MARITIME ACCIDENT EVENT AT

SEA
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2
2.0 Why and when that accident happens .................................................................................. 2
2.1 Situation of the Collision ................................................................................................. 2
2.2 Date time and Location of the accident occurrence ......................................................... 2
2.3 Probable Cause................................................................................................................. 2
Analysis of the Accident Occurrence .................................................................................... 3
2.0 How they take action? .......................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Safety Actions Taken ....................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Measures Taken by Japan Coast Guard ........................................................................... 5
3.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 6
4.0 References ............................................................................................................................ 6

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1.0 Introduction

The cargo ship ERNA OLDENDORFF was travelling east in Obatake Seto toward a
privately-operated berth in Etajima City, Hiroshima Prefecture, with a master, a second officer,
and 19 other crew members aboard when she crashed with Oshima Bridge at about 00:27 on
October 22, 2018.

The ERNA OLDENDORFF suffered dents and other damage to three of her four
cranes, as well as a bent aft mast; nonetheless, there were no fatalities or injuries on board.

The girders of the Oshima Bridge were damaged by cracks, dents, and other damage;
an inspection passage installed beneath the girders was broken and fell; and a water pipe was
severed, resulting in a forty-day water outage that affected almost all of Suo-Oshima Town,
Yamaguchi Prefecture; power cables, communication cables, and other cables were also
severed.

2.0 Why and when that accident happens

2.1 Situation of the Collision
The Vessel entered Oshima Bridge with a heading of approximately 100° and a speed
over the ground of approximately 7 kn; her No.1 crane collided with the inspection passage,
etc. installed under the girder of Oshima Bridge, and brought it down; despite the fact that her
No.2 crane passed through under the girder in which the inspection passage, etc. was brought
down, No.3 crane, No.4 crane, and aft mast sub.

2.2 Date time and Location of the accident occurrence

It is very likely that the accident occurred at 00:27 on October 22, 2018, and that the
position was around 058°, 875m from the Oiso Lighthouse.

2.3 Probable Cause

It is likely that the accident happened when ERNA OLDENDORFF was driving east in
Obatake Seto at night and collided with Oshima Bridge because she went under a bridge that
she couldn't pass through at "the heights above the water line at the time of the accident to the
top of each cargo crane and the aft mast" (hereinafter referred to as "the height of crane and
mast").

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 It is likely that ERNA OLDENDORFF proceeded under Oshima Bridge, which she was
unable to pass through due to the height of her cranes and mast, because the Master of ERNA
OLDENDORFF approved the voyage plan, including the route from Onsan to Etajima via
Obatake Seto prepared by the Second Officer, without being aware of the height of Oshima
Bridge, and the Master continued navigating.

Because the Master did not check the details of the route assuming that the former
master had already checked it, it is likely that the Master approved the voyage plan, including
the route from Onsan to Etajima via Obatake Seto, which was prepared by the Second Officer,
without being aware of the height of Oshima Bridge.

After getting close to the bridge, it is likely that the Master continued navigating while
feeling uncertain about the bridge's height because he waited for a report from the Second
Officer after the Master ordered the Second Officer to check the height of the bridge, and the
Master was concerned that the westerly current would push ERNA OLDENDORFF toward
shore in the situation where the navigable width became narrower after she turned to starboard
off the west of Kasasa Shima.

Analysis of the Accident Occurrence

Navigation Officer A1did not properly survey the Route utilising the Sailing Directions
and the ECDIS, it is likely that Navigation Officer A1 drafted the trip plan without being aware
of the height of Oshima Bridge while being cognizant of the Vessel's air-draught.

Because Master A did not verify the details of the Route thinking that the old master
had already verified it, it is likely that Master A authorised the trip plan submitted by
Navigation Officer A1 without being aware of the height of Oshima Bridge while being aware
of the Vessel's air-draught.

It is likely that the Vessel proceeded under the Oshima bridge, which the Vessel was
unable to pass through due to the height of the crane and mast, and collided with the bridge
because Master A continued navigating while feeling uncertain about the bridge's height; he
waited for a report from Navigation Officer A1 after Master A ordered Navigation Officer A1
to check the height of the bridge while the Vessel was passing through. He was apprehensive
that the westerly current would drive the Vessel closer to land as the navigable breadth
narrowed when the Vessel swung to starboard off the west of Kasasa Shima.

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 Although Company A stated the processes for voyage planning, etc. in the Safety
Management Manual, etc., it is possible that Master A and Navigation Officer A1 were not
adequately aware of the need of following them.

2.0 How they take action?

Because Master A approved the voyage plan, including the Route prepared by
Navigation Officer A1, without being aware of the height of Oshima Bridge, and Master A
continued navigating while feeling uncertain about the bridge's height after getting cloaked, it
is likely that the Vessel proceeded under Oshima Bridge, which the Vessel was unable to pass
through at the height of crane and mast. Although Company A stated the processes for voyage
planning, etc. in the Safety Management Manual, etc., it is possible that Master A and
Navigation Officer A1 were not adequately aware of the necessity of complying with them,
which led to the occurrence of this catastrophe.

