

When we are talking about a sensation, experience or having an image of something,

we usually think that this thing is a private concept, but in Wittgenstein’s theory, what

determines the meaning of this thing is the use of a language.

“ We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of

thinking), and therefore the use of a word…………” (Wittgenstein, PI, 383)

This idea (imagination) is seen in different ways in other disciplines, Imagery has an

important role in Experimental psychology. In Psychology the idea of imagination is

related with perception. It is conceived that imagination is a power within the human

being, not in the brain. Mental images are important in this imagination process, but

they are not necessary, because we can imagine lots of things without having a picture

in our brain.

For example we can imaging the difficulties we are going to have with some future

work but we are not necessarily having a mental image or a picture of that situation in

our brain.
Having a good imagination does not imply the ability to create mental images; it is

more the ability to think of unusual and new possibilities. (Bennett & Hacker,

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience: 183)

Most scientists focus on trying to understand the connection between having mental

images and perception, some studies have concluded, that when someone is having a

mental image, the same area of the brain which is stimulated in perception is

stimulated too, therefore there is an important similarity between perceiving an image

and imagining one, and this connection and similarity is in the neural system.

Perception is limited to space and time, we can only perceive things which are in this

moment and in this space, because in order to be perceiving something we need an

object which stimulates our sensitive system, but in the case of the imagination we

have to understand that we don’t need the presence of an object, we can create some

mental image without the stimulation of our sensitive system. The important issue

here, and one which is frequently studied in psychology, consists in trying to analyse

why, when we are not visualizing objects and we are only imaging them, some areas

of the brain are stimulated, and these areas are exactly the same as those areas

activated in the perception situation.

We can see here that this discipline is trying to analyse another aspect of the

imagination, which is related more with the cause of the concept. This is distant from

Wittgenstein’s aim. Psychology is trying to develop the imagination concept,

understanding the cause of this process, and not through the meaning or uses of words

in the language, so in this respect Wittgenstein’s argument and the psychological one

are distant in the way they are trying to analyse the concept of imagination.

In order to continue developing this idea about imagination in a philosophical

aspect, we need to go deeper into Wittgenstein’s concept of “seeing as”.

First I will try to explain the two uses for the word “see”. The first one, refer to a

description of an object and the second one, is about similarities between two objects.

This latter is called “noticing an aspect”, because when we perceive an object, it does

not change, ... however, it can be seen in another way. (Wittgenstein, PI, 193).

This is the most important part of the Wittgenstein’s argument, because he is trying to

explain what is happening when we see an object in a different way but it is still the

same object.

To understand this, he used the duck-rabbit picture. A person can see this picture as a

rabbit or as a duck, and we admit that both answers are correct. But if we show this

picture to someone who has never see the duck-rabbit picture or rabbits before, he

will answer “ I see a duck”, and he is not going to use the term seeing as, but this does

not mean that the other answer is not correct. If the person knows the duck-rabbit

picture he could say that the other “is seeing it as a duck or as a rabbit”.

When I use “seeing as” this implies that there exist other ways to see the picture and I

must be aware of these ways. In the case that I am not aware of others ways to see the

picture I will use the form “I see”.

In the last case we are only reporting our perception of the situation. Therefore we

can conclude that when we are simply reporting a perception, we don’t talk of “seeing

as”, because this term is not a description of a perception.

It is the description of other aspects of the picture we are seeing, however, it is

important to emphasise that the object remains the same, it doesn’t present any

changes.

If the difference between these two terms (see and seeing as) does not arise from

changes in the object, we have to accept that maybe the difference arises in the way
they are used. Therefore we can say that see has two senses, the first which is the

simple sense of see and the second which is implied in the concept of seeing as.

“Our concept of what is seen is intimately connected with the concept of a

representation of what is seen, in that one criterion of what a subject sees is the

representation or description that he gives of what he sees” (Mc Ginn M; P: 199)

The most important difference between seeing and seeing-as, is that in the first

(seeing) we perceive some properties of the object seen, but in seeing as we also

perceive some relations between the object and others things, so when we are talking

about seeing as, we can say that we are having two kinds of perception, because we

need to see something first in order to see the thing as another thing later.

Something characteristic in seeing as is the perception of relations. Wittgenstein

called these relations “internal relations” and this is another important part of his

work. External relations imply external conditions like preferences. Internal

relations imply a relation with the object.

The premise we have to accept is that in seeing – as, we need first to see some relation

to a picture of the object seen or the object, and this is an internal relation.

