NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

BHOPAL

In The Partial Fulfilment For The Requirement of The Project on The Subject of
Property law of B.A. LL.B (Hons.)

L.L.B (Hons.), Fourt Trimester

END-TERM PROJECT

PROJECT ON CASE ANALYSIS OF

“MODINASAB INDIKAR vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF INDIAN

OVERSEAS BANK MANU/MH/0502/2020”

SUBMITTED TO: - SUBMITTED BY: -

Prof. Mr. SANJAY YADAV Samarth Mehrotra

1
(ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR) (2019 B.A. LL.B. 10)
 TABLE OF CONTENT

TABLE OF CONTENT 2

PREFACE 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 4

CERTIFICATE 5

SYNOPSIS 6

CASE ANALYSIS 7

NAME OF THE CASE: 7

DATE OF THE JUDGEMENT: 7

CITATION OF THE JUDGEMENT: 7

NAME OF THE JUDGES: 7

NAME OF THE BENCH: 7

NUMBER & TYPE OF OPINIONS: 7

NAME OF THE JUDGE WHO DELIVERED JUDGEMENT: 7

FACTS OF THE CASE:- 8

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGEMENT: 8

QUESTION OF FACT OR LAW: 8

ISSUES RAISED: 9

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES: 9

CASES DISCUSSED IN THE JUDGEMENT:- 11

JUDGEMENT IN PERSONAM: 12

REASONING GIVEN BY THE COURT: 12

JUDGEMENT IN REM/ RATIO DECIDENDI: 13

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY 17

REVIEW OF LITERATURE 18

2
3
 PREFACE

I feel great pleasure in presenting the project under study. I hope that the readers will find the
project interesting and that the project in its present from shall be well received by all. The
project contains a detailed study of
“CASE ANALYSIS OF MODINASAB INDIKAR vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF INDIAN
OVERSEAS BANK MANU/MH/0502/2020”

Every effort is made to keep the project error free. I would gratefully acknowledge any
suggestions to improve the project to make it more useful.

4
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“The project has been made possible by the unconditional support of many people. I would
like to acknowledge and extend our heartfelt gratitude to Mr. Sanjay Yadav for guiding us
throughout the development of this paper into a coherent whole by providing helpful insights
and sharing his brilliant expertise. I would also like to thank the officials of the Gyan Mandir,
NLIU for helping me to find the appropriate research material for this study via the online
library it has provided even in the desperate pandemic times.”

I am deeply indebted to my parents, seniors and friends for all the moral support and
encouragement.
Samarth Mehrotra
2019BALLB10

5
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Project titled – has been prepared and submitted by SAMARTH
MEHROTRA who is currently pursuing his B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law Institute
University Bhopal in fulfillment of PROPERTY LAW-I course. It is also certified that this is
original research report and this project has not been submitted to any other university, nor
published in any journal.

Date

Signature of the student

Signature of the research supervisor

6
 SYNOPSIS

BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE CASE:

1. The appellant claims to be a tenant. The first respondent is the Board of Directors of the
second respondent Bank; the third respondent, the authorized officer, that is the Assistant
General Manager of the Bank; and the fourth respondent, according to the Bank, does not exist.

2. To ascertain the identity of the fourth respondent, the learned counsel was asked for the
appellant. She has then consulted the appellant present in the Court. He too has said he has no
idea.

3. The fifth and sixth respondents are the borrowers. The seventh respondent is the District
Magistrate; the eighth respondent is the Mamlatdar; and the ninth respondent, the SI of Police.

4. As narrated by both the learned counsel, the fifth and sixth respondents borrowed the money
in 2008 and later defaulted in repaying it. So the Bank has approached the DRT to recover that
money, and those proceedings are said to be pending. Pending those proceedings, the Bank
invoked the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities
Interest Act, 2002 (“the Securitisation Act”). It issued a notice under Section 13 of the
Securitisation Act. It was on 24.11.2016.

5. To the Bank’s notice under Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, the fifth and sixth
respondents, that is the borrowers, did not respond. Then, the Bank invoked Section 14 and
approached the District Magistrate for taking possession of the secured asset. In turn, on
25.07.2017, the District Magistrate passed an order, requiring the Mamlatdar to take possession
of the secured asset, with the help of the police, and deliver it to the Bank.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:

Whether the trial Court erred in rejecting the plaint?