As a result, the implementation of the following actions is required to avoid the

occurrence of a similar accident.

1. Crewmembers should do in-depth surveys along the entire route utilising ENCs,
sailing instructions, and other tools, especially when making voyage plans for
seas that will be travelled for the first time.
2. Crewmembers should extensively evaluate alerts provided by the ECDIS route
check function, as well as visually inspect the route on ENCs, to avoid
overlooking navigational risks when drafting trip plans using ECDIS.
3. Crewmembers should follow the procedures outlined above, especially when
using a route generated automatically by computer software, etc. in actual
navigation, because such software does not always include navigational risks,
etc. on the route.
4. Crewmembers should make full use of the height check feature, if available.
Furthermore, ship owners should promote the use of ECIDS with the height
check function in order to avoid crewmembers from overlooking overhead
obstacles.
5. During navigation, crewmembers should take prompt actions such as changing
course, slowing down or stopping according on the circumstances, and so on,
and then continue navigation after ensuring the safety.

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 6. Company A should provide education and training for crewmembers while
keeping the aforementioned items in mind.

2.1 Safety Actions Taken

1. Company A reminded all masters to follow the company procedures for planning and
checking voyage plans by ECDIS.
2. Company A reminded all masters to crosscheck all voyage plans via ECDIS,
including all alarms, using the ECDIS route check tool.
3. Company A warned all masters and navigation officers that whenever they are in
question about a navigational hazard, including a bridge, the vessel must be slowed
and stopped, and the path must be changed to a safer route.
4. Company A form for voyage plans in the Safety Management Manual was changed to
include air-draught information.
5. Company A concluded that the Software should not be utilised to prepare voyage
plans.

2.2 Measures Taken by Japan Coast Guard

Since February 1, 2019, the Japan Coast Guard has called attention to vessels installing AIS
(excluding vessels that have been confirmed to have sailed under Oshima Bridge in the past)
headed to Obatake Seto to pass under Oshima Bridge.

1. Attention calling by AIS message

• The height of the Oshima Bridge (automatic transmission) is transmitted by an AIS
message for vessels with a length of 80 m or more but less than 120 m.
• Warning (automatic transmission) is made for vessels with a length of 120m or more
to check if there is a risk of collision, as well as sending information about the height
of Oshima Bridge through AIS message.
2. Attention calling by VHF
• For vessels with a length of 120m or more, information on the height of the Oshima
Bridge is provided, and the vessel's height (height of masthead) is examined, and a
warning is issued via international VHF radio telephone equipment if necessary.

Based on the findings of the accident investigation, the Japan Transport Safety Board requests
the cooperation of the Japanese Shipowners' Association, the Japan Foreign Steamship
Association, the Japan Ship's Agency Association, and the Japan Association of Foreign-trade

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Ship Agencies in disseminating the investigation report to their respective member companies,
etc. Examining the safety activities in this inquiry report in the viewpoint that navigational
risks, including bridges on the intended route, needed to be thoroughly evaluated, especially
when foreign seafarers unfamiliar with Japanese coastal area construct a trip plan.

3.0 Conclusion
The disaster is occurred at around 00:27 on October 22, 2018, and the location was
around 058°, 875m from the Oiso Lighthouse and most likely to have occurred while the Vessel
was travelling east in Obatake Seto at night and crashed with Oshima Bridge because the Vessel
proceeded beneath a bridge that the Vessel was unable to pass through due to the height of the
crane and mast.
Because Master A approved the voyage plan, including the Route prepared by
Navigation Officer A1, without being aware of the height of Oshima Bridge, and Master A
continued navigating while feeling uncertain about the bridge's height after getting close, it is
likely that the Vessel proceeded under Oshima Bridge, which the Vessel was unable to pass
through at the height of crane and mast.
Master A did not review the details of the Route thinking that the old master had already
verified it, it is likely that Master A authorised the trip plan, including the Route submitted by
Navigation Officer A1, without being aware of the height of Oshima Bridge.
After getting close to the bridge, it is likely that Master A continued navigating while
feeling uncertain about the bridge's height because he waited for a report from Navigation
Officer A1 after Master A ordered Navigation Officer A1 to check the height of the bridge, and
Master A was concerned that the Vessel would be pushed toward shore by the westerly current
in the situation that the navigable width became narrower after the Vessel turned to starboard
off the west of Kasasa Shima.

4.0 References
• https://www.fleetmon.com/maritime-news/2018/24017/oldendorff-cargo-ship-
collided-bridge-thousands-cu/
• https://www.marinelink.com/news/erna-oldendorff-collided-japanese-bridge-442948
• https://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/eng-mar_report/2019/2018tk0020e.pdf