We can summarize the most relevant differences between seeing and seeing as in the

following way: First, in seeing we perceive the properties of objects, but in seeing as

we perceive internal relation between objects. Second, in the case of seeing we are

passive subjects but in the case of seeing as we are active subjects, in order to

perceive this internal relation we need to be active. Third, seeing as implies a

presupposition because to see the duck rabbit picture as a duck I need to know what is

a duck or a picture of duck is. I need to have the concept of ducks and have the

possibility to recognizes one when I seeing it.

Another consideration about this term seeing –as, for Wittgenstein is the idea that this

concept implies a form of life. To have the possibility to use this concept (seeing as)

we need to have a language, which is involved in a culture. In this sense we make

agreements with others.

Therefore when we have some visual experience this will imply the concepts and

techniques we had as consequences of our agreement with others.

In this aspect the images we have are not private, (as I explained above) the other can

grasp the idea of my image through the representation I make of them. (Beaney, M.

Imagination and Creativity, ed. Open University, 2005 U.K)

This is the other dimension Wittgenstein used to explain the term seeing as, and it is

between seeing and thinking.

Now that I have explained the concept of seeing as, my aim is to develop the relation

between this concept and thinking. Another term that Wittgenstein relates with this

idea of seeing – as is thinking.

But what is the role of thinking in aspect perception? For Wittgenstein there is a

connection between seeing - as and interpreting.

He says that aspect perception implies some interpretation, and seeing as would then

be, between simply seeing and interpreting.

But seeing - as, has not been understood as a simple interpretetation, it is for this that

he tries to open a further dimension.

Wittgenstein suggests that an important relation between seeing - as and thinking

exists and this relation could demonstrate the difference between seeing and seeing -

as.
I mentioned above that there exists a relation between objects when we are talking

about seeing – as; Wittgenstein called this perceived relation in seeing-as as “internal

relations”.

We can try to understand this idea, using the duck – rabbit picture. When I see this

picture, I see some properties of the picture (object) and also some relations between

the duck – rabbit picture and other pictures of rabbits or a real rabbit.

Therefore if this relation doesn’t exist it will be difficult to see the duck – rabbit

picture as a rabbit or as a duck at all. This relation is then, an internal relation, if we

return to the last paragraph, we can remark here that one difference between seeing

and seeing – as is that in the former, we perceive the properties of objects themselves,

and in the latter, we perceive internal relations between the objects.

In the case of perceiving internal relations, we are active because we have to think

about the relation with other objects to seeing – as.

He said later in his Philosophical Investigations that seeing an aspect and imagining

it is a subject for the will. Seeing - as implies the idea of thinking about objects to

which the primary object is related in some internal way, so we can assume that this

thinking about the object is created by our imagination.

We can say that seeing and in seeing as, are not the only explanations of some visual

experience, therefore we can conclude that other aspects are involved in them. When

we use seeing as, this implies some other possibilities that don’t exist in the simply

seeing.

Through this idea we can understand the argument Wittgenstein is trying to give us

about the different uses we have in the languages.

Now we can summarize that the difference between seeing and seeing as is not only

matter of visual experience is also matter of organization of the data one perceives.

To explain this idea Wittgenstein suggests analysing a picture, which has some hidden

figures, to understand that the possible changes in this picture are related to the

changes in our visual organization. It is important to know that these changes are not

happening in the picture it remains exactly the same.

Trying to explain this idea about organization we can draw a parallel with Gestalt

Theory.

We have to understand first, that this theory tries to explain the different ways that

exist to organize our perception. They believe that our perception is organized using

forms, these forms are not the addition of different elements in our perception, but it

is something more complex. This is because if we change something in the

organization of our perception, this change generates a different composition.

The form is like a structure; it is impossible to decompose it. The most important idea

in this theory is that human perception is not the sum of sensitive datas; indeed it

follows a reconstruction process and produces with that information a form, a gestalt.

This gestalt is going to deconstruct if we try to analyse it, and this is the principal

problem for psychology.

An important investigation regarding this aspect, was done by Dr. Wetheiner, who did

an investigation called apparent movement, and in this investigation he showed how

some stimulation of the visual system, presented in a discontinuous sequence

generated a perception of a continuous movement. The experiment consists of

projecting lights in the same rhythm and sequences, when the time between the

stimulus is large there is a perception of one light, but when the time between
stimulus is shorter the perception is simultaneous and when the time between stimulus

is adequate the perception is like a light in movement.

The stimuli that are clearly perceived are going to be the figure and the others are the

ground. In this figure we can have a better idea about figure and ground

If we perceive the figure in one-way we can see a white cross in a black ground or a

black cross in a white ground.