OBJECTIVE OF STUDY:

7
To analyze the Case and to find the ratio of the judgment.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: -

Doctrinal research method is used in this project.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

The research question in this project is to find that does trail court had made a mistake by
dismissing the accusation or the charges.

HYPOTHESIS:

8
 CASE ANALYSIS

NAME OF THE CASE:

Modinasab Indikar ............ Appellant

Vs.

Board of Directors of Indian Overseas Bank ….........

Respondents

DATE OF THE JUDGEMENT:

14th February 2020.

CITATION OF THE JUDGEMENT:

MANU/MH/0502/2020

NAME OF THE JUDGES:

1. DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

NAME OF THE BENCH:

....... CIVIL APPEAL BEFORE SINGLE BENCH OF HIGH COURT.

NUMBER & TYPE OF OPINIONS:

THERE IS ONE OPINION IN THE PRESENT JUDGMENT AND IT IS A UNANIMOUS OPINION.

NAME OF THE JUDGE WHO DELIVERED JUDGEMENT:

1. DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

9
NAME OF THE COUNSELS APPEARING FOR THE PARTIES:

APPELLANT:-

Adv. Ms. Maria Nedumpara

RESPONDENTS:-

Adv. Shri V. Ajay Kumar

NAME OF THE INTERVENORS/ AMICUS:-

N/A

FACTS OF THE CASE1:-

1. The appellant claims to be a tenant. The first respondent is the Board of Directors of the
second respondent Bank; the third respondent, the authorized officer, that is the Assistant
General Manager of the Bank; and the fourth respondent, according to the Bank, does not exist.

2. To ascertain the identity of the fourth respondent, the learned counsel was asked for the
appellant. She has then consulted the appellant present in the Court. He too has said he has no
idea.

3. The fifth and sixth respondents are the borrowers. The seventh respondent is the District
Magistrate; the eighth respondent is the Mamlatdar; and the ninth respondent, the SI of Police.

4. As narrated by both the learned counsel, the fifth and sixth respondents borrowed the money
in 2008 and later defaulted in repaying it. So the Bank has approached the DRT to recover that
money, and those proceedings are said to be pending. Pending those proceedings, the Bank
invoked the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities
Interest Act, 2002 (“the Securitisation Act”). It issued a notice under Section 13 of the
Securitisation Act. It was on 24.11.2016.

1
Modinasab Indikar vs. Boards of Directors of Indian Overseas Bank, MANU/MH/0502/2020

10
5. To the Bank’s notice under Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, the fifth and sixth
respondents, that is the borrowers, did not respond. Then, the Bank invoked Section 14 and
approached the District Magistrate for taking possession of the secured asset. In turn, on
25.07.2017, the District Magistrate passed an order, requiring the Mamlatdar to take possession
of the secured asset, with the help of the police, and deliver it to the Bank.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGEMENT2:

1. The court stated that the appellant could not establish that the plaint in his suit passes the
judicial muster under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC. At this juncture, the court may note that for this
adjudication the plaint is the fulcrum, but the appellant has not filed a copy, though he has
secured interim protection and had the matter pending for considerable time. So court renders
this judgment based on the rival submissions and the material on record, including the impugned
judgment. As this court finds no grounds to interfere with the judgment, the court dismisses this
appeal. No order on costs.

2. After the dictation was completed and the verdict pronounced, Ms. Nedumpara for the
appellant wanted the Court to suspend the operation of this judgment for three weeks so that the
appellant could approach the DRT, Mumbai. Shri Ajay Kumar for the respondent Bank has
opposed that plea. At any rate, the plant was rejected, there is no further legal hurdle for the
appellant to approach the DRT, Mumbai if he chooses to. Thus, to conclude, it is open for the
appellant to exhaust all statutory or legal options available to him in this regard.

QUESTION OF FACT OR LAW:

This is the question of fact and law.

ISSUES RAISED:
Whether the trial Court erred in rejecting the plaint?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES:

APPELLANT3:-

1. Ms. Maria had submitted her first argument that Section 17 (4) of the Securitisation Act
sets out the grounds of tenancy that could be considered by the DRT.

2
Modinasab Indikar vs. Boards of Directors of Indian Overseas Bank, MANU/MH/0502/2020
3
Modinasab Indikar vs. Boards of Directors of Indian Overseas Bank, MANU/MH/0502/2020

11
 2. Then appellant has continuously asked for the court's remand.

RESPONDENTS4:-

1. Mr. Ajay has submitted the alleged tenant had been nowhere in the picture until the District
Magistrate passed the order under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act.

PROVISIONS OF STATUTES / CONSTITUTION REFERRED: -

Various statutes have been referred-

1. THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882

Act by which a living person conveys property, in present or future, to one or more than one
living person, or himself. The phrase “to transfer property” means to perform such an act.
According to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, there are mainly six types of transfers.

2. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
2.1. Art. 226- Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.

3. SECURITISATION ACT,2002

3.1 Section 13 of the Securitisation Act.- No borrower shall, after receipt of the notice
referred to in sub-section (2), transfer by way of sale, lease, or otherwise (other than in
the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice,
without the prior written content of the secured creditor.
3.2 Section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act.- Where any borrower, who is under a liability
to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of
secured debt or any installment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is
classified by the secured creditor as an- performing asset, then, the secured creditor may
require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured
creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall
be entitled to e excise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4).

4
Modinasab Indikar vs. Boards of Directors of Indian Overseas Bank, MANU/MH/0502/2020

12
 3.3 Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. - In case the borrower fails to discharge his
liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may
take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt.
3.4 Section 14 of the Securitisation Act.-Act mandates District Magistrate to deliver
possession of a secured asset within 30 days, extendable to an aggregate of 60 days upon
reasons recorded in writing, to banks.
3.5 Sections 17 of the Securitisation Act.-
3.6 Section 17 (4) of the Securitisation Act- If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the
recourse taken by a secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13, is under the
provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be
entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under subsection (4) of
section l3 to recover his secured debt.
3.7 Sections 18 of the Securitisation Act.
3.8 Section 34 of the Securitisation Act.- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain
any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the
Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction
shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be
taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or the Recovery of Debts
Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).
3.9 Section 35 of the Securitisation Act- The provisions of this Act to override other laws.
—the provisions of this Act shall affect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument affecting under
any such law.

4. Section 9 Code of Civil Procedure. - The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein
contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
5. Section 17 of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax.

13
CASES DISCUSSED IN THE JUDGEMENT:-
The Hon’ble High Court in its judgment referred to the following judgments of the Supreme
Court and High Courts.

1. Jayalakshmi N. Pillai v. Authorized Officer5

This case held that Section 17(4A) of the Securitisation Act, engrafted through an amendment,
provides a forum for tenants to have their grievances redressed.

2. Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd6

This case held that only if possession of the secured asset is required to be taken under the
Securitisation Act, will the secured creditor move the CMM or the District Magistrate “for
assistance to take possession of the secured asset.”

3. Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal7

This case held that the opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding "in respect of any matter" which a DRT or an
Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine.

4. Church of Christ Charitable Trust And Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman

Educational Trust8

In this case, it was held that t where a document issued upon and is referred to in the plaint, that
document gets incorporated by reference in the plaint.

5. Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India9

It was held that a full reading of Section 34 shows that the civil court’s jurisdiction is barred “in
respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to
determine in respect of any action taken or to be taken under any power conferred under the Act.

6. Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat, Mehal Kalan10

5
2019 (1) KHC 838
6
(2014) 6 SCC 1
7
AIR 2014 SC 371
8
2012 SCC 8 706
9
(2004) 4 SCC 311
10
(1986) 4 SCC 364

14
Court noted when the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent the
bar by clever drafting.

7. Dhulabhai v. The State of Madhya Pradesh11

In this case, it was held that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special
tribunals, the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to
do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude
those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the
statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure.

JUDGEMENT IN PERSONAM:
The appeal was dismissed; no orders on the costs were passed. It was held by the court that
because the facts were insufficient the court cannot held on the matter. The court further held
that it cannot challenge the jurisdiction of the S.C.

REASONING GIVEN BY THE COURT:

The scope of Order 7, Rule 11 needs no reiteration. Challenged as to its sustainability, the plant
should survive on its own—based on the averments it contains. And the documents produced
along with the plaint should also form part of the plaint. At that stage, the defense, if any, stands
disregarded. Culled out from the judicial precedents, the fundamental aspects of Order 7, Rule 11
are that this provision is not exhaustive, nor does it affect the inherent powers of the court. The
court observed that the trial court may well remember that if a meaningful (and not formal)
reading of the plaint shows that it is vexatious and meritless, disclosing no right to sue, the court
should exercise its power under Rule 11 to ensure that the requirement of the law is fulfilled.
And if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud.
“An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The court observed the section 34
that- Civil Court not to have jurisdiction:- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any
suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by

11
AIR 1969 SC 78

15
any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any
power conferred by or under this Act or the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial In
Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India12, the Supreme Court has held that a full reading of Section
34 shows that the civil court’s jurisdiction is barred “in respect of matters which a Debts
Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action
taken or to be taken under any power conferred under the Act. “That is to say, the prohibition
covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, though
no measure in that direction has so far been taken under Section 5(4). Later, in Jagdish Singh v.
Heeralal13, the Apex Court has held that the opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no
civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding "in respect of any matter"
which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to
determine. The expression 'in respect of any matter' referred to in Section 34, according to
Jagdish Singh, would take in the "measures" provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the
Securitisation Act. Consequently, if any aggrieved person has any grievance against any
"measures" taken by the creditor under Section 13(4), the remedy open to him is to approach the
DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. This court observed that the Supreme
Court's recent judgment in Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal squarely applies to the facts of this
case. It pays to examine the case in detail. The owner of a residential flat mortgaged it with the
bank and secured a loan. On his default, the bank invoked the recovery proceedings. It issued a
statutory demand notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act. When the borrower failed
to comply with its demand, the bank applied under Section 14 of the Act to take physical
possession of the secured asset. The CMM allowed that application. Then, the appellant,
claiming to be a tenant, applied to intervene in the proceedings under Section 14. He wanted the
CMM’s order to stay. The appellant has asserted that the secured asset was let out to him by the
borrower/landlord in January 2000 and that he has been paying rent since then. Indeed, the
tenancy was said to be based on an oral agreement. Allegedly faced with a notice from the
landlord to vacate the flat, the appellant filed a suit before the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai.
In course of time, the Small Causes Court granted an interim injunction to the appellant. Pending
the civil suit, the appellant applied to the CMM not to dispossess him. But the CMM rejected the
application, “holding that the appellant being a tenant without any registered instrument is not
12
(2004) 4 SCC 311
13
AIR 2014 SC 371

16
entitled to the possession of the secured asset for more than one year from the date of execution
of unregistered tenancy agreement.” Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal by Special Leave
before the Supreme Court. The court stated that In Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal has
considered the legislative purpose of the Securitisation Act. It has held that the Act “in response
to a scenario where slow-paced recovery and staggering amounts of non-performing assets were
looming over the banks.” The present Act is to enable the banks to resolve the issue of liquidity
and aim for the reduction in the number of non-performing assets. The Preamble to the Act
emphasizes the efficient and expeditious recovery of bad debts. Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal
notes that Section 17 provides for an invaluable right of appeal to any person including the
borrower to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Quoting with approval Harshad Govardhan, it
has further held that the right of appeal is available to the tenant claiming under a borrower,
though the right of re-possession does not exist with the tenant. Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal,
too, notes that at no stage of the proceedings did the parties reveal about the tenancy. “It was
only after passing of the aforesaid order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, that the appellant
tenant started agitating his rights before the Small Causes Court.” The borrower/landlord, again
as happened here, did not even respond to the claims of the tenant. The bank has produced
multiple records to substantiate its claim that the tenant was nowhere to be seen earlier and that
this tenancy was created just to defeat the proceedings initiated under the Securitisation Act. “On
the contrary, the appellant tenant has failed to produce any evidence to substantiate his claim
over the secured asset.” In such a situation, the appellant tenant “cannot claim protection under
the garb of the interim protection granted to him, ex parte, by solely relying upon the xerox of
the rent receipts.” Here, even they are absent. It pays to analyze what Bajarang Shyamsunder
Agarwal says about the oral tenancy. Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence has come to India with both the
streams mixed. That said, it is elementary to note that both the common-law and equity
principles stand displaced to the extent a statute occupies the adjudicatory arena. They are
invoked where the statute is silent. Further, even in the statutory scheme, they both play a vital
role as interpretative tools. Wherever a statute is ambiguous, its interpretation must accord with
the already established common law or equity principles. Thus, they fill the statutory crevices;
they neither displace nor negate the statute law, though. The petitioner wanted the Civil Court to
declare that (a) he is an equitable tenant; (b) his rights as the tenant cannot be interfered with,
abrogated, or abridged; (c) Defendants 2 and 3 have no jurisdiction to secure his forcible

17
dispossession; (d) the District Magistrate is a coram non-judice; (e) the Supreme Court’s
judgment in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar “is rendered sub silentio, nay, per incuriam”; (f) the
Supreme Court’s judgment in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar is rendered sub silentio, if not per
incuriam; (g) the statute conferring jurisdiction on District Magistrate would destroy or negate
the separation of powers. The court stated that this court keeps side the contentions on the cause
of action, it is very evident that no tenant pleading oral tenancy could get the protection from the
provisions of the Securitisation Act. Besides that, as we have noted, Section 34 is emphatic in its
declaration that Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction over any matter which the Debts Recovery
Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under this Act to determine. And, last, none of
the reliefs the petitioner has sought is amenable to an ordinary civil court’s jurisdiction.

JUDGEMENT IN REM/ RATIO DECIDENDI:

The Appellant could not establish that plaint in his suit passes judicial muster under Order 7,
Rule 11 of CPC, and also, the appellant failed to file a copy, though he has secured interim
protection and had matter pending for considerable time. Hence, insufficiency in facts cannot
rear decision.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In the current judgment where the court stated that the appellant could not establish that the plaint in
his suit passes the judicial muster under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC. At this juncture, the court may
note that for this adjudication the plaint is the fulcrum, but the appellant has not filed a copy,
though he has secured interim protection and had the matter pending for considerable time. So
court renders this judgment based on the rival submissions and the material on record, including
the impugned judgment. The author completely agrees with the judgment and the provided
reasoning which is well applauded by the author as there are no grounds to interfere with the
judgment, the court dismisses this appeal and no order on costs. Where in the present case
according me the appellant had messed up much time and even not present considerable proof
were on the other side respondent had well presented the case and even gave grounded cross and

18
straight arguments which are even accepted by the honorable court. The further honorable court
even in the given statement of the judgment proofs the stated statement of the author i.e. after the
dictation was completed and the verdict pronounced, Ms. Nedumpara for the appellant wanted
the Court to suspend the operation of this judgment for three weeks so that the appellant could
approach the DRT, Mumbai. Shri Ajay Kumar for the respondent Bank has opposed that plea. At
any rate, the plant was rejected, there is no further legal hurdle for the appellant to approach the
DRT, Mumbai if he chooses to. Whereas to conclude, the court said - it is open for the appellant
to exhaust all statutory or legal options available to him in this regard. By providing the above
statement I will like to conclude my thinking over the present case.

19
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

1. TAXMANN'S GUIDE TO INDIAN STAMP ACT 1899

2. PROPERTY LAW by POONAM PRADHAN SAXENA, 3RD EDITION BY LEXIS NEXIS
BUTTERWORTH, NAGPUR:

E-RESOURCES

1. MANUPATRA
2. SCC ONLINE
3. JSTOR

INTERNET

1. HTTPS://TAXGURU.IN/CORPORATE-LAW/VALIDITY-UNDER-STAMPED-NON-STAMPED-

INSTRUMENT-DOCUMENT.HTML

2. HTTPS://WWW.MANUPATRAFAST.IN/PERS/PERSONALIZED.ASPX

3. HTTPS://WWW.CASEMINE.COM/SEARCH/IN/%20RAM%2BRATTAN

4. HTTPS://LEGISLATIVE.GOV.IN/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/A1899-2.PDF

20
 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1. TAXMANN'S GUIDE TO INDIAN STAMP ACT 1899

The book provides a detailed analysis of each section. The book is written in a very detailed style
and it helped the presenter to study Sec- 33 and Sec-35 of the act. The book gave theoretical
knowledge about the concept and the purpose for enacting the particular provision. The book
also contained all the recent amendments, and in detail points out the new enactments. The book
is written simply and lucidly. It acts as a commentary and helps to understand the legal language
of the act.

2. PROPERTY LAW by POONAM PRADHAN SAXENA, 3RD EDITION BY LEXIS NEXIS

BUTTERWORTH, NAGPUR:

The book is one of the most well-written books in the field of transfer of Property act 1882, it
somehow manages to dig deeper into the soul of the subject and enactment. It advances case
laws and the purpose behind adopting a particular enactment. The book helped the presenter to
understand section 53A of this act. The act is very well explained with the help of relevant case
law. The book has its comments on every minute detail of enactment with a touch of simple and
easy-to-process language.

21