In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein used the same diagram to explain

that if we see a figure in certain way and then we perceive it in a different way, we are

only seeing the first one, but in another way. We can explain and describe this new

image in another way and also we can say that we had a different visual experience. It

is important for him to notice that we have to recognizes that in this organization

some others cognitive activities are implied. This aspect perception implies an

interpretation of what I am seeing, in some way.

We know now that Gestalt theory says that our perception divides our perceptual

space in two areas, one is called figure and the other is called ground. The next

picture is another example about Gestalt theory.

We can perceive this picture as two faces or as a vase, but it is impossible to see it in

the both ways in the same time. Our necessity to organize or generate a structure

about our perception creates the ability to see the picture as a whole.

The Gestalt Theory says that there is nothing in the points which are projected on the

retina which can make these points belong to two different objects or two different

parts of the same one. This depends on the capacity of our perception in grouping the

stimulus it perceives through our senses.

Köhler summarizes the Gestalt Theory about perception with this idea: Our point of

view is that the organism, instead of reacting to local stimulus, responds to patterns of

stimulus to which it is exposed, and this response is a totally united function, which

constitutes an experience, a sensorial scene rather than a mosaic of sensations.

With this Theory, psychologists have tried to understand the cause of our concept of

perception and seeing as, but it is clear that they are a not in the trying to analyse that

Wittgenstein suggests, the concept and the uses of the words Imagination, and seeing

as. I will explain this differences later. But I can see that is in this aspect that I see

some similarities between Wittgenstein’s argument about seeing as and Gestalt

Theory. Both of them are using the concept of organization to explain the experience

of seeing as or our visual experience.

As I said in the beginning of this essay, the idea of Imagination is not the main claim

in Wittgenstein’s argument, but in certain ways he mentioned that imagination is

involved in some cases of aspect perception (Wittgenstein, PI, 207).

In some cases of aspect perception, we need to add an image, and this image is a work

of our imagination.

Wittgenstein said:

“The concept of an aspect is similar to the concept of image. In other words, the

concept ”I am now seeing it as”… Is similar to” I am now having this image”.

(Wittgenstein, PI, 213)

We can understand now, why this idea of seeing – as is connected with imagination,

since in both situations, we need to take a decision, we need to decide to have an

image in one case or to see the object as something else in the other.

In a certain way, when I see something as, I need to create an image to make an

internal relation with; this is necessary to perceive the object as something else.

It is important to remark that the aim of Wittgenstein is to analyse the concept of the

words, not the mental process, he doesn’t believe that imagination is a kind of mental

process, he says that we need to understand the different uses we have to this concept

and only in this way will we find an explanation of the different kinds of imaginative

experiences we could have.

As I see it, psychology and philosophy are working on different levels, the first

discipline is trying to analyse and find answers to explain the cause of our perception.

Gestalt psychology, which is related in some ways to philosophy holds the idea that
people do not perceive the world as it is, rather they interpret what they see in terms

of their own filters or patterns that is, they impose order and meaning on what they

perceive.

Meanings are different, according to each person's individual cultural and personal

experiences. The brain does more than looks at pictures. It interprets them, tries to

make sense of them, and considers cause and effect.

In the case of Philosophy and especially Wittgenstein, he is not trying to find any

cause for these two phenomenon; indeed he is not making any kind of theory. His aim

is try to explain the different uses we can have for these two words imagination and

seeing as. He also agrees with the argument, presented by Gestalt Theory, that we

have in our perception an organization necessity, and is in this point that the two

disciplines seems to be related.

Bibliography:
Baker G & Hacker P. Wittgenstein Rules, Grammar and Necessity

Ed. Basil Blackwell. USA 1985

Beaney M. Imagination and Creativity. Ed. Open University, U.K 2005

Bennett & Hacker P, Philosophical Foundation of Neuroscience.

Ed. Blackwell Publishing. U.K 2003

Mc Ginn M. Wittgenstein and the philosophical Investigations. Ed. Routledge,

London U.K 1997

Dember W. Psychology of Perception. Ed. Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. USA

1960.

Hacker P. Insight and Illusion. Ed. Clarendon Press, USA 1972

Warnock M. Imagination. Ed. Faber and Faber. USA 1976

Wittgenstein L.Philosophical Investigations. Translated by M. Anscombe. Ed.

Blackwell. U.K 1958, 2001

Wittgenstein L. Investigaciones Filosóficas. Traducción castellana Alfonso Garcia

Suarez. Ed.Critica/Filosofia Mexico 1988

Woldt A & Toman S. Gestalt Theory History and Practise. Ed. Sage. USA 2005

Examination Number: Y1682168

Module’s Name: Final Project

Tutor: Dr. Michael Beaney

Title: Imagination in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy